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1CHAPTER 1
RESEARCH STUDY: PROBLEM, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
1.1 Research Problem
The horrifying experiences of the Armed Conflict in the Gulf, Vietnam,
Somalia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda remind us of the war and the suffering, death
and destruction it causes. War is against humanity and involves most brutal and
arbitrary violence. The contemporary International Law - in particular the charter
of the United Nations - prohibits not only the use of force but even the threat to
use force with exception to the collective actions taken by the United Nations or
the defensive measures permitted by Article 51 of the Charter.  In order to make
this prohibitions realistic international law offers to states a great scale of means
and measures for the peaceful settlements of disputes with a view to an effective
abolition of the recourse to war.
Unfortunately, the prohibition of war proclaimed after World War - II is not
respected. The sad reality of today's International Relations is that armed
conflicts continue spread and are not ready to disappear. The recourse to the
armed force is accompanied by most heinous crimes such as Genocide, Rape,
Enforced Prostitution Torture, Hostage taking summery executions, internment,
deportation and intimidation. Armed conflicts completely bend twist, torture and
put to the ground the mechanisms for the protection, and promotion of Human
Rights.
The threes core international crimes i. e. Genocide, Crimes against
Humanity and War Crimes are expressly prohibited by International Law through
adoption of serious of Conventions, and also by setting up of International
Tribunals and International Criminal Court.
All these Conventions makes it mandatory for the parties to make these
crimes punishable under the municipal laws. The concept of International
2Jurisdiction for these crimes has also been established. In short these crimes
have achieved Jus Cogens status under the Public International Law, and any
individual who has perpetrated such crimes is punishable irrespective of his
position in Government. Even the Heads of the States can be punished for such
crimes according to International Criminal Law.
The conflict starts when it comes to punishing heads of state for the
International Crimes. Two conflicting norms exists in International Law. The
principle of sovereign immunity on one side and International Crimes on the other
side. When a head of state perpetrates or orders, plan, abates perpetration of
International Crimes, can he claim sovereign immunity for such acts under
International Law?
There are conflicting decisions of various international Courts and
Tribunals and also by various National Courts specially after the controversial
decision of International Court of Justice in Belgium v Congo the debate has
heated again. This conflict has to be resolved in order to deter head of states
from perpetrating such heinous crimes.
1.2 Aims of Research
1.2.1 To study the meaning and definition of International Crimes.
1.2.2 To study the Legal Provisions under various International Instruments
regarding punishment of individuals perpetrating International Crimes.
1.2.3 To study the concept of sovereign immunity i.e. immunity ratione
materiae and immunity Ratione Personae under the International
Law.
1.2.4 To study the conflict of various International Courts and Tribunals
regarding sovereign immunity and International Crimes.
1.2.5 To study the various decisions of National Courts of different Countries
regarding sovereign immunity vis-à-vis International Crimes.
1.2.6 To study the conflict of between international tribunals and ICC vis-à-vis
National Courts exercising International Jurisdiction.
31.2.7 To examine whether existing Laws can eliminate the protection of
sovereign immunity to the perpetrators of International Crimes.
1.3. Objective of Research
The objective of the research is to examine whether the principle of sovereign
immunity overrules the norms of International Criminal Law and to examine the
possible steps to be taken for elimination of such conflict.
1.4 Hypothetical Issues
1.4.1 What are International Crimes?
1.4.2 What is the Definition, elements and meaning of International Crimes i.e.
genocide, crimes against humanity and War Crimes according to
various International Instruments?
1.4.3 What are the general principles of criminal responsibility under
International Criminal Law?
1.4.4 What is the concept of sovereign immunity under the International
codified Law and International Customary Law?
1.4.5 What is the concept of Universal Jurisdiction under International Criminal
Law?
What are the Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction?
1.4.6 What is the conflict between the principles of Universal
Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity?
4.6.1 What are the issues of Jurisdiction in cases of exercise of
Universal Jurisdiction?
1.4.7 What is the position of International Tribunals and National Courts
regarding the defence of sovereign immunity made by various heads of
States?
1.4.8 What is the position of Sovereign immunity in today’s age of Human
Rights?
4.8.1 Case of General Augusto Pinochet
41.4.9 Whether there is a possible solution to this problem in existing
International Law?
1.4.10 What changes are needed in contemporary International Law to
eliminate this conflict of Law?
1.5. Scope of Study
The present study will examine in a broad perspective. The
International Law and Municipal Laws of various countries with
reference to punishment of International Crimes and sovereign
immunity.
The study will be limited only to crimes, which are declared as
International Crimes i.e. Genocide Crimes against Humanity and War
Crimes.
The sovereign immunity will consider both personal immunity and
material immunity provided to sovereigns of states.
1.6. Research Methodology
The research is based upon comparative and analytical study of
various international and National Jurisprudence regarding
International Criminal Laws and sovereign Immunity laws.
The study is based on Primary Laws, Reference Books, Court
Decisions, Journals, Reports, Opinions of Legal Scholars and Statistics
available on the subject of research.
1.7 Significance of Study
1.7.1 International Level
5The study will ensure and deepen the analytical aspects of the
subject and help international Tribunals and lawyers practicing
International Criminal Law to solve the conflict of International
Law. It will also help the International Community to develop
International Criminal Law in order to eliminate gross human
rights violations perpetrated by sovereigns of states.
1.7.2 The Study will help the legislature to enact laws on international
jurisdiction and International criminal Laws, which is the need of
the day in the era of Global Terrorism.
1.7.3 Contribution to knowledge
This study will help immensely to legal scholars, academicians
and students to further their knowledge of the relatively new and
rapidly growing subject of International Criminal Law. This will
also serve as a reference book to the students of International
Law especially in India, where there is negligible contribution to
this subject by Indian Legal Scholars.
1.8 Scheme of Research
Research Problem, need of its study, and introduction of the problem.
1.8.1 Introduction to International Crimes
1.8.2 The Definition, elements and meaning of International Crimes
i.e. genocide, crimes against humanity and War Crimes according to
various International Instruments
1.8.3 The general principles of criminal responsibility under
International Criminal Law
1.8.4 The concept of sovereign immunity under the International
codified Law and International Customary Law
1.8.5 The concept of Universal Jurisdiction under International
Criminal Law
61.8.5.1 The Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction
1.8.6 The conflict between the principles of Universal Jurisdiction and
Sovereign Immunity?
1.8.6.1 The issues of Jurisdiction in cases of exercise of
Universal Jurisdiction.
1.8.7 The position of International Tribunals and National Courts
regarding the defence of sovereign immunity made by various heads of
States
1.8.8 The position of Sovereign immunity in today’s age of Human
Rights
1.8.8.1 Case of General Augusto Pinochet
1.8.9 Possible solution to this problem in existing International Law
1.8.10 Conclusion: Changes is needed in contemporary International
Law to eliminate this conflict of Law
7CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
2.1. Preliminary remarks
In every legal order general principles are needed, which set out the overall
orientation of the system, provide sweeping guidelines for the proper
interpretation of the law whenever specific rules on legal construction prove
insufficient or unhelpful, and also enable courts to fill the gaps of written or
unwritten norms. ICL, being a branch of public international law, shares of course
with any other sector of this corpus of rules the general principles proper to it.
However, given the unique features and the overarching purpose of this body of
law on many occasions those general principles may turn out to be of scant
assistance. More useful and relevant appear to be the general principles proper
to ICL, for they are more attuned to its specificities.1
1 An international court recently questioned reliance on such principles. In Delatic and others an ICTY TC,
after noting that these principles 'exist and are recognised in all the world's major criminal justice systems'
stated that 'it is not certain to what extent they have been admitted as part of international legal practice,
separate and apart from the existence of the national legal systems. This is essentially because of the
different methods of criminalisation of conduct in national and international criminal justice systems'
(§403). The Chamber then explained the difference between the two levels (national and international) as
follows 'Whereas the criminalisation process in a national criminal justice system depends upon legislation
which dictates the time when conduct is prohibited and the content of such prohibition, the international
criminal justice system attains the same objective through treaties and conventions, or after a customary
practice of the unilateral enforcement of a prohibition by State' (§404).
With respect, this explanation is not compelling. It would rather seem that the difference between national
criminal laws and international criminal rules lies in the still rudimentary character of the latter. This body
of law has not yet attained the degree of sophistication proper to national legal systems. It follows that the
principles in question are not yet applicable at the international level in all their implications and
ramifications. Whether or not this legal justification in more cogent that the one advanced by the TC, one
can, however, share at least the substance of the conclusions reached by the Chamber, which were as
follows. 'It could be postulated, therefore, that the principles of legality in ICL, are different from their
related national legal systems with respect to their application and standards. They appear to be distinctive,
in the obvious objective of maintaining a balance between  the preservation of justice and fairness towards
the accused and taking into account the preservation of world order. To this end, the affected State or States
must take into account the following factors, inter alia: the nature of international law; the absence of
international legislative policies and standards; the ad hoc processes of technical drafting; and the basic
assumption that international criminal law norms will be embodied into the national criminal law of the
various States' (§405).
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In ICL there exist principles that are not specific to this body of law, for the same
principles can also be found in most state legal systems of the world.
Nonetheless, as we shall see, often the unique features of the international legal
order and the way law takes shape therein, condition the content and scope of
some of those principles. One may therefore conclude that some of those
principles ultimately bear scant resemblance to those of municipal systems, for
they are uniquely shaped to suit the characteristic features of the world legal
order.
The principle of individual criminal responsibility
In ICL, the general principle applies that no one may be held accountable for an
act he has not performed or in the commission of which he has not in some way
participated, or for an omission that cannot be attributed to him.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber set this fundamental principle out most clearly in
Tadic (AJ).2 The principle in fact lays down two notions. First, nobody may be
held accountable for criminal offences perpetrated by other persons. The
rationale behind this proposition is that in modern criminal law the notion of
collective responsibility is no longer acceptable. In other words, a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group to which a person may belong is not accountable
for acts performed by a member of the group in his individual capacity. By the
same token, a member of any such group is not criminally liable for acts contrary
to law performed by leaders or other members of the group and to which he is
extraneous. The principle of individual autonomy whereby the individual is
2 Before ascertaining whether the Appellant could be found guilty under the notion of participation in a
common criminal purpose, it stated that 'nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions
in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated'. 'The basic assumption must be
that in international law as much as in national systems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the
principle of personal culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in
which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa). In national
legal systems this principle is laid down in Constitutions, in laws, or in judicial decisions. In international
criminal law the principle is laid down, inter alia, in Article 7(1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal
which states that: A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed... [a crime]... shall be individually
responsible for the crime' (emphasis added) (§186).
An ICTY TC recently restated in Kordic and Cerkez that this is a general principle applicable at the
international level (§364).
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normally endowed with free will and the independent capacity to choose his
conduct is firmly rooted in modern criminal law, including ICL.
Secondly, a person may only be held criminally liable if he is somehow culpable
for any breach of criminal rules. In other words, he may only be deemed
accountable if he is somehow involved in the commission of a crime and in
addition entertains a frame of mind that expresses or implies his mental
participation in the offence, or his culpably negligent (or deliberate) omission to
prevent or punish the commission of crimes by his subordinates. As a
consequence, objective criminal liability is ruled out.
It follows from the first notion that, among other things, no one may be held
answerable for acts or omissions of organizations to which he belongs, unless he
bears personal responsibility for a particular act, conduct, or omission.
An exception was, however, provided for in Articles 9 and 10 of the Statute of the
IMT at Nuremberg. Article 9(1) stipulated that
At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal
may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted)
that the group or organization of which that individual was a member was a
criminal organization.
Under Article 10
In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the
competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring
individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military, or occupation
courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is
considered proved and shall not be questioned.
Thus, mere membership in a criminal organization was regarded as criminal,
whether or not participation in that organization was voluntary. The idea behind
the whole scheme for post-war trials for war crimes, first propounded by Colonel
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Murray C. Bernays in the US Pentabon in 1944, and eventually upheld by the
Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, was that 'It will never be possible to catch
and convict every Axis was criminal, or even any great number of them, under
the old concepts and procedures.3 Given also that Anglo-American law to some
extent upholds the notion of corporate criminal liability, it was suggested that it
was for an international court to adjudicate and punish the crimes of the leaders
and of the criminal organizations. Thereafter, every member of the Nazi
Government or of those organizations would be subject to arrest, trial, and
punishment in the national courts of each state concerned. 'Proof of membership,
without more, would establish guilt of participation in the mentioned conspiracy,
and the individual would be punished in the discretion of the court.4 This scheme
was confirmed by Control Council Law no.10, of 20 December 1945, which
provided in Article II (1)(d) that acts 'recognized as a crime' included 'membership
in categories of a criminal group of organization declared criminal by the
International Military Tribunal'.
In its judgment in Goring and others the IMT eventually labeled some
organizations as criminal: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party; the Gestapo
and the SD; and the SS. However, the Tribunal discarded the doctrine of
'objective' or 'group responsibility' and brought back the provisions of the Statute
to traditional concepts of concepts of criminal law. It made the following qualifying
points.
First, it held that the labeling of a group or organization as criminal should not be
based on 'arbitrary action' but on 'well-settled legal principles', chiefly the
principle that 'criminal guilt is personal' and 'that mass punishments should be
avoided'. In addition, 'the Tribunal should make such declaration of criminality so
far as possible in a manner to insure that innocent persons will not be punished.'
3 See Memo by Colonel Bernays of 15 September 1944, in B.F. Smith, The American Road to Nuremberg -
The Documentary Record-1944-45 (Stanford, Cal.:Hoover Institution Press, 1982), at 35.
4 Ibid., at 36.
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A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the essence
of both is cooperation for criminal purposes. There must be a group bound
together and organized for a common purpose. The group must be formed or
used in connection with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter.
It followed that one 'should exclude persons who had no knowledge of the
criminal purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted by the
state for membership, unless they were personally implicated in the commission
of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as members of the
organization'.
Thirdly, the Tribunal issued three 'recommendations' to other courts with regard
to penalties to be inflicted on members of criminal organizations.5
Fourthly, the Tribunal, each time it termed on organization criminal, added a
similar caveat: one could hold criminally liable only those members of the
organization who had had 'knowledge that it was being used for the commission'
of international crimes, or were 'personally implicated' in the commission of such
crimes,6 and in addition had not ceased to belong to the organization prior to 1
September 1939 (the start of the war of aggression by Germany).
It would appear that subsequent courts complied. Consequently, members of
German organizations termed criminal by the IMT were not punished for the
5 They were as follows : '1. That so far as possible throughout the four zones of occupation if Germany the
classifications, sanctions and penalties be standardized. Uniformity of treatment so far as practical should
be a basic principle [...] 2. [Control Council] Law no. 10 [...] leaves punishment entirely in the discretion of
the trial court even to the extent of inflicting the death penalty. The De-Nazification Law of 5 March 1946,
however, passed for Bavaria, Greater-Hesse, and Wurttemberg-Baden, provides definite sentences for
punishment in each type of offense. The Tribunal recommends that it no case should imprisonment
imposed under Law no. 10 upon any members of an organization or group declared by the Tribunal to be
criminal exceed the punishment fixed by the De-Nazification Law. No person should be punished under
both laws. 3. The Tribunal recommends to the Control Council that Law no. 10 be amended to prescribe
limitations on the punishment which may be imposed for membership in a criminal group or organization
so that such punishment shall not exceed the punishment prescribed by the De-Nazification Law' (at 267-
8).
6 Emphasis added. See ibid., at 262, 268, 273.
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mere fact of belonging to one of them. Furthermore, other Tribunals upheld the
principle of personal responsibility laid down by the IMT in is judgement.7
The principle of legality of crimes
To grasp fully the significance of this principle a few words of introduction are
necessary.
National legal systems tend to embrace, and ground their criminal law on either
the doctrine of substantive justice or that of strict legality. Under the former
doctrine the legal order must primarily aim at prohibiting and punishing any
conduct that is socially harmful or causes danger to society, whether or not that
conduct has already been legally criminalized at the moment it is taken. The
paramount interest is defending society against any deviant behaviour likely to
cause damage or jeopardize the social and legal system. Hence this doctrine
favours society over the individual (favor societatis). Extreme and reprehensible
applications of this doctrine can be found in the Soviet legal system (1918-58) or
7 Thus, in Krupp and others, where the 12 accused were officials of the Krupp industrial enterprises who
occupied high positions in the political, financial, industrial, and economic life of Germany, a US Tribunal
sitting at Nuremberg held that the defendants could be held criminally liable only if it could be proved that
they had 'actually and personally, committed the offences charged. 'The mere fact without more that a
defendant was a member of the Krupp Directorate or an official of the firm is not sufficient [for criminal
liability to arise].' It then cited a rule of the American Corpus Juris Secundum on corporate liability,
whereby officers of a corporation, normally not criminally responsible for corporate acts performed by
other officers or agents, are nevertheless liable if they actually and personally do the acts constituting the
offence, or such acts are done by their direction or permission, so that an officer is liable 'where his scienter
or authority is established, or where he is the actual present and efficient actor'. The Tribunal added that the
same principles must apply in the case of war crimes (at 627-8).
Another US Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg took a similar stand in Flick and others (at 1189), and then in
Krauch and others (I.G. Ferban trial, at 1108). In this latter case the 23 accused were all officials of I.G.
Farban industrial enterprises, charged among other things with war crimes. The Tribunal took pains to
emphasize that they did not bear collective responsibility but could only be found guilty of individual
criminal liability. It noted the following. 'It is appropriate here to mention that the corporate defendant,
Farben is not before the bar of this Tribunal and cannot be subjected to criminal penalties in these
proceedings. We have used the term Farben as descriptive of the instrumentality of cohesion in the name of
which the enumerated acts of sopliation were committed. But corporations act through individuals and,
under the conception of personal individual guilt to which previous reference has been made, the
Prosecution, to discharge the burden imposed upon it in this case, must establish by competent proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that in individual defendant was either a participant in the illegal act or that,
being aware thereof, he authorized or approved it. Responsibility does not automatically attach to an act
proved to be criminal merely by virtue of defendant's membership in the Varstand (administration board).
Conversely, one may not utilize the corporate structure to achieve an immunity from criminal responsibility
for illegal acts which he directs, counsels, aids, orders, or abets. But the evidence must establish action of
the character we have indicated, with knowledge of the essential elements of the crime/ (at 1153).
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in the Nazi criminal law (1933-45). However, one can also find some variations of
this doctrine in modern democratic Germany, where the principles of 'objective
justice' (materielle Gerechtigkeit) have been upheld as a reaction to oppressive
governments trampling upon fundamental human rights, and courts have had
recourse to the celebrated 'Radbruch's formula'. Radbruch, the distinguished
German professor of jurisprudence, created this 'formula in 1946. In terms
subsequently taken up in some German cases,8 he propounded the notion that
positive law must be regarded as contrary to justice and not applied where the
inconsistency between statute law and justice is so intolerable that the former
must give way to the latter. This 'formula' has been widely accepted in the legal
literature.9
In contrast, the doctrine of strict legality postulates that a person may only be
held criminally liable and punished if at the moment when he performed a certain
act the act was regarded as a criminal offence by the relevant legal order or, in
other words, under the applicable law. Historically, this doctrine stems from the
opposition of the baronial and knightly class to the arbitrary power of monarchs,
and found expression in Article 39 of Magna Charta libertatum of 1215 (so-called
'Magna Carta'). One must, however, wait for the principal thinkers of the
Enlightenment to find its proper philosophical and political underpinning.
Montesquieu and then the great American proclamations of 1774 and of the
French revolution (1789) conceived of the doctrine as a way of restraining the
power of the rulers and safeguarding the prerogatives of the legislature and the
8 The German Federal Constitutional Court referred to that 'formula' in its judgment of 24 October 1996 in
Streletz and Kessler. The question at issue was whether the accused, former senior officials of the former
German Democratic Republic (GDR) charged with incitement to commit international homicide for their
responsibility in ordering the shooting and killing by border guards of persons trying to flee form the GDR,
could invoke as a ground of justification the fact that their action were legal under the law applicable in the
GDR at the material time, which did not make them liable to criminal prosecution. The defendants
submitted that holding them criminally liable would run contrary to the ban on the retroactive application
of criminal law and Article 103(2) of the German Constitution laying down the nullum crimen principle.
The Court dismissed the defendants' submission. Among other things, it noted that the prohibition on
retroactive law derived its justification from the special trust responded in criminal statutes enacted by a
democratic legislature respecting fundamental rights.
9 Of course, the notion propounded by Radbruch could simply be termed the Natural Justice view that an
unjust law is no law and must be disregarded. As such, it might be susceptible to the criticism of positives
that it makes the law subjective, since the sense of justice varies from person to person.
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judiciary. As the distinguished German criminal lawyer Franz von Liszt wrote in
1893, the nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege principles are the
bulwark of the citizen against the state's omnipotence, they protect the individual
against the ruthless power of the majority, against the Leviathan. However
paradoxical it may sound, the Criminal Code is the criminal's magna carta. It
guarantees his right to be punished only in accordance with the requirements set
out by the law and only within the limits laid down in the law.10
At present, most democratic civil law countries tend to uphold the doctrine of
strict legality as an overarching principle. In these countries the doctrine is
normally held to articulate four basic notions : (i) criminal offences may only be
provided for in written law, namely legislation enacted by Parliament, and not in
customary rules (less certain and definite than statutes) or in secondary
legislation (which emanates from the government and not from the parliamentary
body expressing popular will); this principle is referred to by the maxim nullum
crimen sine lege scripta (criminal offences must be provided for in written
legislation); (ii) criminal legislation must abide by the principle of specificity,
whereby rules criminalizing human conduct must be as specific and clear as
possible, so as to guide the behaviour of citizens; this is expressed by the Latin
tag nullum crimen sine lege stricta (criminal offences must be provided for
through specific legislation); (iii) criminal rules may not be retroactive; that is, a
person may only be punished for behaviour that was considered criminal at the
time the conduct was undertaken; therefore he may not be punished on the
strength of a law passed subsequently; the maxim referred to in this case is
nullum crimen sine proevia lege (criminal offences must be provided for in a prior
law);11 (iv) resort to analogy in applying criminal rules is prohibited.
10 P. von Liszt, 'Die deterministischen Genger der Zweckstrafic'. 13 Zeitschrift fur die pesamic
Strafrechtswissenchaft (1893), 325-70, at 357 (an English translation of some excerpts from this paper has
been published in 5 JICJ (2007) 1009-13). The Latin tag nullum crimen had been coined by another
German criminal lawyer. P.I.A. Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland gultigen peinlichen Rechts, 11th
edn (Geissen: Heyer, 1832) at 12-19 (English trans. In 5 JICJ (2007), at 1005-8).
11 The German Fedral Constitutional Court set out the principle in admirable terms in its aforementioned
decision of 24 October 1996 in Streletz and Kessler. In illustrating the scope of Article 103(2) of the
German Constitution, laying down the principle at issue, it stated the following : '(l.a.) Article 103 & 2 of
the Basic Law protects against retroactive modification of the assessment of the wrongfulness of an act to
the offender's detriment [...] Accordingly, it also requires that a statutory ground of justification which
15
Plainly, as stated above, the purpose of these principles is to safeguard citizens
as for as possible against both the arbitrary power of government and possibly
excessive judicial discretion. In short, the basic underpinning for this doctrine lies
in the postulate of favor rei (in favour of the accused) (as opposed to favor
societatis, or in favour of society).
In contrast, in common law countries, where judge-made law prevails or is at
least firmly embedded in the legal system, there is a tendency to adopt a
qualified approach to these principles. For one thing, common law offences (as
opposed to statutory offences) result from judge-made law and therefore may
lack those requirements of rigidity, foreseeability, and certainty proper to written
legislation. For another, common law offences are not strictly subject to the
principle of non-retroactivity, as is shown by recent English cases contemplating
new offences, or at any rate the extinguishing of traditional defences (see, for
instance, R.v.R. (1192), which held that the facto of marriage was not longer a
common law defence to a husband's rape of his wife).12 It is notable that the
European Court of Human Rights did not regard such cases as questionable, or
at any rate contrary to the fundamental provisions of the European Convention
(see SW and CR v United Kingdom, 1995).
Thus, the condition is not the same in every legal system. Let us now see which
of the two aforementioned doctrines is applied in international law.
One could state that international law, being based on customary processes, is
more akin to English law than to French, German, Argentinean, or Chinese law.
However, this would not be sufficient. The main problem is that for a long period,
could be relied on at the time when an act was committed should continue to be applied even where, by the
time criminal proceedings begin, it has been abolished. However, where justifications are concerned, in
contrast to the definition of offences and penalties, the strict reservation of Parliament's law-making
prerogative does not apply. In the sphere of the criminal law grounds of justification may also be derived
from customary law or case-law'.
12 It would seem that the English law used to be that a man could not rape his wife because, by agreeing to
marry, she had implicitly consented to sexual intercourse for all time. This was obviously a somewhat
mediaeval approach. The defence existed only as a matter of common law-it was not in any statute. The
judge in R. v. R. rightly held that societal attitudes had changed and that it was no longer acceptable to hold
that a husband could in law never be held guilty of raping his wife; hence he did not allow the old common
law defence. In fairness, it was not the introduction of a new offence-rape had always been an offence. It
was a question of disallowing a (retrograde) common law defence.
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and until recently, international law has applied the doctrine of substantive
justice, and it is only in recent years that it is gradually replacing it with the
doctrine of strict legality, albeit with some important qualifications.
That international law has long applied the former doctrine is not to be attributed
to a totalitarian or authoritarian streak in the international community. Rather, the
rationale for that attitude was that states were not prepared to enter into treaties
laying down criminal rules, nor had customary rules evolved covering this area.
In practice, there only existed customary rules prohibiting and punishing war
crimes, although in a rather rudimentary or unsophisticated manner. Hence the
need for the international community to rely upon the doctrine of substantive
justice when new and extremely serious forms of criminality (crimes against
peace, crimes against humanity) suddenly appeared on the international scene.
The IMT clearly enunciated this doctrine in Goring and others. From the outset
the Tribunal had to face the powerful objections of German defence counsel that
the Tribunal was not allowed to apply ex post facto law. These objections were
grounded in the general principles of criminal law embedded in civil law
countries, and also upheld in German law before and after the Nazi period. The
French Judge H. Donnedieu de Vebres, coming from a country where the nullum
crimen principle is deeply implanted, also showed himself to be extremely
sensitive to the principle. As a consequence, when dealing with the crimes
against peace of which the defendants stood accused, the Tribunal, before
stating that in fact such crimes were already prohibited when they were
perpetrated - a finding that still seems highly questionable-noted that in any case
it was not contrary to justice to punish those crimes even if the relevant conduct
was not criminalized at the time of their commission.
In the first place, it is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is
not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To assert
that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have
attacked neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such
circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it
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being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wring were allowed to go
unpunished.
In other words, substantive justice punishes acts that harm society deeply and
are regarded as abhorrent by all members of society, even if these acts were not
prohibited as criminal when they were performed.13
As stated above, after the Second World War the doctrine of substantive justice
(upheld in a number of cases, among which one may cite peleus and later on
Eichmann)14 was gradually replaced by that of strict legality. Two factors brought
13 In his Dissenting Opinion in the Tokyo trial (Araki and others), Judge B.V.A. Roling spelled out the
same principle, again with regard to crimes against peace. He noted that in national legal systems the
nullum cimen prenciple 'is not a principle of justice but a rule of policy'; this rule was 'valid only if
expressly adopted, so as to protect citizens against arbitrariness of courts [...] as well as arbitrariness of
legislators [...] the prohibition of ex post facto law is an expression of political wisdom, not necessarily
applicable in present international relations. This maxim of liberty may, if circumstances necessitate it, be
disregarded even by  powers victorious in a war fought for freedom' (at 1059). Judge Roling then
delineated two classes of criminal offence: Crime in international law is applied to concepts with different
meanings. Apart from those indicated above [war crimes], it can also indicate acts comparable to political
crimes in domestic law, where the decisive element is the danger rather than the guilt, where the criminal is
considered an enemy rather than a villain and where the punishment emphasizes the political measure
rather than the judicial retribution' (at 1060). Judge Roling applied those concepts to crimes against peace
and concluded that such crimes were to be punished because of the dangerous character of the individuals
who committed them, hence on accurate considerations. In his view, however, given the novel nature of
these crimes, it followed that persons found guilty of them could not be punished by a death sentence
(ibid).
14 In Peleus, in his summing up the Judge Advocate stated: 'You have heard a suggestion made that this
Court has no right to adjudicate upon this case because it is said you cannot  create an offence by a law
which operates retrospectively so as to expose someone to punishment for acts which at the time he did
them were not punishable as crimes. That is the substance of the Latin maxim (nullum crimen sine lege,
nulla poena sine lege) that has been used so much in this Court. My advice to you is that the maxim and the
principle [of legality] that it expresses has nothing whatever to do with this case. It has reference only to
municipal or domestic law of a particular State, and you need not be embarrassed by it in your
consideration of the problems that you have to deal with here' (at 132). It should be noted that the
defendants had been accused of killing survivors of a sunken merchant vessel, the Greek steamship Peleus;
they had raised the pleas of 'operational necessity' and superior orders.
The British Judge Advocate in Burgholz (No. 2) took a clearer stand. After noting that the Allies had set up
tribunals in Germany and Japan with the object of bringing to justice certain persons who have outraged the
basic principles of decency and humanity, he pointed out: 'It may well be that no particular concrete law
can be pointed to as having been broken,  and you remember what Defence Counsel Dr. Mayer-Labastille
sai yesterday on the principle of "no punishment without pre-existing law". That principle I agree with but
to this extent, that I do not regard it as limiting punishment of persons who have outraged human decency
in their conduct' (at 79).
As for Eichmann, see the judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel, at 281.
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about this change.
First, states agreed upon and ratified a number of important human rights treaties
which laid down the nullum crimen principle, to be strictly complied with by
national courts.15 The same principle was also set out in such important treaties
as the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949, respectively, on Prisoners
of War and on Civilians.16 The Expansive force and striking influence of these
treaties could not but impact on international criminal proceedings, leading to the
acceptance of the notion that also in such proceedings the nullum crimen
principle must be respected as a fundamental part of a set of basic human rights
of individuals. In other words, the principle came to be seen from the viewpoint of
the human rights of the accused, and no longer as essentially encapsulating
policy guidelines dictating the penal strategy of states at the international level.
The second factor is that gradually the network of ICL greatly expanded both
through a number of international treaties criminalizing conduct of individuals
(think of the 1948 Convention on Genocide, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the
1984 Convention on Torture, and the various treaties on terrorism) and by dint of
the accumulation of case law. In particular, case law contributed to either the
crystallization of customary international rules of criminal law (for instance, on the
mental element of crimes against humanity) or to clarifying or specifying
elements of crimes, defence, and other important segments of ICL. As a
consequence, the principle of strict legality has been laid down first, albeit
implicitly, in the two and hoc Tribunals (ICTY and ICTR),17 and then, explicitly, in
the Statute of the ICC, Article 22(1) of which provides that 'A person shall not be
15 See, for instance, Article 15 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 7 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, or Article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
16 See Article 99(1) of the Third Convention and Article 67 of the Fourth Convention. See also Article
75(4)(c) of the First Additional Protocol of 1977
17 See for instance Articles 1-8 of the ICTY Statute, as well as §29 of the UN Secretary-General's Report to
the Security Council for the establishment of the Tribunal (S/25704) ('It should be pointed out that, in
assigning to the International Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law, the Security Council would not be creating or purporting to "legislate" that
law. Rather, the International Tribunal would have the task of applying existing international humanitarian
law').
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criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.'
The conclusion is therefore warranted that nowadays this principle must be
complied with also at the international level, albeit subject to a number of
significant qualifications, which we shall presently consider.18 Articulations of the
principle of legality
The principle of specificity
Under the principle of specificity, criminal rules must be as detailed as possible,
so as to clearly indicate to their addressees the conduct prohibited, namely, both
the objective elements of the crime and the requisite mean rea. The principle is
aimed at ensuring that all those who may fall under the prohibitions of the law
know in advance which specific behaviour is allowed or proscribed. They may
thus foresee the consequences of their action and freely choose either to comply
with, or instead breach, legal standards of behaviour. Clearly, the more accurate
and specific the criminal rule, the greater is the protection accorded to the agent
from arbitrary action of either enforcement officials or courts of law.
The principle is still far from being fully applicable in international law, which still
includes many rules that are loose in their scope and purport. In this regard,
suffice it to mention, as an extreme or most conspicuous instance, the provision
first enshrined in the London Charter of 1945 and then restated in many
international instruments (Control Council Law no. 10, the Statutes of the Tokyo
Tribunal, the ICTY, the ICTR and SCSL), whereby crimes against humanity
encompass 'other inhumane acts".19 Similarly, the provisions of the four 1949
Geneva Conventions on grave breaches among other things enumerate, as
'grave breaches', 'torture or inhuman treatment'. In addition, many rules contain
18 On this principle see, among other decisions by the ICTY, AC, Tadic interlocutory Appeal 1995, §92;
Delatic and other (TJ, 1998), §§402-7; Jelisic, TJ, §61; Hadzihasanovic, Alagic and Kubura, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, AJ, §§32-6
19 The ICC Statute fleshes the motion out, by providing that crimes against humanity may include 'other
inhumane acts of a similar character [to the other, specifically enumerated, classes of such crimes]
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health' (Art.7(1)(k).
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notions that are not defined at the 'legislative' level, such as 'rape', 'torture',
'persecution', 'enslavement', etc. Furthermore, most international rules
proscribing conduct as criminal do not specify the subjective element of the
crime. Nor are customary rules on defences crystal clear they do not indicate the
relevant excuses or justifications in unquestionable terms.
Given this indeterminacy and the consequent legal uncertainty for the possible
addressees of international criminal rules, the contribution of courts to giving
precision to law, not infrequent even in civil law systems, and quite normal in
common law countries, becomes of crucial importance at the international level,
as has already been pointed out above. Both national and international courts
play in immensely important role in gradually clarifying notions, or spelling out the
objective and subjective ingredients of crimes, or better outlining such general
legal concepts as excuses, justifications, etc.
Thus, for instance, the District Court of Tel Aviv, in Ternek spelled out, by way of
construction, the notion of 'other inhumane acts' in a manner that seems
acceptable.20 Similarly, in defining the concept of 'rape' a TC of the ICTY in
Furundzija had recourse to general principles of ICL as well as general principles
common to the major legal systems of the world, and general principles of law.21
20 The Court stated that: 'The defence counsel argue, secondly, that the words "other inhumane acts" which
appear in the definition of "crimes against humanity" should be interpreted subject to the principle of
ejusdem generis. That is, that an "other inhumane act" should be of the sype of the specific action
mentioned before it, in the same definition, which are "murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation and
deportation" [...] We believe that there is truth in the defence counsel's second claim. The punishment
determined in Article 1 of the [Israeli] Law [of 1950 on the Doing of Justice to Nazis and their
Collaborators]  for "crimes against humanity" is death (subject to extenuating circumstances pursuant to
Article 11(b) of the Law), ant it can be assumed that the legislator intended to inflict the most extreme
punishment known to the penal code only for those inhumane actions which resemble in their type and
severity "murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation and deportation of a civilian population". If we
measure by this yardstick the actions proven against the defendant [beating with bare hand other detainees
and making detainees kneel, in the Concentration camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau, where the defendant
herself was an inmate, with the role of custodian of Block 7] we shall find that even if some of these
actions could be considered inhumane from known aspects, they do not, under the circumstances, reach the
severity of the actions which the legislator intended to include in the definition of "crimes against
humanity" in Article 1 of the Law' (§7).
21 It is worth citing the relevant passage, for that TC proved alert to the principle of specificity. It stated the
following : "This TC notes that no elements [for defining rape] other than those emphasized may be drawn
from international treaty or customary law, nor is resort to general principles of international criminal law
or to general principles of international law of any avail. The TC therefore considers that, to arrive at an
21
One should not underestimate, however, another drawback of ICL: the lack of a
central criminal court endowed with the authority to clarify for the whole
international community the numerous hazy or unclear criminal rules. To put it
differently; the contribution of courts to the gradual specification and precision of
legal rules, emphasized above, suffers from the major shortcoming that such
judicial refinement is 'decentralized' and fragmentary. In addition, when such
process is affected by national courts, it suffers from the another flaw: each court
tends to apply the general notions of criminal law proper to the legal system
within which such court operates. Hence, the possibility frequently arises of a
contradictory and 'cacophonic' interpretation or application of international
criminal rules.
Fortunately, the draftsmen of the ICC Statute made a significant contribution,
when they endeavored to define as precisely as possible the various categories
of crimes. (However, as the Statute is not intended to codify international
customary law, one ought always to take it with a pinch of salt, for in some cases
it may go beyond existing law, whereas in other instances it is narrower in scope
than current rules of customary international law. Furthermore, formally speaking
that Statute is only binding on the ICC.)
For the time being, international criminal rules still make up a body of law in need
of legal precision and some major refinement at the level of definitions and
general principles. To take account of these features and at the same time
safeguard the right of the accused, currently some notions play a role that is far
greater than in most national systems: the defense of mistake of law, the
principle of strict interpretation (barring extensive or broad constructions of
criminal rules), the principle of favor rei (imposing that in case of doubt a rule
should be interpreted in such a manner as to favour the accused). These notions
accurate definition of rape based on the criminal law principle of specificity (Bestimmtheitgrundsatz, also
referred to by the maxim "Nullum crimen sine lege stricta"), it is necessary to look for principles of
criminal law common to the major legal systems of the world. These principles may be derived, with all
due caution, from national laws (§177)
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act as counter-veiling factors, aimed at compensating for the present flaws and
lacunae of ICL.
2.2. THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-RETROACTIVITY
A. General
As stated above, a logical and necessary corollary of the doctrine of strict legality
is that criminal rules (that is, rules criminalizing certain classes of human
conduct) may not cover acts performed prior to their enactment, unless such
rules are more favourable to the accused. Otherwise the executive power, the
fiduciary, or even the legislature could arbitrarily punish persons for actions that
were allowed when they were carried out. In contrast, the ineluctable corollary of
the doctrine of substantive justice is that, for the purpose of defending society
against new and unexpected forms of criminality, one may go so far as to
prosecute and punish conduct that was legal when taken. These two approaches
lead to contrary conclusions. The question is: which approach has been adopted
in international law?
It seems indisputable that the London Agreement of 1945 provided for two
categories of crime that were new: crimes against peace and crimes against
humanity. The IMT did act upon the Charter provisions dealing with both
categories. In so doing, it applied ex post facto law; in other words, it applied
international law retroactively, as the defence counsel at Nuremberg rightly
stressed."22
Many tribunals sitting in judgment over Germans in the aftermath of the Second
World War,23 as well as the German Supreme Court in the British Occupied
22 See the Motion adopted by all defence counsel on 19 November 1945, in Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the international Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946
(Nuremberg, 1947), vol. I, at 168-9.
23 See in particular the fuitice case (at 971-85}, KinsatlgruppeM (at 456-9), Flicic and othen (at 1189),
Krauch and iithers (J. G. fur-fan case) (at ]0?7-8. 1125), Krupp (at 1331). High Cammand (at 487),
Hostages (.1112.18-42).
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Zone,24 endorsed the legal approach taken by the IMT, for all its deficiencies, this
stand, while having scant persuasive force with regard to the past, nonetheless
contributed to the slow consolidation of the principle of non-retroactivity in ICL.
Subsequently, as a logical consequence of the emergence of the nullum crime
sine lage principle a genera] rule prohibiting the retroactive application of criminal
law gradually evolved in the international community. 'Thus, the principle of non-
retroactivity of criminal rules is now solidly embedded in ICL. It follows till at
courts may only apply substantive criminal rules that existed at the time of
commission of the alleged crime, this, o f course, does not entail that courts are
barred from refining and elaborating upon, by way of legal construction, existing
rules. The ICTY AC clearly set out this notion in Aiekwvski (AJ).25
B. Expansive adaptation of some legal ingredients of crimes laid down in
international rules to new social conditions
One should duly take account of then at u re of ICL, to a large extent made up of
customary rules that are often identified, clarified or spelled out, or given legal
determinacy by courts. In short, that body of law to a large extent consists of
judge-made law (with no doctrine of precedent). Consequently, one should
reconcile the principle of non-retroactivity with these inherent characteristics of
ICL. In this respect some important rulings of the European Court of Human
Rights may prove of great assistance. In particular, in CR v. United Kingdom26
24 See the Bi. case (at 5), the B. and A. case (at 297), the H. cast (at 232-3), the N.we (at.135), and
Angeklitfur H, at (at 135)
25 After commenting on the significance and legal purport of the nuilum cttmen principle, that AC added
that this principle 'does not prevail in court, either at the national or international level, from determining an
issue through a process of interpretation and clarification as to the elements, of a particular crime; nor does
it prevent a court from relying on previous decisions which reflect an interpretations to the meaning to be
ascribed to particular ingredients of a crime' (§127).
26 In 1989 a British national went back to see his estranged wife. who had been living for some time with
her parents, and attempted to have sexual intercourse with her against her will; he also assaulted her,
squeezing her neck with both hands. He was charged with attempted rape and assault occasioning actual
bodily harm, and convicted. Before the European Court he repeated the claim already advanced before
British courts, that at the time when the facts occurred, marital rape was not prohibited in the UK. Indeed,
at that time a British Statute only prohibited as rape sexual intercourse with a woman who did not consent
to it if such intercourse was 'unlawful' (see section 1(1) of the Sclual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976);
hence the question tinned on determining whether forced marital intercourse v,'as 'uniawful'. Various
English courts had ruled, until 1990, that a husband could not be convicted of raping his wife, for the status
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the Court held that the European Convention could not be read' as outlawing the
gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through Judicial interpretation
from case to case, provided that the resulting development is consistent with the
essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen'.27 In a subsequent
case, Cantoni v. France, the Court insisted on the notion that in order for criminal
law (that is, a statutory provision or a judge-made rule) to be in keeping with the
nullum crimen principle, it is necessary for the law to meet the requirements of
accessibility and foreseeability. It added two important points. First, a criminal
rule may be couched in vague terms. When this happens, there may exist 'grey
areas at the fringe of the definition':
This penumbra of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not in itself make a
provision incompatible with Article 7 [of the European Convention on Human
Rights, laying down the nullum crimen principle], provided that it proves to be
sufficiently clear in the large majority of cases. The role of adjudication vested in
the courts is precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking
into account the changes in everyday practice.
The second point related to the notion of foresceability. The Court noted that the
scope of this notion:
depends to a considerable degree on the content of the text in issue, the held it is
designed to cover, and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed
[....] A law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person
of marriage involved that the woman had given her ccinientto her husband having intercourse with her
during the subsistence ofthe marriage and cuuld not unilattrally withdraw such consent. In contrast,
Scottish courts had first held that that view did not apply where the parties to a marriage were no longer
cohabiting, and then ruled, in 19 89, that the wi fes impUed consent was a legal fiction, the rea [quest ion
being whether as a matter of tact the wife consented tn the acts complained of. The word 'unlawful' in the
Act referred lo above was deleted in 1994 by tht Criminal) unties and Public Order Act.'lhisbeingths legal
situ ill ion in the UK, before the European Court the applicant argued that the British ;ourts had goini
beyond a reasonably interpretation (if the eii sting law a nd i ndeed e utende d tile definition of rape i ii
such a way as lo include facts t hut until then had not constituted a criminal offence.
Both the European Commission and the European Court lield instead (hat the Brililh courts had not
breached Article 7(1.) of the European Convention on Human Rights ('No one shall b? held guilty of any
criminal offence on account of anv act of omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under
national or international lan' at the time when it was coininitted').
27 See also S.W.v. United Kingdom, §§37-47
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concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may
entail [.. ..] This is particularly true in relation to persons carrying on a
professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of
caution when pursuing their occupation. They can on this account be expected to
lake special care in assessing the risk that such activity entails.28
It would seem that the following legal propositions could be inferred from the
Court's reasoning. First, while interpretation and clarification of existing rules is
always admissible, adaptation is only compatible with legal, principles subject to
stringent requirements. Secondly, such requirements are that the evaluative
adaptation, by courts of law, of criminal prohibitions, namely the extension of
such legal ingredients of an offence as acts reus in order to cover conduct
previously not clearly considered as criminal must
(i)     be in keeping with the rules of criminal liability relating to the subject matter,
more specifically with the rules defining 'the essence of the offence';
(ii) conform with, and indeed implement and actualize, fundamental principles
of ICL or at least general principles of law; and
(iii)  be reasonably foreseeable by the addressees; in other words the extension,
although formally speaking it turns out to be to the detriment if the accused, could
have been reasonably anticipated by him, as consonant with general principles of
criminal law.29
28 In the case at issue the applicant was the owner of a supermarket, convicted of unlawfully selling
pharmaceutical products in breach of the Public Health Code. In his application he had contended that the
deSmtion of medicinal pfoduci contained in the relev,ant provision of that Code was very imprecise and
left a wide discretion to the courts.
29 That notions of foreseeability and accessibility wire taken up by the ICTY AC in Hadzihasanmicanic and
others (Decision on lnteriocutary Appeat ChaUenging lurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility),
at §34.
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To put it differently, courts may not create a new criminal offence, with new legal
ingredients (a new act us reus or a new niens rea). They can only adapt
provisions envisaging criminal offences to changing social conditions—as long as
this adjustment (resulting in the broadening of actus reus or, possibly, in lowering
the threshold of the subjective element, for insta.nce, from intent to recklessness,
or from recklessness to culpable negligence.) is consonant with, or even required
by, general principles.
This process, particularly if it proves to be to the detriment of the accused (which
is normally the case.) must presuppose the existence of broad criminal
prohibition (for instance, the proscription of rape) and no clear-cut and explicit
enumeration, in law, of the acts embraced by this definition. It is in the penumbra
left by law around this definition that the adaptation may be carried out.
Admittedly, the frontier between such adaptation process and the analogical
process, which is instead banned (see below), is rather thin and porous. It falls to
courts to proceed with great caution and determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the 'adaptation' under discussion is legally warranted and consonant
with general principles, and in addition does not unduly prejudice the rights of the
accused.
An instance of this process of adaptation 'of existing law can be seen in the
judgment delivered by the ICTY AC in Tadic (iA), where the AC unanimously held
that some customary rules of international law criminalized certain categories of
conduct in inferno armed conflict,30 It is well I known that until that decision many
commentators, states as well as the ICRC, had held the view that violations of
the humanitarian law of internal armed conflict did not amount to war crimes
30 Before pointing to practice and opinio juris supporting the view that some customry rules had envolved
in the international community criminalizing conduct in internal armed conflict, the AC eniphasiled the
rationale behind this evolution, as follows: 'A Stale-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually
supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law hem in urn causa
om»t;ul•coniflf;Jfuffl<lt(alUawiscreatrd for the benefit of human beingi) has gained a firm foothold in thr
international community as well. It follows that in the area of armed conflict the distinction between
interstate win and dvii wars is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned. Why protect civilians
from btl-Sigeftrit ri(i]ence,or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or
private propirty, as well as proscribe weapon s causing tinnecei;sarY suffering when two sovereign States a
re engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when
armed violence
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proper, for such crimes, could only be perpetrated within the context of an
international armed conflict. The ICTY AC authoritatively held that the contrary
was true and clearly identified a set of international customary rule's prohibiting
as criminal certain classes of conduct. Since then this view has been generally
accepted.
Similarly, contrary to the submission made by defence counsel in
Hadzihasanovlc and others,31 an 'adaptation' of existing rules (corroborated by a
logical construction) warrants the contention this persons may be held
accountable under the notion of command responsibility even in internal armed
conflicts. Two arguments support this proposition. First, generally speaking the
notion is widely accepted in international humanitarian law that each army or
military unit engaging in fighting either in an international or in an internal armed
conflict must have a commander charged with holding discipline, ensuring
compliance with the law, and executing the orders from above (with the
consequence that whenever the commander culpably fails to ensure such
compliance, he may be called to account). The notion at issue is crucial to the
existence and enforcement of the whole body of international humanitarian law,
because without a chain of command and a person in control of' each military
unit, anarchy and chaos would ensue and no one could ensure compliance with
law and order. Secondly, and with specific regard to the Statute of the ICTY,
Article 7(3) of this Statute is couched in sweeping terms and clearly refers to the
commission by subordinates of any crime falling under the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal: any time such a crime has been perpetrated involving the responsibility
of a superior, this superior may be held accountable to criminal omission (of
course, if he is proved to have the requisite mens rea). If this is so, it is sufficient
to show that crimes perpetrated in internal armed conflicts fall under the tribunal's
jurisdiction, as held in 1995 in Tadic (IA), for inferring that as a consequence the
Tribunal has jurisdiction over a commander who failed to prevent or punish such
crimes.32
31 See the ICTV TC Decision on foint ChaUetigi: to lurinUctiw.M 7 Deci-mbtr 2001, §§15-39.
32 The notions set out in I he tent are to a large extent toinddent with the rulings in Hailliha.fanofii aid ot
hers made in 2002 by the ICTY TC {Decision (in jaint Challenge to furlidicticn), at ~ISO-79, and later, in
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2.3. THE BAN ON ANALOGY
National courts (particularly civil law countries as well as international courts
normally refrain from applying ICL by analogy; that is, they do not extend the
scope and purport of a criminal rule to a matter that is unregulated by law
(analogin tegis). In national law the prohibition on the application of criminal rules
by analogy (which was not provided for in the German Nazi state or in the Soviet
Union, and was banned in China only in 1997, when a new Criminal Code was
enacted) is rooted in the need to safeguard citizens and in particular to prevent
their being punished for actions that were not considered illegal when they were
performed. By the same token, the prohibition is intended to narrow down
arbitrary judicial decisions.
The same principle applies in international law. Its rationale is the need to protect
individuals from arbitrary behaviour of states or courts (which is another side, or
a direct consequence, of the exigency that no one be accused of an act that at
the time of its commission was not a criminal offence). In other words, the
primary rationale is to safeguard the rights of the accused as much as possible.
To satisfy this requirement, analogy is prohibited with regard to both treaty and
customary rules. Such rules (fur instance, norms proscribing certain specific
crimes against humanity) may not be applied by analogy in classes of acts that
are unregulated by law.
Article 22(2) of the ICC Statute thus codifies existing customary law where it
provides that "The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be
extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in
favour of the persons being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.' For example,
2003, by the AC (Decisian on Intericcutory Appeal ChalienginglurinUctiM in Rctaticin to Cummand
Responcibility),at §§10-36. must be strictly construed to exclude isolated cases of atrocity or persecution
whether committed by private individuals or by governmental authorities. As we construe it, that section
[of the aforementioned Law] provides for the punishment of crimes committed against German nationals
only where there is proof of conscious participation in systematic governmentally organized or approved
procedures, amounting to atrocities and offences of that kind specified in the act and committed against
populations or amounting to persecution on political, racial or religious grounds (at 284-5).
29
one is not allowed to apply by analogy the rule prohibiting a specific weapon
(such as blinding weapons) to a new weapon or, at any rate, to another weapon
not prohibited. Nor may one apply by analogy a rule prohibiting a particular use
of a specific weapon (for instance, t house of napalm and other incendiary
weapons contrary to Protocol III to the 19PO UN Convention on Conventional
Weapons) to another use;- of that weapon. Consequently, one is not allowed to
criminalize the use of those weapons when their use was permitted.
As the aforementioned provision of the ICC Statute makes clear, a prohibition
closely bound up with that of analogy is the ban on broad or extensive
interpretation of international criminal rules, and the consequent duty for states,
courts, and other relevant officials and individuals to resort to strict interpretation.
This principle entails that one is not allowed to broaden surreptitiously, by way of
interpretation, the scope of rules criminalizing conduct, so as to make them
applicable to instances not specifically envisaged by those rules.
An example of sir set construction can be found in some post-Second World War
cases relating to the notion of crimes against humanity. In Altstotter and others a
US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg held that that notion, as laid down in
Control Council Law no. 10.
The finding was cited with approval in Fauk and others, handed down by-a not
her US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg (at 1216), where the Tribunal also
held that under a strict interpretation of the same notion, crimes against humanity
do not encompass offences against property, but only those against persons.33
Three qualifications must, however, be set out restricting the ban on analogy.
33 Subsequently the Dutch Serial Court of Cassation took up in Aibrecht (at 397-S) and in Bellmer {M
543), as well as in Haase (at 432), thtlame strict inarpretation advanced in Alt f totter ami Dihers.
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First, international law only prohibits the so-called analogiateg is (that is, the
extension of a rule so as to cover a matter that is formally unregulated by law). It
does not bar the regulation of a matter not covered by a specific provision or rule,
by resorting to general principles of ICL, or to general principles of criminal
justice, or to principles common to the major legal systems of the world [so-called
analogia juris).34 National and international courts or tribunals have repeatedly
affirmed that it is permissible to rely upon such principles for establishing whether
an international rule covers a specific matter in dispute. To be sure, the question
has always been framed as me, of interpretation, rather than analogical
application. Nevertheless, whatever the terminology employed, the fact remains
that gaps or lacunae have been filled by resort to those principles. It should,
however, be that drawing upon general principle should never be used to
criminalize conduct that was previously not prohibited by a criminal rule. It may
only serve to spell out and clarify, or give a clear legal contour to, prohibitions
that have already been laid down in either customary law or treaties. In other
words, this approach may only be resorted to for the interpretation of existing
rules, not to the creation of new classes of criminal conduct. To hold the contrary
would mean to admit serious departures from the nulluni crimen principle,
contrary to the whole thrust of current ICL.
Secondly, in quite a few cases international rules themselves invite or request
analogy, through the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction [whereby
when in a legal rule general words follow the enumeration of a particular class of
persons or things, the general words must be construed as applying to persons
or things of the same kind or class as those enumerated). For instance, the
customary and treaty rules prohibiting and penalizing as crimes against humanity
'other inhumane acts', as well as the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
caramelizing as 'grave breaches' of the Convention 'inhuman acts' in addition to
torture, impose upon the interpreter the need to look at acts and conduct
analogies in gravity to those prohibited. This indeed was the reasoning of the Tel
34 Resort to general principles of law recognized by civilized nations is termed by Anzilotti (op. cit., 106-7)
analogia juris. It should be noted, however, that according to the celebrated international lawyer those
general principles did not constitute an autonomous source of international law
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Aviv District Court in Ternek.35 The draftsmen of the ICC Statute took the same
logical approach when they criminalized in Article 7(l)(k) 'other in humane acts of
a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body
or to mental or physical health' (emphasis added),
Thirdly, in some cases international law allows a logical approach that at first
glance runs foul of the ban on analogy, but which is in fact permissible because it
applies to general principles. An example will clarify this proposition. In the ease
of a new weapon that does not fall under any specific prohibition precisely
because of its novel features, analogical extension of an existing treaty ban is not
allowed, as pointed out above. Nevertheless, one is authorized to enquire
whether the new weapon is at variance with the general principle proscribing
weapons that are inherently indiscriminate or cause unnecessary suffering. For
this purpose, one may justifiably look at those weapons that have been
prohibited by treaty because they are either indiscriminate or cause superfluous
sufferings. The object of this enquiry will not be the application of these treaty
prohibitions by analogy, but rather to better ascertain whether the characteristics
of the new weapon are such as to make them contrary to the general principle. It
would seem that the District Court of Tokyo in Shimoda and others took precisely
this approach (although, of course, it had been requested to pronounce on a
question of civil liability, not of criminal law}.36
2.4. THE PRINCIPLE OF FAVOURING THE ACCUSED
Another principle is closely intertwined with the ban on analogy, and is designed
to invigorate it. This is the principle requiring, when faced with conflicting
35 See supra, n.21.
36 After nothing that the use of an atomic bonib was 'believed to be contrary to the principb of international
law prohibiting means of injuring the eniimy which cause unnecessary suffering or are inhuman', the
District Court ot'Ti.ikyo noted that the bomb was a new weapon. It then pointed (.nit that the
employrnentol' asphyxiating, poisotious, and other gases and baeteriologicl methods of warfare was
prohibited, noting that it could 'safely be concluded that besides poisons, poisonous gases and bacteria, the
use of means of inilmng the enemy which cause in;ury at least as great as or greater than theM prohibited
materials is prohibitedbyintiirnational law'. Tile Court concluded that It is not too Tnuch to say
tliatthesufferingsbrought about by the atorniL; bomb are greater than those caused by poisons and
poisonous gases' indeed the act of dropping this bomb may be regarded as contrary to the fundamental
principle of the law of war which prohibits the causing of unnecessary suffering' (at 1694-5).
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interpretations of a rule, the construction that favours the accused: see also ICC
Statute, Article 22(2). An ICTR TC upheld this principle in Akayesa with regard to
the interpretation of the word 'killing' in the Genocide Convention and the Statute
of the ICTR.37 An ICTY TC reaffirmed the principle in Krstic. The question was
how to interpret the: notion of 'ex term in at ion' as a crime against humanity. The
Chamber pointed out that the ICC Statute provides that extermination may
embrace acts 'calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the population',
namely only a limited number of victims; it stressed that under customary law
extermination generally involves a large number of victims. It went on to hold as
follows:
This definition [that is, that contained in the ICC Statute was adopted after the
time the offences in this case were committed. In accordance with the principle
that where there is a plausible difference of interpretation or application, the
position which most favours the accused should be adopted, the Chamber
determines that, For the purpose of this case, the definition should be read as
meaning the destruction of a numerically significant part of the population
concerned.
It should be noted that the principle of construction in favour of the accused
(favor rei) has also been conceived of as a standard governing the appraisal of
evidence: in this case the principle is known as in dubioproreo (in case of doubt,
one should hold for the accused). For instance, in Flick and others, a US Military
Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg held that it must be guided among other things by
the standard whereby 'If from credible evidence two reasonable inferences may
37 With regard to the wmd'nwuftre (in French) and 'killing' in English, contained in thf phrisf 'killing
members of the group' (as acategfiryofgrtiocide), theTC noted the following: "The TC is of the opinion that
the term "killing" used in the English version is too general, since it could very wnll include both
intentional and unintentional homicides, whereas the term "meurtre", used in the French version, is more
precise. It is accepted that there is murder when death has been caused with the intention to do so, as
provided for, incidentally, in the Penal Code of Rwanda, which stipulates in its Article 31.1 that "Homicide
committed with intent to cause death shall be treated as murder'- Given the presumption of innocence of the
accused, and pursuant to the general principles of criminal law, the Chamber holds that the version more
favourable to the a.ccused should be upheld and finds that Article 2(2)(a) of the Statute must be interpreted
in accordance with the definition of murder given in the Penal Code of Rwanda, according to which
"meuftTC" ( hilling) is homicide committed with the intent to cause death' (§§500-1).
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be drawn, one of guilt and the other of innocence, the latter must be taken' (at
1189).38 The notion was also upheld in Stakic.39
2.5. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY OF PENALTIES
It  is  common  knowledge  that  in  many  states,  particularly  in  those  of
Romano-Germanic tradition, it is considered necessary to lay down in law a tariff
relating to sentences for each crime, so as: (i) to ensure the uniform application
of criminal law by a all courts of the state; and (ii) to make the add res sees
cognizant of the possible punishment that maybe meted out if they transgress a
particular criminal provision.
This principle is not applicable at the international level, where these tariffs do not
exist. Indeed, states have not yet agreed upon a scale of penalties, due to widely
differing views about the gravity of the various crimes, the seriousness of guilt for
each criminal offence, and the consequent harshness of punishment. It follows
that courts enjoy much greater judicial discretion in punishing persons found
guilty of international crimes. However, some statutes of international tribunals
set forth limitations on the absolute discretion of judges. Thus, for instance,
Article 24(1) of the ICTY Statute provides, first, that penalties will be limited to
imprisonment (thus ruling out the death sentence), and, secondly, that In
determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse
to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former
Yugoslavia.' This last provision was applied in various cases,40 although it was
gene rail)' not held mandatory. Article 23 of the ICTR Statute is identical, but it
38 Another US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg uphrid the principle in Krauch and ffthen (!. G.
Farben case) (at 1108).
39 The TC explicitly distances itailf from the Defence submission that the principle in dubio pro rsc should
apply as a principle for the interpretalion (iflht substantive criminal law of the Statute. As this prin- ciple is
applicable to findings of fact and not of law, theTC has not taken it into account in its interpretalian of the
law' (T),g416).
40 See, for instance, in Erdemovic and Tadic (Sentencing 1, 1997) (§§-10), Tadic (sentencinig 1. 1999)
(§§10 13). Delatic and others (§§1193-212), and Kupreikic and others(§§839-47)
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refers of course to the general practice regarding opinion sentences in the courts
of Rwanda.
As for the Statute of the ICC, Article 23 provides that 'A person convicted by the
Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute' and Article 77
confines it self to envisaging imprisonment for a maximum of30 years, while at
the same time admitting life imprisonment 'when justified by the extreme gravity
of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person'. It thus
implicitly rules out the death penalty, but does not establish a scale of sentences,
nor does it suggest that the Court should take into account the scale of penal ties
o I' the relevant territorial or national state. The Court is thus left with a very
broad margin of appreciation.
2.6. THE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
In any legal system, crimes consist of two elements; (i) conduct (an act or
omission, contrary to a rule imposing a specific behavior; this is called actus
reus, that is a culpable act); and (ii) state of mind, a psychological element
required by the; legal order for the conduct to be blameworthy and consequently
punishable also called culpable frame of mind or mens rea.
In international law also, there exist rules prescribing that individuals (whether
acting as state officials or as private persons) lake a certain conduct (tor
instance, they must refrain from killing civilians or from injuring prisoners of war in
an armed conflict, or from engaging in large-scale torture of persons held in
detention, or from murdering a multitude of persons belonging to a certain ethnic,
national, religious or racial group). As ill national legal systems, also in
international law, conduct contrary to a substantive rule of this corpus of law is
not sufficient for individual criminal responsibility to arise. A mental clement is
also required, in some way directed to be linked with the commission of the
criminal act.
2.7. THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
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We will consider the specific acts, actions, or omissions falling under the notion
of actus reus when we move on to examine the various classes of international
crime. It is necessary now to dwell on some criminal notions relating to the
essential structure of such crimes.
Two main features characterize international crimes proper.' First, they consist of
conduct taken or acts performed by either (i) state officials (for instance,
servicemen engaged in war, or political leaders planning or ordering genocide,
etc.); or (ii) private individuals,
What is notable is that this conducts either (a) Linked to an international or
internal armed conflict or, absent of such a conflict, (b) has a political or
ideological dimension or is somehow linked or otherwise connected to
(instigated, influenced, tolerated, or acquiesced in) the behavior of state
authorities or organized non-state group), or entities.
Thus, it is characteristic of such crimes that, when perpetrated by private
individuals, they are somehow connected with a state policy or at any role with
system criminality'.41 On this score international crimes are thus different from
criminal offences committed for persona! purposes (private gain, satisfaction of
personal greed, desire for revenge, etc.) as is the case with ordinary criminal
offences such as theft, robbery, assault, kidnapping for extorting a ransom, etc.,
or such other crimes that have a transnational dimension but pursue private
goals, such as piracy, slave trade, trade in women and children, counterfeiting
currency, drool dealing, etc.
41 see on this matter P. Gaeta, Interoatinal Criminalization of Prohibited Conduct', in A. Cassese(ed.),
Oxford Campanion to International Criminai Justice [forthcoming).
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The fundamental hallmark of international crimes, which I have just highlighted, is
also called 'tile international element' or 'a context of organized violence' of such
crimes.42
The second notable feature of international crimes, inextricably intertwined with
the one I have  just conceptualized,  is  that  they  normally  possess  a  twofold
dimension or are double-layered. They constitute criminal offences in domestic
legal systems: serious bodily harm, murder, rape, sexual assault, torture,
persecution, etc., in that they in fringe municipal rules of criminal law. In addition,
they have an international dimension, in that they breach values recognized as
universal in the world community and enshrined in international customary rules
and treaties. It follows that normally these crimes consist of an 'underlying
offence' (for example, murder or torture) with the requisite objective and
subjective elements of such offence, plus an objective and mental element
required by the international rules that contemplate the crime at issue. For
instance, we will see that murder as a crime against humanity requires (i) the
objective element of murder (causing the death of another person) as well as a
mental element (intent to bring about by one's action the death of another
person); plus (ii) a broader objective context (the existence of a widespread or
systematic attack on the civilian population, whether in time of armed conflict or
in time of peace) and a mental element: awareness of the existence of such
broader context.
These features relate to the vast majority of cases. There are, however, also
crimes that do not possess this double dimension, in that they do not encompass
an underlying criminal offence. For instance, the use of prohibited weapons in
time of war or the indiscriminate attack of civilians in an internal armed conflict is
per se an international crime, without necessarily having a 'domestic'
underpinning. It follows that what is required for the crime to be perpetrated is a
conduct defined in international rules (for example, using a weapon that is
42 The notion ol's/stem cfiminaliiv as appowd to individual criminulit}' was at out by the great Dutch
scholar and udge B.V.A. Holing, 'The Law ot'War Und the National Jurisdiction Since 1945' 100 HagM
Recueil. 1960-11,335ffi see a I so lhe Sign ificancii of till Laws of War', in A. Cas~e led.),
CMMtPrcbiemsof !nternatianalLiM(MiliM-.GwSi-i, 1975), 137-9.
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proscribed by international law) as well as a mental element (the intent to use the
weapon). The same holds true for a sub-category of crimes against humanity,
namely persecution.
Further more, as is normally I he case in domestic legal systems with all criminal
offences, international crimes also can be split into conduct, consequences, and
circumstances, from the' point of view of their objective structure.43
The conduct is described by the international rule that imposes a certain behavior
(for instance, respect civilians in a civil war, or protect prisoners of war in
international armed conflict) and therefore criminalizes any act or omission
contrary to such a rule. Consequences are the effects caused by one's conduct.
Between conduct and consequences there is, of course, in causation nexus: for
instance, I fire a missile at a hospital and thus bring about the destruction of the
building and the death of dozens of civilians and wounded persons. From this
point of view crimes maybe held to belong to two different Categories: crimes of
conduct and crimes of result. The former category comprises offences consisting
in the breach of an international rule that imposes a specific behavior, there, it is
irrelevant whether or not this breach brings about any harm or injury to p
respective victims. (Think, for instance, of the rule that obliges belligerent, to
refrain from declaring that no quarter will be given; that is, that in combat
operations enemies will not be captured but wilt be killed, even if they surrender;
the same holds true for the rule prohibiting the use of a certain mean of warfare,
for instance dum dum bullets or chemical or bacteriological weapons; the use of
these weapons constitutes a breach of lHL and a war crime, even if in a specific
case no damage to the adversary is in fact caused by such use.) Crimes of result
embrace violations of rules that confine themselves to imposing the achievement
of a certain end, regardless of the modalities for the realization of that end; for
instance, causing disproportionate casualties among civilians when attacking a
military objective, or starving prisoners of war.
Consequences of a crime are the effects of criminal conduct. Most international
criminal rules focus on the harm caused by human behaviour and proscribe
43 G. Werle, FfiticiplesoflnternatianaiCrimitialLsw (The Hague; I'. M. C. Ai'.er Press, 200 5), 94-S.
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conduct that is such as to bring about such harm: for instance, they criminalize
the killing of civilians, the wounding of prisoners of war, the rape of women. The
rationale behind this emphasis is that the primary goal of international criminal
law is to prevent and punish behaviour that injures protected persons. On this
score 'consequences' are particularly relevant with regard to 'crimes of result', as
defined above.
Circumstances are 'any objective or subjective facts, qualities or motives with
regard to the subject of the crime (such as the perpetrator and any accomplices),
the object of the crime (such as the victim or other impaired interests) or any
other modalities of the crime (such as means or time and place of commission)44
Thus, for instance, in the rule imposing on military commanders and, more
generally, on superior authorities to prevent and repress crimes by their
subordinates, one of 'the circumstances of the crime is that a person is a military
commander or a civilian superior. Similarly, in the rule banning crimes against
humanity the 'forcible transfer of population, the use of force in bringing about the
movement of a multitude of civilians from one place to another is a 'circumstance'
required by the rule.
2.8. GENERAL FEATURES OF THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT
It is not easy to identify the various forms and shades of the mental element in
ICL Two problems arise.
First, substantive rules concerning crimes often do not specify the subjective
element required for each specific offence. An exception may be found in the
various substantive provisions of the ICC Statute: Articles 6 (on genocide), 7 (on
crimes against humanity), and 8 [on war crimes), and the accompanying
'Elements of Crime' elaborated pursuant to Article 9. Most of the time these
provisions set out the subjective element required for each class of crime.
However, in this respect the provisions of the Statute are hedged about with two
44 See A. Eser, 'Mental Element-Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law' in Cassese, Gaeta, Jones, ICC
Commentary, vol. 1, 911-20.
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major limitations. They are only designed to set out the categories of crime over
which the ICC may exercise jurisdiction; in other words they are not couched as
provisions of a criminal code. Furthermore, they are not intended to codify, or
restate, or contribute to the development of customary international law. Their
legal value is therefore limited (although, of course, they may gradually have a
bearing on, and bring about a change in, existing law).
Secondly, there is no customary rule setting out a general definition of the
various categories of mens rea (such as intent, recklessness, or negligence). In
this respect the only exception is Article 30 of the ICC Statute, on 'mental
element'. However, it is doubtful that it reflects customary international law, In
addition, as we shall see, ever at the level of treaty law, it is not certain that it
encompasses all the various possible subjective elements of international crimes.
This difficult condition is compounded by the failure of national case law to cast
light on the matter. It is state courts that have handed down the bulk of Judicial
decision' dealing with this matter, and each court has applied the rules of criminal
law proper to its own domestic system. Depending on the legal tradition to which
it belonged, and court has placed its own interpretation on the notion of intent,
fault, or negligence.
Consequently, to tackle the first of the two problems outlined above, one should
first identify all the international substantive provisions which themselves lay
down, implicitly, the subjective element required for their violation to amount to
an international crime. One ought also to draw upon the case law of international
tribunals, to the extent that they have pronounced on the matter. To come to
grips with the second problem, one must start from the assumption that has in
other fields of ICL, what matters is to identity the possible existence of general
rules of international law or, in the absence of such rules, principles common to
the legal systems of the world. To pinpoint such rules, one may chiefly rely on: (i)
the case law of courts, with special attention being paid to the judicial decisions
of international tribunals, in particular the ICTY and the ICTR (these decisions
have in fact proved to be of crucial importance in the gradual elaboration of the
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various mental elements of each category of international crime); And (ii) the
existence of some practices common to all major legal systems of the world, as
evidence of a convergence of these systems and confirmation that parallel
principles have also taken shape at the international level.
I shall briefly mention some instances of how the first of the two problems is
sometimes solved. I shall then concentrate on the second problem; that is, the
general definitions of the various categories of subjective element that one may
deduce from a perusal of international rules and the relevant case law.
2.9. GENERAL NOTIONS OF MENS REA COMMON TO MOST LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD
By way of introduction, it may prove fitting to undertake a brief comparative
survey of the attitude taken towards the definition of the major facets of means
rea by the major legal systems of the world. It is apparent that, in spite of broad
differences in terminology, most legal systems tend to take the same basic
approach to the specific regulation of each aspect of mens rea, and its
implications. They tend to require one of the following frames of mind, for
conduct to be considered criminally punishable (these are listed in decreasing
order of culpability):
2.9.1 Intention, namely awareness that a certain conduct will bring about a
certain result in the ordinary course of events, and will to attain that objective: for
example, use a gun to shoot at a person because I want to cause his death and
anticipate that as consequence of my shooting he will die. This class of mens rea
is normally called intent.
2.9.2 Awareness that undertaking a course of conduct carries with it an
unreasonable or unjustifiable risk of producing harmful consequences, and the
decision nevertheless to go on to take that risk. For instance, I perceive the risk
that using a certain weapon may entail killing dozens or even hundreds of
innocent civilians, and nevertheless willingly ignore this risk. This class is
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normally called recklessness (or Eventualdolus, or bedingter Vorsatz), dolus
eventualis).45
2.9.3 Failure to pay sufficient attention to or to comply with certain generally
accepted standards of conduct thereby causing harm to another person when the
actor believe that the harmful consequences of his action will not come about,
thanks to the measures he has taken or is about to take. For instance, an
attendant at a mental hospital causes the death of a patient by releasing a flow of
boiling water into the bath; one of two persons playing with a loaded gun points it
at the other and pulls the trigger believing that it will not fire because neither
bullet is opposite the barrel; however, as the gun is a revolver, it does fire, killing
the other person.46
This class is normally referred to as advertent or culpable
negligence (negligence consciente, bewusste Fahrlassigkeit) where the agent's
conduct seriously or blatantly fails to meet the standards of the reasonable man
test.47
45 Under Art. 2(2)(c) of the US Model Penal Code, 'A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
clemer of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exist or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering
the nature an purpose of the actors conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation froi the standard of conduct that a law abiding person would observe in the actors situation'
(emphasis added).
On dolus eventualiSt see in particular G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, 1978 reprint (Oxford: Oxfor
University Press, 2000), 445-9.
46 See A. Ashworth, Principles af Criminal Law, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 191-5.
See also A. P. Simester and G. R. Sullivan, Criminal Law— Theory ami Doctrine (Oxford: Hart, 2002),
139-40. According to D. L. Hart ('Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility', in Punishment and
Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford L'niversitv Press, 1968, at 149), 'Negligence is gross if the precautions to
be taken against harm are very simple, such as persons who are but poorly endowed with physical and
mental capacities can easily take.' A. P. Simester and G. R. Sullivan (at 140) provide a telling example: It
may be negligent to drive around a particular bend at 50 mph; if so, it is grossly negligent to do so at 80
mph. It will also be gross negligence if the risk created by the defendant is very obvious.'
47 Under Art. 2(2)(d) of the US Model Penal Code, 'A person acts negligently with respect to a material
element of an offense when he should beaware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actors
failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to
him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the
actors situation' (emphasis added)
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2.9.4 Failure to respect generally accepted standards of conduct without,
however, being aware of or anticipating the risk that such failure may bring about
harmful effects. To prevent road accidents, some countries envisage this state of
mind for drivers who act negligently (for instance, cause the death of a
pedestrian by not stopping at the stop sign, or by driving at excessive speed or in
a state of intoxication).
This class is normally termed inadvertent negligence (negligence inconsciente,
unbewusste Fahrlassigkeit).
These are, of course, only general trends of national criminal law. The courts of
some states often do not draw such a fine distinction between the
aforementioned shades on the scale of criminal culpability.48 Similarly, national
laws or military manuals may set out notions that do not necessarily fit in the
above enumeration of forms of mens rea.49
Depending on the category of crime and the degree of responsibility,
international customary rules (rdiulting from opinwjuris seu neceisitatif, i.e. the
48 For instance, in 1975 in Robert Strong the Court of Appeals of New York held that, from the point of
view of the mental state of the defendant at the time the crime was committed, the essential distinction
between the crime of 'manslaughter in the second degree' (that is, recklessly causing the death of a person,
or intentionally causing or aiding a person to commit suicide, or committing upon a female an abortion
causing her death), and 'criminally negligent homicide' (that is, causing the death of a person with criminal
negligence) is that in the former class of crime 'the actor perceives the risk but consciously disregards it',
whereas in the latter the actor 'negligently fails to perceive the risk'. In the case at issue the accused, a
leader of a Muslim sect with a sizeable following, purportedly exercising his powers of 'mind over matter
used to perform ceremonies such as walking though fire, performing surgical operations without
anaesthesia, or stopping a follower's heartbeat and breathing while he plunged knives into his chest without
any injury to the person. Although he had performed this last-mentioned ceremony countless times without
once causing an injury, in the case brought before the court the follower had died as a result of the wounds.
The jury found that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter in the second degree, as charged, without
considering whether he could have been guilty of the lesser crime of criminally negligent homicide. The
Court of Appeals held that in this case the jury could have found that the defendant 'failed to perceive the
risk inherent in his actions [...] The defendant's conduct and claimed lack of perception, together with the
belief of the victims and the defendant's followers, if accepted by the jury, would justify a verdict of
criminally negligent homicide' rather than manslaughter in the second degree (568-9).
49 Thus, lor example, according to the Australian Detenct Force Discipline Manual, 'A person can be said to
have acted rei'khsfiy when hr is aware that certain harmful consiquences are likeir to dew from l particular
ael but he performs the act despite the risk. A person acts negligently when he performs an act without
consideration of tiltprobliblr harmful consequences which will flow from it but where those harmful
onstlquencllss would lie foreseeable by a reasonable man' (S-W)
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conviction that a certain behaviour is necessary or is dictated by a legal rule, and
international practice, as evidenced by case law, treaty provisions if any, the
views of state officials, and the convergence of the major legal systems of the
world) envisage various modalities of the mental element. As mentioned above,
the ICC Statute includes a provision, Article 30, that specifically deals with this
matter. However, this provision has a limited purport, for it only applies to the
crimes falling under ICC jurisdiction and in addition does not reflect or codify
customary rules. It therefore may not apply to other international courts or
tribunals, which are bound either by their own Statute or, if such Statutes do not
regulate the matter (which is indeed the case), by customary international law,
2.10 GENERAL CATEGORIES OF MENS REA: INTENT
By intent or intention {dolus direct''us) is meant awareness that by engaging in a
certain action or by omitting to act I shall bring about a certain re-suit (such as,
for example, the death of a civilian) coupled with the will lo cause such result. For
instance; I want to kill a civilian. So I shoot him and he dies as a result of my act.
I must therefore answer for this crime, Or else, I think he is dead but in fact he
has not: died; he only dies later of exposure because he is left in the cold. It does
not matter that my conduct did not kill him—l am guilty of murder because: (1) I
intended him to die (mens rea); and (ii) he died as a result of my acts (because
he would never have been lying exposed were it not for any acts). As a rule, my
intent only has to be linked to a certain result (the death of the victim).
International rules require intent for most international crimes, although, as we
shall see, under certain circumstances other states of mind are admissible.
As an illustration of intent, Enigster may be mentioned, The accused, a Jewish
internee in a Nazi concentration camp having the rank of Schieiler or group
leader, had been charged with crimes against humanity, in particular, grievous
injuries, against his fellow inmates. In examining the alleged grievous attack on
another inmate, named Schweizer, the District Court of Tel Aviv had to establish
whether all the necessary elements were present; it therefore asked itself, among
other things, whether the requisite intent also existed. It noted that in this respect
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no special testimony had been brought to the Court; it nonetheless had to
determine whether the accused had that intent. The Court noted the following:
As to 'intent', it is a well settled that person in ills right mind is held to intend the
natural consequences of his actions. As it appears from the severe results of the
blows struck by the defendant, the blows were inflected with sonic significant
force, and for this reason, and barring any proof that the defendant landed from
his own free will, it must be concluded of his mind, that he intended to cause
Schweizer grievous damage.
Premeditation, which is normally not required for international criminal
responsibility, occurs when the intent to engage in conduct contrary to an
international substantive rule is formed before the conduct is actually embarked
upon. As the Turin Military Tribunal pointed out in Sliveckf in 1999 (at 14) and
repeated in Engel in 2000 (at 13), perpetration necessarily requires two
elements: one of a temporal nature, namely that some time must pass between
the formation of the criminal intent and its being carried out; the other of a
psychological nature, namely that the criminal intent must persist from the
involvement of its formation until final perpetration of the crime.50
In some instances premeditation may coincide with, or overlap, the criminal
action. However, while planning, as we shall all see, has an autonomous scope
50 The Court went on to say that 'In regard to this it must remembered that the defendant denied the entire
action and did not give any explanation that could have shown an other intent or arouse doubts as to his evil
intent. In addision, it is clear fom the testimony that no Germans were present while the blows wm being
landed, and it was not proven, as mentioned above, that the (lelendans was bound by the orders of the
Germans, to do thsdeed he did in general, and in the way he did it, in particulair' (§14). See also Gotzfrid, at
22-3, 62.
On the notion ot" 'del ibri-atc'~attalk on a i:iv ilia ii population) i n crimes again st hum anil)', see some
Indo- nriiancasti: Herman iieiiycn<? andotherf (at fi9), Afep Kuiwani (at 47-?), and YayatS:iiinijat (at 6).
1?  In 1971 a US m ilitary judge took a ),iinilnr st.ind in Cnlky, although less accurately spelled out, when
he issued instruct ions to the Court-M a rtial.Hepol ii redoutthalpremedilatedniudiir (which under US Saw
is a distinct Mtegon- from, and not an aggravating circumstance tor, unpremeditated murder) is a murder
whrretheaeturhad 'a premeditated deni gii to k il]'; thist'xpressiol] means 'formation of a s,peci(ic in tent to
kill and considerarion ithe act [...! or the acts intended to bring about death {..] prior to doing them. It is
nolnettilary that the "ptemeditaled design lo kill" shull have been entertained for any particular or
considerable length of time, but it must precede the killing.'In contra si, in the case of unpremeditated
murder, only Intent to kill 'is required (wherea sinthica se of vol untary man slaughter the person entertains
'an in lent to kill but kJlis in the heat of sudden passion caused by adequate provocation') (at 1703-10). See
also ManHel Gonwhes Letc Sere (at 10).
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and legal significance, predetermination has not. In ICL premeditation may only
be material to sentencing, for it may amount to an aggravating Circumstance.51
2.11. THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE WITHIN (AND WITHOUT) INTENT
' Knowledge ' is not a notion similar to civil law countries) where it is not regarded
as an autonomous category of mens rea, being absorbed either by intent or by
recklessness, In contrast, the notion as a distinct class of mental attitude in
criminal behavior is widespread in some. Common law countries, particularly the
United States, where one may find a clear-cut definition in the Model Penal
Code. There it is stated at section 2.02 that
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offence when;
(i)    if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist; and
(ii)  if the element involves a res ulto this conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.52
In such countries as the UK, some distinguished commentators consider
knowledge as having the same value and intensity as intent, with the difference
that intent 'relates to the consequences specified in the definition of the crime'
(for instance, death as a result of killing, i ii the case of voluntary murder),
whereas knowledge 'relates to circumstances forming part of the definition of the
51 In the two cases quoird above, the Turin Military Tribunal held that premeditasinn had been proved and
consequently considered it in aggravating circumstance: see Sancke, at I4-15, a i1dE.ngi:i at 13.
52 14 See Moiliil  Penal Code and CawmeMaries  (Official lhaft and Reriftd Comments), Part I, vol.  I
(Philadelphia, Pa.; The American Law Institute, 1965.1,225-6.
The Model Penal Code then specilw that 'when knowledge of the exisittiee ofa particular fact is in element
of an offencr, such knowledge is established if a person ii aware of a high probability of its existence,
unless, he actually believes thut it does not exist' (at 227).
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crime''53 (for instance, the circumstances that property belongs to another
person, in the case of criminal damage to property).
In short, it would seem that in some common law countries, knowledge denotes
two different forms of mental attitude, depending on the contents of the
substantive criminal rule at stake: (i) if the substantive penal rule prescribes the
existence of a part if ular fact or circumstance for the crime to materialize,
knowledge means awareness of the existence of the fact or circumstance, (ii) if
instead the substantive criminal rule focuses on the result of one’s conduct, then
knowledge meat-is (a) awareness that one's action is most likely to bring about
that harmful result, and nevertheless (h) taking the high risk of causing that
result. Plainly, ill category (i) knowledge is part of intent (which involves not only
the will to accomplish a certain action and thereby attain certain result, but also
awareness of the factual circumstances implicated in the action). Instead, in
category (ii) knowledge substantially coincides with recklessness, as defined
below (see infra, 3.7).
International rules, probably under the influence of US negotiators, uphold the
notion under discussion, in both versions. Also Article 30(2) of the ICC Statute
incorporates both versions, in that it stipulates that knowledge 'means awareness
that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events'.
In addition, some international rules also rely upon or require a third notion of
knowledge, i.e. as the mere fact of being apprised of a certain fact. Here,
knowledge is disconnected from intent or recklessness; it is not part of, nor is it
closely connected to intent or recklessness (as instead in the murder of a civilian,
where there is intent to cause the death of a human being and awareness of his
status as a civilian; or, as in the bombing of auditory objective situ a ted in a
densely populated area, where there is intent to bring about the destruction of the
military objective and the deliberate taking of the risk if killing civilians in the
53 See Ashwortli, PriMiples, 191-7. In fontrast, the notion is discussed only in paying by Smith and Hogan
(see at 103 and 117)
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knowledge that those living around that objective have the status of civilians in
the third category under discussion, knowledge constitutes an element per se of
men s rea, an element that is normally required in addition to another, distinct,
central element. Such is, for example, the case with crimes against humanity;
there, in addition to the intent required for the underlying offence (such as
murder, rape, torture, or extermination) the substantive criminal rules also require
that the agent have knowledge of a factual circumstance, namely that those
offences were part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population (see, e.g., Article 7(1) of the IC.C Statute).
Let us see instances of the notions of knowledge.
2.11.1  Knowledge as  part  of intent  can  be  found,  for instance,  in  Article
85(3)(e) of the First Additional Protocol of 1977. It enumerates the grave
breaches of the Protocol (which must be committed willfully' and cause 'death or
serious injury to body or health') the fact of 'making a person the object of attack
in the knowledge that he is hors de combat'. Here, knowledge means awareness
of the requisite circumstances, namely that the person is hors de combat.
As another example of knowledge as awareness of acts, hence as part of intent,
one can mention that, to be held responsible for complicity in planning or waging
an aggressive war, it must be proved either that an accused participated in the
preparation or execution of these plans (and in this case the criminal intent may
be inferred from such participation), or that tile accused was apprised of the
plans, in addition to taking some sort of action furthering their implementation. In
Goring and other', in considering the charges o f c rimes against peace made
against Schacht (President of the Reichsbank and Minister without Portfolio until
1943), the lMT noted that he was responsible for rearmament o f Germany, but
this as such was not a crime; for it to become a crime it must be shown that he
carried out rearmament as part of the Nazi plans to wage aggressive wars.
However, the Tribunal found that while organizing rearmament, Schacht did not
know of the Nazi aggressive plans; hence it acquitted him (at 307-10). A US
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg took the same position and came to the same
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conclusion in Krauch and others (1. G. Farben case), where it also held that the
defendants' lack of knowledge of Hitler's aggressive plans proved that they
lacked the requisite criminal intent (at 1115-17).
Another important instance where know] edge is required by international
criminal rules is aiding and abetting an international crime (for example, a war
crime such as killing a prisoner of war or an enemy civilian). Here criminal
responsibility arises if the aider and abettor knows that his action will assist the
commission of a specific crime by the principal. Various courts have taken this
position.54 As the ICTYTC put it in Furundizija, the accomplice need not share the
mens rea of the principal: 'mere knowledge that his actions assist the perpetrator
in the commission of the crime is sufficient to constitute mens rea in aiding and
abetting the crime' (§236).55
As will be shown below (11.4.4), knowledge is also required in most cases of
command responsibility.56 Thus, international rules on command responsibility
require knowledge of circumstances, in the case of a commander who knows
54 For instinc?, a US Military Tribune I sitting at Nuremberg, inEinsattgruppun (at 56S-73), two British
couru respectively in Schottfttd (at 64) and Zykton B (at •»), th< German Supreme Court in the British
Occupied Zont in the Synagopic cast (at 239), and lh» AC in Tadic (§229).
In Veit Hilfian the Coun uf,issues of Hamburg held in 19SO that in the cisc at isme there existed the
requisite subjective element of the offeiici.' of complicity in a crime against humanity Ipcrsecutinn ot'Jiws),
in that tht .iccused, a film director ri-ho had produced a strong anti-Semitic film at the behest i)fGoebbeli,
'knelv the intent ion ofGoebbels, n,imelv to justify through the film. beyond the usual propaganda, (he
persecutor y me.mrt'5 against ]cm that had been taken and planned' (al 156), and in add)li«n 'had taken into
account the possi bit materializingol't he [adverse] con sequence!, of the til in, sue hco rise
que;iceshavingbfcn destribed (in general terms] by the Supreme Court [inthf British Occupied Zoiii:'] '(at
116).
55 In this cast the accused interrogated the victim while she was being i-ubjected to rape and scriouaiwual
assaults by another person; the TC found that the .sccused's presenci; and continued interrogation of the
victim while she was beinf; subjected to violence amounted to aiding and abetting the crime, fur the
accused provided assistance, encouragement, or moral support to the senulil offender, and knew that these
acts assisted the commission cifthr rape and seitual assault.
56 The issue was well put bv the US Judge Advocate in his instructions to a US Court Martial in Medina
'(A] couiniander is [...] responsible if he has actual knowledge that troops or other persons subject to hi.i
control are in the process of committing or are about to corn in it a war crime and he wrongful I y fails to
take the necessary a ndreasonablr steps to insure compi i ance with the law of war. You will observe that
these legal requirements placed upon a commander require actual knowledge plus awrongful failure to act.
Thus mere presence at the scene without knowledge will not suffice. That is, the comrnander-subordinate
relationship alone will not allow an inference of knowledge. While it is not necessary that a commander
actually see an atrocity being committed, it is. essential that he know that his subordinates are in the
process ofcommitting atroJi!ie.! or are about to commit atrocities' (at 1732).
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that his subordinates have committed crime, and yet fail to take any action to
repress those crimes. He is criminally liable if, in addition to knowledge (or rather,
in spite of that knowledge), he culpably fails to take any action for the prosecution
and punishment of the culprits (intentional omission to take the prescribed act
ion). Here, awareness of the tact that troops under the control or authority of t he
commander have committed international crimes is a mental element,
constituting the preliminary sine qua non condition of intent, and is part and
breach of intent.
2.11.2  Secondly, some international rules focus on result, and hence
substantially consider knowledge as amounting or equivalent to recklessness.
Thus, Article 85(3)(b) of the First Additional Protocol considers as a grave breach
launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the Civilian population or civilian
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury
to civilians or damage to civilian objects'. A fairly similar definition is laid down in
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the ICC Statute.
2.11.3  In the cases considered above, knowledge is not an autonomous criminal
state of mind, but only as a means of entertaining criminal intent or recklessness.
In contrast (and we thus move on to the third category), in some instances
knowledge cannot be reduced to either of those classes of neutral state, and it
remains indispensable as a subjective element on its own. One example has
already been given above. It refers to crimes against humanity: the accused must
know of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. It is not
that he intends the civilian population to be subject to the attack, nor that he
knows that there is a risk of them being subjected to an attack—both of which are
beside the point. What one wants, is simply to be sure that he knew of the attack.
In these instances knowledge is irreducible to other mental elements and exists
per se (see ICTR TC, Kayishtima, at 55133-4 and ICTY TC Kupreikic and others,
at §556).
Finally, let it be emphasized that in ICL knowledge as awareness of criminal
instances not mean awareness of the legal implications of those circumstances.
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It only denotes cognizance of the factual circumstances envisaged in a particular
international rule. International law, like most national systems, does not require
awareness of the illegality of an act to the act to be regarded as an international
crime. As we shall see (13.5.1) it starts from the assumption that everybody must
know the law; it therefore it takes culpable even acts that were performed without
the author being fully aware of the unlawfulness (as long as the required intent,
recklessness, knowledge, etc. are there).57 International law only takes into
account knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of the law when the defence of
mistake of law can be regarded as admissible, for the law oil a particular matter
is uncertain or unclear (see infra, 13.5,2). In other words, international rules do
not attach importance to the subjective mental attitude of the perpetrator with
regard to law, unless this subjective attitude coincides with the objective,
condition of the law, namely its uncertainty.
2.12 SPECIAL INTENT (DOLOUS SPECIALIS)
International rules may require a speciaI intent (dolus specialis, dol aggrave) for
particular classes of crime. Such rules, in addition to providing for the intent to
bring about a certain result by undertaking certain conduct (for example, death by
killing), may also require that the agent pursue a specific goal that goes beyond
the result of his conduct.
International rules require a special intent for genocide: the agent must possess
'the intent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group'. Thus, it is not sufficient for the person to intend to kill, o r cause serious
mental or bodily harm, or deliberately inflict on a group seriously adverse and
discriminatory conditions of life, or forcibly transfer children from one group to
another, etc. It also must be proved that he did all this with the (furthest-and
dominant) intention of destroying a group. For, as the German Federal Court of
57 Burglwtz (.No. 2), th» British ludg» Advocate, in delinrating to the Military Court the scope ofmens tM
in inttrnitional crinits, stattd; '(Ylou might think it difficull to say that any man could have a guilty mind in
Mipect of his conduct it' he is not aware that his conduct is in breath of any law, or if there is no formal! led
law to fit his participator)' conduct and to involve the breach thereof. But Me its RM goes a little further
than that. If a man ought to have known that he was doing wrong, then the law presumes a guilty mind, a
nd the requi rements ofthe doctrine of Mem Rea a ff fulfil I edifyou find the accused either knew that they
were doing wrong or ought to have known; the fact that they may havii had no conscious thought of
wrongdoing will not protect them from convict ion if a breach of law has been committed' (84-5).
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justice (Bundesgerichtshof) stated in forgic on 30 April 1997, in the crime of
genocide a single person is the object of an attack 'not as an individual but rather
in his capacity as a member of a group whose sociaI existence the perpetrator
intends to destroy  .1 the particular inhumanity that characterizes genocide as
distinct from murder lies in that the perpetrator or perpetrators do not see the
victim as a human being but only as a member of a persecuted group' (at 401).58
Similarly, a special intent is required in some categories of crimes against
humanity, namely persecution. Here, in addition to the intent necessary for the
commission of the underlying offence (murder, rape, serious bodily assault,
expulsion from a village, an area or a country, etc.) a discriminatory intent is
called for, namely the will to discriminate against members of a particular
national, ethnic, religious, racial, or other group. Asan ICTY TC put it in Kupreikic
and others (<>634), and another TC restated it in Kordic and Cerkez. (25%14
and 220), the acts of the accused must have Lie in 'aimed at singling out and
attacking certain individuals on discriminatory grounds', for the purpose of
'removal of those persons from the society in which they live alongside the
perpetrator, or eventually from humanity itself. In Bin skid, another TC worded
that intent as follows: 'the specific intent to cause injury to a human being
because he belongs to a particular community or group' (§235).
The rules on crimes of international terrorism require a special intent; that of
spreading terror in the population by killing, hijacking, blowing up buildings, etc.
(see infra, 83.2). Also the rules crimilializing aggression require special intent
(see infra, 7,3.3(b)).
In all these cases pursuance of a special goal is essential, while its full
attainment is not necessary for the crime to be consummated. Clearly, the
murder of dozens of Muslims, Kurds, or Jews may he termed genocide if the
required special intent is present, regard less of whether the general purpose of
destroying the group as such is achieved; the same holds true for terrorist
attacks, which may amount to international crimes even if in fact a specific attack
58 20 That a specific or special intent is required for genocide has also been stressed in Akayesu (TJ §498),
Musemo (TJ §§ 164-7), Julistic(AJ §§45-6); Kristic (TJ, §§569-99; AJ, §§24-38).
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does not achieve the purpose of terror i zing the population; similarly, the forcible
expulsion of a number of Muslims from their homes amounts to persecution even
if not all Muslims are in fact driven out of the area.
2. 13. RECKLESSNESS
Recklessness or dolus eventualis is a state of mind where a person foresees that
his or her action if likely to produce its prohibited consequences, and
nevertheless willingly takes the risk of so acting. In this case the degree of
culpability is less than in intent. There, the actor anticipates and pursues a
certain result and in addition knows that he will achieve it by his action; here
instead he only envisages that result as possible or likely and deliberately takes
the risk: however, he does not necessarily will or desire the result. Recklessness,
thus, is made up of foresight and a volitional act (deliberately taking the risk).59
Instances of recklessness are clearly envisaged in some international rules.
Thus, for instance, the rule on superiors' responsibility provides that the superior
is criminally liable for the crimes of his subordinates if 'he consciously
disregarded information which clearly indicated' that his subordinates were about
to commit, or were committing, international crimes (see infra, 11.4.4). In this
case the superior is liable to punishment for consciously having taken the risk,
knowing that his subordinates were likely to commit or were committing crimes.
Furthermore, in the case of responsibility for crimes perpetrated by a multitude of
persons pursuant to a common design, or joint criminal enterprise (see infra,
59 According to ai ICTY TC in Rtakic, "Hie techniini definilioii of$oiui ewntualis is lhefollwing: it'lh'ictm
engages in lile-endangefing behaviouf, his killing becomes intentional ifhe 'reconcilei himselF' or "makes
peace" with the likelihood of death. Thus, iftlii.' killing is corn milted with "manifest indiffirence u:i he
value of human life", even conduct ofminimal risk can qua lily as intentiona I homicide. Large scale
killings that would be classified as reckless muriici in the United States would meet the continental criteria
of dalus even! uai:s. The Trial Chamberemphasisesth.ittlK1.'oncL'ptofiJolus ei~nlunlir dws nul include a
standard of negligence or gross ncgligencr' (55S7). In B!iiskii- and ICTY TC defined recklessiiess as the
situation where •the outcome is foreseen by the perpetratur as only a probable or possible con sequence' of
his conduct; according K) the TC the ageni takes 'a deliberate risk in the hope that the risk does not cause
injury' W2 -i).
A good definition ofthis noticin—ai set out in the criminal law oft lie State ol'NewYork— can be found in
RLile 15.5(3) of the New York Penal Code, whereby 'A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to
a circumstance described by a statute defining an offence when he M aware of and consciously disregards a
iubstantial and unjuiitifiahle risk lhat i,uch result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must
be of inch nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
conduet that a reasonable person would abserve in the situation.' See also Art. 2(Z)(c) of the US Model
Penal Code cited above, at n. 6.
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9.4.4), as the ICTY AC held in Tadic (AD, what is required is that, under the
circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that a n on -concerted crime
might be perpetrated by one or other members of a group or collectivity jointly
pursuing a criminal intent; and (ii) the accused consciously and deliberately took
that risk 111217-8).
The notion of recklessness was also applied in many cases brought before
German courts after the Second World War. These courts, which administered
criminal justice under Control Council Law no. 10, were seized with crimes
against humanity committed by Germans against other Germans. Most cases
concerning to the Gestapo, with alI the ensuing inhuman consequences. In many
cases these courts held that, for the denunciation to amount to a crime against
humanity, it was not necessary for the author of the denunciation to foresee and
will all the nefarious consequences of his act; it was sufficient that he be aware of
the authoritarian and arbitrary system of Nazi violence then prevailing in
Germany and of the consequent risk that the victim would be subjected to
persecution and great suffering. In this connection the German Supreme Court in
the British Occupied Zone employed the German equivalent of the notion of
recklessness, namely Eventualwrwtz. (or bedingter Vorsatz).60
60 For instance, one can mention K. and Afi, decided by the Offenburg Tribunal (Lundgerkht) on 4 June
1946.1 nJan uary 1944, K„ the principal accused, a member of the Naii pa rty,ow a din tier with friends and
atquaintancJi had a discussion with KBnningLr,a soldier who wns on linme lei'/e. Already tipsy, Konninger
inveighed against th« German leadership, noting among other things that the war was about to be lo.». A
few weeks later K. reported Konoinger'i, tirade to various piTions including some dignitaries attending a
party nice t ing at a restaurant.Asa result, the Geslapo arrested Kunningeramibrouglilhini lo trial. In fulv
1944 he was sentenced to death for defeatism and e:w«ted. Hefoi-i; the 0 [Ten burg courl K.submilted that
he had not intended lo havrthe victim prosecuted and punished for his utterances. The court held, how-
ever, lhat when hi.' reported Ills statementH to the parlv meeting, 'he must expect that his words would
have adverse cr.in sequences for Konninger. lhe accustii cau.sed proceedings against Ki:)nning[;r to be
instituted, witnesses to be heard, and the victim i-'ventuallv lo be sentenced. [I is entirely credible tlial the
accused K did Jiot intend all lhat. However, he was to expect tliat this would be the result ofhis tall; a [the
restaurant. Hi must foresee thii, result. He tacilli,' approved it. There was therefore reel: less ness on his
part' i(i7). The court found K. guilty of a crime agninut humanity (persecution oil p»litica] grounds) under
Arlicle l[[l)(cl of0.inirn! Council Law no. 10.
A very similar case is  IV., brought before the Tribumi ot'Waldshut (judgment of 16 Pebruarv  19-I'J at
147).                                                                                                ' '    '
K-, decided on 2? July 1948 bv the GermaJ: liuprenie Court in the British Occupied Zone, is also
intenisting. In Februar)' 19Ui the accused, a member iifthe \\'affen SS working at the headquarters (if the
Gesl,lp[i in 1:1., liaj denounced at his headquarters a Ir·ir·j h businessman (M.) because the latler had gone
lo the apartnieni of 3 non-lew. The denunciation led to the lew being taken iiUi:i preventive custody tor
three weeks, rh e ace u scij wa s fo undg LI illy of a crime against human it ~ On appeal I he Supreme
Court con firmed the judgment. 1.1 heid that under the relevant rules the a;cuaed had engaged in 'offensive
conduct that was conscious and deliberate', he inuit he aware thal he IrBi ' h unding over lhe viclim
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The Supreme Court in the British Occupied Zone also required recklessness in
other cases not dealing with denunciations. For instance, in L. and others (the
so-called Pig-cart parade case) the events had occurred on 5 May 1933. In a
parade by SA (assault troopers) through the main streets of a small German
town a prominent socialist senator and a Jewish inhabitant were publically
humiliated and subjected to inhuman treatment (they were led along in a pig cart,
with demeaning inscriptions hung around their necks and lucre vilified in various
ways). The defendants took part in the parade. The- Court held that, as far as the
involvement of three accused went, 'it was inconceivable' that they, who were old
officials of the Nazi party, 'did not at least think it possible and consider that in the
case at issue, through their participation, persons were being assaulted by &
system of violence and injustice; more is not required for the mental element' (at
232). In contrast, in the case of another defendant, who had simply followed the
profession among the onlookers and in civilian clothes, the Court held that he
was not guilty because he 'had not participated in causing the offence nor had he
at least entertained dolus eventualis in taking part in the causation of the offence
(at 234).61 It would thus seem that, according to the Court at least, some of the
defendants took an unjustified risk of the victims being assaulted.
61 Another significant case is !'. and others. On the night after Germany partial capitulation (5 May 1945)
four young German marines had tried to escape from Denmark back to Germany. The next day the were
caught by Danes and delivered to the German troops, who court-martialled andsentenced three of them to
death for desertion; on the very day of the general capitulation of Germany, i.d. 10 may three were
executed. The German Supreme Court t'iiundthal some or the partidpanis in the tria[ belore th Court-
Martial were guiltv of'complifitv in a crime against humailitv. According to the Supreme Cour the glaring
discrepancy between the utTence and the punishment proved that the execution of the thre marinei had
constituted a clear manifestation of lhe Nazis' brutal and intimidatorv justice. The acispCJ formed by the
defendants involved a crime against humanity. As for the mental element nfthe crime, th Cwn held that
intent [indisp stably present in the Mse ofthejudgei who had sentenced the marines t death and of the
military commander who had confirmed the sentence and ordered the execution) was ne nectssari I yri.-
quired;reckles.s ness, tori ii slanct in the case of the prosecutor, wassuffident:'itis)efficient ft tile defendant
concerned to hare taken into account the poi-sibility and have consented to the lad that h conduct would
contribute to cause the resulting biiling' (124).
In Eschner. the accused, an SS officer who had he!d an important position in the roncentration camp (
Gross-RoseniKIween 1 "41 and 1945, was ace used .among other things, of having requei.tedKapo V., a
crin- inal byprofession, to 'get rid of a camp inmate who had tried to escape; the inmate had probably died.
1h Wdi-zburg Tribunal held that the accused knew the violent behaviour ofKapd and 'appruvingly took int
account that the inmate might suffer death as a result of the intended ill-treatment Thus he willed recklessi
the death ol'a man contrary to law' However, in view of the fact t hat the in mate's death was not certain, th
court found the accused guilty of 'attempted murder' by recl;lessnei,s (253),
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As for the case law of international tribunals, it bears mentioning blaskic (where
the AC held that to establish liability under Article 7(1.1 of the ICTY Statute for
ordering the commission of a crime, it is required that a person 'orders an act or
omission with the awareness of a substantial likelihood that a crime.' will be
committed in the execution of that order', because ordering with such awareness
has to be regarded a.", accepting the crime', at 42) and Stakic (where the TC
held that recklessness or dolus eventuatis could suffice for the crime of murder
as a war crime and for extermination as a crime against humanity, at §§587 and
642).62
2.14. CULPABLE OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE
Generally speaking, negligence entails that the person (i) is expected or required
to abide by certain standards of conduct or take certain specific precautions with
which any reasonable person should comply; (ii) acts in disregard of these
standards or precautions; and (iii) either (a) does not advert at all to the risk of
harm to another person involved in his conduct, which falls short of the standards
or precautions (simple negligence), or (b) is aware of that risk but believes that it
will not occur, and in addition takes a conduct that is blatantly at odds with the
prescribed standards (gross negligence). Mere negligence is the least degree of
culpability. Normally it is not sufficient for individual criminal liability to arise.
It would seem that, given the intrinsic nature of international crimes (which
always amount to serious attacks on fundamental values) in ICL negligence
operates as a standard of liability only when it reaches the threshold of gross or
culpable negligence (culpa gravis). Given the nature o {international crimes, the
mental element under discussion only becomes relevant when there exist some
specific conditions relating to the; objective elements of the crime; that is, the
values attacked are fundamental and the harm caused is serious.63
62 As for the ICTR, fee for in stance Musems, TJ, al ~ I Sand Knyishfma andRuirniiana, Tl, at 614h.
63 This definition ofciilpible negligence Is in some respects at varianM with that upheld in some cominon
law and dvU law countries. For instance, under the Mew York Penal Cude, Rule ljrla(4): 'A person acts
with c r iminal negligence with respect n:i a result or to a circumstance described by a staluie defining an
oft'i.'nce when fae tails to perceive a nubstanliai and unjustifiable risk that such ri-'su!! ~r·ill ocLur or that
su(.'hcircumi.tance eii.ts. lht: risk must be of such nature and degree that I he failure to Fcrceir·e it consti-
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That national legal system may penalize a mental state that is less grave than
the one criminalized at the international level should not be surprising. Given the
consequences following from, and the stigma inherent in, international crimes, it
is only natural than international criminal rules should be more exacting, with
regard to subjective requirements of the offence, than some? National criminal
legislation.64
Gross negligence is clearly required by the customary rules on superiors'
responsibility (see infra 10.4) whereby a superior is responsible for the crimes of
his subordinates if he did not know but 'should have known' that they were about
to commit, or were committing, or had committed crimes. In this case, the
superior was required to become cognizant of, and verify, all the information
necessary to monitor the activities and the conduct of his subordinates. If he
disregards these standards of conduct, he acts with gross negligence and is
tuMs .i gross deviation from the standard oCcare that a reason a bit- person woJld i)bserve in the situatiou.'
Clearly, lhis definition corresponds to what we termed above 'inadvertent negtigeiici:'', or culpa (L'I·ii (see
iupra.S.S).
64 Case law bears oat the above international notion, )ohn G. Schultf.i case brought betore a US Court of
Military Appeals in 1952, deserves mention. Sthulti, driving a car, had struck and killed two [apanese
pedestrians in 1950 in Japan (although lapan was Mill under US military occupation, this of course was not
a war crime). The US Court stated the following: 'A careful pt'rusal of the penal codes of most cirilized
nations leads us to the conclulion that homicide involving le»s than culpable negligence is not universally
recognizid asanoffense. Even in those Americanjurisdictiotif— still relatively few in numbiir— whicJi
have given statutory recognition to either negligent homiride or vehicular homicide, the degree of
negligence required is often held to be 'culpable' or 'gross'—the same as that required for involuntary
manslaughter. Imposing crirninai liability for less than culpable negligence is a relatively new concepi in
criminal law and has not, as yet, been given universal acceptance bycivilized nations', 4 CMR (1952), lfrl,
115-1 d (CMA Lexlsfi61). On this case see also in/r(l,4.3, n. &. A definition of negligence as a possible
subjective element in international crimes can be found in the instructionsgivenbytheJudgeAdvocate to a
Canadian Court Mania I in Major A. G. StivBfif.Thedelendant had, among other thing, been charged with
negligently performing his military duty while in Somalia in 1993. Theparticulars of his negligence were
stated to be that he 'by issuing an instruction to his subordinates (hat prisoners, could be abused, [he) failed
to properly exercise command over h is sutMirdinates, as it was his day to do'. As a result of his
instructions, soineofhis subordinates had beaten up and killed a Somali civilian. In instructing the Court
Martial on the notion ot negligence, the Judge Advocate stated: '(A)s a matter of law the alleged negligence
must go bevond mere error in judgment. Mere error in ludgment does not constitute negligence. The
alleged negligence must be either accompanied b\'a lackofzeal in the performance of the military duty
imposed, or it must amount to a measure of indifference or a wain ot'care by Major Seward in the matter at
hand, or to an intentional failure on his part to take appropriate precautionary measures' (at 1081). The
Court Martial found the defendant guilty on this count. In commenting on this finding by the Court Martial,
the Court Martial Appeal Court ofCanada stated that the Court Martial 'must be taken to have concluded
that the respondent did issue an "abuse" order and that his doing so was no mere error i:i  judgment. He
himself confirmed that he was taking a "calculated  risk" in doing so and  that nothing in his training or in
Canadian doctrine would permit the use ofthat word duringthe giving oforders' (ibid.). Arguably,
recklessness more than negligence was at issue in this case.
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consequently liable for dereliction of duty, if all the other conditions are fulfilled.65
Culpable negligence has also been considered sufficient in other circumstances.
A case where a court held negligence to be the mental element of a war crime is
Stinger and Cruises, decided in 1921 by the Leipzig Supreme Court.66 Another
court also took into account negligence, this time with regard to crimes against
humanity: Hinselmann and others, decided by the British Court of Appeal in the
British Zone of Control in Germany, in 1947. A Trial Court had convicted a group
of German doctors and police officers of crimes against humanity, under Control
Council Law no. 10 (Article l(c)). It had found that they were concerned with
carrying out, in 1944-45, sterilization operations 'on a number of persons of
gypsy blood, to prevent the increase of the race' (three doctors had performed
the operations and two police officers had induced persons to sign consent to the
operations by threats). Counsel for one of the doctors, Giinther (a gynecological
specialist); argued that there was no evidence that he knew that the gypsies
were being sterilized on account of their race. In counsel’s view, the case against
Günter could only be one of negligence; however, negligence was not sufficient
to constitute an offence under Control Council Law no. 10, which required
65 Among the cases that maybe cited to support the applicability of gross negligence in cases of superior
responsibility, Schmitt stands out. This case, concerning the commander of a concentration camp in
Benkock, was brought before the Brussels Military Tribunal, which held in 1950 that 'although it is true
that generally speaking jurisprudence does not consider that, in case of murder, simple lack of action or
negligence are punishable, this however does no longer apply when a persons failure to act amounts to the
non-fulfilment of a duty (...) in this case failure to take action amounts to material conduct sufficient for the
realisation of criminal intent' (at 936-7).
66 In the battle near Saarburg in Loraine between the French and the German Army, on 21 August 1914 the
accused, Crusius, a captain of the German army, thought that Major-General Stenger had verbally ordered
the killing of all French wounded. Acting under this erroneous assumption, he passed on this alleged order
to his company. The Court concluded that Crusius was guilty of causing 'death through culpable
negligence' (fahrlassige Totung) and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment. The Court held that: 'the
act of will which in the further course of events caused the objectively illegal outcome [...] included an act
of carelessness which ran contrary to his duty, and neglect of the consideration required in the situation at
hand which was perfectly reasonable to expect from the accused. Had he applied the care required of him,
he would not have failed to notice what many of his men realized immediately, namely that the
indiscriminate killing of all wounded represented an outrageous and by no means justifiable war
manoeuvre (...] Captain Crusius was certainly familiar with the provisions of the field operating procedures
which require a written order as the basis for troop command by the higher troop leaders, as well as the drill
manual which makes the written order a rule, especially concerning orders for brigades and higher. This
circumstance is also not entirely without significance, particularly in view of the personality of the accused
who was described as a diligent, zealous and benevolent officer. In view of the accused's background and
personality, he should have anticipated the illegal outcome which was easily demonstrated even if his
mental and emotional states at the time were to be fully taken into consideration (at 2567-8)
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extremely gross negligence. Hence, Günter, if he were to be convicted at all,
could only be convicted under section 230 of the German Criminal Code.67 The
Prosecutor countered that Gaunter must have known the correct procedure in the
case of sterilization, but made no enquiries, and saw no legal documents.68
The Court of Appeals found that the appellant's frame of mind amounted to
negligence: a German law of 1933, as amended in 1935, made it clear that
sterilization operations were illegal unless: (i) they were performed to avert a
serious threat to the life and health of the person operated upon, and with the
consent of that person; or (ii) they were carried out in pursuance of an order of
the Eugenics Court. The Court of Appeals noted that in the case at issue neither
of these conditions was fulfilled.69 The crucial point was, however, whether
negligence (Fahrlassigkeit) could suffice for the requisite mens rea in the case of
a crime against humanity. The Court of Appeals held that in the case at issue
there was 'no suggestion that the operations were cruelly performed, and the
evidence was inadequate to establish a degree of negligence which could have
amounted in any event to a Crime against Humanity'. It consequently reduced
the sentence of two years' imprisonment to six months.70
67 Under this provision.'Who evert hrough negligence causes bodily harm to another is punished by a
pecnniary penalty or imprisonment up to three years' (see A. Schonke, Strafgesetzbuchfur das Deutscht
Reich—Kommentar, 2nd edn (Munich and Berlin: Beck, 1944), at 484; and see 172-3 for the notion of
negligence).
68 In addition, in his view there was no difference 'in the degree of negligence required to constitute an
offence under Section 230 and that required to constitute an offence under [Control Council) Law 10'.
69 The operations were of so special a nature, and the limits within which they could be legally performed
so narrow, that Gunther was put upon his enquiry before he operated. His failure to make the necessary
enquiry was negligence. Although 'negligence' as used by British lawyers (in English law there is
negligence when the conduct of a person fails to measure up to an objective standard and the person ought
to have foreseen the risk involved in his conduct; see, for instance. Smith and Hogan, 90-6.) and
'Fahrlasfigkeit' as used by German lawyers are not co-extensive terms [in German law there is negligence
when a person, acting in breach of a duty of precaution brings about a certain result he has not willed, and
this result occurs either because the person is not cognizant of the breach of duty, or else is aware that the
breach may occur, but trusts that the result will not materialize; see, for instance, lescheck, Lehrbuch, at
563) there was undoubtedly Fahrlassigkeit on Giinthers part; and the sterilization of the persons operated
upon was a bodily injury.' (66-60)
70 As mentioned above, counsel for the appellant had argued that negligence, if any, on the part of Gflnther
was not serious enough to constitute an offence under Control Council Law no. 10; German lawwas
therefore applicable. However, under this law, unless the rule under which a person was charged expressly
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It may be clearly inferred from this finding that, for the Court of Appeals, crimes
against humanity may result from negligence, provided, however, that negligence
is gross.
Finally, it should be pointed out that there are also cases where culpable
negligence has been so conceived of as to border on recklessness.71
2.15 THE ICC STATUTE
As stated above, the ICC Statute contains the only international provision setting
out general definition of the subjective element of international crimes: Article 30.
It provision envisages intent and knowledge as the only mental elements of those
stated that negligence was sufficient, the person could not be convicted of a criminal offence if the act
constituting it was merely negligent and not intentional. The Court dismissed this argument. The Court of
Appeal stated as follows: 'We do not accept the proposition that this is necessarily so [namely that
negligence may not amount to the requisite subjective element unless this is explicitly provided for in the
relevant law] where a charge under IControl Councill Law 10 is tried in a Control Commission Court; but,
in the present case, there is no suggestion that the operations were cruelly performed, and the evidence was
inadequate to establish a degree of negligence which could have amounted in any event to a Crime against
Humanity.' The Court consequently set aside Gunther's conviction under Control Council Law no. 10 and
substituted it with a finding that he was guilty of an offence under section 230 of the German Criminal
Code (at 60).
71 Thus in Medina, in 1971 a US military judge issued to the Court-Martial instructions with regard to
command responsibility arising in a case where the commander allegedly had actual knowledge that troops
or other persons subject to his control were in the process of committing war crimes (killing of innocent
civilians in the Vietnamese village of My Lai), and wrongfully failed to take the necessary and reasonable
steps to ensure compliance with the laws of war. The military judge pointed out that the legal requirements
of international law 'placed upon a commander require actual knowledge plus a wrongful failure to act*. He
then stated that the omission to exercise control must constitute culpable negligence and then pointed out
that 'culpable negligence is a degree of carelessness greater than simple negligence. For purposes of making
the distinction between the two, you are advised that simple negligence is the absence of due care. that is an
omission by a person who is under a duty to exercise due care, which exhibits a lack of that degree of care
for the safety of others which a reasonable, prudent commander would have exercised under the same or
similar circumstances. Culpable negligence, on the other hand, is a higher degree of negligent omission,
one that is accompanied by a gross, reckless, deliberate, or wanton disregard for the foreseeable
consequences to others of that omission; it is an omission showing a disregard of human safety. It is higher
in magnitude than simple inadvertence, but falls short of intentional wrong. The essence of wanton or
reckless conduct is intentional conduct by way of omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct
involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to others' (at 1732-4). See also above,
the Major A. G. Seward case (cited in nt. 26)
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crime (as set forth in Articles 6-8 of the ICC Statute). Article 30(1) provides that
'Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material
elements are committed with intent and knowledge.' Paragraph 2 then defines
those two notions.72
Article 30 raises two problems. First, it does not refer expressly to recklessness
or culpable negligence, although recklessness {dolus eventualis) may be held to
encompassed by the definition of intent laid down in paragraph 2, Secondly, it
always requires both intent and knowledge, whereas there may be cases where
only intent, as defined in the provision, is sufficient, and other cases where
instead only knowledge (which, according to the definition given in the provision,
may be regarded as equivalent to recklessness) would be sufficient.
To solve the first problem one may focus on the initial proviso of the rule (‘unless
otherwise provided'): whenever a provision of the Statute or a rule of international
customary law requires a different mental element, this will be considered
sufficient by the Court. For instance, Article 28(a) (i) provides for the
responsibility of superiors where the 'military commander or person [...) owing to
the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces (under his
effective command, control or authority] were committing or about to commit [...]
crimes'. Plainly, this provision envisages culpable negligence (see supra, 3.8 as
well as 11.4.4). This case would be covered by the proviso just referred to.
Nonetheless, when a specific substantive provision of the Statute does not
specify the mental element required, one may deduce from Article 30 that one
must take that substantive provision to require intent and knowledge. In this
manner the Statute may eventually require a mental element higher than that set
72 Para. 2 provides that: 'For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where (a) in relation to conduct,
that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) in relation to a consequence, that person means to cause
that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.'
Para. 3 provides that: 'For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be
construed accordingly,'
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down in customary law. Indeed, differences may arise between customary
international law and treaty law whenever a customary rule concerning a specific
crime considers as a sufficient requirement for that crime a subjective element
other than intent (for instance, culpable negligence).
As for the second problem (the use of the conjunctive 'and'), one ought to note
that in international law the standard of construction applies that a purely
grammatical construction must yield to a logical interpretation whenever this is
dictated by the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) and is
consonant with the object and purpose of the rule. It is therefore admissible to
construe the word 'and' as also including the word 'or' when this is logically
required.73
2.16 JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE MENTAL ELEMENT
As in national law, in ICL a culpable state of mind is normally proved in court I
circumstantial evidence. In other words, one may infer from the facts of the ca:
whether or not the accused, when acting in a certain way, willed, or was aware,
that his conduct would bring about a certain result. To put it differently, one may
normal deduce from factual circumstances whether the action contrary to ICL
was accompanied by a mental attitude denoting some degree of fault.
This is the position taken by national and international courts. For instance, one
can refer to the statement made by the Judge Advocate addressing a Canadian
Military Court in Johann Neitz. The question at issue was whether the accused,
who had shot at a member of the Royal Canadian Air Force taken prisoner by
Germans, wounding the prisoner without killing him, had intended to cause his
death. The Judge Advocate put the issue to the Military Court as follows:
Intention is not capable of positive proof, and, accordingly, it is inferred from the
overt acts. Evidence of concrete acts is frequently much better evidence than the
73 An application of this rule of construction was made by an ICTY TC in Tadii, decision of 7 May 1997,
§§712-13.
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evidence of an individual for, after all, an individual alone honestly knows what he
is thinking. The Court cannot look into the mind to see what is going on there.
The individual may protest vehemently what his intentions were, but such
evidence is subject to human frailty and human perfidy. Accordingly, intention is
presumed from the overt act. It is a simple application of the principle that actions
speak louder than words, and, I add, often more truthfully. It is also a well-
established maxim of law that a man is presumed to have intended the natural
consequences of his acts. If one man deliberately strikes another over the head
with an axe, the law presumes he intended to kill the other. Similarly so, if one
man deliberately shoots a gun at another, an intent to kill will be presumed [...] If
a man points a gun at another and deliberately fires, it is presumed that he
intends to kill the other. However, this is a presumption of fact, but it may be
rebutted' (at 209). (The Court found the accused had committed a war crime with
intent to kill and sentenced him to life imprisonment.)74
Interestingly, in Jelisic an ICTY TC, in order to establish whether the accused
had entertained the special intent required for genocide, examined various
statements he had made to the effect that he wished to exterminate Muslims, for
he hated them and wanted to kill them all (§§102-4). The Court concluded,
however, that these utterances revealed a disturbed personality and
consequently, for lack of the requisite special intent, the acts of the accused were
not 'the physical expression of an affirmed resolve to destroy in whole or in part a
74 A court of Bosnia and Herzegovina took the same approach in Tepei with regard to intent. In setting out
the mental element of the crimes of torture and murder of civilians, the Sarajevo Cantonal Court stated that
"The accused perpetrated the crime deliberately; he was aware that together with others from Rajko Kuj's
group he was taking part in torture, beatings and killing ofprisoners. Since the accused repeated these
actions many times, he definitely wished to do that and was aware that repeated beatings ofprisoners with
hard objects, fists and boots in vital parts of their bodies can certainly result in their death. By repeating
these actions it is evident that the accused wanted these people killed' (at 7).
With regard to the subjective element of command responsibility, an ICTY TC pointed out in Delalic and
others, that it could be established 'by way of circumstantial evidence. The TC pointed out that 'in the
absence of direct evidence of the superior's knowledge of the offences committed by his subordinates, such
knowledge cannot be presumed, but must be established by way of circumstantial evidence' (8386).
Again, with regard to 'knowledge' that the subordinates were committing or had committed crimes in the
case of command responsibility, an ICTY TC stated in Kordic and Cerkez that, 'Depending on the position
of authority" held by a superior, whether military or civilian, dejure or defacto, and his level of
responsibility in the chain of command, the evidence required to demonstrate actual knowledge may be
different. For instance, the actual knowledge of a military commander may be easier to prove considering
the fact that he will presumably be part of an organized structure with established reporting and monitoring
systems. In the c&seo{ defacto commanders of more informal military structure, or of civilian leaders
holding defacto positions of authority, the standard of proof will be higher' (§428).
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group as such' (§107). The AC, while holding that the TC had erred in acquitting
the defendant of genocide (Jelisic, Aj, §§53-72), surprisingly did not uphold the
Appellant's request that the case be remitted to a TC for retrial (§§73-7). It held
that such remittal was 'not in the interests of justice' (§77).
2.17 THE NOTION
War crimes are serious violations of customary or treaty rules belonging to the
corpus of the international humanitarian law of armed conflict (IHL). As the AC of
the ICTY stated in Tadic (IA), (i) war crimes must consist of 'a serious
infringement' of an international rule, that is to say 'must constitute a breach of a
rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave
consequences for the victim'; (ii) the rule violated must either belong to the
corpus of customary law or be part of an applicable treaty; and (iii) 'the violation
must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal
responsibility of the person breaching the rule' (§94); in other words, the conduct
constituting a serious breach of international law, in addition to being an
interstate violation involving the responsibility of the state to which the
serviceman belongs, must be criminalized.
In the same decision the AC gave the following example of a non-serious
violation: 'the fact of a combatant simply appropriating a loaf of bread in an
occupied village' would not amount to such a breach, 'although it may be
regarded as falling foul of the basic principle laid down in Art. 46(1) of the [1907]
Hague Regulations [on Land Warfare] (and the corresponding rule of customary
international law) whereby "private property must be respected" by any army
occupying an enemy territory' (§94).
War crimes may be perpetrated in the course of either international or internal
armed conflicts; that is, civil wars or large-scale and protracted armed clashes
breaking out within a sovereign state. Traditionally, war crimes were held to
embrace only violations of international rules regulating war proper; that is
international armed conflicts and not civil wars. After the ICTY AC decision in
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Tadic (IA) of 1995 (see infra, 4.3), it is now widely accepted that serious
infringements of international humanitarian law on internal armed conflicts may
also be regarded as amounting to war crimes proper, if the relevant conduct has
been criminalized. As evidence of this new trend, suffice it to mention Article 8(2)
(c-f) of the ICC Statute.
IHL is a vast body of substantive rules comprising what are traditionally called
'the law of the Hague' and 'the law of Geneva'. The former set of rules includes
some Hague Conventions of 1899 or 1907 on international warfare. These rules,
in addition to providing for the various categories of lawful combatants, primarily
regulate combat actions (means and methods of warfare) and the treatment of
persons who no longer take part in armed hostilities (prisoners of war). The so-
called law of Geneva' comprises the various Geneva Conventions (at present the
four Conventions of 1949 plus the two Additional Protocols of 1977), and is
essentially designed to regulate the treatment of persons who do not, or no
longer, take part in armed conflict (civilians, the wounded, the sick and
shipwrecked, as well as prisoners of war). Furthermore, Article 3, common to the
four Geneva Conventions and the Second Additional Protocol, regulate, internal
armed conflict. The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 also regulates the various
classes of lawful combatants, thereby updating the Hague rules. In addition, the
First Additional Protocol of 1977 to some extent updates those rules of the
Hague law which deal with means and methods of combat, for the sake of
sparing civilians as far as possible from armed hostilities. It is thus clear that the
traditional distinction between the two sets of rules is fading away; even
assuming it has not become obsolete, its purpose now is largely descriptive.
War crimes may be perpetrated by military personnel against enemy servicemen
or civilians, or by civilians against either members of the enemy armed forces or
enemy civilians (for instance, in occupied territory). Conversely, crimes
committed by servicemen against their own military (whatever their nationality)
do not constitute war crimes.' Such offences may nonetheless fall within the
ambit of the military law of the relevant belligerent.
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2.18 THE NEED FOR A LINK BETWEEN THE OFFENCE AND AN ARMED
CONFLICT
Criminal offences, to amount to war crimes, must also have a link with an
international or internal armed conflict. Many courts, chiefly the ICTY2 and the
ICTR, have restated this proposition, which can easily be deduced from the
whole body of international humanitarian law of armed conflict. This applies in
particular to offences committed by civilians, although courts have also required
the link or nexus with an armed conflict in the case of crimes perpetrated by
members of the military.
Special attention should be paid to crimes committed by civilians against other
civilians. They may constitute war crimes, provided there is a link or connection
between the offence and the armed conflict. In the absence of such a link, the
breach simply constitutes an 'ordinary' criminal offence under the law applicable
in the relevant territory.
2.19 ESTABLISHING WHETHER A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF IHL HAS BEEN
CRIMINALIZED
As pointed out above, in order for a serious violation of IHL to become a war
crime, it is necessary that the violation be criminalized. The question then
becomes one of how to determine whether this is the case.
The point of departure is the observation that the failure of the relevant rules of
IHL to provide for any courts or criminal proceedings in the event of the rule
being breached is not determinative of the issue. What matters is that criminal or
military courts have in fact adjudicated breaches of IHL. Various courts rightly
held this view.
A second, general and preliminary, remark concerns the need to avoid the
following simplistic proposition: to determine whether a particular act may be
termed as war crime, one need only establish that the act breaches IHL, since all
violations of the laws of war are war crimes under national law and military
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manuals. The Judge Advocate at a Canadian Military Court pronouncing in 1946
on a war crime in Johann Nets took this view. After noting that, under Canadian
law, a war crime was any 'violation of the laws and usages of war committed
during any war in which Canada had been or may be engaged at any time', the
Judge Advocate added
The test of criminal responsibility is therefore not properly applicable, and the
issue upon any charge is not 'did the accused commit a crime?' as we
understand the word 'crime' under our criminal law, but 'did he violate the laws
and usages of war'? (195-6).
This approach is not convincing, as not all violations of international humanitarian
law amount to war crimes, as pointed out in Tadic (IA) (§94), although they may
give rise to state responsibility.
These points having been established, several situations need to be
distinguished. First, it may be that a violation has been consistently considered a
war crime by national or international courts (this is, for example, true for the
most blatant violations, such as unlawfully killing prisoners of war or innocent
civilians, shelling hospitals, refusing quarter, killing shipwrecked or wounded
persons, and so on). The existence of war crimes cases on a particular matter
may sometimes be considered sufficient for holding the breach to be a war crime.
However, strictly speaking, the existence of a few (possibly isolated) war crimes
decisions may not be enough. It would be better if it were possible to show that
the breach is considered a war crime under customary international law, in which
case there would have to be widespread evidence that states customarily
prosecute such breaches as war crimes and that they do so because they
believe themselves to be acting under a binding rule of international law (opinio
juris).
A second possible instance is that a breach is termed a war crime by the Statute
of an international tribunal. In this case, even if the breach has never been
brought before a national or international tribunal, it may justifiably be regarded
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as a war crime—or, at least, as a war crime falling under the jurisdiction of that
international tribunal.
A third, and more difficult, category is when the case law and statutes of
international tribunals are absent or silent on the matter. In such a case, how is
one to determine whether violating a prohibition of international humanitarian law
amounts to a war crime? In light of the case law (see List and others (Hostages
case), John G. Schultz, Tadic (IA), and Blaskic, to which I will presently return)
and the general principles of ICL, one is entitled, in seeking an answer to the
question, to examine: (i) military manuals; (ii) the national legislation of states
belonging to the major legal systems of the world; or, if these elements are
lacking, (iii) the general principles of criminal justice common to nations of the
world, as set out in international instruments, acts, resolutions and the like; and
(iv) the legislation and judicial practice of the state to which the accused belongs
or on whose territory the crime has allegedly been committed.
Let us now take a look at how courts have gone about this matter.
In List and others (Hostages case) the defendants were high-ranking officers in
the German armed forces charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity.
They were accused of offences committed by troops under their command during
the occupation of Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Norway, these offences
mainly being reprisal killings, purportedly carried out in an attempt to maintain
order in the occupied territories in the face of guerrilla opposition, or wanton
destruction of property not justified by military necessity. They claimed that
Control Council Law no. 10, on the basis of which they stood accused, was an ex
post facto act and retroactive in nature. The Tribunal rejected the contention,
holding that the crimes defined in that Law were crimes under pre-existing rules
of international law, 'some by conventional law and some by customary law'. It
went on to state that the war crimes at issue were such under the Hague
Regulations of 1907 and then added
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In any event, the practices and usages of war which gradually ripened into
recognized customs with which belligerents were bound to comply, recognized
the crimes specified herein as crimes subject to punishment. It is not essential
that a crime be specifically defined and charged in accordance with a particular
ordinance, statute or treaty if it is made a crime by international convention,
recognized customs and usages or war, or the general principles of criminal
justice common to civilized nations generally (634-5).
The Tribunal then noted that the acts at issue were traditionally punished, adding
that, although no courts had been established nor penalties provided for the
commission of these crime, 'this is not fatal to their validity. The acts prohibited
are without deterrent effect unless they are punishable as crimes' (635).
It was the AC of the ICTY that best addressed the issue under discussion, in
Tadic (IA). The question in dispute was whether the accused could be held
criminally liable for breaches of international humanitarian law allegedly
committed in an internal armed conflict; in other words, whether he could be held
responsible for war crimes perpetrated in a civil war. The AC first considered
whether there were customary rules of international humanitarian law governing
internal armed conflicts, and answered in the affirmative (§§96-127). It then
asked itself whether violations of those rules could entail individual criminal
responsibility. For this purpose, the Court examined national cases, military
manuals, national legislation, and resolutions of the UN Security Council. It
concluded in the affirmative (§§128-34) and then added that in the case at issue
this conclusion was fully warranted 'from the point of view of substantive justice
and equity', because violations of IHL in internal armed conflicts were punished
as criminal offences in the countries concerned, that is both the old Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, As the Court
noted, 'Nationals of the former Yugoslavia as well as, at present, those of Bosnia-
Herzegovina were therefore aware, or should have been aware, that they were
amenable to the jurisdiction of their national criminal courts in cases of violation
of international humanitarian law' (§135; see also §136).
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An ICTY TC returned to the question in Blaskic. The defense contended that
violations of common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (on internal
armed conflict) did not entail criminal liability. The TC dismissed this contention
by noting, first, that those violations were envisaged in Article 3 of the ICTY
Statute, conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal, and secondly, that the criminal
code of Yugoslavia, taken over in 1992 as the criminal code of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (the place where the alleged offences had been committed),
provided that war crimes perpetrated either in international or in internal armed
conflicts involved the criminal liability of the perpetrator (§176).8
2.20 THE OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS
2.20.1 GENERAL
In order to identify the main legal features of the prohibited conduct, it is
necessary to consider in each case the content of the substantive rule that has
been allegedly breached. This should not be surprising. No authoritative and
legally binding list of war crimes exists in customary law. An enumeration can
only be found in Article 8 of the ICC Statute, which is not, however, intended to
codify customary law. It should also be noted, more generally, that the principle
of legality or nulium crimen fine lege (traditionally laid down in national legal
systems, particularly those of civil law countries) is upheld in ICL only in a limited
way (see supra, 2.3). Hence in each case the objective element of the crime can
essentially be inferred from the substantive rule of international humanitarian law
allegedly violated.
For a subcategory of war crimes, namely those acts that are provided for in terms
and defined by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977
as 'grave breaches', a further requirement is provided for: such acts must be
committed within the context of an international armed conflict. The ICTY AC
held in Tadic (IA) that a customary rule was in statu nascendi, that is in the
process of forming, whereby 'grave breaches' could also be perpetrated in
internal armed conflicts; instead, according to fudge Abi-Saab's Separate Opinion
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in that case, such a rule had already evolved. At present, in light of the recent
trends in the legislation or practice of states, the contention is perhaps warranted
that a customary rule has indeed emerged. However, it would seem plausible to
interpret this rule to the effect that it only confers on states the power to search
for and bring to trial or extradite alleged authors of grave breaches committed in
internal armed conflicts; the rule does not go so far as to also impose upon states
an obligation to seek out and try or extradite those alleged authors (as is instead
the case for grave breaches perpetrated in international armed conflicts).
2.20.2 CLASSES OF WAR CRIME
War crimes can be classified under different headings. The following
classification is based on some objective criteria, and may prove useful, although
of course it only serves descriptive purposes: (i) war crimes committed in
international armed conflicts (that is, between two or more states, or between a
state and a national liberation movement, pursuant to Article 1(4) of the First
Additional Protocol of 1977); and (ii) war crimes perpetrated in internal armed
conflicts (that is, large-scale armed hostilities, other than internal disturbances
and tensions, or riots or isolated or sporadic acts of armed violence, between
state authorities and rebels, or between two or more organized armed groups
within a state). Traditionally, states and courts have held that war crimes may
only be committed during wars proper. Violations of international law committed
in the course of internal armed conflicts were not criminalized. Thus, a glaring
and preposterous disparity existed. As stated above, in 1995, a seminal
judgment of the ICTY AC in Tadic (IA) (§§97-137) signaled a significant advance:
the AC held that war crimes could be committed not only in international armed
conflicts but also in internal armed conflicts. Since then the view has been
generally upheld and the ICC Statute definitively consecrates it in Article 8(2) (c)-
(f).
Both classes include the following:
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1.  Crimes committed against persons not taking part, or no longer taking part, in
armed hostilities. In practice by far the most numerous crimes are committed
against civilians,10 or armed resistance movements in occupied territory,11 and
include sexual violence against women.12 In particular, they are perpetrated
against persons detained in internment or concentration camps.13 They are also
committed against prisoners of war.14
In the case of international armed conflicts, serious war crimes against one of the
'protected persons' (wounded, shipwrecked persons, prisoners of war, civilians
on the territory of the Detaining Power or subject to the belligerent occupation of
an Occupying Power) or 'protected objects' provided for in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, as well as the First Additional Protocol are termed 'grave breaches'.
Grave breaches are defined in the following provisions: Articles 50, 51, 130, and
147 of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Geneva Conventions, respectively, as
well as in Article 85 of the First Additional Protocol. They include willful killing,
torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, mot justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly. The essential feature of 'grave breaches' is that they are
subject to 'universal jurisdiction' of all states parties to the Convention and the
Protocol: any contracting state is authorized as well as obliged to search for and
bring to trial—or, alternatively, extradite to a requesting state—any person
suspected or accused of a grave breach (whatever his or her nationality and the
territory where the grave breach has allegedly been perpetrated) who happens to
be on its territory.
In the case of internal armed conflict, 15 the same violations are prohibited and
may amount to a war crime if they are serious. In this connection reference
should be made to Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions,
Additional Protocol II (especially Article 4 thereof), 16 as well as Article 4 of the
ICTR Statute.17 As noted above, there is no treaty provision characterizing
violations of these rules as grave breaches' and consequently attaching to such
classification all the ensuing consequences at the procedural level (power and
duty to exercise universal jurisdiction over the alleged offender). Nor, it would
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seem, has a customary rule evolved imposing upon states (and the rebellious
group engaged in a civil war) the obligation to search for and bring to trial (or
extradite) persons suspected or accused of a grave breach perpetrated in an
internal armed conflict.
2. Crimes against enemy combatants or civilians, committed by resorting to
prohibited methods of warfare. Examples include intentionally directing attacks
against the civilian population in the combat area or individual civilians in the
combat area not taking part in hostilities; committing acts or threats of violence
the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population;
intentionally launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or
civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life,
injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects; intentionally making non-
defended localities or demilitarized zones the object of attack; intentionally
making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors de combat,
intentionally attacking medical buildings, material, medical units and transport,
and personnel; intentionally using starvation of civilians, as a method of warfare
by depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully
impeding relief supplies; intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that
such attack will cause widespread, long-term, and  severe damage to the natural
environment; utilizing the presence of civilians or other protected persons with a
view to rendering certain points, areas, or military forces immune from military
operations; declaring that no quarter will be given, that is, that enemy combatants
will be killed and not taken prisoner.
It should be noted that, the substantive rules of IHL on this matter being
purposely loose, so far very few cases have been brought before national or
international courts concerning alleged violations of rules on the conduct of
hostilities entailing the criminal liability of the perpetrators.18 Strikingly, more
cases involving the alleged breach of rules of IHL on the conduct of hostilities
have been brought before interstate courts, pronouncing on state responsibility.
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3. Crimes against enemy combatants and civilians, involving the use of
prohibited means of warfare. Examples include employing weapons, projectiles,
and materials which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering; employing poison or poisoned weapons, or asphyxiating, poisonous, or
other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices; using chemical or
bacteriological weapons; employing expanding bullets or weapons, the primary
effect of which is to injure by fragments not detectable by X-rays, or blinding laser
weapons,20 employing booby traps or land mines indiscriminately, that is, in
such away as to hit both combatants and civilians alike, or anti-personnel mines
which are not detectable; employing napalm and other incendiary weapons in a
manner prohibited by the 1980 Protocol III to the aforementioned Convention (for
instance, by making a military objective located within a concentration of civilians
the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons').
What I have pointed out above, with regard to breaches of international rules on
methods of war, a fortiori applies to violations of rules on means of warfare, the
latter category of rules being even more difficult to apply than the legal standards
on the conduct of hostilities.
4. Crimes against specially protected persons and objects (such as medical
personnel units or transport, personnel participating in relief actions,
humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross, or Red Crescent, or Red Lion
and Sun units, UN personnel belonging to peace-keeping missions, etc.).
5. Crimes consisting of improperly using protected signs and emblems (such
as a flag of truce; the distinctive emblems of the Red Cross, or Red Crescent, or
Red Lion and Sun, plus the emblem provided for in the Third Additional Protocol
of 8 December 2005 (the emblem 'composed of a red frame in the shape of a
square on edge on a white ground'); perfidious use of a national flag or of military
uniform and insignia, etc.).
6. Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years or using
them to participate actively in hostilities (in either international or internal armed
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conflicts). According to the AC of the SCSL (Norman, Decision on Preliminary
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction, §53) 'child recruitment was criminalized
before it was explicitly set out as a criminal prohibition in treaty law and certainly
by November 1996, the starting point of the time frame relevant to the
indictment'(against the defendants in that case). This proposition was restated by
a TC of the SCSL in Brima and others (§§727-8), where the elements of the
crime were set out (§729).
2.20.3 THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS
The subjective—or mental—element (mens rea) of the crime is sometimes
specified by the international rule prohibiting a certain conduct.
Thus, for instance, Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 (on
prisoners of war) enumerates among the 'grave breaches' of the Convention the
'willful killing [of prisoners of war], torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments' as well as 'willfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health' of a prisoners of war, or 'willfully depriving a prisoner of
war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in [the) Convention'. The word
'willful' obviously denotes criminal intent, namely the intention to bring about the
consequences of the act prohibited by the international rule (for instance, in the
case of 'willful killing' proof must be produced of the intention to cause the death
of the victim; in the case of 'willfully causing great suffering' it must be proved that
the perpetrator had the intention to cause great suffering, etc.). The same holds
true for other similar provisions, such as Article 147 of  the Fourth Geneva
Convention (on civilians), as well as provisions of other treaties, such as Article
15 of the 1999 Second Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict. (This provision, in enumerating the serious
violations of the Protocol entailing individual criminal liability, makes such liability
contingent upon the fact that the author of the 'offence' has perpetrated it
'intentionally'.)
One can also mention Article 85(3) of the First Additional Protocol of 1977. This
provision subordinates the criminalization of such acts as attacking civilians or
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undefended localities, or demilitarized zones, or perfidiously using the distinctive
emblem of the Red Cross, Red Crescent or Red Lion and Sun, to three
conditions: (i) the acts must be committed 'willfully'; (ii) they must be carried out
in violation of the relevant provisions of the Protocol; and (iii) they must cause
death or serious injury to body or health. Thus, the provisions clearly require
intent or at least recklessness (so- called dolus eventualis), which exists
whenever somebody, although aware of the likely pernicious consequences of
his conduct, knowingly takes the risk of bringing about such consequences (see
supra, 3.7).
For other acts, the same provision also requires 'knowledge' as a condition of
criminal liability. This, for instance, applies to launching an indiscriminate attack
affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such
attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects' (Article 85(3) (b)); or to launching an attack against works or installations
containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects' (Article
85(3) (c)). As we have seen (3.6.1), in criminal law 'knowledge' is normally part of
'intent' {dolus) and refers to awareness of the circumstances forming part of the
definition of the crime. However, in the context of the provision at issue,
'knowledge' must be interpreted to mean 'predictability of the likely consequences
of the action' (recklessness or dolus eventualis). Therefore, for an act such as
that just mentioned to be regarded as a war crime, evidence must be produced
not only of the intention to launch an attack, for instance an attack on a military
objective normally used by civilians (e.g. a bridge, a road, etc.), but also of the
foresee ability that the attack was likely to cause excessive loss of life or injury to
civilians or civilian objects. In other instances, international rules require
knowledge in the sense of awareness of a circumstance of fact, as part of
criminal intent (dolus). Thus, Article 85(3) (e) of the same Protocol makes it a
crime to willfully attack a person 'in the knowledge that he is hors de combat'.
When international rules do not provide, not even implicitly, for a subjective
element, it would seem appropriate to hold that what is required is the intent or,
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depending upon the circumstances, recklessness as prescribed in most legal
systems of the world for the underlying offence (murder, rape, torture, destruction
of private property, pillage, etc.). Often, international courts and tribunals have
gradually identified the requisite mental element based on the nature of the
underlying offence. Thus, for instance, in the case of murder as a war crime, the
jurisprudence of the ICTR and the ICTY has consistently held that what is
required is that 'the death of the victim must result from an act or omission of the
accused committed with the intent either to kill or to cause serious bodily harm in
the reasonable knowledge that it would likely result in death' (Krstic, TJ, §483;
Blaskic, T}, §217; Kvocka and others, TJ, §132; Stakic, TJ, §§584-6). In other
words, either intent or at least dolus eventualis or recklessness (see supra, 3.7)
are required.
Generally speaking, it appears admissible to contend that, for at least some
limited categories, of war crimes, gross or culpable negligence (culpa gravis)
may be sufficient; that is, the author of the crime, although aware of the risk
involved in his conduct, is nevertheless convinced that the prohibited
consequence will not occur (whereas in the case of 'recklessness' or dolus
eventualis the author knowingly takes the risk). Supra, 3.8. Indeed, the
consequent broadening of the range of acts amenable to international
prosecution is in keeping with the general object and purpose of international
humanitarian law. This modality of mens rea may, for instance, apply to cases of
command responsibility (see infra, 11.4.4), where the commander should have
known that war crimes were being committed by his subordinates. Also, it could
be contended that it may apply to such cases as wanton destruction of private
property. In contrast, it may seem difficult to consider culpable negligence a
sufficient subjective element of the crime in cases involving the taking of human
life.
2.20.4 THE DEFINITION OF WAR CRIMES IN THE ICC STATUTE
Generally speaking, the Rome Statute appears to be praiseworthy in many
respects as far as substantive criminal law is concerned. Many crimes have been
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defined with the required degree of specificity, and the general principles of
criminal liability have been set out in detail.
As far as war crimes more specifically are concerned, it is no doubt
commendable that they have been regulated in such a detailed manner.
Furthermore, the notion of war crimes has rightly been extended to offences
committed in time of internal armed conflict. However, in some areas the relevant
provision of the Rome Statute, Article 8, marks a retrograde step with respect to
existing international law.
First of all, there is a perplexing phrase, 'within the established framework of
international law', that appears in Article 8(2) (b) and (e), dealing with crimes
likely to be perpetrated while in combat (that is, crimes involving the wrongful use
of means or methods of combat), respectively in international armed conflicts and
in non-international armed conflicts. These two provisions are worded as follows:
(For the purpose of this Statute 'war crimes' means] Other serious violations of
the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict (in armed
conflicts not of an international character; lit (e)], within the established
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts.
It is notable that in the other provisions of Article 8 no mention is made of 'the
established framework of international law'. Hence one could argue that there is
only one possible explanation of this odd phrase: the offences listed in the two
aforementioned provisions are to be considered as war crimes for the purpose of
the Statute only if they are regarded as such by customary international law. In
other words, whilst for the other classes of war crimes the Statute confines itself
to setting out the content of the prohibited conduct, and the relevant provision
can thus be directly and immediately applied by the Court, in the case of the two
provisions under consideration things are different. The Court may consider that
the conduct envisaged in these provisions amounts to a war crime only if and to
the extent that general international law already regards the offence as a war
crime. It would follow, for example, that 'declaring that no quarter will be given'
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(Article 8(2)(b)(xii)) will no doubt be taken to amount to a war crime, because
indisputably denial of quarter is prohibited by customary international law and, if
effected, amounts to a war crime. By contrast, offences such as "The transfer,
directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or
parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory'
(Article 8(2)(b)(viii)) cannot ipso facto be regarded as war crimes. The Court will
first have to establish whether: (i) under general international law they are
considered as breaches of the international humanitarian law of armed conflict;
and, in addition, (ii) whether under customary international law their commission
amounts to a war crime.
Were the above explanation regarded as sound, it would follow that for two broad
categories of war crime the Statute does not set out a self-contained legal
regime, but presupposes a mandatory examination, by the Court, on a case-by-
case basis, of the current status of general international law. This method, while
commendable in some respects, may, however, entail that the Statute's
provisions eventually constitute only a tentative and interim regulation of the
matter, for the final say rests with the Court's determination. Whether or not such
a regulation is considered satisfactory, it seems indisputable that it leaves greater
freedom to sovereign states or, to put it differently, makes the net of international
prohibitions less tight and stringent.
Secondly, the legal regulation of means of warfare seems to be narrower than
that laid down in customary international law.
The use in international armed conflict of modern weapons which (a) cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; or (b) are inherently indiscriminate,
is not banned per se and therefore does not amount to a crime under the ICC
Statute—whereas arguably such use constitutes a war crime under customary
international law, at least in those instances where the weapon at issue or the
way it is used indisputably infringes those two principles or one of them." Thus, in
the event the two principles are deprived of their overarching legal value, at least
79
with regard to individuals (the principles still act as standards applicable to states,
with the consequence that those states that breach them incur international
responsibility). This seems all the more questionable because even
bacteriological weapons, which undoubtedly are already prohibited by general
international law, might be used without entailing the commission of a crime
falling under the jurisdiction of the Court (it would seem that the use of this
category of weapons is not covered by the ban on 'asphyxiating, poisonous or
other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices', contained in Article
8(2)(b)(xviii) and clearly relating to chemical weapons only).
A similar criticism may be made of the sub-article on damage to the environment.
Under Article 8(2) (b) (IV)) intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that
such attack will cause 1...] Widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantage anticipated' constitutes a war crime. It
should be noted that Article 55(1) of Additional Protocol I—to which any provision
on environmental war crimes must accord a sort of 'precedential' value—provides
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition
on the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be
expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to
prejudice the health or survival of the population.
Article 55 makes no mention of the 'excessive' or disproportionate character of
the attack nor of 'anticipated military advantage' (let alone of the 'direct overall
military advantage anticipated', a phrase that gives belligerents a very great
latitude and renders judicial scrutiny almost impossible). Moreover, in paragraph
2 it prohibits reprisals by way of attack against the natural environment. Article 8
of the ICC Statute therefore takes a huge leap backwards by allowing the
defense that 'widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment' caused by the perpetrator—not just damage, but widespread, long-
term and severe damage, intentionally caused—was not 'clearly excessive'
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(perhaps it was excessive, but not clearly excessive') in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantage anticipated. This seems indefensible.
Thirdly, one may entertain some misgivings concerning the distinction, upheld in
Article 8, between the regulation of international armed conflict, on the one side,
and internal conflicts on the other. In so far as Article 8 separates the law
applicable to the former category of armed conflict from that applicable to the
latter category, it is somewhat retrograde, as the current trend has been to
abolish the distinction and to have simply one corpus of law applicable to all
conflicts. It can be confusing— and unjust—to have one law for international
armed conflict and another for internal armed conflict.
More specific flaws may be discerned. For instance, when it comes to crimes in
internal armed conflicts perpetrated against adversaries hors de combat
(combatants who have laid down their weapons), the wounded, the sick, as well
as civilians, the relevant provision (Article 8(2)(c)) admits that such crimes may
be committed in broad categories of armed conflict (any 'armed conflict not of an
international character', excluding 'situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a
similar nature'). In contrast, the threshold required by the provision for crimes
committed in combat is higher: Article 8(2)(f)) stipulates that the relevant
provisions only apply 'to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a state
when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and
organized groups or between such groups'  (emphasis added). It follows that for
a crime belonging to the second class to be perpetrated, an added requirement is
envisaged, namely that the internal armed clash be 'protracted'. Allegedly the
main reason for this distinction is that in the first class, there already existed a set
of provisions laid down in Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions and
that furthermore these provisions are held to have turned into customary
international law. On the contrary, no previous treaty or customary rule existed
regulating methods of combat in internal armed conflict. While making progress
in this area, the majority of states gathered at the Rome Conference preferred to
tread gingerly, so the explanation goes, so as to take due account of states'
concerns. Assuming that this explanation is correct, the fact remains that a
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dichotomy was created, which appears contrary to the fundamental object and
purpose of international humanitarian law.
Furthermore, the prohibited use of weapons in internal armed conflicts is not
regarded as a war crime. This regulation does not reflect the current status of
general international law.
The above ICC Statute restrictions on modern regulation of armed conflict are
compounded by two more factors: (i) allowance has been made for superior
orders to relieve subordinates of their responsibility for the execution of orders
involving the commission of war crimes (whereas under the ICC Statute for
crimes against humanity or genocide superior orders a priori may not be
pleaded); (ii) Article 124 allows states to declare, upon becoming parties to the
Statute, that the Court's jurisdiction shall not become operative for a period of
seven years with regard to war crimes (committed by their nationals or on their
territory), whereas no similar allowance is made for other categories of
international Crime.
One is therefore left with the impression that the framers of the ICC Statute were
eager to shield their servicemen as much as possible from being brought to trial
for war crimes.
To summarize, a tentative appraisal of the provisions on war crimes of the ICC
Statute cannot but be changed: in many respects the Statute marks a great
advance in ICL, in others it proves instead faulty; in particular, it is marred by
being too obsequious to state sovereignty.
2.20.5 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
THE NOTION
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Under general international law the category of crimes against humanity is
sweeping but sufficiently well defined. It covers actions that share a set of
common features:
1.  They are particularly odious offences in that they constitute a serious attack
on human dignity or a grave humiliation or degradation of one or more persons.
2. They are not isolated or sporadic events, but are part of a widespread or
systematic practice of atrocities that either forms part of a governmental policy or
are tolerated, condoned, or acquiesced in by a government or a de facto
authority. Clearly, it is required that a single crime be an instance of a repetition
of similar crimes or be part of a string of such crimes (widespread practice), or
that it be the manifestation of a policy or a plan of violence worked out, or
inspired by, state authorities or by the leading officials of a de facto state-like
organization, or of an organized political group (systematic practice). However,
this contextual element does not necessarily mean that the individual act
amounting to crime against humanity (murder, torture, rape, persecution, etc.) be
repeated in time and space or, in other words that the same offence be
committed on a large scale. It may also be sufficient for the offence at issue
(murder, torture, persecution, etc.) to be part of a massive attack on the civilian
population (see, however, infra, 5.6), whatever the form taken by such large-
scale violence. This conclusion is warranted by the very rationale behind the
prohibition and criminalization of this category of heinous conduct (international
rules intend to proscribe and make punishable any offence against humanity,
whatever its features, which is part of massive despicable violence against
human beings, for they consider that such attacks, in whatever form, offend
against humanity). It is also borne out by case law.
3. They are prohibited and may consequently be punished regardless of whether
they are perpetrated in time of war or peace. While in 1945 a link with an armed
conflict was required, at present customary law no longer attaches any
importance to such nexus. Thus, while in 1945 the 'contextual element' of the
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crime was the existence of an armed conflict, at present such element resides in
a 'widespread or systematic' attack on the population.
4. The victims of the crime may be civilians or, where crimes are committed
during armed conflict, persons who do not take part (or no longer take part) in
armed hostilities, as well as, under customary international law (but not under the
Statute of the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC), enemy combatants.
Before embarking upon an exposition of the history of the notion and the various
classes of crimes, it may be fitting to note that to a large extent many concepts
underlying this category of crimes derive from, or overlap with, those of human
rights law (the rights to life, not to be tortured, to liberty and security of the
person, etc.), laid down in provisions of international human rights instruments
(e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights). Indeed, while ICL concerning war crimes largely derives from, or
is closely linked with, IHL, ICL concerning crimes against humanity is to a great
extent predicated upon international human rights law. IHL (which traditionally
regulates warfare between or within states), and international human rights law
(which regulates what states may do to their own citizens and, more generally, to
individuals under their control), are in essence two distinct bodies of law, each
arising from separate concerns and considerations. The former is largely rooted
in notions of reciprocity—one need not be a great humanist to be in favour of
laws of war for international conflicts, as it is simple self-interest for a state to
ensure that its soldiers are treated well in exchange for treating  enemy soldiers
well and that its civilians are spared the horrors of war. The latter is more geared
to community concerns, us it intends to protect human beings per se regardless
of their national or other allegiance.
Let us now return to the large-scale or massive nature of the crimes. That this
feature is a necessary ingredient of the crimes may be inferred from the first
provisions setting out a list of such offences. They clearly, if implicitly, required
that the offence, to constitute an attack on humanity, be of extreme gravity and
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not be a sporadic event but part of a pattern of misconduct. Subsequent case law
has consistently borne out that this is a major feature of the crimes.
The link or connection with a systematic policy of a government or a de facto
authority was emphasized by the German Supreme Court in the British zone of
occupation, in the numerous and significant decisions on crimes against
humanity it delivered in the years 1948-52. By way of illustration, one can
mention /. In 1950 the Court of Assizes of Hamburg summed up the case law in
Veit Harlan.
However, when the atrocities are part of a government policy, the perpetrators
need not identify themselves with this policy, as the District Court of Tel-Aviv held
in 1951 in Enigster (a case concerning a Jew imprisoned in a Nazi concentration
camp, who persecuted his fellow Jewish inmates). The Tel-Aviv Court rightly
stated that a person who was himself persecuted and confined in the same camp
as his victims can, front the legal point of view, be guilty of a crime against
humanity if he performs inhumane acts against his fellow prisoners. In contrast to
a war criminal, the perpetrator of a crime against humanity does not have to be a
man who identified himself with the persecuting regime or its evil intention (542).
In summary, murder, extermination, torture, rape, political, racial, or religious
persecution and other inhumane acts reach the threshold of crimes against
humanity only if they are part of a practice.4 Isolated inhumane acts of this
nature may constitute grave infringements of human rights or, depending on the
circumstances, war crimes, but fall short of the stigma attaching to crimes against
humanity. On the other hand, an individual maybe guilty of crimes against
humanity even if he perpetrates one or two of the offences mentioned above, or
engages in one such offence against only a few civilians, provided those
offences are part of a consistent pattern of misbehavior by a number of persons
linked to that offender (for example, because they engage in armed action on the
same side, or because they are parties to a common plan, or for any other similar
reason).
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2.20.6 THE ORIGIN OF THE NOTION
The notion of crimes against humanity was propounded for the first time in 1915,
on the occasion of mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. On 28 May
1915 the French, British, and Russian Governments decided to react strongly.
They therefore jointly issued a declaration staling that in law of these new crimes
of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the Allied governments announce
publicly to the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally responsible [for] these
crimes all members of the Ottoman Government and those of their agents who
are implicated in such massacres.
The expression crimes against humanity' was not in the original proposal
emanating from the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov. He had suggested
instead a protest against 'crimes against Christianity and civilization'. However,
the French Foreign Minister Delcasse took issue with the reference to crimes
against Christianity. He feared that the Muslim populations under French and
British colonial domination might take umbrage at that expression, because it
excluded them; consequently, they might feel discriminated against. Hence, he
proposed, instead of 'crimes against Christianity', 'crimes against humanity'. This
proposal was accepted by the Russian and British Foreign Ministers, and passed
into the joint Declaration. It would seem that the three states were neither aware
of, nor interested in, the general philosophical implications of the phrase they had
used. Indeed, they did not ask themselves, nor did they try to establish in
practice, whether by 'humanity' they meant 'all human beings' or rather 'the
feelings of humanity shared by men and women of modern nations' or even 'the
concept of humanity propounded by ancient and modern philosophy'. It is
probable that, although they used strong language criminalizing the perpetrators
of the massacre, in fact they were only intent on solving a short-term political
problem, as is shown by the lack of any practical follow-up to their joint protest.
In any event, various initiatives to act diplomatically on behalf of humanity
subsequently failed.
86
Similarly, the special Commission set up after the First World War proposed in its
report to the Versailles Conference that an international criminal tribunal be
created and that its jurisdiction extend to 'offences against the laws of humanity'.
However, the 'Memorandum of Reservations' submitted by the two distinguished
representatives of the United States, Robert Lansing and lames Brown Scott,
paralyzed any action by the Conference. They emphasized that while war crimes
should be punished because 'the laws and customs of war are a standard
certain' (at 64), the laws and principles of humanity are not certain, varying with
time, place and circumstance, and according, it may be, to the conscience of the
individual judge. There is no fixed and universal standard of humanity' (at 73).
This, the US delegates said, 'if for no other reason, should exclude them from
consideration in a court of justice, especially one charged with the administration
of criminal law' (at 64). As a result of the American opposition, no provision was
made for crimes against humanity.
It is notable that in 1919 a few Extraordinary Courts Martial were established in
the Ottoman Empire to try the presumed authors of the 1915-16 deportation,
massacres and looting of Armenians. According to a distinguished author, at
least 28 such Court Martial trials were held. Judging from the verdicts that are
available, those courts tried in 1919-20 officials of the Ottoman Empire under the
Ottoman Criminal Code,11 and found many of them responsible for massacres,
deportation, and looting,12 or massacres 'for the purpose of destroying and
annihilating Armenians.
During the Second World War, the Allies became aware that some of the most
heinous acts of barbarity perpetrated by the Germans were not prohibited by
traditional international law. The laws of warfare only proscribed violations
involving the adversary or the enemy populations, whereas the Germans had
also performed inhuman acts for political or racial reasons against their own
citizens (Jews, trade union members, social democrats, communists, gypsies,
members of the church), as well as other persons not covered by the laws of
warfare.14 In addition, in 1945 persecution for political or racial purposes was not
prohibited, even if perpetrated against civilians of occupied territories.
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In 1945, at the strong insistence of the USA, the Allies thus decided that a better
course of action than simply to execute all the major war criminals would be to
bring them to trial. The London Agreement embodying the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal (IMT) included a provision under which the Tribunal
was to try and punish persons guilty, among other things, of 'crimes against
humanity' (the use of this specific term was suggested by a leading scholar,
Hersch Lauterpacht, to Robert Jackson, the US delegate to the London
Conference, who was subsequently appointed chief US prosecutor at
Nuremberg).15 These crimes were defined as murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or
religious grounds in execution of or connection with any crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal [i.e. either 'crimes against peace' or 'war crimes'],
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
One major shortcoming of this definition is that it closely linked crimes against
humanity to the other two categories of offences. Article 6(c) indeed required, for
crimes against humanity to come under the jurisdiction of the IMT, that they be
perpetrated 'in execution of or in connection with' war crimes or crimes against
peace. This link was not spelled out, but it was clear that it was only within the
context of a war or of the unleashing of aggression that these crimes could be
prosecuted and punished. As rightly pointed out by Schwelb, this association
meant that only those criminal activities were punished which 'directly affected
the interests of other States' (either because these activities were connected with
a war of aggression or a conspiracy to wage such a war, or because they were
bound up with war crimes, that is crimes against enemy combatants or enemy
civilians). Plainly, in 1945 the Allies did not feel that they should legislate' in such
a way as to prohibit inhuman acts regardless of their consequences or
implications for third states.
At that stage, what happened within a national system, even if contrary to
fundamental values of humanity, was still of exclusive concern to that state if it
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had no spill-over effects on other states: it fell within its own 'domestic
jurisdiction',
Despite this limitation, the creation of the new category marked a great advance.
First, it indicated that the international community was widening the category of
acts considered of international concern. This category came to include all
actions running contrary to those basic values that are, or should be, considered
inherent in any human being (in the notion, humanity did not mean 'mankind' or
'human race' but 'the quality' of being humane).
Secondly, inasmuch as crimes against humanity were made punishable even if
perpetrated in accordance with domestic laws, the 1945 Charter showed that in
some special circumstances there were limits to the 'omnipotence of the State'
(to quote the British Chief Prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shaweross) and that 'the
individual human being, the ultimate unit of all law, is not disentitled to the
protection of mankind when the State tramples upon his rights in a manner which
outrages the conscience of mankind'.
A number of courts have explicitly or implicitly held by that Article 6(c)  of the
London Agreement simply crystallized or codified a nascent rule of general
international law prohibiting crimes against humanity. It seems more correct to
contend that that provision constituted new law. This explains both the limitations
to which the new notion was subjected (and to which reference has already been
made above) and the extreme caution and indeed reticence of the IMT in
applying the notion.
The reticence and what could be viewed as the embarrassment of the IMT on the
matter are striking. Six points, in particular, should be stressed.
First, the IMT tackled the issue of ex post facto law only with regard to crimes
against peace (in particular, aggression,', whereas it did not pronounce at all
upon the no less delicate question of whether or not crimes against humanity
constituted a new category of offence. (However, the reason for this omission
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may also be found in the fact that the German defense counsel, in the joint
motion of 19 November 1945 by which they complained about the retroactive
application of criminal law by the IMT,18 only referred to crimes against peace;
this probably occurred because they felt that such offences as murder,
extermination, or persecution constituted breaches of the law in most countries of
the world and in any case had been committed by Nazi authorities on a very
large scale.)
Secondly, when dealing with ex post facto law, the IMT was rather reticent and
indeed vague, as is apparent from, inter alia, the glaring discrepancy between
the English and the French text of the judgment,19 both authoritative.
Thirdly, the IMT held that no evidence had been produced to the effect that
crimes against humanity had been committed before the war, in execution of or
in connection with German aggression.20 The IMT thus markedly narrowed the
scope, in case, of the category of crimes against humanity,  although it asserted
that it did so on grounds linked to the evidence produced.
Fourthly, probably aware of the novelty of that class of crimes and hence of the
possible objection that the nullum crimen principle (see above, 2.3) was being
breached by applying criminal law retroactively, the IMT tended to find that some
defendants accused of various classes of crime were guilty both of war crimes
and of crimes against humanity (this was the case with 14 defendants): in other
words, the Tribunal avoided clearly identifying the distinction between the two
classes, preferring instead to find that in many cases the defendant was
answerable for both.
Fifthly, in the only two cases where the IMT found a defendant guilty exclusively
of crimes against humanity (Streicher and von Schirach), the Tribunal did not
specify the nature, content, and scope of the link between crimes against
humanity and war crimes (in the case of Streicher) or crimes against humanity
and aggression (in the case of von Schirach); rather, the Tribunal confined itself
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to a generic reference to the connection between the classes of crimes, without
any further elaboration.
Finally, it is striking that in the part of the judgment referring to Streicher, the
English text is markedly different from the French.
In summary, in all probability the IMT applied new law, or substantially new law,
when it found some defendants guilty of crimes against humanity alone or of
these crimes in conjunction with others. However, this was not in breach of a
general norm strictly prohibiting retroactive criminal law. As noted above (2.3),
immediately after the Second World War, the nullum crimen sine lege principle
could be regarded as a moral maxim destined to yield to superior exigencies
whenever it would have been contrary to justice not to hold persons accountable
for appalling atrocities. The strict legal prohibition of ex post facto law had not yet
found expression in international law; nor did it constitute a general principle of
law universally accepted by all states. The IMT set out the view that 'the maxim
nullum crimen sine lege (...) is in general a principle of Justice' allowing the
punishment of actions not proscribed by law at the time of their commission,
when it would be 'unjust' for such wrongs to be 'allowed to go unpunished' (at
219).
In the wake of the major war trials, momentous changes in international law took
place. On II December 1946 the UN GA unanimously adopted a resolution
'affirming' the principles of the Charter of the Nuremberg International Tribunal
and its judgment. On 13 February 1946 it passed resolution 3(1) recommending
the extradition and punishment of persons accused of the crimes provided for in
the Nuremberg Charter. These resolutions show that the category of crimes
against humanity was in the process of becoming part of customary international
law.
In addition to the Charter of the Tokyo International Tribunal, a number of
international instruments were then drawn up embodying the prohibition of
crimes against humanity, some of which improved and expanded the provisions
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of the London Agreement, for instance, the Peace Treaties with Italy, Romania,
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, each of which included terms providing for the
punishment of these crimes.
In particular, after 1945 the link between crimes against humanity and war was
gradually dropped. This is evidenced by Article ll(l)(c) of such 'multinational'
legislation as Control Council Law no. 10 passed by the four victorious Powers
four months after the London Agreement; that is on 20 December 1945, by
national legislation (such as the Canadian25 and the French26 criminal codes),
case law,27 as well as international treaties such as the 1948 Genocide
Convention, the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, and the 1973
Convention on Apartheid. This evolution gradually led to the abandonment of the
nexus between crimes against humanity and war: at present, as stated above,
customary international law bans crimes against humanity whether they are
committed in time of war or peace. The same holds true for the ICC Statute,
which confirms the rupture of the link between these crimes and armed conflict.
On the other hand, some treaties and other binding international instruments
enshrining the Statutes of international courts and tribunals restrict the scope of
customary rules. To be more accurate (because strictly speaking those Statutes
do not lay down substantive rules of criminal law but only provide for the
definition of those crimes over which each relevant court or tribunal is endowed
with jurisdiction), such treaties and other instruments may indirectly contribute to
the restriction of the customary rules. Thus, the Statutes of the ICTY (1993), the
ICTR (1994), and the ICC (1998) provide that the crimes at issue can only be
committed against civilians, whereas in some respects customary law upholds a
broader notion of victims of such crimes (see infra, 5.6).
2.20.7 THE OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS
The conduct prohibited was loosely described in the London Agreement of 1945,
and similarly in Control Council Law no. 10 and the Charter of the Tokyo
92
International Tribunal, as well the ICTY and the ICTR. Gradually case law has
contributed to defining the legal contours of the actus reus. In the event, the
various categories have been largely spelled out in the ICC Statute, Article 7, of
which may be held to a large extent either to crystallize nascent notions or to
codify the bulk of existing customary law (see infra, 5.7).
At present, ICL always requires for the crimes under discussion a general context
of criminal conduct, consisting of a widespread or systematic practice of unlawful
attacks against the population (see supra, 5.1, at 2; see, however, also the
qualifications set out infra in 5.6).
If such context does exist, the following classes of offence constitute crimes
against humanity:
1.  Murder. As a rule, the mental element of this conduct is the intent to bring
about the death of another person; intentional killing may or may not be
premeditated, that is planned and willed in advance of the act of killing (with the
mental status persisting over time between the first moment when the intention
took shape and the later physical act of killing). However, for murder as a crime
against humanity a lesser mental element is required by case law: it is sufficient
for the perpetrator 'to cause the victim serious injury with reckless disregard for
human life'.
2. Extermination-, that is mass or large-scale killing, as well as 'the intentional
infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and
medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population' (Article
7(2)(b) of the ICC Statute).
The ICTR has defined the notion of extermination in a few cases30 A Chamber
of the ICTY offered a better definition in Krstic. It held that:
for the crime of extermination to be established, in addition to the general
requirements for a crime against humanity, there must be evidence that a
particular population was targeted and that its members were killed or otherwise
subjected to conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of
numerically significant part of the population (§503).
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The TC also specified that In accordance with the Tadic (AJ),' [...] it is
unnecessary that the victims were discriminated against for political, social or
religious grounds' (§499).31
It is submitted that one ought not to exclude from this class of crimes
extermination carried out by groups of terrorists/or the purpose of spreading
terror. (Of course, the necessary condition that the terrorist attack exterminating
a group of persons be part of a widespread or systematic attack, must be
fulfilled.) See also infra, 8.6.
3.  Enslavement. This notion was gradually elaborated upon by case law, notably
by two US Military Tribunals sitting at Nuremberg, in Milch (at 773-91) and in
Pohl and others (at 970), and then refined by a TC of the ICTY in Kunarac and
others (§§515-43). According to the ICC Statute, which crystallizes a nascent
notion, enslavement 'means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to
the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in
the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children' (Article
7(2)(c)). The ICTY TC in Kunarac and others convincingly propounded a set of
elements that clarify this definition (§§542-3). In addition, the TC set out clearly
the reasons for which it found two of the defendants guilty of enslavement
(§§728-82).
4.  Deportation or forcible transfer of population', that is, the 'forced displacement
of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in
which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international
law' (Article 7(2)(d)).
An ICTY TC emphasized in Krstic that:
Both deportation and forcible transfer relate to involuntary and unlawful
evacuation of individuals from the territory in which they reside. Yet the two are
not synonymous in customary international law. Deportation presumes transfer
beyond State borders, whereas forcible transfer relates to displacement within a
State (§521).
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In that case the TC found that, on 12-13 July 1995, about 25,000 Bosnian Muslim
civilians were forcibly bussed outside the enclave of Srebrenica to the territory
under Bosnian Muslim control, always within the same state (Bosnia and
Herzegovina). The transfer was compulsory and was carried out 'in furtherance
of a well organized policy whose purpose was to expel the Bosnian Muslim
population from the enclave'. The Chamber concluded that the civilians
transported from Srebrenica were not subjected to deportation but to forcible
transfer, a crime against humanity (§§527-32).
5. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law. An ICTY TC, in Kordic and Cerkez, was
the first international court to offer a definition of this offence. It held that
imprisonment as a crime against humanity must 'be understood as arbitrary
imprisonment, that is to say, the deprivation of liberty of the individual without due
process of law, as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population' (§§302-3).
6. Torture-, that is 'the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the
accused', except when pain or suffering is inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions (Article 7(2)(e) of the ICC Statute).
In Delalic and others an ICTY TC noted that the definition of torture contained in
the 1984 Torture Convention was broader than, and included, that laid down in
the 1975 Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly and in the 1985
Inter- American Convention, and considered it to reflect a consensus which the
TC regarded as 'representative of customary international law' (§459). Another
TC of the ICTY, ruling in Furundzija, shared that conclusion, although on different
legal grounds. It held that, as shown by the broad convergence of international
instruments and inter- national jurisprudence, there was general acceptance of
the main elements contained in the definition set out in Article I of the Torture
Convention. It considered, however, that some specific elements pertained to
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torture as considered from the specific view- point of ICL relating to armed
conflicts. It held that torture as a crime committed in an armed conflict must
contain the following elements: It (i) consists of the infliction, by act or omission,
of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental; in addition, (ii) this act or
omission must be intentional; (iii) it must aim at obtaining information or a
confession, or at punishing, intimidating, humiliating or coercing the victim or a
third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third
person; (iv) it must be linked to an armed conflict; (v) at least one of the persons
involved in the torture process must be a public official or must at any rate act in
a non- private capacity, e.g. as a defacto organ of a State or any other authority-
wielding entity.
The TC went on to note that:
As is apparent from this enumeration of criteria, the Trial Chamber considers that
among the possible purposes of torture one must also include that of humiliating
the victim. This proposition is warranted by the general spirit of international
humanitarian law: the primary purpose of this body of law is to safeguard human
dignity. The proposition is also supported by some general provisions of such
important international treaties as the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols, which consistently aim at protecting persons not taking part, or no
longer taking part, in the hostilities from 'outrages upon personal dignity'. The
notion of humiliation is, in any event close to the notion of intimidation, which is
explicitly referred to in the Torture Conventions definition of torture (§162).
Subsequently, in Kunarac and others, another TC of the ICTY broadened that
definition. Starting from the correct assumption that one ought to distinguish
between the definition of torture under international human rights law and that
applicable under ICL, the TC held, among other things, that 'the presence of a
State official or of any other authority-wielding person in the torture process is not
necessary for the offence to be regarded as torture under IHL' (§496). Another
TC shared this view in Kvocka and others (§§137-41).
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In Brdanin the ICTY AC made an interesting contribution to the delineation of the
notion. The appellant had submitted that the TC had erred in law in its
determination of what acts constitute torture; in his view torture, to amount to an
international crime, must involve physical pain equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function or even death. To support his contention, the appellant had stressed that
this notion of torture was that recently  propounded by the US Department of
Justice in a legal memorandum. The AC dismissed the submission. After noting
that 'no matter how powerful or influential a country is, its practice does not
automatically become customary international law' (§247), the Chamber held that
'acts inflicting physical pain may amount to torture even when they do not cause
pain of the type accompanying serious injury' (251).
Finally, in Naletilic and Martinovic the ICTY AC added an important specification,
given the general purport of the definition of torture eventually set out 'in
international case law. It clarified that the concrete and specific determination of
whether an act causing severe mental or physical pain amounts to torture must
be made on a case-by-case basis.
7.  Sexual violence. This class of offence includes: (i) rape, a category of crime
that was not defined in international law until a TC of the ICTR set out a rather
terse definition in Akayesu (rape is 'a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed under circumstances which are coercive', §597), taken up by a TC of
the ICTY in Delalic and others (§479). Subsequently, two ICTY TCs delivered
important judgments, in Furundztja and Kunarac and others33 (ii) sexual slavery,
(iii) enforced prostitution; (iv) forced pregnancy, namely 'the unlawful confinement
of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of
international law' (Article 7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute for(_an ICC) (perhaps this
sub-category is not yet contemplated by customary international law: see infra,
5.7.3); (v) enforced sterilization; and (vi) any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity.
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8.  Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds, that are universally
recognized as impermissible grounds of discrimination under international law;
persecution 'means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights
contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity'
(Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute for an ICC).'
An ICTY TC propounded an elaborate definition of this crime in Kupreskic and
others (§§616-27). It found that the defendants were guilty of persecution, for: the
"deliberate and systematic killing of Bosnian Muslim civilians" as well as their
"organized detention and expulsion from Ahmici [the village where the crimes
were committed]' can constitute persecution. This is because these acts quality
as murder, imprisonment, and deportation, which are explicitly mentioned in the
Statute under Article 5 (§629).
The TC also found that the comprehensive destruction of Bosnian Muslim homes
and property constituted 'a gross or blatant denial of fundamental human rights',
and, being committed on discriminatory grounds, amounted to persecution
(§§630-1).
9.  Enforced disappearance of persons, namely 'the arrest, detention or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a
State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time' (Article 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute for an ICC). It may
be noted that with respect to this crime the ICC Statute has not codified existing
customary law but contributed to the crystallization of a nascent rule, evolved
primarily out of treaty law (that is, the numerous treaties on human rights
prohibiting various acts falling under this heading), as well as the case law of the
Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights, in addition to a number
of UN General Assembly resolutions. These various strands have been
instrumental in the gradual formation of a customary rule prohibiting enforced
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disappearance of persons. The ICC Statute has upheld and laid down in a written
provision of the criminalization of this conduct.
10. Other inhumane acts of a similar character and gravity, intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. This
notion harks back to Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Statute, which simply
criminalized 'other inhumane acts', by a provision lacking any precision and
therefore at odds with the principle of specificity proper to criminal law (see
above, 2.4.1).
The provision was subsequently interpreted in such cases as Ternek35 on the
strength of the ejusdem generis principle, thereby acquiring some degree of
precision, as well as in Kupresk'tc and others, where an ICTY TC dwelt at length
on the interpretation of the clause (§§563-6). The rule was recently restated in
Article 7(l)(k) of the ICC Statute, which to a large extent codifies and in some
respects develops customary international law.
In spite of its relatively loose character (which, however, has been rightly
narrowed down by the case law, as just noted), the rule is important for it may
function as a 'residual clause' covering and criminalizing instances of inhuman
behaviour that do not neatly fall under any of the other existing categories of
crimes against humanity (for instance, it can cover acts of terrorism not falling
under the sub-category of murder, torture, etc; see infra,
Of course, the clause may serve this purpose only subject to strict conditions
concerning the gravity of the inhuman conduct.
2.20.8 THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS
The relevant rules of international law require two mental elements for the crimes
under discussion- (i) the mens rea proper to the underlying offence (murder, rape
torture, deportation, etc.); and (ii) awareness of the existence of a widespread or
systematic practice.
99
In most cases the first mental element is intent that is the intention to bring about
a certain result. However, as noted above (5.3) in the case of murder, case law
has considered that what is required for such conduct to amount to a crime
against humanity is inter alia either the intent to kill, proper to murder, or a
different intentional element, namely 'the intent to inflict serious injury in reckless
disregard of human life'.
More generally, where an accused, acting as an 'agent of a system', does not
directly and immediately cause the inhumane acts, it is not necessary that he
anticipate all the specific consequences of his misconduct; it is sufficient for him
to be aware of the risk that his action might bring about serious consequences for
the victim, on account of the violence and arbitrariness of the system to which he
delivers the victim.36 Thus, recklessness (or dolus eventualis) maybe sufficient
(see supra 3.7).
The second requirement is that the agent be cognizant of the link between his
misconduct and a widespread or systematic practice (the 'contextual' practice
may refer either to offences of the same category or to other large-scale attacks
on the civilian population directed to offend the dignity and humanity of the
population, as long as a link exists between the crime against humanity at issue
and the practice). As the ICTY AC held in  Tadic (AJ, 1999), the perpetrator
needs to know that there is an attack on the civilian population and that his acts
comprise part of the attack (§248); a TC held in Blaskic that the perpetrator
needs at least to be aware of the risk that his act is part of the attack, and then
takes that risk (TJ §§247, 251). This does not, however, entail that he needs to
know the details of the attack (Kunarac and others, TJ §434). The rationale
behind this requirement is clear: ICL intends to punish persons who, being aware
of the fact that the crimes they are perpetrating (or plan to perpetrate) are part of
a general framework of criminality, are thereby encouraged to misbehave and
also hope subsequently to enjoy impunity (if this requirement is lacking,
depending on the circumstances misconduct will amount to either a war crime or
an ordinary criminal offence under domestic law).
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When crimes against humanity take the form of persecution, another mental
element also is required: a persecutory or discriminatory animus. The intent must
be to subject a person or group to discrimination, ill-treatment, or harassment, so
as to bring about great suffering or injury to that person or group on religious,
political, or other such grounds. This added element for persecution amounts to a
special criminal intent (dol special).
Finally, courts have not required, as part of the mens rea, that the perpetrator
should have a specifically racist or inhuman frame of mind.
To sum up, the requisite subjective element or mens rea in crimes against
humanity is not simply limited to the criminal intent (or recklessness) required for
the underlying offence (murder, extermination, deportation, rape, torture,
persecution, etc.).38 The viciousness of these crimes goes far beyond the
underlying offence, however wicked or despicable it may be. This additional
element—which helps to distinguish crimes against humanity from war crimes—
consists of awareness of the broader context into which this crime fits.
2.20.9 THE POSSIBLE AUTHORS
Normally it is state organs, i.e. individuals acting in an official capacity such as
military commanders, servicemen, etc. who perpetrate crimes against humanity.
Is this a necessary element of the crimes; that is, mast the offence be
perpetrated by organs or agents of a state or a governmental authority or on
behalf of such bodies, or may such crimes be committed by individuals not acting
in an official capacity? In the latter case, must the offence be approved or at least
condoned or countenanced by a governmental body for it to amount to a crime
against humanity?
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The case law seems to indicate that the crimes we are discussing may be
committed by individuals acting in their private capacity, provided they behave in
unison, as it were, with a general state policy and find support for their misdeeds
in such policy. This is clearly shown by the numerous cases brought after 1945
before the German Supreme Court in the British Occupied Zone and concerning
denunciations to the German authorities of Jews or political opponents by private
German individuals.
An interesting problem that may arise is whether crimes against humanity may
be committed by state officials acting in a private capacity. It would seem that in
such cases some sort of explicit or implicit approval or endorsement by state or
governmental authorities is required, or else that it is necessary for the offence to
be clearly encouraged by a general governmental policy, or at least to fit clearly
within such a policy. This is best illustrated by the Weller case. This case, which
seems to have been unknown until it was cited by the ICTY in Kupreskic (§555),
gave rise to six different judgments by German courts after the Second World
War.
2.20.10 THE POSSIBLE VICTIMS
Article 6(c) of the London Agreement establishing the IMT clearly prohibited two
distinct categories of crimes: (i) inhumane acts such as murder, extermination,
enslavement, and deportation of any civilian population, i.e. any group of civilians
whatever their nationality; and (ii) persecution on political, racial, or religious
grounds. Since the customary international law of crimes against humanity that
has emerged is largely based on Article 6(c), it is fitting to look into the
fundamental elements of that provision.
It is apparent from the wording of Article 6(c) that the actus reus is different for
these two classes of crimes. Murder, extermination, and other 'inhumane acts' (of
similar gravity) largely constitute offences already covered by all national legal
systems, and also are committed against civilians. 'Persecutions', instead,
embrace actions that at the time of their commission may not be prohibited by
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national legal systems, for persecution may take the form of acts other than
murder, extermination, enslavement, or deportation. Furthermore, since no
mention is made of the possible victims of persecutions, or rather, as it is not
specified that such persecutions should target 'any civilian population', the
inference is warrantor that not only any civilian group but also members of the
armed forces may be the victims of this class of  crime.
For the purposes of our discussion, it is useful to deal separately with each of the
two classes of crime against humanity.
2.20.11 'MURDER-TYPE' CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
'Murder-type' crimes against humanity embrace offences that are perpetrated
'against any civilian population'. The words 'any' and 'civilian' need careful
interpretation. As for 'any', it is apparent, both from the text of the provision and
from the legislative history of Article 6(c), that it was intended to cover civilians
other than those associated with the enemy, who were already protected by the
traditional rules of the law of warfare. In other words, by using 'any', the
draftsmen intended to protect the civilian population of the state committing
crimes against humanity, as well as civilians of its allied countries or of countries
under its control, although formally under no military occupation.
As for the word 'civilian', it is apparent that it was intended to refer to persons
other than lawful combatants, whether or not such persons were civilians fighting
alongside enemy military forces. In other words, this phrase does not cover
belligerents. The rationale for the relatively limited scope of this part of Article
6(c) is that enemy combatants were already protected by the traditional laws of
warfare, while it was deemed unlikely that a belligerent might commit atrocities
against its own servicemen or those of allied countries. In any event, such
atrocities, if any, would come under the jurisdiction of the Courts Martial of the
country concerned; in other words, they would fall within the scope of national
legislation.
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Nonetheless, after the Second World War courts gradually inclined towards
placing a liberal interpretation on the term 'civilians'. For instance, the Supreme
Court of Germany in the British Occupied Zone propounded a broad construction
of Article 6(c). This court held in at least three cases that military persons could
be the victims of crimes against humanity even in situations where the crime did
not take the form of persecution. In other words, the court held that the crime at
issue could be perpetrated against military personnel even if the offence was not
one of those envisaged in the second part of Article 6(c) or in the corresponding
second part of Article ll(l)(c) of Control Council Law no. 10. As a consequence,
the court substantially broadened the notion of 'any civilian population' included
in the first part of that provision. These three cases will be briefly summarized.
In a decision of 27 July 1948 in R., the court pronounced upon the guilt of a
member of the Nazi Party and Nazi commandos (NSKK), who in 1944 had
denounced a non-commissioned officer in uniform and member of the Nazi Party
and the SA (assault units), for insulting the leadership of the Party. As a result of
this denunciation, the victim had been brought to trial three times and eventually
sentenced to death (the sentence had not been carried out because in the
interim the Russians had occupied Germany). The court held that the
denunciation could constitute a crime against humanity if it could be proved that
the agent had intended to hand over the victim to the 'uncontrollable power
structure of the [Nazi] party and State', knowing that as a consequence of his
denunciation, the victim was likely to be caught up in an arbitrary and violent
system (at 47).
In 1948, in P. and others the same court applied the notion of crimes against
humanity to members of the military. In the night following Germany's partial
capitulation (5 May 1945), four German marines had tried to escape from
Denmark back to Germany. The next day the)' were caught by Danes and
delivered to the German troops, who court-martialed and sentenced three of
them to death for desertion; on the very day of the general capitulation of
Germany (10 May 1945), the three were executed. The German Supreme Court
found that the five members of the Court Martial were guilty of complicity in a
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crime against humanity. According to the Supreme Court, the glaring discrepancy
between the offence and the punishment proved that the execution of the three
marines had constituted a clear manifestation of the Nazis' brutal and intimidatry
justice, which denied the very essence of humanity in blind deference to the
superior exigencies of the Nazi State. In this case as well, there had taken place
'an intolerable degradation of the victims to mere means for the pursuit of a goal,
hence the depersonalization and reification of human beings' (at 220);
consequently, by sentencing to death those marines, the members of the Court
Martial had also injured humanity as a whole. With regard to the wording of the
relevant provision on crimes against humanity (namely. Article ll(l)(c) of Control
Council Law no. 10, which referred only to offences 'against civilian populations'),
the court observed the following:
Whoever notes the expressly emphasized illustrative character of the instances
and classes of instance mentioned there, cannot come to the conclusion that
action between soldiers may not constitute crimes against humanity.
[Admittedly), a single and isolated excess would not constitute a crime against
humanity pursuant to the legal notion of such crimes. [However], it has already
been shown [in the judgment) that the action at issue can belong to the criminal
system and criminal tendency of the Nazi era. For the offence to be a crime
against humanity, it is not necessary that the action should support or sustain
Nazi tyranny, or that the accused should intend so to act (at 228).
Finally, in its decision of 18 October 1949 in H., the court dealt with a case in
which a German judge had presided over two trials by a Naval Court Martial
against two officers of the German Navy: one against a commander of
submarines who had been accused of criticizing Hitler in 1944, the other against
a lieutenant-commander of the German naval forces, charged with procuring two
foreign identity cards for himself and his wife in 1944. The judge had initially
sentenced both officers to death (the first had been executed, while the sentence
against the second had been commuted by Hitler to ten years' imprisonment).
The Supreme Court held that the judge could be held guilty of crimes against
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humanity to the extent that his action was undertaken deliberately in connection
with the Nazi system of violence and terror (at 233-4,238, 241-4).
After the Second World War other courts, with the notable exception of the
French Court of Cassation in Burbie,42 tended instead to place a strict
interpretation on the term 'civilians' and consequently to rule out from the notion
of victims of crimes against humanity persons who belonged, or had belonged, to
the military. Indicative in this respect is Neddermeier, brought before a British
Court of Appeal established under Control Council Law no. 10.43
The trend towards loosening the strict requirement that the victims be civilians
also continued, however, in more recent times. It is significant that the ICTY has
placed a liberal interpretation on the narrow notion of victims of crimes against
humanity set out in Article 5 of its Statute (according to which those crimes can
only be committed against 'any civilian population'). In its decision in Mrksic and
others (rendered under Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), the
court held that crimes against humanity could be committed even where the
victims at one time bore arms.
A different issue that arose in cases brought before the United States Military
Tribunals sitting at Nuremberg is whether victims of extermination through
euthanasia as a crime against humanity may be nationals of the state concerned,
or whether such victims must perforce be foreigners. In these cases some
defendants had been accused of participating in euthanasia programmes for the
chronically disabled or terminally ill. The Tribunals wrongly held that euthanasia
amounted to a crime against humanity only if carried out against foreigners, i.e.
non-nationals of the state practicing euthanasia.
2.20.12 'PERSECUTION-TYPE' CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
As stated above, il- is apparent from Article 6(c) that in the case of persecution,
the victims of crimes against humanity need not necessarily be civilians; they
may also include military personnel. There is an obvious rationale for this
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regulation: traditional laws of warfare, while they protected servicemen against
such illegal actions by the enemy as treachery and use of prohibited means or
methods of warfare, did not safeguard them against persecution either by the
enemy, or by the Allies or by the very authorities to which military personnel
belonged.
The textual and logical construction of Article 6(c) was confirmed implicitly in Pilz
by the Dutch Special Court of Cassation and explicitly by French courts in Barbie
and Touvier.
2.20.13 THE GRADUAL BROADENING OF THE CATEGORY OF VICTIMS
As a result of the gradual disappearance in customary international law of the
nexus between crimes against humanity and armed conflict, so too has the
emphasis on civilians as the exclusive class of victims of such crimes dwindled, if
not disappeared. For if crimes against humanity may be committed in time of
peace as well, it no longer makes sense to require that such crimes be
perpetrated against civilians alone. Why should members of military forces be
excluded, since they in any case would not be protected by IHL in the absence of
any armed conflict? Plainly, in times of peace military personnel too may become
the object of crimes against humanity at the hands of their own authorities. By
the same token, in time of armed hostilities, there is no longer any reason for
excluding servicemen, whether or not hors de combat (wounded, sick, or
prisoners of war), from protection against crimes against humanity (chiefly
persecution), whether committed by their own authorities, by allied forces, or by
the enemy.
The broadening of the category of persons safeguarded by the relevant rules of
customary international law is consonant with the overall trend in IHL toward
expanding the scope of protection of the basic values of human dignity,
regardless of the legal status of those entitled to such protection. This trend has
manifested itself in, inter alia, the adoption of international treaties protecting
human rights and treaties prohibiting crimes such as genocide, apartheid, or
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torture, in the passing of some significant resolutions by the United Nations
General Assembly, and in certain pronouncements of the International Court of
Justice. Nowadays, international human rights standards also clearly protect
individuals against abuses and misdeeds of their own governmental authorities. It
follows that there no longer exists any substantial reason for refusing to apply the
notion of crimes against humanity to vicious and inhumane actions undertaken
on a large scale by governments against the human dignity of their own military
or the military personnel of allies or other non-enemy countries (or even of the
enemy). It is worth noting that, had this expansion of the notion of crimes against
humanity not occurred, a strict interpretation of the notion of civilians would lead
in times of armed conflict to a questionable result. Some categories of
combatants who, in modern armed conflicts (particularly in internal conflicts)
often find themselves in a twilight area, would remain unprotected—or scantily
protected—against serious atrocities. Consider, for example, members of
paramilitary forces or members of police forces who occasionally or sporadically
take part in hostilities. These are per- sons whose legal status may be uncertain,
as one may not be sure whether they are to be regarded as combatants or
civilians.47 It could therefore follow that, under a strict and traditional
interpretation of the crimes at issue, and assuming that these persons were at
the same time regarded as combatants, they would ultimately be unprotected by
the prohibition against such crimes.
By way of conclusion on this point, the proposition is warranted that the scope of
the customary rules on crimes against humanity is much broader than normally
admitted. Private individuals may also perpetrate those crimes (provided the
governmental authorities approve of or condone, or at any rate fail to repress
their action, or their action fits into a widespread or systematic practice of official
misconduct). Furthermore, the victims of the crimes belonging to the subclass of
persecutory offences, as well as—it is here contended—those of the other
subclass, may embrace both civilians and combatants. In addition, such victims
need not have the nationality of an enemy country but may belong to the country
whose authorities order, approve, fail to punish, or con- done the pattern of
misbehaviour amounting to crimes against humanity.
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2.20.14 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARTICLE 7 OF THE ICC
STATUTE
Let us now ask ourselves whether Article 7 of the ICC Statute, contemplating
crimes against humanity as one of the categories of criminal conduct over which
the Court has jurisdiction, departs from or instead restates customary
international law.
A comparison between customary international law and the ICC Statute shows
that by and large the latter is based on the former. However, many differences
may be discerned. In some respects. Article 7 elaborates upon and clarifies, in
other respects it is narrower than, customary international law; in others, it
instead broadens customary rules.
2.20.15 AREAS WHERE ARTICLE 7 SETS FORTH ELEMENTS OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 7 specifies and elaborates upon customary international law in many
respects. First, it specifies that a crime against humanity must be committed 'with
knowledge of the attack'. The provision thus makes it clear that the requisite
mens rea must include the awareness that the individual criminal act is part of a
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population.
Secondly, Article 7 clarifies the objective elements of some of the underlying
offences, by making explicit notions that, until set out in this Article, were only
implicit and could therefore be determined only by way of interpretation. These
notions are further elaborated upon in the 'Elements of Crimes' adopted by the
Preparatory Commission.
Finally, one should emphasize that the 'Elements of Crime' have clarified an
important aspect of mens rea. In commenting on the need for the offender to
have knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, it
is stated there that:
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However, the last element should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the
perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise
details of the plan or policy of the state or organization. In the case of an
emerging widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, the intent
clause of the last element indicates that this mental element is satisfied if the
perpetrator intended to further such attack.
2.20.16 AREAS WHERE ARTICLE 7 IS NARROWER THAN CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
On some points, Article 7 departs from customary law by setting out notions at
odds with that body of law.
First, Article 7(1) defines the victim or target of crimes against humanity as 'any
civilian population'. This provision, which thus adopts a position similar to that
taken in the statutes of the ICTY (Article 5) and the ICTR (Article 6), excludes
non-civilians (i.e. the military) from the victims of the crimes under discussion.
Thus, any of the acts enumerated in Article 7(l)(c) to (k), if perpetrated against an
enemy combatant, would only amount to a war crime or a grave breach of the
1949 Geneva Conventions. The question arises whether the term civilian
population' includes belligerents hors de combat who have laid down their
weapons, either because they are wounded or because they have been
captured. As we have seen above, the case law of the ICTY has answered this
question in the affirmative. It would seem to be consonant with the humanitarian
object and purpose of Article 7 to suggest the same solution with regard to this
provision.
Secondly, Article 7, in defining 'attack directed against any civilian population'
narrows the scope of the notion of 'widespread or systematic practice' required
as a context of a specific offence, for the offence to amount to a crime against
humanity. Indeed, in paragraph 2(a) that provision stipulates that 'attack' means
'a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in
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paragraph I against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such attack'. It would seem that the
Statute requires that the offender, in committing a crime against humanity,
pursue or promote such a practice. It would follow that any practice simply
tolerated or condoned by a state or an organization would not constitute an
attack on the civilian population or a widespread or systematic practice. For
instance, in the case of murder, or rape, or forced pregnancy, why should it be
required that the general practice constitute a policy pursued by a state or an
organization? Would it not be sufficient for the practice to be accepted, or
tolerated, or acquiesced in by the state or the organization, for those offences to
constitute crimes against humanity?
Clearly, this requirement goes beyond what is required under international
customary law and unduly restricts the notion under discussion. The 'Elements of
Crime' make this restriction even broader and more explicit. There it is stated that
'the policy to commit such attack' 'requires that the State or organization actively
promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population' (emphasis
added).
Thirdly, Article 7 is less liberal than customary international law with regard to
one element of the definition of persecution. Under Article 7(l)(h), persecution, in
order to fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, must be perpetrated 'in connection
with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court'. Instead, under customary international law no such link is required. In
other words, it is not necessary for persecution to consist of (a) conduct defined
as a war crime or a crime against humanity or linked to any such crime; plus (b) a
discriminatory intent. Under general international law, persecution may also
consist of acts not punishable as war crimes or crimes against humanity, as long
as such acts (a) result in egregious violations of fundamental human rights; (b)
are part of a widespread or systematic practice; and (c) are committed with a
discriminatory intent. Article 7(1) (h) imposes a further burden on the
Prosecution: it must be proved that, in addition to discriminatory acts based on
one of the grounds described in this provision, the actus reus consists of one of
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the acts prohibited in Article 7(1) or of a war crime or genocide (or aggression, if
this crime is eventually accepted as falling under the jurisdiction of the Court), or
must be 'connected' with such acts or crimes. Besides adding a requirement not
provided for in general international law. Article 7 uses the phrase 'in connection
with', which is unclear and susceptible to many interpretations.
2.20.17 AREAS WHERE ARTICLE 7 IS BROADER THAN CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 7 expands general international law in at least two respects.
First, it broadens the classes of conduct amounting to crimes against humanity.
Thus, it includes within this category 'forced pregnancy' (Article 7(l)(g) and
(2)(f))> (see supra, 5.3, sub 7); 'enforced disappearance of persons' (Article 7(l)(i)
and (2)(i)); and 'the crime of apartheid' (Article 7(l)(j) and (2)(h)) (as noted supra
at 5.3 sub 9, the ICC Statute has, however, contributed to the recent formation of
a customary rule on the matter).
Secondly, in dealing with the crime of persecution, it greatly expands the
category of discriminatory grounds. While under customary international law
these grounds may be political, racial, ethnic, or religious, Article 7(l)(h) adds
'cultural' grounds, 'gender as defined in paragraph 3 [of the same provision]', as
well as 'other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law'.
2.20.18 GENOCIDE
THE NOTION
Genocide is the intentional destruction, through one of five well-specified
categories of conduct, of one of some groups as such (national, ethnical, racial,
or religious) or of members of one of these groups as such.
Article 6(c) of the Charter of the IMT did not envisage genocide as a crime falling
under the Tribunals jurisdiction. However, in referring to crimes against humanity
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it used a wording ('murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population' and 'persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds') that encompassed large-scale massacres of
ethnic, racial or religious groups. In dealing with the extermination of laws and
other ethnic or religious groups, the IMT referred in its judgment to the crime of
persecution (Goring and others, at 247-55).
The extermination of Jews as a crime against humanity was discussed in a few
other cases: Hoess, decided by a Polish court in 1947 (at 12-18), and Greifelt
and others, heard in 1948 by a US Military Tribunal (at 2-36). In the latter
judgment (and in Altstotter and others, at 1128, 1156), the word 'genocide' was
used to describe the criminal conduct, without however elevating genocide to a
distinct category of criminality. In other cases (for instance, Kramer and others
(the Belsen trial), at 4, 117-21; and see 106) the killing of Jews in concentration
camps was dealt with as a war crime.
Thus, at this stage prosecution and punishment of massacres of ethnic or
religious groups did not require evidence of the 'special intent' typical of genocide
(see infra, 6.5), but simply proof of the subjective and objective elements of either
crimes against humanity or war crimes.
2.20.19 THE 1948 CONVENTION ON GENOCIDE
Genocide acquired autonomous significance as a specific crime in 1948, when
the UN GA adopted the Genocide Convention.
2.20.20 MAIN FEATURES OF THE CONVENTION
A careful look at the Convention shows that it pursued two goals: (i) to oblige
Contracting Parties to criminalize genocide and punish their authors within the
legal system of each Party, and accordingly (ii) to provide for the judicial
cooperation of those contracting states for the suppression of the crime. This is
already made clear by the preamble, where the draughtsmen, after declaring that
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genocide is a crime under international law, set out their conviction that 'in order
to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is
required'.1 The various provisions of the Convention bear out that this is its main
purpose. In Article I it is stipulated that the Contracting Parties 'undertake to
prevent and punish' genocide. Article III imposes upon Contracting Parties the
obligation to punish not only the perpetration of genocide but also conduct
somehow linked to the crime, which the provision defines by using criminal law
categories: conspiracy, incitement, attempt, and complicity. By Article IV states
assume the obligation to punish persons committing genocide or related conduct
even if they are 'constitutionally responsible rulers' or 'public officials'. Article V
provides for the enactment of the necessary criminal legislation, with particular
regard to penalties. Article VI deals with criminal jurisdiction over the offence, and
Article VII addresses the issue of extradition.
In  thus seems clear, both from the text of the Convention and the preparatory
works2 that the Genocide Convention is very much like some previous
international treaties such as the 1926 Convention on Slavery (followed by the
Protocol of 1953), the 1929 International Convention for the Suppression of
Counterfeiting Currency, or the more recent UN Convention Against Torture of
1984, which (i) provide for a set of international obligations that contracting states
are required to implement within their own domestic legal systems, and in
addition (ii) arrange for judicial cooperation in the matter regulated by the treaty.
It was perhaps the naive assumption of the Convention's draughtsmen that, after
the horrendous genocide of European Jews in the Second World War and the
stiff punishment of many of its planners and perpetrators at the hands of criminal
courts, contracting states themselves would not dare to engage in genocide.
Plausibly it is this assumption that to some extent accounts for the odd (or,
rather, ingenuous) provision in Article VI stipulating that persons accused of
genocide must be prosecuted and tried by the judicial authorities of the territory
in which 'the act was committed' (plus a future international criminal court that in
1948 looked like a radiant daydream).
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2.20.21 THE DUAL REGIME OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE,
ACCORDING TO THE ICJ
In the judgement delivered on 26 February 2007 in the Bosnia v. Serbia case, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) chose to place an expansive interpretation on
the Convention. It preferred to look upon it as a treaty that also imposes on
contracting states as such, that is as international subjects, specific obligations
relating to their own behaviour towards groups protected under Article II (1)
(national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups). This led the Court to propound the
notion that the Convention upholds 'a duality of responsibility' for genocide:
according to the Court the same acts may give rise both to individual criminal
liability and state responsibility (§§163 and 173).
The Court first of all construed Article I as imposing not only a duty to prevent
and punish genocide, but also an obligation for contracting states to refrain from
engaging in genocide (§§162-6). This interpretation, as the Court rightly noted, is
fully warranted having regard to the object and purpose of the Convention. It
broadens the scope of Article I and also makes the set of obligations it is
designed to impose more consistent: it would be 'paradoxical' for states to be
obliged to prevent and punish genocide, while being free themselves to engage
in genocide.4 The interpretation 'is also supported by the purely humanitarian
and civilizing purpose of the Convention'. I would add that this obligation, as set
out by the Court, does not remain unchecked:
It is the ICJ that can ensure the judicial safeguard of compliance with such
obligation, pursuant to Article IX of the Convention. However, the Court did not
stop here. It interpreted Article III as implying that contracting states are also
under the obligation to refrain from engaging in any of the sets of conduct
envisaged in that provision: conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempt to
commit genocide, or complicity in genocide.
Thus the Court ended up contemplating the same prohibited conduct both with
regard to individuals and with respect to states. Both individuals and states may
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incur, respectively, criminal liability and state responsibility for the same unlawful
behaviour (acts of genocide, conspiracy, incitement, attempt, or complicity). This
view has been criticized by a number of commentators7 According to a more
convincing view the Convention (and the customary rules evolved as a result of
its broad acceptance by states and the passing of national legislation along the
same lines) chiefly provides for criminal liability of individuals for any of the acts
of genocide enumerated in Article III of the Convention (and in addition imposes
on contracting states only the obligation to prevent and repress genocide by
individuals, be they state officials or private individuals). As for state responsibility
for genocide, it arises in the event of a breach of the customary rule of
international law obliging states to refrain from engaging in genocide as a
conduct involving a genocidal policy pursued or tolerated by the state. Thus, as
has been rightly noted, the subjective and objective conditions on which the
arising of, respectively, state and individual responsibility for genocide is
contingent, may and indeed do differ.
2.20.22 MAIN MERITS OF THE CONVENTION
The Convention has numerous merits. Among other things, (i) it sets out a
careful definition of the crime; (ii) it punishes other acts connected with genocide
(conspiracy, complicity, etc.); (iii) it prohibits genocide regardless of whether it is
perpetrated in time of war or peace; (iv) thanks to the Convention and its very
broad acceptance by states, at the level of state responsibility it is now widely
recognized that customary rules on genocide impose erga omnes obligations;
that is, lay down obligations towards all other member states of the international
community, and at the same time confer on any state the right to require that acts
of genocide be discontinued. Furthermore, those rules now form part of jus
cogens or the body of peremptory norms; that is, they may not be derogated from
by international agreement (nor a fortiori by national legislation).
One should, however, be mindful of the flaws or omissions of the Convention.
These are the most blatant ones:
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1.  The definition of genocide does not embrace cultural genocide (that is, the
destruction of the language and culture of a group).Probably it was felt that
cultural genocide is a rather nebulous concept. Similarly, genocide does not
encompass the extermination of a group on political grounds. This was a
deliberate omission. One may wonder whether the elimination of political groups
fits with the notion of genocide. Killing all the communists in a country is
extermination, but is it genocide? Many would think not. The Convention confined
itself to the physical destruction of relatively stable groups to which persons in
most instances belong 'involuntarily' and, often, by birth (clearly, in the case of
religious groups, membership may be voluntary).
2. The four classes of protected groups (national, ethnical, racial, and
religious) are not defined, nor are criteria for their definition provided.
3. The enforcement mechanism envisaged in the Convention is ineffective
(in Article IV the Convention contemplates trials before the courts of the state on
the territory of which genocide has occurred, or before a future 'international
penal tribunal'. This is a flaw because it is the territorial state authorities (or
persons supported by such authorities) that normally tend to commit acts of
genocide; so national prosecutors will be reluctant to bring prosecutions;
furthermore, no international penal tribunal existed at the time, nor for 50 years
afterwards. Moreover, Article VIII provides that any contracting party 'may call
upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action' under the
Charter 'as they consider appropriate' for the prevention or suppression 'of
genocide, whereas Article IX confers on the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes
between states concerning the interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the
Convention.
Indeed, at the enforcement level the Convention has long proved a failure.
Only once did a United Nations body pronounce on a specific instance of
massacres, that it defined as genocide: this occurred in the case of Sabra and
Shatila, when the UN GA characterized the mass killing of Palestinians
perpetrated there by Christian falangist troops as 'an act of genocide' in its
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resolution 37/123 Dofl6 December 1982. (However, the GA did not set out the
legal reasons for this 'finding', nor did it draw any legal consequences from it.)
Subsequently in 1993, for the first time a state brought a case of genocide before
the ICJ: Bosnia v. Serbia. In 1999 Croatia also instituted before the ICJ
proceedings against Serbia for violations of the Genocide Convention.
2.20.23 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW ON GENOCIDE
If we leave aside a few decisions handed down by the Extraordinary Courts
Martial of the Ottoman Empire in 1920 and dealing with 'the massacres of
Armenians carried out with the goal of annihilating them11 (at that time the notion
of genocide had not yet been fully developed), it is striking that, until the 1990s,
only a few cases of genocide were brought before national courts. Chief among
them is Eichmann (decided in 1961 by the District Court of Jerusalem and
subsequently, in 1962, by the Israeli Supreme Court). Eichmann was tried for
'crimes against the Jewish people', an offence under Israeli law which
incorporated all the elements of the definition of genocide (and the Supreme
Court of Israel held that 'the crimes against the Jewish People' corresponded to
genocide, Eichmann, SC, at 287).
By contrast, much headway has been made both at the level of prosecution and
punishment of genocide by infernafional criminal tribunals (which have prodded
national courts also to deal with this crime) and at the normative level.
Genocide as a crime of individuals began to be punished following the
establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR. Genocide having been provided for in
the Statutes of both Tribunals as well as the ICC (followed by provisions relating
to the Special Panels for East Timor and the Extraordinary Chambers for
Cambodia),12 the first two courts have had the opportunity to try quite a few
persons accused of this crime. They have delivered important judgments on the
matter: the ICTR, particularly in Akayesu (§§204-28) and Kayishema and
Ruzindana (§§41-9); the ICTY in felisic (§§78-83) and Krstic (§§539-69).
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After the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, some national courts began to
institute criminal proceedings against persons accused of serious crimes in the
former Yugoslavia. German courts have thus pronounced on some cases of
genocide.13 Trials on genocide have also been conducted in other countries (for
instance, in Ethiopia, where the High Court tried former President Mengistu in
absentia; see Mengistu and other's.
At the norm-setting level, some major advances stand out. The major substantive
provisions of the Convention gradually turned into customary international law. In
its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, the ICJ
held that 'the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on states, even without any
conventional obligation' (at 24). This view was confirmed by the Court in Bosnia
v. Serbia (§§161). It is notable that the UN SG took the view of the customary
status of the Genocide Convention (or, more accurately, of the substantive
principles it lays down), a view that was endorsed implicitly by the L'N' SC,14 and
explicitly by the ICTR in Akayesu (§495) and by the ICTY in Krstic (§541).
2.20.24 THE OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS
Article II of the Genocide Convention, and the corresponding rule of customary
law, clearly defines the conduct that may amount to genocide:
(i) killing members (hence more than one member) of what we could term a
'protected group', namely a national or ethnical, racial, or religious group;
(ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a 'protected group';
(iii) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(iv) imposing measures intended to prevent birth within the group; or.
(v) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
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While the definition of the four classes of group is an intricate problem that
requires serious interpretative efforts (see infra, 6.6.1), the various classes of
action falling under genocide seem to be relatively clear. They were to a large
extent spelled out in Akayesu (T]), as well as other judgments of the ICTR:
(i)  as for killing members of the group, 'killing' must be interpreted as 'murder',
i.e. voluntary or intentional killing;
(ii)  as' for causing serious bodily or mental harm, these terms 'do not necessarily
mean that the harm is permanent and irremediable': Akayesu §§502-4;
Gacumbitsi, D, §291. As an ICTY TC put it in Krstic: In line with the Akayesu
Judgement [§502], the Trial Chamber states that serious harm need not cause
permanent and irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that goes beyond
temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. It must be harm that
results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person's ability to lead a
normal and constructive life. In subscribing to the above case-law, the Chamber
holds that inhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual abuse and deportation are
among the acts which may cause serious bodily or mental injury (§513).
See also ICTY, Blagojevic andJokic, TJ, §645. The harm may include acts of
bodily or mental torture, sexual violence, and persecution (Rutaganda, TJ, §51).
(iii)  with  regard  to  deliberately  inflicting  on  the  group  conditions  of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in Akayesu the TC held that this
expression includes among other things, 'subjecting a group of people to a
subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential
medical services below minimum requirement[s]': (§§505-6), or the 'deliberate
deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as food or medical
services' (Kayishema and Ruzindana, §115); according to an ICTY TC in
Brdanin, 'also included is the creation of circumstances that would lead to a slow
death, such as lack of proper housing, clothing and hygiene or excessive work or
physical exertion' (§691).
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(iv)  as for 'imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group', in
Akayesu it was held that these measures could consist of 'sexual mutilation, the
practice of sterilization, forced birth control [and the] separation of the sexes and
prohibition of marriage's' (§507); in addition, the measures at issue may be not
only physical but also mental (§508); they may include rape as an act directed to
prevent births when the woman raped refuses subsequently to procreate (§508);
see also Rutaganda, TJ, §53 and Musema, TJ, § 158.
(v)  forcibly transferring children of the group to another group may embrace
threats or intimidation leading to the forcible transfer of children to another group
(Akayesu, §509).
Another interesting problem relating to actus reus is whether genocide may also
include the killing, with the required intent, of only one single member of a
protected group. In Akayesu the Trial Chamber, when dealing with the
constituent elements of genocide, held the view that there may be genocide even
if one of the acts prohibited by the relevant rules on this matter is committed
'against one' member of a group (§521). Arguably, this broad interpretation is not
consistent with the text of the norms on genocide, which speak instead of
'members of a group' (see above).
lt would seem that Article II does not cover the conduct currently termed in non-
technical language 'ethnic cleansing'; that is the forcible expulsion of civilians
belonging to a particular group from an area, a village, or a town. (In the course
of the drafting of the Genocide Convention, Syria proposed an amendment
designed to add a sixth class of acts of genocide: Imposing measures intended
to oblige members of a group to abandon their homes in order to escape the
threat of subsequent ill-treatment'. However, the draughtsmen rejected this
proposal.)
Some courts have indeed excluded the forced expulsion of persons belonging to
a particular ethnic, racial, or religious group from the notion of genocide.17
However, in other cases courts have asserted that that expulsion, under certain
121
circumstances, could be held to amount to genocide.18 Probably the better view
is that upheld by the German Constitutional Court in Jorgic, namely that
'systematic expulsion can be a method of destruction and therefore an indication,
though not the sole substantiation, of an intention to destroy' (at §24). (A similar
view was propounded by an ICTYTC in Krstic (at §§589-98).)
In Krstic an ICTY TC clarified the actus reus by defining the notion of the
destruction of a group 'in part'. The Prosecution had accused the defendant of
genocide for having planned and participated in the massacre in a limited locality
(the area of Srebrenica), of between 7,000 and 8,000 Bosnian Muslims, all of
them men of military age. The question arose of whether the 'protected group'
was constituted by the 'Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica' or instead by 'Bosnian
Muslims'. The Chamber answered the query by noting that the group was that of
Bosnian Muslims, and the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica constituted 'a part of
the protected group' under Article 4 of the ICTY Statute (§560) (which was based
on Article II of the Genocide Convention and was held by the Chamber to be
declaratory of customary international law: §§541-80). The Chamber added that
'the intent to eradicate a group within a limited geographical a rea such as the
region of a country or even a municipality' could be characterized as genocide
(§589).19 As for the fact that the persons systematically killed at Srebrenica were
'only men of military age', the TC emphasized that, while these men were being
massacred, at the same time the rest of the Bosnian Muslim population was
being forcibly transferred out of the area.
The Chamber concluded that the killing of all the Bosnian Muslim men of military
age in Srebrenica accompanied by the intent to destroy in part the Bosnian
Muslim group within the meaning of Article 4 of the ICTY Statute must qualify as
genocide.
Before making this ruling, the TC had also discussed the question of the extent to
which, while appraising whether or not genocide had been perpetrated in the
case at issue, it could take into account evidence or facts relating to the cultural
122
or social destruction of a group, as opposed to its physical or biological
destruction.
2.20.25 THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS
The mental requirement for genocide as a crime involving international criminal
liability is provided for in Article 11(1) of the Convention on Genocide (and in the
corresponding customary rule): the 'intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group'. Genocide is a typical crime based on
the 'depersonalization of the victim'; that is a crime where the victim is not
targeted on account of his or her individual qualities or characteristics, but only
because he or she is a member of a group. As the German Federal Court of
Justice rightly held in Jorgic in 1999, the perpetrators of genocide do not target a
person 'in his capacity as an individual'; they 'do not see the victim as a human
being but only as a member of the persecuted group'
This intent amounts to dolus specialis-, that is, to an aggravated criminal
intention, required in addition to the criminal intent accompanying the underlying
offence (killing; causing serious bodily or mental harm; inflicting conditions of life
calculated to physically destroy the group; imposing measures designed to
prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children). It logically follows
that other categories of mental element are excluded: recklessness (or dolus
eventualis) and gross negligence.
The ICTR TCs have contributed greatly to elucidating the subjective element of
genocide. In Akayesu, an ICTR TC held that the commission of genocide
required 'a special intent or dolus specialis'. 'Special intent' is defined by the
ICTR as 'the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime,
which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged'
(§498). The TC added that intent 'is a mental factor which is difficult, even
impossible to determine. This is the reason why, in the absence of a confession
from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain number of
presumptions of fact' (§523). It added that one can in particular infer the special
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intent 'from all acts or utterances of the accused, or from the general context in
which other culpable acts were perpetrated systematically against the same
group, regardless of whether such other acts were committed by the same
perpetrator or even by other perpetrators'.
2.20.26 PROBLEMATICAL ASPECTS OF GENOCIDE
There are three issues concerning genocide that are at the same time intricate
and controversial, and which therefore deserve our attention: (i) how to identify
the various 'protected' groups; (ii) whether acts of genocide always require an
underlying genocidal policy by a state or organized authority; (iii) how to discern
genocidal intent.
2.20.27 HOW TO IDENTIFY THE 'PROTECTED' GROUPS
The major problems concerning the objective element of genocide relate to the
notion of the group victim of the crime as well as the identification of thefour
groups enumerated in the rule (national, ethnical, racial, and religious). The
former problem may be termed as follows: what do the Convention and the
corresponding customary rule mean by 'group'? In other words, when can one
state with certainty that one is faced with a group protected by the Convention?
The latter question, which is obviously closely related to the former, is 'By what
standards or criteria can one identify each of the four groups?' Can one rely upon
an objective test for each group? If so, where does one find such a test?
Normally the various classes of groups are defined objectively, on account of
some alleged objective features each group exhibits. By national group is meant
a multitude of persons distinguished by their nationality or national origin (for
instance, the French citizens living abroad in a particular country, the US
nationals of Irish descent). Race is a notion whose scientific validity has been
debunked by anthropologists: it must nevertheless be perforce interpreted and
applied when used in a legal provision. In the Genocide Convention race seems
to embrace groups that share some hereditary physical traits or features, such as
the colour of skin. Ethnicity refers to groups that share a language and cultural
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traditions. Religion is probably the least controversial standard; it refers to groups
sharing the same religion or set of spiritual beliefs and faith, as well as modes of
worship.
The case law of the ICTR and ICTY has contributed considerably to clarifying the
notion of 'group', moving from an objective to a subjective evaluation. The
importance of Akayesu in particular needs to be stressed. In this case, an ICTR
TC not only emphasized that genocide is the most grave international crime or,
as it put it, 'the crime of crimes' (§16), but also, and more importantly, set out a
definition of 'group'. In its view, this word, in the provisions on genocide, refers
only to 'stable groups constituted in a permanent fashion, and membership of
which is determined by birth, with the exclusion of the more 'mobile' groups which
one joins through individual voluntary commitment, such as political and
economic groups. Therefore, a common criterion in the four types of groups
protected by the Genocide Convention is that membership in such groups would
seem to be normally not challengeable by its members, who belong to it
automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner (§511).
According to the TC, the groups protected against genocide should not be limited
to the four groups envisaged in the relevant rules, but—in order to respect the
intention of the draughtsmen of the Genocide Convention, who clearly intended
to protect any identifiable group—should include 'any stable and permanent
group' (§516). This proposition without further elaboration appears unconvincing,
given that the framers of the Convention, as clearly expressed in the text of that
instrument, evinced an intention to protect only the four groups explicitly
indicated there. The Chamber then propounded a definition of each of the four
groups envisaged in the relevant rules. It defined 'national groups' as 'a collection
of people who are perceived to share a legal bond of common citizenship,
coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties' (§512), an 'ethnic group' as 'a group
whose members share a common language or culture' (§513), a 'racial group' as
a group 'based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a
geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious
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factors' (§514), and a 'religious group' as a group 'whose members share the
same religion, denomination or mode of worship' (§515).
It should be noted that in the particular case of the genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in
Rwanda, the question of how to identify a protected group played a major role.
Indeed, these two groups shared language, religion, and culture, lived in the
same areas, and in addition there was a high rate of mixed marriages. The ICTR
stressed that the two terms of Tutsi and Hutus before colonization by the
Germans (1885-1916) and then by the Belgians (1916-1962) referred to
individuals and not to groups, the distinction being based on lineage rather than
ethnicity (§81). (Furthermore, Tutsis were originally shepherds, whereas Hutus
were farmer.) However, in 1931 Belgians introduced a permanent distinction by
dividing the population into three ethnic groups (Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa), making it
mandatory for each Rwandan to carry an identity card that mentioned his or her
ethnicity (§83). The TC concluded that thus in fact the members of the various
groups ended up considering themselves as distinct from members of the other
groups.
It would thus seem that for the TC in Akayesu the question of whether or not a
multitude of persons made up a group protected by the rules against genocide
was primarily a question of fact: the court had to establish whether (i) those
persons were in fact treated as belonging to one of those protected groups; and
in addition (ii) they considered themselves as belonging to one of such groups.
One may find the same admixture of objective and subjective criteria in
Kayishema and Razindana. There an ICTR TC stated that
An ethnic group is one whose members share a common language and culture:
or a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self-identification); or a group
identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by
others) (§98).
In Rutaganda the ICTR pushed the subjective standard even further. It noted
that:
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The concepts of national, ethnical, racial and religious groups have been
researched extensively and […] at present, there are no generally and
internationally accepted precise definitions thereof. Each of these concepts must
be assessed in the light of a particular political, social and cultural context.
Moreover, the Chamber notes that for the purposes of applying the Genocide
Convention, membership of a group is, in essence, a subjective rather than an
objective concept. The victim is perceived by the perpetrator of genocide as
belonging to a group slated for destruction. In some instances, the victim may
perceive himself/herself as belonging to the said group (§56).
Also, two ICTY TCs, as well as the UN International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur, shared this subjective approach.
2.20.28 WHETHER GENOCIDE ALWAYS REQUIRES A GENOCIDAL POLICY
OR PLAN
Various commentators have noted that acts of genocide by individuals or groups
always presuppose a policy or at least a collective activity of a state, an entity or
a group, policy or collective activity in which the individual perpetrators of
genocide participate by their conduct.26 Contrary to this view, the ICTY AC held
in felisic that 'the existence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of the
crime', although 'it may facilitate proof of the crime' (AJ, 948).
I submit that both views do not construe the existing law correctly. Arguably a
con- textual element is not required by the customary and treaty rules on
genocide for some instances of genocide, whilst it is needed for other categories.
At least with regard to two categories of acts of genocide ((i) killing members of a
protected group; (ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a
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protected group), one or more individuals may engage in the crime of genocide
without any general policy or collective action being required for their being
prosecuted and punished for that crime. One or more individuals may, for
example, kill a number of members of a religious group with genocidal intent,
even if no state authorities or collectivity persecute and intend to destroy that
group. Similarly, one or more persons may engage in rape or torture of members
of an ethnic or racial group with the intent of thereby destroying the group in
whole or in part. In other words, international rules do not require the existence of
either a widespread or systematic practice or a plan as a legal ingredient of the
crime of genocide. This conclusion is material at the procedural level, for it
implies that the Prosecutor in a national or international trial need not lead
evidence on that practice or contextual element. In reality, however, even
genocidal acts belonging to one of the two categories at issue are hardly
conceivable as isolated or sporadic events. Normally they are in fact part of a
pattern of conduct tolerated, approved, or condoned by governmental authorities.
These circumstances remain nevertheless factual events, not provided for or
required by the relevant treaty and customary rules.
Instead, the other three categories of genocide perforce not only presuppose, but
necessarily take the shape of, some sort of collective or even organized action (I
am referring to (i) deliberately inflicting on a protected group or members thereof
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (ii) imposing measures intended to prevent births within a protected group;
(iii) forcibly transferring children of a protected group to another group). Plainly,
actions such as deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for the survival
of members of a protected group, e.g. food or medical supplies, or such action as
systematic expulsion from home with a view to bringing about conditions of life
leading to the destruction of the group, constitute actions that are necessarily
carried out on a large scale and by a multitude of individuals in pursuance of a
common plan, possibly with the support or at least the acquiescence of the
authorities. Similarly, such measures designed to prevent births as prohibition of
marriages, separation of the sexes, forced birth control, sterilization, large-scale
sexual mutilation, are all activities that only state organs or other official
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authorities may undertake, or authorize to undertake, or at least approve or
condone.
2.20.29 HOW TO IDENTIFY GENOCIDAL INTENT
The ICTR TCs have contributed greatly to elucidating the subjective element of
genocide. As noted, in Akayesa an ICTR TC held that intent 'is a mental factor
which is difficult, even impossible to determine' (§523).
Indeed, normally to prove the existence of genocidal intent one has to infer such
intent from factual circumstances. Only seldom can one find documents or
statements by which one or more persons explicitly declare that they intend to
destroy a whole group. An instance of such statements can be found in the
minutes (drafted by Eichmann) of the discussion held at Wannsee (Berlin) on 20
January 1942 to plan the extermination of the European Jews,30 as well as in
the speech Heinrich Himmier (head of the SS) made on 4 October 1943 in
Poznan to SS officers31 to the same effect.
In other instances utterances against a particular group expressing the intent to
destroy (or to contribute to destroy) the group, were not taken to express
genocidal intent proper. A case in point is felisic. An ICTY TC held that his
repeated statements against Muslims and the consequent criminal offences
perpetrated by him against many Muslims did not manifest genocidal intent but
were expression of 'a disturbed personality' (§§102-7). The AC took a different
(and a more correct) view, ruling that the accused had instead entertained
genocidal intent (§§55-72), although it then oddly declined to reverse the
acquittal for genocide entered by the TC and remit the case for further
proceedings.
In Krstic an ICTY TC made a considerable contribution, in various respects, to
the definition of mens rea of genocide. The Prosecution, as noted above,
accused the defendant of genocide for having planned and participated in the
massacre in a limited locality (the area of Srebrenica), of between 7,000 and
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8,000 Bosnian Muslims, all of them men of military age. The following question
then arose: was this intent present in this case where only men of military age
were systematically killed? The Chamber answered the query in the affirmative. It
emphasized that the rest of the Bosnian Muslim population had been forcibly
transferred out of the area, with the inevitable result of the physical
disappearance of the whole Muslim population of Srebrenica.32 The Chamber
concluded that the intent to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age in
Srebrenica evinced the intention to destroy in part the Bosnian Muslim group and
therefore must qualify as genocidal intent.
As pointed out above, the special intent under discussion is normally deduced
from the factual circumstances. Hence, in those cases where the actus reus is
murder or bodily or mental harm the question whether those acts were part of a
plan or policy or of widespread or systematic practice may eventually acquire
importance from an evidentiary viewpoint (although, as noted above, not as a
legal ingredient of the crime), as an element capable of proving (or confirming)
that there was indeed genocidal intent.
This is clear from what an ICTR TC held in some cases, for instance in Akayesu
and in Kayishema and Ruzindanda. In the former case the TC inferred the
special intent from the speeches by which the accused called, 'more or less
explicitly', for the commission of genocide (§729). It also deduced intent from the
very high number of deliberate and systematic atrocities committed against the
Tutsis (§730) and the numerous and systematic acts of rape and sexual violence
against Tutsi women (§§731-3). Also in Kayishema and Ruzindanda the TC
inferred genocidal intent from the high number of Tutsis killed (§531 and 533),
the fact that they had been massacred regardless of gender or age (§532), as
well as the fact that the attacks had been carried out in a consistent and
methodical way (§§534-6 and 543). The utterances of the two defendants were
also taken into account (for instances, Tutsis had been called 'cockroaches', had
been referred to as 'dirt' or 'filth' (§538); if particular, Ruzindana had stated that
babies whose mothers had been killed must not be spared 'because those
attacking the country initially left as children' (at §542).
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Similarly, in Musema an ICTR TC inferred special intent to destroy Tutsis from
(he numerous atrocities committed against them (§928), form large-scale attacks
launched against Tutsi civilians (§930) and, more generally, from the widespread
and systematic perpetration of other criminal acts against members of the Tutsi
group'(§931) in which the defendant participated. These acts were accompanied
by humiliating utterances.33
When the objectively genocidal act is part of a whole pattern of conduct taking
place in the same state (or region or geographical area), or, a fortiori, of a policy
planned or pursued by the governmental authorities (or by the leading officials of
an organized political or military group), then it may become easier to deduce not
only the intent34 but also lack of intent from the facts of the case. Thus, the UN
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur held that a range of acts or conducts by the
Sudanese governmental authorities committed in breach of international rules
evinced that the intent to destroy an ethnic group in whole or in part was lacking.)
If instead no policy or plan or widespread practice may be discerned, it may turn
out to be extremely difficult to prove the required intent. The Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur stated that the fact that no genocidal intent could be imputed to
the Sudanese authorities did not exclude that such special intent might be
entertained by single individual Sudanese servicemen or militias fighting on
behalf of or together with the Sudanese armed forces. To establish the existence
of such intent in specific cases was, according to the Commission, a task falling
to a competent court of law (§§520-1).
2.20.30 GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
As emphasized above, large-scale massacres of ethnic or religious groups were
first criminalized as a subclass of the category of crimes against humanity.
However, after the adoption of the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the gradual
transformation of its main substantive provisions into customary international law,
genocide became a category of crimes per se, with its own specific actus reus
and mens rea.
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True, both categories share at least three elements: (i) they encompass very
serious offences that shock our sense of humanity in that they constitute attacks
on the most fundamental aspects of human dignity; (ii) they do not constitute
isolated events but are instead always part of a larger context, either because
they are large-scale and massive infringements of human dignity or because they
are linked to a broader practice of misconduct; and (iii) although they need not be
perpetrated by state officials or by officials of entities such as insurgents, they are
usually carried out with the complicity, connivance, or at least the toleration or
acquiescence of the authorities.
However, the objective and subjective elements of the two crimes differ in many
respects (see also supra, 6.5). As for the objective element, the two crimes may
undoubtedly overlap to some extent: for instance, killing members of an ethnic or
religious group may as such fall under both categories; the same holds true for
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a racial or religious group,
or even for the other classes of protected group. However, crimes against
humanity have a broader scope, for they may encompass acts that, as such, do
not come within the purview of genocide (for instance, imprisonment and
torture)—unless they amount to acts inflicting on members of a group conditions
of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group. By the
same token, there may be acts of genocide that are not normally held (at least
under the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC) to fall within the other
category of crime (for instance, killing detained military personnel belonging to a
particular religious or racial group, by reason of their membership of that group).
Thus, from the viewpoint of their objective elements, the two categories are
normally 'reciprocally special', in that they form overlapping circles which
nevertheless intersect only tangentially.
By contrast, from the perspective of the mens rea, the two categories do not
overlap at all. In the case of crimes against humanity, international law requires
the intent to commit the underlying offence plus knowledge of the widespread or
systematic practice constituting the general context of the offence. For genocide,
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what is required is instead the special intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
particular group, in addition to the intent to commit the underlying offence. From
this viewpoint, the two categories are therefore 'nlitually exclusive'. They form two
circles that do not intersect. The only exception is the case where the underlying
actus reus is the same, for instance, murder; in this case, the intent to kill is
required in both categories; nevertheless genocide remains an autonomous
category, for it is only genocide that also requires the intent to destroy a group.
Similarly, it is only for crimes against humanity that knowledge of the widespread
or systematic practice is required. As for persecution, the intent of seriously
discriminating against members of a particular group is shared by both crimes
against humanity and genocide. For persecution-type crimes against humanity,
however, it is sufficient to prove that the perpetrator intentionally carried out
large-scale and severe deprivations of the fundamental rights of a particular
group, whereas for genocide it is necessary to prove the intent to destroy a
group, in whole or in part.
I should add that, depending on the group targeted and the accompanying intent,
the same objective conduct may give rise to a combination of both genocide and
crimes against humanity. For instance, the Hutus' massacres of Tutsis in
Rwanda in 1994 amounted to genocide, whereas their simultaneous or
concomitant killing of moderate Hutus constituted a crime against humanity.
2.20.31 ARTICLE 6 OF THE ICC STATUTE AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 6 of the ICC Statute reproduces word for word Article II of the Genocide
Convention and the corresponding customary rule. In contrast, Article III of the
Convention (and the corresponding customary rule) on responsibility for forms of
participation in the crime other than perpetration, namely conspiracy, incitement,
attempt, and complicity, have not been taken up in the provision on genocide,
either because the notion has not been accepted by the Rome Diplomatic
Conference (as was the case with conspiracy, a concept that has not found the
support of all the civil law countries present at Rome), or because the relevant
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notion is laid down in general terms (i.e. in terms applicable to other crimes as
well) in other provisions of the ICC Statute: this applies to incitement (at present
envisaged in Article 25(3)(e)), attempt (which is provided for in Article 25(3)(f)),
and complicity (which is contemplated in Article 25(3)(e) and (d)).
It follows that in at least one respect there is an inconsistency between
customary international law and the Rome Statute. The former prohibits and
makes punishable 'conspiracy to commit genocide'; that is, an inchoate crime
consisting of the planning and organizing of genocide not necessarily followed by
the perpetration of the crime, whereas Article 6 does not contain a similar
prohibition.
It should be noted that in the process of drafting Article 6, in February 1997 it was
suggested in the Working Group of the Preparatory Committee that 'the
reference to "intent to destroy in whole or in part [...] a group as such" was
understood to refer to the specific intention to destroy more than a small number
of individuals who are members of a group'.37 This suggestion was aptly
assailed by two commentators, who noted that nothing in the Genocide
Convention could justify such a restrictive interpretation and that, in addition,
international practice belied this interpretation, for 'successful counts or
prosecutions of crimes against humanity, of which genocide is a species, have
involved relatively small numbers of victims'.38 It would seem that the customary
international rule, as codified in Article 6, does not require that the victims of
genocide be numerous. The only thing that can be clearly inferred from the rule is
that genocide cannot be held to occur when there is only one victim (see above
6.4). However, as long as the other requisite elements are present, the killing or
commission of the other enumerated offences against more than one person
may amount to genocide.
Finally, one should note a further view put forth with regard to the mens rea
element of genocide. According to the proponent of this view, the ICC Statute
'appears to allow' that 'genocide may be committed with a lower level of mens
rea' than the very high intent requirement mentioned above, for it 'contemplates
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[in Article 28, on command responsibility] liability of commanders for genocide
committed by their subordinates even if they have no real knowledge of the
crime'. It may be objected that this could be true only with regard to the case
where the superior knows that genocide is about to be perpetrated, or is being
committed, and deliberately refrains from forestalling the crime or stopping it.
Indeed in this case, according to a widespread opinion, the superior may be
equated to a co-perpetrator, or at least an aider and abettor (see infra, 11.4.2-4).
Instead, one could not accuse a superior of genocide (as a co-perpetrator or an
accomplice) when the superior fails to punish the subordinates who have
engaged in genocide; or when, although he has information that should enable
him to conclude that genocide is being committed or may be committed, fails to
act, in breach of his supervisory obligations (see Article 28(l)(a) and (2)(a)). In
these cases the superior would be guilty of a different offence: intentional,
reckless, or grossly negligent breach of his supervisory duties. It follows that, with
regard to such cases, it ‘would not be correct to assert that he should be held
responsible for genocide, although with a subjective element lower than specific
intent.
2.20.32 The Definition, elements and meaning of International Crimes i.e.
genocide, crimes against humanity and War Crimes according to various
International Instruments
2.20.33 GENERAL
As in any national legal system, also in ICL responsibility arises not only when a
person materially commits a crime but also when he or she engages in other
forms or modalities of criminal conduct. In the following paragraphs I shall set out
these different modalities of participation.
Before I do so, it may however prove fitting to discuss briefly the position in
national legal systems. They converge in holding that, where a crime involves
more than one person, all performing the same act, all are equally liable as co-
perpetrators, or principals. In contrast, national legal orders differ when it comes
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to the punishment of two or more persons participating in a crime, where these
persons do not perform the same act but in one way or another contribute to the
realization of a criminal design.
For instance, A draws up plans for a bank robbery, B provides the weapons, C
performs the actual robbery, D acts as a lockout, E drives the getaway car, and F
hides the loot and in addition gives shelter to the robbers. Many systems (for
instance those of the US, France, Austria, Uruguay, and Australia) do not make
any legal distinction between the different categories of participant and mete out
the same penalty to each participant, whatever his role in the commission of the
crime. As the California Penal Code provides at §31, all those 'concerned in the
commission of a crime' including those who aid and abet the crime, are to be
held liable as principals.
In spite of this legal regulation, for classificatory purposes and to aid analysis,
legal commentators and courts use descriptive terms to distinguish between the
various categories of participant: in the example given above, A is an 'accessory
before the fact' (he is not a 'principal' for he was not present when the robbery
was perpetrated), B is an aider and abettor (or an 'accessory before the fact'), C
is a 'first degree principal', D and E are 'second degree principals',  and F is an
'accessory after the fact'. However, as noted above, under the general
sentencing tariff no distinction is made between these different categories of
person. It is only provided that for accomplices or accessories extenuating
circumstances may be taken into account if their participation in the offence is
less serious than that of the principal or principals. In fact, for the purposes of
sentencing, judges often draw a distinction between principals, instigators, and
aiders and abettors.
In other national legal systems (for instance, Germany, Spain, and Russia) the
law draws instead a normative distinction between two categories—principals,
and accomplices or accessories—and provides in terms that the persons falling
under the latter category must be punished less severely. Thus, for instance, in
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German law, the scale of penalties for accomplices (at least in the case of aiders
and abettors, Gehilfe) is less harsh than for the perpetrator (Tater).75
We will see that in international law neither treaties nor case law (as indicative of
customary rules) make any legal distinction between the various categories, at
least as far as the consequent penalties are concerned. This lack of distinction
follows both from: (i) the absence of any agreed scale of penalties in ICL; and
from (ii) the general character of this body of law; that is, its still rudimentary
nature and the ensuing lack of formalism (see supra, 1.2).
Consequently, the differentiation between the various classes of participation in
crimes, which I shall set out below, is merely based on the intrinsic features of
each modality of participation. It serves a descriptive and classificatory purpose
only. It is devoid of any relevance as far as sentencing is concerned. It is for
judges to decide in each case on the degree of culpability of a participant in an
international crime and assign the penalty accordingly, whatever the modality of
participation of the offender in the crime.
2.20.34 PERPETRATION
Whoever physically commits a crime, either alone or jointly with other persons, is
criminally liable. For instance, the soldier who kills a war prisoner or an innocent
civilian is liable to punishment for a war crime. Similarly, the serviceman who
rapes an enemy civilian as part of a widespread or systematic attack on civilians
is accountable for a crime against humanity,
Perpetration is thus the physical carrying out of the prohibited conduct,
accompanied by the requisite psychological element.76
75 In two cases, the Extraordinary Courts Martial established in the Ottoman Empire to try persons accused
of participating in massacring Armenians in 1915 and plundering their possessions, applied the Imperial
Military Penal Code', which drew a normative distinction between principals and accessories. The Court
therefore made a point of distinguishing between the 'principal perpetrators' and the 'accessories', and
assigning a different sentence to each category of defendant. In Kemal and TevftkU sentenced the principal
perpetrator to death and the accessory to 15 years of hard labour (at 5-6, or 157-8); in Bahaeddirt Sdkir and
others the majority of judges held that two defendants were accessories, while three dissenting judges held
that they 'were equally guilty of having been principal co-perpetrators' (at 4 and 8 or 171 and 173).
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2.20.35 CO-PERPETRATION
Crimes are often committed by a plurality of persons. If all of them materially take
part in the actual perpetration of the same crime and perform the same act (tor
instance, they are all members of an execution squad shooting innocent
civilians), we can speak of co-perpetration. All participants in the crime partake of
the same criminal conduct and the attendant mens rea.
2.20.36 PARTICIPATION IN A JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE TO
COMMIT INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
2.20.37 INTRODUCTION
International crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
torture, and terrorism share a common feature: they tend to be expression of
collective criminality, in that they are perpetrated by a multitude or persons:
military details, paramilitary units or government officials acting in unison or, in
most cases, in pursuance of a policy. When such crimes are committed, it is
extremely difficult to pinpoint the specific contribution made by each individual
participant in the criminal enterprise or collective crime, on two grounds.
First, not all participants may have acted in the same manner, but rather each of
them may have played a different role in planning, organizing, instigating,
76 In some cases courts have minimized the role of perpetrators executing illegal orders. This for instance
holds true for Alfons Gotzfrid, which concerns mistreatment at the Majdanek camp. The Stuttgart Court
(Landgericht) held that 'According to established case-law [...I, the offender or accomplice is defined as one
whose thoughts and actions coincide with those of the author of the crime, who willingly gives in to
incitement to political murder, silences his conscience and makes another person's criminal aims the basi of
his own conviction and his own action or who sees to it that orders of that kind are ruthlessly carried ou or
who in so doing otherwise displays consenting enthusiasm or who exploits State terror for his own pui
poses. Accordingly, the accused could only be shown to have an attitude denoting guilt if, over and above
the activity he was instructed to carry out, he had performed some contributory act on his own initiative
beyon the call of duty, shown particular enthusiasm, had acted with particular ruthlessness in the
exterminatio operation or had shown a personal interest in the killings. These conditions cannot be shown
to exist in th case of the accused. He was at the end of the chain of command, had no power ot decision
himself and n authority to act [...) Similarly, there is no evidence that the accused had any personal interest
in the killing He merely wanted to carry out the order which had been issued to him '(67, b).
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coordinating, executing or otherwise contributing to the criminal conduct. For
instance, in the case of torture one person may order the crime, another may
physically execute it, yet another may watch to check whether the victim
discloses any significant information, a medical doctor may be in attendance to
verify whether the measures for inflicting pain or suffering are likely to cause
death, so as to stop the torture just before the measures become lethal, another
person may carry food for the executioners, and so on. The question arises as to
whether all these participants are equally responsible for the same crime, torture.
Similarly, in the case of deportation of civilians or prisoners of war to an
extermination camp, a commander may issue the order, several officers may
organize the transport, others may take care of food and drinking water, others
may carry out surveillance over the inmates so as to prevent their escape, others
may search the detainees for valuables or other things before deportation, and
so on. Secondly, the evidence relating to each individual's conduct may prove
difficult, if not impossible, to find. It would, however, be not only immoral, but also
contrary to the general purpose of criminal law (to protect the community from
the deviant behaviour of its members that causes serious damage to the general
interests) to let those actions go unpunished. These considerations a fortiori
apply to crimes such as murder or aggravated assault committed by a whole
crowd; in such cases, it may prove even more difficult to collect evidence about
the exact participation of members of the . crowd in the crimes. The same
considerations also hold true for cases where crimes are institutionally committed
within organized and hierarchical units such as internment, detention, or
concentration camps, where it is difficult to pinpoint the gradations of culpability
of the various persons working within and for the organization.
As in most national legal systems, also in ICL all participants in a common
criminal action are equally responsible if they (i) participate in the action,
whatever their position and the extent of their contribution, and in addition (ii)
intend to engage in the common criminal action. Therefore they are all to be
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treated as principals77 although of course the varying degree of culpability may
be taken into account at the sentencing staged.78
The notion of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) denotes a mode of criminal liability
that appears particularly fit to cover the criminal liability of all participants in a
common criminal plan. At the same time, this notion does not run contrary to the
general principles of criminal law. As in national legal systems, the rationale
behind this legal regulation is clear: if all those who take part in a common
criminal action are aware of the purpose and character of the criminal action and
share the requisite criminal intent, they must perforce share criminal liability,
whatever the role and position they may have played in the commission of the
77 However, some courts ot common law countries have taken the view that participants in a common
crimilial design may plav the role of, and be regarded as, accessories. Thus, for instance, in
Einsatzgruppen, with regard to common design, the Prosecutor T. Taylor, in his closing statement noted
that 'the elementary principle must be borne in mind that neither under Control Council Law No. 10 nor
under anv known sys- tem of criminal law is guilt for murder confined to the man who pulls the trigger or
buries the corpse. In line with recogn'.zed principles common to all civilized legal systems, §2 of Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies a number of types of connection with crime which are sufficient
to establish guilt. Thus, not only are principals guilty but also accessories, those who take a consenting part
in the commission of crime or are connected with plans or enterprises involved in its commission, those
who order or abet crime, and those who belong to an organization or group engaged in the commission of
crime. These provisions embody no harsh or novel principles of criminal responsibility' (372).
78 In this connection one may mention, by way of example, a decision of the Supreme Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in Tepez, delivered on I October 1999: 'The appeal bv the defence counsel argues that the
contested judgment has not individualised the criminal responsibility of the accused and his personal
involvement in actions characteristic of a war crime against the civilian population. For this crime to exist it
is necessary to "commit murder, torture, inhumane acts, inflict severe suffering, physical and mental
injuries on civilians, destroying their health and physical integrity". The disposition does not include these
essential elements of this criminal act and therefore represents a major violation of the provisions of
criminal procedure. This Court finds these allegations groundless. The appeal fails to note that the
contested judgment states that the accused carried out these actions with three other named individuals (as
well as others), which means that he perpetrated the crime for which he has been pronounced guilty in
complicity with others. It further means that in cases of this kind where it is not possible to isolate
individual actions and their consequences or to distinguish the degree to which each person was involved in
their execution, it suffices that these actions complement each other and together form a single entity,
which the accused [Tepe] wishes to achieve by being involved. Therefore it was neither possible nor
necessary for the court of first instance to separate only the actions of the accused. It suffices that the
accused participated in executing these actions, even if it had only been one or two actions of personal
involvement in the beating of civilians. However, the court of first instance has established that the accused
personally beat up many individuals on many occasions' (2).
Also the decision of a Canadian court in Moreno deserves mentioning: In reaching this conclusion, I am
influenced by one commentator's view that the closer a person is involved in the decision-making process
and the less he or she does to thwart the commission of inhumane acts, the more likely criminal
responsibility will attach (...) of course, the further one is distanced from the decision makers, assuming
that one is not a "principal", then it is less likely that the required degree of complicity necessary to attract
criminal sanctions, or the application of the exclusion clause, will be met' (18). See also Ramirez (6-9)
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crime. This is the case because: (i) each of them is indispensable for the
achievement of the final result; and on the other hand (ii) it would be difficult to
distinguish between the degree of criminal liability, except for sentencing
purposes.
Thus, it is by now widely accepted by international criminal courts that in the case
of collective' criminality where several persons engage in the pursuit of a
common criminal plan or design, all participants in this common plan or design
may be held criminally liable for the perpetration of the criminal act, even if they
have not materially participated in the commission of said act; in addition, they
may also be held responsible, under a number of well-defined conditions, for
criminal conduct that, although not originally envisaged in the common criminal
design, has been undertaken by one of the participants and may to some extent
be regarded as a natural and foreseeable consequence of such a common plan.
It is also widely accepted that at the international level this mode of criminal
liability can take three different forms. It was the ICTY AC that first articulated in
Tadic (A] 1999) the doctrine of ICE as a fully fledged legal construct of modes of
criminal liability. However, the doctrine had already been upheld at the national
or international level by various courts, if only in passing. In Tadic (A] 1999) the
ICTY AC spelled out the three categories I will refer to below.
2.20.38 LIABILITY FOR A COMMON INTENTIONAL PURPOSE
(A) The notion
The first and more widespread category of liability is responsibility for  acts
agreed upon when making the common plan or design. Here all the participants
share the same intent to commit a crime, and all are responsible, whatever their
role and position in carrying out the common criminal plan (even if they simply
vote, in an assembly or in a group, in favour of implementing such a plan). In
addition to shared intent, dolus eventualis (i.e. recklessness or advertent
recklessness) (see supra, 3.7) may also suffice to hold all participants in the
common plan criminally liable. For instance, if a group of servicemen decides to
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deprive civilians of food and water in order to compel them to build a bridge
necessary for military operations or to disclose the names of other civilians who
have engaged in unlawful attacks on the military, and then some civilians die, the
servicemen should all be accountable not only for a ICE to commit the war
crimes of intentionally starving civilians and 'compelling the nationals of the
hostile party to take part in operations of war directed against their own country;
they should also be held guilty of murder. Indeed, even if the servicemen did not
intend to bring about the death of the civilians, the death was the natural and
foreseeable consequence of their common criminal plan and the follow-up action.
Society—in our case the world community—must defend itself from this collective
criminality by reacting in a repressive manner against all those who, in some
form, took part in the criminal enterprise. Society may not indulge in distinctions
between the different roles played by each of the participants when trying to
uproot or, better, punish this form of collective criminality. All actors are guilty,
even though in some instances the mens rea (for example, intent to murder) is
not attended by the corresponding conduct (for example, stabbing or firing a
gun); this applies to all those who, while sharing the criminal intent, do not carry
out the primary crime (for example, the driver or the look-out in an armed robbery
involving murder). However, the differing degrees of culpability can be taken into
account at the stage of sentencing.
(B) Case law
In Ponzano, a case concerning the unlawful killing of four British prisoners of war
by German troops, the Judge Advocate adopted the approach suggested by the
Prosecutor, and stressed the requirement that an accused, before he can be
found guilty, must have been concerned in the offence (...T]o be concerned in the
commission of a criminal offence [...] does not only mean that you are the person
who in fact inflicted the fatal injury and directly caused death, be it by shooting or
by any other violent means; it also means an indirect degree of participation [...
l]n other words, he must be the cog in the wheel of events leading up to the result
which in fact occurred. He can further that object not only by giving orders for a
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criminal offence to be committed, but he can further that object by a variety of
other means (at 7). The Judge Advocate also underlined that the accused should
have knowledge of the intended purpose of the criminal enterpriser.79
In 2001, in Krstic, an ICTY TC held that the defendant had participated in a ICE
to commit genocide. The Court explained at length that initially Krstic had only
taken part in a common plan to forcibly expel Muslims from the area of
Srebrenica; however, later on, when it became apparent that the various military
leaders in fact were planning the killing of thousands of military-aged men, the
defendant showed, through his various acts and behaviour, that he shared the
'genocidal intent to kill the men' (§§621-45). The Chamber therefore found Krstic
guilty of genocide and sentenced him to 46 years in prison. The AC held instead
that Krstic was only guilty of complicity in genocide, for he had not shared the
genocidal intent but simply aided and abetted genocide. It reduced his sentence
to 35 years' imprisonment.
In 2003, in Blagojevic, Simic and others an ICTY TC held that the three accused,
Bosnian Serbs operating in the municipalities of Bosania Herzegovina'; and
Odzak in Bosnia Herzegovina, committed various crimes there. The main
defendant, Simic (who, at the time of the conflict, was the President of the
Municipal Assembly and of the Crisis Staff, later renamed 'the War Presidency'),
participated in a basic form of JCE. He shared with others the intent to execute a
common plan of persecution of non-Serb civilians in the Bosanski Samac
79 Georg Otto Sandrock et at. (also known as the Almelo Trial) can also be cited. Three Germans had killed
a British prisoner of war; it was clear that they had all had the intention of killing the British soldier.
although each of them played a different role. The British Court found all of them guilty of murder under
the doctrine of common enterprise' (at 35,40-1). In Holzer and others, brought before a Canadian military
court, in his summing up the ludge Advocate emphasized that the three accused (Germans who had killed a
Canadian prisoner of war) knew that the purpose of taking the Canadian to a particular area was to kill him.
The ludge Advocate spoke of a 'common enterprise' with regard to that murder (at 341, 347, 349). In Jepsen
and others a British court had to pronounce upon the responsibility ofJepsen and others for the death of
inmates of a concentration camp in transit to another concentration camp. The Prosecutor argued that '[l]f
lepsen was joining in this voluntary slaughter of eighty or so people, helping the others by doing his share
of killing, the whole eighty odd deaths can be laid at his door and at the door of any single man who was in
any way assisting in that act'. The Judge Advocate did not rebut the argument (at 241). In Schonfeld the
ludge Advocate stated that: 'ifsev-eral persons combine for an unlawful purpose or for a lawful purpose to
be effected by unlawful means, and one of them in carrying out that purpose, kills a man, it is murder in all
who are present f...] provided that the death was caused by a member of the party in the course othis
endeavours to effect the common object of the assembly' (68).
143
municipality. According to the TC, Simic, as the highest-ranking civilian in the
municipality, acted in unison with others to execute a plan that included: the
forcible takeover of the town of Bosanski Samac, and the persecutions of non-
Serb civilians in the area, which took the form of unlawful arrests and detention,
cruel and inhumane treatment including beatings, torture, forced labour
assignments, and confinement under inhumane conditions, deportations and
forcible transfers. The Chamber held that he was a participant in the JCE, while
no evidence permitted the conclusion that the other two defendants were also
participants (TC, 2003, §§144-60,983-1055).80
The ICTY took an important stand in Brdanin in 2004. In the indictment, the
Prosecution had alternatively pleaded the defendant’s criminal responsibility
pursuant to the first and third categories of JCE (on this third category see infra,
9.4,4). With respect to the first category, the Prosecution alleged in the various
counts that '(the purpose of the joint criminal enterprise was the permanent
forcible removal of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat inhabitants from the
territory of the planned Serbian state by the commission of the crimes alleged'.
The alternative pleading of the third category specified that '(the defendant] [was]
individually responsible for the crimes enumerated in [various counts] on the
basis that these crimes were natural and foreseeable consequences of the acts'
of deportation and forcible transfer of civilians. The Chamber noted that for both
categories of crimes to materialize, it was required to prove not only the
existence of a common criminal plan, but also that the crimes had been
perpetrated by one or more participants in such common plan. However, in the
case at issue the crimes had been committed by members of the army, police,
and para-military groups that had not participated in the criminal plan or
80 It should be noted that the ICTR upheld the doctrine at issue as well. In Rwamakuba (Decision on
Interlocutory appeal) the AC held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to try the appellant on a charge of
genocide through the mode of liability of ICE ($§9-39). In Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gerard
¹akirutimana the AC relied upon the first category ofJCE, but found that the TC had been correct in not
applying the doctrine to the case at issue (§§462,466,468-84). In Simba, in 2005, an ICTR TC held [hat the
accused was guilty of JCE to commit genocide and extermination (§§386-96, 411-19, 420-6). In another
case where the Prosecution had similarly charged a person with JCE to commit genocide and extermination
(Mpambara), an ICTR TC held instead that no proof beyond a reasonable doubt had been tendered that the
accused possessed the intent to be part of a JCE. It consequently acquitted him on all counts of the
indictment (§§13-4,38-40, 76, 113,164).
144
enterprise (§345)81 The Chamber therefore dismissed the applicability of the
notion of crimes to those crimes (§§351 and 355). However, the AC reversed the
TC decision on this issue, taking the contrary view. After reviewing post-Second
World War case law it concluded that such case law recognizes the imposition of
liability upon an accused for his participation in a common criminal purpose,
where the conduct that comprises the criminal actus reus is perpetrated by
persons who do not share the common purpose and that in addition it does not
require proof that there was an understanding or agreement to commit that
particular crime between the accused and the principal perpetrator of the crime.
The AC thus held that [\V]hat matters in a first category ICE is not whether the
person who carried out the actus  reus of a particular crime is a member of
crimes, but whether the crime in question forms part of the common purpose, in
cases where the principal perpetrator of a particular crime is not a member of the
JCE, this essential requirement may be inferred from various circumstances,
including the fact that the accused or any other member of the ICE closely
cooperated with the principal perpetrator in order to further the common criminal
purpose. In this respect, when a member of the JCE uses a person outside the
JCE to carry out the actus reus of a crime, the fact that the person in question
knows of the existence of the ICE—without it being established that he or she
shares the mens rea necessary to become a member of the )CE—may be a
factor to be taken into account when determining whether the crime forms part of
the common criminal purpose. However, this is not a sine qua non for imputing
liability for the crime to that member of the JCE (§410). (...] Considering the
discussion of post-World War II cases and of the Tribunals jurisprudence above,
the Appeals Chamber finds that, to hold a member of the JCE responsible for
crimes committed by non-members of the enterprise, it has to be shown that the
crime can be imputed to one member of the joint criminal enterprise, and that this
member—when using a principal perpetrator—acted in accordance with the
common plan. The existence of this link is a matter to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis (§413).
81 The TC had set out the same view in a previous decision in the same case (Brdanin, Decision on Form of
Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, §44).
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The AC clinched the point by adding, always in light of post-Second World War
jurisprudence, that when the principal perpetrator is not part of the JCE, for the
accused to be held liable for the crime perpetrated, an understanding or an
agreement between the accused and the principal perpetrator of the crime is not
necessary. It may suffice that the crime at issue be part of the common criminal
purpose (§§415-19) and the accused 'uses' the principal perpetrator to further
that purpose (§§430-1).
For the reasons set out below (§§9.4.5), it is respectfully submitted that this
broadening of the notion under discussion is excessive and raises doubts about
its consistency with the nullum crimen principle and the principle of personal
responsibility. The AC'S ruling in Brctdilin seems all the more objectionable
because in the same case the Chamber also held that the doctrine of the JCE
extends to large-scale cases' or in other words covers instances where crimes
are perpetrated on a large scale by individuals who are remote from the accused
(§§420-5).
2.20.39 LIABILITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN A COMMON CRIMINAL
PLAN WITHIN AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
(A) The notion
The second modality of liability is that of responsibility for carrying out a task
within a criminal design that is implemented in an institution such as an
internment, detention, or concentration camp. In one such camp where inmates
are severely ill-treated and even tortured, not only the head of the camp, but also
his senior aids and those who physically inflict torture and other inhuman
treatment bear responsibility for those acts. In addition to those who physically
carry out the misdeeds, also those who discharge administrative duties
indispensable for the achievement of the camp's main goals (for example, to
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register the incoming inmates, record their death, give them medical treatment,
or provide them with food) may incur criminal liability.
They bear this responsibility so long as they (i) are aware of the serious abuses
being perpetrated (knowledge); (ii) willingly take part in the functioning of the
institution (intent); and (iii) make an important contribution to the pursuit of the
institution's goals. That they should be held responsible is only logical and
natural: by fulfilling their administrative or other operational tasks, they contribute
to the commission of crimes. Without their willing support, crimes could not be
perpetrated. Thus, how- ever peripheral their role, they may constitute an
indispensable cog in the murdering machinery. The man who, upon arrival of
new trains at Auschwitz, separated the men and the women from the children
and the elderly, knowing that this served to establish who should be a forced
laborer and who should instead be sent immediately to gas chambers, was
instrumental in the perpetration of extermination. Had he intended to shirk
criminal responsibility, he should have asked to be relieved of his duties and to
discharge other duties elsewhere. This decision was possible and was
sometimes made (although it often involved being sent to combat zones on the
Eastern Front). Similarly, the locomotive driver of a train that carried hundreds of
detainees to Auschwitz could have been held criminally liable for his participation
in extermination, so long as he knew what would happen to the persons he was
transporting and showed to share the intent to exterminate those persons by
willingly continuing to fulfill his role (instead of asking to be exempted from this
horrible task).
It can thus be noted that for this mode of liability no previous plan or agreement
is required. Nevertheless, one can legitimately hold that each participant in the
criminal institutional framework not only is cognizant of the crimes in which the
institution or its members engage, but also implicitly or expressly shares the
criminal intent to commit such crimes. It cannot be otherwise, because any
person discharging a task of some consequence in the institution could refrain
from participating in its criminal activity by leaving it. As pointed out above, for
criminal liability to arise it is also necessary that the person at issue make a
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substantial contribution to the joint criminal enterprise. It follows that those who,
for example, merely sweep the streets or clean the laundry should not incur
criminal liability for their action, although they may both be aware of the criminal
purpose pursued by the whole institution and share it.
Clearly, this mode of responsibility is very close to that of criminal organizations
laid down in the IMT Charter annexed to the London Agreement of 8 August
1945 (Articles 9-11), and upheld in some respects by the IMT at Nuremberg (see
infra, 2.2). Indeed, in both cases belonging to and operating for an organization
(or an institutional framework) that primarily or at least in part pursues criminal
purposes involves, subject to certain conditions, the personal guilt of a member.
However, the conditions for personal liability of a member to arise are only
partially similar. True in both cases membership as such is not punishable. In
both cases it is necessary for the member to have knowledge of the criminal acts
being committed or be personally implicated in the commission of such acts.82
However, in the case of criminal organization this would be sufficient, for the
assumption is that the organization as such institutionally pursues a criminal
purpose (e.g. extermination of a racial or religious group). Instead, in the JCE
under consideration, since the institutional aims are not per se criminal (the camp
has been established to detain prisoners of war, or intern enemy civilians, etc.),
but the institution is incidentally used for criminal purposes (torture, murder,
extermination, rape, etc.), it is also necessary for a member to make a
substantial contribution to the furtherance of criminal purposes, for his liability to
arise.
(B) Case law
One can find a particularly clear and significant illustration of this category of
criminality in Alfons Klein and others (the Hadamar trial), heard by a US Military
82 In Goring and others the IMT held that the definition or criminal organization 'should exclude persons
who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted by
the State for membership, unless they were personally implicated in the commission of acts declared
criminal by Article 6 or the Charter as members of the organization' (at 256).
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Commission sitting at Wiesbaden. It is fitting to dweil on this case at some length,
because it best shows how the category of criminality at hand works.
The accused were seven Germans. Between July 1944 and April 1945, they
killed over 400 Polish and Russian nationals, who had been obliged to work in
Germany for the German war effort and were suffering from tuberculosis or
pneumonia. Brought to Hadamar, in Germany, where there was a hospital or
institution originally designed to care for the mentally unsound, but with no
medical facilities to treat persons ill with tuberculosis or pneumonia, they were
told that they would be given medication. In fact they were killed by injections of
poisonous drugs; afterwards the relevant medical records and death certificates
were falsified. It would seem that the primary purpose of these killings was to
make space in hospitals for German war victims. The accused comprised Klen,
the administrative head of the hospital, a local Nazi Party leader who made all
the arrangements leading to the perpetration of the atrocities; Wahlmann, a
physician specializing in mental diseases, the Institution's only doctor (he
participated in the conferences designed to plan the murders, knew what was
going on at the hospital, and acquiesced in it); three nurses, Ruoff, Willig, and
Huber, who administered the poisonous drugs; Merkle, the institution's book-
keeper (who registered incoming patients for the purpose of recording dates and
causes of death, actually falsifying these documents); and Blum, a doorman and
telephone switchboard operator, who also served as caretaker of the cemetery,
charged with burying the victims in mass graves (but he sometimes walked
through the wards to inspect the victims before they were taken, dead, to his
cellars a few hours later).
The charge for all of them was 'violation of international law', namely, as the
Prosecutor specified in his opening argument, breach of the laws of warfare (at
202). The specification stated that the seven accused 'acting jointly and in
pursuance of a common intent' did [...] willfully, deliberately and wrongfully aid,
abet and participate in the killing of human beings of Polish and Russian
nationality'. Thus, in addition to the notion of 'participation in killing based on
common intent' also the notion of 'aiding and abetting' was used. However, in his
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Opening Argument the Prosecutor, when setting out the applicable law (there
was no Judge Advocate), emphasized that all those who participate in a common
criminal enterprise are equally guilty as 'co-principals whatever the role played by
each single participant. Referring to the case of murder committed by sever
persons, he pointed out that
Every single one of those who participated in any degree towards the
accomplishment of that result [murder] is as much guilty of murder as the man
who actually pulled the trigger [...] That is why under our (that is US) Federal Law
all distinctions between accomplices, between accessories before the fact and
accessories after the fact, have been completely eliminated. Anyone who
participates in the commission of any crime, whether formerly called as an
accessory or no, are now co-principals and have been so for several years (203).
Moving then to the case at bar, the Prosecutor in fact offered an eloquent
illustration of the rationale behind the legal notion he was invoking :
At this Hadamar mill there was operated production line of death. Not a single
one of these accused could do all the things that were necessary in order to have
the entire scheme of things in operation. For instance, the accused Klein, the
administrative head, make arrangements for their death chamber, and at the
same time go up these and use the needle that did the dirty work, and then also
turn around and haul the bodies out and bury them, and falsify the records and
the death certificates. No, when you do business on a wholesale production
basis as they did at the Hadamar Institution, that murder factory, it means that
you have to have several people doing different things of that illegal operation in
order to produce the results, and you cannot draw a distinction between the man
who may have initially conceived the idea of killing them and those who
participated in the commission of those offences. Now, there is no question but
that any person who participated in that matter, no matter to what extent,
technically is guilty of the charge that has been brought [...] every single one of
the accused has overtly and affirmatively participated in this entire network that
brought about the illegal result (205-7).
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The defence counsel did not dispute these concepts, but in their arguments
preferred to rely upon the notions of necessity and superior orders, or argued
that German law rather than US or international law should apply. The Court
upheld the charge. The administrative head of the hospital and two nurses were
sentenced to death; the physician (a 70-year-old man) to life imprisonment and
hard labour; the book-keeper to 35 years and hard labour; the third nurse to 25
years and hard labour; the doorman and caretaker to 30 years and hard labour
(at 247).
Courts also applied this notion of crimes in cases where the crimes had allegedly
became committed by members of military or administrative units running
concentration camps; that is, by groups of persons acting pursuant to a
concerted plan.83 In such cases the accused held some position of authority
within the hierarchy of the concentration camps. Normally, the defendants were
charged with having acted in pursuance of a common design to kill or mistreat
prisoners and hence to commit war crimes.84 When found guilty, they were
regarded as co-principals in the various crimes of ill-treatment, because of their
objective 'position of authority' within the concentration camp system and
because they had 'the power to look after the inmates and make their life
satisfactory' but failed to do so. In these cases, as the ICTY AC pointed out in
Tadic (AJ, 1999) the required actus reus was the active participation in the
enforcement of a system of repression, as it could be inferred from the position of
authority and the specific functions held by each accused. The mens rea element
comprised: (i) knowledge of the nature of the system and (ii) the intent to further
the common concerted design to ill-treat inmates. It is important to note that, in
83 See, for instance, such cases as Dachau Concentration Camp. brought before a US Tribunal under
Control Council Law no. 10 (at 5. 14), Nadlerand others, decided by a British Court of Appeal under
Control Council Law no. 10 (at 132-4), Auschwitz Concentration Camp, decided by a German Court (at
882), as well as Belsen, decided by a British military court sitting in Germany (121).
84 In his summing up in the Betsen case, the Judge Advocate took up the three requirements set out by the
Prosecution as necessary to establish guilt in each case: (i) the existence of an organized system to ill-treat
the detainees and commit the various crimes alleged; (ii) the accused's awareness of the nature of the
system; and (iii) the fact that the accused in some way actively participated in enforcing the system, i.e.
encouraged, aided, and abetted or in any case participated in the realization of the common criminal design
(637-41).
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these cases, the requisite intent could also be inferred from the position of
authority held by the camp personnel. Indeed, it was scarcely necessary to prove
intent where the individual's high rank or authority would have, m and of itself,
indicated an awareness of the common design and an intent to participate
therein. All those convicted were found guilty of the war crime of ill-treatment,
although of course the penalty varied according to the degree of participation of
each accused in the commission of the war crime (§203).
Later on an ICTY TC invoked this mode of responsibility in 2001 in Kvocka and
others. The Chamber found that the five defendants had occupied positions or
roles in the operation of a detention camp at Omarska, where various crimes
were committed (persecution, murder, and torture). Kvocka had been the camp
commander's right hand; Kos was a guard shift commander; Radic was a shift
commander. Zigic, who was a taxi driver in the Prijedor area during the period of
26 May to 30 August 1992, used to enter Omarska as well as other two camps
for the purpose of abusing, beating, torturing, and killing prisoners. Finally, Prcac
was de facto a deputy camp commander. According to the Chamber, the
Omarska camp 'was a JCE, a facility used to interrogate, discriminate against,
and otherwise abuse non-Serbs from Prijedor and which functioned as a means
to rid the territory of or subJugate non-Serbs' (§323). The Chamber held that the
continuous perpetration of crimes in the camp was common knowledge to
anybody living there (§324). It held that all the accused formed part of a ]CE to
commit the crimes ascribed to them, and sentenced all of them to varying
sentences. The AC confirmed the convictions and sentences.
It is worth stressing that the TC rightly emphasized the need for the participation
of a person in an institutionalized JCE to be 'significant'; that is, through 'an act or
omission that makes an enterprise efficient or effective; e.g. a participation that
enables the system to run more smoothly or without disruption' (§309). It then
wisely went on to note that the significance of the contribution is to be determined
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on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a variety of factors (§311). On this
point the AC took a slightly different stand.85
In other cases the Chamber has stressed the need for the contribution of each
participant in a JCE to be 'substantial'.86 For instance, in Lima] and others an
ICTYTC found that the Prosecution had not proved that the three accused
persons (members of the Kosovo Liberation Army) were liable for a joint criminal
enterprise to commit in 1998 such crimes as torture, ill-treatment, and murder in
a prison camp in Kosovo (§§665-70).
It bears noting that the requirement that the contribution of a participant in a JCE
should be 'substantial' had not been envisaged by the ICTY AC in Tadic (A],
1999, §227). This requirement seems to the present writer to be indispensable.
2.20.40 INCIDENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY BASED ON FORESIGHT AND
VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK:
(A) The notion
The third mode of responsibility concerns those participants who agreed to the
main goal of the common criminal design (for instance, the forcible expulsion of
civilians from an occupied territory) but did not share the intent that one or more
members of the group entertained to also commit other  crimes incidental to the
main concerted crime (for instance, killing or wounding some of the civilians in
the process of their expulsion). This mode of liability only arises if the participant
85 It held that 'in general, there is no specific legal requirement that the accused make a substantial
contribution to the JCE. However, there may be specific cases which require, as an exception to the general
rule, a substantial contribution of the accused to determine whether he participated in the ]CE. In practice,
the significance of the accused's contribution will be relevant to demonstrating that the accused shared the
intent to pursue the common purpose ($97). However, the Chamber subsequently held that in some
exceptional cases the 'substantial' character of a participants contribution is needed (§599).
86 Ibid.. §667
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who did not have the intent to commit the 'incidental' offence, was nevertheless
in a position to foresee its commission and willingly took the risk.
A clear example in domestic criminal law of this mode of liability is that of a gang
of thugs who agree to rob a bank without killing anyone, and to this end agree to
use fake weapons. In this group, however, one of the members secretly takes
real weapons with him to the bank with the intent to kill, if need be. Suppose
another participant in the common criminal plan sees this gang member stealthily
carrying those weapons. If the armed man then kills a teller or bank officer during
the robbery, the one who saw him take the real weapons may be held liable for
robbery and murder, like the killer and unlike the other robbers, who will only be
liable for armed robbery. Indeed, he was in a position to expect with reasonable
certainty that the robber who was armed with real weapons would use them to
kill, if something went wrong during the robbery. Although he did not share the
mens rea of the murderer, he foresaw the event and willingly took the risk that it
might come about (plainly, he could have told the other robbers that there was a
serious danger of a murder being committed; consequently, he could either have
taken the weapons away from the armed robber or withdrawn from the specific
robbing expedition or even dropped out of the gang).
To clarify the matter, one should perhaps distinguish between an abstract and a
concrete foreseeability of the unconcerted crime. Arguably, for criminal liability
under the third category of ICE to arise it is necessary for the unconcerted crime
to be abstractly in line with the agreed-upon criminal offence; in addition, it is also
essential that the 'secondary offender' had a chance of predicting the
commission of the unconcerted crime by the 'primary offender'. For instance, if a
paramilitary unit occupies a village with the purpose of detaining all the women
and enslaving them, a rape perpetrated by one of them would be in line with
enslavement, since treating other human beings as objects may easily lead to
raping them. It would, however, also be necessary for the 'secondary offender' to
have specifically envisaged the possibility of rape (a circumstance that should be
proved or at least inferred from the facts of the case), or at least to have been in
a position to predict the rape.
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Furthermore, we should ask ourselves whether the mens rea requirement for this
JCE is the 'secondary offenders' subjective foresight of the likelihood of the crime
being committed by the 'primary offender (i.e. the 'secondary offender' actually
foresaw that the offence would be committed), or instead objective foreseeability
of that likelihood (i.e. he ought to have foreseen that the crime was likely to be
perpetrated). As the Supreme Court of Canada rightly pointed out in two
celebrated decisions concerning constructive murder' (i.e. murder imputed to a
person by law from his course of actions, though his deeds taken severally do
not amount to voluntary murder), R. v. Vaillancourt (1987) and R. v. Martineau
(1990), objective foreseeability constitutes a lower threshold.87 This threshold the
Court in Vaillancourt considered admissible in cases of 'constructive murder',
whereas in Martineau the same Court held the subjective test to be more
consonant with principles of fundamental justice. Probably the later ruling was
also dictated by the fact that under Canadian legislation a finding of murder
entails a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment; it was therefore felt necessary
to raise the threshold of culpability for any such finding. Be that as it may, it
would seem that at the inter- national level the lower requirement of objective
foreseeability is upheld by case law, as proved by the cases that I will consider
below. In other words, at the international level what is required is not that the
'secondary offender' actually predicted that the 'primary offender' would engage
in unconcerted criminal conduct; the test is rather whether a man of reasonable
prudence would have forecast that conduct, under the circumstances prevailing
at the time. Three reasons seem to warrant the acceptance of a lower threshold
at the international level. First, the crimes at issue are massive and of extreme
87 See R. v. Vaillancourt, judgment of 3 December 1987, [19871 2 S.C.R 636 (online:
www.scc.lexum.umontreal.ia/1987/1987rcs2-636, at 24-29) and R. v. Martineau, judgment of 13
September 1990, [1990] 2. S.C.R 633 (online at: www.scc.lexiim.umontreal.ca/1990/199rcs2-633, at 16-
20). The facts in Vaillancourt are interesting. During an armed robbery, appellants accomplice shot and
killed a client. He then escaped but the appellant was arrested and convicted of second degree murder (i.e.
unlawful taking of human life with malice but without deliberation or premeditation) as a party to the
offence. However, the two had previously agreed to commit the robbery armed only with knives; when on
the night ofthe robbery the accomplice arrived with a gun, the appellant insisted that it be unloaded; the
accomplice removed three bullets from the gun and gave them to the appellant, whose glove containing the
three bullets was later recovered by the police at the scene ofthe crime. The Court upheld the appeal against
conviction and ordered a new trial. As Judge L'Heureux-Dube later noted in his dissenting opinion in
Martineau, "The facts themselves in Vaillancourt negated mens rea [...] Given these facts, it seems unlikely
that Vaillancourt, or any reasonable person in his position, had reason to foresee that anyone would be
killed in the course ofthe robbery' (at 29).
155
gravity; moreover, they are normally perpetrated under exceptional
circumstances of armed violence. Under these circumstances one can
legitimately expect that combatants and other persons participating in armed
hostilities or involved in large-scale atrocities be particularly alert to the possible
consequences of their actions. Secondly, the gravity of the crimes at issue
makes it necessary for the world community to prevent and punish serious
misconduct to the maximum extent allowed by the principle of legality. Thirdly, in
ICL there is no fixed scale of penalties; courts are therefore free duly to appraise
the level of culpability of the accused and impose a congruous sentence
accordingly.
Some commentators have noted that the foreseeability standard on which this
form of liability is based is unreliable, so much so that through such a standard—
it has been claimed—the doctrine introduces a 'form of strict liability'. It has also
been contended that this category of criminal enterprise disregards the necessity
that a person be held guilty only if his culpability has been proven; or in other
words, that the causal link between his conduct and mens rea on the one side,
and the crime, on the other, be proved. Based on that doctrine, one would find a
person guilty of, say, murder, even if that person lacked the requisite subjective
element (intent or dolus) proper to the crime and only entertained a lesser form of
mens rea (foreseeability plus willingly taking the risk that the crime be
perpetrated; that is dolus eventualis). It would follow that the causal link between
mens rea and conduct on the one side and the event or crime, on the other,
would be lacking. Thus—so the objection continues—under certain conditions,
one would place on a par the person who deliberately brought about the death of
the victim with an individual who instead did not intend to cause such effect.
This objection is indisputably important,'88 and can be met by propounding three
arguments.
88 For critical remarks about ICE, see in particular 1. D. Ohiin, 'Three Conceptual Problems with the
Doctrine of loint Criminal Enterprise, 5/fC/(2007),69-90, in particular 75-88 (this paperis, however, marred
by the insistence on the concept of conspiracy and a misapprehension of the relevant international c«se
law); E. van Sliedregt, *)oint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide*,
ibid., 184-207, particularly 187-91; K. Ambos, ')oint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility',
ibid., 159-83.
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First, the foundation of this mode of responsibility is to be found in considerations
of public policy; that is the need to protect society against persons who (i) band
together to take part in criminal enterprises; and (ii) while not sharing the criminal
intent of those participants who intend to commit more serious crimes outside the
common enterprise, nevertheless are aware that such crimes may be committed;
and (iii) do not oppose or prevent them. These policy considerations were aptly
spelled out by the House of Lords in 1997, in two cases decided jointly, Regina v.
Powell and another and Regina v. English89, although the cases concerned
Less significant is the objection frequently heard whereby the category of ICE under discussion in fact
amounts to, or is equally objectionable as, the common law concept of' felony-murder'. Such concept, still
widespread (albeit on the wane) in such countries as the UK, some states of the USA, New Zealand and
cer- ta'.ii Australian states, is substantially different from JCE. As first enunciated by Coke in 1797 (E.
Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London: Clarke and Sons, 181/, at 56) , the
concept entails that if an unlawful act involves the perpetration of murder, then the individual is guilty of
murder (in the celebiated exanple by Coke, if a person (A), intending to steal a dear in the park of another
person (B), throws an arrow at the dear but in so doing kills a boy hidden in a bush, he is guilty of murder
'for that act was unlawful, although A. had no intent to hurt the boy, nor knew not ot him'). The concept has
been widely criticized for it equates manslaughter (involuntary killing) to murder i.e. intentional killing of
another person. In the case of the )CE we are discussing the secondary offender not only is involved in a
common criminal plan or purpose to commit some crimes and has the intention to commit those crimes, but
also actually foresees (or is in a position to foresee) the likely perpetration of a further crime by a member
of the criminal group, and nevertheless deliberately accepts the risk of such likelihood. There is therefore
here a mental clement present with regard to the perpetration ofthe 'extra crime' (dolus eventualis) that is
instead absent in the felony-murder or, if present, then only in the attenuated form ofculpa (negligence). In
the case of 'felony-murder' the agent does not figure out at all the possibility of killing a person as a result
of his engaging in an unlawful action such as theft; instead in the category of ICE we are discussing the
agent is aware (or at least is fully in a position to be aware) that a crime may be perpetrated by another
person and deliberately omits to take action (i.e. to stop or prevent that person from perpetrating the crime,
or to disassociate himself from that criminal conduct). In addition, the concept of?CE can only be relied
upon on condition that the lesser culpability ofthe secondary offender shall be taken into account at the
sentencing stage.
89 In the first case. P., D„ and a third man went to the home of a dealer in cannabis. As soon as he opened
the door, one member of the group shot him and he died shortly afterwards. The defendants were charged
with murder on the basis ofjoint enterprise. At the trial P. gave evidence and claimed that he was present at
the scene only to buy cannabis. D. did not give evidence, but it was submitted on his behalf that he was
unaware ofthe presence ofthe gun until it was used and that P. was responsible for the shooting. Both
defendants were convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed both defendants'
appeals.
In the second case, the defendant, E., aged 15 at the time ofthe offence, and W. were convicted ofthe
murder of a police sergeant on the basis ofjoint enterprise. Both the defendant and W. had attacked the
deceased with wooden posts. At the trial it was the Crown's case that the defendant was present when W.
produced the knife with which the fatal injuries were inflicted. It was maintained on the defendant's behalf
that there was evidence that he had fled the scene before W. produced the knife. The Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division) dismissed, however, E.'s appeal.
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crimes committed at the domestic level. The speeches of Lords Steyn90 and
Sutton91 are enlightening. In their view by punishing the 'secondary-offender' the
law intends to convey the message that he should have opposed or impeded the
crime of the 'primary offender'.
The second argument is more germane to strictly legal considerations. Generally
speaking, one should not neglect an important factor: incidental criminal liability
based on foresight and risk is a mode of liability that is consequential on (and
incidental to) a common criminal plan; that is, an agreement by a multitude of
persons to engage in illegal conduct. The 'extra crime' we are discussing is the
outgrowth of previously agreed or planned criminal conduct for which each
participant in the common plan is already responsible. This 'extra crime' is
90 16 His Lordship stated the following: 'At first glance there is substance in the third argument (ofcoun' for
the Appellants] that it is anomalous that a lesser form of culpability is required in the case ofaseconda
party, viz. foresight of the possible commission of the greater offence, whereas in the case of the prima
offender the law insists on proof of the specific intention which is an ingredient of the offence. This gener
argument leads, in the present case, to the particular argument that it is anomalous that the secondary par
can be guilty of murder if he foresees the possibility of such a crime being committed while the prima can
only be guilty if he has an intent to kill or cause really serious injury. Recklessness may suffice in t' case of
the secondary party but it does not in the case of the primary offender. The answer to this suppos' anomaly,
and other similar cases across the spectrum of criminal law, is to be found in practical an4 poll
considerations. If the law required proof of the specific intention on the part ofa secondary party, the utili of
the accessory principle would be gravely undermined. It is just that a secondary party who foresees th the
primary offender might kill with the intent sufficient for murder, and assists and encourages the p) mary
offender in the criminal enterprise on this basis, should be guilty of murder. He ought to be criminal liable
for harm which he foresaw and which in fact resulted from the crime he assisted and encouraged. B it
would in practice almost invariably be impossible for a jury to say that the secondary party wanted dea to
be caused or that he regarded it as virtually certain. In the real world proof of an intention sufficient murder
would be well nigh impossible in the vast majority ofjoint enterprise cases. Moreover, the propos change in
the law must be put in context. The criminal justice system exists to control crime. A prime fun tion of that
system must be to deal justly but effectively with those who join with others in criminal enterprises.
Experience has shown that joint criminal enterprises only too readily escalate into the commission of
greater offences. In order to deal with this important social problem the accessory principle is needed a)
cannot be abolished or relaxed. For these reasons I would reject the arguments advanced in favour of t
revision of the accessory principle' (8).
91 My Lords, I recognise that as a matter of logic there is force in the argument advanced on behalf oft
appellants, and that on one view it is anomalous that ifforeseeability of death or really serious harm is n
sufficient to constitute mens rea for murder in the party who actually carries out the killing, it is sufficie to
constitute mens rea in a secondary party. But the rules of the common law are not based solely on lo; but
relate to practical concerns and, in relation to crimes committed in the course ofjoint enterprises, to the
need to give effective protection to the public against criminals operating in gangs. As Lord Salmon stat in
Reg. v, Majewski (1977] A.C. 443,482e, in rejecting criticism based on strict logic ofa rule of the
comnrlaw, "this is the view that has been adopted by the common law of England, which is founded on
commnsense and experience rather than strict logic". In my opinion there are practical considerations of
weight a: importance related to considerations of public policy which justify the principle stated in Chan
Wing-Sili The Queen 11985) A.C. 168 and which prevail over considerations of strict logic' (15)
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rendered possible by the prior joint planning to commit the agreed crime(s) other
than the one 'incidentally' or 'additionally' perpetrated. Thus, what is at stake here
is not the responsibility arising when members of a group (for instance, a military
unit) engage in lawful action for example, overpowering by military force an
enemy fortification) and in the course of combat one of the combatants kills a
civilian or rapes a woman—a crime for which of course he alone must bear
criminal responsibility. Our discussion here turns, rather, on cases where a
plurality of persons agrees to perpetrate one or more crimes for which they all
bear responsibility and in addition one of them commits a further crime. Here, it is
plain, the additional crime is premised on the existence of a concerted criminal
purpose. In other words, there exists a causal link between the concerted crime
and the 'incidental' crime: the former constitutes the preliminary sine qua non
condition and the basis of the latter (although, with regard to the latter, only the
participant that evinced knowledge and risk-taking shares the liability of the other
participant who perpetrated the 'additional' offence). To clarify further the nexus
between the two categories of crimes at issue, it could perhaps  prove useful to
insist on the distinction between abstract and concrete (or specific) foreseeability,
suggested above (9.4.4).92
92 The fact that the incidental crime may be based on a nexus with the concerted crime was clearly
emphasized by various courts. Suffice it to mention here the decision of the Italian Court of Cassation in
D'Ottavio and others (decision of 12 March 1947).Two former Yugoslav war prisoners, who had escaped
from a concentration camp, were suddenly surrounded by tour local individuals near an Italian village.
While one of them managed to flee, the other man was hit by two gunshots fired by D'Ottavio with his
hunting rifle. The four aggressors then immediately left the scene. The injured man later died. The Teramo
Court of Assize held that the accused had not intended to kill. With regard to the defendants other than
D'Ottavio, it applied Article 116 of the Italian Criminal Code, providing that 'Where the crime committed is
different from that willed by one of the participants, also that participant answers for the crime, if the fact is
a consequence of his action or omission, it the crime committed is more serious than that willed, the
penalty is decreased for the participant who wlUcci the less serious offence.' On appeal, the Court of
Cassation held that: 'The complaint concerning the application of Article 116 is also without merit. By
virtue of this provision, where the crime committed is other than the one willed bv one of the participants,
also that participant is accountable for the crime if the criminal result is a consequence of his action or
omission. In order for a criminal event to be held to constitute the consetilience of the participant's action, it
is necessary that there be a causation nexus—which is not only objective but also psychological—between
the fact committed and willed by all the participants and the dif- ferent fact committed by one ofthe
participants. This is so because the participant's responsibility envisaged in Article I i6 is grounded not in
the notion of collective responsibility 1...] but in the fundamental principle of concurrence of
interdependent causes, upheld and specified in Articles 40 and 41 ofthe Criminal Code. By virtue ofth';
latter principle all the participants answer for a crime both where they are the direct cause of the crime and
where they are the indirect cause, in accordance with the canon causa causae est causa causati (the cause of
a cause is also the cause ofthe thing caused; i.e. whoever voluntarily creates a situation bringing to, or
resulting in, criminal conduct is accountable for that conduct whether or not he willed the crime]. It is this
concurrence of causes that also in this particular case of participation re-establishes the requirement of legal
identity ofthe fact that is the precondition ofthe cooperation "in the commission of same crime". This
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The third response to the objections under discussion is directed to emphasize
that the basic proposition suggested here on the basis of existing case law (that
any participant in a JCE is also guilty for acts by another participant, under the
conditions set out in the case law) is premised on the proposition that at the
sentencing stage one must, however, take into account the different degrees of
culpability of the participants. The lesser form of mens rea of the 'secondary
offender' shall be taken into account by meting out a lighter sentence than that
inflicted on the participant who materially perpetrated the offence not envisaged
in the criminal plan. Both participants are guilty, but the one who did not
materially perpetrate the further crime must receive a less stiff sentence on
account of his lesser culpability.
(B) Limitations of the category at issue
There exist two important qualifications to the application of the third class of JCE
under discussion.
First, resorting to such class would be intrinsically ill-founded when the crime
committed by the 'primary offender' requires special or specific intent (dolus
specialis), that is, the crime charged is one of genocide, persecution, or
aggression (it is common knowledge that for genocide the intent to destroy a
identity is at least generic if not specific in that all the defendants have effectively contributed to the first
crime that was the cause ofthe second. Here lies the nexus of objective causation: all participants have
directly cooperated in the crime of attempted illegal detention of persons (provided for in Article 605 ofthe
Criminal Code) by surrounding and chasing two fugitive prisoners of war, armed with a gun and a musket
for the purpose of unlawfully capturing them. This crime was the indirect cause ofthe subsequent and
connected event consisting ofthe rifle shot that D'Ottavio alone fired at one ofthe fugitives, a rifle shot that
caused a wound followed by death (see Article 584 on manslaughter). There also exists a psychological
causation in that all the participants shared the conscious will to engage in an attempt to unlawfully detain a
person while foreseeing a possible different crime, as can be inferred from the use of weapons: it was to
anticipate that one of them might have shot at the fugitives with a view to achieving the common purpose
of capturing them.'
It would seem that the Court rightly stressed the causal link between the concerted and the not-envisaged
crime, by pointing to the fact that this causal link related to the objective element of the crime at issue.
However, there is ultimately a link with regard to the subjective element as well. The participant in the
fCEto commit a specific crime or set of crimes is put in the position to foresee the further, unconcerted c-
rime, on account of his joining the criminal enterprise to commit the agreed upon crime. Although he did
not share the intent ofthe participant that engaged in the further criminal conduct, he had predicted that
conduct and willingly taken the risk that it might occur. There lies his culpability. He could have prevented
the further crime, or disassociated himself from its likely commission. His failure to do so entails that he
too must be held guilty. See also Mannetti and others.
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'protected group' in whole or in part is required; persecution presupposes the
intent to discriminate on one of the requisite grounds; aggression, at least in the
opinion of some commentators,93 is grounded in the intent to appropriate a
foreign territory or to obtain economic advantages, or to interfere with the internal
affairs of the victim state; see above, 7.3.3(B)). In these cases the 'secondary
offender' may not share—by definition—that special intent (otherwise one would
fall under the first and second class of JCE), even though entertaining such intent
is a sine qua non condition for being charged with the crime. He may therefore
not be accused of such crime under the doctrine at issue. This proposition is
based on two grounds. First, on a logical impossibility: one may not be held
responsible for committing a crime that requires special intent (in addition to the
intent needed for the underlying crime) unless that special intent can be proved,
whatever mode of responsibility for the commission of crimes is relied upon (this
leaves out aiding and abetting, where it suffices to prove that the offender has
made a substantial contribution to the commission of the crime by others, had
knowledge of the crime, and intentionally provided assistance to its perpetration).
Secondly, admittedly whoever is liable under the third category of JCE has a
distinct mens rea from that of the 'primary offender'; nevertheless, as the
'secondary offender' bears responsibility for the same crime as the 'primary
offender,' the 'distance' between the subjective element of the two offenders must
not be as drastic as in the case of crimes requiring special intent. Otherwise the
crucial notions of 'personal culpability' and 'causation' would be torn to shreds94
93 S.GIaser.'Quelquesremarquessurladefinitiondel'agressionendroitintrnatioalpenal'in FPfsc/irif fir
Th.Rittler(A.nlen: Verlag Scientia, 1957), at 388-93; Idem 'Culpability en droit international penal', in 99
Hague Recueil (1960-1), at 504-5.
94 In 2004 the ICTY AC took a contrary view in Brdanin, with regard to genocide, [n its Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal of 19 March 2004 it held that 'provided that the standard applicable to that head of
Iiability [the third category of JCE], i.e. "reasonably foreseeable and natural consequences" is established,
criminal liability can attach to an accused for any crime that falls outside of an agreed upon joint criminal
enterprise' ($9). It went on to say that "The Trial Chamber erred by conflating the mens rea requirement of
the crime of genocide with the mental requirement of the mode of liability by which criminal responsibility
is alleged to attach to the accused' (§10). The AC thus reversed a prior decision of the TC (Brdanin,
Decision for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis, 28 November 2003), which had held (correctly, in my
opinion) that the specific intent required for genocide 'cannot be reconciled with the mens rea required for a
conviction pursuant to the third category of ICE. The latter consists of the Accused's awareness of the risk
that genocide would be committed by other members of the )CE. This is a different mens rea and falls short
of the threshold needed to satisfy the specific intent required for a conviction for genocide under Article
4(3)(a) (of the ICTY Statute]' (§57). In 2005, in Kvocka and others, the same AC limited the need for
sharing the special intent to the first category of ICE. It 'affirmed' 'the Trial Chamber's conclusion that
participants in a basic or systemic form of joint criminal enterprise must be shown to share the required
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For such crimes the 'secondary offender' could only be-charged— it is
submitted—with aiding and abetting the main crime (needless to say, subject to
the condition that the requirements of aiding or abetting the commission of one of
the three classes of aforementioned crimes are met).
Let us now consider the second qualification to the application of the third class
of JCE under discussion. Mature legal systems make it possible to take account
of the lesser degree of culpability of the 'secondary offender' by qualifying his
culpability through a charge less than that against the 'primary offender'. If the
latter has engaged in murder while conducting a concerted unlawful deportation
of civilians, the 'secondary offender' could be accused of manslaughter. This
different charge would take into account the lesser degree of culpability of that
offender. Unfortunately ICL is a rudimentary body); of law, which allows for such
sophisticated distinctions or gradations only to a very limited extent. In short, one
cannot charge a lesser offender with an offence belonging to a different category
of international crimes; for instance, one cannot charge the 'primary offender'
with murder as a crime against humanity and the 'secondary offender' with
murder as a war crime. This would indeed be erroneous, for the two categories
show different features; the offences at issue belong either to one category (for
instance, crimes against humanity) if the requisite conditions are met (chiefly, the
existence of a context of widespread or systematic practice), or to the other.
Furthermore, laying different charges within the same category of international
crime is logically possible only with regard to some classes of underlying
offences. As classes of offences where a gradation is possible, one can mention:
murder and man- slaughter (as a war crime, or a crime against humanity); willful
killing (as a grave breach); and unlawful killing (as a war crime in an international
armed conflict);95 rape and sexual violence (as a war crime or a crime against
humanity); and torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (as a war crime or a
intent of the principal perpetrators. Thus, for crimes of persecution, the Prosecution must demonstrate that
the accused shared the common dis- criminatory intent of the joint criminal enterprise. If the accused does
not share the discriminatory intent, then he may still be liable as an aider and abettor if he knowingly makes
a substantial contribution to the crime' (§110). This proposition was taken up by an ICTR TC in Simba (at
§388).
95 This proposition  is based on the assumption that grave breaches may only be committed in international
armed conflicts, a position taken in 1995 by the ICTY AC in Tadii (IA), but probably no longer valid under
current international customary law.
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crime against humanity). For other underlying offences it would seem difficult to
apply such gradations of culpability and hence of charging.
(C) Case law
The first case where this category of ICE was raised is Tadic (Af, 1999).
According to the Prosecution the TC had erred in finding that the accused could
not be charged with the killing of five men in the village of Jessica, when he
participated in the attack on that village and the village of Sivci on 14 June 1992,
because there was no evidence showing that he had killed or taken part in the
killing of those five men. For the Prosecution 'the only conclusion reasonably
open from all the evidence is that the killing of five victims was entirely
predictable as part of the natural and probable consequences of the attack on the
villages of Sivci and Jaskici on 14 June 1992' (§175). The Defence argued
instead that the TC correctly found that 'it was a possibility that the five victims in
Jaskici were killed by another, distinct group of armed men, especially as nothing
[was] known as to who shot the victims or in what circumstances' (§176). As for
the Prosecutions common purpose submission, the Defence contended that 'it
would have to be shown that the common purpose in which the Appellant
allegedly took part included killing as opposed to ethnic cleansing by other
means' (§177).
The AC upheld the Prosecution's submissions after engaging in an elaborate
outline of the notion of common purpose or JCE in ICL.96 Based on this notion,
the AC found that in the case at issue the defendant had taken part in a common
plan to commit inhumane acts against the non-Serb civilian population in the
PriJedor region in 1992. He was an armed member of the armed group that took
96 With regard to the first category, what is required is the intent to perpetrate a certain crime (this being the
shared intent on the part of all co-perpetrators). With regard to the second category [.. ], personal know-
ledge of the system of the treatment is required (whether proved byexpress testimony fora matter of
reasonable in view inference from the accuseds position of authority), as well as the intent to further this
common concerted system of ill-treatment. With regard to the third category, what is required is the
intention to participate in and further the criminal activity or the criminal purpose of a group and to
contribute to the joint criminal enterprise or in any event to the commission of a crime by the group. In
addition, responsibil- ity for a crime other than the one agreed upon in the common plan arises only if,
under thecircumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or
are the members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk' (§228).
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part in the attack and committed several crimes. He must have been aware 'that
the actions of the group of which he was a member were likely to lead to [...]
killings, but he nevertheless willingly took that risk' (§232). The AC therefore
found the defendant guilty. Subsequently the TC, to which the case had been
remitted for sentencing purposes, held that for the murder of the five Muslims,
Tadic was simultaneously guilty of a grave breach, a war crime, and a crime
against humanity. It sentenced him to 24 years' imprisonment for the grave
breach and the war crime and 25 years for the crime against humanity, with the
sentences to be served concurrently97 (in its previous judgment, where the
murder of the five Muslims had not been imputed to Tadic, the TC had sentenced
him to 20 years' imprisonment).98 The AC subsequently reduced the sentence to
20 years' imprisonment, both because it held the previous sentence to be
excessive with regard to the relatively minor position of the accused, and
because in its view 'there is in law no distinction between the seriousness of a
crime against humanity and that of a war crime'. It was consequently wrong to
consider the same offence as more grave if regarded as a crime against
humanity than as a war crime.99
The question of this category of criminal liability arose again in Krstic, although
only tangentially, before the TC.100 The essential features of the category, as set
97 23 ICTY, TC, Sentencing Judgment, §§15-18,27-9 and 32 E and G.
98 24 ICTY.TC, Sentencing judgment.
99 25 ICTY, AC, §§55-8.69 and 76(3).
100 As pointed out above, the Chamber held that the defendant had participated in a JCE to commit
genocide. Nevertheless, the Chamber relied upon the third category of criminal enterprise with regard to
somi crimes committed against the persons who had escaped the massacre. It held that it was not proved
that vari ous crimes committed against Muslims fleeing Srebrenica had been agreed upon in the criminal
plan. The were nevertheless to be imputed to the defendant—so held the Chamber—because they were the
foreseeabl consequence of the policy of forcible expulsions that was part of the criminal plan: 'The Trial
Chamber not, however, convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the murders, rapes, beatings and abuses
committee against the refugees at Potocari were also an agreed upon objective among the members of the
joint crimina enterprise. However, there is no doubt that these crimes were natural and foreseeable
consequences ofthi ethnic cleansing campaign. Furthermore, given the circumstances at the time the plan
was formed. Genera Krstic must have been aware that an outbreak of these crimes would be inevitable
given the lack of sheltci the density of the crowds, the vulnerable condition of the refugees, the presence of
many regular and irregii lar military and paramilitary units in the area and the sheer lack of sufficient
numbers of UN soldiers to provide protection. In fact, on 12 July, the VRS organised and implemented the
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out in Tadic (A), 1999) were restated by the ICTY AC in Vasiljevic (§99), Kvocka
and others (§83), as well as in Babic (§27). In Stakic the AC, after reversing the
TCs ruling based on the notion of' co-perpetratorship', held that the accused, in
holding important positions such as President of the Crisis Staff, had participated
in a JCE to commit crimes of persecution, forced displacement, and ill-treatment
in detention camps against Muslims in the Prijedor area in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
It then held that the accused bore criminal liability under the third category of JCE
for crimes not agreed upon, namely killings in detention camps, transportation to
camps of the non-Serb civilian population, and killings by the Serb armed military
and police forces. The AC concluded that the accused was responsible under the
third head of JCE for the crimes of murder (as a war crime and a crime against
humanity) and extermination as a crime against humanity. It is notable that the
Chamber insisted on the requirement of dolos eventualis and held, based on the
findings of the TC, that this form of mens rea did exist in the case at issue (§§93-
7).
An interesting application of the third category of JCE was made by an ICTY TC
in FlagoJevic and fokic. After noting that where the objective of a JCE changes in
time, a new and distinct JCE may be established, the TC pointed out that, with
the establishment of such new JCE a participant in the enterprise shall not incur
responsibility for criminal acts beyond the scope of the enterprise in which he had
agreed to participate, but only for those acts that are 'natural and foreseeable
consequences', thereby falling under the third category of JCE (§701).
Finally, it should be mentioned that the ICTY AC has placed a broad
interpretation on the category of JCE at issue. In 2004 in Brdanin it held that this
category of JCE can also apply when acts of genocide are committed by the
'primary offender'.101 In 2006, in Karemera and others the ICTR AC held that this
category of criminal liability can also cover crimes committed by fellow
participants 'in a vast joint criminal enterprise' where crimes committed by the
transportation of the women children and elderly outside the enclave; General Krstic was himself on the
scene and exposed to firsthani knowledge that the refugees were being mistreated by VRS or other armed
forces' (§616)
101 Brdanin, Decision an interlocutory Appeal, at §§9-10.
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fellow participants are 'structurally or geographically remote from the accused:102
The same view was taken in 2007 by the ICTY AC in Brdanit with regard to the
category of JCE we are discussing (AJ, §§420-5).
2.20.41 THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE 'PHYSICAL
PERPETRATOR' SHOULD ALSO BE PART OF THE JCE
As we saw above (9.4.2(B)), in Brdanin the issue was raised of the relations
between members of a JCE and persons not part to the JCE who nevertheless
carry out crimes in execution of the JCE (deportation and forcible transfer of
Bosnian Muslim or Croat civilians). The question is as follows: do such
perpetrators (henceforth physical perpetrators) need to share the joint criminal
purpose for the members of the JCE to be answerable for the crimes
perpetrated? The TC answered in the negative (TJ, §§344-56), while the AC in
the affirmative (AJ, §§410-19, 426-32). It is therefore appropriate to dwell on the
question of the relations between members of a JCE and organized groups that
commit crimes in execution of a common criminal purpose.
Normally members of a JCE make up fairly small groups and are persons
operating at the same level, even though in different capacities. Hence no
serious problem arises: each of them is responsible for the concerted criminal
actions, even if such actions are performed only by one member of the JCE.
However, there may be cases where the members of the JCE constitute a larger
group and form part of a hierarchically constituted organization or structure. This
is typically the case for ICE II (participation in a common criminal plan within an
institutional framework). Here, however, only those who knowingly make a
substantial contribution to the pursuit of common criminal purposes are
personally liable. Hence for all of them it is required that they be part to the JCE.
The problem becomes complicated when the criminal plan is agreed upon by a
number of members of a political or military group, and one of these members
carries out the common criminal purpose by ordering or instigating subordinate
102 ICTR AC, Karefnera and others. Decision on furisdictional Appeals: foint Criminal Enterprise, at §§11-
18.
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military units outside the JCE to commit some or all of the crimes envisaged in
the JCE.
One should distinguish between the legal position of (a) the member of the JCE
that orders or instigates outsiders to commit the crimes; and (b) that of the other
members of the JCE.
To my mind the member of the JCE ordering or instigating the commission of
crimes may be responsible under two distinct heads of liability. He is responsible
for (1) the JCE to commit other crimes that may have been perpetrated by
himself as well as other members of the JCE; and for (2) ordering and instigating
the crimes perpetrated by the subordinates. These subordinates need not, of
course, share the common criminal purpose (this is what occurred in Brdanin,
according to the TC, which rightly found the defendant guilty of ordering and
instigating the crime 'of deportation and forced expulsion of Bosnian Muslims and
Croats, perpetrated by the army: §§359-69). If brought to trial, such subordinates
are liable for the perpetration of the crime at issue.
Let us now move on to situation (b). Here the following question must be asked:
does a member of the JCE other than the member that orders or instigates
subordinate troops or paramilitary units or police officers (not part to the JCE) to
perpetrate crimes in consonance with the criminal purposes agreed by members
of the JCE, bear responsibility for the crimes perpetrated by the executioners?
The answer may only be given in light of general principles of international
criminal law, in particular the principle of personal criminal responsibility (indeed
the judicial precedents relied upon by the AC in Brdanin (A) 99393-404) are not
germane to the question under discussion).103 In accordance with these
103 They are two cases brought before US Military Tribunals sitting at Nuremberg: Altstotter and others (so-
called lustice case) and Greifrlt and others (so-called RL'SHA case). As the AC admitted in Brdanin (Al,
6393), in neither case did the Tribunals use the expression ICE'. What matters, however, is that neither
Judgment relied upon the notion of)CE. In the former, faced with crimes planned, ordered or committed by
member? ur the Ministry of Justice, the Tribunal adopted traditional notions of criminal responsibility, as is
apparent from the following passage: 'The defendants are not now charged with conspiracy as a separate
and substantive offense, but it is alleged that they participated in carrying out a governmental plan and
program for the persecution and extermination of lews and Poles, a plan which transcended territorial
boundaries as well as the bounds of human decency. Some of the defendants took part in the enactment of
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principles the member of the JCE  may only be held responsible for those crimes
if(i) when concerting the crime to be perpetrated in execution of the JCE he had
agreed to the physical perpetration of crimes by persons who, albeit outside the
JCE, could, however, act upon the orders of one of the members of the JCE (in
this case JCE I would be applicable); or (ii) he anticipated the risk that another
member of the JCE might order or instigate persons outside the JCE to
perpetrate crimes and willingly ran that risk (ICE III). It would not be sound to
hold the member at issue liable even when the agreement (or consent) or the
anticipation and deliberate taking of risk are lacking. In such case the basic pre-
condition of liability for JCE would be lacking, and to hold the member
responsible for the crimes committed by the physical perpetrator would be
contrary to the principle of personal criminal responsibility.104
Of course, also in the case I have just discussed the member of the JCE that
ordered or instigated subordinates is responsible for ordering and instigating the
crimes, although he did so in consonance with or in execution of a JCE (which in
this respect would not be relevant to the establishment of guilt of the accused,
whereas it might perhaps have some relevance to the setting of penalty).
laws and decrees the purpose of which was the extermination of Poles and lews in Germany and throughout
Europe. Others, in executive positions, actively participated in the enforcement of those laws and in
atrocities, illegal even under German law, in furtherance of the declared national purpose. Others, as
judges, distorted and then applied the laws and decrees against Poles and Jews as such in disregard of every
principle of judicial behavior. The overt acts of the several defendants must be seen and understood as
deliberate contributions toward the effectuation of the policy of the Party and State. The discriminatory
laws themselves formed the subject matter of war crimes and crimes against humanity with which the
defendants are charged. The material facts which must be proved in any case are: (1) the fact of the great
pattern or plan of racial persecution and extermination; and (2) specific conduct of the individual defendant
in furtherance of the plan. lhis is but an application of general concepts of criminal law. The person who
persuades another to commit murder, the person who furnishes the lethal weapon for the purpose of its
commission, and the person who pulls the trigger are all principals or accessories to the crime' (1063;
emphasis added). The reason why the Tribunal did not discuss the mental state of those who executed death
sentences and other criminal acts agreed upon and planned by the defendants is simply that those
executioners so acted following orders by the defendants: who were hence responsible not for ICE to
commit persecution but for ordering persecution. Similarly in Greifelt and others the Tribunal convicted the
defendants of ordering and instigating the kidnapping of children of foreign nationals, taking away foreign
infants, executing in concentration camps foreigners and so on. As the Tribunal put it: '[i]t is no defense for
a defendant to insist, for instance, that he never evacuated populations when orders exist, signed by him, in
which he directed that the evacuation should take place. While in such a case the defendant might not have
actually carried out the physical evacuation in the sense that he did not personally evacuate the population,
he nevertheless is responsible for the action, and his participation by instigating the action is more
pronounced than that of those who actually performed the deed' (153).
104 For a similar view, see the Partly Dissenting opinion of fudge Shahabuddeen in Brdanin (AJ) (§§4 The
contrary view is advanced by ludge Meron in his Separate Opinion in the same case (513-8)
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2.20.42 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ICE AND AIDING AND ABETTING
It has been objected that the doctrine of JCE does not clearly distinguish
between the responsibility of a participant in JCE and that of an aider and
abettor. Moreover, that doctrine would even go so far as to foist a greater weight
upon a person responsible for aiding and abetting than on a participant in a JCE.
In fact a major difference between the two categories of persons does exist. It
lies in their respective mens rea (as for actus reus, in both cases a 'substantial'
contribution is required, as I shall point out below with regard to JCE). The
participant in a JCE (i) takes part in a common criminal plan or purpose and
shares a common intent to perpetrate a crime (murder, forced expulsion,
persecution, and so on); or (ii) by willingly and knowingly participating in an
institutional criminal framework, expressly or implicitly evinces his sharing the
criminal conduct in which that institutional framework engages; or else (iii) in
addition to adhering to a criminal plan and sharing the intent to commit a crime,
willingly runs the risk that another participant may intentionally perpetrate a
further crime that the former had foreseen.
In contrast, as we shall see when discussing aiding and abetting (see infra, 10.1),
he who aids and abets does not share, either at the outset or later, the criminal
intent of the perpetrator, although he is cognizant that the perpetrator intends to
commit a crime; the aider and abettor only intends to assist the perpetrator in the
commission of a crime. This is why, in principle, the criminal liability of the aider
and abettor is more tenuous (or less weighty) than that of a participant in a
common criminal enterprise. As the ICTY AC put it in a number of cases, aiding
and abetting 'generally involves a lesser degree of individual criminal
responsibility than co-perpetration in a joint criminal enterprise'.105
It should be added that, according to ICTY case law, it would be wrong to speak
of 'aiding and abetting a JCE', for whenever a person intends to assist in the
105 Krnojelac (Af, §75), Vasiljevic (A), §102), Kvotka and others (A], §92).
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commission of crimes by a group of persons involved in a JCE, that person
should more correctly be held liable for participation in the JCE.106
2.20.43 TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE ICC RELY UPON THE DOCTRINE
OF JCE?
The ICC Statute does not contain a provision that regulates JCE in detail as a
mode of responsibility. That such form of criminal liability is implicitly permitted
under the Statute can however be inferred from Article 25(1),107 which generically
states that criminal responsibility for any of the crimes covered by the Statute is
incurred by anybody 'committing a crime' 'jointly with another person'. This
provision, in addition to co-perpetration (the same crime is committed by a
plurality of persons, who perform the same criminal act; see above, 9.3), also
covers JCE. However, the ICC Statute goes further, for, although in envisaging a
different mode of liability (outsider's contribution to a JCE; see below), it explicitly
refers to the 'commission or attempted commission of such a crime [within the
jurisdiction of the Court] by a group of persons acting with a common purpose'
(Article 25(3)(d)).
106 ICTY AC, MilutinovU and others. Decision on Dragoliub OjdanU's Motion Challenging furisdicti foint
criminal Enterprise, §20; Kvodka and others (AJ, §91).
107 This provisions stipulates that:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through
another person, regardless of
whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or i-.iduces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or
is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or
otherwise assists in its commission or
its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) in any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such
a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution
shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of ]
the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime'
(emphasis added)
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As for the mens rea required for ICE under the Statute, one can refer to the
general provision of Article 30 (on the mental element of the crimes covered by
the Statute), which requires 'intent or knowledge'. Should one hold the view that
consequently the Statute of the ICC always requires intent as the necessary
subjective element necessary for a finding of criminal liability, whatever the mode
of responsibility, it would follow that the ICC, while generally empowered to rely
upon the doctrine of JCE, would be barred from applying the third category
referred to above. 108
However, Article 30, before setting out the two mental elements of intent or
knowledge, contains a general clause ('unless otherwise provided') that leaves
other subjective frames of mind unaffected, so long as they are provided for or
required by other provisions of the Statute or by customary international law.109
Hence the contention can be made that dolus eventualis or recklessness for the
third form of the JCE is not excluded by the ICC Statute.
This interpretation would be justified by the need to punish criminal conduct that
otherwise would not be regarded as culpable. In addition, it would not be contrary
to the principle of personal culpability, for in any case the person at issue (i)
would be guilty of intentionally participating in a criminal purpose or plan; (ii) his
mens rea concerning the additional, not previously concerted crime, would have
to be proved by the Prosecution; and (iii) his lesser culpability would have to be
taken into account at the sentencing stage.
It should be added that, contrary to what various authors, including the present
one, have either implicitly or expressly contended,'110 the gist of Article 25(3)(d) is
the regulation not of JCE but rather of a different mode of responsibility. This
108 It would seem that this is the view taken by the ICC Pre-lrial Chamber in Lubanga (§§322-67).
109 See G. Werle and F. Jcssberger, 'Unless Otherwise Provided' in 3 IICf (2005), ssds.
110 For instance see W.A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 3rd e (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 211-13; K. Ambos, loint Criminal Enterprise a Command
Responsibility* in 5//C/(2007), 172-3; A. Cassese, *The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibil under the
Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise', ibidem, at 132. See also the ICTY A; in Tadii (1999, at §222).
On Article 25(3)(d) see also K. Ambos in 0. Triffterer (ed), Commentary, at 483-6 as well A. Eser, Cassese,
Gaeta, fones (eds), The Rome Statute, 1,802-3.
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consists in the fact that a person outside the criminal group committing (or
attempting to commit) a crime contributes to the perpetration of such crime
without being a member to the criminal group. It would seem that such
contribution is different from aiding and abetting. Indeed, the aider and abettor
intends to assist in the commission of a crime by others but do not share the
criminal intent of the perpetrator (see 10.1 and 9.4.6). Here, instead, the 'outside
contributor' either (a) intends to further the criminal action (hence is aware of and
shares the criminal intent of the group), or (b) simply knows, that is, is aware of,
the criminal intent of the group. In the former instance, the 'outside contributor',
by sharing the criminal intent of the group only distinguishes himself from
members of the JCE in that he is not part of the criminal agreement (neither at
the moment when such agreement is made nor later). In the latter instance that is
in the category (b) the 'outside contributor' distinguishes himself from the aider
and abettor only in that he aides and abets a whole criminal group (that is, a
multiplicity of persons) and not a single perpetrator. Otherwise, there is no
distinction between the two classes of persons assisting in the commission of
crimes by others.
Probably the inclusion of this new mode of liability is justified by its origin, namely
the fact that the provision was taken up from Article 2(3) of the 1997 International
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing. The needs of the fight
against widespread and increasingly dangerous terrorist criminality warranted the
expansion of responsibility to these forms of 'external assistance'. The ICC
Statute rather uncritically restated that provision of the Terrorist Bombing
Convention.111
2.20.44 OTHER MODES OF LIABILITY
111 The category of  outsider contributor' to ICE is in some respects not dissimilar from  the category
'external participation in mafia crimes' (concorso esterno in associazione mafiosa), set forth by Italian cou
(see P. L. Vigna, 'Fighting organized Crime, with particular reference to Mafia Crimes in Italy, in 4 /J
(2006), 526-7; according to this author the criminal offence at issue covers cases where a person, althoug
not a part and parcel of the structure of a criminal organization and free from any link of subjection the
association, nevertheless provides the association with a contribution which is specific, conscious a
voluntary. Such contribution must however be causally relevant to the strengthening of the criminal
assoation and aimed at the implementation (albeit partial) of the criminal pJan.' (ibidem).
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AIDING AND ABETTING
A person may participate in a crime without sharing the criminal intent of the
principal perpetrator, but simply by assisting him in the commission of a crime. In
aiding and abetting the objective element is constituted by practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support, by the accessory to the principal (namely the
author of the main crime); in addition, such assistance, support, etc. must have a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.
Thus, unlike some instances that we will consider infra (see, for instance, 10.2),
aiding and abetting does not necessarily presuppose that the aider and abettor
shares a common plan or purpose with the principal or his criminal intent or other
form of mens rea; as stated by the ICTY AC in Tadic, 'the principal may not even
know about the accomplices contribution' (§229). What is required is that the
person supporting or assisting in the crime be aware that his action helps the
perpetrator in the com- mission of the crime, and intend to encourage such
commission (on this subjective element, see further below).
The substantial assistance required for aiding and abetting may be provided in
the form of positive action or omission before, during or after perpetration of the
crime (see e.g. Aleksovski, AJ, §62; Blaskic, AJ, §48). Furthermore, the
assistance may be physical (or tangible) or moral and psychological (Furundiija,
TJ, §231). An example of intangible assistance was given by the Advocate
General in Schonfeld and others. The defendants had been charged with being
'concerned in the killing' of three Allied airmen who had been hiding in the home
of a member of the Dutch resistance. In out- lining the role of accessories not
present at the scene of a crime, the Advocate General gave the following
example:
if he [the accessory] watched for his companions in order to prevent surprise, or
remained at a convenient distance in order to favour their escape, if necessary,
or was in such a situation as to be able readily to come to their assistance, the
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knowledge of which was calculated to give additional confidence to his
companions, he was, in contemplation of law, present, aiding and abetting (70).
An interesting legal issue is whether mere presence at the commission of a crime
may involve aiding and abetting such crime. The case law has rightly set out the
notion that mere presence may only imply aiding and abetting when such
presence involves substantial encouragement to the crime on account of the
authority of the onlooker, with the consequence that the perpetrator draws moral
and psychological support or a legitimizing effect from that presence (if, for
instance, such person is a superior to the perpetrator, or has an important status
in society or in the military hierarchy). As a an example of an 'approving
spectator' whose mere presence involved his aiding and abetting a crime, one
can mention the Synagogue case (case against K. and A, at 56), decided in
1948, under the terms of Control Council Law No. 10, by the German Supreme
Court in the British Occupied Zone. One of the defendants accused was found
guilty of a crime against humanity (the devastation ot a synagogue in 1938 in
Germany), although he had not physically taken part in it, nor planned or ordered
it. The court of first instance and then the Supreme Court held that his
intermittent presence on the crime scene, together with his status as a long-time
militant of the Nazi party, as well as his knowledge of the criminal enterprise,
were sufficient to convict him. Instead, as an example of presence not involving
any liability for aiding and abetting, mention can be made of the Pig-cart parade
case (L. and others case), also from the German Supreme Court in the British
Occupied Zone. The defendant P. had attended, as a spectator in civilian dress,
a 'parade' of Nazi 'assault troops' in which two political opponents of the Nazi
party were exposed to public humiliation. P. had followed the 'parade' without
taking any active part. According to the court (pronouncing in 1948), P.'s conduct
could not 'even with certainty be evaluated as objective or subjective approval.
Furthermore, silent approval that does not contribute to causing the offence in no
way meets the requirements for criminal liability' (234). Hence he was
acquitted.112
112 See also Furundijia, t], §203. The ICTY AC held in Brdanin that 'an accused can be convicted for aiding
and abetting a crime when it is established that his conduct amounted to tacit approval and encouragement
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The subjective element of aiding and abetting resides in the accessory having
know- ledge that 'his actions assist the perpetrator in the commission of the
crime'.113 Thus, this subjective element consists of two requirements:
(i)  awareness that the principal will be using, is using, or has used the
assistance for the purpose of engaging in criminal conduct. It is not required that
the accessory be fully cognizant of the specificities of the crime that will be, is
being, or has been committed by the perpetrator, let alone of the specific criminal
intent of the perpetrator. The aider and abettor is required to be aware either of
the criminal intent of the perpetrator or at least of the risk for the perpetrator to
engage in criminal conduct.114 In other words, it may suffice for the accomplice to
entertain recklessness (dolus eventualis) with regard to the behaviour of the
principal. As an SCSL TC put it in Brima and others,  the mens rea required for
aiding and abetting is that the accused knew that his acts would assist the
commission of the crime by the perpetrator or that he was aware of the
substantial likelihood that his acts would assist the commission of a crime by the
perpetrator (§776).
This seems to correspond to fundamental principles of criminal law: if I lend a
gun to a well-known thug, already convicted of burglary or armed robbery,
ofthe crime and that such conduct substantially contributed to the crime. This form of aiding and abetting is
not, strictly speaking, criminal responsibility for omission. In the cases where this category was applied, the
accused had a position of authority, he was physically present on the scene ofthe crime, and his non-
intervention was seen as tacit approval and encouragement' (AJ, $273). See also ICTR, Kayishema and
Ruzmdana, TI, §200-3, and Al, §§201-2.
113 This, with convincing arguments, an ICTY TC held in Furundiija Tf, §§190-249. See also Aleksovski
TJ, §63; Kunarac and others TI, §391; Vasiljevic. TI, §70; Kvoika. TI, §254; Delalic. A), §352; Tadic Al,
§229; Blaskic Al, § 46; Krnojelac, Al, §52; see also, Akayesu TI, §484; Kayishema and Ruzindana, TI,
§§203-7; Musema (§126), Ntakirutimana, TI, §787; Kajelijeli, TI, §763; Kamuhanda, TI, §597.
In the ICC Statute aiding and abetting is envisaged in Article 25(3)(c), whereby a person is responsible if
for the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime [i.e. a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court], aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing
the means for its commission'.
114 In Furundtija an ICTY Trial Chamber held that 'it is not necessary that the aider and abettor should
know the precise crime that was intended and which in the event was committed. If he is aware that one of
a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one ot those crimes is in fact committed, he has
intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and is guiltv as an aider and abettor' (T}, 9247).
Another Trial Chamber supported this proposition in Blaskic (Tl, $?ST), and the Appeals Chamber
concurred in it in its judgment in Blaskic (A), §50)
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without knowing what specific crime he intends to perpetrate but in the
knowledge that he will use it to engage in criminal conduct, I am answerable for
aiding and abetting whatever crime he may later have committed by using that
weapon (murder, armed robbery, serious bodily harm, etc.); it is not necessary
for me to be fully aware of the specific crime he intends to perpetrate and the
required mental element of that crime;115 (ii)  furthermore the aider and abettor
must willingly aim to help or encourage another person in the commission of a
crime; in this respect intent is therefore required.
Among the various cases where the notion was applied,116 Akayesu can be cited,
not so much for outlining the legal contours of the notion (the TC at one point
115 The issue arose in van Anraat before the Hague Court of Appeal. The Court was faced with a case of
aiding and abel tir.g. The accused had provided to Iraq, between 1980 and 1988. the chemical raw material
TDG (ThiodiglvcJi) necessary for the manufacture ofthe mustard gas that the Iraqi Government had then
used against the Kurds in 1987-8. The Court discussed whether, faced with this case of aiding and abetting
a war crime, it was to apply Article 48 ofthe Dutch Criminal Code, on complicity as an accessory, or rather
ICL. The Court held appropriate to apply Dutch law, which in its view was cleared on the matter. Dutch
law does not require that the assistance provided by the accessory be indispensable or make a 'causal
contribution' to the main offence; it simply requires that 'the assistance offered by the accessory [should]
promote the offence or [make] it easier to commit that offence' (§12.4).
The Court first found that the accused knew that the chemicals he provided would be used to produce
mustard gas ('The fact that TDG, in the quantities as supplied by the defendant—more than eleven hun-
dred (1,100) tons altogether—could only serve for the production of mustard gas and not—as continuously
argued by the defendant and his defence—for use in the textile industry, has been stated by expert witness
[A], among others, during the court session of 4 April 200/. [A] confirmed his earlier statement of 30 May
2006 before the examining magistrate in which he said that it is totally unthinkable that during the 1980s
TDG was used in Iraq as textile 'additive' and that in Iraq not one factory had been found that was equipped
for the production of textile paint or printing ink. Also witness (head ofthe Iraqi team that set up the
FFCD], who was in charge of quality control of mustard gas and who was head ofthe team that set up the
already mentioned Full Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) stated mid-2005 before the examining
magistrate: If one speaks about tons ofTDG, then there is only one possible application: mustard gas*
§11.10).
The Court then found that the accused was aware ofthe high risk of use ofthe mustard gas in war ('From the
defendant's awareness of the fact that his supplies ofTDG served for the production of mustard gas in a
country that was involved in a long lasting war with a neighbouring country and ofthe efforts to conceal the
supplies of a precursor of that gas and the production ofthe poison gas itself, follows defendant's awareness
that the mustard gas was going to be used by Iraq in the war [... ]. Through his conscious contribution to the
production of mustard gas in a country at war, the defendant knew under those circumstances that he was.
The one who supplied the material and created the occasion for the actual use of that gas, in the sense that
he was very aware ofthe fact that in the given circumstances the use of this gas could not and would not fail
to materialise. In different words: the defendant was very aware of the fact that—'in the ordinary course of
events'—the gas was going to be used. In this respect the Court assumes that the defendant,
notwithstanding his statements concerning his relevant knowledge, was aware of the— also then known—
unscrupulous character of the then Iraqi regime' ¹11.16; emphasis added).
116 Such cases include Schonfeld and Rohde, both heard by British military courts (at 64 and 56,
respectively), Zyklon B, also heard by a British court (at 93), Einsatzgruppen, brought before by a US
Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg (at 569-85), S. and others (Hechingen Deportation case), brought
betore a German court in the French Occupied Zone (at 484-90). However, in most of these cases the
176
stated that 'complicity' was to be defined in the light of the Rwandan Renal Code:
§537), as for the legal findings on this matter. The TC found that
Akayesu, in his capacity as hourgmestre [mayor], was responsible for
maintaining law and public order in the commune of Taba and (...] had the
effective authority over the communal police. Moreover, as leader' of Taba
commune, of which he was one of the most prominent figures, the inhabitants
respected him and followed his orders. Akayesu himself admitted before the
Chamber that he had the power to assemble the population and that they obeyed
his instructions. It has also been proved that a very large number of Tutsi were
killed in Taba between 7 April and the end of June 1994, while Akayesu was
bourgmestre of the Commune. Knowing of such killings, he opposed them and
attempted to prevent them only until 18 April 1994, after which date he not only
stopped trying to maintain law and order in his commune, but was also present
during the acts of violence and killings, and sometimes even gave orders himself
for bodily or mental harm to be caused to certain Tutsi, and endorsed and even
ordered the killing of several Tutsi [...] The Chamber holds that the fact that
Akayesu, as a local authority, failed to oppose such killings and serious bodily or
mental harm constituted a form of tacit encouragement, which was compounded
by being present [during] such criminal acts (§§704-5).
The Chamber added that Akayesu was present during numerous incidents of
rape and sexual violence against Tutsi women and, by his attitude and
utterances, encouraged such acts, thus giving 'tacit encouragement' to the rapes
being committed. The Court concluded that he was criminally responsible 'for
having abetted in the preparation or execution of the killings of members of the
notion of aiding and abetting was not clearly defined as distinct from that of 'participation in a common
purpose'.
TCs of the ICTR and the ICTY have made a better jurisprudential contribution to the outlining and enun-
ciation of the concept in Akayesu (dealing with the notion of 'complicity in genocide': §§525-48), in Tadic
(§§688-92), and in Furundzija (§§190-249).
One may also mention a Canadian case involving torture: in Moreno (decision of 14 September 1993) the
Court held that 'Presence at the commission of an offence can be evidence of aiding and abetting if accom-
panied by other factors, such as prior knowledge of the principal offender's intention to commit the offence
or attendance for the purpose of encouragement [...I While mere presence at the scene of a crime (torture) is
not sufficient to invoke the exclusion clause [of the Refugee Convention], the act of keeping watch with a
view to preventing the intended victim from escaping may well attract criminal liability' (at 16-17). See
also Ramirez (at 5-9).
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Tutsi group and the infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on members of
the said group' ($§706-7).
In Furundzija an ICTY TC found that the accused, an officer of the Bosnian Croat
armed forces, was present while the victim was being raped by another officer,
and interrogated her. It held that in this way he had given assistance,
encouragement, or moral support, having a substantial effect on the crime by the
other officer, with the knowledge that these acts assisted the commission of the
offence. The TC therefore found the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting
outrages upon personal dignity, including rape (§§270-5).117
2.20.45 INCITEMENT AS A FORM OF PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
Incitement to commit a crime is some form of instigation, inducement,
encouragement, or persuasion to perpetrate the crime. Incitement does not
necessarily presuppose a hierarchical position. It simply means taking all those
psychological or physical steps designed to prompt somebody else to commit a
crime. It also requires the intent to have the crime perpetrated.
Both positive acts and omissions may constitute incitement.118 Furthermore,
incitement is a crime only under certain conditions: (i) it must be direct and
explicit, (ii) commission of the crime by other persons must follow up. In other
words, incitement is not punished per se, but only if it leads to the perpetration of
a crime (as we shall see, at i0.8, ICL provides for an exception to this rule, in the
case of genocide). Thus, a causal connection is necessary between the
instigation and the criminal conduct of the persons that committed the crime.119
117 In Aleksovski the TC found that the defendant 'By being present during the mistreatment, and yet not
objecting to it notwithstanding its systematic nature and the authority he had over its perpetrators, the
accused was necessarily aware that such tacit approval would be construed as a sign of his support and
encouragement. He thus contributed substantially to the mistreatment. Accordingly, the accused must be
held responsible for aiding and abetting under Article 7(1) in the physical and mental abuse which
detainees were subjected to during the body searches on 15 and 16 April 1993' (§87).
118 Blaikic 17, WO Kordic and Cerkez, TJ, $387.
119 See Blaskic,. 17, §280; Kordic and Cerkez Tl, $387; Kvaika, TJ, 9252; Akayesu. I-l, $482; Semanza, f],
$381; Rutaganda. T), §38; Musema, Tf, §120, Kajelijdi, T;, 762; Kamuhanda, Tl, §593.
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The requisite subjective element may be set out as follows: (i) the person
intended to induce the commission of the crime by another person, or in other
words 'directly intended to provoke the commission of the crime';120 or (ii) the
person was at least aware of the likelihood that commission of the crime would
be a consequence of his action; in addition, (iii) the person must possess the
mens rea concerning the crime he is instigating.121
In Kurt Mayer, tried by a Canadian Military Court sitting at Aurich in Germany, the
accused, a Commander of the 25 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, was among
other things, charged with having incited and counseled troops under his
command to deny quarter to Allied troops in 1943-4 in Belgium and France. The
Judge Advocate stated As it is an offence to deny quarter to prisoners I think an
officer may be convicted of a war crime if he incites and counsels troops under
his command to deny quarter, whether or not prisoners were killed as a result
thereof. It would seem to be common sense to say that not only those members
of the enemy who unlawfully kill prisoners may be charged as war criminals, but
also any superior military commander who incites and counsels his troops to
commit such offences (At 840).122
2.20.46 INCHOATE CRIMES: GENERAL
Many legal systems punish not only consummated criminal offences (for instance
murder, theft, etc.), but also 'inchoate', that is preliminary or 'just begun' criminal
wrongdoings. These are acts that: (i) are preparatory to prohibited offences; (ii)
have not been completed, therefore have not yet caused any harm, and (iii) are
punished or their own-, that is, in spite of the tact that they have not led to a
completed offence.
120 BlaskU, TL §278; Kordic and Cerkez, T; §387; Bagilishema. "[], §31.
121 Kvocka, Tl, §252; Naletilic and Martinovic, T), §60
122 Cases where incitement to commit war crimes was punished include Falkenhorst (at 23 and 29-30).
179
The rationale behind criminalization of such offences is clear: the legal system
intends to protect society as far as possible; therefore, in addition to punishing
offence' already perpetrated, it endeavors to prevent the commission of potential
transgressions. It consequently intervenes with its prohibitions at an early stage,
before crime: are completed; that is, at the stage to their preparation, so as to
forestall the consummation of the harmful consequences of actual crimes.
In many national legal systems (particularly in common law countries) three
categories of such crimes are envisaged: attempt, conspiracy, and incitement. In
international law, while attempt is regarded as admissible as a general class of
inchoate crimes, conspiracy and incitement are only prohibited as 'preliminary'
(not consummated) offences when connected to the most serious crime,
genocide. In addition, ICI also punishes planning or ordering the commission of
international crimes.
The very limited acceptance of conspiracy is probably due to the fact that this
class of criminal offence is not accepted in most civil law countries; hence it has
been considered admissible at the international level only with regard to the most
heinous and dangerous international crime, genocide, which aims at destroying
groups as such.
As for incitement, as we have seen above (10.2), in ICL it is prohibited only if i
leads to the actual perpetration of the crime; that is, as a form of participation in
crime, probably because states and courts have felt that prohibiting incitement
per se in connection with any international crime, including war crimes and
crimes against humanity would excessively broaden the range of criminal
conduct, the more so because of the difficulty of clearly delineating the notion of
incitement. Incitement as such has been exceptionally prohibited, subject,
however, to some stringent conditions, in connection with genocide.
As for planning and ordering, the rationale behind the tendency of international
law to punish them as inchoate crimes lies primarily in this: the most serious and
large-scale international crimes result from careful preparation and concerted
action by many agents, or are the result of instructions and directives issued by
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military or political leaders. In consequence international criminal rules aim to
prevent or at least circumscribe such conduct by stigmatizing it as criminal and
making it punishable.
In summary, in ICL, within the general category of inchoate crimes one ought to
distinguish three subcategories:
1.  Criminal conduct that is preparatory to a crime, but which by definition cannot
be followed by the intended crime. This subcategory encompasses attempt,
where, by definition, the subsequent offence is not consummated (because
subjective or external circumstances prevent consummation).
2. Criminal conduct that is preparatory to crimes proper, and is punished per se;
that is, even if it does not lead to the actual perpetration of the crime. However,
when this perpetration follows, the preparatory conduct is no longer punishable
as such, as it is 'absorbed' into the actual crime (although it may nevertheless be
taken into account as an aggravating circumstance) if the author of the
preliminary offence also is the perpetrator of the actual crime. If, however, the
two classes of agent  differ, one agent will be responsible for the inchoate crime,
the other for the execution of the crime proper. This Sub category embraces
planning as well as conspiracy to wage aggression.
3.  Criminal conduct that is punished per se, whether or not it is followed by the
consummation of a crime; where a crime does follow, this conduct as well as the
consummated crime is punished. This subcategory includes incitement to commit
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, as well as ordering (which, if the order
is executed, involves the responsibility of the superior for ordering criminal
conduct, while the subordinate is liable for the execution of the unlawful order).
2.20.47 ATTEMPT
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Attempt as a distinct criminal offence occurs whenever a person intending to
commit a crime tries to carry it out without, however, the normal outcome of his
action coming about.
One should distinguish between two different possibilities: (i) the perpetrator
takes the initial steps but is then stopped by others; or (ii) on account of circum-
stances independent of his will, his action does not produce the effects he
intended to bring about; in other words, he performs all the necessary acts
without, however, the intended result following. An example of the first category
is when a soldier starts to beat a prisoner of war savagely with the intention of
killing him, and is only prevented from so doing by others, who drag him off his
intended victim; or, within a general context of massive attacks against civilians,
a military officer orders his troops to blow up an internment camp where male
civilians belonging to a particular ethnic group are being held; however, the
sudden and unexpected arrival of a superior officer who is contrary to such acts
of extermination at the last minute prevents the troops from lighting the fuse of
the dynamite. An example of the second category is when a soldier shoots at a
'prisoner of war, intending to execute him, but the intended victim is not fatally
wounded and subsequently manages to escape. Another example is when a
military unit, following orders of an officer, launches a missile against a group of
civilian dwellings; the missile launcher, however, gets jammed and the missile is
not fired, or else the launcher misfires and the missile ends up in a nearby lake,
where it does not cause any victims or material damage. Yet another example is
when an order for the deportation of civilians is executed, within the context of a
systematic attack on civilians, and all civilians detained in a camp are put on
buses to be deported; however, an air attack by the enemy belligerent prevents
the buses from leaving and all the detainees, taking advantage of the ensuing
turmoil, manage to escape. A further example is the case where the victim of an
attempted murder is already dead (without, of course, the agent knowing this
circumstance).123
123 In Charles W. Keenan the accused had been ordered bv his superior to 'finish off' a civilian woman at
whom the superior had already shot. A US Court of Military Appeal held that in the case at issue attempted
murder was to be ruled out only because the subordinate knew that she was no longer alive when he fired at
her (at 114). The Court stated that 'so far as attempted murder is concerned, military law "has tended
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Although in the category of attempt the intended harm is not caused to the victim,
international law nevertheless makes attempt punishable, in order to prevent
breaches of international rules as far as possible. Consistently, this offence is
punished in various national laws on war crimes,'124 or is regarded as a distinct
offence in national case law on the same crimes.125
Some international tribunals have denied that either customary rules or the
tribunal's Statute contemplated attempt as a general category (Akayesu, T],
§473; Krnojelac, TJ, §432 nt. 1292).126 Probably this wrong conclusion is due
partly to the fact that attempt as an inchoate offence rarely occurs in the case of
crimes against humanity (while it is expressly prohibited for genocide), partly to
the fact that where attempted crimes were committed, prosecutors, followed by
international tribunals, misapprehended such offences and, instead of charging
the defendant with attempted war crimes or crimes against humanity, wrongly
charged him with other offences. A case in point is Vasiljevic. The offender, a
Bosnian Serb member of a paramilitary group, together with three other persons,
had allegedly taken serbien Bosnian Muslim civilians to the bank of the river
toward the advanced and modern position" that holds one accountable for conduct which would constitute a
crime if the facts were as he believed them to be (see United States v. Thomas). Here the accused expressly
testified that he believed the woman was dead; and the board of review specifically refused to find that she
was still alive when the accused fired at her. Moore and Eakins also testified that they believed the victim
was dead before the accused fired. The board of review could, therefore, reasonably conclude that the
accused knew he was firing at a corpse. This conclusion necessarily absolves him of attempted murder' (at
113).
To support its ruling the Court cited an important case, unrelated to war crimes, where the same Court had
extensively dealt with the notion at issue: Rodger D. Thomas, a case of attempted rape, which had offered
the Court the opportunity to discuss the requisite ingredients of the offence, with a reasoning that is along
the same lines as the notion propounded above for international criminal law (at 287-92). The Court held
that the elements of the offence of attempted rape were: '(i) an overt act; (2) specific intent; (3) more than
mere preparation; (4) tending to effect the commission of the offence; and (5) failure to effect its
commission' (at 286).
124 See, for instance, the laws cited in UN Law Reports, vol. XV, at 89 (Norway, Yugoslavia, the
Netherlands).
125 See the cases reported in UN Law Reports, vol. VI, 120, as well as-in UN Law Reports, vol. VII, at 73.
126 The TC stated that 'The existence of a mistaken belief that the intended victim will be discriminated
against, together with an intention to discriminate against that person because of that mistaken belief, may
in some circumstances amount to the inchoate offence of attempted persecution, but no such crime falls
within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal' (§242 n. 1292).
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Drina, forced them to line up and then opened fire to kill all of them. Five men
died, while two, pretending to be shot dead, jumped into the river and saved their
life. The Prosecution charged the defendant with murder (as a war crime and a
crime against humanity) for the killing of the five Muslims, while, for the
attempted murder, it charged them with inhumane acts as a crime against
humanity and violence to life and persons as a war crime. The TC in the event
convicted the defendant of 'other inhumane acts' as a crime against humanity.127
The AC did not reverse the decision on this specific issue. However, in another
case where the prosecutor had charged the defendant with murder as well as, for
12 attempted murders, 'inhuman acts' (Mrdja, Indictment, at 4), the TC rightly
spoke of 'attempted murder' in its sentencing judgment (§31).
The existence of a customary rule on attempt can be inferred, more than from the
fact that all penal systems of the world provide for attempt as a separate mode of
criminal. Liability, from the existence of numerous cases where national courts
have relied upon the notion of attempt (normally attempted murder) in connection
with war crimes, In this respect one can cite numerous cases brought before
German courts, where the question revolved around the attempted killing of
prisoners of war, civilians or inmates in concentration camps;128 Canadian courts
(for instance in of hand Neitz, at 209, where the question at issue was the
attempted murder of a prisoner of war),129 as well as US courts (for instance, in
127 On the decision, see the critical remarks of A. Cassese in 2 //C/ (2004), 265-74
128 See, for instance, Friedrich Otto Kohler, at 274 (the defendant was a police officer charged with killing
German and foreign detainees in 1945); Kurt KSIlner, at 682 (the accused, a member of the SS and head of
the security police, had committed war crimes in 1942 against persons detained in a concentration camp in
Poland); Otto Haupt and others, at 604 (the defendants had committed war crimes against prisoners of war
detained in a concentration camp); Karl Dietrich, at 485 (the issue was that of ill-treatment of lews in
occupied territory; the Court of Assize ruled out attempted murder on the facts). Some cases concern aiding
and abetting attempted murder: see, for instance, W. 1. F. Kleinhenn at, at 9 (in 1942 the accused had
committed war crimes against sick detainees in a concentration camp). Other cases concern attempted
manslaughter: see for instance S. case, at 505 (in early 1945 the defendant had committed war crimes
against foreign workers).
129 The accused )ohann Neitz, a German soldier, had shot twice at a member of the Royal Canadian Air
Force, who had been taken prisoner after his aircraft had been struck by flak. As a result of the shooting the
Canadian prisoner fell down but did not die. Neitz was charged both with committing a war crime, in that
he had fired, with intent to kill, two shots at the Canadian prisoner, and, alternatively, with a war crime in
that he had wounded the prisoner of war, in violation of the laws and usages of war (see the Prosecutors
opening address, at 13, and the Judge Advocate's summing-up, at 195-205). The Court found Neitz guilty
of the first charge and sentenced him to be imprisoned for life (see ibid., 209).
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Charles W. Keenn, at 114).130 In these cases national courts made allowance for
the war crime of attempted murder (or manslaughter).131
130 The L'S Court of Military Appeals allowed for the war crime of attempted murder, although it held that
in the case at issue the accused was not guilty of such crime, lhe facts were as follows. In 1966 a ten-man
squad of L'S servicemen entered a village in Vietnam where they suspected Vietcongs were hiding or were
being protected. One of them, corporal Luczko, shot twice at an unarmed woman; the accused, private
Keenan, asked the corporal whether he wanted him, Keenan, to finish her off. The corporal did not answer,
but fired a third shot at the woman. After that he asked Keenan to finish her off, and Keenan fired an
automatic burst. The Board ot Review indicated that 'it was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the victim was alive at the time the accused fired at her' (113). On the basis oUhat finding 'it absolved the
accused of all criminal responsibility in the death 'of the woman. Appellate Government counsel contended
that the Board of Reviews finding of tact did not automatically render the evidence insufficient to affirm a
finding of guilt' among other things on the ground that he fthe accused) committed the lesser included
offense of attempted murder' fl 13). The Court of Military' Appeals held, however, otherwise, it stated that
'so far as attempted murder is concerned, military law 'has tended toward the advanced and modern
position' that holds one accountable for conduct which would constitute a crime ifthe tacts were as he
believed them to be [...] Here the accused e.\'pres?lv testified that he believed the woman was dead; and the
board ofreview specifically refused to find that she was alive when the accused fired at her. Moore and
Eakins 'two members of the squad] a-otestitied that they believed the victim was dead before the accused
fired. The Board of Review could, therefore, reasonably conclude that the accused knew he was firing at a
corpse. This conclusion necessarily absolves him or ar~mpted murder' (113)
131 Incontrast, somcpost-Second World War German courts pronouncing on casesofdenunciationasa crime
against humanirr--zii r hat attempt is conceptually not admissible it related to such category of crimes. It is
not clear '.whether the rat her convoluted propositions of those courts may be construed as indicating that
such courts only referred to dcnunciationf to the Gestapo (of Jews or political opponents or at any rate per-
sons contrary' lo the \azi sv.-temJ as crimes against humanity (that is, as 'assaults on victims connected with
the Nazi rule based on violence and tyranny'). See P. case, at 15; V. case, at. 21 and 0 case, at 391-2.
It would seem that this exclusion of attempt is primarily due to the upholding by these German courts of a
very broad notion ofcrimes against humanity, a notion that also includes as part ofthe obiective element of
the crime the 'attempi to cause damage'. In this connection the first decision on the matter, namely the
aforementioned case P. is significant, although the Court's reasoning is rather convoluted. The facts were as
follows: in 1933 the accused, a member of the SA {Sturmabteilungen) passed bv the veranda of a young
man who was whistling the International' while shining shoes. The accused considered that he was being
provoked by the song and. after trying unsuccessfully to get into the house, returned some time later with a
police van. Havin g entered thr  house, he pushed himself forward between the police officials and
punched the young man in the face and kicked him in the legs. The police came to the aid of the young man
by holding the accused away from him, then arrested the young man and took him away to the police
prison instead of the SA barracks, as requested by the accused. A few days later the young man was
released from police custody. The court ot first instance sentenced the accused to two months'
imprisonment for a crime against human- its pursuant to Control Council Law no. 10. The Supreme Court
held that the crime of persecution has a 'the relationship to violence and arbitrary rule, as was the case of
the Nazi time with the persecution programme, as one of its core elements '(14j. 'A connection must be
established between the assault ton the victimi and the system of violent and arbitrary rule prevailing' (14J.
A harm or injury to the victim is also necessary. 'All external and inner harm which he fthe victim) suffered
at the hands of the perpetrators or their collaborators may be considered for the objective characterization
of a crime against humanity. Insofar as the injury has had an effect, it belongs to the elements of the
offence. Furthermore, a danger or threat caused by the perpetrator and experienced by the victim,
depending on the circumstances, may already signify or carry with it sufficient harm for the victim
(example; a person who is the subject of a dangerous denunciation commits suicide out of fear, or flees into
the woods and dies of hunger). Only from this perspective can what the perpetrator planned, intended,
prepared or sought, or what harm the act could have generated, be of interest for the objective definition of
the act. In addition, however, the ingredients of the act cannot be realised by what the victim did not
actually suffer but could easily have suffered (15). "This clarification makes it possible to state that, in
respect of crimes against humanity, attempt is conceptually impossible in the German legal sense.
Nonetheless, the attempt as such to commit harm mavbv itself fall within the definition of a crime against
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Other cases can also be mentioned.132
The customary rule has been codified in Article 25(3)(f) of the ICC Statute,
whereby a person is criminally responsible if he 'attempts to commit [a crime
under the Court's jurisdiction] by taking action that commences its execution by
means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of
circumstances independent of the person's intentions'.
Clearly, what is required for the attempt to be punishable, is: (i) conduct
consisting of a significant commencement of the criminal action (to hold to the
example given above, it is not sufficient for the guard to take the prisoner out of
his cell and possibly even shout at, or abuse, him; it is necessary for the guard to
start beating him savagely); (ii) the clear intention to commit a crime, (iii) failure of
that intention to take effect owing to external circumstances.
The ICC Statute codifies international customary laws in another respect as well.
Article 25(3)(f) duly takes account of the cessation of the attempter's criminal
intention and leaves his initial steps unpunished
humanity even if the worst possible results did not occur* (15). Turning to the specific offence at issue, the
Supreme Court held that it constituted dangerous bodily harm, which however did not tall under the
category of crimes against humanity. In its view, even ifthe act 'did prejudice the non-material value of the
(young man] it did not do so with an effect on humanity in general [...] The more serious harm that the
accused had intended for the [young man] did not materialise. The fact that the accused had tried to cause
harm must not be taken into consideration as regards the objective elements of the offence. Humanity as the
bearer and protector of the non-material values is not prejudiced by such an act; should this act—insofar as
it was not punishable under German criminal law—remain unpunished, it would not be unbearable for
humanity (18). See also V. (so called Nu ,ase), at 21. ('Certainly, the sense of repugnance [that the act
would arouse in an ideal observer] mentioned in the submission ruling can already occur when the person
affected has only been exposed to the danger of harm. Endangerment by denunciation can only be a crime
against humanity by virtue of the typical hardship of inhumanity that the denunciation has effected. An
attempted crime against humanity does not even come into question, since, as explained in Sts 3/48 (P.
case] an attempt is inconceivable with this type of crime.') Another relevant case is 0., at 391-2 (the Berlin
Court of assize held that there was no evidence of the harm to the victim; it added that 'in the action of the
accused one could see the beginning of execution of the crime against humanity'; however, according to the
Court, the notion of attempt had already been excluded from the notion of crimes against humanity by the
Supreme Court in Cologne; the accused was therefore to be acquitted of the charge of crime against
humanity: at 392).
132 Seethecases reported inLawReportsof Trials of WarCriminals (UN War Crimes Commission), vol. VI,
at 120 and vol. VII at 73.
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However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise
prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this
Statute tor the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and
voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
Thus, to continue with one of the aforementioned example, if the guard, after
beating the prisoner for a while, suddenly decides not to carry through his initial
purpose and takes the prisoner back to his cell, he is not guilty of attempted
murder (although he may well be guilty of other crimes). Similarly, if an officer
gives an order to shoot and kill a group of innocent civilians and then, just before
the order is carried out, changes his mind and orders that their lives be spared,
he is not considered criminally liable for murder (although he may be guilty of
inhuman treatment or even torture, if he intended to carry out a mock execution).
As for the mens rea required  for attempt,  it may be  noted  that  in  common
law countries as well as in many civil law systems, what is normally required is
the intention to carry out the offence (recklessness is not enough). It would seem
that also in ICL the subjective element required is intent.
2.20.48 PLANNING
Planning consists of devising, agreeing upon with others, preparing, and
arranging for the commission of a crime. Think, for instance, of planning an air
attack on civilians or the use of such prohibited arms as chemical or
bacteriological weapons, or the indiscriminate killing of civilians as part of a
widespread or systematic attack on civilians. As stated by various courts,
planning implies that 'one or several persons contemplate designing the
commission of a crime at both the preparatory and executory phases'.133
Given the nature and features of international crimes, it is often the higher
military or civilian authorities that carry out the planning,
Whoever takes part in the planning of an international crime is liable to
punishment for the relevant crime, whatever his rank in the hierarchy and the
133 Akayesu T], §480; BlaskicTf. §279; Kardic andCerkez, TJ, §386; Brima antiothers, Tf, §765
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level of his participation (although of course the rank and role may be germane to
punishment; it is evident that the higher the status of the planner and the intensity
of his participation in the planning, the harsher his penalty should be).
The subjective element required is the intent to carry out the criminal conduct:
the offender 'directly or indirectly intended that the crime in question be
committed'.134
A difficult question is whether planning an international crime is punishable per
se, regardless of whether or not it leads to the actual commission of the crime
planned, or instead is only punishable if planning is followed up by perpetration of
the crime. TCs of the ICTR opted for the latter solution in a number of cases.135
They grounded this conclusion on the works of the International Law Commission
and on the interpretation of the relevant rule of the ICTR Statute (Article 6(1))
laying down the principle of individual criminal responsibility, which 'implies that
the planning or the preparation of a crime actually must lead to its commission'
(Musema, §115).
It may be noted that prosecuting someone for planning, where the planning is not
put into effect, comes close to prosecuting conspiracy (although with conspiracy
there must be an agreement of two or more persons, whereas planning may be
carried out by one person alone, and if done by more persons, no agreement is
required). The ICTY and ICTR Statutes allow conspiracy for genocide, but not for
crimes against humanity and war crimes. (This was also the position of the IMT
at Nuremberg: conspiracy to commit crimes against peace was held admissible,
whereas conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes was not.)
An ICTY TC, ruling in Kordic and Cerkez, propounded a contrary view. It held
that 'an accused may be held criminally responsible for planning alone' (§386).
The reason for this conclusion is that 'planning constitutes a discrete form of
responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute'. However, the TC set forth two
134 Blaikic Tf, §278; Kordicand Cerkel, Tl, 5386; Bagilishema, T), §31; BriMia anif otfteri, TJ, §7
135 Akayesu (§475), Rutaganda (§34), andMusewa (§115).
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caveats: first, 'a person found to have committed a crime will not be found
responsible for planning the same crime'; secondly, 'an accused will only be held
responsible for planning, instigating or ordering a crime if he directly or indirectly
intended that the crime be committed' (§386).
Although there is no consistent case law on this matter, it would seem that the
gravity of international crimes (or at least of the most serious among them) may
warrant the conclusion that planning the commission of one or more of such
crimes are punishable per se even if the crime is not actually perpetrated. The
rationale is that ICL aims not only to punish persons found guilty of crimes, but
also to prevent persons from engaging in serious criminal conduct.
Consequently, in case of doubt criminal rules must be interpreted as being also
designed as far as possible to prevent offences.
It would follow that planning an international crime is also punishable per se as a
distinct form of criminal liability, subject to a set of conditions that can be derived
from the general system of ICL:
1. Only the planning of serious or large-scale international crimes constitutes
a discrete offence: for instance, the planning of massive war crimes (such as the
extermination of a large number of prisoners of war, or the large-scale
deportation of civilians to extermination camps), or of crimes against humanity, or
genocide. Since the rules on planning do not specify the legal ingredients of this
crime, it seems warranted to maintain that, for international crimes of lesser
gravity (for instance, ill-treatment of one prisoner of war, the taking by members
of the Occupying Power of private property belonging to civilians), those rules
must be construed in such a way as to favour the accused (favor rei).
Consequently, the mere planning of those crimes of lesser gravity may be held
not to constitute a crime per se.
2. If planning is followed up by execution of the crime by the same person,
planning is no longer punishable as a crime distinct from that resulting from its
execution: the perpetrator may not be convicted of both planning and committing
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the crime, for the latter 'absorbs' the former.136 (in this respect planning is
different from, hence may not be equated to, such 'inchoate crimes' as
conspiracy to commit genocide and incitement to genocide, to be discussed
below). Nevertheless, the fact of planning the criminal offence may be held to
constitute an aggravating factor.137
3. As for the requisite mens rea, it is necessary for the author to intend that the
planned crime be committed, or else he must be aware of the risk that the
planned crime would be perpetrated by him or by someone else (recklessness or
dolus eventualis).
2.20.49 CONSPIRACY
2.20.49.1 GENERAL: THE NOTION OF CONSPIRACY
It is common knowledge that conspiracy is a form of criminality punished in
common law systems, but either unknown to, or accepted to a very limited extent
by, civil law countries. Conspiracy is a group offence, consisting of the
agreement of two or more persons to commit a crime. It is punished even if the
crime is never perpetrated. In addition, if the crime is carried out, the perpetrators
are held liable both for conspiracy and for the substantive crime they commit.
The mens rea element of conspiracy required for each and every participant is
twofold: (i) knowledge of the facts or circumstances making up the crime the
group intends to commit; (ii) intent to carry out the conspiracy and thereby
perpetrate the substantive offence. Plainly, the basic rationale behind the
prohibition of this crime is the need to prevent offences, especially when they
involve several persons and are thus more dangerous to the community.
As noted above, in international law no customary rule has evolved on
conspiracy on account of the lack of support from civil law countries for this
category of crime. (In civil law systems, entering into agreement to commit a
crime is not punishable per se, unless it leads to the perpetration of the crime;
136 ICTY TC, KordU, S386: Brdanm, §268; SPCS TC, Bi-ima and others, §767.
137 ICTY TC, Siakic, §443; SPCS TC, Brima and others, §767.
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only exceptionally, and for such categories of serious offences as those aimed at
undermining state security or at setting up associations or organizations
systematically bent on criminal conduct in various areas, is conspiracy as such
prohibited). In 2006 in Hamdan the US Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens,
rightly ruled out that conspiracy is criminalized as a war crime in international law
(at 9-12, 46-56).
Treaty rules on conspiracy can only be found in the London Agreement of 1945.
In Article 6 it made punishable persons 'participating in a Common Plan or
Conspiracy for the accomplishment' of any crime against peace and in addition
made leaders, organizers, instigators or accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing crimes [that is, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity] responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such
plan'. This provision laid down ex post facto law. However, as it referred to
conspiracy to commit a crime against peace, it punished persons who had
conspired to wage the war that had just ended. In addition, to the extent that it
referred to other crimes, it also made conspiracy punishable for acts already
accomplished. In other words, in the end conspiracy was held to be punishable to
the extent that any plan or agreement to commit an international crime had been
actually carried out. (Strikingly, Control Council Law no. 10 only referred to
conspiracy to commit crimes against peace: see Article 2(l)(a).)
Nevertheless, generally speaking, both the IMT at Nuremberg and the Military
Tribunals sitting at Nuremberg took a restrictive view of conspiracy: see, in
particular, Goring and others (at 224-6) and Alstotter and others (at 289-90). In
the former case the influence of the French Judge Donnedieu de Vabres, and his
insistence on the novel nature of conspiracy in international law, were
indisputably decisive.138
138 H. Donnedieu de Vabres, 'Le proems de Nuremberg devant les principes modernes du droit penal
international' in 70 HR (1947-1), 528-42. Among other things he held the view that in the event Article 6
(in fine), of the Nuremberg Charter upheld the French notion of 'complicitf (at 541). He also emphasized
that, with regard to crimes against peace, the IMT ultimately avoided holding that there was a general
conspiracy (at 541-2).
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As noted above (7.3.4) it is warranted to hold that conspiracy to engage in a war
of aggression is criminalized by a customary rule of international law. However,
the getting together or more persons and their agreeing to undertake a war or
other acts of aggression is punishable only if such concerting measures for acts
of aggression is not followed up by the actual waging of aggression. If aggression
is subsequently carried out, this crime 'absorbs' the crime of conspiracy, unless
those who conspired are different from the persons who in fact undertook the
aggression (in which case the former are responsible for conspiring and the latter
for aggression).
2.20.49.2 THE OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT GENOCIDE
The only treaty rule on conspiracy currently in force is Article 3(b) of the 1948
Genocide Convention, which, on the grounds and motivations set out above,
makes 'conspiracy to commit genocide' punishable (genocide was deemed to be
such an odious crime that even the mere agreement to commit it or its planning
without any practical follow-up that is, execution of the crime, were banned and
criminalized). It would seem that, like most other substantive provisions of the
Convention, it has turned into customary law. Among other things it has been
taken up in the Statutes of both the ICTY and the ICTR (but, strikingly, not in
Article 6 of the ICC Statute, which consequently differs in this respect from
international customary law).
In Musema an ICTR TC held that conspiracy to commit genocide 'is to be defined
as an agreement between two or more persons to commit the crime of genocide'
(§191).139 In Nahimana and others the ICTRTC added some interesting remarks
on the modalities of reaching agreement, as part of the conspiracy to commit
genocide. It noted that:
Conspiracy to commit genocide can be comprised of individuals acting in an
institutional capacity as well as or even independently of their personal links with
each other. Institutional coordination can form the basis of a conspiracy among
139 See also Kajelijeli, TL §788; Nahimana and others, T;, S1047.
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those individuals who control the institutions that are engaged in coordination
action. The Chamber considers the act of coordination to be the central element
that distinguishes conspiracy from 'conscious parallelism', the concept put
forward by the Defence to explain the evidence in this case (§1048).
As for mens rea, it rests on the concerted intent to commit genocide, that is, to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religions group, as such.
Thus [...] the requisite intent for the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide is
ipso facto the intent required for the crime of genocide, that is the dolus specialis
of genocide (Musema, TJ §192).
As noted above, the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide is punishable even
if it fails to lead to its result; that is, even if genocide is not perpetrated.140
2.20.50 INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE
Incitement is only prohibited in ICL with regard to genocide. The perceived
gravity of genocide accounts for this legal exception. Genocide is held to be such
a heinous crime involving the annihilation of entire human groups, that any act or
conduct leading to, or pushing towards, its perpetration is banned and
criminalized.
However, incitement to genocide, to be punishable, must be not only direct but
also public (for clarification of these two notions, see below). At the same time
incitement is criminalized as such; that is, even it is not followed by the
commission of genocide.141
Incitement must be public: the fact of inducing or provoking other persons to
engage in acts of genocide must be performed in a public place (for instance, a
square) or in a public gathering, through speeches, 'shouting or threat'(Akayesu
TJ, §559) or 'through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display of written
material or printed matter [...] or the public display of placards or posters' (ibid.),
or else through such means as radio or television capable of reaching the
140 Musema, T}, §194; Niyitegeka, T), §423; Nahimana and others, T), §1044; KajeUjeh, Tf, §78!
141 Akayesu, Tf, §§561-2; Musema, T;, §§193-4; Kajeli)eli,Tf. §855; Nahimana, TJ, §1029.
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general public at large.142 Incitement made in private, for instance to small and
selected groups, may, however, amount to conspiracy to commit genocide
(Akayesu, TJ, §556; AJ, §480).
Incitement must also be direct, that is, it must specifically provoke or induce other
persons to engage in genocide. In other words, it must not consist of vague and
indirect suggestions. Nevertheless, even implicit messages or utterances may
amount to incitement, as long as the addressees immediately grasp the
implications of the message in light of its cultural and linguistic content.143 For
instance, the use of the term 'cockroaches' referring to Tutsis in the Rwandan
context, as possible targets of genocidal action, could amount to incitement
(Akayesu, TJ §§557-8),
As for the subjective element of the crime, an ICTR TC held that [it] lies in the
intent to directly prompt or provoke another to commit genocide. It implies a
desire on the part of the perpetrator to create by his actions a particular state of
mind necessary to commit such a crime in the minds of the person(s) he is so
engaging. That is to say that the person who is inciting to commit genocide must
have himself the specific intent to commit genocide, namely, to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such (Akayesu, TC,
§560).
An interesting case is Ruggiu, the journalist of 'Radio Mille Collines' accused b
the ICTR Prosecutor of 'direct and public incitement to commit genocide and
crime against humanity (persecution)'. He pleaded guilty. An ICTRTC found that
when examining the acts of persecution which have been admitted by the
accused, it is possible to discern a common element. Those acts were direct and
public radio broadcasts a aimed at singling out and attacking the Tutsi ethnic
group and Belgians on discriminator grounds, by depriving them of the
fundamental rights to life, liberty and basic humanity enjoyed by members of
wider society. The deprivation of these rights can be said to have as its aim the
142 Akayesu, T), §§556 and 559; Kajelijeli, TL §851; Nahimana, TI, §431.
143 Akayesu, TL §558; KajeUjeli, T), §853; Nahimana, T), §§1004-6.
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death and removal of those persons from the society in which they live alongside
the perpetrators, or eventually even from humanity itself (§22).
2.20.51 ORDERING
Ordering is a mode of responsibility entailing that a de jure or de facto superior
(within a military or civilian hierarchy) issues a command to a subordinate to the
effect that he or she must take a certain course of action that is contrary to law
and amounts to a criminal offence.144 As an ICTY TC rightly held in Kordic and
Cerke: (§388), 'no formal superior- subordinate relationship is required for a
finding of "ordering" so long as it is demonstrated that the accused possessed
the authority to order'. This proposition, albeit not supported by any legal reason
in the judgment, is warranted because ICL is not a formalistic body of law geared
to legal technicalities but aims at proscribing and punishing crimes whatever the
modalities of their commission.
As held by ICTY TCs,145 there is no need for the order to be given in writing or in
any particular form. In addition, the existence of an order may be proved through
circumstantial evidence.
If the order issued by a superior authority is passed on by a subordinate authority
down the chain of command, the latter authority, depending upon the
circumstances, may also be held to be responsible for ordering an illegal act
(Kupreskic, TJ, §§827,862).
It would seem that it is not necessary for the order to be executed. An officer or
any other higher authority issuing a criminal order may be found guilty even if the
order is not carried out by the subordinates, if the superior intended the order to
be executed and knew that the order was illegal, or else the order was manifestly
illegal. Thus, in General Jacob H. Smith, in 1902 a US Court Martial held that
144 See for instance Krstic. TJ, §601: Naletilicand Martinovii, TJ, 161; Stakic, TJ, §445; Semanza, TJ, §382;
Baplishema, TJ, §31; Rutaganga, TJ, §39; Kamuhanda, TJ, §594.
145 Blaikic (§281) and Kordic and Cerkez (§388). See also SCSL TC, Brima and others. §772.
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General Smith was guilty of ordering that no quarter should be given to the
enemy in the Philippines, even though in fact his troops did not comply with this
order (at 799-813). In many other cases courts have convicted officers for issuing
criminal orders, even if such orders were not executed.146
If the internationally unlawful order is executed, the person issuing the order is
criminally liable qua co-perpetrator of the crime carried out by the subordinate.
Also for this category of criminality the requisite mental element is the intent to
have the crime committed,147 at least, as long as the order is specific; that is,
instructs to perform a specific crime. However, when the order is generic,
recklessness or even gross negligence may be considered sufficient.148
So far we have addressed the issue of orders that impose to engage in criminal
conduct. Plainly, if a superior issues a lawful order (for example, bombing military
installations near civilian houses, after taking all the necessary precautions
imposed by international humanitarian law) and the subordinates, in partial non-
compliance with the order, commit a war crime (for instance, deliberately
146 See, for instance. High Command (at 118-23), The Hostages Trial (at 118-23), Kurt Maytr (at 98 and
108), Falkenhorst (at 18,23,29-30), Hans Wickmann (at 133). In Twfan and othersv. IDF Advocate and
others (Yehuda Meir case). Judge D. Levin (concurring) held that 'the higher the rank of the commanding
officer and the more comprehensive and more decisive his authority, the greater the responsibility
incumbent upon him to examine and determine the justification and legality of the order' (at 745). It should
be noted that ordering is sometimes treated as a species of instigation, for instance ordering that no quarter
be given may be regarded as the same thing as inciting troops to commit war crimes.
147 In fung and Schumacher, decided by a Canadian Military Court sitting at Aurich in Germany, the Judge
Advocate, in discussing the position of the defendant lung, who had ordered the other defendant to shoot
and kill a Canadian war prisoner, noted the following: 'The Court may find that the accused uttered the
words or some words to do harm to the prisoner, but it must be found that he uttered them with the
expectation and intention that they should be acted upon by someone who heard them, including
Schumacher. In this event he would have either incited, counselled or procured the acts to have been done,
and so be concerned [in the crime]. Now, if you find that the accused lung handed the prisoner over to
Schumacher, knowing or expecting he would be killed, then again he would be concerned [in the killing of
the Canadian POWr (at 219-20).
On the requisite of intent in ordering, see Blaskic, TJ, §278: Kordic and Cerkez, Tl, §386; Stakic, TJ, §445;
BagiUshema. TJ, §31.
148 In one case a Canadian Court Martial held that the defendant was guilty of negligence for issuing
unlawful orders (he had instructed his subordinates that prisoners 'could be abused'): see Major A.G.
Seward (at 1079-81). Interestingly, the defendant was acquitted on another count, namely of having caused
bodily harm to the Somali civilians beaten up, tortured, and killed by his subordinates. The Court Martial
Appeals Court of Canada noted in this regard that by this acquittal the defendant 'must be taken to have
been found neither to have intended nor to have been capable or reasonably foreseeing that any of his
subordinates would mistreat unto death anySomalian [sic] prisoner' (at 1082)
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bombing some civilian dwellings as well, or else failing to take the necessary
precautions), the ordering official is not criminally liable for that war crime.
However, there may be cases where even a lawful order may involve the
responsibility of the superior. This occurs when it can be proved that the superior
was aware that the execution of his or her order was most likely to lead to the
commission of a war crime and nevertheless willingly took this risk. A case in
point is Blaskic. An ICTY TC had held that the defendant had ordered artillery fire
against some villages; a massacre of civilians had ensued; according to the
Chamber, 'even if doubt were still cast in spite of everything on whether the
accused ordered the attack with the clear intention that the massacre would be
committed, he would still be liable under Article 7(1) of the [ICTY] Statute for
ordering the crimes' (§474). Hence the TC held Blaskic guilty for this order as
well. On appeal, the AC held, however, that the test of recklessness had not
been rightly set out. In its view, while it may be correct to require a culpable
mental state lower than intent and thus admit recklessness (or dolus eventualis),
the mental element required by the TC was too low a standard: under such
standard 'any military commander who issues an order would be criminally
responsible, because there is always a possibility that violations could occur (A),
§41). The correct standard, according to the AC, is awareness of a substantial
likelihood of risk plus a volitional element, namely acceptance that the risk may
ensue.149
2.20.52 GENERAL
International criminal liability may arise not only as a result of a positive act or
conduct (killing an enemy civilian, unlawfully destroying works of art, etc.) but
149 According to the AC "The knowledge of any kind of risk, however low, does not suffice for the
imposition of criminal responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Trial
Chamber does not specify what degree of risk must be proven. Indeed, it appears that under the Trial
Chamber's standard, any military commander who issues an order would be criminally responsible, because
there is always a possibility that violations could occur. The Appeals Chamber considers that an awareness
of a higher likelihood of risk and a volitional element must be incorporated in the legal standard' (AJ, §41).
The Chamber went on to hold that 'a person who orders an act or omission with the awareness of the
substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order, has the requisite mens
rea for establishing liability under Article 7(1) pursuant to ordering. Ordering with such awareness has to
be regarded as accepting that crime' (§42).
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also from an omission; that is, failure to take action. Omission is only criminalized
when the law imposes a clear obligation to act and the person willfully or
recklessly fails to do what was legally required.
It took a long time for a general rule on this matter to evolve in international
criminal law. The reason for this state of affairs is clear. The first body of
substantive rules restraining conduct in war, namely traditional international
humanitarian law, tended to prohibit action; in other words, it imposed on
combatants the obligation not to engage in conduct contrary to some
international standards (killing civilians, raping women, shelling hospitals, etc.).
By the same token it refrained, as a rule, from imposing positive obligations to do
something. The purpose of this body of law was to ensure respect for a modicum
of legal standards by belligerents. Law largely respected the autonomy of states,
leaving them free to pursue their ends and purposes in war, and only banned
(and later criminalized) glaring breaches of the most fundamental standards of
behaviour. The law did not go so far as also to require that belligerents should
take some kind of positive action to protect civilians and other victims of war-
fare. International law-makers did not deem it expedient to restrict states' conduct
by establishing obligations requiring states to do a particular thing under some
specific circumstances.
Progress was made after the Second World War, when an 'interventionist'
attitude in international humanitarian law, intended to broaden the protection of
war victims, gradually replaced the previous liberal laissez-faire approach',
substantially geared to freedom of states subject to some exceptional
prohibitions. As we shall soon see, many provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions clearly laid down the duty to do something and considered failure so
to act as criminal.
As we shall see below, after the Second World War one particular class of
responsibility by omission, that is, superiors' responsibility, has taken on distinct
features and evolved as a discrete and important form of this category.
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2.20.53 RULES IMPOSING A POSITIVE OBLIGATION TO ACT
Some provisions of the Geneva Conventions lay down unconditional (in other
words, unqualified) positive obligations. For instance, this holds true for article
16(4) of the First Geneva Convention (on the wounded and sick armed forces in
the field), which contains positive prescriptions concerning the preparation and
transmission by one belligerent to the other, of death certificates or lists of the
dead. It also holds true for Article 17 of the same Convention, which provides for
the burial or cremation of the dead.150 Other provisions lay down positive
obligations that are, however, very sweeping and therefore leave to Contracting
States a fairly broad margin of appreciation. This applies for instance to Article
14(2) of the Third Geneva Convention (on prisoners of war), concerning the duty
to protect prisoners of war against acts of violence or intimidation; Article 15 of
the same Convention, requiring maintenance of prisoners of war free of charge;
and Article 29 of the same Convention, on the duty to take all sanitary measures
necessary to ensure the cleanliness and hygiene of detention camps. Similarly,
Article 36 of the First Additional Protocol obliges states studying, developing,
acquiring, or adopting new weapons to ascertain whether these weapons are
prohibited by international law. Articles 76 and 77 of the same Protocol protect
women and children, respectively, against various forms of assault by imposing
on states broad positive obligations. Articles 82 and 83 of the Protocol similarly
lay down positive obligations concerning the provision and availability of legal
advisers, and dissemination of the Conventions and Protocol respectively.
As stated above, some provisions contain qualified obligations. For instance,
Article 12(5) of the First Geneva Convention provides that a party to the conflict
compelled to abandon wounded or sick to the enemy must leave with them a part
150 Similar provisions may be found in Articles 19 and 20 of the Second Geneva Convention (on the
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea): as well as in Article 32(5) of the First Geneva Convention (on the
treatment of neutral personnel lending assistance to a belligerent and falling into the hands of the adversary
belligerent); in Articles 69-77 otthe Third Geneva Convention (on prisoners of war), relating to relations of
prisoners of war with the external world; Article 118 of the same Convention, concerning release and
repatriation of prisoners of war at the close of hostilities (violation of this provision amounting to a grave
breach, pursuant to Article 85(4)(b) of the First Additional Protocol); Article 121 of the same Convention,
concerning the duty to establish an official inquiry into the death or serious injury of prisoners of war; and
Article 122 of the same Convention, providing for the establishment, by each belligerent, of an information
bureau concerning prisoners of war.
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of its medical personnel as well as material, 'as far as military considerations
permit'. Similarly, Article 12(2) of the Second Geneva Convention provides that
enemy wounded, sick, or shipwrecked 'shall not be willfully left without medical
assistance and care, nor shall conditions exposing them to contagion or infection
be created' (emphasis added). Article 60 of the Third Geneva Convention
imposes on the Detaining Power the duty to grant all prisoners of war a monthly
advance of pay, and specifies the amount of advance each class of prisoner
must obtain (depending on their rank); however, the provisions go on to state that
this amount may be modified by special agreement between the parties to the
conflict, or by the Detaining Power, subject to some conditions. Articles 55 and
56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (on civilians), relating to provision of food
and medical supplies and hygiene and public health, respectively, are qualified
by the proviso 'to the fullest extent of the means available' to the Occupying
Power.151
2.20.54 CULPABLE OMISSION OF AN ACT MANDATED BY AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RULE
Serious violations of many of the above positive obligations (for instance, those
enjoining to protect women and children from assault), as well as others laid
down in other provisions152 amount to an international crime, more specifically to
war crimes, as held by the ICTY AC in Tadic (IA): Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute,
on individual criminal responsibility also covers 'the culpable omission of an act
that was mandated by a rule of criminal law (§188). Of course, it is necessary for
the conditions set forth in the same decision in Tadic (IA) (§§94-5), determining
151 Similarly, Article 69(1) of the First Additional Protocol imposes upon the Occupying Power the
obligation to provide to the civilian population means for satisfying its basic need, 'to the fullest possible
extent of the means available' to that Power. Article 70 of the same Protocol provides for relief actions in
favour of the civilian population in occupied territories 'subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in
such relief actions'.
152 See, for instance, Sumida Haruzo and others (at 228-9,278, and 280-2) for the breach of the duty to
provide food and care to detained civilians as a war crime. In Gozawa Sadaichi and others it was held that
the lack of food and medical supplies, as well as the existence of bad conditions for prisoners of war,
amounted to a crime of which the detaining authorities were guilty (at 200-1, 210-11, 222-3, and 227-31).
See also Schmitt (decision of the Antwerp Court Martial, at 751-2, and the subsequent decision of the Cour
militaire de BruxeUes, at 752, nt. 89 bis), as well as Koppelmann Ernst (decision of the Brabant Court
Martial, at 753-4, and of the Belgian Court of Cassation, at 185-6). In both cases the courts dealt with the
positive obligations of the commanders of detention camps for prisoners of war
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which violations may be regarded as war crimes, to be met. However, in some
instances, specified in the relevant provisions, a serious violation may amount to
a 'grave breach', with the attendant consequences with regard to the mandatory
character of 'universal' judicial repression at the national level (see infra, 16.1).
As in the case of crimes consisting of positive conduct, criminal omission also
may only be punished if accompanied by a certain subjective frame of mind. As
in those cases, this mental element may vary, depending on the requirements of
international rules. Normally intent is required. However, in some cases the
relevant rules or provisions of international criminal law may require a less
demanding subjective element, such as recklessness.153 It would seem
admissible to hold the view that, at least in some instances, and subject to strict
conditions, even culpable negligence might suffice for criminal liability to arise.154
153 In Niagerura and other} an ICTR TC set out the necessary subjective and objective elements of the
crime as follows: 'The TC finds that in order to hold an accused criminally responsible for an omission as a
principal perpetrator, the following elements must be established: (a) the accused must have had a duty to
act iTiandated by a rule of criminal law; (b) the accused must have had the ability to act; (c) the accused
failed to act intending the criminally sanctioned consequences or with awareness and consent that the
consequences would occur; and (d) the failure to act resulted in the commission of the crime' (§6.58).
See also Blaskic W,i 663), GaUc W, § 175), and Brdanin (A), §§274-5).
154 A case where it would seem that a British court considered culpable negligence sufficient is Heinrich
Gerike and others (the Veipke Baby Home trial). The defendants were charged with war crimes for
violating Article 46 (on respect for family honour and life by the Occupant) of the 1907 Hague Rules, for
leaving without food and care the children of Polish female workers compulsorily separated from their
parents and brought to a home for infants in Veipke; as a result of lack of care many children had died. The
Prosecutor, Major Draper (a Judge Advocate being absent) argued that the staff in charge of the children
'were so grossly and criminally negligent that they did in fact cause the death of something over 80 children
in six months' (at 326). He then noted that one of the questions arising in the case was whether 'that neglect
[was] more than something that was gross and reckless, or was [...] wilful disregard of consequences to
such an extent that the party or parties responsible are deemed to have intended the natural and probable
consequences of their act, namely, that death would result' (at 326). He then pointed out that In either event
it is the contention of the Prosecution that they are within the charge which is laid before this Court,
namely, that the accused are concerned between the relevant dates in the killing by wilful neglect of a
number of children, Polish nationals' (ibid.). He then cited Archbold on gross negligence and recklessness
(at 336-7), noting that his propositions were 'in point in this case' (at 337). The Court found two defendants
not guilty (neither of them had been entrusted with the care of the children; one had consistently
disapproved of the running of the Home and consequently decided to keep aloof, the other had tried
unsuccessfully to have the Home removed); it sentenced the remaining four either to death by hanging or to
imprisonment (at 339-43)
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CHAPTER 3
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE DOCTRINE
Although it was adumbrated after the First World War,155 it was in the aftermath
of the Second World War that there evolved in international law the notion of
criminal responsibility of superiors for failure to prevent or punish crimes
perpetrated by their subordinates. The gradual evolution of ICL on the matter can
be roughly divided up into various phases.
At the outset law-makers and courts considered that military commanders were
to be held criminally liable for failure to prevent or punish, for in so acting they in
some way aided and abetted the crimes of their underlings. Some national laws
set out the notion tersely and conceived of such responsibility as a form of
complicity.156 For instance, the French Order on War Crimes of 28 August 1944
provided in Article 4 that where a subordinate is prosecuted as the principal
perpetrator of a war crime and his hierarchical superiors may not be investigated
as co-perpetrators, they hall be held to be accomplices to the extent that they
have organized or tolerated the criminal offences of their subordinates (emphasis
added).
Here the notion was clearly set out that a military commander is criminally liable
as an aider and abetter, it he tolerated—that is, failed to stop or repress—the
commission of war crimes by his subordinates. A slightly broader notion was
embodied in the Chinese law of 24 October 1946 on the trial of war criminals,
which, however, like the French law, regarded culpable commanders as
155 See the proposals of the 1919 International Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War
and on Enforcement of Penalties, in 14 AJIL (1920), at 121.
156 See the French Law of 1944 and the Chinese Law of 1946 quoted in UN Law Report, vol. IV, at 87-8.
202
accomplices of the subordinates committing crimes.157 In 1949-50 two Belgian
Courts Martial took the same approach in Schniitt, although they stressed the
notion that a commander is under a set of obligations, the breach of which may
entail his criminal liability.158
A further step in the evolution of the doctrine can be seen in a leading, if
controversial, US case, Yamashita (1946). In this case the first fully fledged
enunciation of the doctrine was propounded, again with regard to military
commanders. The court did not base itself on the notion of complicity but only
stressed that command responsibility is consequent upon the breach of the
duties incumbent upon commanders. Given the importance of the case a few
words of explanation prove necessary.
The Japanese general Yamashita had been Commanding General of the
Japanese Army in the Philippines between 1943 and 1945. His soldiers had
massacred a large part of the civilian population of Batangas Province and
inflicted acts of violence, cruelty, and murder upon the civilian population and
prisoners of war, as well as wholesale pillage and wanton destruction of religious
monuments in the occupied territory. The US authorities accused the General,
before a US Military Commission, of breaching his duty as an army commander
157 Persons who occupy a supervisory or commanding position in relation to war criminals and in their
capacity as such have not fulfilled their duty to prevent crimes from being committed by their subordinates
shall be treated as the accomplices of such war criminals.'
158 The Antwerp Court Martial dealt with the case of a German head of a prisoners of war camp at
Breedonck where many inmates died either of fatigue for the forced labour to which they had been
subjected or of starvation, whereas some 32 inmates were killed by some of the prison guards. The Court
applied Art. 66 of the Belgian Penal Code (which made liable for a crime both the perpetrators and aiders
and abetters). It stressed that the defendant; as head of the camp *had the positive duty to protect prisoners
in his custody' (at 751). The Court therefore found that he was accountable, as co-perpetrator, for the killing
for the 32 inmates, whereas for the death of the inmates resulting from excessive fatigue or starvation he
was liable as an accomplice, on account of his breach of his duty 'since he had rendered such assistance that
without it the crimes could not be committed'; 'he had seriously breached his duty as head of the camp and
hence voluntarily and consciously cooperated to the criminal activity of the Sicherheitsdienst [the SS
branch whose members were in charge of the camp at his orders] (ibid.). On appeal, a Military Court of
Appeal upheld the decision and noted that the defendant's action was twofold: 'positive', where he imposed
exhausting labour and ordered the destruction of food parcels, and 'negative*, where he refrained to step in
to prevent cruel acts. The appellant, the Court went on to hold, must be punished for both classes of
conduct. As for the latter, he was punishable for the breach of his duty to see to it that 'the inmates in his
camp be adequately nourished and treated' so as not to 'become physically exhausted and unable to work';
this duty, the Court noted, was similar to 'that incumbent upon a person charged with nourishing another
person unable to attend to himself, and who gets him to starve'. In this case 'the failure to act constitutes the
material act sufficient to evidence criminal intent' (at 752).
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to control the operations of his troops 'by permitting them to commit' extensive
and widespread atrocities. The Commission upheld these submissions by setting
out a new doctrine as follows:
Clearly, assignment to command military troops is accompanied by broad
authority and heavy responsibility. This has been true in all armies throughout
recorded history. It is absurd, however, to consider a commander a murderer or
rapist because one of his soldiers commits a murder or a rape. Nevertheless,
where murder and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offences,
and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the
criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable,
for the lawless acts of his troops, depending upon their nature and the
circumstances surrounding them (1597).
The US Supreme Court, to which the case had been brought by the defendant by
way of a petition for habeas corpus agreed. It held that commanders had a duty
to take such appropriate measures as are within their power to control the troops
under their command for the prevention of violations of the laws of warfare. It
derived this duty from a number of provisions of such laws: Articles I and 43 of
the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 (under the
former, combatants, to be recognized as legitimate belligerents, must 'be
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates'; pursuant to the latter,
the commander of a force occupying enemy territory shall take all the measures
in his power to re-tore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country');
Article 19 of the Tenth Hague Convention of 1907, relating to bombardment by
naval vessel and providing that commanders-in-chief of the belligerent vessels
'must see that the above Articles are properly carried out'; Article 26 of the 1929
Geneva Convention on the wounded and sick. which made it the duty ‘of the
commanders-in-chief of the belligerent armies to provide for the detail of
execution of the foregoing Articles [of the Convention] as well as for unforeseen
cases’??? The Court's majority held that these provisions made it clear that the
accused had an affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power
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and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian
population. This duty of a commanding officer has heretofore been recognized,
and its breach penalized by our own military tribunals (13).
However, two judges. Murphy and Rutledge, forcefully (and rightly) disagreed
and set forth their views in important Dissenting Opinions. They noted among
other things that the Court's majority had not shown that Yamashita had
'knowledge' of the gross breaches perpetrated by his troops (at 31, 36, 48-9, 50)
or had any 'direct connection with the atrocities' (at 36), or could be found guilty
of 'a negligent failure [...] to discover' the atrocities (at 49) or in other words, had
'personal culpability' (at 36-79).159
This is therefore a case where the principle was affirmed, based (as the two
dissenting judges rightly noted), on a novel interpretation of existing rules of lHL,
as well as a questionable application of the principles to the case at bar, in
addition to total disregard for the required mental element for the crime.
Although case law thus started off on the wrong foot, soon other decisions
handed down after the Second World War followed suit and fleshed out the
doctrine. Unlike Yamashita, these decisions, which can be considered as a third
step in the formation of the doctrine at issue, emphasized the need for the
commander to have knowledge of the crimes committed by his underlings, in
some instances also requiring criminal intent for the commander's liability to
arise. They all neglected the notion of complicity. Furthermore, in some cases the
doctrine was extended to civilian leaders.
In Karl Brand and others (Docto'is case), a US Military tribunal sitting at
Nuremberg under Control Council Law no. 10 held the German top medical staff
159 Justices Murphy and Rutledge did not only dissent on the application of the law to the facts by the
Commission—they also objected to the whole notion of command responsibility as a matter of law. Justice
Murphy stated: 'The recorded annals of warfare and the established principles of international law afford
not the slightest precedent for >uch a charge. This indictment in effect permitted the military commission to
make the crime whatever it willed dependent on its biased view as to the petitioner's duties and his
disregard thereof, a practice reminiscent otthat pursued in less respected nations in recent years' (32/ US, at
28).
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liable for the killings perpetrated by their subordinate doctors, stressing that those
leaders had knowledge of what was going on.160 In Pohl and others, a US Military
Tribunal held that 'the law of war imposes on a military officer in a position of
command an affirmative duty to take such steps as are within his power and
appropriate to the circumstances to control those under his command for the
prevention of acts which are violations of the law of war' (at 1011). The Tribunal
required 'actual knowledge' of the misdeeds of subordinates (1011-2). The same
doctrine was set out in a subsequent case, Wilhem List and others (Hostages
case), where another US Military tribunal sitting at Nuremberg applied it to 12
high-ranking German officers charged, among other things, with the unlawful
killing of hostages by way of reprisal. In this case the Tribunal stressed that, to
pronounce a guilty verdict, it required 'proof of a causative, overt act or omission
from which a guilty intent can be inferred' (1261). Turning to the liability of the
defendants for their failure to prevent or punish, the Tribunal noted that, for this
form or criminal liability to arise, knowledge by the army commander of the
crimes committed by the subordinates was required. Furthermore, the Tribunal
emphasized that a commander has the duty to require reports about occurrences
160 After citing the Yamashita case, the Tribunal stated: "This decision is squarely in point as to the criminal
responsibility of those defendants in this dock who had the power and authority to control the agents
through whom these crimes were committed. It is not incumbent upon the prosecution to show that this or
that defendant was familiar with all of the details of all of these experiments. Indeed, in the Yamashita case,
there was no charge or proof that he had knowledge of the crimes 1...] But we need not discuss the
requirement of knowledge on the facts of this case. It has been repeatedly proved that those responsible
leaders of the German medical services in this dock not only knew of the systematic and criminal use of
concentration camp inmates for murderous medical experiments, but also actively participated in such
crimes. Can it be held that Karl Brandt had no knowledge of these crimes when he personally initiated the
jaundice experiments by Dohmen in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp and the phosgene experiments
ofBickenbach? Can it be found that he knew nothing of the criminal Euthanasia Program when he was
charged by Hitler with its execution? Can it be said that Handloser had no knowledge when he participated
in the conference of 29 December 1941 where it was decided to perform the Buchenwald typhus crimes,
when reports were given on criminal experiments at meetings called and presided over by him? Was
Rostock an island of ignorance when he arranged the program for and presided over the meetings at which
Gebhardt and Fischer lectured on their sulfanilamide experiments, when he classified as "urgent" the
criminal research ofHirt, Haagen, and Bickenbach? Did Schroeder lack knowledge when he personally
requested Himmier to supply him with inmates for the sea-water experiments? Can it be found that
Genzken had no knowledge of these crimes when the miserable Dr. Ding was subordinated to and received
orders from him in connection with the typhus experiments in Buchenwald, when his office supplied
Rascher with equipment for the freezing experiments? Was Blome insufficiently informed in the face of
proof that be collaborated with Rascher in the blood coagulation experiments, issued a research assignment
to him on freezing experiments and to Hirt on the gas experiments, as well as performed bacteriological
warfare and poison experiments himself? No, it was not lack of information as to the criminal program
which explains the culpable failure ofthese men to destroy this Frankenstein's monster. Nor was it lack of
power' (934-5).
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taking place in the area under his control, failing which he may be accused of
'dereliction of duty' (at 1271-2).161 These notions were taken up and elaborated
on by another US Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg in Wilhelm van Leeb and others
(High Command case). The Tribunal noted that a commander's 'criminal
responsibility is personal. The act or neglect to act must be voluntary and
criminal' (at 543). It went on to note that there must be a personal dereliction.
That can occur where the act is directly traceable to him [the commander] or
where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal
negligence on his part. In the latter case it must be a personal neglect amounting
to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to
acquiescence. [...] the occupying commander must have knowledge of these
offences [by his troops) and acquiesce or participate or criminally neglect to
interfere in their commission and [...] the offences committed must be patently
criminal (543-5).162
The doctrine was not only embraced by US tribunals. The International Tokyo
Tribunal also upheld it in Araky and others (at 29-31). In dealing with
responsibility for war primes against prisoners of war, the Tribunal insisted on the
liability of commanders on account of their 'negligence or supineness' (at 30) if a
commander that had the duty to know 'knew or should have known' the
commission of crimes but failed to stop them or to take 'adequate steps' 'to
prevent the occurrence of [...] crimes in the future' (at 31).163 Similarly, the
161 If he fails to require and obtain complete information, the dereliction of duty rests upon him and he is in
no position to plead his own dereliction as a defence' (1271).
162 The Tribunal also noted the following: 'Military subordination is a comprehensive but not conclusive
factor in fixing criminal responsibility. The authority, both administrative and military, of a commander
and his criminal responsibility are related but by no means co-extensive. Modern war such as the last war,
entails a large measure of de-centralization. A high commander cannot keep completely informed of the
details of military operations of subordinates and most assuredly not of every administrative measure. He
has the right to assume that details entrusted to responsible subordinates will be legally executed. The
President of the United States is Commander-in-Chiefofits military forces. Criminal acts committed by
those forces cannot in themselves be charged to him on the theory of subordination. The same is true of
other high commanders in the chain of command. Criminality does not attach to every individual in this
chain of command from that fact alone. There must be a personal dereliction. That can occur only where
the act is directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes
criminal negligence on his part' (at 543)
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doctrine was enunciated by an Australian-US Military Tribunal, in Soemu Toyoda
(at 5005-6) and by a Chinese War Crimes Tribunal in Takashi Sakai (at 1-7). It is
notable that in Soemu Toyoda the Tribunal, besides insisting on the need for
knowledge as a requirement of ‘command responsibility, also held that such
knowledge may be either 'actual', 'as in the case of, an accused who sees' the
commission of the subordinates' crimes or 'is informed thereof shortly after', but
also 'constructive knowledge', which can be asserted to exist when there is
the commission of such a great number of offences within his command that a
reasonable man could come to no other conclusion than that the accused must
have known the offences or of the existence of an understood and acknowledged
routine of their commission (5005-6).
It can thus be held that in a matter of few years after the Second World War the
doctrine of command responsibility crystallized into an international customary
rule (i) imposing on military commanders as well as civilian or civilian leaders164
the obligation to prevent or repress crimes by their subordinates if they knew or
should have known that the troops were about or were committing or had
committed crimes; and (ii) criminalizing the culpable failure to fulfill this obligation,
albeit without clearly outlining the mental element of such criminal liability. That
such a rule (the existence of which was authoritatively asserted in Deialic and
others, TJ, §343) evolved so quickly should not surprise. In modern times
international criminality increasingly tends to be planned, organized, ordered, or
condoned or tolerated by superior authorities. In other words, a clear trend is
emerging in the world community towards commission of crimes either by high-
163 The Tribunal found the highest-ranking defendant, prime minister Hideki Tojo, guilty of acts of
omission in that 'He took no adequate step to punish offenders [who had ill-treated prisoners and internees]
arid to prevent the commission of similar offences in the future. His attitude towards the Bataan death
March gives the key to his conduct towards these captives. He knew in 1942 something of the conditions of
that march and that many prisoners had died as a resuit of these conditions. He did not call for a report on
the incident. When in the Philippines in 1943 he made perfunctory inquiries about the march but took no
action. No one was punished.[... ] Thus the head of the Government of Japan knowingly and wilfully
refused to perform the duty which lay upon the Government of enforcing performance of the Laws ofWar'
(at 462).
164 For this latter category of cases see in particular. Alaky and others (the Tokyo trial), heard by the Tokyo
International Tribunal (vol. 20, at 791,816,831), Flick and others, brought before a US Military Tribunal
sitting at Nuremberg (at 1202-12), Rochlingand others, heard by a French court in the French Occupation
Zone in Germany (at 8, or 403-4), and Delalic and others (41370.377-8).
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level military or political leaders or by low-level officials or military personnel,
who, however, perpetrate crimes because superior authorities (be they military or
civilian) do not prevent, or tolerate or at any rate fail to repress them. Hence, the
issue of superior responsibility has gradually acquired enormous importance in
international criminal law.
Subsequently the customary criminal rule was enshrined in the Statutes of the
ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC and has been relied upon in many cases brought
before the ICTY and the ICTR. It covers superior responsibility for any
international crime committed by subordinates; that is, not only war crimes but
also crimes against humanity, genocide, etc.
It is notable that after the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR the doctrine
was gradually refined by case law, also under the influence of the 2002 German
Code of Crimes Against International Law165 and some leading commentators.166
As a consequence, the criminal liability of the superior was increasingly seen as
a consequence of his own culpability, not necessarily linked by means of a
causal nexus to the responsibility of the subordinates (see below).
It should be added that in 2003 the ICTY AC rightly set out the notion that
command responsibility also applies in time of internal armed conflict, basically
because also with regard to such conflicts a general principle of international law
assumes that there must be an organized military force: 'military organization
implies responsible command and [...] responsible command in turn implies
command responsibility'.'167
165 TheCode is important for it drawsacleardistinction between three different hypotheses: Responsibility of
superiors (Section 4), Violations of the duty of supervision (Section 13), and Omission to report a crime
(Section 14), thus identifying the distinct mens rea required for each of these classes.
166 See, in particular, M. Damaska, "The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility', 49 Am. 1.
Comparative Law (2001), 455-96.
167 Hadlihasanovti, Alagic and Kubura, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging lurisdiction in
Relation to Command Responsibility, §17 and see §$11-36; see also in the same case the re Decision on
Joint Challenge to lurisdiction, $§67-179.
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It is striking that in this area there has been an inversion of the normal process
whereby states first develop an international rule binding upon them, namely an
interstate rule imposing a certain behaviour, and then this rule gradually evolves
as a penal rule criminalizing any conduct contrary to the standards imposed by
the interstate rule (see above, 1.2 at point 4). In this case there first emerged a
criminal law rule (admittedly based on a general principle of lHL concerning
'responsible command') that addressed itself to individuals (military commanders
or civilian or political leaders); then a written rule was agreed upon by states
imposing on them to see to it that their commanders prevent or repress crimes by
their subordinates. This is Article 87 of the First Additional Protocol, which is
addressed to the Contracting parties and to the Parties to a conflict, and spells
out as well as codifies the principle on responsible command mentioned
above.168 This rule is accompanied by Article 86 of the same Protocol, which in
S2 restates the customary criminal law rule.
As noted above, this class of responsibility is different from the others considered
so far, in that it is responsibility by omission: the person is criminally liable not for
an act he has performed, but for failure to perform an act required by
international law. In other words, he is responsible for the breach of an
international obligation incumbent upon any commander or superior authority, to
prevent or suppress crimes by subordinates.169
168 "The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave breaches, and take
measures necessary to suppress all other breaches of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from
a failure to act under a duty to do so.
169 According to the ICTY AC in DetalU and others (Af) (§240) there is no duty, incumbent upon military
or civilian authorities, to ascertain that their subordinates are not committing crimes. This proposition is
questionable, in light of the abundant case law on the matter, as well as some clear treaty provisions and
provisions of important Military Manuals. With regard to international rules, it may suffice to mention
Article 87 of the First Additional Protocol of 1977, on 'Duty of commanders'. The obligation in question is
clearly set out in many national Military Manuals, for instance, those of Switzerland, Reglement (1987),
Article 19b ('Les commandants doivent informer la troupe de ses obligations aux termes des Conventions,
11s sont responsables du fail que leurs troupes respectent les Conventions et de punir d'eventueHes
infractions'); Russia's Military Manual (1990), Part VII, §§a and b (commanders of all grades must 'call to
account persons who committed violations of the rules of international humanitarian law defined by
Articles 85-7 of the First Additional Protocol'); Germany, Military Manual (1992), ch. I, no. 138; New
Zealand, Military Manual (1992), ch. 16, s. 2, §1603-2 (It is incumbent upon a commanding officer to
ensure that the forces under his command behave in a manner consistent with the laws and customs of war
[... ] and it is part of his responsibility to ensure that the troops under his command are aware of their
obligations'); Australia, Defence Force Manual (1994), §1304 ('Military commanders of all Services and at
all levels bear responsibility for ensuring that forces under their control comply with the Law of Armed
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3.2 CRIMINAL CATEGORIES INTO WHICH THE GENERAL NOTION MAY
BE SUBDIVIDED
International rules tend to lump together various classes of superior
responsibility, without drawing any distinction. This, for instance, holds true both
for Articles 7(3) and 6(3) of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, respectively and
for Article 28 of the ICC Statute. These provisions are essentially of a descriptive
nature, in that they indicate the prohibited conduct by enumerating the various
forms this conduct may take. They do not, however, differentiate between the
various categories of liability that can be logically identified, nor do they attach
any legal relevance to conduct falling under one particular category rather than
another.
Nonetheless, it is both logically appropriate and also relevant for the practical
purposes of sentencing to draw a distinction between different classes. It is not
sound, for instance, to hold that a commander who fails to punish subordinates
who previously, unbeknown to him, have perpetrated acts of genocide, is
responsible for genocide, if only as an accomplice. Plainly, in this case the
requisite conduct and the mens rea of the superior are neatly different from those
required for the perpetrators of genocide, or for persons aiding and abetting
genocide. Only when the superior in some way knows of the crime being or
about to be perpetrated and willingly fails to check or prevent its commission,
may he be deemed to participate in some way in the crime (according to some
Conflict'); Benin, Military Manual (1995), ch. V ('Chaque chetmilitaire est responsable du respect du droit
de la guerre dans sa sphere de commandement [...] il est particulierement responsable de l'instruction du
droit de la guerre afin de communiquer a sa troupe un comportement conforme au droit*); Canada, Law of
Armed Conflict Manual (1999), at 15-1 and 16-1 ('Commanders have responsibility to ensure that forces
under their command are aware of their responsibilities'); and France, Manual on the Law of Armed
Conflict (2001), Introduction, at 14, para. 7 ('Le commandement [...] doit s'assurer que les membres des
forces armees connaissent leurs droits et appliquentles obligations qui en sont le parallele. II est a ce litre
responsable de leur instruction').
As for case law, one may recall, in addition to Yamashita (see supra, 11.4.1), the instructions a Judge
Advocate issued to a US Court Martial in Medina-, he stated: In relation to the question pertaining to the
supervisory responsibility of a Company Commander, I advise you that as a general principle of military
law and custom amilitary superior in command is responsible and required, in the performance of his
command duties, to make certain the proper performance by his subordinates of their duties as assigned by
him. In other words, after taking action and issuing an order, a commander must remain alert and make
timely adjustments as required by a changing situation' (1732).
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commentators, as a co-perpetrator or accomplice), for in this case there is a clear
nexus of causality between the superior's omission and the crime.
This approach, which seems logically and theoretically correct and also
consonant with general principles of justice (because of its consequences at the
level of sentencing), leads to distinguishing three categories:
1.  A commander or superior breaches his duty to prevent his subordinates from
engaging in criminal conduct. He knows that an offence is about to be, or is
being, committed by his subordinates and willingly fails to stop the crime. In this
case, the superior has knowledge of the crime and its omission is deliberate
(intent).
According to one view the offender should be legally treated as a co-perpetrator,
although the crimes are physically committed by the subordinates, or at least as
an accomplice. In a way the superior participates in the crime, for if he had acted
to stop it, the delinquency would not have been perpetrated. There is therefore a
causal link between the superior's attitude and the commission of crimes.
Arguably this view was reflected to some extent not only in the French and
Chinese laws mentioned above, and in Araki and others (Tokyo trial), at 30-1, but
also in the German Law on Crimes against International Law (Section 4).170
Under a different view (that would seem to be reflected in e.g. Halilovic, TJ, §54;
Hadzihasanovic and Kubura, T), §75) , the superior is responsible for violating
his own duty to prevent or stop misconduct by his subordinates; both the
objective and the subjective elements of his crime are different from those of the
subordinates. For instance, if the underlings have committed large-scale rape
within a context of systematic attack on civilians, the conduct (sexual assault)
and the mens rea (intent to sexually abuse a civilian in a grave manner, plus
awareness of the systematic nature of the attack on civilians) are different from
170 Section 4(1) of the Code provides that the commander 'shall be punished in the same way as the
perpetrator of the offence committed by [the]subordinate'. And the Explanatory Memorandum of the
German Government states that 'from a theoretical viewpoint' 'the negligence' of the superior 'could be
classified as mere complicity' (at 39).
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those of the commander, who may be accused of failure to act (conduct) with
knowledge that crimes were being or were about to be perpetrated, and intent
not to stop or forestall them. True, the subjective and objective elements of the
criminal offence attributable to the superior are not far from those of aiding and a
betting: in both cases the person other than the perpetrator does not share the
criminal intent of the perpetrator, but knows the crime that the perpetrator is
committing or will commit, and in both cases the person at issue provides
assistance to the perpetrator (in the case under discussion by not preventing the
commission of his crimes). Nevertheless, the fact remains that the aider and
abettor, by his action or omission, intends to further the act of the perpetrator,
and this element must be proved by the prosecution; instead, in the case of
command responsibility that intent is not a legal requirement, and consequently
need not be proved in court, although it may happen that the commander by his
inaction aimed in fact at furthering the crime of the subordinate. Therefore,
although for sentencing purposes the conduct of the superior may be as
blameworthy as that of the subordinates, the legal ingredients of the crimes are
different.171
2. A commander or a superior breaches his duty properly to supervise the
conduct of his troops or underlings. He intentionally or negligently omits to
monitor the actions of his subordinates, where he could have become cognizant
of the imminent commission of the offence or of the fact that the offence was
being committed, and therefore prevented it. Here the superior does not know
that the subordinate is about to commit or is committing a crime: he lacks
knowledge. However, his failure to know derives from his negligent or deliberate
breach of his duty of supervision, with the consequence that he does not impede
the perpetration of crimes that he could foresee and avoid. In these cases the
offence imputable to the superior is arguably different from and less serious than
171 In Hadzihasanovic and Kubura, the TC held that there must be a link or nexus between the superior's
omission and the crimes in the sense that the superior's 'omission created or heightened a real and
reasonably foreseeable risk that those crimes would be committed, a risk he accepted willingly', a risk that
'materialised in the commission of those crimes. In that sense, the superior has substantially played a part in
the commission of those crimes. (... ] it is presumed that there is such a nexus between the superiors'
omission and those crimes' ( TJ, §§193).
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that perpetrated by the subordinate, in that it rarely consists of the deliberate or
negligent dereliction of supervisory duties.172
However, a different view is also admissible, although it is arguably less
persuasive. One can contend that failure by the superior to exercise his duty of
supervision has a causal link with the crime, in that by breaching his supervisory
duty he has in some way contributed to bringing about the offence. In other
words, the superior's conduct may be considered as serious as that of the
subordinate; the former could therefore be punished by a sentence similar to that
of the subordinate.
3. A superior breaches his duty to report to the appropriate authorities crimes
committed by his subordinates unbeknownst to him. Here the superior knows
that a crime has been perpetrated and fails immediately to draw the attention of
the body responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the crime. In this
case, the superior is liable to be punished for the specific crime of failure to
report. His offence is plainly different from that of his subordinates: he is
responsible if, upon becoming cognizant of the crimes of his subordinates, he
deliberately or with culpable negligence fails to report them to the appropriate
authorities for punishment. Here the superior's conduct may not be held to have
caused, or contributed to cause, the criminal offence.173
172 With respect to the supervisory duties of a commander, the holding of the US Military Tribunal in
Wilhelm List and others (Hostage case) is instructive. Since the defence of List (commander in chief of the
German armed forces in 1941-2), had alleged that he had no knowledge of the killings of civilians in
occupied territory, the Tribunal noted the following: 'A commanding general of occupied territory is
charged with the duty of maintaining peace and order, punishing crime, and protecting lives and property
within the area of his command. His responsibility is coextensive with his area ofcommand. He is charged
with notice of occurrences taking place within that territory. He may require adequate reports of all
occurrences that come within the scope of his power and, if such reports are incomplete or otherwise
inadequate, he is obliged to require supplementary reports to apprize him of all the pertinent facts. If he
fails to require and obtain complete information, the dereliction of duty rests upon him and he is in no
position to plead his own dereliction as a defence' (1271; emphasis added).
173 The various categories are instead merged in Toyoda. The Tribunal stated the following: "The Tribunal
considers the essential elements of command responsibility for atrocities of any commander to be; 1. That
offenses, commonly recognized as atrocities, were committed by troops of his command; 2. The ordering
of such atrocities. In the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the issuance of orders, then the
essential elements of command responsibility are: 1. As before, that atrocities were actually committed; 2.
Notice of the commission thereof. This notice may be either: a. Actual, as in the case of an accused who
sees their commission or who is informed thereof shortly thereafter; b. Constructive; that is the commission
of such a great number of offenses within his command that a reasonable man could come to no other
conclusion than that the accused must have known of the offenses or of the existence of an understood and
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In a case brought before the ICTY (Hadzihasanovic, Alagic and Kubura) the AC
dismissed the proposition (upheld instead by the TC: Decision on joint Challenge
to Jurisdiction, §§197-202) that a commander may also be responsible for failure
to report crimes committed before he took command of the relevant unit. The
main reason for this holding is that there is no practice or opinio juris to support
the proposition (Decision on IA Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command
Responsibility, $§37-56). It would seem instead that the proposition is correct (as
was rightly opined by Judges Hunt and Shahabuddeen in their dissenting
opinions appended to the decision of the AC). It is not necessary to search for a
specific customary rule on the matter. The duty to report follows, as in the case of
crimes committed by the underlings while the commander was in control, from
the general principles on superior responsibility set out by the AC in the same
case (see §§12-18). If international law imposes on a military commander the
obligation to report to the appropriate authorities any crime committed by his
subordinates, clearly this obligation applies whether or not the crimes have been
committed when he was the commander. The purpose of the obligation
incumbent upon any person in a position of command to make his subordinates
criminally accountable is twofold: (i) to ensure military discipline and respect for
IHL: and (ii) to avoid the troops interpreting any inaction by the superior as an
implicit approval of their misconduct. It does not matter at all whether the crimes
were perpetrated when he was in control of the troops or prior to that date: this
circumstance is immaterial to the fulfillment of the obligation. The contrary view is
based on a misapprehension of the various categories of command responsibility
acknowledged routine for their commission. 3. Power of command; that is, the accused must be proved to
have had actual authority over the offenders to issue orders to them not to commit illegal acts, and to
punish offenders. 4. Failure to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the troops
under his command and to prevent acts which are violations of the laws of war. 5. Failure to punish
offenders. In the simplest language it may be said that this Tribunal believes the principle of command
responsibility to be that, if this accused knew, or should by the exercise of ordinary diligence have learned,
of the commission by his subordinates, immediate or otherwise, of the atrocities proved beyond a shadow
of a doubt before this Tribunal or of the existence of a routine which would countenance such, and, by his
failure to take any action to punish the per- petrators, permitted the atrocities to continue, he has failed in
his performance of his duty as a commander and must be punished' (5005-6).
In BagHishema the ICTR AC rightly insisted on the fact that the information about the crimes must be
specific, namely specifically related to the crimes by subordinates. It stated that it was necessary 'to make a
distinction between the fact that the Accused had information about the general situation that prevailed in
Rwanda at the time, and the fact that he had in his possession general information which put him on notice
that his subordinates might commit crimes' (§42). See also Krnojelac, T), §§312-13, Al, §§165-71.
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and the fact that 'failure to report' is a 'distinct category from the others, where
the breach lies in a dereliction of the duty to inform other authorities of the crimes
so that they take action to punish the perpetrators. In addition, as Judge
Shahabuddeen rightly emphasized in his dissenting opinion (§14), one of the
consequences of the AC ruling is that the subordinates' crimes may go
unpunished: if the crimes were committed 'shortly before the assumption of duty
of the new commander—possibly, the day before, when all those in previous
command authority disappeared', and were not reported by the then commander,
and the new commander were not obliged to report them even if he knows that
the crimes were committed, the crimes would not be punished by anyone. This
would clearly be contrary to the notion that superiors are legally bound to make
their subordinates criminally accountable.
3.3 GENERAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY
Before trying to identify the mental element required for each of these three
categories, it may be helpful to set out the general conditions required for all
these categories. Superior authorities, whether military or civilian, bear
responsibility for crimes committed by their subordinates if the following
cumulative conditions are met:
1.  Commission of international crimes by troops or other subordinates. It is not
necessary for the troops or the other subordinates to have physically perpetrated
the crimes. They may have engaged in criminal conduct under any head of
liability, namely perpetration, co-perpetration, aiding and abetting, joint criminal
enterprise to commit crimes, etc.174
2. Effective command and control over the subordinates. It is not necessary for
there to be a formal hierarchical structure. Individuals in positions of authority,
whether within civilian or military structures, may incur criminal responsibility
under the doctrine of command responsibility on the basis of their de facto or
174 See ICTY, Boskffvskiand Tarlulovski, TC, Decision on the Proserutioni Motion to Amend the
Indictment §§18-20; One, TL 297-8.
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dejure position as superiors. The mere absence of formal legal authority to
control the actions of subordinates should therefore not be understood to
preclude the imposition of such responsibility.175
Control must be effective. Thus in von Weizsacker and others (Ministries case) a
US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg held that the mere appearance of an
officials name on a distribution list attached to an official document could only
provide evidence that it was intended that he be provided with the relevant
information, and not that 'those whose names appear on such distribution lists
have responsibility for, or power and right of decision with respect to the subject-
matter of such document' (at 693).176 In Blaskic an ICTY TC held that 'what
counts is his material ability [of a superior to control the subordinate], which
instead of issuing orders or taking disciplinary actions may entail, for instance,
submitting reports to the competent authorities in order for proper measures to
be taken' (§302). In Kordic and Cerkez an ICTY TC provided some important
examples.177 And in Cappellim and others the Milan Court of Cassation held that
a superior who in fact had been deprived of his authority, although he still was
formally vested with his position, could not be held responsible for crimes
perpetrated by his subordinates unbeknownst to him or even in breach of his
orders, for lack of the required intent (at 86-7).
175 Delatic and others (T), 55377-8). Al (§§197-8); KordU arid Cerkel (T), 11405-7).
176 See. e.g., Delalic and nihers, §354-78; Delalic and others (Appeal), 19192-5; BlaikU, §§295-303; Kordii
andCerkez, §§405-171.
177 It thLs stated that: 'For instance, a government official who knows that civilians are used to perform
forced labour or as human shields will be held liable onlv it it is demonstrated that he has effective control
over the persons who are subjecting the civilians to such treatment. A showing that the official merely was
generally ari influential person will not be sufficient. In contrast, a government official specifically in
charge of the treatment of prisoners used for forced labour or as human shields, as well as a military
commander in command of formations which are holding the prisoners, may be held liable on the basis of
superior responsibility because of the existence of a chain of command' (§415).
In addition, with reference to civilian authorities, the same TC stated in the same case: 'Evidence that an
accused is perceived as having a high public profile, manifested through public appearances and
statements, and thus as exercising some authority, may be relevant to the overall assessment of his actual
authority although not sufficient in itself to establish it, without evidence of the accused's overall behaviour
towards subordinates and his duties. Similarly, the participation of an accused in high-profile international
negotiations would not be necessary in itself to demonstrate superior authority. While in the case of
military commanders, the evidence of external observers such as international monitoring or humanitarian
personnel may be relied upon, in the case of civilian leaders evidence of perceived authority may not be
sufficient, as it may be indicative of mere powers of influence in the absence of a subordinate structure'
(§424).
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It bears noting that in Kordic and Cerkez, the TC found that one of the accused,
Kordic, a civilian leader and politician having 'tremendous influence' and playing
an important role in military matters, nevertheless did not possess the authority to
prevent the crimes that were being committed, or to punish the perpetrators. It
therefore acquitted the accused of charges involving command responsibility,
while nonetheless convicting him of various offences on the basis of perpetration
under Article 7(1) of the Statute (§§838-41).
A question that can also arise is how effective the control over subordinates must
be when crimes are perpetrated by irregular armies or rebel groups. The
question was convincingly discussed by an SCSL TC in Brima and others.178
Another question has arisen before international courts: whether commanders of
a unit engaged in joint combat with other units may be held liable for acts of
these other units formally not under their dejure command. In Hadzihasanovic
and Kubura an ICTY TC held that 'mere participation in joint combat operations is
not sufficient to find that commanders of different units exercise effective control
over all participants in battle. Although such cooperation might be an indicator of
effective control, it is appropriate to determine on a case-by-case basis what
authority an accused commander actually had over the troops in question' (Tl,
§84).
3. Knowledge (or constructive knowledge, namely knowledge that can be
inferred from or implied by the conduct of the persons involved, the surrounding
178 According to the TC, in a conflict involving irregular armies or rebel groups, 'the traditional indicia of
effective control provided in the jurisprudence may not be appropriate or useful'(§787). Such indicia
include 'that the superior had first entitlement to the profits of war, such as looted property and natural
resources; exercised control over the fate of vulnerable persons such as women and children; the superior
had independent access to and/or control of the means to wage war, including arms and ammunition and
communications equipment; the superior rewarded himself or herself with positions of power and
influence; the superior had the capacity to intimidate subordinates into compliance and was willing to do
so; the superior was protected by personal security guards, loyal to him or her, akin to a modern praetorian
guard; the superior fuels or represents the ideology of the movement to which the subordinates adhere; and
the superior interacts with external bodies or individuals on behalf of the group'(§788). The TC, however,
conceded that the traditional indicia of control remain crucial, including the superior's power to issue orders
and take disciplinary action (§789).
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circum- stances, etc.) or breach of the obligation to acquire knowledge. The
superior knew, or had information which should have enabled him to conclude in
the circumstances at the time, that crimes were about to be, or were being
committed or had been committed. The superior is also criminally liable if, owing
to the circumstances prevailing at the time, he should have known and
consciously disregarded information indicating that his subordinates were going
to commit (or were about to commit, or were committing, or had committed),
international crimes. The case law has clarified that the superior need not know
the exact identity of the subordinates, it being sufficient that he should know the
'category' of the subordinates engaging in criminal conduct (this can be inferred
from the fact that this is what courts have required prosecutors to prove). 179
4. Failure to act. The superior failed to take the action necessary to prevent
or repress the crimes, thereby breaching his duty to prevent or suppress crimes
by his subordinates.
3.4 SPECIFICATION OF THE SUBIECTIVE ELEMENT IN THE VARIOUS
CLASSES OF OMISSION
The objective element of the crime is apparent from what has just been set out.
It is clear from the above that command responsibility, or responsibility by
omission of superior authorities, is not a form of strict or objective liability; that is,
liability for offences for which one may be convicted without any need to prove
any form or modality of mens rea.180 Even for this category of crimes a mental
element is required.
First of all, one ought to distinguish between the mens rea required for the crimes
perpetrated by the subordinates (normally intent, as in the case of killing of
civilians, rape, use of unlawful weapons, torture, etc.) and that required for the
179 KrnojelaCi decision on the defence motion on the formbf indictment, §46; HadzihasanovU and Kubura,
17, §90.
180 Recently ICTY Trial Chambers rightly took this view in Delalic and others. §239, and in Kordii and
Cerkez, §369.
219
superior. This follows from the fact that in the case of superior responsibility the
superior is criminally liable for his own culpability, which follows from his own
breach of obligation;181 he is not responsible for the crimes committed by his
subordinates, which may require a different actus reus and mens rea, although
there may be a causal link between those crimes and the responsibility of the
superior.
That law should admit for the superior a less culpable mental element as
sufficient for his liability to arise (for instance, gross negligence instead of the
intent required for the subordinates), is justified by his hierarchical position, the
obligation attendant upon this position to control the subordinates and ensure
that they comply with the law of international armed conflict, and the consequent
need to make him accountable for the conduct of his subordinates.
It would seem that intent is not always required for the superior to be held
criminally liable.182 Rather, one should distinguish various situations:
1.  The superior knows that crimes are about to be committed or are being
committed by his subordinates and nonetheless takes no action. Here
international rules require for culpability (i) knowledge, that is awareness that the
crimes are being or are about to be committed;183 and (ii) intent, that is the will
not to act or, in other words, the conscious decision to refrain from preventing or
stopping the crimes of the subordinates (this intent is clearly different from that
181 Halitavic, Tf, S54; Hadithasanoncand Kubura, TJ, §75.
182 In Baba Masao, the ludge Advocate summed up the law for the Australian Military Court trying the
case: 'In order to succeed {in proving charges of command responsibility] the prosecution must prove [...]
that war crimes were committed as a result of the accused's (Commanding General of the [apanese Army in
Borneo] failure to discharge his duties as a commander, either bv deliberately failing in his duties or by
culpably or wilfully disregarding them, not caring whether this resulted in the commission of a war crime
or not' (at 207).
183 In Maltauro and others the Court of Assize of Milan held in 1952 that the head of police, being
cognizant of the massacre that was about to be carried out by partisans, failed to prevent it. He was
therefore held responsible as a co-perpetrator of the massacre (at 176-7). The massacre took place in a
prison where numerous fascists, previously arrested by partisans on 28 April 1945 (the day when Schio, the
small town in northern Italy, had been liberated), were being held. See also Sumida Haruzo and others (at
260-1).
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required for such crimes of the subordinates as murder, torture, rape, etc., as
well as the further subjective ingredient of crimes against humanity, if any,
namely awareness of the existence of a widespread or systematic practice).184
2. The superior has information which should enable him to conclude in the
circumstances at the time that crimes are being or will be committed, and fails to
act, in breach of his supervisory duties.185 Or he does not pay attention to reports
concerning crimes about to be committed or being perpetrated by subordinates,
and consequently fails to prevent or stop those crimes. Here either recklessness
or gross or culpable negligence (culpa gravis) may be held sufficient. The former
mental element consists of awareness that failure to prevent the action of
subordinates risks bringing about certain harmful consequences (commission of
the crimes), and nevertheless ignoring this risk.186 The latter state of mind, as
pointed out above (3.8), may be found when: (i) the commander is required to
abide by certain standards of conduct or to take certain specific precautions (for
example, to request reports on the conduct of his underlings, or to exact that
reports submitted to him be more accurate and specific); in addition (ii) he
184 See, for instance, Cappellini and others (at 86-7), Leoni (Milan Court of Cassation, decision of 31 July
1945, at 128), Bonini (Court of Cassation, decision of 3 March 1948, at 1137-8), Tabellini (Rome Military
Tribunal, decision of 6 August 1945, at 394-8). This last case is particularly interesting: the defendant was
a colonel ofthe Carabinieri, accused of having allowed, in October 1943, at the request of the German
occupying forces, the disarming and transfer ofthe Carabinieri stationed in Rome to Northern Italy; they
had been subsequently deported to Germany and detained in concentration camps. The Court found that the
defendant was not guilty of failure to prevent the commission of a crime. He was not aware ofthe real
reasons for the transfer and believed that it was done in the exercise ofthe Occupant's power to transfer civil
servants and police forces; according to the Court 'he lacked the requisite intent, because he carried out the
execution ofthe order believing that such order was not inconsistent with his duties and those ofthe police
forces to which he belonged, pursuant to international law' (at 398).
185 According to Delalic andothcr&, this is the case when the commander or the superior authority *had in
his possession information of a nature, which at least, would put him on notice of the risk of such offences
[by his subordinates] by indicating the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such
crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his subordinates' (§383).
186 37 In  Xotomi  Sueo  and  others  a  Temporary Court  Martial  in  the  Netherlands  East  Indies,  in
dealing  with the responsibility of the commander of a prisoner of war camp in Celebes, held in 1947 that:
'Even though a particular act had been neither ordered nor condoned by a superior, who might even [have]
been unaware of it, he must nevertheless be held responsible for the outrages of those under his command,
on the ground that as a Commander he was bound to prevent their occurrence, the more so as he could
reasonably foresee that they would be committed' (at 209).
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contemplates the risk of harm and nevertheless takes it, for he believes that the
risk will not materialize.187 It should be clear that a conviction for command
responsibility can only be predicated on gross negligence; that is, if the military or
civilian commanders conduct glaringly falls short of the standard set by the
reasonably prudent and competent commander test.
3. The superior should have known that crimes were being or had been
committed. Here again gross or culpable negligence (culpa gravis) is sufficient.188
187 In Sumida Haruzo anJ others the Prosecutor stated that, 'with respect to the torture inflicted by the
members of his unit [on the prisoners], this may be attributed to his [ofSumida Haruzo] neglect in
exercising sufficient supervision, and he may, as a result, be condemned on a charge arising out of
responsibility for supervision, which is entirely different from being condemned on criminal responsibility'
(at 235). In Delalic and others the ICTY AC upheld the interpretation given by the TC to the standard 'had
reason to know': that is, 'a superior will be criminally responsible through the principles of superior
responsibility only if information was available to him which would have put him on notice of offences
committed by subordinates. This is consistent with the customary law standard of mensrea as existing at the
time of the offences charged in the Indictment* (§241). The AC specified, however, that the information
available to the commander 'may be written or oral, and does not need to have the form of specific reports
submitted pursuant to a monitoring system'. Furthermore, this information 'does not need to provide
specific information about unlawful acts committed or about to be committed. For instance, a military
commander who has received information that some of the soldiers under his command have a violent or
unstable character, or have been drinking prior to being sent on a mission, may be considered as having the
required knowledge' (§238). See also BagHishema, A; (ICTR), §28; Krnojdac, A), at $59; Blaikic, AJ, §62.
188 In Rochling and others a French court stated that the lack of knowledge' alleged by the defendant was
culpable because he had the authority to stop the odious practices to which forced labourers were subjected
and instead showed utter indifference to the plight of those labourers (at 8). In Soemu Tffyoda a US
Military Commission held that the accused 'should have known, by use of reasonable diligence, the
perpetration of atrocities by his troops' (at 5006). The Commission went on to point out that In determining
the guilt or innocence of an accused, charged with dereliction of his duty as a commander, consideration
must begiven to many factors. The theory is simple, its application is not. [...) His guilt cannot be
determined by whether he had operational command, administrative command, or both. If he knew, or
should have known, by use of reasonable diligence, of the commission by his troops ofatrocities and if he
did not do everything within his power and capacity under the existing circumstances to prevent their
occurrence and punish the offenders, he was derelict in his duties. Only the degree of his guilt would
remain' (5008).
A Canadian Court Martial relied upon the notion of negligence in Sergeant Boland. The defendant had
failed to prevent two subordinates from torturing and beating to death a Somali civilian taken prisoner fat
1075-8). See also Medina (cited above).
In Delalic and others an ICTYTC held that 'from a study of these decisions [of post World War II
tribunals], the principle can be obtained that the absence of knowledge should not be considered a defence
if, in the words of the Tokyo judgement, the superior was "at fault in having failed to acquire such
knowledge"' (§388). In Blaskic an ICTY TC held that 'after World War II. a standard was established
according to which a commander may be liable for crimes by his subordinates if "he failed to exercise the
means available to him to learn of the offence and, under the circumstances, he should have known and
such failure to know constitutes criminal dereliction" ' (§322).
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4. The superior becomes cognizant that crimes have been committed and
fails to repress them by punishing the culprits. Here, knowledge and intent or
culpable negligence would seem to be required for criminal liability.
3.5 GENERAL: VARIOUS CLASSES OF IMMUNITIES
One of the possible obstacles to prosecution for international crimes may be
constituted by rules intended to protect the person accused by granting him
immunity from. prosecution.
There exist two categories of immunities that may in principle come into play and
be relied upon.
1. Those accruing under international law. They may relate either to conduct
of state agent? acting in their official capacity (so-called functional immunities), or
protect the private life of the state official (personal immunities). The former
immunities apply, on the strength of the so-called Act of State doctrine, to all
state agents discharging their official duties. In principle, an individual performing
acts on behalf of a sovereign state may not be called to account for any
violations of international law he may have committed while acting in an official
function. Only the state may be held responsible at the international level. The
latter category of immunities (personal immunities) are granted by international
customary or treaty rules to some categories of individuals on account of their
functions and are intended to protect both their private and their public life, or in
other words to render them inviolable while in office. Such individuals comprise
Heads of State, prime ministers or foreign ministers, diplomatic agents, and high-
ranking agents of international organizations. They enjoy these immunities so as
to be able to discharge their official mission free from any impairment or
interference. These immunities end with the cessation of the agent's official
duties.
All these immunities may be invoked by a state official before foreign courts or
other foreign organs (for example, enforcement agencies).
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2. The immunities provided for in national legislation and normally granted to
the Head of State, members of cabinet, and members of Parliament. They
normally cover the acts of the individuals concerned and involve exemption from
national jurisdiction. In addition, they also often include immunity from national
prosecution for ordinary crimes having no link with the function and committed
either before or during the exercise of the  functions. However, such immunity
terminates as soon as the functions come to an end, although normally the
individual remains immune from jurisdiction for any official act performed during
the discharge of his functions.
The rationale behind these national immunities is grounded in the principle of
separation of powers and in particular the need to protect state officials (say, the
Head of State) from interference by other state organs (say, courts) that could
jeopardize their independence or political action.
All these categories of immunity normally apply to ordinary crimes. Do they also
apply to international crimes? To answer this question one must of course
establish whether there are international customary or treaty rules that cover this
matter.
3.6 FUNCTIONAL AND PERSONAL IMMUNITIES PROVIDED FOR IN
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW
Let us now return to and dwell upon an issue that is of great importance for our
purposes: the distinction between two categories of immunities laid down in
international law; that is, functional (or ratione materiae or organic) immunities
and personal (or ratione personae) immunities. One ought always to distinguish
between these two categories when discussing the question of, among other
things, exemption from foreign jurisdiction.
The first category is grounded in the notion that states must respect other states'
internal organization and may not therefore interfere with the structure of foreign
states or the allegiance a state official may owe to his own state. Hence no state
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agent is accountable to other states for acts undertaken in an official capacity
and which therefore must be attributed to the state.
The second category is predicated on the need to avoid a foreign state either
infringing sovereign prerogatives of states or interfering with the official functions
of a state agent under the pretext of dealing with an exclusively private act (ne
impediaturlegatio, i.e. the immunities are granted to avoid obstacles to the
discharge of diplomatic functions).
This distinction, based on state practice189 as well as some recent judicial
decisions190 is important. Organic or functional immunities: (i) relate to
substantive law, that is, amount to a substantive defence (although the state
agent is not exonerated from compliance with either international law or the
substantive law of the foreign country—if he breaches national or international
law, this violation is not legally imputable to him but to his state)191 (ii) cover
official acts of any de jure or defacto state agent; (iii) do not cease at the end of
the discharge of official functions by the state agent (the reason being that the
act is legally attributed to the state, hence any legal liability for it may only be
incurred by the state); (iv) are erga omnes, that is, may be invoked towards any
other state.
189 With regard to the first class of immunities, suffice it to refer to the famous McLwd incident and the
Rainbow Warrior case. For the McLwd case, see British and Foreign Papers, vol. 29, at 1139, as well as
Jennings, 'The Caroline and McLwd Cases', 32 A)IL (1938), 92-9; see also the decision of 1841 of the New
York Supreme Court in People v. McLeod, at 270-99. For the Rainbow Warrior case, see UN Reports of
International Arbitral Awards, XIX, at 213. See also the Governor Collot case, in ). B. Moore, A Digest of
International Law, vol. II (Washington: Government Printing House, 1906), at 23.
190 One can mention the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Israel in Eichmann (at 308-9), that
handed down by the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshcf) in Scotland Yard, at  1101-2 (the
Director of Scotland Yard was not amenable to German civil jurisdiction for he had acted as a state agent).
See also the judgment delivered by the ICTY AC in Blaskic (subpoena) (at §$38 and 41).
For other cases see in particular M. Bothe, 'Die strafrechtliche Immunitat frernder Staatsorgane', in 31 Zeit.
Ausl. Off. Recht Volk (1971), at 248-53.
191 Nevertheless, it would seem that if the state official acting abroad has breached criminal rules of the
foreign state, he may incur criminal liability and be liable under foreign criminal jurisdiction (at least, this
is what happened both in McLeod and in the Rainbow Warrior case). Be that as it may, it seems certain,
how- ever, that the state official in question will not in any case be asked to pay for any damage his act may
have caused. The state for which he acted remains internationally responsible for that act and will have to
bear all the legal consequences of such responsibility.
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In contrast, personal immunities', (i) relate to procedural law, that is, they render
the state official immune from civil or criminal jurisdiction (a procedural defence);
(ii) cover official or private acts carried out by the state agent while in office, as
well as private or official acts performed prior to taking office; in other words, they
assure total inviolability; (iii) are intended to protect only some categories of state
officials, namely diplomatic agents, Heads of State, heads of government, foreign
ministers (under the doctrine set out by the International Court of Justice in its
judgment in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, at §§51-5);
(iv) come to an end- after cessation of the official functions of the state agent; (v)
may not be erga omnes (in the case of diplomatic agents they are only applicable
with regard to acts performed as between the receiving and the sending state,
plus third states through whose territory the diplomat may pass while proceeding
to take up, or to return to, his post, or when returning to his own country: so-
called jus transitus innoxii, i.e. the right to move from one place to another
without hindrance).
The above distinction permits us to realize that the two classes of immunity
coexist and somewhat overlap as long as a state official who may also invoke
personal or diplomatic immunities is in office. While he is discharging his official
functions, he always enjoys personal immunity.192 In addition, he enjoys
functional immunity, subject to one exception that we shall see shortly, namely in
the case of perpetration of international crimes. Nonetheless, the personal
immunity prevails even in the case of the alleged commission of international
crimes, with the consequence that the state official may be prosecuted for such
crimes only after leaving office.
3.7 THE CUSTOMARY RULE LIFTING FUNCTIONAL IMMUNITIES WITH
RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
192 For a recent departure from this rule, see the 2002 decisions of the European Union concerning the
freezing of the private assets of Mugabe (head of state in Zimbabwe): see Council Common Position of 18
February 2002 concerning restrictive measures against Zimbabwe (2002/145/CFSP), in Official journal of
the Eurnpean Communitiei, 21.32.2002, L50/1; Council Regulation (EC) No. 310/2002 of 18 February
2002 on the same matter, ibid„ L50/4: Council Common Position of 22 luly 2002 amending Common
Position 2002/145/CFSP, ibid., L195/1: Commission Regulation no. 1643/2002 of 13 September 2002,
ibid., L247/22; and Council decision of 14 September 2002 implementing Common Position
2002/145/CFSP, ibid., L247/56.
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(A)  THE QUESTION OF IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION
The traditional rule whereby senior state officials may not be held accountable for
acts performed in the discharge of their official duties was significantly
undermined after the Second World War, when international treaties and judicial
decisions upheld the principle that this 'shield' no longer protects those senior
state officials accused of war crimes, crimes against peace, or crimes against
humanity. More recently, this principle has been extended to torture and other
international crimes.
It seems indisputable that by now an international general rule has evolved on
the matter. Initially this rule only applied to war crimes and covered any member
of the military of belligerent states, whatever their rank and position. When the
major provisions of the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 (setting forth the
Statute of the IMT) gradually turned into customary law, Article 7 ('The official
position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in
Government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating punishment') has also come to acquire the status of a
customary international rule.
National case law proves the existence of such a rule. Many cases where state
military officials were brought to trial demonstrate that state agents accused of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide may not invoke before national
courts their official capacity as a valid defence. Even if we leave aside cases
where tribunals adjudicated on the strength of international treaties or Control
Council Law no. 10, a string of significant judgments where courts applied
national law should be mentioned.193 Admittedly, in most of these cases the
193 One mav recall, for instance, Eichmann in Israel (at 277-342), Barbie in France (see the various
judgments in 78 ILR, 125ff, and 100 ILR 331ff), Kappler (193-9), and Priebke in Italy (959ff). Router
(526-48), Albrecht (747-51), and Bouterse in the Netherlands (Amsterdam Court of Appeal), Kesserling
(9ff) before a British Military Court sitting in Venice, and von Lewinski (called von Manstein) before a
British Military Court in Hamburg (523-4), Pinochet in the UK (see infra, n. 7), Yamafhita in the USA
(1599ff), Buhler before the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland (682), Pinochet and Scilingo in Spain (at
4-8 and 2-8, respectively), and Miguel Cavallo in Mexico (by ludge lesus Guadalupe Luna authorizing the
extradition ofRicardo Miguel Cavallo to Spain).
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accused did not challenge the court's jurisdiction on the ground that he had acted
as a state official. The fact remains, however, that the courts did pronounce on
acts performed by those officials in the exercise of their functions. The
defendants' failure to raise the 'defence' of acting on behalf of their state shows
that they were aware that such defence would have been of no avail. In addition,
in some cases the defendant did plead that he had acted in his official capacity
and hence was immune from prosecution. This, for example, happened in
Eichmann, where the accused raised the question of 'Act of State'. Although the
Court used that terminology, which could be misleading, in essence it took the
right approach to the question at issue and explicitly held that state agents acting
in their official capacity may not be immune from criminal liability if they commit
international crimes (at 309-12).
It can also be conceded that most of the cases under discussion deal with
military officers. However, it would be untenable to infer from that fact that the
customary rule only applies to such persons. It would indeed be odd that a
customary rule should have evolved only with regard to members of the military
and not for all state agents who commit international crimes.
Besides, it is notable that the Supreme Court of Israel in Eichmann (at 311) and
more recently various Trial Chambers of the ICTY have held that the provisions
of, respectively, Article 7 of the Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg and Article 7(2)
of the Statute of the ICTY (both of which relate to any person accused of one of
the crimes provided for in the respective Statutes) 'reflect a rule of customary
international law'.194 In 2002 in Letkolfnf. Soedjarwo the Indonesian Ad Hoc Court
on Human Rights held that the relevant provision of the ICC Statute has
'developed' into 'a legal principle' (at 23). Furthermore, Lords Millet and Phillips of
Worth Matravers in the House of Lords' decision of 24 March 1999 in Pinochet
took the view, with regard to any senior state agent, that functional immunity
194 See Karadzic and others (§24). Furundzija (§140), and Slobodan Milosevic (decision on preliminary
motions) (§28)
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cannot excuse international crimes.195 The ICTY Appeals Chamber had already
set out this legal proposition in Blaikic (subpoena) (§41) (see also SCSL, TC,
Taylor (Decision on the immunity from prosecution), §§52-3).
In addition, important national Military Manuals, for instance those issued in 1956
in the USA and in 1958 (and then in 2004) in the UK,196 expressly provide that
the fact that a person who has committed an international crime was acting as a
government official (and not only as a serviceman) does not constitute an
available defence.
It is also significant that, at least with regard to one of the crimes at issue,
genocide, the ICJ implicitly admitted that under customary law official status does
not relieve responsibility (see Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, at
24).197
195 See at 171-9 (Lord Millet) and 186-90 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers). Instead, according to Lord
Hope (at 152), Pinochet lost his immunity ratione materiae only because of Chile's ratification of the
Torture Convention. In other words, for him the unavailability of functional immunity did not derive from
customary law; itstemmed from treaty law.
196 See the US Department ofthe Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare ()uly 1956), S§498 and
510.
See also the British manual. The Law of War on Land (1958), at §632 and the 2004 Manual ofthe Law of
Armed Conflict (UK Ministry of Defence, London: Oxford University- Press, 2004), at 16.38.1. ('Heads of
State and their ministers are not immune from prosecution and punishment for war crimes. Their liability is
governed by the same principles as those governing the responsibility of civilian authorities').
197 One should also recall that on 11 December 1946 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted
Resolution 95, whereby it 'affirmed' 'the principles recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and the judgment of the Tribunal'. These principles include Principle III as formulated in 1950 by the UN
International Law Commission. This Principle provides as follows: 'The fact that a person who committed
an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government
official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.' See YILC (1950-11), 192. All the
Nuremberg Principles, Israel's Supreme Court noted in Eichmann, 'have become part of the law of nations
and must be regarded as having been rooted in it also in the past' (at 311).
It is notable that the UN SG took the same view of the customary status of the Genocide Convention (or,
more accurately, of the substantive principles it lays down), a view that was endorsed implicitly by the UN
Security Council (see Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para. 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704, W) and explicitly by a TC of the ICTR in Akayesu (§495) and of the ICTY
in Krstic (§541).
A further element supporting the existence of a customary rule having a general purport can be found in the
pleadings made by the two states (the Congo and Belgium) that were in dispute before the International
Court of lustice in the aforementioned Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 2000. In its
Memoire of 15 May 2001, the Congo explicitly admitted the existence of a principle ofICL, whereby the
official status of a state agent cannot exonerate him from individual responsibility for crimes committed
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Arguably, while each of these elements of practice, on its own, cannot be
regarded as indicative of the crystallization of a customary rule, taken together
they may be deemed to evidence the formation of such a rule (a rule, it should be
added, on whose existence legal commentators seem to agree, although
admittedly without producing compelling evidence concerning state or judicial
practice,198 and which the Institut de droit international recently restated, at least
with regard to Heads of State or government).199
Let me emphasize that the logic behind this rule, which was forcefully set out as
early as 1945 by justice Robert H. Jackson in his Report to the US President on
the works for the prosecution of major German war criminals,200 is in line with
present day trends in international law. Today, more so than in the past, it is state
officials, and in particular senior officials, that commit international crimes. Most
of the time they do not perpetrate crimes directly. They order, plan, instigate,
organize, aid and abet, or culpably tolerate or acquiesce, or willingly or
negligently fail to prevent or punish international crimes. This is why 'superior
responsibility' has acquired such importance since Yamashita (1946) (see above,
while in office; the Congo also added that on this point there was no disagreement with Belgium (Memoire,
at 39, §60).
198 See,e.g.,S. GIaser, 'L'Acied' Etatetle probleme de laresponsabilite individuelle', fievue de
riroitpenfllefrie criminologie (1950), Iff.; S. Glaser, Introduction, 71-6; M. Bothe, supra n. 2,254-7; Y.
Dinstein, International Criminal Law', 5 IYHR (1975), 82-3; A. Bianchi, Immunity versus Human Rights;
The Pinochet Case', 10 EJIL (1999), 269-70.
199 See the Resolution on Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of
Governments in International Law' adopted at the Session of Vancouver (August 2001), Article 13(2).
200 In his Report to the US President of 6 lune 1945, lustice R. H. Jackson (who had been appointed by
President Roosevelt as 'Chief Counsel for the United States in prosecuting the principal Axis War
Criminals') illustrated as follows the first draft of Article 7 of the London Agreement (whereby 'The official
position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government departments, shall
not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment'), contained in a US
memorandum presented at San Francisco on 30 April 1945: 'Nor should such a defence be recognized as
the obsolete doctrine that a head of state is immune from legal liability. There is more than a suspicion that
this idea is a relic of the doctrine of the divine right of kings. It is, in any event, inconsistent with the
position we take toward our own officials, who are frequently brought to court at the suit of citizens who
allege their rights to have been invaded. We do not accept the paradox that legal responsibility should be
the least where power is the greatest. We stand on the principle of responsible government declared some
three centuries ago to King James by Lord Justice Coke, who proclaimed that even a King is still "under
God and the law" ' (in International Conference on Military Trials, 47).
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11.4). To allow these state agents to go scot-free only because they acted in an
official capacity, except in the few cases where an international criminal tribunal
has been established or an international treaty is applicable, would mean to bow
to traditional concerns of the international community (chiefly, respect for state
sovereignty). In the  present international community respect for human rights
and the demand that just ice be done whenever human rights have been
seriously and massively put in jeopardy, override the traditional principle of
respect for state sovereignty. The new thrust towards protection of human dignity
has shattered the shield that traditionally protected state agents.201
(B)  THE QUESTION OF EXEMPTION FROM THE DUTY TO ASSIST COURTS
An important issue related to that we have just discussed is the extent to which
the current removal of state officials' immunity from prosecution for international
crimes also sets aside their right not to appear before an international court to
testify, or at any rate to assist the court. To put it differently, may a state official
that an international criminal court, through the issuance of a binding order or
subpoena, has ordered to appear before the court either to give testimony or to
deliver probative material, refuse to do so? Or is he instead legally bound to
comply with the order? Clearly, the question does not turn on answering for
international crimes, but on giving or handing over evidence about crimes
committed by others. In Blaskic (subpoena) Croatia contended that under
international law the ICTY was not allowed to issue binding orders to state
organs acting in their official capacity; hence it asked the AC to quash the
subpoena daces teucum (a judicial injunction to hand over evidence,
accompanied by a threat of penalty in case of non-compliance) issued by an
ICTY TC to the Croatian defence Minister, which ordered him to produce military
201 A recent deviation from the rule should, however, be stressed. In 2007, in lbrakim Matar and others v.
Avraham Dichter, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a civil action
brought before US courts under the Alien Torts Statute against a former Israeli agent who, in his capacity
as head of the Shin Beth, had allegedly authorized, planned, and directed the bombing on 22 )uly 2002 of
an apartment building in Gaza City housing a Palestinian terrorist (the bombing caused many deaths and
other casualties among civilians, and was termed in the petition a war crime). The US District Court,
applying the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, held that that action was covered by immunity (at 4-
15).
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documents or, alternatively, appear before the Chamber to show cause of non-
compliance with the order. The TC relied upon Article 18(2) of the ICTY Statute,
which grants the Prosecutor express authority to deal with state authorities and
therefore implies, according to the TC, a general power of the Tribunal directly to
'approach' the relevant state officials. It consequently held that state officials
could be directly addressed by the Tribunal by means of compelling orders
(Blaskic, Decision on the Objection of Croatia to the Issuance of sub-poena
duces tecum, §§67-9), The AC held instead that the general customary rule on
functional immunities of state officials, though set aside by another customary
rule where such officials are accused of international crimes, was still applicable
when it came to the question of state cooperation with international criminal
courts. These courts face states, so did the AC argue, and have therefore to
address themselves to states, not to individual state officials, if they intend to
order the production of documents, the seizure of evidence, etc. (§§42-3). The
AC buttressed this legal argument by noting that in any case, were the state to
refuse to deliver documents, the state official concerned would be bound by such
refusal, and his appearing in court publicly to explain such refusal would serve
little purpose (§44).
It would seem that the AC laid too much emphasis on state sovereignty and
traditional international law. The contention is warranted that at present the
expansion of the human rights doctrine and the thrust towards international
criminal justice involve a significant erosion of traditional tenets. The duty of
states to cooperate with international criminal courts that they have either
voluntarily accepted or to which they are subjected on the strength of binding
resolutions of the UN SC, entails that these courts are authorized to issue
binding orders or subpoenas directly to state, officials (hence not through
designated state channels), whenever they need the handing over of probative
material necessary for the administration of justice. If the highest state authorities
refuse to deliver the documents requested and consequently oblige the
subpoenaed state official to behave accordingly, it is nevertheless important for
such official to appear before the international court in order formally and publicly
to set out the reasons for such refusal. Similarly, international criminal courts are
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authorized to compel incumbent (and a fortiori former) state officials to testify in
court, by issuing a subpoena ad testificandum. This is borne out by case law.202
3.8 INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL IMMUNITIES
(A) DO THEY INVOLVE IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION?
The problem of international personal immunities arises with regard to state
officials accused of international crimes when they are abroad: may they be
arrested and brought to trial for the alleged crimes? As we shall see, the problem
can be differently framed and solved when the state official is in his own country;
the question then arises whether under national (or international) law national
courts are empowered to take proceedings against him.
The conflict between international rules granting personal immunities and the
customary rules proscribing international crimes may be settled as indicated by
the ICJ in its judgment in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 2000
(§§51-7). The Court logically inferred from the rationale behind the rules on
personal immunities of such senior state officials as Heads of State or
government (plus foreign ministers and diplomatic agents), that these immunities
must perforce prevent any prejudice to the 'effective performance' of their
functions. They therefore bar any possible interference with the official activity of
such officials. It follows that an incumbent senior state agent (belonging to one of
the categories mentioned above) is immune from jurisdiction, even when he is on
a private visit or acts in a private capacity while holding office. Clearly, not only
the arrest and prosecution of such a state agent while on a private visit abroad,
but also the mere issuing of an arrest warrant, may seriously hamper or
jeopardize the conduct of international affairs of the state for which that person
acts.
202 See KrstU (Decision on application for subpoenas) (ICTY, Al, §S23-8); Milosevic (Decision on
application for interview and testimony of Tony Blairand Gerhard Schroder), ICTY, A), §§12-33; and
Norman and others (Decision on interlocutory appeal against Trial Chamber decision refusing to subpoena
the President of Sierra Leone) (SCSL, AC, §§8-29). It should be noted that in the last two cases the court
declined to issue the subpoena only because it held that the testimony of the dignitaries at issue was not
material to the defence case.
233
In summary, even when accused of international crimes, the state agent entitled
to personal immunities is inviolable and immune from prosecution on the strength
of the international rules on such personal immunities. This proposition is
supported by some case law (for instance, Pinochet203 in the UK and Fidel
Castro204 in Spain, which ' relate to a former and an incumbent Head of State,
respectively).
If the allegations about international crimes committed by foreign state officials
are known before they enter a foreign territory, the territorial state may ask the
foreign state official to refrain from setting foot in the territory; if that official is
already on the territory, the state may declare him persona non grata and request
him to leave forthwith.
Of course, it may be that an international treaty on specific international crimes
implicitly or expressly prescribes that personal immunities may not relieve
officials of responsibility for the international crimes they envisage. Many treaty
rules, although couched in genera! terms, may be interpreted to this effect. On
this score one can mention the Genocide Convention of 1948 (Article IV), the
1984 Convention on Torture (Article 4), as well as a number of treaties on
terrorism. To these treaties one should add the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR.
Both contain a provision (respectively, Articles 7(2) and 6(2)), whereby "The
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government
or as responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal
203 See, e.g., the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others,
ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, judgment of 24 March 1999, at 112-15. See also the speeches of Lord Hope of
Craighead, at 145-52, Lord Saville ofNewdigate, at 169-70, Lord Millet, at 171-91, and Lord Phillips of
Worth Matravers, at 181-90.
204 See Order (auto) of 4 March 1999 (no. 1999/2723). The Audiencia Nacional held that the Spanish Court
could not exercise its criminal jurisdiction, as provided for in Article 23 of the Law on the Judicial Power,
for the crimes attributed to Fidel Castro. He was an incumbent Head of State, and therefore the provisions
of Article 23 could not be applied to him because they were not applicable to Heads of State, ambassadors,
etc. in office, who thus enjoyed immunity from prosecution on the strength of international rules to which
Article 21(2) of the same Law referred (this provision envisages an exception to the exercise of Spanish
jurisdiction in the case of 'immunity from jurisdiction or execution provided for in rules of public
international law'); see Legal Grounds nos 1-4. The Court also stated that its legal finding was not
inconsistent with its ruling in Pinochet, because Pinochet was a former Head of State, and hence no longer
enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction (see Legal Ground no. 5). For the (Spanish) text of the order, see the
CD-Rom, EL DERECHO, 2002, Criminal case law.
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responsibility nor mitigate punishment.' The strictness of this provision can be
construed to the effect that it rules out the possibility of invoking personal
immunities as a legal ground for not being prosecuted or tried.205 The same
interpretation could be advanced with regard to the 1984 Convention on Torture,
Articles 1-4 of which are so strict as to warrant such interpretation. However, the
only treaty that explicitly excludes the right to rely upon personal immunities is
the ICC Statute (Article 27(2)).
Certainly, there is still resistance to this trend favourable to lifting personal
immunities in the case of international crimes. For example, in March 2000 the
US State Department allowed a Peruvian alleged torturer to go free on the
grounds that he enjoyed personal (that is, diplomatic) immunity.206
The question must nevertheless be raised as to whether a customary rule has
evolved in the international community removing personal immunities for alleged
international crimes, at last when jurisdiction over such crimes is granted to
international criminal courts or tribunals. This question is not only theoretical, but
also has a practical dimension. For instance, the STL, unlike the Statutes of other
international criminal courts and tribunals referred to above, does not provide in
terms for the lifting of the immunity under discussion. Can we nevertheless hold
205 Therefore, it would seem that one ought to reject as unfounded the claim made by the Serbian
authorities of the FRY that some of the co-accused ofMr Slobodan Milosevic, in particular the former
foreign minister of the FRY and incumbent president of Serbia, Mr M. Milutinovie, could not be arrested
and handed over to the ICTY because they enjoyed immunities under the national or federal Constitution.
Assuming this were correct under national law, the rules of the ICTY Statute would prevail, because those
rules were enacted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and therefore override
contrary treaties, customary rules, and also national legislation pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter.
206 In the above example, Major Tomas Ricardo Anderson Kohatsu, a retired official of Peru's notorious
Armv Intelligence Service, was alleged bvthe US State Department to have perpetrated *horrendous
crimes' in 1997. In early March 2000 the Peruvian authorities sent him to the US to appear before a hearing
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Washington. When he was about to leave the US
to return to Peru, FBI agents detained him, pursuant to the 1984 UN Convention against Torture, duly
ratified by the US. However, a few hours later he was released following a decision by the Under-Secretary
of State, Thomas Pickering. According to Pickering, Anderson was entitled to diplomatic immunity
because he held a G-2 visa, granted to accredited members of the staff of the Peruvian Mission to the
Organization of American States. Consequently, he could not be arrested or prosecuted (on-line: at
www.windos\temp\center for constitutional rights.htm). It was pointed out by M. Ratner, (US Center for
Constitutional Rights), that Anderson had not in fact been accredited to the Peruvian Mission. More
importantly, the 1984 Convention on Torture does not permit exemption for diplomatic immunity. In any
case, it was for the US courts to determine the matter. As Ratner pointed out, unlike Pinochet, 'despite
serious doubts as to Andersons claimed immunity, the decision to allow him to return to Peru was made by
the State Department and not the courts' (see ibid., at 2, §3).
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the view that the Tribunal is not barred from prosecuting and trying state officials
enjoying personal immunities (including inviolability and immunity from foreign
criminal jurisdiction)? In other words, is a Head of State, a prime minister, a
foreign minister or a diplomat, charged by the Tribunal's Prosecutor with the
crime of terrorism, precluded from claiming personal immunity?
It is submitted that the above question must be answered in the affirmative, on
three grounds. First, the judgment of the ICJ on Arrest warrant does not exclude
either explicitly or implicitly that a customary rule on the matter has evolved with
regard to international criminal courts and tribunals. It held that 'the immunities
enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign
Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances'
(§61). It then enumerated among such instances the case where 'an incumbent
or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings
before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction (ibid.,
emphasis added). The Court then mentioned the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC,
noting that the ICC Statute expressly provides, in Article 27(2), that [i] immunities
or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person,
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person" ' (ibid.). It is thus clear that the ICJ
did not make the lifting of personal immunities before international criminal courts
contingent upon the express or implicit contemplation of such lifting in the
relevant courts statute. It instead held that the non-invocability of personal
immunity before international courts was admissible to the extent that the
relevant court or tribunal had jurisdiction over the international crime with which
the state official at stake was charged.
Secondly, the rationale for foreign state officials being entitled to urge personal
immunities before national courts does not apply to international courts and
tribunals. That rationale resides in the need for foreign state officials not to be
exposed to the prosecution by national authorities that might use this means as a
way to interfering with the foreign state officials' activity, thereby unduly impeding
or limiting their international action. In many states judicial authorities are not
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independent of the political power; they could therefore decide to prosecute
foreign state officials on grounds that have little to do with their legal or illegal
conduct and indeed amount to a way of' unduly interfering with the action of
those state officials. This danger of abuse does not arise instead with regard to
international criminal courts and tribunals, which are totally independent of states
and subject to strict rules of impartiality. In addition, these courts and tribunals
are much better equipped than national courts to deal with international crimes,
because they are 'specialized' in this area and their judges are selected on
account of their particular competence or experience in the matter.
Thirdly, the current thrust of international law is to broaden as much as possible
the protection of human rights and, by the same token, to make those who
engage in heinous breaches of such rights criminally accountable. The very logic
of the present trends of international law therefore fully warrants the subjection of
state officials to the judicial scrutiny of international independent bodies,
whenever such officials (i) are accused of serious criminal offences against basic
values of the world community; and (ii) there is no risk that such judicial scrutiny
be surreptitiously used as a means of unduly restraining the official activity of the
state agent concerned.
In summary, it seems justified to hold that under customary international law
personal immunities of state officials may not bar international criminal courts
and tribunals from prosecuting and trying persons suspected or accused of
having committed international crimes, or at any rate the criminal offences over
which the relevant international court or tribunal has jurisdiction.
All this applies to incumbent senior state officials. As soon as the-state agent
leaves office, he may no longer enjoy personal immunities and, in addition,
becomes liable to prosecution for any international crime he may have
perpetrated while in office (or before taking office), pursuant to the
aforementioned customary rule lifting functional immunities in the case of
international crimes.
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(B) DO THEY EXEMPT SENIOR STATE OFFICIALS FROM THE DUTY TO
TESTIFY OR HAND OVER EVIDENCE?
We must now briefly discuss the question of whether an incumbent senior state
official belonging to one of the four abovementioned categories is entitled to
invoke personal immunity in order to refuse either to testify before an
international court or tribunal dealing with international crimes, or to hand over
documents needed, by the court or tribunal.
Plausibly, a Head of State may not be compelled to testify before a. foreign court,
not even with regard to an international crime: an order to testify issued by a
national court to a foreign Head of State (or prime minister or foreign minister or
diplomat) would run counter to international rules protecting personal immunities
(as for the rationale behind this legal regulation, see above). Arguably here
traditional notions relating to state sovereignty still apply and have not yet been
set aside by the demands of international justice.
Does the same hold true for orders issued by international courts exercising
jurisdiction over international crimes? It would seem that the rationale applying to
the lifting of personal immunity from prosecution for those crimes, mentioned
above, should also apply to the right of one of those senior officials to refrain
from testifying; it follows that such right may not be invoked. Here the paramount
demands of inter- national justice, together with the absence of any possible risk
that the international court may interfere with the state agent activity or abuse its
powers, override the rights of senior state officials deriving from traditional
notions of respect (by other states or state organs) for their sovereign
prerogatives. It follows that an international criminal tribunal is empowered to
compel a senior state official (belonging to one of the four categories) to testify
(subpoena ad testificandum) or to hand over important documents (subpoena
duce tecum).
Interestingly, the ICTY AC in Krstic (Decision on application for subpoenas
decision) (§27) and an ICTRTC in Bagosora (Decision on request for a subpoena
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for Major f.Biot, at §4) affirmed this authority of international criminal courts,
staling that they may compel senior state agents to testify, whether or not such
agents witnessed the relevant facts in their official capacity. Other courts have in
fact eschewed pronouncing on the merits of this matter. In Fofana and others, in
2006 a SCSL TC did not grant a request to issue a subpoena ad testificandum
against the incumbent President of Sierra Leone, for it found that the
requirements set out in Rule 54 (on the power to issue such orders 'as may be
necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct
of the trial') were not met in the case at issue. The AC upheld the decision (§§8-
39). However, a member of the TC, Judge T, Thompson, issued a forceful
opinion clearly showing that the law allowed the issuance of the order (Dissenting
Opinion, §§14-30); similarly, in the AC Judge Robertson appended an opinion
along the same lines, providing reference to previous case law (Dissenting
Opinion, §§10-50). In Milosevic Slobodan (Decision of 9 December 2005) the AC
declined to call to testify the incumbent British prime minister.
3.9 NATIONAL PERSONAL IMMUNITIES
The question of whether a national court is authorized to start proceedings
against a national accused of international crimes, who happens to be a senior
state official enjoying immunities under national law (for instance, the Head of
State, a member of cabinet, a member of parliament) must be looked at from the
viewpoint of international and national law.
Customary international law, it would seem, does not contain any rule imposing
upon a state the obligation to disregard national legislation on immunities.
However,' treaty rules may impose the obligation to punish the authors of
international crimes. If this is the case, any national legislation granting immunity
would be in conflict with the treaty obligation.
National law may contain general rules granting immunity from prosecution for
any crime, including international crimes. It very much depends on each
particular national system. However, after the entry into force of the ICC Statute,
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those states that are gradually ratifying such Statute are no longer allowed to rely
upon any possible national legislation on immunities. The national
implementation of the ICC Statute requires that states change their legislation
(including their constitutional provisions, it any) on immunities, removing any
such immunities for the international crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the
Court.
3.10 The general principles of criminal responsibility under International Criminal
Law
3.11 GENERAL
As in any national legal system, also in ICL responsibility arises not only when a
person materially commits a crime but also when he or she engages in other
forms or modalities of criminal conduct. In the following paragraphs I shall set out
these different modalities of participation.
Before I do so, it may however prove fitting to discuss briefly the position in
national legal systems. They converge in holding that, where a crime involves
more than one person, all performing the same act, all are equally liable as co-
perpetrators, or principals. In contrast, national legal orders differ when it comes
to the punishment of two or more persons participating in a crime, where these
persons do not perform the same act but in one way or another contribute to the
realization of a criminal design.
For instance, A draws up plans for a bank robbery, B provides the weapons, C
performs the actual robbery, D acts as a lockout, E drives the getaway car, and F
hides the loot and in addition gives shelter to the robbers. Many systems (for
instance those of the US, France, Austria, Uruguay, and Australia) do not make
any legal distinction between the different categories of participant and mete out
the same penalty to each participant, whatever his role in the commission of the
crime. As the California Penal Code provides at §31, all those 'concerned in the
commission of a crime' including those who aid and abet the crime, are to be
held liable as principals.
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In spite of this legal regulation, for classificatory purposes and to aid analysis,
legal commentators and courts use descriptive terms to distinguish between the
various categories of participant: in the example given above, A is an 'accessory
before the fact' (he is not a 'principal' for he was not present when the robbery
was perpetrated), B is an aider and abettor (or an 'accessory before the fact'), C
is a 'first degree principal', D and E are 'second degree principals',  and F is an
'accessory after the fact'. However, as noted above, under the general
sentencing tariff no distinction is made between these different categories of
person. It is only provided that for accomplices or accessories extenuating
circumstances may be taken into account if their participation in the offence is
less serious than that of the principal or principals. In fact, for the purposes of
sentencing, judges often draw a distinction between principals, instigators, and
aiders and abettors.
In other national legal systems (for instance, Germany, Spain, and Russia) the
law draws instead a normative distinction between two categories—principals,
and accomplices or accessories—and provides in terms that the persons falling
under the latter category must be punished less severely. Thus, for instance, in
German law, the scale of penalties for accomplices (at least in the case of aiders
and abettors, Gehilfe) is less harsh than for the perpetrator (Tater).207
We will see that in international law neither treaties nor case law (as indicative of
customary rules) make any legal distinction between the various categories, at
least as far as the consequent penalties are concerned. This lack of distinction
follows both from: (i) the absence of any agreed scale of penalties in ICL; and
from (ii) the general character of this body of law; that is, its still rudimentary
nature and the ensuing lack of formalism (see supra, 1.2).
207 In two cases, the Extraordinary Courts Martial established in the Ottoman Empire to try persons accused
of participating in massacring Armenians in 1915 and plundering their possessions, applied the Imperial
Military Penal Code', which drew a normative distinction between principals and accessories. The Court
therefore made a point of distinguishing between the 'principal perpetrators' and the 'accessories', and
assigning a different sentence to each category of defendant. In Kemal and TevftkU sentenced the principal
perpetrator to death and the accessory to 15 years of hard labour (at 5-6, or 157-8); in Bahaeddirt Sdkir and
others the majority of judges held that two defendants were accessories, while three dissenting judges held
that they 'were equally guilty of having been principal co-perpetrators' (at 4 and 8 or 171 and 173).
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Consequently, the differentiation between the various classes of participation in
crimes, which I shall set out below, is merely based on the intrinsic features of
each modality of participation. It serves a descriptive and classificatory purpose
only. It is devoid of any relevance as far as sentencing is concerned. It is for
judges to decide in each case on the degree of culpability of a participant in an
international crime and assign the penalty accordingly, whatever the modality of
participation of the offender in the crime.
3.12 PERPETRATION
Whoever physically commits a crime, either alone or jointly with other persons, is
criminally liable. For instance, the soldier who kills a war prisoner or an innocent
civilian is liable to punishment for a war crime. Similarly, the serviceman who
rapes an enemy civilian as part of a widespread or systematic attack on civilians
is accountable for a crime against humanity,
Perpetration is thus the physical carrying out of the prohibited conduct,
accompanied by the requisite psychological element.208
3.13 CO-PERPETRATION
208 In some cases courts have minimized the role of perpetrators executing illegal orders. This for instance
holds true for Alfons Gotzfrid, which concerns mistreatment at the Majdanek camp. The Stuttgart Court
(Landgericht) held that 'According to established case-law [...I, the offender or accomplice is defined as one
whose thoughts and actions coincide with those of the author of the crime, who willingly gives in to
incitement to political murder, silences his conscience and makes another person's criminal aims the basi of
his own conviction and his own action or who sees to it that orders of that kind are ruthlessly carried ou or
who in so doing otherwise displays consenting enthusiasm or who exploits State terror for his own pui
poses. Accordingly, the accused could only be shown to have an attitude denoting guilt if, over and above
the activity he was instructed to carry out, he had performed some contributory act on his own initiative
beyon the call of duty, shown particular enthusiasm, had acted with particular ruthlessness in the
exterminatio operation or had shown a personal interest in the killings. These conditions cannot be shown
to exist in the case of the accused. He was at the end of the chain of command, had no power to decision
himself and n authority to act [...) Similarly, there is no evidence that the accused had any personal interest
in the killing He merely wanted to carry out the order which had been issued to him '(67, b).
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Crimes are often committed by a plurality of persons. If all of them materially take
part in the actual perpetration of the same crime and perform the same act (tor
instance, they are all members of an execution squad shooting innocent
civilians), we can speak of co-perpetration. All participants in the crime partake of
the same criminal conduct and the attendant mens rea.
3.14 PARTICIPATION IN A JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE TO COMMIT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
3.14.1 INTRODUCTION
International crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
torture, and terrorism share a common feature: they tend to be expression of
collective criminality, in that they are perpetrated by a multitude or persons:
military details, paramilitary units or government officials acting in unison or, in
most cases, in pursuance of a policy. When such crimes are committed, it is
extremely difficult to pinpoint the specific contribution made by each individual
participant in the criminal enterprise or collective crime, on two grounds.
First, not all participants may have acted in the same manner, but rather each of
them may have played a different role in planning, organizing, instigating,
coordinating, executing or otherwise contributing to the criminal conduct. For
instance, in the case of torture one person may order the crime, another may
physically execute it, yet another may watch to check whether the victim
discloses any significant information, a medical doctor may be in attendance to
verify whether the measures for inflicting pain or suffering are likely to cause
death, so as to stop the torture just before the measures become lethal, another
person may carry food for the executioners, and so on. The question arises as to
whether all these participants are equally responsible for the same crime, torture.
Similarly, in the case of deportation of civilians or prisoners of war to an
extermination camp, a commander may issue the order, several officers may
organize the transport, others may take care of food and drinking water, others
may carry out surveillance over the inmates so as to prevent their escape, others
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may search the detainees for valuables or other things before deportation, and
so on. Secondly, the evidence relating to each individual's conduct may prove
difficult, if not impossible, to find. It would, however, be not only immoral, but also
contrary to the general purpose of criminal law (to protect the community from
the deviant behaviour of its members that causes serious damage to the general
interests) to let those actions go unpunished. These considerations a fortiori
apply to crimes such as murder or aggravated assault committed by a whole
crowd; in such cases, it may prove even more difficult to collect evidence about
the exact participation of members of the . crowd in the crimes. The same
considerations also hold true for cases where crimes are institutionally committed
within organized and hierarchical units such as internment, detention, or
concentration camps, where it is difficult to pinpoint the gradations of culpability
of the various persons working within and for the organization.
As in most national legal systems, also in ICL all participants in a common
criminal action are equally responsible if they (i) participate in the action,
whatever their position and the extent of their contribution, and in addition (ii)
intend to engage in the common criminal action. Therefore they are all to be
treated as principals209 although of course the varying degree of culpability may
be taken into account at the sentencing staged.210
209 However, some courts ot common law countries have taken the view that participants in a common
crimilial design may plav the role of, and be regarded as, accessories. Thus, for instance, in
Einsatzgruppen, with regard to common design, the Prosecutor T. Taylor, in his closing statement noted
that 'the elementary principle must be borne in mind that neither under Control Council Law No. 10 nor
under anv known sys- tem of criminal law is guilt for murder confined to the man who pulls the trigger or
buries the corpse. In line with recogn'.zed principles common to all civilized legal systems, §2 of Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies a number of types of connection with crime which are sufficient
to establish guilt. Thus, not only are principals guilty but also accessories, those who take a consenting part
in the commission of crime or are connected with plans or enterprises involved in its commission, those
who order or abet crime, and those who belong to an organization or group engaged in the commission of
crime. These provisions embody no harsh or novel principles of criminal responsibility' (372).
210 In this connection one may mention, by way of example, a decision of the Supreme Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in Tepez, delivered on I October 1999: 'The appeal bv the defence counsel argues that the
contested judgment has not individualised the criminal responsibility of the accused and his personal
involvement in actions characteristic of a war crime against the civilian population. For this crime to exist it
is necessary to "commit murder, torture, inhumane acts, inflict severe suffering, physical and mental
injuries on civilians, destroying their health and physical integrity". The disposition does not include these
essential elements of this criminal act and therefore represents a major violation of the provisions of
criminal procedure. This Court finds these allegations groundless. The appeal fails to note that the
contested judgment states that the accused carried out these actions with three other named individuals (as
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The notion of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) denotes a mode of criminal liability
that appears particularly fit to cover the criminal liability of all participants in a
common criminal plan. At the same time, this notion does not run contrary to the
general principles of criminal law. As in national legal systems, the rationale
behind this legal regulation is clear: if all those who take part in a common
criminal action are aware of the purpose and character of the criminal action and
share the requisite criminal intent, they must perforce share criminal liability,
whatever the role and position they may have played in the commission of the
crime. This is the case because: (i) each of them is indispensable for the
achievement of the final result; and on the other hand (ii) it would be difficult to
distinguish between the degree of criminal liability, except for sentencing
purposes.
Thus, it is by now widely accepted by international criminal courts that in the case
of collective' criminality where several persons engage in the pursuit of a
common criminal plan or design, all participants in this common plan or design
may be held criminally liable for the perpetration of the criminal act, even if they
have not materially participated in the commission of said act; in addition, they
may also be held responsible, under a number of well-defined conditions, for
criminal conduct that, although not originally envisaged in the common criminal
design, has been undertaken by one of the participants and may to some extent
be regarded as a natural and foreseeable consequence of such a common plan.
well as others), which means that he perpetrated the crime for which he has been pronounced guilty in
complicity with others. It further means that in cases of this kind where it is not possible to isolate
individual actions and their consequences or to distinguish the degree to which each person was involved in
their execution, it suffices that these actions complement each other and together form a single entity,
which the accused [Tepe] wishes to achieve by being involved. Therefore it was neither possible nor
necessary for the court of first instance to separate only the actions of the accused. It suffices that the
accused participated in executing these actions, even if it had only been one or two actions of personal
involvement in the beating of civilians. However, the court of first instance has established that the accused
personally beat up many individuals on many occasions' (2).
Also the decision of a Canadian court in Moreno deserves mentioning: In reaching this conclusion, I am
influenced by one commentator's view that the closer a person is involved in the decision-making process
and the less he or she does to thwart the commission of inhumane acts, the more likely criminal
responsibility will attach (...) of course, the further one is distanced from the decision makers, assuming
that one is not a "principal", then it is less likely that the required degree of complicity necessary to attract
criminal sanctions, or the application of the exclusion clause, will be met' (18). See also Ramirez (6-9)
245
It is also widely accepted that at the international level this mode of criminal
liability can take three different forms. It was the ICTY AC that first articulated in
Tadic (A] 1999) the doctrine of ICE as a fully fledged legal construct of modes of
criminal liability. However, the doctrine had already been upheld at the national
or international level by various courts, if only in passing. In Tadic (A] 1999) the
ICTY AC spelled out the three categories I will refer to below.
3.14.2 LIABILITY FOR A COMMON INTENTIONAL PURPOSE
(A) The notion
The first and more widespread category of liability is responsibility for acts
agreed upon when making the common plan or design. Here all the participants
share the same intent to commit a crime, and all are responsible, whatever their
role and position in carrying out the common criminal plan (even if they simply
vote, in an assembly or in a group, in favour of implementing such a plan). In
addition to shared intent, dolus eventualis (i.e. recklessness or advertent
recklessness) (see supra, 3.7) may also suffice to hold all participants in the
common plan criminally liable. For instance, if a group of servicemen decides to
deprive civilians of food and water in order to compel them to build a bridge
necessary for military operations or to disclose the names of other civilians who
have engaged in unlawful attacks on the military, and then some civilians die, the
servicemen should all be accountable not only for a ICE to commit the war
crimes of intentionally starving civilians and 'compelling the nationals of the
hostile party to take part in operations of war directed against their own country;
they should also be held guilty of murder. Indeed, even if the servicemen did not
intend to bring about the death of the civilians, the death was the natural and
foreseeable consequence of their common criminal plan and the follow-up action.
Society—in our case the world community—must defend itself from this collective
criminality by reacting in a repressive manner against all those who, in some
form, took part in the criminal enterprise. Society may not indulge in distinctions
between the different roles played by each of the participants when trying to
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uproot or, better, punish this form of collective criminality. All actors are guilty,
even though in some instances the mens rea (for example, intent to murder) is
not attended by the corresponding conduct (for example, stabbing or firing a
gun); this applies to all those who, while sharing the criminal intent, do not carry
out the primary crime (for example, the driver or the look-out in an armed robbery
involving murder). However, the differing degrees of culpability can be taken into
account at the stage of sentencing.
(B) Case law
In Ponzano, a case concerning the unlawful killing of four British prisoners of war
by German troops, the Judge Advocate adopted the approach suggested by the
Prosecutor, and stressed the requirement that an accused, before he can be
found guilty, must have been concerned in the offence (...T]o be concerned in the
commission of a criminal offence [...] does not only mean that you are the person
who in fact inflicted the fatal injury and directly caused death, be it by shooting or
by any other violent means; it also means an indirect degree of participation [...
l]n other words, he must be the cog in the wheel of events leading up to the result
which in fact occurred. He can further that object not only by giving orders for a
criminal offence to be committed, but he can further that object by a variety of
other means (at 7). The Judge Advocate also underlined that the accused should
have knowledge of the intended purpose of the criminal enterpriser.211
211 Georg Otto Sandrock et at. (also known as the Almelo Trial) can also be cited. Three Germans had
killed a British prisoner of war; it was clear that they had all had the intention of killing the British soldier.
although each of them played a different role. The British Court found all of them guilty of murder under
the doctrine of common enterprise' (at 35,40-1). In Holzer and others, brought before a Canadian military
court, in his summing up the ludge Advocate emphasized that the three accused (Germans who had killed a
Canadian prisoner of war) knew that the purpose of taking the Canadian to a particular area was to kill him.
The ludge Advocate spoke of a 'common enterprise' with regard to that murder (at 341, 347, 349). In Jepsen
and others a British court had to pronounce upon the responsibility ofJepsen and others for the death of
inmates of a concentration camp in transit to another concentration camp. The Prosecutor argued that '[l]f
lepsen was joining in this voluntary slaughter of eighty or so people, helping the others by doing his share
of killing, the whole eighty odd deaths can be laid at his door and at the door of any single man who was in
any way assisting in that act'. The Judge Advocate did not rebut the argument (at 241). In Schonfeld the
ludge Advocate stated that: 'ifsev-eral persons combine for an unlawful purpose or for a lawful purpose to
be effected by unlawful means, and one of them in carrying out that purpose, kills a man, it is murder in all
who are present f...] provided that the death was caused by a member of the party in the course othis
endeavours to effect the common object of the assembly' (68).
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In 2001, in Krstic, an ICTY TC held that the defendant had participated in a ICE
to commit genocide. The Court explained at length that initially Krstic had only
taken part in a common plan to forcibly expel Muslims from the area of
Srebrenica; however, later on, when it became apparent that the various military
leaders in fact were planning the killing of thousands of military-aged men, the
defendant showed, through his various acts and behaviour, that he shared the
'genocidal intent to kill the men' (§§621-45). The Chamber therefore found Krstic
guilty of genocide and sentenced him to 46 years in prison. The AC held instead
that Krstic was only guilty of complicity in genocide, for he had not shared the
genocidal intent but simply aided and abetted genocide. It reduced his sentence
to 35 years' imprisonment.
In 2003, in Blagojevic, Simic and others an ICTY TC held that the three accused,
Bosnian Serbs operating in the municipalities of Bosanski Sarna'; and Odzak in
Bosnia Herzegovina, committed various crimes there. The main defendant, Simic
(who, at the time of the conflict, was the President of the Municipal Assembly and
of the Crisis Staff, later renamed 'the War Presidency'), participated in a basic
form of JCE. He shared with others the intent to execute a common plan of
persecution to non-Serb civilians in the Bosanski Samac municipality. According
to the TC, Simic, as the highest-ranking civilian in the municipality, acted in
unison with others to execute a plan that included: the forcible takeover of the
town of Bosanski Samac, and the persecutions of non-Serb civilians in the area,
which took the form of unlawful arrests and detention, cruel and inhumane
treatment including beatings, torture, forced labour assignments, and
confinement under inhumane conditions, deportations and forcible transfers. The
Chamber held that he was a participant in the JCE, while no evidence permitted
the conclusion that the other two defendants were also participants (TC, 2003,
§§144-60,983-1055).212
212 It should be noted that the ICTR upheld the doctrine at issue as well. In Rwamakuba (Decision on
Interlocutory appeal) the AC held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to try the appellant on a charge of
genocide through the mode of liability of ICE ($§9-39). In Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gerard
¹akirutimana the AC relied upon the first category ofJCE, but found that the TC had been correct in not
applying the doctrine to the case at issue (§§462,466,468-84). In Simba, in 2005, an ICTR TC held [hat the
accused was guilty of JCE to commit genocide and extermination (§§386-96, 411-19, 420-6). In another
case where the Prosecution had similarly charged a person with JCE to commit genocide and extermination
(Mpambara), an ICTR TC held instead that no proof beyond a reasonable doubt had been tendered that the
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The ICTY took an important stand in Brdanin in 2004. In the indictment, the
Prosecution had alternatively pleaded the defendants criminal responsibility
pursuant to the first and third categories of JCE (on this third category see infra,
9.4,4). With respect to the first category, the Prosecution alleged in the various
counts that '(the purpose of the joint criminal enterprise was the permanent
forcible removal of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat inhabitants from the
territory of the planned Serbian state by the commission of the crimes alleged'.
The alternative pleading of the third category specified that '(the defendant] [was]
individually responsible for the crimes enumerated in [various counts] on the
basis that these crimes were natural and foreseeable consequences of the acts'
of deportation and forcible transfer of civilians. The Chamber noted that for both
categories of JCE to materialize, it was required to prove not only the existence
of a common criminal plan, but also that the crimes had been perpetrated by one
or more participants in such common plan. However, in the case at issue the
crimes had been committed by members of the army, police, and para-military
groups that had not participated in the criminal plan or enterprise (§345)213 The
Chamber therefore dismissed the applicability of the notion of JCE to those
crimes (§§351 and 355). However, the AC reversed the TC decision on this
issue, taking the contrary view. After reviewing post-Second World War case law
it concluded that such case law recognizes the imposition of liability upon an
accused for his participation in a common criminal purpose, where the conduct
that comprises the criminal actus reus is perpetrated by persons who do not
share the common purpose and that in addition it does not require proof that
there was an understanding or agreement to commit that particular crime
between the accused and the principal perpetrator of the crime. The AC thus
held that [\V]hat matters in a first category ICE is not whether the person who
carried out the actus  reus of a particular crime is a member of JCE, but whether
the crime in question forms part of the common purpose, in cases where the
principal perpetrator of a particular crime is not a member of the JCE, this
accused possessed the intent to be part of a JCE. It consequently acquitted him on all counts of the
indictment (§§13-4,38-40, 76, 113,164).
213 The TC had set out the same view in a previous decision in the same case (Brdanin, Decision on Form
of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, §44).
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essential requirement may be inferred from various circumstances, including the
fact that the accused or any other member of the ICE closely cooperated with the
principal perpetrator in order to further the common criminal purpose. In this
respect, when a member of the JCE uses a person outside the JCE to carry out
the actus reus of a crime, the fact that the person in question knows of the
existence of the ICE—without it being established that he or she shares the
mens rea necessary to become a member of the) CE—may be a factor to be
taken into account when determining whether the crime forms part of the
common criminal purpose. However, this is not a sine qua non for imputing
liability for the crime to that member of the JCE (§410). (...] Considering the
discussion of post-World War II cases and of the Tribunals jurisprudence above,
the Appeals Chamber finds that, to hold a member of the JCE responsible for
crimes committed by non-members of the enterprise, it has to be shown that the
crime can be imputed to one member of the joint criminal enterprise, and that this
member—when using a principal perpetrator—acted in accordance with the
common plan. The existence of this link is a matter to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis (§413).
The AC clinched the point by adding, always in light of post-Second World War
jurisprudence, that when the principal perpetrator is not part of the JCE, for the
accused to be held liable for the crime perpetrated, an understanding or an
agreement between the accused and the principal perpetrator of the crime is not
necessary. It may suffice that the crime at issue be part of the common criminal
purpose (§§415-19) and the accused 'uses' the principal perpetrator to further
that purpose (§§430-1).
For the reasons set out below (§§9.4.5), it is respectfully submitted that this
broadening of the notion under discussion is excessive and raises doubts about
its consistency with the nullum crimen principle and the principle of personal
responsibility. The AC'S ruling in Brctdilin seems all the more objectionable
because in the same case the Chamber also held that the doctrine of the JCE
extends to large-scale cases' or in other words covers instances where crimes
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are perpetrated on a large scale by individuals who are remote from the accused
(§§420-5).
3.14.3 LIABILITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN A COMMON CRIMINAL
PLAN WITHIN AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
(A) The notion
The second modality of liability is that of responsibility for carrying out a task
within a criminal design that is implemented in an institution such as an
internment, detention, or concentration camp. In one such camp where inmates
are severely ill-treated and even tortured, not only the head of the camp, but also
his senior aids and those who physically inflict torture and other inhuman
treatment bear responsibility for those acts. In addition to those who physically
carry out the misdeeds, also those who discharge administrative duties
indispensable for the achievement of the camp's main goals (for example, to
register the incoming inmates, record their death, give them medical treatment,
or provide them with food) may incur criminal liability.
They bear this responsibility so long as they (i) are aware of the serious abuses
being perpetrated (knowledge); (ii) willingly take part in the functioning of the
institution (intent); and (iii) make an important contribution to the pursuit of the
institution's goals. That they should be held responsible is only logical and
natural: by fulfilling their administrative or other operational tasks, they contribute
to the commission of crimes. Without their willing support, crimes could not be
perpetrated. Thus, how- ever peripheral their role, they may constitute an
indispensable cog in the murdering machinery. The man who, upon arrival of
new trains at Auschwitz, separated the men and the women from the children
and the elderly, knowing that this served to establish who should be a forced
labourer and who should instead be sent immediately to gas chambers, was
instrumental in the perpetration of extermination. Had he intended to shirk
criminal responsibility, he should have asked to be relieved of his duties and to
discharge other duties elsewhere. This decision was possible and was
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sometimes made (although it often involved being sent to combat zones on the
Eastern Front). Similarly, the locomotive driver of a train that carried hundreds of
detainees to Auschwitz could have been held criminally liable for his participation
in extermination, so long as he knew what would happen to the persons he was
transporting and showed to share the intent to exterminate those persons by
willingly continuing to fulfill his role (instead of asking to be exempted from this
horrible task).
It can thus be noted that for this mode of liability no previous plan or agreement
is required. Nevertheless, one can legitimately hold that each participant in the
criminal institutional framework not only is cognizant of the crimes in which the
institution or its members engage, but also implicitly or expressly shares the
criminal intent to commit such crimes. It cannot be otherwise, because any
person discharging a task of some consequence in the institution could refrain
from participating in its criminal activity by leaving it. As pointed out above, for
criminal liability to arise it is also necessary that the person at issue make a
substantial contribution to the joint criminal enterprise. It follows that those who,
for example, merely sweep the streets or clean the laundry should not incur
criminal liability for their action, although they may both be aware of the criminal
purpose pursued by the whole institution and share it.
Clearly, this mode of responsibility is very close to that of criminal organizations
laid down in the IMT Charter annexed to the London Agreement of 8 August
1945 (Articles 9-11), and upheld in some respects by the IMT at Nuremberg (see
infra, 2.2). Indeed, in both cases belonging to and operating for an organization
(or an institutional framework) that primarily or at least in part pursues criminal
purposes involves, subject to certain conditions, the personal guilt of a member.
However, the conditions for personal liability of a member to arise are only
partially similar. True in both cases membership as such is not punishable. In
both cases it is necessary for the member to have knowledge of the criminal acts
being committed or be personally implicated in the commission of such acts.214
214 In Goring and others the IMT held that the definition or criminal organization 'should exclude persons
who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted by
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However, in the case of criminal organization this would be sufficient, for the
assumption is that the organization as such institutionally pursues a criminal
purpose (e.g. extermination of a racial or religious group). Instead, in the JCE
under consideration, since the institutional aims are not per se criminal (the camp
has been established to detain prisoners of war, or intern enemy civilians, etc.),
but the institution is incidentally used for criminal purposes (torture, murder,
extermination, rape, etc.), it is also necessary for a member to make a
substantial contribution to the furtherance of criminal purposes, for his liability to
arise.
(B) Case law
One can find a particularly clear and significant illustration of this category of
criminality in Alfons Klein and others (the Hadamar trial), heard by a US Military
Commission sitting at Wiesbaden. It is fitting to dwell on this case at some length,
because it best shows how the category of criminality at hand works.
The accused were seven Germans. Between July 1944 and April 1945, they
killed over 400 Polish and Russian nationals, who had been obliged to work in
Germany for the German war effort and were suffering from tuberculosis or
pneumonia. Brought to Hadamar, in Germany, where there was a hospital or
institution originally designed to care for the mentally unsound, but with no
medical facilities to treat persons ill with tuberculosis or pneumonia, they were
told that they would be given medication. In fact they were killed by injections of
poisonous drugs; afterwards the relevant medical records and death certificates
were falsified. It would seem that the primary purpose of these killings was to
make space in hospitals for German war victims. The accused comprised Klen,
the administrative head of the hospital, a local Nazi Party leader who made all
the arrangements leading to the perpetration of the atrocities; Wahlmann, a
physician specializing in mental diseases, the Institution's only doctor (he
participated in the conferences designed to plan the murders, knew what was
the State for membership, unless they were personally implicated in the commission of acts declared
criminal by Article 6 or the Charter as members of the organization' (at 256).
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going on at the hospital, and acquiesced in it); three nurses, Ruoff, Willig, and
Huber, who administered the poisonous drugs; Merkle, the institution's book-
keeper (who registered incoming patients for the purpose of recording dates and
causes of death, actually falsifying these documents); and Blum, a doorman and
telephone switchboard operator, who also served as caretaker of the cemetery,
charged with burying the victims in mass graves (but he sometimes walked
through the wards to inspect the victims before they were taken, dead, to his
cellars a few hours later).
The charge for all of them was 'violation of international law', namely, as the
Prosecutor specified in his opening argument, breach of the laws of warfare (at
202). The specification stated that the seven accused 'acting jointly and in
pursuance of a common intent' did [...] willfully, deliberately and wrongfully aid,
abet and participate in the killing of human beings of Polish and Russian
nationality'. Thus, in addition to the notion of 'participation in killing based on
common intent' also the notion of 'aiding and abetting' was used. However, in his
Opening Argument the Prosecutor, when setting out the applicable law (there
was no Judge Advocate), emphasized that all those who participate in a common
criminal enterprise are equally guilty as 'co-principals whatever the role played by
each single participant. Referring to the case of murder committed by sever
persons, he pointed out that
Every single one of those who participated in any degree towards the
accomplishment of that result [murder] is as much guilty of murder as the man
who actually pulled the trigger [...] That is why under our (that is US) Federal Law
all distinctions between accomplices, between accessories before the fact and
accessories after the fact, have been completely eliminated. Anyone who
participates in the commission of any crime, whether formerly called as an
accessory or no, are now co-principals and have been so for several years (203).
Moving then to the case at bar, the Prosecutor in fact offered an eloquent
illustration of the rationale behind the legal notion he was invoking :
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At this Hadamar mill there was operated production line of death. Not a single
one of these accused could do all the things that were necessary in order to have
the entire scheme of things in operation. For instance, the accused Klein, the
administrative head, make arrangements for their death chamber, and at the
same time go up these and use the needle that did the dirty work, and then also
turn around and haul the bodies out and bury them, and falsify the records and
the death certificates. No, when you do business on a wholesale production
basis as they did at the Hadamar Institution, that murder factory, it means that
you have to have several people doing different things of that illegal operation in
order to produce the results, and you cannot draw a distinction between the man
who may have initially conceived the idea of killing them and those who
participated in the commission of those offences. Now, there is no question but
that any person, who participated in that matter, no matter to what extent,
technically is guilty of the charge that has been brought [...] every single one of
the accused has overtly and affirmatively participated in this entire network that
brought about the illegal result (205-7).
The defence counsel did not dispute these concepts, but in their arguments
preferred to rely upon the notions of necessity and superior orders, or argued
that German law rather than US or international law should apply. The Court
upheld the charge. The administrative head of the hospital and two nurses were
sentenced to death; the physician (a 70-year-old man) to life imprisonment and
hard labour; the book-keeper to 35 years and hard labour; the third nurse to 25
years and hard labour; the doorman and caretaker to 30 years and hard labour
(at 247).
Courts also applied this notion of JCE in cases where the crimes had allegedly
been committed by members of military or administrative units running
concentration camps; that is, by groups of persons acting pursuant to a
concerted plan.215 In such cases the accused held some position of authority
215 See, for instance, such cases as Dachau Concentration Camp. brought before a US Tribunal under
Control Council Law no. 10 (at 5. 14), Nadlerand others, decided by a British Court of Appeal under
Control Council Law no. 10 (at 132-4), Auschwitz Concentration Camp, decided by a German Court (at
882), as well as Belsen, decided by a British military court sitting in Germany (121).
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within the hierarchy of the concentration camps. Normally, the defendants were
charged with having acted in pursuance of a common design to kill or mistreat
prisoners and hence to commit war crimes.216 When found guilty, they were
regarded as co-principals in the various crimes of ill-treatment, because of their
objective 'position of authority' within the concentration camp system and
because they had 'the power to look after the inmates and make their life
satisfactory' but failed to do so. In these cases, as the ICTY AC pointed out in
Tadic (AJ, 1999) the required actus reus was the active participation in the
enforcement of a system of repression, as it could be inferred from the position of
authority and the specific functions held by each accused. The mens rea element
comprised: (i) knowledge of the nature of the system and (ii) the intent to further
the common concerted design to ill-treat inmates. It is important to note that, in
these cases, the requisite intent could also be inferred from the position of
authority held by the camp personnel. Indeed, it was scarcely necessary to prove
intent where the individual's high rank or authority would have, m and of itself,
indicated an awareness of the common design and an intent to participate
therein. All those convicted were found guilty of the war crime of ill-treatment,
although of course the penalty varied according to the degree of participation of
each accused in the commission of the war crime (§203).
Later on an ICTY TC invoked this mode of responsibility in 2001 in Kvocka and
others. The Chamber found that the five defendants had occupied positions or
roles in the operation of a detention camp at Omarska, where various crimes
were committed (persecution, murder, and torture). Kvocka had been the camp
commander's right hand; Kos was a guard shift commander; Radic was a shift
commander. Zigic, who was a taxi driver in the Prijedor area during the period of
26 May to 30 August 1992, used to enter Omarska as well as other two camps
for the purpose of abusing, beating, torturing, and killing prisoners. Finally, Prcac
216 In his summing up in the Betsen case, the Judge Advocate took up the three requirements set out by the
Prosecution as necessary to establish guilt in each case: (i) the existence of an organized system to ill-treat
the detainees and commit the various crimes alleged; (ii) the accused's awareness of the nature of the
system; and (iii) the fact that the accused in some way actively participated in enforcing the system, i.e.
encouraged, aided, and abetted or in any case participated in the realization of the common criminal design
(637-41).
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was de facto a deputy camp commander. According to the Chamber, the
Omarska camp 'was a JCE, a facility used to interrogate, discriminate against,
and otherwise abuse non-Serbs from Prijedor and which functioned as a means
to rid the territory of or subjugate non-Serbs' (§323). The Chamber held that the
continuous perpetration of crimes in the camp was common knowledge to
anybody living there (§324). It held that all the accused formed part of a ]CE to
commit the crimes ascribed to them, and sentenced all of them to varying
sentences. The AC confirmed the convictions and sentences.
It is worth stressing that the TC rightly emphasized the need for the participation
of a person in an institutionalized JCE to be 'significant'; that is, through 'an act or
omission that makes an enterprise efficient or effective; e.g. a participation that
enables the system to run more smoothly or without disruption' (§309). It then
wisely went on to note that the significance of the contribution is to be determined
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a variety of factors (§311). On this
point the AC took a slightly different stand.217
In other cases the Chamber has stressed the need for the contribution of each
participant in a JCE to be 'substantial'.218 For instance, in Lima] and others an
ICTYTC found that the Prosecution had not proved that the three accused
persons (members of the Kosovo Liberation Army) were liable for a joint criminal
enterprise to commit in 1998 such crimes as torture, ill-treatment, and murder in
a prison camp in Kosovo (§§665-70).
It bears noting that the requirement that the contribution of a participant in a JCE
should be 'substantial' had not been envisaged by the ICTY AC in Tadic (A],
1999, §227). This requirement seems to the present writer to be indispensable.
217 It held that 'in general, there is no specific legal requirement that the accused make a substantial
contribution to the JCE. However, there may be specific cases which require, as an exception to the general
rule, a substantial contribution of the accused to determine whether he participated in the ]CE. In practice,
the significance of the accused's contribution will be relevant to demonstrating that the accused shared the
intent to pursue the common purpose ($97). However, the Chamber subsequently held that in some
exceptional cases the 'substantial' character of a participants contribution is needed (§599).
218 Ibid.. §667
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3.14.4 INCIDENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY BASED ON FORESIGHT AND
VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK:
(A) The notion
The third mode of responsibility concerns those participants who agreed to the
main goal of the common criminal design (for instance, the forcible expulsion of
civilians from an occupied territory) but did not share the intent that one or more
members of the group entertained to also commit other  crimes incidental to the
main concerted crime (for instance, killing or wounding some of the civilians in
the process of their expulsion). This mode of liability only arises if the participant
who did not have the intent to commit the 'incidental' offence, was nevertheless
in a position to foresee its commission and willingly took the risk.
A clear example in domestic criminal law of this mode of liability is that of a gang
of thugs who agree to rob a bank without killing anyone, and to this end agree to
use fake weapons. In this group, however, one of the members secretly takes
real weapons with him to the bank with the intent to kill, if need be. Suppose
another participant in the common criminal plan sees this gang member stealthily
carrying those weapons. If the armed man then kills a teller or bank officer during
the robbery, the one who saw him take the real weapons may be held liable for
robbery and murder, like the killer and unlike the other robbers, who will only be
liable for armed robbery. Indeed, he was in a position to expect with reasonable
certainty that the robber who was armed with real weapons would use them to
kill, if something went wrong during the robbery. Although he did not share the
mens rea of the murderer, he foresaw the event and willingly took the risk that it
might come about (plainly, he could have told the other robbers that there was a
serious danger of a murder being committed; consequently, he could either have
taken the weapons away from the armed robber or withdrawn from the specific
robbing expedition or even dropped out of the gang).
To clarify the matter, one should perhaps distinguish between an abstract and a
concrete foreseeability of the unconcerted crime. Arguably, for criminal liability
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under the third category of ICE to arise it is necessary for the unconcerted crime
to be abstractly in line with the agreed-upon criminal offence; in addition, it is also
essential that the 'secondary offender' had a chance of predicting the
commission of the unconcerted crime by the 'primary offender'. For instance, if a
paramilitary unit occupies a village with the purpose of detaining all the women
and enslaving them, a rape perpetrated by one of them would be in line with
enslavement, since treating other human beings as objects may easily lead to
raping them. It would, however, also be necessary for the 'secondary offender' to
have specifically envisaged the possibility of rape (a circumstance that should be
proved or at least inferred from the facts of the case), or at least to have been in
a position to predict the rape.
Furthermore, we should ask ourselves whether the mens rea requirement for this
JCE is the 'secondary offenders' subjective foresight of the likelihood of the crime
being committed by the 'primary offender (i.e. the 'secondary offender' actually
foresaw that the offence would be committed), or instead objective foreseeability
of that likelihood (i.e. he ought to have foreseen that the crime was likely to be
perpetrated). As the Supreme Court of Canada rightly pointed out in two
celebrated decisions concerning constructive murder' (i.e. murder imputed to a
person by law from his course of actions, though his deeds taken severally do
not amount to voluntary murder), R. v. Vaillancourt (1987) and R. v. Martineau
(1990), objective foreseeability constitutes a lower threshold.219 This threshold
the Court in Vaillancourt considered admissible in cases of 'constructive murder',
whereas in Martineau the same Court held the subjective test to be more
consonant with principles of fundamental justice. Probably the later ruling was
219 See R. v. Vaillancourt, judgment of 3 December 1987, [19871 2 S.C.R 636 (online:
www.scc.lexum.umontreal.ia/1987/1987rcs2-636, at 24-29) and R. v. Martineau, judgment of 13
September 1990, [1990] 2. S.C.R 633 (online at: www.scc.lexiim.umontreal.ca/1990/199rcs2-633, at 16-
20). The facts in Vaillancourt are interesting. During an armed robbery, appellants accomplice shot and
killed a client. He then escaped but the appellant was arrested and convicted of second degree murder (i.e.
unlawful taking of human life with malice but without deliberation or premeditation) as a party to the
offence. However, the two had previously agreed to commit the robbery armed only with knives; when on
the night ofthe robbery the accomplice arrived with a gun, the appellant insisted that it be unloaded; the
accomplice removed three bullets from the gun and gave them to the appellant, whose glove containing the
three bullets was later recovered by the police at the scene ofthe crime. The Court upheld the appeal against
conviction and ordered a new trial. As Judge L'Heureux-Dube later noted in his dissenting opinion in
Martineau, "The facts themselves in Vaillancourt negated mens rea [...] Given these facts, it seems unlikely
that Vaillancourt, or any reasonable person in his position, had reason to foresee that anyone would be
killed in the course ofthe robbery' (at 29).
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also dictated by the fact that under Canadian legislation a finding of murder
entails a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment; it was therefore felt necessary
to raise the threshold of culpability for any such finding. Be that as it may, it
would seem that at the inter- national level the lower requirement of objective
foreseeability is upheld by case law, as proved by the cases that I will consider
below. In other words, at the international level what is required is not that the
'secondary offender' actually predicted that the 'primary offender' would engage
in unconcerted criminal conduct; the test is rather whether a man of reasonable
prudence would have forecast that conduct, under the circumstances prevailing
at the time. Three reasons seem to warrant the acceptance of a lower threshold
at the international level. First, the crimes at issue are massive and of extreme
gravity; moreover, they are normally perpetrated under exceptional
circumstances of armed violence. Under these circumstances one can
legitimately expect that combatants and other persons participating in armed
hostilities or involved in large-scale atrocities be particularly alert to the possible
consequences of their actions. Secondly, the gravity of the crimes at issue
makes it necessary for the world community to prevent and punish serious
misconduct to the maximum extent allowed by the principle of legality. Thirdly, in
ICL there is no fixed scale of penalties; courts are therefore free duly to appraise
the level of culpability of the accused and impose a congruous sentence
accordingly.
Some commentators have noted that the foreseeability standard on which this
form of liability is based is unreliable, so much so that through such a standard—
it has been claimed—the doctrine introduces a 'form of strict liability'. It has also
been contended that this category of criminal enterprise disregards the necessity
that a person be held guilty only if his culpability has been proven; or in other
words, that the causal link between his conduct and mens rea on the one side,
and the crime, on the other, be proved. Based on that doctrine, one would find a
person guilty of, say, murder, even if that person lacked the requisite subjective
element (intent or dolus) proper to the crime and only entertained a lesser form of
mens rea (foreseeability plus willingly taking the risk that the crime be
perpetrated; that is dolus eventualis). It would follow that the causal link between
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mens rea and conduct on the one side and the event or crime, on the other,
would be lacking. Thus—so the objection continues—under certain conditions,
one would place on a par the person who deliberately brought about the death of
the victim with an individual who instead did not intend to cause such effect.
This objection is indisputably important,'220 and can be met by propounding three
arguments.
First, the foundation of this mode of responsibility is to be found in considerations
of public policy; that is the need to protect society against persons who (i) band
together to take part in criminal enterprises; and (ii) while not sharing the criminal
intent of those participants who intend to commit more serious crimes outside the
common enterprise, nevertheless are aware that such crimes may be committed;
and (iii) do not oppose or prevent them. These policy considerations were aptly
spelled out by the House of Lords in 1997, in two cases decided jointly, Regina v.
220 For critical remarks about ICE, see in particular 1. D. Ohiin, 'Three Conceptual Problems with the
Doctrine of loint Criminal Enterprise, 5/fC/(2007),69-90, in particular 75-88 (this paperis, however, marred
by the insistence on the concept of conspiracy and a misapprehension of the relevant international c«se
law); E. van Sliedregt, *)oint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide*,
ibid., 184-207, particularly 187-91; K. Ambos, ')oint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility',
ibid., 159-83.
Less significant is the objection frequently heard whereby the category of ICE under discussion in fact
amounts to, or is equally objectionable as, the common law concept of' felony-murder'. Such concept, still
widespread (albeit on the wane) in such countries as the UK, some states of the USA, New Zealand and
cer- ta'.ii Australian states, is substantially different from JCE. As first enunciated by Coke in 1797 (E.
Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, London: Clarke and Sons, 181/, at 56) , the
concept entails that if an unlawful act involves the perpetration of murder, then the individual is guilty of
murder (in the celebiated exanple by Coke, if a person (A), intending to steal a dear in the park of another
person (B), throws an arrow at the dear but in so doing kills a boy hidden in a bush, he is guilty of murder
'for that act was unlawful, although A. had no intent to hurt the boy, nor knew not ot him'). The concept has
been widely criticized for it equates manslaughter (involuntary killing) to murder i.e. intentional killing of
another person. In the case of the )CE we are discussing the secondary offender not only is involved in a
common criminal plan or purpose to commit some crimes and has the intention to commit those crimes, but
also actually foresees (or is in a position to foresee) the likely perpetration of a further crime by a member
of the criminal group, and nevertheless deliberately accepts the risk of such likelihood. There is therefore
here a mental clement present with regard to the perpetration ofthe 'extra crime' (dolus eventualis) that is
instead absent in the felony-murder or, if present, then only in the attenuated form ofculpa (negligence). In
the case of 'felony-murder' the agent does not figure out at all the possibility of killing a person as a result
of his engaging in an unlawful action such as theft; instead in the category of ICE we are discussing the
agent is aware (or at least is fully in a position to be aware) that a crime may be perpetrated by another
person and deliberately omits to take action (i.e. to stop or prevent that person from perpetrating the crime,
or to disassociate himself from that criminal conduct). In addition, the concept of?CE can only be relied
upon on condition that the lesser culpability ofthe secondary offender shall be taken into account at the
sentencing stage.
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Powell and another and Regina v. English221, although the cases concerned
crimes committed at the domestic level. The speeches of Lords Steyn222 and
Sutton223 arc enlightening. In their view by punishing the 'secondary-offender' the
221 In the first case. P., D„ and a third man went to the home of a dealer in cannabis. As soon as he opened
the door, one member of the group shot him and he died shortly afterwards. The defendants were charged
with murder on the basis ofjoint enterprise. At the trial P. gave evidence and claimed that he was present at
the scene only to buy cannabis. D. did not give evidence, but it was submitted on his behalf that he was
unaware ofthe presence ofthe gun until it was used and that P. was responsible for the shooting. Both
defendants were convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed both defendants'
appeals.
In the second case, the defendant, E., aged 15 at the time ofthe offence, and W. were convicted ofthe
murder of a police sergeant on the basis ofjoint enterprise. Both the defendant and W. had attacked the
deceased with wooden posts. At the trial it was the Crown's case that the defendant was present when W.
produced the knife with which the fatal injuries were inflicted. It was maintained on the defendant's behalf
that there was evidence that he had fled the scene before W. produced the knife. The Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division) dismissed, however, E.'s appeal.
222 16 His Lordship stated the following: 'At first glance there is substance in the third argument (ofcoun'
for the Appellants] that it is anomalous that a lesser form of culpability is required in the case ofaseconda
party, viz. foresight of the possible commission of the greater offence, whereas in the case of the prima
offender the law insists on proof of the specific intention which is an ingredient of the offence. This gener
argument leads, in the present case, to the particular argument that it is anomalous that the secondary par
can be guilty of murder if he foresees the possibility of such a crime being committed while the prima can
only be guilty if he has an intent to kill or cause really serious injury. Recklessness may suffice in t' case of
the secondary party but it does not in the case of the primary offender. The answer to this suppos' anomaly,
and other similar cases across the spectrum of criminal law, is to be found in practical an4 poll
considerations. If the law required proof of the specific intention on the part ofa secondary party, the utili of
the accessory principle would be gravely undermined. It is just that a secondary party who foresees th the
primary offender might kill with the intent sufficient for murder, and assists and encourages the p) mary
offender in the criminal enterprise on this basis, should be guilty of murder. He ought to be criminal liable
for harm which he foresaw and which in fact resulted from the crime he assisted and encouraged. B it
would in practice almost invariably be impossible for a jury to say that the secondary party wanted dea to
be caused or that he regarded it as virtually certain. In the real world proof of an intention sufficient murder
would be well nigh impossible in the vast majority ofjoint enterprise cases. Moreover, the propos change in
the law must be put in context. The criminal justice system exists to control crime. A prime fun tion of that
system must be to deal justly but effectively with those who join with others in criminal enterprises.
Experience has shown that joint criminal enterprises only too readily escalate into the commission of
greater offences. In order to deal with this important social problem the accessory principle is needed a)
cannot be abolished or relaxed. For these reasons I would reject the arguments advanced in favour of t
revision of the accessory principle' (8).
223 My Lords, I recognise that as a matter of logic there is force in the argument advanced on behalf oft
appellants, and that on one view it is anomalous that ifforeseeability of death or really serious harm is n
sufficient to constitute mens rea for murder in the party who actually carries out the killing, it is sufficie to
constitute mens rea in a secondary party. But the rules of the common law are not based solely on lo; but
relate to practical concerns and, in relation to crimes committed in the course ofjoint enterprises, to the
need to give effective protection to the public against criminals operating in gangs. As Lord Salmon stat in
Reg. v, Majewski (1977] A.C. 443,482e, in rejecting criticism based on strict logic ofa rule of the
comnrlaw, "this is the view that has been adopted by the common law of England, which is founded on
commnsense and experience rather than strict logic". In my opinion there are practical considerations of
weight a: importance related to considerations of public policy which justify the principle stated in Chan
Wing-Sili The Queen 11985) A.C. 168 and which prevail over considerations of strict logic' (15)
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law intends to convey the message that he should have opposed or impeded the
crime of the 'primary offender'.
The second argument is more germane to strictly legal considerations. Generally
speaking, one should not neglect an important factor: incidental criminal liability
based on foresight and risk is a mode of liability that is consequential on (and
incidental to) a common criminal plan; that is, an agreement by a multitude of
persons to engage in illegal conduct. The 'extra crime' we are discussing is the
outgrowth of previously agreed or planned criminal conduct for which each
participant in the common plan is already responsible. This 'extra crime' is
rendered possible by the prior joint planning to commit the agreed crime(s) other
than the one 'incidentally' or 'additionally' perpetrated. Thus, what is at stake here
is not the responsibility arising when members of a group (for instance, a military
unit) engage in lawful action for example, overpowering by military force an
enemy fortification) and in the course of combat one of the combatants kills a
civilian or rapes a woman—a crime for which of course he alone must bear
criminal responsibility. Our discussion here turns, rather, on cases where a
plurality of persons agrees to perpetrate one or more crimes for which they all
bear responsibility and in addition one of them commits a further crime. Here, it is
plain, the additional crime is premised on the existence of a concerted criminal
purpose. In other words, there exists a causal link between the concerted crime
and the 'incidental' crime: the former constitutes the preliminary sine qua non
condition and the basis of the latter (although, with regard to the latter, only the
participant that evinced knowledge and risk-taking shares the liability of the other
participant who perpetrated the 'additional' offence). To clarify further the nexus
between the two categories of crimes at issue, it could perhaps prove useful to
insist on the distinction between abstract and concrete (or specific) foreseeability,
suggested above (9.4.4).224
224 The fact that the incidental crime may be based on a nexus with the concerted crime was clearly
emphasized by various courts. Suffice it to mention here the decision of the Italian Court of Cassation in
D'Ottavio and others (decision of 12 March 1947).Two former Yugoslav war prisoners, who had escaped
from a concentration camp, were suddenly surrounded by tour local individuals near an Italian village.
While one of them managed to flee, the other man was hit by two gunshots fired by D'Ottavio with his
hunting rifle. The four aggressors then immediately left the scene. The injured man later died. The Teramo
Court of Assize held that the accused had not intended to kill. With regard to the defendants other than
D'Ottavio, it applied Article 116 of the Italian Criminal Code, providing that 'Where the crime committed is
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The third response to the objections under discussion is directed to emphasize
that the basic proposition suggested here on the basis of existing case law (that
any participant in a JCE is also guilty for acts by another participant, under the
conditions set out in the case law) is premised on the proposition that at the
sentencing stage one must, however, take into account the different degrees of
culpability of the participants. The lesser form of mens rea of the 'secondary
offender' shall be taken into account by meting out a lighter sentence than that
inflicted on the participant who materially perpetrated the offence not envisaged
in the criminal plan. Both participants are guilty, but the one who did not
different from that willed by one of the participants, also that participant answers for the crime, if the fact is
a consequence of his action or omission, it the crime committed is more serious than that willed, the
penalty is decreased for the participant who wlUcci the less serious offence.' On appeal, the Court of
Cassation held that: 'The complaint concerning the application of Article 116 is also without merit. By
virtue of this provision, where the crime committed is other than the one willed bv one of the participants,
also that participant is accountable for the crime if the criminal result is a consequence of his action or
omission. In order for a criminal event to be held to constitute the consetilience of the participant's action, it
is necessary that there be a causation nexus—which is not only objective but also psychological—between
the fact committed and willed by all the participants and the dif- ferent fact committed by one ofthe
participants. This is so because the participant's responsibility envisaged in Article I i6 is grounded not in
the notion of collective responsibility 1...] but in the fundamental principle of concurrence of
interdependent causes, upheld and specified in Articles 40 and 41 ofthe Criminal Code. By virtue ofth';
latter principle all the participants answer for a crime both where they are the direct cause of the crime and
where they are the indirect cause, in accordance with the canon causa causae est causa causati (the cause of
a cause is also the cause ofthe thing caused; i.e. whoever voluntarily creates a situation bringing to, or
resulting in, criminal conduct is accountable for that conduct whether or not he willed the crime]. It is this
concurrence of causes that also in this particular case of participation re-establishes the requirement of legal
identity ofthe fact that is the precondition ofthe cooperation "in the commission of same crime". This
identity is at least generic if not specific in that all the defendants have effectively contributed to the first
crime that was the cause ofthe second. Here lies the nexus of objective causation: all participants have
directly cooperated in the crime of attempted illegal detention of persons (provided for in Article 605 ofthe
Criminal Code) by surrounding and chasing two fugitive prisoners of war, armed with a gun and a musket
for the purpose of unlawfully capturing them. This crime was the indirect cause ofthe subsequent and
connected event consisting ofthe rifle shot that D'Ottavio alone fired at one ofthe fugitives, a rifle shot that
caused a wound followed by death (see Article 584 on manslaughter). There also exists a psychological
causation in that all the participants shared the conscious will to engage in an attempt to unlawfully detain a
person while foreseeing a possible different crime, as can be inferred from the use of weapons: it was to
anticipate that one of them might have shot at the fugitives with a view to achieving the common purpose
of capturing them.'
It would seem that the Court rightly stressed the causal link between the concerted and the not-envisaged
crime, by pointing to the fact that this causal link related to the objective element of the crime at issue.
However, there is ultimately a link with regard to the subjective element as well. The participant in the
fCEto commit a specific crime or set of crimes is put in the position to foresee the further, unconcerted c-
rime, on account of his joining the criminal enterprise to commit the agreed upon crime. Although he did
not share the intent ofthe participant that engaged in the further criminal conduct, he had predicted that
conduct and willingly taken the risk that it might occur. There lies his culpability. He could have prevented
the further crime, or disassociated himself from its likely commission. His failure to do so entails that he
too must be held guilty. See also Mannetti and others.
264
materially perpetrate the further crime must receive a less stiff sentence on
account of his lesser culpability.
(B) Limitations of the category at issue
There exist two important qualifications to the application of the third class of JCE
under discussion.
First, resorting to such class would be intrinsically ill-founded when the crime
committed by the 'primary offender' requires special or specific intent (dolus
specialis), that is, the crime charged is one of genocide, persecution, or
aggression (it is common knowledge that for genocide the intent to destroy a
'protected group' in whole or in part is required; persecution presupposes the
intent to discriminate on one of the requisite grounds; aggression, at least in the
opinion of some commentators,225 is grounded in the intent to appropriate a
foreign territory or to obtain economic advantages, or to interfere with the internal
affairs of the victim state; see above, 7.3.3(B)). In these cases the 'secondary
offender' may not share—by definition—that special intent (otherwise one would
fall under the first and second class of JCE), even though entertaining such intent
is a sine qua non condition for being charged with the crime. He may therefore
not be accused of such crime under the doctrine at issue. This proposition is
based on two grounds. First, on a logical impossibility: one may not be held
responsible for committing a crime that requires special intent (in addition to the
intent needed for the underlying crime) unless that special intent can be proved,
whatever mode of responsibility for the commission of crimes is relied upon (this
leaves out aiding and abetting, where it suffices to prove that the offender has
made a substantial contribution to the commission of the crime by others, had
knowledge of the crime, and intentionally provided assistance to its perpetration).
Secondly, admittedly whoever is liable under the third category of JCE has a
distinct mens rea from that of the 'primary offender'; nevertheless, as the
'secondary offender' bears responsibility for the same crime as the 'primary
225 S.GIaser.'Quelquesremarquessurladefinitiondel'agressionendroitintrnatioalpenal'in FPfsc/irif fir
Th.Rittler(A.nlen: Verlag Scientia, 1957), at 388-93; Idem 'Culpability en droit international penal', in 99
Hague Recueil (1960-1), at 504-5.
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offender,' the 'distance' between the subjective element of the two offenders must
not be as drastic as in the case of crimes requiring special intent. Otherwise the
crucial notions of 'personal culpability' and 'causation' would be torn to shreds226
For such crimes the 'secondary offender' could only be-charged— it is
submitted—with aiding and abetting the main crime (needless to say, subject to
the condition that the requirements of aiding or abetting the commission of one of
the three classes of aforementioned crimes are met).
Let us now consider the second qualification to the application of the third class
of JCE under discussion. Mature legal systems make it possible to take account
of the lesser degree of culpability of the 'secondary offender' by qualifying his
culpability through a charge less than that against the 'primary offender'. If the
latter has engaged in murder while conducting a concerted unlawful deportation
of civilians, the 'secondary offender' could be accused of manslaughter. This
different charge would take into account the lesser degree of culpability of that
offender. Unfortunately ICL is a rudimentary body); of law, which allows for such
sophisticated distinctions or gradations only to a very limited extent. In short, one
cannot charge a lesser offender with an offence belonging to a different category
of international crimes; for instance, one cannot charge the 'primary offender'
with murder as a crime against humanity and the 'secondary offender' with
murder as a war crime. This would indeed be erroneous, for the two categories
226 In 2004 the ICTY AC took a contrary view in Brdanin, with regard to genocide, [n its Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal of 19 March 2004 it held that 'provided that the standard applicable to that head of
Iiability [the third category of JCE], i.e. "reasonably foreseeable and natural consequences" is established,
criminal liability can attach to an accused for any crime that falls outside of an agreed upon joint criminal
enterprise' ($9). It went on to say that "The Trial Chamber erred by conflating the mens rea requirement of
the crime of genocide with the mental requirement of the mode of liability by which criminal responsibility
is alleged to attach to the accused' (§10). The AC thus reversed a prior decision of the TC (Brdanin,
Decision for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis, 28 November 2003), which had held (correctly, in my
opinion) that the specific intent required for genocide 'cannot be reconciled with the mens rea required for a
conviction pursuant to the third category of ICE. The latter consists of the Accused's awareness of the risk
that genocide would be committed by other members of the )CE. This is a different mens rea and falls short
of the threshold needed to satisfy the specific intent required for a conviction for genocide under Article
4(3)(a) (of the ICTY Statute]' (§57). In 2005, in Kvocka and others, the same AC limited the need for
sharing the special intent to the first category of ICE. It 'affirmed' 'the Trial Chamber's conclusion that
participants in a basic or systemic form of joint criminal enterprise must be shown to share the required
intent of the principal perpetrators. Thus, for crimes of persecution, the Prosecution must demonstrate that
the accused shared the common dis- criminatory intent of the joint criminal enterprise. If the accused does
not share the discriminatory intent, then he may still be liable as an aider and abettor if he knowingly makes
a substantial contribution to the crime' (§110). This proposition was taken up by an ICTR TC in Simba (at
§388).
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show different features; the offences at issue belong either to one category (for
instance, crimes against humanity) if the requisite conditions are met (chiefly, the
existence of a context of widespread or systematic practice), or to the other.
Furthermore, laying different charges within the same category of international
crime is logically possible only with regard to some classes of underlying
offences. As classes of offences where a gradation is possible, one can mention:
murder and man- slaughter (as a war crime, or a crime against humanity); willful
killing (as a grave breach); and unlawful killing (as a war crime in an international
armed conflict);227 rape and sexual violence (as a war crime or a crime against
humanity); and torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (as a war crime or a
crime against humanity). For other underlying offences it would seem difficult to
apply such gradations of culpability and hence of charging.
(C) Case law
The first case where this category of ICE was raised is Tadic (Af, 1999).
According to the Prosecution the TC had erred in finding that the accused could
not be charged with the killing of five men in the village of Jalisic, when he
participated in the attack on that village and the village of Sivci on 14 June 1992,
because there was no evidence showing that he had killed or taken part in the
killing of those five men. For the Prosecution 'the only conclusion reasonably
open from all the evidence is that the killing of five victims was entirely
predictable as part of the natural and probable consequences of the attack on the
villages of Sivci and Jaskici on 14 June 1992' (§175). The Defence argued
instead that the TC correctly found that 'it was a possibility that the five victims in
Jaskici were killed by another, distinct group of armed men, especially as nothing
[was] known as to who shot the victims or in what circumstances' (§176). As for
the Prosecutions common purpose submission, the Defence contended that 'it
would have to be shown that the common purpose in which the Appellant
allegedly took part included killing as opposed to ethnic cleansing by other
means' (§177).
227 This proposition  is based on the assumption that grave breaches may only be committed in international
armed conflicts, a position taken in 1995 by the ICTY AC in Tadii (IA), but probably no longer valid under
current international customary law.
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The AC upheld the Prosecution's submissions after engaging in an elaborate
outline of the notion of common purpose or JCE in ICL.228 Based on this notion,
the AC found that in the case at issue the defendant had taken part in a common
plan to commit inhumane acts against the non-Serb civilian population in the
PriJedor region in 1992. He was an armed member of the armed group that took
part in the attack and committed several crimes. He must have been aware 'that
the actions of the group of which he was a member were likely to lead to [...]
killings, but he nevertheless willingly took that risk' (§232). The AC therefore
found the defendant guilty. Subsequently the TC, to which the case had been
remitted for sentencing purposes, held that for the murder of the five Muslims,
Tadic was simultaneously guilty of a grave breach, a war crime, and a crime
against humanity. It sentenced him to 24 years' imprisonment for the grave
breach and the war crime and 25 years for the crime against humanity, with the
sentences to be served concurrently229 (in its previous judgment, where the
murder of the five Muslims had not been imputed to Tadic, the TC had sentenced
him to 20 years' imprisonment).230 The AC subsequently reduced the sentence
to 20 years' imprisonment, both because it held the previous sentence to be
excessive with regard to the relatively minor position of the accused, and
because in its view 'there is in law no distinction between the seriousness of a
crime against humanity and that of a war crime'. It was consequently wrong to
consider the same offence as more grave if regarded as a crime against
humanity than as a war crime.231
228 With regard to the first category, what is required is the intent to perpetrate a certain crime (this being
the shared intent on the part of all co-perpetrators). With regard to the second category [.. ], personal know-
ledge of the system of the treatment is required (whether proved byexpress testimony fora matter of
reasonable in view inference from the accuseds position of authority), as well as the intent to further this
common concerted system of ill-treatment. With regard to the third category, what is required is the
intention to participate in and further the criminal activity or the criminal purpose of a group and to
contribute to the joint criminal enterprise or in any event to the commission of a crime by the group. In
addition, responsibil- ity for a crime other than the one agreed upon in the common plan arises only if,
under thecircumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or
are the members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk' (§228).
229 23 ICTY, TC, Sentencing Judgment, §§15-18,27-9 and 32 E and G.
230 24 ICTY.TC, Sentencing judgment.
231 25 ICTY, AC, §§55-8.69 and 76(3).
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The question of this category of criminal liability arose again in Krstic, although
only tangentially, before the TC.232 The essential features of the category, as set
out in Tadic (A), 1999) were restated by the ICTY AC in Vasiljevic (§99), Kvocka
and others (§83), as well as in Babic (§27). In Stakic the AC, after reversing the
TCs ruling based on the notion of coperpetratorship', held that the accused, in
holding important positions such as President of the Crisis Staff, had participated
in a JCE to commit crimes of persecution, forced displacement, and ill-treatment
in detention camps against Muslims in the Prijedor area in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
It then held that the accused bore criminal liability under the third category of JCE
for crimes not agreed upon, namely killings in detention camps, transportation to
camps of the non-Serb civilian population, and killings by the Serb armed military
and police forces. The AC concluded that the accused was responsible under the
third head of JCE for the crimes of murder (as a war crime and a crime against
humanity) and extermination as a crime against humanity. It is notable that the
Chamber insisted on the requirement of dolos eventualis and held, based on the
findings of the TC, that this form of mens rea did exist in the case at issue (§§93-
7).
An interesting application of the third category of JCE was made by an ICTY TC
in Flago Jevic and fokic. After noting that where the objective of a JCE changes
in time, a new and distinct JCE may be established, the TC pointed out that, with
232 As pointed out above, the Chamber held that the defendant had participated in a JCE to commit
genocide. Nevertheless, the Chamber relied upon the third category of criminal enterprise with regard to
somi crimes committed against the persons who had escaped the massacre. It held that it was not proved
that vari ous crimes committed against Muslims fleeing Srebrenica had been agreed upon in the criminal
plan. The were nevertheless to be imputed to the defendant—so held the Chamber—because they were the
foreseeabl consequence of the policy of forcible expulsions that was part of the criminal plan: 'The Trial
Chamber not, however, convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the murders, rapes, beatings and abuses
committee against the refugees at Potocari were also an agreed upon objective among the members of the
joint crimina enterprise. However, there is no doubt that these crimes were natural and foreseeable
consequences ofthi ethnic cleansing campaign. Furthermore, given the circumstances at the time the plan
was formed. Genera Krstic must have been aware that an outbreak of these crimes would be inevitable
given the lack of sheltci the density of the crowds, the vulnerable condition of the refugees, the presence of
many regular and irregii lar military and paramilitary units in the area and the sheer lack of sufficient
numbers of UN soldiers to provide protection. In fact, on 12 July, the VRS organised and implemented the
transportation of the women children and elderly outside the enclave; General Krstic was himself on the
scene and exposed to firsthani knowledge that the refugees were being mistreated by VRS or other armed
forces' (§616)
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the establishment of such new JCE a participant in the enterprise shall not incur
responsibility for criminal acts beyond the scope of the enterprise in which he had
agreed to participate, but only for those acts that are 'natural and foreseeable
consequences', thereby falling under the third category of JCE (§701).
Finally, it should be mentioned that the ICTY AC has placed a broad
interpretation on the category of JCE at issue. In 2004 in Brdanin it held that this
category of JCE can also apply when acts of genocide are committed by the
'primary offender'.233 In 2006, in Karemera and others the ICTR AC held that this
category of criminal liability can also cover crimes committed by fellow
participants 'in a vast joint criminal enterprise' where crimes committed by the
fellow participants are 'structurally or geographically remote from the accused:234
The same view was taken in 2007 by the ICTY AC in Brdanit with regard to the
category of JCE we are discussing (AJ, §§420-5).
3.14.5 THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE 'PHYSICAL
PERPETRATOR' SHOULD ALSO BE PART OF THE JCE
As we saw above (9.4.2(B)), in Brdanin the issue was raised of the relations
between members of a JCE and persons not part to the JCE who nevertheless
carry out crimes in execution of the JCE (deportation and forcible transfer of
Bosnian Muslim or Croat civilians). The question is as follows: do such
perpetrators (henceforth physical perpetrators) need to share the joint criminal
purpose for the members of the JCE to be answerable for the crimes
perpetrated? The TC answered in the negative (TJ, §§344-56), while the AC in
the affirmative (AJ, §§410-19, 426-32). It is therefore appropriate to dwell on the
question of the relations between members of a JCE and organized groups that
commit crimes in execution of a common criminal purpose.
233 Brdanin, Decision an interlocutory Appeal, at §§9-10.
234 ICTR AC, Karefnera and others. Decision on furisdictional Appeals: foint Criminal Enterprise, at §§11-
18.
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Normally members of a JCE make up fairly small groups and are persons
operating at the same level, even though in different capacities. Hence no
serious problem arises: each of them is responsible for the concerted criminal
actions, even if such actions are performed only by one member of the JCE.
However, there may be cases where the members of the JCE constitute a larger
group and form part of a hierarchically constituted organization or structure. This
is typically the case for ICE II (participation in a common criminal plan within an
institutional framework). Here, however, only those who knowingly make a
substantial contribution to the pursuit of common criminal purposes are
personally liable. Hence for all of them it is required that they be part to the JCE.
The problem becomes complicated when the criminal plan is agreed upon by a
number of members of a political or military group, and one of these members
carries out the common criminal purpose by ordering or instigating subordinate
military units outside the JCE to commit some or all of the crimes envisaged in
the JCE.
One should distinguish between the legal position of (a) the member of the JCE
that orders or instigates outsiders to commit the crimes; and (b) that of the other
members of the JCE.
To my mind the member of the JCE ordering or instigating the commission of
crimes may be responsible under two distinct heads of liability. He is responsible
for (1) the JCE to commit other crimes that may have been perpetrated by
himself as well as other members of the JCE; and for (2) ordering and instigating
the crimes perpetrated by the subordinates. These subordinates need not, of
course, share the common criminal purpose (this is what occurred in Brdanin,
according to the TC, which rightly found the defendant guilty of ordering and
instigating the crime 'of deportation and forced expulsion of Bosnian Muslims and
Croats, perpetrated by the army: §§359-69). If brought to trial, such subordinates
are liable for the perpetration of the crime at issue.
Let us now move on to situation (b). Here the following question must be asked:
does a member of the JCE other than the member that orders or instigates
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subordinate troops or paramilitary units or police officers (not part to the JCE) to
perpetrate crimes in consonance with the criminal purposes agreed by members
of the JCE, bear responsibility for the crimes perpetrated by the executioners?
The answer may only be given in light of general principles of international
criminal law, in particular the principle of personal criminal responsibility (indeed
the judicial precedents relied upon by the AC in Brdanin (A) 99393-404) are not
germane to the question under discussion).235 In accordance with these
principles the member of the JCE  may only be held responsible for those crimes
if(i) when concerting the crime to be perpetrated in execution of the JCE he had
agreed to the physical perpetration of crimes by persons who, albeit outside the
JCE, could, however, act upon the orders of one of the members of the JCE (in
this case JCE I would be applicable); or (ii) he anticipated the risk that another
member of the JCE might order or instigate persons outside the JCE to
perpetrate crimes and willingly ran that risk (ICE III). It would not be sound to
235 They are two cases brought before US Military Tribunals sitting at Nuremberg: Altstotter and others (so-
called lustice case) and Greifrlt and others (so-called RL'SHA case). As the AC admitted in Brdanin (Al,
6393), in neither case did the Tribunals use the expression ICE'. What matters, however, is that neither
Judgment relied upon the notion of)CE. In the former, faced with crimes planned, ordered or committed by
member? ur the Ministry of Justice, the Tribunal adopted traditional notions of criminal responsibility, as is
apparent from the following passage: 'The defendants are not now charged with conspiracy as a separate
and substantive offense, but it is alleged that they participated in carrying out a governmental plan and
program for the persecution and extermination of lews and Poles, a plan which transcended territorial
boundaries as well as the bounds of human decency. Some of the defendants took part in the enactment of
laws and decrees the purpose of which was the extermination of Poles and lews in Germany and throughout
Europe. Others, in executive positions, actively participated in the enforcement of those laws and in
atrocities, illegal even under German law, in furtherance of the declared national purpose. Others, as
judges, distorted and then applied the laws and decrees against Poles and Jews as such in disregard of every
principle of judicial behavior. The overt acts of the several defendants must be seen and understood as
deliberate contributions toward the effectuation of the policy of the Party and State. The discriminatory
laws themselves formed the subject matter of war crimes and crimes against humanity with which the
defendants are charged. The material facts which must be proved in any case are: (1) the fact of the great
pattern or plan of racial persecution and extermination; and (2) specific conduct of the individual defendant
in furtherance of the plan. This is but an application of general concepts of criminal law. The person who
persuades another to commit murder, the person who furnishes the lethal weapon for the purpose of its
commission, and the person who pulls the trigger are all principals or accessories to the crime' (1063;
emphasis added). The reason why the Tribunal did not discuss the mental state of those who executed death
sentences and other criminal acts agreed upon and planned by the defendants is simply that those
executioners so acted following orders by the defendants: who were hence responsible not for ICE to
commit persecution but for ordering persecution. Similarly in Greifelt and others the Tribunal convicted the
defendants of ordering and instigating the kidnapping of children of foreign nationals, taking away foreign
infants, executing in concentration camps foreigners and so on. As the Tribunal put it: '[i]t is no defense for
a defendant to insist, for instance, that he never evacuated populations when orders exist, signed by him, in
which he directed that the evacuation should take place. While in such a case the defendant might not have
actually carried out the physical evacuation in the sense that he did not personally evacuate the population,
he nevertheless is responsible for the action, and his participation by instigating the action is more
pronounced than that of those who actually performed the deed' (153).
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hold the member at issue liable even when the agreement (or consent) or the
anticipation and deliberate taking of risk are lacking. In such case the basic pre-
condition of liability for JCE would be lacking, and to hold the member
responsible for the crimes committed by the physical perpetrator would be
contrary to the principle of personal criminal responsibility.236
Of course, also in the case I have just discussed the member of the JCE that
ordered or instigated subordinates is responsible for ordering and instigating the
crimes, although he did so in consonance with or in execution of a JCE (which in
this respect would not be relevant to the establishment of guilt of the accused,
whereas it might perhaps have some relevance to the setting of penalty).
3.14.6 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ICE AND AIDING AND ABETTING
It has been objected that the doctrine of JCE does not clearly distinguish
between the responsibility of a participant in JCE and that of an aider and
abettor. Moreover, that doctrine would even go so far as to foist a greater weight
upon a person responsible for aiding and abetting than on a participant in a JCE.
In fact a major difference between the two categories of persons does exist. It
lies in their respective mens rea (as for actus reus, in both cases a 'substantial'
contribution is required, as I shall point out below with regard to JCE). The
participant in a JCE (i) takes part in a common criminal plan or purpose and
shares a common intent to perpetrate a crime (murder, forced expulsion,
persecution, and so on); or (ii) by willingly and knowingly participating in an
institutional criminal framework, expressly or implicitly evinces his sharing the
criminal conduct in which that institutional framework engages; or else (iii) in
addition to adhering to a criminal plan and sharing the intent to commit a crime,
willingly runs the risk that another participant may intentionally perpetrate a
further crime that the former had foreseen.
In contrast, as we shall see when discussing aiding and abetting (see infra, 10.1),
he who aids and abets does not share, either at the outset or later, the criminal
236 For a similar view, see the Partly Dissenting opinion of fudge Shahabuddeen in Brdanin (AJ) (§§4 The
contrary view is advanced by ludge Meron in his Separate Opinion in the same case (513-8)
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intent of the perpetrator, although he is cognizant that the perpetrator intends to
commit a crime; the aider and abettor only intends to assist the perpetrator in the
commission of a crime. This is why, in principle, the criminal liability of the aider
and abettor is more tenuous (or less weighty) than that of a participant in a
common criminal enterprise. As the ICTY AC put it in a number of cases, aiding
and abetting 'generally involves a lesser degree of individual criminal
responsibility than co-perpetration in a joint criminal enterprise'.237
It should be added that, according to ICTY case law, it would be wrong to speak
of 'aiding and abetting a JCE', for whenever a person intends to assist in the
commission of crimes by a group of persons involved in a JCE, that person
should more correctly be held liable for participation in the JCE.238
3.14.7 TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE ICC RELY UPON THE DOCTRINE
OF JCE?
The ICC Statute does not contain a provision that regulates JCE in detail as a
mode of responsibility. That such form of criminal liability is implicitly permitted
under the Statute can however be inferred from Article 25(1),239 which generically
237 Krnojelac (Af, §75), Vasiljevic (A), §102), Kvotka and others (A], §92).
238 ICTY AC, MilutinovU and others. Decision on Dragoliub OjdanU's Motion Challenging furisdicti foint
criminal Enterprise, §20; Kvodka and others (AJ, §91).
239 This provisions stipulates that:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through
another person, regardless of
whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or i-.iduces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or
is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or
otherwise assists in its commission or
its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) in any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such
a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution
shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of ]
the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime'
(emphasis added)
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states that criminal responsibility for any of the crimes covered by the Statute is
incurred by anybody 'committing a crime' 'jointly with another person'. This
provision, in addition to co-perpetration (the same crime is committed by a
plurality of persons, who perform the same criminal act; see above, 9.3), also
covers JCE. However, the ICC Statute goes further, for, although in envisaging a
different mode of liability (outsider's contribution to a JCE; see below), it explicitly
refers to the 'commission or attempted commission of such a crime [within the
jurisdiction of the Court] by a group of persons acting with a common purpose'
(Article 25(3)(d)).
As for the mens rea required for ICE under the Statute, one can refer to the
general provision of Article 30 (on the mental element of the crimes covered by
the Statute), which requires 'intent or knowledge'. Should one hold the view that
consequently the Statute of the ICC always requires intent as the necessary
subjective element necessary for a finding of criminal liability, whatever the mode
of responsibility, it would follow that the ICC, while generally empowered to rely
upon the doctrine of JCE, would be barred from applying the third category
referred to above. 240
However, Article 30, before setting out the two mental elements of intent or
knowledge, contains a general clause ('unless otherwise provided') that leaves
other subjective frames of mind unaffected, so long as they are provided for or
required by other provisions of the Statute or by customary international law.241
Hence the contention can be made that dolus eventualis or recklessness for the
third form of the JCE is not excluded by the ICC Statute.
This interpretation would be justified by the need to punish criminal conduct that
otherwise would not be regarded as culpable. In addition, it would not be contrary
to the principle of personal culpability, for in any case the person at issue (i)
would be guilty of intentionally participating in a criminal purpose or plan; (ii) his
240 It would seem that this is the view taken by the ICC Pre-lrial Chamber in Lubanga (§§322-67).
241 See G. Werle and F. Jcssberger, 'Unless Otherwise Provided' in 3 IICf (2005), ssds.
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mens rea concerning the additional, not previously concerted crime, would have
to be proved by the Prosecution; and (iii) his lesser culpability would have to be
taken into account at the sentencing stage.
It should be added that, contrary to what various authors, including the present
one, have either implicitly or expressly contended,'242 the gist of Article 25(3)(d) is
the regulation not of JCE but rather of a different mode of responsibility. This
consists in the fact that a person outside the criminal group committing (or
attempting to commit) a crime contributes to the perpetration of such crime
without being a member of the criminal group. It would seem that such
contribution is different from aiding and abetting. Indeed, the aider and abettor
intends to assist in the commission of a crime by others but does not share the
criminal intent of the perpetrator (see 10.1 and 9.4.6). Here, instead, the 'outside
contributor' either (a) intends to further the criminal action (hence is aware of and
shares the criminal intent of the group), or (b) simply knows, that is, is aware of,
the criminal intent of the group. In the former instance, the 'outside contributor',
by sharing the criminal intent of the group only distinguishes himself from
members of the JCE in that he is not part of the criminal agreement (neither at
the moment when such agreement is made nor later). In the latter instance, that
is in the category (b), the 'outside contributor' distinguishes himself from the aider
and abettor only in that he aides and abets a whole criminal group (that is, a
multiplicity of persons) and not a single perpetrator. Otherwise, there is no
distinction between the two classes of persons assisting in the commission of
crimes by others.
Probably the inclusion of this new mode of liability is justified by its origin, namely
the fact that the provision was taken up from Article 2(3) of the 1997 International
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing. The needs of the fight
242 For instance see W.A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 3rd e (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 211-13; K. Ambos, loint Criminal Enterprise a Command
Responsibility* in 5//C/(2007), 172-3; A. Cassese, *The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibil under the
Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise', ibidem, at 132. See also the ICTY A; in Tadii (1999, at §222).
On Article 25(3)(d) see also K. Ambos in 0. Triffterer (ed), Commentary, at 483-6 as well A. Eser, Cassese,
Gaeta, fones (eds), The Rome Statute, 1,802-3.
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against widespread and increasingly dangerous terrorist criminality warranted the
expansion of responsibility to these forms of 'external assistance'. The ICC
Statute rather uncritically restated that provision of the Terrorist Bombing
Convention.243
243 The category of  outsider contributor' to ICE is in some respects not dissimilar from  the category
'external participation in mafia crimes' (concorso esterno in associazione mafiosa), set forth by Italian cou
(see P. L. Vigna, 'Fighting organized Crime, with particular reference to Mafia Crimes in Italy, in 4 /J
(2006), 526-7; according to this author the criminal offence at issue covers cases where a person, althoug
not a part and parcel of the structure of a criminal organization and free from any link of subjection the
association, nevertheless provides the association with a contribution which is specific, conscious a
voluntary. Such contribution must however be causally relevant to the strengthening of the criminal
assoation and aimed at the implementation (albeit partial) of the criminal pJan.' (ibidem).
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CHAPTER 4
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (THE INTERNATIONAL
CODIFIED LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW
PERSPECTIVE)
4.1 Introduction
Foreign sovereign immunity belongs without doubt to the traditional domains of
public international law and has received wide attention within academia and
practice over the last 200 years. But the rise of international human rights has
called the fairly settled doctrine of relative sovereign immunity – also known as
the relative theory of sovereign immunity – into question. If states are bound by
human rights and if the rule of law has any meaning in international law, why are
states exempted from jurisdiction within the territory of another state? There are,
of course, numerous reasons which support sovereign immunity – historical as
well as more practical ones. But the alleged inconsistency between protecting
human rights on the one hand and granting sovereign immunity on the other has
found powerful support, particularly among human rights activists or idealists, as
they have sometimes been called. In Europe, it was above all the Pinochet case
244 that divided academia as well as practice; in the US, this happened with the
case of Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany. 245 Both sides of the great divide
claim that their approach reflects the law as it stands. The idealists argue that
with regard to international crimes and fundamental human rights states are
obliged to deny sovereign immunity, whereas the (alleged) realists emphasize
the indispensible importance of upholding sovereign immunity for maintaining
good and peaceful relations among states. Immunity reflects a basic state right
based on the respect for a state’s sovereignty and independence.
The conflict between these incompatible conceptions has occupied not just
national courts, which are naturally the first ones to decide matters of sovereign
immunity. The ICJ in The Arrest Warrant case 246 and the European Court of
244 Ex Parte Pinochet, House of Lords, 24 Mar. 1999, 38 ILM (1999) 581
245 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F. 3d 1166 (DC Cir. 1994).
246 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 3. A
similar case also brought to the ICJ by the Democratic Republic of Congo is still pending; see Certain
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Human Rights (ECtHR) in Al-Adsani 247 and McElhinney248 have addressed
certain aspects of the problem as well: the immunity of high-ranking state officials
from criminal proceedings in another state in cases of war crimes and crimes
against humanity (The Arrest Warrant case), or whether states are under an
obligation to grant access to their courts if the foreign state is being accused of
torture (as in Al-Adsani). In both cases the courts argued in favour of sovereign
immunity. The ICJ in particular accepted that a right to sovereign immunity exists.
It thus did not come as a surprise when on 23 December 2008 Germany
instituted proceedings against Italy before the ICJ based on a violation of its
(alleged) right to sovereign immunity in civil proceedings.249
This legal action is the direct response to several decisions of the Italian Corte di
Cassazione (Supreme Court). In Ferrini the Court awarded payments in favour of
Mr. Ferrini, an Italian national, who was deported from Italy and forced into slave
labour in Germany in 1943.250 The Distomo case concerns the recognition of a
Greek judgment which ordered Germany to pay damages for a massacre
committed against the civilian population of the Greek village Distomo during
World War II.251 The Corte di Cassazione denied Germany a right to sovereign
Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), application filed on 9 Dec. 2002,
available at: www.icj-cij.org.
247 App No 35763/97, Al-Adsani v. UK, ECHR, 21 Nov. 2001, 123 ILR (2001) 24.
248 App No 31253/96, McElhinney v. Ireland, ECHR, 21 Nov. 2001, 123 ILR (2001) 73.
249 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), 23 Dec. 2008, available at: www.icj-cij.org.
250 Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court),
5044/2004, English translation available in 128 ILR (2006) 658; see also Gattini, ‘War Crimes and State
Immunity in the Ferrini Decision’, 3 J Int’l Criminal Justice (2005) 224; Focarelli, ‘Denying Foreign State
Immunity for Commission of International Crimes – The Ferrini Decision’, 54 ICLQ (2005) 951; De Sena
and De Vittor, ‘State Immunity and Human Rights – The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini
Case’, 16 EJIL (2005) 89.
251 The Distomo massacre was one of the worst crimes committed against the civilian population in Greece
during World War II. On 10 June 1944, SS troops who were integrated into the German Wehrmacht entered
the Greek village of Distomo. They came to take revenge for a partisan attack, even though they had no
proof that the village was either directly or indirectly involved in that attack. Those surviving the massacre
reported that the Germans randomly killed every person they could get hold of and burned the village to the
ground. Members of the Red Cross who went to Distomo days after the massacre found bodies hanging
from the trees lining the roads outside the village. For a brief description of the massacre see M. Mazower,
Inside Hitler’s Greece (1993), at 213–215. The Distomo litigation history is quite remarkable. Two years
after the proceedings had been instituted, the Court of Leivadia held Germany liable for the Distomo
massacre, awarding damages in the amount of approximately $30 million; Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal
Republic of Germany, Court of 1st Instance Levadia, 137/1997; an English translation is provided by
Gavouneli, ‘War Reparation Claims and State Immunity’, 50 Revue Hellénique de Droit International
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immunity based on the severity of the crimes committed during the war. It
therefore did what the plaintiffs in Al-Adsani and McElhinney had asked the
domestic courts in the UK and Ireland to do. As a consequence, the ICJ must
decide whether states are allowed to deny sovereign immunity or whether the
denial violates international law. The focus of the case thus differs completely
from that of Al-Adsani and McElhinney. In these cases, the ECtHR had to decide
whether states were under an obligation to deny sovereign immunity because
they would otherwise violate the plaintiff’s rights under the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR).252 According to the ECtHR, the convention would
have been violated if there had been a duty to deny sovereign immunity under
customary international law. But, as the Court denied such a duty, it held that the
UK did not violate the convention. The ICJ, however, does not have to consider
the existence of any duty to deny immunity in the present case. Quite the
contrary, it must decide whether Italy, by denying Germany’s immunity in Ferrini
(1997) 595, at 599 ff; for a short summary of the judgment see Bantekas, ‘Case Report: Prefecture of
Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany’, 92 AJIL (1998) 765. After the Greek Supreme Court confirmed
the judgment in May 2000, it became final; Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Areios
Pagos, 11/2000, 4 May 2000, 129 ILR (2007) 514. But the efforts to enforce the judgment eventually failed
because the Minister of Justice denied his approval – a necessary prerequisite for executing a judgment
against a foreign state under Greece law (Art. 923 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The Athens Court of
Appeal upheld this decision and a complaint lodged with the European Court of Human Rights was equally
unsuccessful: App. No. 59021/00, Kalogeropoulou v. Greece and Germany, ECtHR, 12 Dec. 2002, 129
ILR (2007) 537. Finally in 2003, the German Federal Supreme Court rejected the enforcement of the Greek
judgment in Germany, Distomo Massacre case, Bundesgerichtshof, III ZR 245/98, 26 June 2003, 129 ILR
(2007) 556; see also Pittrof, ‘Compensation Claims for Human Rights Breaches Committed by German
Armed Forces Abroad During the Second World War: Federal Court of Justice Hands Down Decision in
the Distomo Case’, 5 German LJ (2004) 15. The German Constitutional Court in 2006 affirmed the
decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, BVerfG, 2 BvR 1476/03, 15 Feb. 2006. In the meantime the Special
Supreme Court of Greece indirectly overruled the Areios Pagos in parallel proceedings granting immunity
to Germany; Margellos and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, Anotato Eidiko Diskastirio (Greek
Special Supreme Court), 6/2002, 129 ILR (2007) 526. This development led Dörr to conclude that the
matter was settled; Dörr, ‘Staatliche Immunität auf dem Rückzug?’, 41 Archiv des Völkerrechts (2003) 201,
at 209. But when the Corte di Cassazione issued its Ferrini decision, the Distomo plaintiffs instituted
proceeding in Italy to execute the Greek judgment against Germany there. Their efforts have been
successful so far: see Corte di Cassazione, 14199, 29 May 2008; German translation available at 27 NVwZ
(2008) 1100. German commentators in particular criticized the judgment harshly: see, e.g., Stürmer,
‘Staatenimmunität und Brüssel I-Verordnung – Die zivilprozessuale Behandlung von
Entschädigungsklagen wegen Kriegsverbrechen im Europäischen Justizraum’, 28 IPRax (2008) 197, at
205, holding that states are deprived of their rights (Rechtlosstellung), or Geimer, ‘Los Desastres de la
Guerra und das Brüssel I-System’, 28 IPRax (2008) 225, at 227, complaining about the disillusioning
conclusion to be drawn from the judgments.
252 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, ETS No. 5, as
amended by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 11 May 1994, ETS No. 155.
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and recognizing the Greek Distomo judgment, has violated international law
because it was under an obligation to grant immunity.253
The intuitive basis for such an obligation is a specific state right to sovereign
immunity. But does such a right exist? Academia and practice by national and
international courts seem to be divided on this question. There are those who
conceptualize sovereign immunity as a default rule which applies as long as
states have not accepted any limitations,254 whereas others reject its legally
binding effect under customary international law altogether.255 But both
conceptions neglect the current realities of international law. States accept
sovereign immunity as a legally binding concept, but only on a very abstract
level.256 They agree on the general idea of immunity, but disagree on the extent
to which they actually must grant immunity in a specific case. I therefore argue
that sovereign immunity is best understood not as a specific rule or something
based on the comity of the forum state, but as a legally binding principle of
253 The ICJ’s decision in The Arrest Warrant case is of no immediate help either. It definitely stipulates a
right to immunity. But this specific right is limited to a Foreign Minister while being in office for criminal
proceedings in another country. In addition, the Court emphasized ‘that the immunity from jurisdiction
enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of
any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. . . . Jurisdictional immunity may well
bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it
applies from all criminal responsibility’: see Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, at para. 60.
254 Even those who deny sovereign immunity in case of fundamental human rights violations (at least when
occurring on the territory of the forum state), such as the Areios Pagos in Distomo or the Corte di Cas-
sazione in Ferrini, assume that states in general have a right to claim immunity under customary inter-
national law, but either that this right collides with fundamental human rights or that international law
accepts restrictions of this right: Ferrini, supra note 7, at 664–674; Distomo, Areios Pagos, supra note 8, at
516–521. The whole debate has therefore circled round the question to what extent international law either
allows or requires exceptions to the default rule: see, e.g., H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (2nd edn,
2008), discussing the character of sovereign immunity as a rule at 13–25 and possible exceptions to this
rule at 533–598; see also C. Appelbaum, Einschränkung der Staatenimmunität in Fällen schwerer
Menschenrechtsverletzungen (2007). Conceptualizing immunity and its limits as a rule–exception rela-
tionship is also supported by the existing international conventions and domestic laws on foreign sovereign
immunity. The European Convention on State Immunity, see infra note 14, and the UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States, see infra note 16, follow this approach as well as the US Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act, infra note 17, and the UK State Immunity Act, infra note 18.
255 Especially the US Supreme Court in its recent decisions in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 US 667
(2004) and Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 US 468 (2003) has referred to comity as the only basis for
sovereign immunity in international law.
256 See the conclusion of Dellapenna, ‘Foreign State Immunity in Europe’, 5 NY Int’l L Rev (1992) 51, at
61; R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (1992), I/1, at 342–343 also point out
that beyond a general understanding of sovereign immunity, national decisions differ in both detail and
substance.
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international law. The distinction between rule and principle is more than a mere
formality. It determines how we approach the matter and which questions we
ask, because a principle, in contrast to a specific rule, allows states to determine
the scope of sovereign immunity within their domestic legal orders confined by
the limits set by international law. The question is ‘What are these limits?’ and not
‘Have states accepted exceptions to sovereign immunity and to what extent?’
In order to substantiate my claim that sovereign immunity must be
conceptualized as a principle and not as a rule, it is necessary, after a few
introductory remarks (section 2), to revisit the classical discussion of possible
exceptions to the alleged rule of sovereign immunity, namely the private–public
distinction (section 3), the tort exception (section 4), (implied) waivers to
sovereign immunity (section 5), and the ‘hierarchy of norms’ argument (section
6), as well as the ‘comity approach’ (section 7). The analysis will reveal that
current state practice is too diverse to establish sovereign immunity as a specific
rule obliging states to grant sovereign immunity to foreign states as a default rule.
But it will also show that states actually agree on the concept of foreign sovereign
immunity, at least on a very abstract level. Denying immunity any binding effect is
thus incompatible with the actual conduct of states. This result will be applied to
the general discussion on principles and rules, thereby trying to verify the
proposition that sovereign immunity is a principle of public international law
(section 8). The article will conclude by suggesting which questions the ICJ
should discuss when deciding the case on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
between Germany and Italy.
4.2 Sovereign Immunity – Some Basics
Sovereign immunity always had two dimensions – a national and an international
one. So far, the international community has witnessed several attempts to codify
the law on sovereign immunity, but until now only the European Convention on
State Immunity (ECSI) has entered into force.257 However, even this Convention
has received only eight ratifications since 1972, with Germany having been the
257 European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, CETS No. 074, 11 ILM (1972) 470.
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last state to ratify it in 1990.258 The United Nations have, of course, also worked
on the matter – for several decades. Still, since its adoption in December 2004,
the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States (UNCJIS) has not been
ratified by enough states in order to become effective.259
Parallel to these codification efforts on the international level, some states
enacted national legislation on sovereign immunity, most importantly the US
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA).260 Other states include the UK,
Australia, Canada, and South Africa.261 States that for whatever reason have
forgone the opportunity to pass national legislation rely on international custom to
determine the scope of immunity which foreign states might claim. In doing so,
most states – or, to be more precise, their courts – assume that sovereign
immunity serves as the basic rule until the existence of an exception has been
proven.
4.3 The Private–Public Distinction
At first glance, the historical developments appear to support this idea: immunity
as a shield which screens foreign states from the jurisdiction of the forum state
unless it is penetrated by international custom. While states once enjoyed
unqualified exemptions from the jurisdiction of other states, this absolute
approach was exchanged for what is now assumed to be the current legal
doctrine – the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.262 A state’s conduct falls
258 The ratification status is available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun
/ChercheSig.asp?NT=074&CM=0&DF=&CL=ENG; status as of 21 Oct. 2010.
259 The Convention was adopted by GA Res 59/38, 2 Dec. 2004. Even though 28 states have signed the
treaty, only 6 have ratified it so far: see http://treaties.un.orgcz/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&id=284&chapter=3&lang=en.
260 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC §§ 1330, 1602–1611.
261 UK, State Immunity Act 1978, 17 ILM (1978) 1123; Canada, State Immunity Act 1982, 21 ILM (1982)
798; Australia, Foreign States Immunity Act 1985, 25 ILM (1986) 715; South Africa, Foreign States
Immunity Act, reprinted in E.K. Bankas, The State Immunity Controversy in International Law (2005), at
455 ff.
262 For the development of sovereign immunity see R. Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their
Officials in International Criminal and International Human Rights Law (2008), at 12–64; Bankas, supra
note 18, at 13–32; Fox, supra note 11, at 204–236.
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within two categories: acts iure imperii or acts iure gestonis. It is either official or
private. States therefore enjoy immunity as long as they act in their official
capacity, but must submit to the jurisdiction of another state if they act as a
private person.263
Even though this summary accurately describes the overall development of
sovereign immunity, it also (over)simplifies it significantly. The change from
absolute to relative immunity did not happen in the course of a few years. Quite
the contrary. Belgian courts were the first to adopt the private acts exception as
early as 1857,264 and Italian courts followed in the 1880s.265 In 1933 E.W. Allen
concluded that a ‘growing number of courts are restricting the immunity to
instances in which the state has acted in its official capacity as a sovereign
political entity. The current idea that this distribution is peculiar to Belgium and
Italy must be enlarged to include Switzerland, Egypt, Rumania, France, Austria
and Greece.’266
But it took an additional 20 years until Jack B. Tate, the then acting Legal Adviser
to the Department of State, announced that the Department would no longer
support absolute immunity for foreign states within the US, but adopt the private–
public distinction instead.267 From 1857 to 1952 the scope and limits of sovereign
immunity changed gradually and slowly. If immunity had actually been a specific
state right, Belgium and other states would have continuously violated
international law until a new rule evolved according to which states must face the
charges within the territory of another states if their conduct is qualified as
private. However, the absence of formal protests by states which had not yet
accepted this new trend is quite remarkable – so remarkable that it led
263 L. Fisler Damrosch et al., International Law (4th edn, 2004), at 1198.
264 Van Alebeek, supra note 19, at 14 with further references.
265 Fox, supra note 11, at 224; Appelbaum, supra note 11, at 47; each with further references.
266 E.W. Allen, The Position of Foreign States Before National Courts (1933), at 301.
267 Tate Letter, 19 May 1952, 24 Department of State Bull. 984 (1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of
London Inc. v. Cuba, 425 US 682, at 711–715 (1976).
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Lauterpacht in 1951 to conclude that state practice is too diverse to assume that
it has legally binding force under international law.268
The world of sovereign immunity has changed since 1951, at least with respect
to the general acceptance of the restrictive theory.269 As a theory, it found
widespread support among states,270 but the distinction between private and
public acts is applied so divergently that it is hard to concede more than a very
abstract conformity in state practice. Disagreement starts with the appropriate
test for determining the act’s character as private or public: is it the purpose or
the nature?271 Even though one can observe a tendency towards the nature test,
Article 2(2) UNCJIS clearly reflects the still existing uncertainties. The private
character of state action is usually determined by its nature, but its purpose
becomes relevant if states agree so or if the forum state routinely applies the
purpose rather than the nature test.
Despite this rather minor divergence, more fundamental differences exist, in par-
ticular concerning the context in which the private–public distinction applies. His-
torically, the restrictive theory is linked to the phenomenon of states entering the
marketplace and taking part in commercial activities like private persons. It
developed round the idea that ‘once the sovereign has descended from his
throne and entered the marketplace he has divested himself of his sovereign
status and is therefore no longer immune to the domestic jurisdiction of the
courts of other countries’.272 Both the ECSI and the UNCJIS follow this
268 H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States’, 28 BYBIL (1951) 220, at
227–228.
269 Even Brownlie concedes by now that ‘there is a trend in the practice of states towards the restrictive
doctrine of immunity. . .’: I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, 2008), at 325.
270 See Bankas, supra note 18, at 31; Fox, supra note 11, at 235; Van Alebeek, supra note 19, at 47.
271 The FSIA, e.g., expressively refers to the nature of the acts: 28 US §1603(d). But, as Caplan, ‘State Im-
munity, Human Rights, and Ius Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory’, 97 AJIL (2003)
741, at 761 has pointed out, this approach is not universally applied; see also Bankas, supra note 18, at 215
ff.
272 I° Congreso Del Partido, House of Lords, 16 July 1981, 64 (1983) ILR 154, at 178, para. 527, thereby
referring to the legal opinion of the plaintiff, not its own.
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understanding, and the FSIA does so as well.273 It is not state behaviour in
general which is either public or private, but only a state’s participation in the
marketplace. Therefore, the exception is more precisely described as the
commercial exception. But this reduction of the private–public distinction has
been challenged by courts. The House of Lords argued that ‘it is possible to
conceive of circumstances in which a sovereign may equally be regarded as
having divested himself of his sovereign status, and yet not have entered the
market place; the principle [the restrictive theory], if it applies at all, should apply
to all circumstances, commercial or otherwise, in which a sovereign acts as any
private citizen may act.’274
The differences between these two methods if, for example, applied to the
problem of immunity for massive human rights violations could be fundamental.
Neither torture, as in the case of Al-Adsani, nor the destruction of homes,
property, and the mass killings of civilians in armed conflict, as in the Distomo
case, are commercial in nature. The same holds true for slave labour, as in
Ferrini. Even though its ultimate purpose could be described as commercial, the
nature of detaining civilians and deporting them for the purpose of exploiting their
work is not. The conduct of military forces within armed conflicts is therefore
usually considered to be acts iure imperii.275 However, if we apply the standard
suggested by the House of Lords and the Italian Corte di Cassazione, it is not
unreasonable to reach a different result depending on how much emphasis is
put, not on the legal context in which the act has taken place, but on the act itself.
273 Art. 3 (contractual obligation) and Art. 7 ECSI (commercial activities within the forum state); Art. 10
UNCJIS (commercial transactions), § 1605(a)(2) FSIA (commercial activities either within or with direct
effect on the United States). The US Supreme Court has given the commercial activity exception a rather
restrictive interpretation: see, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 US 349, 113 SCt 1471 (1993), granting
sovereign immunity to Saudi Arabia which hired Mr Nelson in the US to work as an engineer in Saudi
Arabia. Mr Nelson was tortured and detained unlawfully after he had repeatedly reported on-the-job
hazards.
274 I° Congreso, supra note 29, at para. 527; see also the decision of the Corte di Cassazione in Ditta
Campione v. Ditta Peti Nitrogenmuvek, Stato Ungherese, N. 3386, 14 Nov. 1972, to which the House of
Lords explicitly refers.
275 Ferrini, supra note 7, at 664; see also Distomo, Bundesgerichtshof, supra note 8, at 559 ff.
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The standard for determining the scope of immunity is whether ‘the sovereign
acts as any private citizen may act’276 and whether the act requires governmental
or sovereign authority.277 It is, of course, possible and in accordance with the
current practice to argue that private persons, even though they can carry and
use weapons, enjoy not the same legal or sovereign authority as members of the
armed forces do. But such reasoning focuses on the circumstances in which acts
of mass killings of civilians and torture have been committed (armed conflict) and
not so much on the act itself. There is nothing official about killing or torturing a
person, and these physical acts do not require any sovereign or governmental
authority.278 Private entities and their personnel take part in armed conflicts as
well, and they behave in the same way as official or a state’s military forces. It is
therefore at least theoretically possible completely to neglect the official
circumstances in which the acts take place and to focus exclusively on their very
nature.
The analysis so far has revealed two important points. First, the transition from
the absolute to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity occurred gradually
over a long period of time. During that period, states that still granted absolute
immunity to foreign states failed to protest this development.279 Secondly, even
now that the restrictive theory enjoys widespread support, it is understood
differently by various national courts and legislation.280 Not only do different
standards exist on how to determine the private or public nature of an act, the
276 I° Congreso, supra note 29, at para. 527.
277 Orakhelashvili, ‘State Immunity and International Public Order’, 45 German Yrbk Int’l L (2002) 226, at
235.
278 Even though the UN Convention Against Torture limits the definition of torture in Art. 1(1) to instances
when ‘pain or suffering is inflicted by . . . a public official or other person acting in an official capacity’,
this limitation does not alter the conclusion that the physical acts themselves can be performed by private
persons as well, regardless of whether these acts are considered to be torture from a legal point of view. In
addition, the Convention against Torture itself clearly states that the definition ‘is without prejudice to any
international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application’.
279 Lauterpacht, supra note 25, at 228.
280 See H. Fox, The Laws of State Immunity (2002), at 292: ‘[t]he restrictive doctrine . . . ha[s] not produced
uniformity in practice nor reliable guidance as to when a national court will assume or refuse jurisdic-
tion.. . . [R]eference neither to the nature nor to the purpose of the activity can disguise the arbitrary choices
made by courts.’
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context in which this distinction should be applied is also uncertain. Is it limited to
commercial activities and transactions or does it affect state behaviour in
general? State practice so far has been anything but uniform, and it is not
surprising that ‘a closer examination of the details . . . demonstrates . . . that
consensus exist only at a rather high level of abstraction’.281 It is of course true
that most states agree on the private–public distinction. But when it comes to
determining the legal effects of sovereign immunity, the relevance of uniformity
on an abstract level should not be overestimated. It is the question how this
concept is actually applied and defined in practice which is crucial for legal
analysis.
4.4 Tort Exception
In addition to the private–public distinction, the so-called tort exception has also
played an important role in the rule–exception concept, especially in order to
establish the jurisdiction of the forum state in cases of massive human rights
violations.282 It is obviously irrelevant in cases like Al-Adsani, in which the tortious
act has been committed abroad and not within the forum state. But it could permit
jurisdiction if personal injuries have been caused by an act or omission of the
foreign state within the forum state, such as most atrocities committed by the
German troops during World War II in the territories under their occupation. It is
therefore not surprising that the Greek Areios Pagos argued in the Distomo case
that this exception has evolved into a rule of customary international law and that
it not only allows, but actually requires, that states reject the immunity claim of
the foreign state.283
Still, the disputed status of this exception is evidenced by the ruling of the Greek
Anotato Eidiko Diskastirio (Special Supreme Court) in the Margellos case. It
281 Dellapenna, supra note 13, at 61.
282 In general see C.H. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments (1998), at 93; Fox, supra note
11, at 569 ff; B. Hess, Staatenimmunität bei Distanzdelikten (1992), at 89 ff (US practice), at 138 ff (UK
practice), and at 142 ff (Australian practice).
283 Distomo, Areios Pagos, supra note 8, at 519.
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reached the opposite conclusion, arguing that when the injury is caused during
an armed conflict, customary international law does not provide for an exception
to the default rule of sovereign immunity.284 The Corte di Cassazione in Ferrini,
on the other hand, agreed with the Areios Pagos. Even though the Court heavily
emphasized the jus cogens character of the norms which Germany has violated,
it also referred to the tort exception to support its ruling.285 The scholarly
discussion which has ensued from these rulings has therefore concentrated on
the question whether or not the tort exception is actually supported by
international law.286
In particular states that enacted national legislation on sovereign immunity
included exemptions for torts committed in the forum state.287 The ECSI (Article
11) and the UNCJIS (Article 12) contain a similar exception for tortious acts that
occurred on the territory of the forum state, with one major difference: the ECSI
also incorporates an express counter-exception for ‘anything done or omitted to
be done by, or in relation to, its armed forces when on the territory of another
Contracting State’: Article 31. Consequently, the tort exception would not apply to
284 Margellos, Anotato Eidiko Diskastirio, supra note 8, at 526. The ruling in Margellos must be
distinguished from the judgment of the ECHR in McElhinney, supra note 5. The Court only held that
Ireland, by granting immunity for torts committed by acta jure imperii, acted within the currently accepted
international standards: McElhinney, at para. 38. It did not decide whether states are under an obligation to
grant immunity in such cases. The judgment is therefore better understood in the following way: a state
may grant or deny immunity, but it is under no obligation to do either; a similar view is held by Cremer,
‘Entschädigungsklagen wegen schwerer Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Staatenimmunität vor nationaler
Zivilgerichtsbarkeit’, 41 Archiv des Völkerrechts (2003) 137, at 154. It is therefore misleading to refer to
the judgment as proof that states are prohibited from denying immunity in cases in which personal injuries
are caused by a foreign state on the territory of the forum state, even if it involves an act or omission by the
armed forces of that state (for such an interpretation see Dörr, supra note 8, at 209).
285 Ferrini, supra note 7, at 670 ff, and at 674 (sects 10 and 12 of the judgment respectively); see also
Gattini, supra note 7, at 230 ff and De Sena and De Vittor, supra note 7, at 97 who, in light of the ius
cogens argument, consider it of minor relevance that the Corte di Cassazione relied on the fact that the acts
had been committed in Italy. This might actually explain why the Court did not bother to rule on the legal
nature of the tort exception and its status under customary international law.
286 See accompanying text at supra notes 7 and 11; see also Handl, ‘Staatenimmunität und Kriegsfolgen am
Beispiel des Falles Distomo: Anmerkungen zur Entscheidung des Obersten Gerichtshofs Griechenlands
(Areopag) vom 4. Mai 2000’, 61 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (2006) 433, demanding a more thorough
argument because the tort exception limits existing rights.
287 For the US see 28 USC 1605(a)(5); for the UK sect. 5 of the State Immunity Act 1978; for Canada sect.
6 State Immunity Act 1982; and for Australia sect. 13 Foreign States Immunity Act 1985.
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situations like those in Ferrini and Distomo.288 The UK drafted its State Immunity
Act in a similar fashion: including a tort exception in section 5, but explicitly
excluding anything relating to acts or omissions of armed forces in section 16(2),
whereas the FSIA and the UNCJIS do not contain any explicit privileges for acts
of the armed forces.
Still, it has been argued that the UN Convention must be understood in this way
because the 1991 commentary on Article 12 clarified that only insurable risks
should be covered by the tort exception.289 But the authority of an ILC
commentary is debatable. According to Article 31 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT),290 a treaty must be interpreted ‘in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose’. To define the purpose of Article 12 by referring to
the ILC commentary would eventually neglect the fact that according to Article 32
VCLT, the preparatory work is regarded as supplementary means of
interpretation. It may be invoked only if the interpretation of a provision according
to Article 31 leaves its meaning obscure, ambiguous, or leads to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.291 It is hardly a manifestly absurd and
unreasonable result to include personal injuries caused by the armed forces of
another state on the territory of the forum state if this actually reflects the current
288 Apart from the fact that the Convention does not apply to acts, omissions, or facts which took place
prior to the date on which the Convention was opened for signature on 16 May 1972: Art. 35(3).
289 [1991] Yrbk Int’l L Comm II/2, at 45. In addition G. Haffner as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee
stated that it was the general understanding of the Committee that military activities were not covered by
the Convention: see summary record of the 13th meeting of the Sixth Committee, UN Doc C.6/59/SR.13,
25 Oct. 2004.
290 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS 1155 331, 8 ILM (1969) 679.
291 If the commentary can be qualified as an instrument within the meaning of Art. 31(2) VCLT, it would in
fact have significant authority for the interpretation of the Convention as it is part of the context in which
the treaty was concluded. But the commentary has not been made by one or more parties as it is the
commentary of the ILC. In addition, UN GA Res 59/38 of 2 Dec. 2004 which adopted the Convention only
recalls the work of the ILC, its draft articles and commentaries in its preamble without embracing its
content. The exact scope of Art. 12 UNCJIS is therefore unclear. It is not unreasonable to interpret it in
such a way as to include torts committed by the armed forces of another state within the forum state, which
would also include situations of armed conflict: see Fox, supra note 11, at 582.
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practice of at least some states. The tort exception of the FSIA, for example, has
been applied to activities of foreign intelligence within the US.292
Thus, the current state practice may not support a rule of customary international
law according to which states must deny sovereign immunity in case of tortious
acts committed by another country in the forum state.293 Even though such an
obligation is included in the ECSI and the UNCJIS, a considerable number of
states do not apply this exception. But this does not answer the question whether
states are prohibited from doing so. Section 1605 of the FSIA, for example,
denies immunity in cases ‘in which money damages are sought . . . for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States
and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state’.294 If sovereign
immunity is the default rule and all exceptions must reflect customary
international law, and if the tort exception has not yet evolved into custom, then
states such as the US, UK, Canada, and Australia that have included the tort
exception in their national immunity laws automatically violate international law –
a conclusion which no commentator so far has suggested. But if states that enact
this exception as law do not violate international law, why then should a state do
so if its courts apply this exception not on the basis of national law, but on the
basis of how they construe and interpret the doctrine of sovereign immunity
under international law?
292 Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp 665 (DDC 1980); Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F. 2d 1419
(9th Cir. 1989). It could be argued that foreign intelligence is different from actions by the armed forces.
But such understanding would enable the foreign state to circumvent restrictions to immunity by separating
intelligence from the armed forces. It would thus be the foreign state and not the forum state which
determined the scope of immunity.
293 Cremer, supra note 41, at 150; Fox, supra note 11, at 587 arguing that Art. 12 UNCJIS ‘is a
considerable advance on existing law’, thereby implying that it has not evolved into a rule of customary
international law; Dörr, supra note 11, at 208 ff.
294 § 1605(5) FSIA; however, the exception, even though including acts of ‘any official or employee of that
foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment’, does not apply to a ‘claim based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of
whether the discretion be abused’.
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4.5 (Implied) Waivers
The very foundation of sovereign immunity – the sovereignty of the foreign state
– obviously allows a state to waive its immunity and reveals at the same time that
immunity must be understood as a rule–exception relationship: states are entitled
to claim immunity as long as none of the exceptions apply or as long as the state
has not consented to the jurisdiction of another country.295 It has therefore been
suggested that consenting to the jurisdiction of another state and consenting to
the jurisdiction of an international court are just two sides of the same coin.296
The consent can either be issued by an express statement or derived from the
behaviour of the state, especially from arguing on the merits of the case. It has
therefore been advocated that the concept of implied waiver should be applied to
fundamental human rights violations as well.297 But expanding it could be seen
as a blunt attempt to reach the correct result and has therefore found only little
support in theory and in practice.298
Supporters of that argument could, however, point to the commercial exception,
its development, and the change that the rise of human rights brought about in
the international system. A sovereign doing business like a private person has
disposed of her sovereign rights: ‘once the sovereign has descended from his
throne and entered the marketplace he has divested himself of his sovereign
295 § 1605(a)(1) FSIA, Arts 2 and 3 ECSI, Arts 7 and 8 UNCJIS.
296 Brownlie, ‘Contemporary Problems Concerning the Immunity of Foreign States’, 62 Annuaire Institut
de Droit International (1987) 6, at 55; Jennings, ‘The Place of Jurisdictional Immunity of States in Inter-
national and Municipal Law’, Lecture at the European Institute at the University of the Saarland (1988).
Even though the parallel between immunity and the international dispute settlement rule is convincing at
first glance, it must be restricted to cases in which one state sues another state in yet another state: see Hess,
supra note 39, at 324 ff with further reference; see also Crawford, ‘International Law and Foreign
Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune Transactions’, 54 British Yrbk Int’l L (1983) 74, at 80.
297 See Belsky, Merva, and Roht-Arriaza, ‘Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to
Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law’, 77 California L Rev (1989) 365.
298 Among them is the Court of Leivadia, the Greek Court of First Instance, which issued the first judgment
in the course of the still ongoing Distomo litigation in 1997: see Distomo, Court of Leivadia, supra note 7,
at 599.
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status and is therefore no longer immune’.299 The commercial exception is
obviously based on a capitalist conception of the liberal state, its inherent
distinction between private and public, and on the idea that economic
transactions are private and not public. If someone is participating in economic
activities in a capitalist society she is doing so in her private capacity, an
assumption which applies to the sovereign too. Thus, by stepping down from the
throne and entering the territory of another state, the sovereign implicitly waives
her sovereignty.300 With the aggrandizement of human rights, our understanding
of the state and its powers vis-à-vis its citizens changed again. The once
sacrosanct sovereign authority was first restricted by capitalism and now by
human rights. Thus, the implied waiver for fundamental human rights only
transfers the idea on which the commercial exception is based to the new
realities of international law and the changed conception of the state and its
powers.
Even though such reasoning would put the implied waiver idea for fundamental
human rights violations on a theoretically firmer footing, it misreads the rationale
for the commercial exception. It does not rest on the limits of sovereignty in
relation to private persons. The sovereign was still allowed to take part in
commercial transactions, but had to accept that she must subscribe to the rules
of the marketplace as an equal. The sovereign did not waive her immunity; she
simply had none – like any other private person. Accordingly, other states would
view a state that participates in the marketplace not as a state, but as a private
person. Exercising jurisdiction could therefore not affect the other state’s
299 I° Congreso, supra note 29, at 178, para. 527.
300 Such reasoning is actually based on two different aspects. The first has a specific international context: a
state enters the territory of another state and by doing so it consents to the jurisdiction of that state: see
Storelli v. Governo della Republica Francese, Court of Rome, 26 AJIL (1932) Supp 604, at 605 stating that
the territorial jurisdiction of the forum state does not automatically yield to the claim of sovereign im-
munity of the foreign state, especially when much more emphasis is put on the jurisdiction of the forum
state, as is the case in common law countries: see Fox, supra note 11, at 58. This may also explain the ten-
dency of common law lawyers to define jurisdiction of the forum state as the default rule and immunity as
an exception to it: see Caplan, supra note 28, at 744. The second aspect of the implied waiver argument is
of a more general nature: it is the participation in the marketplace which is interpreted as an implied waiver
of immunity. This reasoning is limited to commercial activities, whereas the implied waiver based on
entering another state’s territory would apply to official acts as well, at least theoretically.
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sovereignty. Those who argue for an implied waiver equate sovereignty (and its
limits vis-à-vis the individual) with sovereign immunity – a conclusion that does
not reflect the basis of immunity in international law. It is the relationship between
two sovereigns and not the relationship between a sovereign and the individual
within her power on which sovereign immunity rests.301 The implied waiver theory
therefore assumes a paradigm shift in international law which has not yet taken
place, at least with regard to the enforcement of human rights.302 States, and not
the individual, are still the foundation of the international system. But the
inconsistency between the protection of fundamental human rights, such as the
prohibition of torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity on the one hand,
and granting immunity to those who are responsible or at least liable for these
acts on the other hand lies at the centre of what is best described as the
supremacy argument.303
4.6 Jus Cogens, Human Rights Violations, and Sovereign Immunity
In practice, the idea that sovereign immunity must yield to fundamental human
rights violations was first applied by the US District Court in the Princz case.304
301 The basis of sovereign immunity in international law is hotly debated. Generally courts and scholars
refer to the sovereign equality and independence and the principle of par in parem non habet imperium,
meaning that an equal does not have power over an equal: see, e.g., Bankas, supra note 18, at 37 ff; van
Alebeek, supra note 19, at 47 ff; Fox, supra note 11, at 40 ff; J. Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation
of Human Rights (1997), at 11 ff. But the equality aspect, and therefore the principle of par in parem non
habet, is seriously questioned because equality has been given a mere formal meaning, not a substantial
one: see Hess, supra note 39, at 307, with further references. The League of Nations also referred solely to
the state’s independence and did not mention the sovereign equality of states as a basis for immunity:
Publications of the League of Nations, V: Legal. 1927. V.9 No. 11, Competence of the Courts in regard to
Foreign States, reprinted in 22 AJIL (1928), Sp. Supp. 117, at 118. In addition one must keep in mind that
the principle of par in parem non habet was developed at a time when sovereignty was usually based not
on equality, but on the personal dignity of the sovereign, and later the abstract dignity of the state. The
equality argument is therefore closely connected to the dignity of states – a basis we should reject in
modern international law.
302 For a more detailed discussion on the obligations of states with regard to ‘private enforcement’ of
human rights see infra, the text accompanying notes 76–82.
303 Bröhmer supra note 58, at 189 ff; Bianchi, ‘Denying State Immunity to Violations of Human Rights’, 46
Austrian J Public & Int’l L (1994) 195, at 220 ff, stressing not the formal hierarchy of norms, but what he
calls a ‘jurisprudential approach’ based on coherence in interpreting international law; this view is also
supported by De Sena and De Vittor, supra note 7, at 102 ff, who argue that the Corte di Cassazione in
Ferrini has in fact taken this position.
304 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp 22 (DDC 1992).
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However, the heyday of the supremacy argument was short: the US Court of
Appeals for the DC Circuit overruled the judgment.305 And even though the
judgment of the House of Lords in the Pinochet case seems to rest on it,306 and
although it reappeared prominently in the powerful dissenting judgment in the Al-
Adsani case,307 it was not until the Corte di Cassazione delivered its judgment in
Ferrini that a state’s highest court had ever embraced it explicitly:
Such [fundamental human] rights are protected by norms, from which no
derogation is permitted, which lie at the heart of the international order and
prevail over all conventional and customary norms, including those, which relate
to State immunity… The recognition of immunity from jurisdiction… for such
misdeeds stand in stark contrast to [this] . . . analysis, in that such recognition
does not assist, but rather impedes, the protection of those norms and
principles. . . There is no doubt that a contradiction between two equally binding
legal norms ought to be resolved by giving precedence of the norm with the
highest status.308
But no matter how plausible this reasoning may appear, it rather simplifies the
concept of jus cogens and its consequences on ‘ordinary’ international law. Most
scholars would probably agree by now that jus cogens is a valid category of
norms in international law, yet everything else is disputed – such as how to
305 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F. 3d 1166 (DC Cir. 1994); for a review see Reisman, ‘A
Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany’, 16 Michigan J Int’l L (1994–95) 403, and Zimmermann, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Violation of
Ius Cogens – Some Critical Remarks’, 16 Michigan J Int’l L (1994–95) 433.
306 Pinochet, supra note 1, at 581. Accepting that the prohibition of torture formed part of ius cogens plays
an important role in the judgment. But interestingly it is primarily invoked to establish universal jurisdic-
tion for international crimes. However, establishing and exercising jurisdiction in such cases necessarily
implies that the accused cannot rely on sovereign immunity: see Lord Phillips at 661. At the same time
Lord Hutton at 640 and Lord Millet at 651 explicitly expressed their conviction that denying immunity for
criminal liability of the individual does not imply that the state itself is deprived of its immunity before
courts in another state.
307 Al-Adsani, supra note 4, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch, Joined by Judges
Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Baretto, and Vajić, at para. 4; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ferrari Bravo and
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides who agrees with Judges Rozakis and Calfisch in general, but
prefers a balancing approach for each case in order to determine whether granting immunity would violate
the individual’s right of access to court under Art. 6(1) ECHR.
308 Ferrini, supra note 7, at 668–669.
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determine which norms have acquired the status of jus cogens and which
practical consequences this generates.309
One of the many particularities of the whole discussion is a basic assumption
which has not been seriously questioned: fundamental human rights, like the
prohibition of torture, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, are part of jus
cogens whereas sovereign immunity, even though a legally binding rule, belongs
to the bulk of norms that form the body of ‘ordinary’ international law.310 This view
reveals a substantive understanding of jus cogens which focuses on the basic
values of the international community.311 In contrast to a more formal perception,
it emphasizes the protection of the most fundamental human rights, thereby
strengthening the position of the individual vis-à-vis the state.312 Such a
normative understanding of jus cogens is, of course, not uncontested. The more
formal or systematic perception includes rules that are inherent to the functioning
of the international legal system, like pacta sunt servanda, good faith, and the
sovereign equality and independence of states.313 If we accept, first, this more
state-centred concept of jus cogens and, secondly, that sovereign immunity is
directly based on sovereignty and the independence of states, it is much more
difficult to argue that sovereign immunity – at least in its core element – is not
part of jus cogens. Thus, construing a conflict between a jus cogens norm and an
‘ordinary’ norm of international law in the case of fundamental human rights
violations and state immunity already points to a conception of international law
that is highly relevant for solving this (alleged) conflict: the supremacy of human
309 See in general L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law (1988); A.
Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (2006).
310 See Al-Adsani, supra note 4, Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch, at para. 2.
311 C.J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005), at 141; see also
Orakhelashvili, supra note 34, at 255 defining ius cogens as peremptory norms of general international law
which ‘serve as a public order embodying material constitutional provisions of international law’.
312 Tams, supra note 68, at 142 with further references, especially to the commentary on Art. 40 of the
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] Yrbk Int’l Law
Commission II, Pt Two.
313 Abi-Saab, ‘The Use of Article 19’, 10 EJIL (1999) 339, at 349 referring to systemic norms of a legal
system imposed by logical or legal necessity. On systemic norms see also A. Verdross and B. Simma,
Universelles Völkerrecht (3rd edn, 1984), at 59–60.
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rights. But given the current state of international law, it is far from settled that
such an absolute hierarchy exists. Assuming a conflict is therefore not the only
way in which the relationship between violations of fundamental human rights
and the granting of sovereign immunity can be illustrated.
This conclusion is closely linked to another problem that those who promote the
supremacy argument have not been able to solve convincingly: does a conflict of
norms exist which must be resolved in favour of human rights?314 Surely, Articles
53 and 64 of the VCLT prescribe that a treaty is either void at the time of its
conclusion if it is inconsistent with an existing peremptory norm of general
international law or becomes void if such a norm evolves after the treaty’s
entering into force.315 But it is far from being settled that this specific
consequence applies outside conflicting treaty obligations involving jus cogens.
Assuming a conflict between fundamental human rights and state sovereignty in
customary international law, it is not a matter of logic that the latter must yield to
the former, but rather a matter of discussion.316
In addition, the clash between fundamental human rights and sovereign immunity
is a clash of concepts and ideologies, not of norms. A conflict of norms would
actually require that the legal consequences of two norms are incompatible with
each other – a requirement not met in the case of fundamental human rights and
sovereign immunity. It is one of the truisms of international law that the existence
314 See, e.g., Orakhelashvili, supra note 34, at 255, arguing that peremptory norms, since they embody the
community interest, must operate unimpeded in case of a conflict, thereby presupposing the existence of a
conflict without describing it. The Corte di Cassazione in Ferrini assumed the existence of a conflict as
well. But it seems to understand it not as a conflict of norms or rules, but as a conflict of values because it
stresses the importance of ius cogens for the reinterpretation of sovereign immunity: Ferrini, supra note 7,
at 670. The effect is, of course, quite similar, but the reasoning much more convincing. Still, the analysis of
the Corte di Cassazione requires that ‘sovereign immunity as a norm of customary international law’ is
actually flexible enough to be reinterpreted. This, in return, suggests that the court, despite its unclear
terminology, conceives immunity as a principle and not as a rule.
315 For the relevance of ius cogens on the law of treaties see in general C.L. Rozakis, The Concept of Jus
Cogens in the Law of Treaties (1976); Czaplinski, ‘Ius Cogens and the Law of Treaties in The Fundamental
Rules of the International Legal Order’ in C. Tomuschat and J.-M. Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental
Rules of the International Legal Order (2006), at 83–98.
316 Tams, ‘Schwierigkeiten mit dem Ius Cogens, Anmerkungen zum Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs
für Menschenrechte im Fall Al-Adsani gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 21. November 2001’, 40 Archiv
des Völkerrechts (2002) 331, at 345.
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of a rule and its enforcement are two different sets of problems.317 The absence
of a centralized enforcement system is one of the characteristics and may be the
weakness of the international legal system. It is therefore not only legitimate but
also perfectly consistent with international law to argue that the existence of a
norm is completely unrelated to its enforcement.318 This is true not only for
‘ordinary’ international law, whether treaty or custom, but also for peremptory
norms. To conclude from the jus cogens character of a norm that all other norms
which may limit its enforcement are invalid would require the existence of the
following rule: any jus cogens norm, because of its superior value, invalidates
rules which limit its enforcement. Such a rule does not and will not exist.
It is, of course, not impossible to construe a conflict of norms, and not just a clash
of concepts. Such a conflict of norms would occur if states were not only allowed,
but actually required, to grant unrestricted access to their courts and establish
universal jurisdiction in civil matters for all cases of fundamental human rights
violations. But for the time being, international law is far from reaching this state.
Article 14 of the Anti-Torture Convention could be interpreted as a first step in
this direction, because it requires member states to ensure an enforceable right
to fair and adequate compensation for torture victims. But the meaning of Article
14 and thereby the scope of the obligation is unclear. The Committee against
Torture seems to believe that Article 14 actually obliges states to establish
universal jurisdiction and to deny sovereign immunity to foreign states because it
criticized Canada for the ‘absence of effective measures to provide civil
compensation to victims of torture in all cases’ and suggested that Canada
‘should… ensure the provision of compensation through its civil jurisdiction to all
victims of torture’.319 The committee was probably responding to the ruling of the
317 Zimmermann, supra note 62, at 438.
318 Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 1933 PCIJ (ser A/B)
No. 61, 1933: ‘It is scarcely necessary to point out that the capacity to possess civil rights does not
necessarily imply the capacity to exercise those rights oneself.’
319 Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Canada, 7 July 2005,
CAT/C/CR/34/CAN (emphasis added).
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Ontario Court of Appeal in Bouzari v. Iran.320 In this case, the court held that the
federal State Immunity Act barred Mr Bouzari from bringing a civil action in
Ontario for torture inflicted upon him by, and in, Iran at a time when he was still
an Iranian citizen.321 The United States, on the other hand, when ratifying the
Convention has taken the view that Article 14 was intended to have territorial
limitations.
The negotiating history of the Convention indicates that Article 14 requires a
State Party to provide a private right of action for damages only for acts of torture
committed in its territory, not for acts of torture occurring abroad. Article 14 was
in fact adopted with express reference to “the victim of an act of torture
committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.” The italicized wording appears to
have been deleted by mistake.322
It is not unreasonable to assume that a state is only required to ensure civil
remedies for acts which have been committed within its territories and/or by its
officials, and that that state is not obliged to establish civil universal jurisdiction
and deny foreign sovereign immunity in cases of torture.323 But even if states are
under a treaty obligation to provide a civil remedy in all cases of torture, this
obligation must also qualify as a jus cogens obligation in order to prevail over
immunity under customary international law.324 To prove only the jus cogens
character of the fundamental human right does not suffice. Thus even those who
320 Bouzari v. Republic of Iran (2004), 71 OR (3d) 675, (2004) 243 DLR (4th) 406 (CA); see also Forcese,
‘De-immunizing Torture: Reconciling Human Rights and State Immunity’, 52 McGill LJ (2007) 127, at
129 and 160–161 and Novogrodsky, ‘Immunity for Torture: Lessons from Bouzari v. Iran’, 18 EJIL (2008)
939.
321 Mr Bouzari, after being tortured in Iran, was granted refugee status in Canada. He applied for Canadian
citizenship, but his application was not granted until hearings during appeal: supra note 77, at para. 15.
322 Reagan Administration Summary and Analysis of the Convention, reproduced in US Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, S. Exec. Rep. No. 30 (1990), at 23–24.
323 M. Nowak and E. McArthur, The United Nations Convention Against Torture – A Commentary (2008),
Art. 14, at para. 123: ‘[s]tates are not yet legally required by Article 14 (1) to ensure universal civil jurisdic-
tion before their domestic courts’.
324 See Gattini, supra note 7, at 236: ‘[t]he incoherence could arise only to the extent that it is . . . assumed
that the right of access to justice constitutes itself a jus cogens norm, which it is evidently not’.
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argue in favour of a human rights exception to sovereign immunity must concede
that there is ‘not yet any consistent state practice or case law to the effect that
the rule of State immunity must yield norms of jus cogens, in particular in the
case of torture’.325
4.7 Sovereign Immunity and Comity
The diametrically opposite position to immunity as a specific state right is held by
those who deny sovereign immunity any legal effect under customary
international law.326 They refer either to inconsistent state practice, as highlighted
by Lauterpacht,327 or to the territorial sovereignty of the forum state which
prevails over any sovereignty claim that foreign states may have when they face
legal action in the forum state, as the US Supreme Court does in its current
jurisprudence.328 The latter view in particular is based on a controversial
reinterpretation of one of the oldest judgments on sovereign immunity: that of
1812 in Schooner Exchange v. Fadden by the US Supreme Court.329 Scholarly
writing and jurisprudence are obviously divided in their understanding of the
case. It has been referred to as a source for the absolute theory of sovereign im-
munity 330 as well as for the assumption that immunity is granted as a matter of
courtesy and not as a matter of law. 331
325 A. Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, 2005), at 106–107.
326 For a summary see Fox, supra note 11, at 13 ff.
327 Lauterpacht, supra note, at 227–228. In addition to inconsistent state practice and the absence of protest
by those states which were still relying on the absolute concept of sovereign immunity, Lauterpacht
referred to the phenomenon of reciprocity in granting sovereign immunity – a peculiar precondition if a
duty to grant sovereign immunity exists as a matter of international custom.
328 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 US 468, 479 (2003); Republic of Austria v. Altmann 541 US 677, 696
(2004). See also Caplan, supra note 28, at 764, who seems to embrace the US position that comity is the
correct basis of immunity in international law but at the same time stresses its binding legal effect as a rule
of customary international law.
329 The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
330 Bankas, supra note 18, at 21; Damrosch, surpa note 20, at 1197.
331 Caplan, supra note 28, at 745 ff; whereas Appelbaum, supra note 11, at 37 concedes that it could be
interpreted either way.
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The factual observation made by Lauterpacht is undeniable: state practice with
regard to sovereign immunity was inconsistent in 1951, and it still is in 2009. But
what conclusion can be drawn from this? The answer depends very much on
what can be established as the lowest common denominator among states. It is
quite striking that all states accept foreign sovereign immunity as a category or
concept of international law. Even the United States, when enacting the FSIA,
believed that immunity reflected a doctrine of international law. 332 Foreign
sovereign immunity as international custom is therefore characterized by
agreement among states concerning the concept as such, and at the same time
by substantial disagreement on detail and substance. It is, thus, binding on
states, but only on a very high level of abstraction. Characterizing sovereign
immunity not as a rule but as a (legally binding) principle of international law is
the only way to reconcile these alleged inconsistencies.
4.8 Sovereign Immunity – A Principle
The current literature and jurisprudence often refer to sovereign immunity as a
principle of international law. But, with a few exceptions, the term is obviously
used as a synonym for a rule and not as a distinct category that requires a
different analysis from the rule–exception concept.333 The idea of principles as an
independent category of norms is not new. But so far it has not been linked to
foreign sovereign immunity as an explanation for the current diverse state
practice on the one hand and the wide-reaching consensus on the general
concept on the other hand.
332 ‘Sovereign Immunity is a doctrine of international law under which domestic courts, in appropriate
cases, relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign state’: HR Rep 94-1487, 1976 USCCAN 6604, at 6606, 15 ILM
(1976) 1398, at 1402; see also Fox, supra note 11, at 14.
333 The Corte di Cassazione in Ferrini counts as one of the few exceptions. Although it considered
sovereign immunity to be a norm under customary international law, it held at the same time that ‘no matter
how often [the proposition that only an express normative provision would be able to justify derogation
from the principle of sovereign immunity] is repeated, this proposition is one with which this Court cannot
agree’: Ferrini, supra note 7, at 671. The Court can derive at this conclusion only on the assumption that
immunity is a principle, not a rule. De Sena and De Vittor, supra note 7, at 89 seem to interpret the Ferrini
decision in this way as well.
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A Rules and Principles – What’s the Difference?
The difference between rule and principle has been widely discussed in legal
theory. In particular Ronald Dworkin emphasized not only their existence, but
also their importance for our understanding of law:334
[P]rinciples . . . conflict and interact with one another, so that each principle that
is relevant to a particular legal problem provides a reason arguing in favor of, but
does not stipulate, a particular solution. The man who must decide the problem is
therefore required to assess all the competing and conflicting principles that bear
upon it, and to make a resolution of these principles rather than identifying one
among others as ‘valid’.335
Naturally, it is impossible to establish a clear-cut distinction between principles
and rules. But problems in categorization can hardly affect the existence of the
category itself. A classical criterion for separating principles from rules is the
former’s lack of precision. Rules are more specific than principles, and the
degree of abstraction indicates the legal nature of the norm: it is either a rule or a
principle.336
More important, however, than the level of generality are the different legal
consequences of a collision of rules and principles. A rule has a specific legal
consequence, meaning that it either requires or allows for a certain behaviour.
Any deviance from this rule is thus prohibited, at least as long as the rule is valid
– something that Dworkin has called the all-or-nothing fashion of rules.337 If two
rules collide because the first rule requires what the second rule prohibits, only
334 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), at 22 ff and at 71 ff.
335 Ibid., at 72
336 Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’, 81 Yale LJ (1972) 823, at 838; Christie, ‘The Model of
Principles’, 17 Duke LJ (1968) 449, at 669.
337 Dworkin, supra note 91 at 24: ‘[r]ules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule
stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it
is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision’.
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one of the rules can be valid. The conflict can be solved by adding an exception
to the first rule for all cases of the second rule or, if no exception exists, by
recourse to more general maxims like lex specialis or lex posterior.338 A principle,
however, allows for a broader spectrum of possible behaviour. It does not require
a particular decision. Quite the contrary; a principle of a given legal system is
something which ‘officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a
consideration inclining in one direction or another’.339 Principles can therefore be
fulfilled gradually depending on what is legally and factually possible.340 As with
rules, more than one principle may apply to a specific situation, each leaning
towards different outcomes. But even though one principle may be given more
weight in a certain situation, this does not necessarily mean that it is no longer
part of the legal system – as is the case with an invalid rule. Instead, it can
prevail in other circumstances over other colliding principles. As a consequence,
principles which collide must be balanced against each other with a view to the
case at hand and the facts involved. The balancing process, in turn, will produce
a specific rule that requires a certain behaviour in a certain situation.341 In other
words, the rule reflects the outcome of the balancing process of two different
principles.
As long as one or more people are authorized to undertake this balancing
process for a group of persons and as long as the result is binding on everyone
within this group, we will not encounter any difficulties with regard to different
outcomes. But if such an authority does not exist, the process of balancing
conflicting principles and thereby specifying the rules which apply to a particular
case or situation will inevitably result in different and sometimes even
inconsistent results. But both outcomes may reflect a reasonable construction of
one single principle or of a balancing of conflicting principles.
338 On the conflict of rules see R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (1986), at 77 ff.
339 Dworkin, supra note 91, at 25.
340 Alexy, supra note 95, at 75.
341 Ibid., at 81 ff.
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B Principles in International Law
The idea of principles as an independent category is not unknown in international
law. The ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ are, for ex-
ample, listed among the sources of international law in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ
Statute.342 The provision was included to enable the Court to fill gaps which its
drafters thought to be very common in international law. 343 The wording
suggests quite unambiguously that the provision applies only to principles which
are derived from a comparative study of municipal legal systems. 344 But an
alternative interpretation understands Article 38(1)(c) to include general
principles of international law as well, such as pacta sunt servanda and good
faith. 345Yet, no matter how the general principle’s provision is understood, it
serves only as a back-up in the event that treaty or custom does not provide the
required solution and leaves the Court and parties to the dispute with a non-
liquet. 346 Thus, Article 38(1)(c) does not cover the entire dimension of principles
in international law because they also exist within treaties and custom. 347
342 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 24 Oct. 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), TS No. 993.
343 Pellet, ‘Article 38’, in A. Zimmermann, C. Tomuschat, and K. Oehllers-Frahm (eds), The Statute of the
International Court of Justice – A Commentary (2006), at para. 245 with further references.
344 Ibid., at para. 249, stating that there is little doubt that general principles within the meaning of Art.
38(1)(c) are ‘unwritten legal norms of wide-ranging character; and recognized in the municipal laws of
States; moreover they must be transposable at the international level’.
345 For a summary see Thirlway, ‘The Source of International Law’, in M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law
(2006), at 115, 128. According to M.N. Shaw, International Law (5th edn, 2003), at 95: ‘it is not clear . . .
whether what is involved is a general principle of law appearing in municipal systems or a general principle
of international law’. At the same time he considers pacta sunt servanda to be a ‘crucial general principle
of international law’: ibid., at 97. The PCIJ also referred to a principle of international law rather than
general principles recognized by civilized nations: Chorzów Factory Case, PCIJ Series A, No 17, 1928, at
29.
346 Shaw, supra note 102, at 93; Thirlway, supra note 102, at 127.
347 It has been argued that principles belong to a category of norms beyond the classical sources of public
international law as they are contained in Art. 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. Particularly the element of opinio
iuris, which is necessary to establish international custom requires a degree of specification which
principles lack: see C.-S. Zöllner, Das Transparenzprinzip im Internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht (2009), at
95 ff. This reasoning is not necessarily convincing. If we accept that principles are in theory part of the law,
then there is no reason why states cannot accept a principle as law and behave accordingly, thereby es-
tablishing a certain state practice. This practice will probably be inconsistent with regard to details seeing
that states differ in how they specify or balance competing principles. But there is a general understanding
on what the law is.
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C Sovereign Immunity – a Principle, not a Rule
All states, with a very few exceptions, accept sovereign immunity as something
which is legally binding under international law. But that’s basically it. 348The
extent to which foreign states are awarded immunity differs from state to state.
Even the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and its distinction between
public and private acts is applied so divergently that it is more aptly described as
an idea, doctrine, or concept which needs to be specified before it can be applied
to a case than as a specific rule. 349
But what is eventually more important for the categorization of immunity as a
principle and not as a rule is the current diverse state practice concerning
exceptions to sovereign immunity, in particular the tort exception and its scope of
application. If sovereign immunity is a rule and the tort exception, at least with
regard to acts iure imperii, has not yet acquired the status of customary
international law, all states which apply it commit an international wrong. 350 The
same is true for states that expand the public–private distinction beyond its
original commercial context. 351 But state practice does not support this
conclusion. There are states that apply the tort exception and states that do
not.352 And even those that do, do so differently. 353 In addition, the tort exception
348 See Dellapenna, supra note 13, at 61, concluding ‘that consensus exists only at a rather high level of
abstraction’, which necessarily implies a certain amount of agreement. Jennings and Watts, supra note 13,
at 342–343, even though emphasizing substantial difference in national court decisions, concede a general
understanding of sovereign immunity.
349 For a brief description of the most fundamental differences see supra at sect. 3.
350 A minor exception must be added for those states which have ratified the ECSI. In relation to each other
they are obliged to give full effect to this exception, whereas they would be legally prohibited from doing
so in relation to states which have not ratified the ECSI – at least if sovereign immunity is the default rule
and exceptions to this default rule must be supported by customary international law.
351 It is quite interesting that the private–public distinction and the commercial exception are usually used
synonymously, even though the former has a more far-reaching scope of application than the latter; for a
more detailed discussion see supra at sect. 3.
352 In particular civil law countries like the US and the UK which have enacted national sovereign
immunity laws apply the tort exception on basis of these laws: § 1605(a)(5) FSIA and sect. 5 of the State
Immunity Act 1978. The ECSI and the UNCJSI also provide for a tort exception, for details see supra at
sect. 4.
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is not the only exception to sovereign immunity which is applied by some, but not
by all states. The FSIA, for example, has been amended over the years and now
contains exceptions inter alia for cases in which property is expropriated in
violation of international law, 354 and cases in which money damages are sought
for personal injury or death which is caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking. 355 Even though additional
requirements must be met in order to establish jurisdiction in US courts, and
even though these requirements limit the application of the exceptions
considerably, the FSIA still provides for jurisdiction of US courts over foreign
states in cases of official conduct. 356
It is not only the current state practice that supports the view of sovereign
immunity as a principle, but also its theoretical underpinnings. The correct basis
of sovereign immunity in international law is hotly debated. Scholars and courts
usually refer to par in parem non habet imperium, the principle of sovereign
equality and independence, even though much more emphasis should be placed
on the aspect of independence than on equality.357 However, the claim of
unimpaired sovereignty by the foreign state clashes with the claim of territorial
sovereignty of the forum state. And no matter how we look at it – from the angle
of either the forum state or the foreign state – neither of the two claims can assert
to be higher ranking in principle. 358 ‘[T]he rule’s content cannot be construed so
353 The ECSI and the State Immunity Act explicitly exempt acts of the armed forces from the tort
exception, whereas the FSIA and the UNCJIS do not include such a counter-exception; at least explicitly;
see supra at sect. 4.
354 § 1605(a)(3) FSIA as long as the expropriated property is present in the US and linked to commercial
activities carried by the foreign state within in the US.
355 The so-called terrorism exception also applies if material support or resources for acts of torture, extra-
judicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage taking is provided. But the act itself or the provision of
material support or resources must be ‘engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state
while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency’, and it applies only to states that
are designated as state sponsors of terrorism; for more details see § 1605A FSIA.
356 The judgments which have been issued against states acting in their official capacity are listed by the
Corte di Cassazione in Ferrini, supra note 7, at 673.
357 See the accompanying text to supra note 58.
358 It is quite surprising that most scholars usually acknowledge the competing/ ‘sovereignty claims’ of the
forum state and the foreign state, but at the same time assume that either one of them is generally less
relevant: see, e.g., Lauterpacht, supra note 25, at 290 (over)emphasizing the principle of territorial sover-
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as to protect the autonomy of only one of the disputing States – this would look
like a totalitarian way of violating sovereign equality. The problem appears rather
to lie in delimitating or balancing the conflicting sovereignties.’359 States are
therefore faced with the task of balancing these two principles – whereby
sovereign independence and equality are equated with immunity of the foreign
state – in order to determine specific rules concerning the conditions under which
foreign states are accorded sovereign immunity within their jurisdiction.360
But who is authorized to conduct the balancing of principles in order to reach
specific rules? The answer to this question is of fundamental importance for all
cases in which national decisions and practice are scrutinized by an international
court or tribunal, as in the current ICJ case, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
between Germany and Italy. Practice seems to support the claim that the states
themselves have the power to do so. The common law countries in particular
have enacted national legislation on sovereign immunity which can be
understood as an exercise of their balancing power. Still, this fact does not
provide sufficient proof that a court like the ICJ is barred from reviewing the
results of the balancing process. But if international law does not oblige states to
behave in a specific way because they have not agreed on precise rules, but only
on an abstract principle, and if states are thus free to determine the rules within
the limits set by international law, then it is not for the courts to second-guess the
balancing process in detail. Otherwise it would be the courts and not the states
that actually make these rules. There may be situations when international courts
are asked and even obliged to specify the meaning of a principle for a certain
eignty, while supporters of state right to sovereign immunity largely neglect any legitimate claim of the
forum state.
359 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (1989), at 433.
360 It seems as if the Corte di Cassazione in Ferrini actually applied such a balancing approach even though
its terminology with regard to the legal nature of sovereign immunity is inconsistent: see the text accom-
panying supra notes 71 and 90. De Sena and De Vittor, supra note 7, at 89 interpret Ferrini in a similar
fashion, even though the principles involved are the territorial sovereignty of the forum state, on the one
hand, and the sovereign independence of the foreign state on the other, and not the sovereign equality of
states and the protection of inviolable right. The latter may influence the outcome of the balancing process,
but it cannot override the limits set by the sovereign independence of a state, at least in cases in which these
rights are not enforced by the international community of states, but by a single state alone.
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case, especially when such a principle is relevant for determining the meaning of
an existing rule. But as long as such a rule does not yet exist, since it has to be
derived from the specification of a principle or the balancing of conflicting
principles, states are generally free to make their decisions according to their
policies.
A critique of this approach could refer to the fact that the international community
– at least since the advisory opinion in the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons case 361 – has rejected the traditional ruling of the PCIJ in the
Lotus case according to which states are free to act as long as they are not
restricted by a rule of customary international law and treaty law. 362 The
international system has changed from the coordination of independent, self-
contained states to a regime of interdependence and cooperation. 363 But even if
we assume that this observation is an accurate description of contemporary
international law, is it really true that the right to balance conflicting principles in
the absence of specific rules is nothing other than ‘Lotus in disguise’? The
underlying problem for the ICJ in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons was that if the Court applied the Lotus doctrine, it had to stipulate ‘a
right in law to act in ways which could deprive the sovereignty of all other States
of meaning’. 364 I do not think that such a consequence would result from holding
that states are free to determine the scope of sovereign immunity within their
borders in the absence of specific rules. In addition, I will show that international
law actually prescribes limits on states’ freedom to act, limits which are based on
competing principles. 365 Unlike France in the Lotus case, states are thus not
required to prove the existence of a specific rule which restricts the other state’s
freedom to act. If we accept that norms, particularly those of international
361 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226.
362 The Case of the S.S. ‘Lotus’ (France v. Turkey), 7 Sept. 1927, PCIJ, Ser. A., No. 10, 1927.
363 On the notion of cooperation and how it changed the conception of public international law see C.
Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964), at 10, 63.
364 Legality, supra note 118, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 393 ff.
365 See infra, at sect. 8 D.
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custom, are sometimes better described as principles than rules, then we must
decide who is authorized to develop specific rules from these principles: the
individual state or international courts? The problem is therefore not one of the
fundamental nature of the legal system; it rather refers to who is making which
decisions. The Lotus case stipulated a presumption that everything not prohibited
by custom or treaty is allowed. But the balancing of conflicting principles neither
rests on nor reinforces this presumption and should therefore be treated
differently.
D The Limits to the Freedom of States
Because sovereign immunity is a principle and not a rule, international courts and
tribunals may only scrutinize whether a state has violated the boundaries set by
international law that a state must observe when balancing its territorial
sovereignty and the sovereign independence of foreign states. These limits of
international law restrict not only the freedom of states to grant, but also their
freedom to deny, sovereign immunity to foreign states within their jurisdiction.
As shown above, granting immunity either in cases of fundamental human rights
violations or in cases in which a foreign state (including its armed forces) has
caused personal injuries on the territory of the forum state (including armed
conflict) does not violate international law. The only possible constraint is the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity: a state may not grant immunity to private
acts of a state, even though it has considerable freedom to determine the criteria
by which it defines what constitutes a public and what a private act.
The limits that prevent the forum state from denying sovereign immunity to a for-
eign state are much more difficult to determine. In our effort to define these limits,
we should recognize the link between jurisdiction and immunity. True, the ICJ
treats jurisdiction and sovereign immunity as two distinct categories.366 But it is
undeniable that both concepts are based on the same competing principles: the
366 Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, at para. 59.
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territorial sovereignty of the forum state and the sovereign independence of the
foreign state.367
As a consequence, recent years have shown a growing tendency to link the outer
limits of denying immunity to the lawful exercise of jurisdiction: as long as
jurisdiction can be established, states can and, in the view of some authors at
least, should deny immunity, especially in cases of fundamental human rights
violations. 368 But this concept, apart from eliminating immunity as a distinct
category, runs the risk of neglecting important differences in the concept of
jurisdiction in general and sovereign immunity in particular. Jurisdiction and its
limits have developed differently depending on the subject matter. The
jurisdiction to adjudicate in civil matters has, for example, developed mainly in
the context of private international law, even though it is not unrelated to public
international law. 369 Immunity, on the other hand, is linked to official acts of a
state (if we accept the principal distinction between private and public acts) and
is therefore more sensitive to the sovereignty of the foreign state. Linking
immunity to the limits of jurisdiction to adjudicate in civil matters would therefore
mean disregarding the official character of the foreign state’s conduct.
Another conception of sovereign immunity, which would allow for taking these
aspects into account, is to think of immunity not as a distinct category, but as a
special form of jurisdiction that the forum state can exercise if a state in its official
capacity is involved. The most difficult problem is, of course, drawing the limits of
this concept of jurisdiction. As already noted, it is sovereignty understood as
367 C. Ryngaert Jurisdiction in International Law (2008), at 6; Muse, ‘A Public International Law Critique
of the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Helms Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996)’, 30 George Washington J Int’l L & Econ (1996/97) 207, at 241–242 and Oxman,
‘Jurisdiction of States’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International law (online), at para. 1
are of a similar view.
368 Caplan, supra note 28, at 778; see also Novogrodsky, supra note 77, at 948 ff, suggesting that Canada
should add an additional exception to its State Immunity Act for cases of fundamental human rights
violations as long as the plaintiff is a Canadian citizen at the time when he takes legal action against the
foreign state in Canada. In justifying this amendment he argues that the citizenship requirement establishes
the necessary nexus or link between the territory of the forum state and the case. Novogrodsky thereby
exclusively relies on the concept of jurisdiction and, at least implicitly, rejects the one of sovereign
immunity as a distinct category.
369 Oxman, supra note 124, at para. 7.
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independence rather than the concept of sovereign equality which should guide
us. 370 Independence is based on the idea that states enjoy some sort of external
sovereignty, especially vis-à-vis other states. These ‘other states’ (but not
necessarily the international community of states) must respect actions taken by
a foreign state within its own territory which affect its own citizens. 371 Yes, these
actions may violate public international law and they can, for example, trigger the
response of the international community in the form of binding Security Council
resolutions. But it is not for the individual states to judge these actions, which
took place within the territory of another state, by their own standards.
Quite different, however, are situations in which a foreign state acts on the
territory of another state, especially when affecting the forum state’s citizens.
Such acts are often in themselves a violation of the forum state’s sovereignty. In
addition, a strong and legitimate link exists between the case and the forum
state. A state may therefore legitimately decide to exercise its jurisdiction and to
deny sovereign immunity to the foreign state even when acting in its official
capacity. This would also include acts committed by the armed forces of the
foreign state during armed conflict because the fact that armed forces and armed
conflict are involved does not make the claim of the foreign state stronger or the
claim of the forum state weaker. There are, of course, doubts whether municipal
courts are suitable for dealing with these kinds of cases at all. But such doubts
are based on practical obstacles and do not change the fact that by denying
jurisdiction, the forum state legitimately exercises its territorial sovereignty.
But cases in which a foreign state acts on the territory of the forum state must be
distinguished from cases in which the national of the forum state is subject to
actions of the foreign state within its territory. Within a criminal law context the
jurisdiction of the forum state would be based on the disputed passive personality
principle: states assert the right to try a foreigner for injuring a national of the
370 See the text accompanying supra note 58.
371 Hess, supra note 39, at 311.
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state outside the territory of that state. 372 But in the case of jurisdiction in civil
matters, the term ‘passive personality’ principle is misleading. It is the national of
the forum state who has been affected and who is trying to assert her rights
against the foreign state. In determining the significance of the forum state’s
external sovereignty in such a case, it is important to consider that the foreign
state acted vis-à-vis citizens of another state and not its own. A state may rely on
sovereignty understood as independence only if it does not internationalize the
issue itself, which it does in cases that involve the nationals of another state.
However, the state has a right that its conduct is judged not by the standards of
the forum state, but by either its own or international standards based on treaty
or custom. To complicate matters, it is of course possible, as in Bozouri v. Iran,
that the applicant, while being the national of the foreign state during the acts in
question, acquires the nationality of the forum state before or even during the
trial. 373 Still, at the time of conduct such a case is identical to those in which the
claim for independence of the foreign state is strongest: when acting vis-à-vis its
own nationals on its own territory. If the principle of sovereign immunity is to have
any discrete meaning and exist as an independent concept, these cases must be
treated alike. States are therefore prohibited from denying sovereign immunity if
the claimant acquires the forums state’s nationality after the conduct in question
occurred.
International law obviously limits the legal ability of states to determine the scope
of sovereign immunity within their legal orders: states may not award immunity
for acts iure gestionis, but must do so when the foreign state acts in its official
capacity on its own territory vis-à-vis its own citizens at that time. Everything else
is up to the forum state: it may, but does not have to, grant sovereign immunity
depending on its political preferences. 374
372 Oxman, supra note 124, at para. 34 ff; Shaw, supra note 100, at 589 ff.
373 Bouzari v. Iran, supra note 77, at para. 15.
374 The freedom of the forum state to determine the scope of sovereign immunity within its legal order has
been particularly emphasized by US scholars as well: see, e.g., Caplan, supra note 28. But they base their
claim on the assumption that the jurisdiction of the forum state serves as the default rule and sovereign
immunity as an exception to it. States are therefore free to determine the limits of sovereignty and are only
required to award immunity in case of state conduct that ‘collectively benefits the community of nations’:
ibid. at 744. However, the scope of immunity is something which is determined by the behaviour of states
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4.9 Remarks: Germany v. Italy
Sovereign immunity is a principle, not a rule. But what implications does this
have for the pending case between Germany and Italy before the ICJ? Though it
does not alter the overall legal question – did Italy, by denying immunity for the
acts committed by the German Wehrmacht during WWII, violate international
law? – it influences the way in which the ICJ must answer it. This answer does
not depend on the existence of a rule under customary international law that
allows for denying immunity in cases of torts committed by a foreign state on the
territory of the forum state during an armed conflict. It is the very nature of a
principle that it can be specified in different ways. The essential problem
therefore is whether in doing so Italy has violated the limits set by international
law.
The analysis has shown that if the conduct of the Wehrmacht had taken place
today, Germany would lose the case. 375 But what consequences arise from the
fact that 65 years have passed since the end of World War II? States at that time
usually granted absolute sovereign immunity even though they were not legally
required to do so. Sovereign immunity was a principle back then just as it is
today. The fact that most, but not all, states awarded immunity without exception
does not mean that they could not have done otherwise. Even 65 years ago,
international law would have allowed Italy to deny immunity for acts committed by
and not by logic. Thus, framing the issue just the other way round does not necessarily explain why states
enjoy considerable freedom to make their own policy decisions. States could have accepted so many
exceptions as a matter of international custom that the freedom to act would have been reduced
considerably. In addition, the requirement of state conduct which collectively benefits the international
community is hardly helpful. It focuses exclusively on the protection of human rights and not the
maintenance of international peace and security. These two aspects are of course intertwined, but policy-
makers and scholars have argued that sovereign immunity is actually necessary for preserving and retaining
good relations among states: see, e.g., Al-Adsani, supra note, at para. 54. What constitutes behaviour which
collectively benefits the international community thus depends on what international law is all about: states
and their relations to each other or the protection of fundamental human rights. But this question has not
been answered in one or the other way.
375 Special problems might arise on the enforcement level which have not been discussed in this article.
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Germany in Italy vis-à-vis Italian citizens during World War II. The crucial point,
however, is that Italy actually did award immunity, at least for acts iure imperii.
The relevant focus for deciding the case therefore shifts significantly. The
outcome now depends on whether Germany may rely on the fact that states until
recently regularly awarded immunity in comparable cases, instead of an alleged
right to sovereign immunity. To make such a claim, Germany must actually show
that not only courts in general, but the Corte di Cassazione in particular has
decided a comparable case and has therefore created a precedent that Germany
could rely on. 376
If that is the case, the ICJ must decide whether Germany’s reliance claim is a
matter of international law. The US Supreme Court, for example, decided that the
FSIA applies even if the facts of the case took place before its enactment.377 But
how to apply the FSIA is surely a domestic legal question, and Italy, in order to
determine the scope of sovereign immunity, applies customary international law
which, according to Article 25 of the Italian Constitution, is part of the Italian legal
system. Still, even though sovereign immunity constitutes a principle of
international custom, it must be specified in order to apply within the Italian legal
order. If enacting domestic legislation transforms sovereign immunity into a
domestic matter, what about a judgment of a national court which specifies an
international law principle: is it national or international law? Italy could at least
argue that specifying sovereign immunity makes it a domestic legal question.
Still, should the ICJ decide that it actually faces a matter of international law, it
has to determine whether Germany can rely at all on how an international law
principle is specified by a domestic court and, if so, for how long. This problem is
obviously of a more general nature than the limits of sovereign immunity under
376 The term ‘precedent’ does not suggest that the Corte di Cassazione is legally bound by its previous
judgments (stare decisis), which is a matter of national and not international law anyway. Instead it is
merely used to illustrate the basis for a possible reliance claim. Even though claiming reliance is closely
connected to the problem of retroactivity, it must be distinguished from questions of inter-temporal
application of the law.
377 Austria v. Altmann, supra note 12.
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customary international law. 378 Answering this and the abovementioned
questions is not part of the present analysis. However, one should bear in mind
that the ICJ itself considers sovereign immunity as a procedural right and not a
substantive one, 379 and that, as a matter of principle, reliance on a procedural
right does not qualify for as much protection as reliance on a substantive right.
378 That the US Supreme Court applied the FSIA retroactively has no bearing on deciding this question. The
Supreme Court based its decision on the text of the FSIA which provides in § 1602 that ‘claims of foreign
states to immunity should henceforth be decided . . . in conformity with the principles set forth in this chap-
ter’ (emphasis added). It is therefore misleading to suggest, like Gattini, supra note 7, in note 68, that the
decision of the Supreme Court in Altmann anticipates the outcome under customary international law,
especially considering that sovereign immunity does not constitute a specific rule and state right, but only a
principle.
379 Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, at para. 60.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
5.1 UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The concept of jurisdiction is integral to the sovereignty of States and is
fundamental to the functioning of the international legal system. Judge Rosalyn
Higgins, the President of the International Court of Justice describes jurisdiction
as an allocation of competence to States, which is important for the avoidance of
conflict of authority. Jurisdiction in international law is essentially the competence
of States to exercise lawful authority over persons, territory as well as events.
Jurisdiction may be civil or criminal (regulatory) in nature. The typology of
jurisdiction includes prescriptive jurisdiction (authority to make laws) and
enforcement jurisdiction (authority to apply and enforce laws). There are different
bases for the exercise of jurisdiction, including territoriality, nationality, protective,
universality and the more controversial passive personality and effects principles.
5.2 ORIGIN AND NATURE
There is generally no agreed doctrinal definition of universal jurisdiction in
customary and conventional international law.  However, this does not preclude
any definition ,which embodies the essence of the concept as the ability to
exercise   jurisdiction irrespective of territoriality or nationality.  Therefore, the
concept of universal jurisdiction applies to a situation where “the nature of (an)
act entitles a State to exercise its jurisdiction to apply its laws, even if the act has
occurred outside its territory, has been perpetrated by a non-national, and even if
(its) nationals have not been harmed by the acts.”  The Princeton Principles on
Universal Jurisdiction provide that universal jurisdiction pertains broadly to the
power of States to punish certain crimes irrespective of the place committed and
by whom committed (i.e. in the absence of other grounds for the exercise of
jurisdiction).
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Universal jurisdiction is not without controversy and this extends to its
history as well as its applicability. While authors like Henry Kissinger, The former
Secretary of State of the United States of America, have challenged the principle
of universal jurisdiction to be novel,  earlier indications of the principle go back to
the international crime of piracy. Customary international law proscribes the
crime of piracy and the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States over pirates is
accepted in customary international law. Article 19 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas and Article 105 of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea codify this customary rule that,
“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State,
every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy
and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on
board.”
Jurisdiction is imperative for the protection of rights and interests.
However, certain fundamental rights cannot be adequately secured by a few
States or through a “framework of bilateral relations” alone.  To ensure effective
protection and enforcement of these international interests a mechanism that
would involve the generality of the world community is sought to be achieved
through universality. It has been argued that, “international law provides that
certain offences may be punished by any State because the offenders are
common enemies of all mankind and (as such) all nations have an equal interest
in their apprehension and punishment”.  The concept of universal jurisdiction is
based on functionality in view of the decentralised nature of the international
system; a feature that makes it difficult for the system to enforce its fundamental
laws.
The exercise of jurisdiction by States on grounds of universality of interest
has been likened to the principle of actio popularis in Roman Law which gave
every member of the public the right to take legal action in defence of public
interest, whether or not one was affected.
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Usual notions regarding the nature of universal jurisdiction is that it applies
to acts which are so heinous that every State has a legal interest in the
enforcement of these acts, largely because they violate obligations owed to the
international community as a whole (obligations erga omnes). The term,
‘obligations erga omnes’, which is commonly used with regard to the concept of
universal jurisdiction was introduced into mainstream international legal language
by the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain).  The Court
stated that,
“…an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis
another State... By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.”
The Court further gave what it considered to be examples in contemporary
international law of acts that attract this type of obligations, and they include acts
of aggression, genocide, the basic rights of the human person, including
protection from slavery and racial discrimination.  However, the fact that an act is
in breach of an obligation erga omnes does not mean that universal jurisdiction
extends to such an act.
5.3 SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY
The controversy surrounding the concept of universal jurisdiction is not
whether the concept validly exists as a basis for jurisdiction in international law
but rather the scope of its applicability. Universal jurisdiction does not apply to all
international crimes, but rather to a very limited category of offences. Universal
jurisdiction over acts of piracy is well established in international law. The fact
that pirates were regarded as Stateless persons coupled with the fact that acts of
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piracy were committed on the high seas outside the territorial jurisdiction of
States would have meant that pirates were completely outside the ambit of the
law. That States would have not have had the right to exercise jurisdiction over
pirates necessitated a means of asserting some sort of universal jurisdiction over
them as common enemies of mankind.
It seems common place in contemporary times and discourse to assume
that international crimes like slavery, slave trade, genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, apartheid, torture, terrorism and hijacking attract universal
jurisdiction because of the moral heinousness of these crimes. Moral
heinousness however, is not to be equated with universal jurisdiction.   . The
issue of whether there exists universal jurisdiction over a crime is dependent on
general international law and the subtleties of international rule-making.
However, the categorization or proscription of an act as an international crime is
not enough to ascribe universal jurisdiction to States for the proscribed act.
It is common to find general and expansive assertions including a wider
range of international crimes, than is actually the case, within the remit of
universal jurisdiction. For instance, the Third Restatement of the Law: The
Foreign Relations Law of the United States mentions the offences of piracy,
slave trade, genocide, war crimes, attacks on or hijacking of aircrafts, and
presumably certain acts of terrorism as falling within the scope of the concept of
universal jurisdiction.  It is also not uncommon to find some commentators,
especially within the field of international relations,  and human rights
organisations and NGOs adopting this expansive view of universal jurisdiction.
The issue of universal jurisdiction over the international crime of slavery
and slave trading, contrary to commonly held opinion is not as straightforward as
the crime of piracy.  It has also been contended that the recognition of universal
jurisdiction over slavery and slave trading can be traced to the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, the 1926 Convention To Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery and its
Protocol in 1953 and Supplementary Convention in 1956.  However, there is
319
nothing in the text of these provisions conferring States with universal jurisdiction,
indeed most of the provisions direct its obligations to the High Contracting
Parties; obligations which the parties contractually agreed to and can denounce.
Professor Kontorovich argues that,
“At most, international treaties on slave trading created “delegated jurisdiction”
whereby several nations conveyed to one another the right to exercise some of
their jurisdictional powers with respect to a particular offence, effectively making
each State an agent of the others. Since such arrangements rest on State
consent and the traditional jurisdiction of each State party to the agreements,
they in no way…can be considered as examples of universal jurisdiction”.
Proponents of universal jurisdiction over slavery and slave trading, like
Kenneth Randall concede that the international instruments on slavery do not
explicitly confer universal jurisdiction, however they assert that such universal
jurisdiction exists in customary international law. They argue that customary
international law as seen in the extensive efforts to abolish slavery, even in the
absence of explicit provisions in international instruments on slavery providing for
universal jurisdiction, sustains universal jurisdiction over these crimes.  However,
it is doubtful if customary law sustains this assertion because to the extent that
the requirements for a rule to emerge as custom in international law include State
practice in support of the rule together with opinio juris, no State practice exists
where States have assumed universal jurisdiction over slavery and slave trade.
The Statutes of the Tribunals established after the World War in 1945 in
Nuremberg and in the Far East (Tokyo) did not provide that universal jurisdiction
exists for crimes against humanity, neither do the trials conducted under the
Statutes and the various war crimes trials conducted in the aftermath of the War
support universal jurisdiction for war crimes. This is because the trials were part
of the terms of surrender of the vanquished States to the victorious Allied
Powers. However, it would seem that universal jurisdiction arguably extended in
the wake of World War II to crimes against humanity as evident in the trial of
Adolf Eichmann in Israel in 1961.  Eichmann, an official in the German Reich,
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who was implicated in the Holocaust was kidnapped from Argentina and brought
to trial in Israel. While States like Argentina objected to the violation of its
territorial sovereignty and the manner of  securing the presence of Eichmann in
Israel, there were no objections to the grounds on which Israel asserted
jurisdiction, which included universal jurisdiction. Further to this, the United
States, in the case of Demjanyuk, accepted that a person implicated in the
Holocaust could be extradited to Israel which could exercise jurisdiction over
persons accused of perpetrating the Holocaust.
Universal jurisdiction has also been argued to have extended to certain
crimes where multilateral treaties codifying these crimes such as the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court stipulate that States within whose
territory persons guilty of such crimes are found are under a duty to prosecute or
extradite (aut dedere, aut judicare/ punire) such persons.  International
instruments on genocide, war crimes, hijacking, torture and terrorism contain
provisions obligating States to exercise jurisdiction over certain acts or extradite
accused persons to other States for trial.
With regard to the so-called treaty-based universal jurisdiction (aut
dedere, aut judicare), resort is to be had to the language of the specific treaties.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
1948 does not contain an express provision mandating State parties to assume
jurisdiction over crimes of genocide by prosecuting accused persons or to
extradite such persons. The Genocide Convention does not impose an obligation
to prosecute or extradite, rather it expressly provides that trials are to be by
“a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed,
or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to
those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”
The Convention also provides in Article VII that,
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“Genocide …shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of
extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant
extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.”
The logical interpretation of these provisions can only, therefore, either be
that proceedings for genocide may be brought by States ,which are obligated to
exercise jurisdiction where there is a territorial jurisdictional link, or that
proceedings may be brought before a competent international criminal court.
Where genocide has been committed and extradition is sought, parties to the
Convention cannot qualify the genocide as a political offence for which there can
be no extradition but rather to grant the extradition in accordance with its own
national laws; extradition being dependent on the existence of a treaty or
agreement in the absence of which there is no obligation to extradite.  However,
these provisions of the Genocide Convention have been progressively
interpreted as including a “potential” for universal jurisdiction”.
International instruments regarding war crimes and torture are more
explicit in their provisions regarding the issue of ‘treaty-based universal
jurisdiction’. Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 of the first,  second,  third  and fourth  of
The Geneva Conventions 1949, provide that,
“Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed...grave breaches and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and
in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over
for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High
Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.”
It is easily assumed that there is universal jurisdiction for war crimes. A
leading expert on war crimes and international criminal law writes that there are
no specific provisions within the Conventions for universal jurisdiction, but that it
is implicit in the penal duty to enforce the grave breaches of the Convention that
Parties exercise universal jurisdiction under their national laws.  He posits that
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universal jurisdiction over war crimes is fuelled by the writings of academics and
experts, rather than the Conventions. The Conventions require States to pass
domestic legislation to facilitate jurisdiction, but unfortunately many States are yet
to do this. The Conventions hold pride of place as multilateral international
agreements because of the near universality of participation of States who have
ratified the Conventions. Universality in the scope of Conventions does not
automatically mean that the Convention provides for universal jurisdiction,
however if the near universal ratification of the Conventions is backed  by the
enactment of national legislations in States as required, then it becomes difficult
to argue against universal jurisdiction for war crimes.
With regards to hijacking of aircrafts, the Tokyo Convention on Offences
and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft 1963 is clear in its
provisions. The Convention does not provide for universal jurisdiction but rather it
provides for jurisdiction on grounds of registration of the aircraft. In the absence
of registration jurisdiction can then be founded on effects in territory, nationality
or residence of affected persons, violation of security of the State or violation of
its laws and obligations under any multilateral international agreement.  Both the
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970 and
the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation 1971 extend the grounds of jurisdiction contained within the
Conventions and provide that,
“The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall,
if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”
The provisions of the Montreal and Hague Conventions seem to embody
universal jurisdiction, however Judge Higgins strongly refutes this arguing that,
“..[I]t is still not really universal jurisdiction stricto sensu, because in any given
case only a small number of contracting States would be able to exercise
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jurisdiction on the basis of Articles 2, 4, and 7. All that is ‘universal’ is the
requirement that all States parties do whatever is necessary to be able to
exercise jurisdiction should the relatively limited bases of jurisdiction arise in the
circumstances. Contrary to the views sometimes expressed elsewhere, this is not
treaty-based universal jurisdiction (and so the question of such treaty basis
‘passing into’ general international law does not arise.”
Similarly, the International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973 contains an undertaking by Parties in
Article 4 to adopt legislative, judicial and administrative measures for the exercise
of jurisdiction over persons accused of apartheid, irrespective of territoriality and
nationality.
The Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons 1973 provides for States to exercise territorial,
nationality and flag jurisdictions.  Article 7 of the Convention further provides that,
“The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does
not extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay,
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through
proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.”
There is nothing in the text of the Convention, which expresses any form
of universal jurisdiction. Unlike the Hague and Montreal Conventions, and indeed
other international multilateral agreements which have adopted the standard
formulation in Article 7 of the Hague and Montreal Conventions, the Convention
on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons does not obligate States to extradite alleged offenders, it only obligates
States to exercise jurisdiction, if the alleged offender is not extradited. This is
clear from a comparative reading of the Conventions.
The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979,
provides in Article 5 that States parties are to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of
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territoriality, habitual residence (for Stateless persons), nationality of offender and
victim, and where the unlawful act was done to compel the State to do or to
abstain from doing an act. Like Article 7 of the Convention on Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Article 8 of the
Convention against taking of Hostages again obligates States to exercise
jurisdiction, if the alleged offender is not extradited.
In United States v. Yunis, the courts of the United States exercised
jurisdiction over a Lebanese national and resident who was charged for the
hijacking of a Jordanian civil aircraft in the Middle East in 1985 involving some
nationals of the United States. The case has been celebrated as “a resounding
acceptance of universal and passive personality principles as sufficient bases
under international law for a State to assert jurisdiction over an extra-territorial
crime…”  However, the Hostages Convention provided expressly for the exercise
of jurisdiction on grounds of nationality of victim.
The Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1980 does not
include universal jurisdiction, rather it provides for the exercise of jurisdiction
under the Convention on grounds of territoriality or aboard a ship or aircraft
registered in the State (flag) and nationality of the offender.  It mandates parties
to exercise jurisdiction where the offender is within its territory, and it does not
extradite the alleged offender.
In addition to providing for jurisdiction, in Article 5, on nationality and
territorial grounds, the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Punishment 1984 expressly contains the expansive obligation of
States to either prosecute or extradite (aut dedere, aut judicare) alleged
offenders. Article 7 of the Convention provides that if a State party in whose
territory a person accused of torture is found shall extradite him or submit the
matter to its competent authorities for prosecution.  The decision of the House of
Lords of the United Kingdom in the case of Pinochet was focused on the
obligations of Chile, Spain and the United Kingdom under the Torture Convention
rather than on whether the Convention provided for universal jurisdiction for acts
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of torture.  The extradition request sought by Spain did not arise from any claims
as to universal jurisdiction, rather it arose from the obligation assumed by Spain
under the Convention against Torture.
The United States have asserted expansive civil jurisdiction in relation to
torture under Alien Torts Claims Act.  In Filartiga v. Pena Irala,  jurisdiction was
assumed at the instance of two citizens of Paraguay over wrongful death
resulting from acts of torture carried out in Paraguay by a police official against a
Paraguayan citizen. The court of first instance dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals held illegal the acts of torture
,which violated the prohibition on torture, a norm of customary international law.
In that case, the Judge likened the torturer to “…the pirate and slave trader
before him; hostis humanis generis, an enemy of all mankind”.
International efforts at the enlargement of jurisdiction extends to terrorist
acts. The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
1998 provides in Article 6 for the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of
territoriality, flag, nationality (of offender as well as victim), habitual residence in
the case of stateless persons, commission of terrorist acts against a State or
government facilities abroad (including embassies), compelling a State to do or
abstain from an act or onboard any aircraft operated by a State.  Article 6(4)
further provides that parties to the Convention are to take measures to establish
jurisdiction where an alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not
extradite the offender. The International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism 1999 and the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005 provide for the exercise of
jurisdiction on the same grounds as the Convention of Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings 1998.
It is doubtful whether the provisions in multilateral conventions as
highlighted above which have been regarded as treaty-based forms of universal
jurisdiction are in fact universal jurisdiction in stricto sensu. The basis for the
exercise of the expanded jurisdiction (beyond the accepted territorial and
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nationality grounds) proceeds from the agreement of States which are party to
the conventions and do not apply to non-party States. Judge Higgins comments
that,
“…none of them [the conventions], properly analysed, provides for universal
jurisdiction. They provide for various bases of jurisdiction coupled with the aut
dedire aut punire principle- that is, that a State party to the treaty undertakes to
try an offender found on its territory, or to extradite him for trial.”
There is no evidence of established State practice in international law with
regard to universal jurisdiction over international crimes as a whole. President
Guillaume of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case found
support with Lord Slynn of Hadley in Pinochet II that there is  no universality of
jurisdiction with regard to international crimes and he further asserted that only
piracy is subject, truly, to universal jurisdiction in international law.
From the study of customary international law and treaty law undertaken
in this Report, it is evident that universal jurisdiction as a concept of international
law exists in relation to acts of piracy, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
torture under the Torture Convention, and, potentially, genocide under the
Genocide Convention. However, the practice of the matter would be dependent
on the extent to which States are bound by the various sources of international
law (customary or treaty law) providing for universal jurisdiction.
The International Court of Justice clearly states that,
“the writings of eminent jurists…important and stimulating as they may be,
cannot of themselves and without reference to the other sources of international
law, evidence the existence of a jurisdictional norm. The assertion that certain
treaties and court decisions rely on universal jurisdiction, which in fact they do
not, does not evidence an international practice recognized as custom…That
there is no established practice in which States exercise universal jurisdiction,
properly so called, is undeniable…Virtually all national legislation envisages links
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of some sort to the forum State; and no case law exists in which pure universal
jurisdiction has formed the basis of jurisdiction.”
5.4 EFFECTS
The categorisation of an act as an international crime, likewise the
designation of a norm as peremptory in international law (jus cogens) does not
mean that universal jurisdiction is applicable to such acts. Also the existence of
an obligation erga omnes regarding the protection of international interest or
standard does not mean that States can exercise universal jurisdiction.
The fact that universal jurisdiction may exist with regard to a crime does
not mean that this disentitles State officials, including Heads of State, from the
jurisdictional immunities obtainable in international law. The International Court of
Justice sums up the matter by asserting as follows,
“It should further be noted that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national
courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional
immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, while absence of
immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus, although various international
conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose
on States obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to
extend their criminal jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects
immunities under customary international law, including those of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before the courts of a foreign State,
even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under these conventions.”
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, in their Joint Separate
Opinion in the ICJ decision in the Arrest Warrant Case, upon considerations of
the various national legislations and case-law in the United Kingdom,  Australia,
Austria,  France,  Germany,  Netherlands  and the United States , observed that
though there may have been efforts to adjudicate over extra-territorial crimes,
especially war crimes, there has been no clear instance of an assertion of
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universal jurisdiction where there has been no other jurisdictional link, with the
exception of Belgium, as evident in the instance before the Court that there
cannot be said to be an established practice of the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by States in international law.
Due to political pressure from the United States, the controversial
universal jurisdiction legislation of Belgium has been amended.  This amendment
was done in the aftermath of the International Court of Justice decision in the
Arrest Warrant and is in line with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court.  Article 27 of the Rome Statute is to be read together with Article 98 of the
Statute, and they both provide, respectively, that,
“This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government,
a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility
under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of
sentence.”
and that,
“ The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that
third State for the waiver of the immunity.”
Furthermore, an inherent effect of the concept, especially when misused,
is that there is potential for disruption in international relations between States as
well as the deprivation of rights and harassment of individuals (especially State
officials) and the abuse of legal process.
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Moral reprehensibility cannot be equated to universal jurisdiction. The
scope, applicability and even the effects of the concept of universal jurisdiction in
international law is less than what proponents of the concept advocate it to be.
This Report has undertaken an analysis of international law, customary and
treaty, which shows that universal jurisdiction exists as a concept in international
law and is not a new introduction into the body of international law. It has also
highlighted the limited cases in which this type of jurisdiction can be exercised.
The expansive approach that has been adopted by proponents of the jurisdiction
is policy-oriented and not legally-oriented; and this policy approach may be
reflective of a desire of law, de lege ferenda (law as it ought to be), and not law,
de lege lata (law as it is). States jealously guard their sovereignty and as such
are hesitant to expand the scope of universal jurisdiction, and with international
law being primarily the domain of States, it is States that would determine the
scope, applicability and future of the concept. Finally, because of the potentially
disruptive effect of universal jurisdiction, it is imperative that disciplines be
established regarding regulation of the concept.
5.5 ANALYSIS OF RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND
DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ON UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION
In this part, the Report provides a critical analysis of relevant resolutions of
the United Nations General Assembly and/or decisions of the International Court
of Justice on the concept of universal jurisdiction.
5.5.1. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The concept of universal jurisdiction is yet to be substantively deliberated
upon by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The involvement of the
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Assembly in international rule-making through multilateral conventions, which
incorporate what has been referred to as treaty-based universal jurisdiction,
under the auspices of the United Nations cannot be considered to be
involvement in the development of the concept in international law. This is
because the issue of jurisdiction has been ancillary in international conventions
and the so-called treaty-based universal jurisdiction has been shown earlier in
this report) to be contractual expansion of jurisdiction by the contracting States
beyond territoriality and nationality to include the international law principle of aut
dedere,aut judicare/punire (extradite or punish).
There is discernible practice of the General Assembly to expand
jurisdiction of contracting States in international conventions to include the
principle of aut dedere, aut judicare over certain international crimes. This
practice is evident in the Genocide Convention adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A
of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948, Apartheid
Convention adopted by General Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVIII) of 30
November 1973, Torture Convention adopted by General Assembly Resolution
39/46 of 10 December 1984, Hostages Convention adopted by General
Assembly Resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979, Convention on
Internationally Protected Persons adopted by General Assembly Resolution 3166
(XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, and the Convention on Suppression of Terrorism
Financing which was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 54/109 of 9
December 1999.
In Resolution 95 (1) of 11 December 1946, the Assembly affirmed the
Principles of International Law Recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal. The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal did not contain any provision
ascribing universal jurisdiction to the Tribunal established under the Charter and
neither did the proceedings under the Charter rely on universal jurisdiction.
Based on this, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 95 (1) of 11
December 1946 cannot affirm what was not established under the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal.
331
It has been argued that the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
and supporting materials “have been translated into five languages and
distributed as a document of the General Assembly of the United Nations.”
However, the Princeton Principles are merely guiding general principles compiled
by some academics and jurists which, though may be relied upon by the General
Assembly, did not originate from the General Assembly or indeed any body of the
United Nations organisation.
5.5.2 THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The issue of universal jurisdiction has come before the International Court
of Justice only once, in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(The Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium).  In that case, the Democratic
Republic of Congo challenged the legality of an international arrest warrant
issued by a Belgian court for the arrest of Mr Yerodia Ndombasi, the former
Foreign Affairs Minister of the Republic of Congo, for crimes against humanity.
Belgium had asserted universal jurisdiction based on a Law of 1993, as amended
by the Law of 1999 ‘Concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law’.
The Republic of Congo claimed before the International Court that the
universal jurisdiction asserted by Belgium was a violation of the sovereignty of
the Republic of Congo and that the non-recognition of the international law
immunity of its Minister of Foreign Affairs was a violation of the diplomatic
immunity to which the Republic of Congo and its officials were entitled to in
international law. Unfortunately, the International Court did not consider the
question of universal jurisdiction in its judgment because the parties decided that
universal jurisdiction was not in contention between them. The Court decided that
it was restricted to the pleadings submitted before it.
However, in their respective separate and dissenting opinions some of the
judges considered the concept of universal jurisdiction and its applicability in
international law. President Guillaume stated that piracy was the only true case
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of universal jurisdiction and that certain international conventions provide for the
establishment of “subsidiary universal jurisdiction” where an offender is within
national territory of States and is not extradited to another State for trial. He
concluded that apart from piracy and instances of “subsidiary universal
jurisdiction” under international conventions that “international law does not
accept universal jurisdiction; still less does it accept universal jurisdiction in
absentia.”
The controversial and unsettled scope of the concept was accepted by the
various judges in their opinions. Judge Oda was of the view that universal
jurisdiction is controversial and has increasingly been recognised for the
international crimes of terrorism and genocide. He supported the Majority
Decision in refraining from addressing universal jurisdiction in its judgment
because of the undeveloped state of the law with regard to the concept and also
because the International Court was not requested to make a decision on the
issue.  The likelihood and potential for abuse of the concept was highlighted by
Judge adhoc Bula Bula in his critique and description of universal jurisdiction as
“a ‘variable geometry’ jurisdiction selectively exercised against some States to
the exclusion of others.” The Judge argued that even if universal jurisdiction were
established in international law that it did not apply to exclude the international
law immunities applicable to Mr Ndombasi, irrespective of the crimes alleged
against him.
The decision of the majority of the International Court of Justice not to
address the issue of universal jurisdiction in the judgment of the Court
disregarded the fact that immunities arise in a jurisdictional context and that
immunity is not an independent principle of international law but is preceded by
the existence of jurisdiction. In their Joint Separate Opinion, Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal correctly asserted that immunity is not “free-
standing” but is “inextricably linked” to jurisdiction.
Judge Al-Khasawneh did not consider the issue in his dissenting opinion
while Judge Ranjeva in his Declaration supported the decision of the
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International Court by declining to address the issue of universal jurisdiction.
Judge Rezek briefly considered the issue and stated that the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 best exemplify universal jurisdiction and concluded that the
Belgian courts lacked jurisdiction to initiate criminal proceedings against an
official of the Republic of Congo “in the absence of any basis of jurisdiction other
than the principle of universal jurisdiction.”
Among the judges, there was no settled category of international crimes
for which universal jurisdiction applied. The most expansive category was
adopted by Judge Koroma who stated that,
“The Judgment cannot be seen either as a rejection of the principle of universal
jurisdiction, the scope of which has continued to evolve, or as an invalidation of
that principle. In my considered opinion, today, together with piracy, universal
jurisdiction is available for certain crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against
humanity, including the slave trade and genocide.”
Judge ad hoc van den Wyngaert was of the view that international law
does not prohibit universal jurisdiction for war crimes and crimes against
humanity but clearly permits it. The Judge also argued that there is no rule of
conventional international law or customary international law prohibiting the
exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia.
An analysis of customary international law and international conventions,
as shown in Part I of this Report 1, shows that universal jurisdiction applies to
piracy, war crimes under the Geneva Conventions, and potentially to genocide.
The so-called ‘treaty-based universal jurisdiction’ is not universal jurisdiction per
se but “really an obligatory territorial jurisdiction over persons in relation to acts
committed elsewhere.”
In the most detailed analysis of universal jurisdiction in the Arrest Warrant
Case, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, upon considerations of the
various national legislations and case-law in the United Kingdom,  Australia,
334
Austria,  France,  Germany,  Netherlands  and the United States , observe that
though there may have been efforts to adjudicate over extra-territorial crimes,
especially war crimes, there has been no clear instance of an assertion of
universal jurisdiction where there has been no other jurisdictional link, with the
exception of Belgium.  The Judges stated that there cannot be said to be an
established practice of the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States in
international law because national legislations envisage some sort of link to the
forum State. The Judges went further to state that the fact that the practice of
universal jurisdiction by States was not established does not necessarily mean
that such an exercise would be unlawful.
Universal jurisdiction is yet to substantively come into the deliberations of
the United Nations General Assembly. As yet, there are no existing Resolutions
of the Assembly dealing with the concept. The uncertainty over the scope of
universal jurisdiction resonates in any related discourse, and it was unfortunate
that the International Court of Justice side-stepped the opportunity to consider
the question of universal jurisdiction as it related to the Arrest Warrant case
despite the fact that the question was necessary to the findings of the Court.  It is
hoped that such an opportunity presents itself before the International Court of
Justice once again and that the Court rises to the occasion through an incisive,
well-considered and well-informed elucidation of universal jurisdiction in
international law, as is customary of the Court. It is also further hoped that the
International Law Commission of the United Nations takes up the concept of
universal jurisdiction so as to assist its developments, as the Commission has
done concerning other areas of International Law, including State  responsibility.
5.6 INTERNATIONAL ABUSE OF THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION
The concept of universal jurisdiction is premised on functionality,
especially in view of the decentralised nature of the international legal system.
Universal jurisdiction enables a far-reaching enforcement and protection of
international norms and standards and it also ensures that individuals are not
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beyond the reach of law and enforcement. It is inherent in the nature of the
concept that the sovereignty of States will be implicated by the exercise of
jurisdiction by one State over the acts of another, and as such there is a wide
scope for abuse of the concept. A leading commentator and international criminal
law expert advocates that,
“Unbridled universal jurisdiction can cause disruptions in world order and
deprivation of individual human rights when used in a politically motivated
manner or for vexatious purposes. Even with the best of intentions, universal
jurisdiction can be used imprudently, creating unnecessary frictions between
States, potential abuses of legal processes, and undue harassment of individuals
prosecuted or pursued for prosecution under this theory. Universal jurisdiction
must therefore be utilized in a cautious manner that minimizes possible negative
consequences, while at the same time enabling it to achieve its useful purposes.”
This Part of the Report considers whether and to what extent the concept
of universal jurisdiction has been abused by some non-African States.
Appropriate recommendations shall consequently be made to the Executive
Council with regards to possible redress by Member States in cases of abuse of
universal jurisdiction in international law. With regards to State practice on this
score, Belgium and Spain have been in the forefront of assertion of universal
jurisdiction and as such the jurisprudence of the Belgian and Spanish courts will
form the core of this part of the Report.
5.6.1 BELGIUM
In 1993 Belgium enacted the Law Relative to the Repression of Serious
Violations of the International Conventions of Geneva of 1949, and of the
Protocols I and II of 1977. This Law permitted individuals, irrespective of their
nationality, to file a criminal complaint in a Belgian court against any person for
international crimes in violation of the Geneva Conventions and their additional
Protocols, even when the acts were perpetrated outside Belgium by non-Belgian
nationals against non-Belgians, and outside of Belgium. This law empowered an
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investigative magistrate to issue an  international arrest warrant against the
alleged offender. The Law was later renamed the Law Relative to Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in 1999 and was extended to
include acts of genocide and crimes against humanity.
By this legislation, Belgium arrogated to itself universal jurisdiction over
persons accused of violations of international humanitarian law irrespective of
any jurisdictional link it would otherwise have required.  Article 7 of the Belgian
Law 1993 provided that Belgian courts shall have jurisdiction in respect of the
offences contained in the Law wherever the offences may have been committed.
Under this Law, many cases were brought against the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon, the then- Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Mauritanian President
Maaouya ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast, Paul Kagame of
Rwanda, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Ange-Felix Patassé of Central African Republic,
Denis Sassou Nguesso of Republic of Congo, Yassir Arafat of the Palestinian
Authority, Former President  Hissène Habré of Chad, former President Augusto
Pinochet of Chile, former President   Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran and former
Minister of the Interior Driss Basri of Morocco.  Complaints were also filed
against certain officials of the United States including President George Bush
and Colin Powell, the then U.S. Secretary of State in 2003.
Colin Powell, in his capacity as Secretary of State, in 2003 highlighted the
problem of harassment, risk and difficulty for public officials to carry out their
duties in the face of such intrusive legislation. Due to political pressure from the
United States, the controversial universal jurisdiction legislation of Belgium was
amended twice in 2003.  The amendments were done in the aftermath of the
International Court of Justice decision in the Arrest Warrant case   and are in line
with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
The first amendment to the Law came in April 2003 and limited the ability
of victims to file complaints directly only where there exists a link between
Belgium and the offensive act, for instance where the alleged offender is within
Belgian territory, if the act occurred within Belgian territory or if the victim of the
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act is of Belgian nationality or has resided in Belgium for a period of at least three
years.
In the absence of the links stated above, the amendment of April 2003
provided that cases can be brought by the State Prosecutor unless the complaint
is manifestly without merit, or the complaint does not allege a violation of the
Law, does not fall within the competence of the Belgian courts, or in the interests
of justice and respect for the international obligations of Belgium, the case should
be transferred to another court, so long as that jurisdiction upholds the right of
the accused to a fair trial. Effectively, the 2003 amendment provided that
jurisdiction was to be on the traditional grounds of territoriality or nationality.  The
amendment of the Law also provides for the power of the government to   refer
certain cases out of Belgium and also for Belgian courts to cooperate with the
International Criminal Court.
Despite these amendments, some nationals of Iraq and Jordan filed a
criminal complaint in Belgium against a General of the U.S. Army for alleged war
crimes during the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the Coalition forces. The Belgian
government referred the case to the U.S. but the U.S was dissatisfied with  the
Law and threatened that the continued existence of the Law had dire
consequences for Belgium’s continued status as the host State of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Belgium further amended the Law in August 2003,
after a criminal complaint was filed against President Bush and Prime Minister
Tony Blair of the United Kingdom for the use of force in Iraq in 2003.
As the Law currently stands, complaints can only be filed based on
nationality or residence of the offender or the victim. It also gives the State
Prosecutor the discretion to initiate proceedings based on respect for the existing
international obligations of Belgium. The Law rules out complaints being filed
against State Officials, including Heads of State and Foreign Ministers, who are
entitled to jurisdictional immunities; and also prohibits enforcement  against
persons present in Belgium at the official invitation of the Government of Belgium
338
or in connection with an international organisation in Belgium pursuant to a
headquarters agreement.
However before the amendment of the Law, an investigating Magistrate in
Belgium issued an international arrest warrant on 11 April 2000 through the
Interpol against the then incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Mr Yerodia Ndombasi, alleging crimes against humanity and
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocols. The
Congo instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice contending
that Belgium had, by issuing and circulating the arrest warrant, violated the
sovereignty and sovereign equality of the Congo as well as violated the
diplomatic immunity of its senior State official.  The International Court of Justice
noted that the Democratic Republic of Congo claimed that, “ the universal
jurisdiction that the Belgian State attributes to itself under Article 7 of the Law in
question constituted a violation of the principle that a State may not exercise its
authority on the territory of another State and of the principle of sovereign
equality among all Members of the United Nations, as laid down in Article 2,
paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations.”
Unfortunately, the Court came to its decision on grounds other than
universal jurisdiction and found that Belgium had failed in its international
obligation to the Congo by not respecting the sovereignty of the Congo and the
jurisdictional immunity of its Foreign Minister. The parties to the case decided
that universal jurisdiction was not in contention between them and the Court’s
actual decision on the merits was therefore restricted to the pleadings submitted
before it.
Despite the decision of the International Court in the Arrest Warrant Case
and the amendment of the scope of the 1993 Law, a Belgian judge in September
2005 issued an arrest warrant against the former President of Chad, Hissene
Habre.  A group of victims, including three Belgian nationals, alleging torture by
Habré in Chad filed a criminal complaint against him in Belgium. Although,
Belgium discontinued cases against President Bush, U.S. officials and other
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cases, it decided to retain the pending cases against Habre of Chad, officials of
Rwanda and Guatemala. In September 2005, a Belgian court issued an
international arrest warrant against Habré and sought his extradition from
Senegal. Habre was subsequently arrested by Senegalese officials but the
request for his extradition to Belgium was not granted by the Senegalese courts.
The Senegalese President referred the matter to the African Union.
The African Union in January 2006, established a Committee of Eminent
African Jurists which was given the mandate to consider the aspects and
implications of the case against Habré and option for his trial.  The Committee
decided on an ‘African option’ as the solution whereby Senegal, Chad or any
African Union member could exercise jurisdiction over the accused person or an
ad hoc tribunal could be established in any Member State to try the accused.
Based on the recommendations of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists, the
African Union decided that the matter fell within the competence of the Union and
mandated Senegal to prosecute and ensure the trial of Hissène Habré on behalf
of Africa.
5.6.2 SPAIN
Spain has come into the forefront of international law over the issue of
universal jurisdiction. Under Article 23 (4) of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial
(Judicial Power Organization Act (LOPJ)), Spain has jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Spanish or foreign citizens outside Spain, including genocide,
terrorism and other crimes in international treaties that Spain is party to.  An
extradition request by Spain, in 1998, led to the very famous case against
Augusto Pinochet of Chile. The Pinochet case was not decided on grounds of
universal jurisdiction, but rather jurisdiction over the case was based on the
United Nations Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Punishment 1984.
In the Spanish Guatemalan Genocide case, complaints were filed with the
Audiencia Nacional for gross human rights violations and the matter was brought
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in Spain by Rigoberta Menchu, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, and other persons
against several Guatemalan officials, including former Heads of State Gral Efraín
Ríos Montt, Oscar Humberto Mejías Victores and Fernando Romeo Lucas
García for acts of terrorism, genocide and torture against the Guatemalan Mayan
indigenous people and their supporters.  The investigating judge accepted the
complaint.
Upon appeal, the Spanish Supreme Court held by a very slim majority
(8:7), in 2003, that Spanish national interests (a jurisdictional link) had to be
affected and solely with regard to the crime of torture for Spanish courts to
exercise jurisdiction in the matter. The Court found that the exercise of territorial
and international criminal jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention 1948 was
not exclusive; and any other criminal jurisdiction capable of being exercised is
subsidiary to the provision of Convention.  The Majority noted that the Genocide
Convention does not provide for universal jurisdiction, and argued that the
Convention also does not prohibit it.
The Majority of the Spanish Supreme Court took into consideration the
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case,
although the International Court did not decide on universal jurisdiction. However,
like in the Spanish Guatemalan Genocide case what was at stake was the
sovereignty of another State. Article VIII of the Genocide Convention provides
that a party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take
such action under the United Nations Charter as may be appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of the acts of genocide. The Majority argued that
Article VIII rendered the jurisdiction of Spanish courts effective.  This is not a
provision for the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States, indeed the
Convention contains no such provision. Furthermore, the judges in the Minority
misinterpreted the decision of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom in the
Pinochet case to the effect that under international law, crimes of jus cogens,
including genocide, are punishable by any State. The Pinochet decision, as
earlier stated, was based on the Convention against Torture, which Spain, Chile
and the United Kingdom were all party to and had contractually agreed to the
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exercise of jurisdiction under the Convention. The effect of the designation of a
norm as jus cogens, does not mean that it can confer a court with jurisdiction
which it does not have under international law.
The Spanish Constitutional Court, in 2005, reversed the decision of the
Supreme Court and held that Spain could investigate crimes of genocide, torture,
murder and illegal imprisonment committed in Guatemala between 1978 and
1986 and that the principle of universal jurisdiction was not dependent on the
existence, or otherwise, of national interests.  The Constitutional Court was of the
view that,
“The Convention’s silence on alternative jurisdictions beyond territorial and
international tribunals cannot be read as an implicit limitation. Rather, Article VI of
the Convention simply establishes the minimal obligations on States. The
obligations to avoid impunity found in customary international law are
incompatible with such a limited reading of the Convention and would,
perversely, place more stringent limits on the actions of States parties to the
Convention than those that applied to non-parties, which could rely on a
universal jurisdiction founded in customary international law.”
The Constitutional Court effectively re-instated the criminal complaints and
in 2006, an international arrest warrant against those involved in the Guatemalan
Genocide.
In another case, asserting universal jurisdiction by the Spanish courts, an
Argentine naval officer, Adolfo Scilingo, was charged with torture, illegal
detention and killing prisoners by throwing them out off air planes.   Scilingo was
convicted and sentenced to 640 years imprisonment.
The action of Spain as it concerns universal jurisdiction cannot form the
basis of customary international law on the matter, as one instance is not enough
to create a rule of custom. A body of practice and opinio juris of the generality of
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States is required for the formation of a rule of customary international law on
universal criminal jurisdiction for genocide and crimes against humanity.
5.7 POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE
The importance of the concept of universal jurisdiction in international law
in ensuring that individuals are within the ambit of the law is not to be taken for
granted. Likewise, the potential for abuse of the concept is not to be taken for
granted. A likely consequence of the abuse of universal jurisdiction would be the
problem of judicial chaos that would arise due to a proliferation of litigation and
the erosion of the principle of the sovereign equality of States.
The fact that States could use universal jurisdiction as an excuse to
pursue citizens of other States should not be in lieu of the principle of the
diplomatic protection of nationals abroad. Although this is a discretionary
principle, the imperative that motivates a State to resort to universal jurisdiction
should be considered to be of a sufficiently compelling factor in favour of invoking
diplomatic protection. Under this principle, one State could bring a claim against
another, upon exhausting local remedies or invoking exceptions to it, on grounds
that such a State has committed a wrong, including the violation of human rights,
against its citizens and has failed to provide an appropriate remedy. A case in
point is that of Amadou Sadio Diallo: Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic
of the Congo. According to the facts of the case, on 28 December 1998, the
Government of the Republic of Guinea instituted proceedings against the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in respect of a dispute concerning ‘serious
violations of international law’ allegedly committed against Mr. Ahmadou Sadio
Diallo, a businessman of Guinean nationality. In its judgment on the preliminary
objections raised by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Court declared
unanimously that the application of the Republic of Guinea was admissible in so
far as it concerned the protection of Mr. Diallo’s rights as an individual.
Universal jurisdiction is subject to the principles of legality in international
law, particularly as regards jurisdictional immunities, and where the alleged
343
offender is outside the State, procedural requirements concerning the extradition
(under a treaty) or lawful transfer of such persons, as well as mutual legal
assistance where relevant, are applicable. Failure to abide by these would
amount to an abuse and a violation of the right to a fair trial, which is a
fundamental human right of an accused person enshrined in international treaties
and in the constitutions of most countries.
To avoid abuse of jurisdiction, summons to Heads of States to appear in
proceedings before the courts of another State must be subject to the consent of
the Head of State concerned and diplomatic confidentiality must be kept.
Obligations pertaining to these matters were pointed out more recently by the
International Court of Justice in its decision on the preliminary objections to its
exercise of jurisdiction in the case between Djibouti and France.  According to
the Court:
‘The consent of the Head of State is expressly sought in this request for
testimony, which was transmitted through the intermediary of the authorities and
in the form prescribed by law…. This measure cannot have infringed the
immunities from jurisdiction enjoyed by the Djiboutian Head of State. Moreover,
the Court does not consider that there was an attack on the honour or dignity of
the President merely because this invitation was sent to him when he was in
France to attend an international conference. The Court observes again that if it
had been proven by Djibouti that this confidential information had been passed
from the offices of the French judiciary to the media, such an act could, in the
context of the attendance of the Head of State of Djibouti at an international
conference in France, have constituted not only a violation of French law, but
also a violation by France of its international obligations. However, the Court
must again recognize, as it has already done regarding the summons of 17 May
2005 (see paragraph 175 of the judgment), that it has not been provided with
probative evidence which would establish that the French judicial authorities
were the source behind the dissemination of the confidential information at issue
here.’
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The exercise of universal jurisdiction over State officials, including Heads
of State and other senior officials, can result in harassment. This would, no
doubt, adversely impact on the effective performance of the official functions of
such persons. This harassment and interference could have international
repercussions by embarrassing or limiting a State in its conduct of foreign
relations which could in turn cause tensions between States or limit their
participation in international affairs. The exercise of universal jurisdiction, as an
analysis of  the cases from Spain and Belgium have demonstrated, is not
mandatory and this could lead to States which claim universal jurisdiction under
their domestic laws employing it discriminately against nationals of certain
States, especially less developed States. The instances of Spanish and Belgian
jurisdiction over nationals of Guatemala, Argentina, Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Chad point to this.
There is the added danger of forum-shopping where victims of
international crimes as well as activists may seek to bring complaints against
certain State officials hoping that a State will be able to institute criminal
proceedings against these officials.
To safeguard abuse by way of harassment of State officials and forum-
shopping, it is important for African States to take specific measures of immunity
indicated by the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Certain
Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France): ‘The
State which seeks to claim immunity for one of its State organs is expected to
notify the authorities of the other State concerned. This would allow the court of
the forum State to ensure that it does not fail to respect any entitlement to
immunity and might thereby engage the responsibility of that State. Further, the
State notifying a foreign court that judicial process should not proceed, for
reasons of immunity, against its State organs, is assuming responsibility for any
internationally wrongful act in issue committed by such organs.’
However, it is important to note that the likelihood of abuse of a concept in
international law does not nullify the existence of the concept or its applicability in
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the right circumstances. The potential for abuse is highlighted with a view
towards a better understanding and regulation of the concept.
In the event of abuse of the concept of universal jurisdiction, certain
avenues for redress may be explored by an aggrieved State. Primarily, legal
redress could be sought before the International Court of Justice challenging
violation of sovereignty. This was the option that was adopted by the Democratic
Republic of Congo against Belgium and the Court decided the case in favour of
Congo.  Although, the decision of the Court in the Arrest Warrant case was not
based on universal jurisdiction for reasons earlier adduced in the Report, some of
the Judges (Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal) in their reasoning
and separate opinions state that there is no clear instance of universal
jurisdiction in the absence of other existing jurisdictional grounds.  It was also the
option taken by Djibouti against France and the Court decided, on preliminary
matters, in favour of Djibouti in relation to the admissibility of the case and the
breach by France of its obligations towards Djibouti with regard to mutual legal
assistance in the Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France).
However, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is not
automatic and is based on the consent of the parties to the suit.  Furthermore,
the parties to the suit can request the Court for an indication of provisional
measures under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court so as to preserve the rights
of the parties. The Democratic Republic of Congo made a request under Article
41 in the Arrest Warrant case on the same day that it filed an application
instituting proceedings against Belgium.
States can also seek political or diplomatic redress through the use of its
good offices. The United States through a policy of negotiation and threats
succeeded in not only having cases against its officials discontinued in the
Belgian courts but also in the amendment of the Belgian Law on universal
jurisdiction.  Likewise, African States can lodge diplomatic protests objecting to
the abuse of universal jurisdiction by some States, especially where a right of
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diplomatic protection may be the more appropriate way to proceed in cases
concerning nationals of the States concerned.
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CHAPTER 6
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: CONFLICTS
6.1. Introduction
The separate and dissenting opinions and declarations of the judges of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Arrest Warrant380 invite discussion of what
is meant by ‘universal jurisdiction’. This article suggests that the respective
judges’ understanding of the concept is debatable, since underlying it is a
tendency, when dealing with states’ criminal jurisdiction, to elide prescription and
enforcement, as well as an inattention to the question of when the requisite
prescriptive jurisdictional nexus must be present. A number of the resulting
judicial statements – eagerly looked to as the first by the World Court on national
criminal jurisdiction since the Lotus case,381 over 70 years before-serve, it is
argued, as questionable guides to one of international law’s more controversial
topics. The various judgments promote regrettable terminology. Moreover, the
elision and inattention cited above lead some judges to a contestable finding on
the lawfulness of the enforcement in absentia of universal jurisdiction, and
causes others to underestimate the degree of state practice that exists in support
of universal jurisdiction over crimes under general international law.
This article first outlines the basic principles of public international law governing
national criminal jurisdiction and then, in this light, highlights and comments on
the treatment of jurisdictional issues, especially universal jurisdiction, in the
separate and dissenting opinions and declarations in Arrest Warrant.
6.2. International Principles Governing National Criminal Jurisdiction
380 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), International Court of
Justice, 14 February 2002, available online at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm (visited 5 May 2004). The case’s discussion of
jurisdiction is limited to the separate and dissenting opinions and declarations.
381 The S. S. Lotus (France v Turkey), 1928 PCIJ Series A, No. 10.
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A state’s ‘jurisdiction’, in the present context, refers to its authority under
international law to regulate the conduct of persons, natural and legal, and to
regulate property in accordance with its municipal law. Jurisdiction can be civil or
criminal. Only criminal jurisdiction will be discussed here and, as such, only the
regulation of the conduct of persons will be considered.
Jurisdiction is not a unitary concept. On the contrary, both the longstanding
practice of states and doctrinal writings make it clear that jurisdiction must be
considered in its two distinct aspects, viz. jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction
to enforce. Jurisdiction to prescribe or prescriptive jurisdiction – sometimes called
‘legislative’ jurisdiction – refers, in the criminal context, to a state’s authority
under international law to assert the applicability of its criminal law to given
conduct, whether by primary or subordinate legislation, executive decree or, in
certain circumstances, judicial ruling.382 Jurisdiction to enforce or enforcement
jurisdiction - sometimes called ‘executive’ jurisdiction – refers to a state’s
authority under international law actually to apply its criminal law, through police
and other executive action, and through the courts. More simply, jurisdiction to
prescribe refers to a state’s authority to criminalize given conduct, jurisdiction to
enforce the authority, inter alia, to arrest and detain, to prosecute, try and
sentence, and to punish persons for the commission of acts so criminalized.383
Universal jurisdiction, it should be stressed from the outset, is a species of
jurisdiction to prescribe.
382 Prescription by judicial ruling occurs most commonly when a court interprets the scope of a statutory
offence in such a manner as to extend that scope. In addition, in some common-law countries, certain
crimes and their jurisdictional scope are still the creatures of the judge-made law alone. See infra note 23
for more.
383 See, similarly, P. Daillier and A. Pellet, Droit International Public (Nguyen Quoc Dinh) (6th edn, Paris:
LGDJ, 1999), §§ 334 and 336, respectively, drawing a distinction between ‘competence normative’ and
‘competence d’execution’, i.e. ‘une distinction entre l’ediction d’une reglementation (au sens large) . . . et
son application’: ‘Par contraste avec la competence normative, qui consiste en l’ediction de norms
generales et impersonelles ou decisions individuelles par les organs investis de la function legislative ou
reglementaire, la competence d’execution “s’etend generalement comme le pouvoir d’accomplir des actes
materiels tels la detention, l’instruction ou le redressement de la violation d’une regle de droit”’.
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Separate reference is sometimes made, especially in the civil context, to
‘jurisdiction to adjudicate’,384 or ‘judicial’385 or ‘curial’386 jurisdiction, referring
specifically to a municipal court’s competence under international law to adjudge
certain matters. But, in the criminal context, the distinction is generally
unnecessary. The application of a state’s criminal law by its criminal courts is
simply the exercise or actualization of prescription: both amount to an assertion
that the law in question is applicable to the relevant conduct.387 As a result, a
state’s criminal courts have no greater authority under international law to
adjudge conduct by reference to that state’s criminal law388 than has the
legislature of the state to prohibit the conduct in the first place. Equally, the trial
and, in the event, conviction and sentencing of an individual for conduct
prohibited by a state’s criminal law is as much a means of executing or enforcing
that law as is the police’s investigation, arrest, charging and prosecution of the
individual under it. As such, a state’s criminal courts have no greater authority
under international law to execute the state’s criminal law than have the police or
other coercive organs and agents of that state: as will be seen below, neither can
operate as of right in the territory of another state. In apparent recognition of the
foregoing, the respective judges of the ICJ in Arrest Warrant, the Court and
dissenting judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the
Lotus case before it, and the bulk of the mainstream European academic
384 See, e.g. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), §§ 401 and 421–
433; Council of Europe, Recommendation R (97) 11 on the amended model plan for the classification of
documents concerning state practice in the field of public international law, 12 June 1997, Appendix, Part
Eight (II); O. Schachter, ‘International Law in Theory and Practice. General Course in Public International
Law’, 178 Hague Recueil (HR) (1982–V) 9, at 244–249; Y. Dinstein, ‘The Universality Principle and War
Crimes’, in M.N. Schmitt and L.C. Green (eds), The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next Millenium
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1998) vol. 17, at 30–32.
385 See, e.g. M. Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’, 46 British Yearbook of International Law
(1972–1973) 145; B. Oxman, ‘Jurisdiction of States’, 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1997)
55, at 55; A. Cassese, ‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some
Comments on the Congo v Belgium Case’, 13 European Journal of International Law (2002) 853, at 858.
386 See, e.g. R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume I. Peace (9th edn,
Harlow: Longman, 1992), § 137.
387 See Akehurst, supra note 6, at 179: ‘In criminal law legislative jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction are
one and the same.’ See similarly Oxman, supra note 6, at 55; F. Berman, ‘Jurisdiction: The State’, in P.
Capps, M. Evans and S. Konstadinidis (eds), Asserting Jurisdiction. International and European Legal
Perspectives (Oxford; Portland OR: Hart, 2003) 3, at 5.
388 Note, in this regard, the seemingly universal practice whereby a state’s criminal courts - in contrast
usually to its civil courts – apply the law of that state and no other.
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literature389 premise their respective treatments of national criminal jurisdiction on
the simple binary distinction between what are, here, termed jurisdiction to
prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce. As specifically regards jurisdiction to
prescribe, state practice reveals a number of accepted bases or ‘heads’ of
jurisdiction,390 pursuant to which, as a matter of general international law, states
may391 assert the applicability of their criminal law, each of these heads being
thought to evidence a sufficient link between the impugned conduct and the
interests of the prescribing state. The two heads of jurisdiction unquestionably
389 See, e.g. the approach adopted by F.A. Mann, although Mann (along with others) refers to ‘legislative’,
rather than ‘prescriptive’ jurisdiction: see F.A. Mann, ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’,
111 HR (1964–I) 1, reproduced in F.A. Mann, Studies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1973) 1; and F.A. Mann, ‘The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After 20 Years’, 186 HR
(1984–II) 9, reproduced in F.A. Mann, Further Studies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990) 1. See, similarly, D.W. Bowett, ‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and
Resources’, 53 British Yearbook of International Law (1982) 1, at 1; V. Lowe, ‘Jurisdiction’, in M.D.
Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 329, at 332–333. Combacau and
Sur, likewise, distinguish between ‘competence normative’ or ‘competence legislative’, on the one hand,
and ‘competence operationnelle’, on the other: see J. Combacau and S. Sur, Droit International Public (4th
edn, Paris: Montchrestien, 1999), 342 and 351, respectively. Recall also, from supra note 4, Daillier and
Pellet’s analogous distinction between ‘competence normative’ and ‘competence d’execution’. A simple
binary distinction between what are here called jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce is also
maintained by Kelsen: see H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2nd edn, New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1966) (revised and edited by R.W. Tucker), 307–310.
390 These heads are alternatives: a state need only point to one of them as the basis for its assertion of
jurisdiction. In this regard, note that a state’s criminal jurisdiction to prescribe in relation to any given
conduct is not necessarily exclusive. It is very commonly the case that two or more states enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction – that is, prescriptive jurisdiction over the same conduct – each under a different head
391 This is not the place to discuss the meaning and present status of the PCIJ’s famous dictum in Lotus, at
19, although cf. the rider added by the Court, ibid., at 20, as well as ibid., diss. op. Loder, at 34, and diss.
op. Nyholm, at 60–61, along with the approach taken in Harvard Law School Research in International
Law, ‘Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime’, 29 American Journal of International Law Supp. (1935) 435.
See also, far more recently, Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Guillaume at § 14, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal at §§ 50–51, and diss. op. Van den Wyngaert at § 51. In the final analysis, it arguably does not
matter whether the so-called ‘Lotus presumption’, in general or in the specific context of criminal
jurisdiction, is correct or accepted in principle, since, in practice, its application need not run counter to the
observable situation whereby state assertions of prescriptive criminal jurisdiction are tolerated only if they
fall under specific acceptable heads: all that is required is that, instead of characterizing the accepted heads
of prescriptive jurisdiction as permissive rules set against a backdrop of a general prohibition, we think of
them as pockets of residual presumptive permission in the interstices of specific prohibitions. The only
difference - and this might not, in the event, be that great - is the burden of proof. As it is, the Court in
Lotus summarized its position very generally, stating that ‘all that can be required of a State is that it should
not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to
exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty’: Lotus, at 19. This simple statement is unimpeachable and
‘[w]hatever the underlying conceptual approach, a State must be able to identify a sufficient nexus between
itself and the object of its assertion of jurisdiction’: Oxman, supra note 6, at 56. On a different note, it is
worth stating that, as a matter of general international law (cf. certain treaty obligations), jurisdiction to
prescribe is permissive or facultative, not mandatory. Whether or not a state actually asserts a jurisdiction
allowed it by international law is a matter for that state.
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available to states in respect of all offences are territoriality and, in relation to
extraterritorial offences, nationality: that is, a state may criminalize conduct
performed on its territory, as well as conduct performed abroad by one of its
nationals. In addition, extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction over the conduct of
non-nationals on the basis of so-called ‘passive personality’ – viz. where the
victim of the offence is a national of the prescribing state392 – now appears
generally permissible.393 Extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction over the conduct
of non-nationals is also permitted, although only in relation to certain offences,
under what is known as the ‘protective’ principle (or competence reelle): that is,
states may assert criminal jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by aliens
where the offence is deemed to constitute a threat to some fundamental national
interest.394 The assertion of criminal jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct by
aliens on the basis of the ‘effects’ doctrine – viz. where the offence is deemed to
exert some deleterious effect within the territory of the prescribing state - remains
controversial, if apparently not objectionable in all cases.395 Many states also
assert prescriptive criminal jurisdiction over the extraterritorial conduct of non-
392 In the past, passive personality was sometimes subsumed terminologically into the protective principle:
see, e.g. Lotus, diss. op. Finlay, at 55–58 and diss. op. Moore, at 91–92.
393 Such jurisdiction was disputed in the past: see, e.g. Lotus, diss. op. Loder, at 36, diss. op. Finlay, at 55–
58, diss. op. Nyholm, at 62 and diss. op. Moore, at 91–93; see also Harvard Law School Research in
International Law, supra note 12, at 445 and 579. The Court in Lotus reserved its opinion on the existence
of the principle: see Lotus, at 22–23. But, as noted by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, in their
joint separate opinion in Arrest Warrant, at § 47, ‘[p]assive personality jurisdiction, for so long regarded as
controversial, is now reflected . . . in the legislation of various countries . . . and today meets with relatively
little opposition, at least so far as a particular category of offences is concerned’. For his part, Judge Rezek
asserts that a ‘majority of countries’ give effect to the principle: Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Rezek, at § 5.
President Guillaume goes so far as to treat passive personality as part of ‘the law as classically formulated’:
Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Guillaume, at § 4.
394 See, e.g. Lotus, at 20 and ibid, diss. op. Loder at 35–36; Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Guillaume at § 4 and
sep. op. Rezek at § 4. In the past, at least, this principle has been less a general rule than the basis on which
a few, specific exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-nationals have been tolerated by states, e.g.
the offence of counterfeiting currency or an inchoate conspiracy to assassinate the head of state.
395 The effects doctrine proper is to be distinguished from prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of so-called
‘objective’ territoriality, out of which it seems to have grown: we speak of the former rather than the latter
when no constituent element of the offence takes place within the territory of the prescribing state. The
Court in Lotus was content simply to note the occasional assertion of such jurisdiction: see Lotus, at 23. In
the event, extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of the effects doctrine has proved
uncontroversial in relation to certain offences, e.g. inchoate conspiracies to commit murder, to import
prohibited drugs, etc. But, to cut a long story short, it has proved highly controversial in other areas,
notably in the field of antitrust or competition law, even if today ‘“[e]ffects” or “impact” jurisdiction is
embraced both by the United States and, with certain qualifications, by the European Union’ in this area:
Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at § 47.
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nationals on a range of other bases thought to evidence a sufficient link with the
prescribing state’s interests, e.g. on the basis of the offender’s residency in that
state or his or her service in that state’s armed forces. Such assertions have
seemingly excited no adverse reaction. Finally, even if the range of such
offences is contested, criminal jurisdiction over the extraterritorial conduct of non-
nationals also attaches to certain specific offences on the basis of universality –
that is, in the absence of any other acceptable prescriptive jurisdictional nexus.396
While jurisdiction to prescribe can be extraterritorial, jurisdiction to enforce is, by
way of contrast, strictly territorial. A state may not enforce its criminal law in the
territory of another state without that state’s consent.397 The territorial character
of jurisdiction to enforce is seen most clearly in the impermissibility, as of right, of
extraterritorial police powers: the police of one state may not investigate crimes
and arrest suspects in the territory of another state without that other state’s
consent.398 It is also reflected in the judicial sphere: the criminal courts of one
state may not, as of right, sit in the territory of another,399 or subpoena witnesses
396 See, e.g. Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Guillaume, at §§ 12 and 16 (piracy), sep. op. Koroma, at § 9 (at least
piracy, war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the slave trade and genocide), sep. op. Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at §§ 61–65 (at least piracy, war crimes and crimes against humanity), and
diss. op. Van den Wyngaert, at § 59 (at least war crimes and crimes against humanity, including genocide).
397 See, e.g. Lotus, at 18–19; Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Guillaume, at § 4, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal, at § 54, and diss. op. Van den Wyngaert, at § 49. General international law admits of only rare
exceptions to the territoriality of criminal jurisdiction to enforce, all of them pertaining to armed conflict.
First, military forces engaged in armed conflict in the territory of a foreign state are permitted to capture or
otherwise take into custody and detain hostile combatants, as well as civilians accompanying regular armed
forces, when such persons fall into their power in the course of hostilities. Secondly, a state in belligerent
occupation of all or part of the territory of a hostile state is permitted to exercise certain extraterritorial
powers of criminal (prescription and) enforcement over the occupied territory, in accordance with rules
now codified in Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12
August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, Arts 64–77. Finally, an occupying power is permitted, under certain
conditions, to resort to preventive detention, in accordance with Geneva IV, Art. 78.
398 Examples of consent to the extraterritorial exercise of police powers are Arts 40 and 41, providing for
limited and conditional cross-border powers of police investigation and of ‘hot pursuit’, respectively, of the
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments of the states
of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual
abolition of checks at their common borders, 22 September 2000, OJ 2000 L239, 0019–0062; see also the
provisions typical of status of forces agreements (SOFAs), e.g. Agreement between the Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces, 19 June 1951, UKTS No. 3 (1955), Cmd 9363, Art.
VII.
399 An example of consent to the extraterritorial sitting of a criminal court is the Agreement between the
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland concerning a Scottish Trial in the Netherlands, 24 August 1998, UKTS No. 43
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or documents, or take sworn affidavit evidence abroad. The upshot of this is that
a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe its criminal law and its jurisdiction to enforce it
do not always go hand in hand. It is often the case that international law permits
a state to assert the applicability of its criminal law to given conduct but, because
the author of the conduct is abroad, not to enforce it. At the same time, general
international law does not prohibit the issuance of an arrest warrant for a suspect
or the trial of an accused in absentia, the legality of both being a question for the
municipal law of each state.400 Nor does the territorial character of criminal
enforcement jurisdiction prevent the prescribing state from requesting the
extradition of a suspect, accused or convict from the territory of a state in which
he or she is present, or from requesting other police or judicial assistance from
another state.
Jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce are logically independent of
each other. The lawfulness of a state’s enforcement of its criminal law in any
given case has no bearing on the lawfulness of that law’s asserted scope of
application in the first place, and vice versa. For example, imagine that a criminal
court in the state of Hernia tries and convicts a national of the state of Dyspepsia
under a Hernian statute outlawing whistling in Dyspepsia, the accused having
been arrested while on holiday in Hernia. Hernia is exercising an exorbitant
prescriptive jurisdiction, but no rule of international law governing jurisdiction to
enforce has been breached. Conversely, imagine that Dyspepsian police arrest,
in Hernian territory, a Dyspepsian national, charged with murder in Dyspepsia.
This constitutes an exorbitant exercise by Dyspepsia of jurisdiction to enforce,
even if it enjoys jurisdiction under international law to criminalize the conduct in
question.
(1999). See also, more recently, the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of New Zealand concerning Trials under Pitcairn Law in
New Zealand and Related Matters, 11 October 2002, Cmd 5745.
400 See, e.g. Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at § 56. As regards the trial of
the accused, the jurisdiction of the criminal courts in the common-law tradition is, as a matter of municipal
law, generally in personam: with a few exceptions, the presence of the accused in the court is a
precondition to his or her trial. By contrast, many civil-law states permit trial in absentia under certain
conditions.
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At the same time, while jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce are
mutually distinct, the act of prescription and the act of enforcement are, in
practice, intertwined. A state’s assertion of the applicability of its criminal law to
given conduct is actualized, as it were, when it is sought to be enforced in a
given case. Nonetheless, the act of prescription can still be said to take place
when the prohibition in question is promulgated, the conduct prohibited being, at
that point, hypothetical (that is, paradigmatic murder, paradigmatic robbery and
so on). It might well be that the question of when prescription occurs is distinct
from the question of when state responsibility for the arrogation of exorbitant
prescriptive jurisdiction can be said to be engaged, although the latter might, in
turn, depend upon the way in which responsibility is invoked.401 But, as far as
prescription itself is concerned, this must be said to occur when jurisdiction is
asserted, rather than exercised.402 If this were not the case, then the prescription
of the prohibition in question – in other words, the proscription of the relevant
conduct - would take place after the commission of the prohibited conduct and,
as such, would amount to ex post facto criminalization - a phenomenon abhorred
401 It would seem that, vis-a -vis an injured state within the meaning of Art. 42 of the International Law
Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, annexed to GA Res.
56/83, 12 December 2001, responsibility arises only when prescriptive jurisdiction is exercised, i.e. when it
is enforced, e.g. when the Dyspepsian national is arrested by the Hernian authorities on suspicion of having
violated Hernian law by whistling in Dyspepsia. See also L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction. International
and Municipal Legal Perspectives (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 25. On the other
hand, it might be the case that a so-called ‘interested’ state acting under Art. 48 of the ILC’s Articles could
invoke the responsibility of Hernia for its mere promulgation of the offensive law, and would be entitled to
demand its repeal, even if it were never enforced. Such questions are beyond the scope of this article.
402 The situation is more complex when a state’s assertion of the applicability of its criminal law to given
conduct takes place by way of judicial ruling. As mentioned supra note 3, this can happen in one of two
ways. In the vast majority of cases in both civilian and common-law systems, such a ruling will take the
form of an expansive interpretation by the court of the ambiguous jurisdictional scope of a given statute.
While the practical effect of such a ruling is that prescription occurs only at the moment of its exercise, the
formal legal characterization of the situation is that the statute in question has always had the jurisdictional
scope ascribed to it by the court; as such, prescription can still be said, at least in formal terms, to have
occurred when the statute came into force. In some common-law countries, however, the jurisdictional
scope of at least certain crimes is still the creation solely of the judge-made law, the upshot being that a
judicial ruling can (leaving aside certain objections) extend the jurisdictional scope of a crime without
reference to statute. Here, recourse must be had to the traditional common-law fiction that a judicial ruling
merely ‘discovers’ what the common law has always been, the result being that, again at least formally,
prescription takes place not at the moment of enforcement but when the common law is said, by historical
fiction, to have emerged. In both instances, the reality is that serious questions of retroactivity arise:
although the prohibition itself might have existed at the time of the accused’s conduct, the application of
the prohibition to the accused might not have been ascertainable.
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by the world’s major legal traditions and contrary to international human-rights
law.403
This last point helps to answer the question of when the relevant prescriptive
jurisdictional nexus – be it territoriality, the nationality or residency of the
offender, the nationality of the victim, or the offender’s service in the armed
forces of the prescribing state – must exist in a given case; and the answer is
that the nexus relied on to ground prescriptive jurisdiction over given conduct
must exist at the time at which the conduct is performed. This is obvious in
relation to territoriality. The assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction over an offence
that takes place abroad cannot be founded on territoriality simply because the
offender subsequently enters the territory of the prescribing state: regardless of
how it is enforced, an assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct taking
place outside the territory of the prescribing state is an assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, for which an alternative legal justification must be found. As Judge
Loder noted in his dissenting opinion in Lotus, speaking specifically of jurisdiction
to prescribe on the basis of territoriality:
. . . a law [cannot] extend in the territory of the State enacting it to an
offence committed by a foreigner abroad should the foreigner happen to
be in this territory after the commission of the offence, because the guilty
act has not been committed within the area subject to the jurisdiction of
that State and the subsequent presence of the guilty person cannot have
the effect of extending the jurisdiction of the State.404
Similarly, in respect of nationality, the offender must be a national of the
prescribing state at the moment at which he or she commits the offence. The
same applies, mutatis mutandis, to prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of
403 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1948, Art. 11(2);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 15(1);
European Convention on Human Rights, 4 November 1950, ETS No. 5, Art. 7(1); American Convention on
Human Rights, 22 November 1969, OASTS No. 36, Art. 9; African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, Art. 7(2).
404 Lotus, diss. op. Loder, at 35 (original emphasis).
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residency, passive personality and service in the armed forces of the prescribing
state.405 The reason for this, as alluded to above, is the cardinal principle of the
rule of law expressed in the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. The
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdictional nexus
established subsequent to the commission of the offence is a form of ex post
facto criminalization and, therefore, repugnant, in that a substantive national
criminal prohibition and its attendant punishment – and not merely a national
procedural competence – become applicable to the accused only after the
performance of the impugned conduct.406
This last point is worth emphasizing: the exercise by a state of prescriptive
jurisdiction in reliance on a jurisdictional nexus not satisfied until after the
commission of the ‘offence’ means that, at the moment of commission, the
‘offender’ is not prohibited by the law of that state from performing the relevant
act; as such, his or her subsequent conviction and punishment for that act under
the law of the state in question are violations of the principle of legality. This is
especially significant in relation to prescriptive jurisdiction asserted on the basis
of a nationality (or, equally, residency) acquired after the impugned act. True, a
number of states provide for jurisdiction over certain strictly municipal offences407
405 The question has less chance of arising in relation to the protective principle and the effects doctrine,
where the requisite prescriptive jurisdictional nexus – respectively, the threat posed by the relevant conduct
to a fundamental interest of the prescribing state and the effect of the relevant conduct within its territory-
is, in practice, simply deemed to exist in relation to certain offences such as counterfeiting. But consider the
situation where the prescribing state itself did not exist at the time of the commission of the offence; and
query the statements in this regard in Attorney-General of Israel v Eichmann, 36 International Law Reports
(ILR) 5, at 49–57, especially §§ 36–38 (1961, Dist. Ct Jerusalem) and 36 ILR 5, at 304 (1962, Sup. Ct
Israel).
406 That said, it might be countered that the considerations of natural justice underpinning the principle of
legality are less compelling in circumstances where individuals have the choice of whether to render
themselves liable to punishment for past conduct by subsequently adopting a given nationality or residency,
or by subsequently joining the armed forces of a given state. This rebuttal, however, is unsatisfactory when
it comes to jurisdiction on the basis of passive personality in cases where the victim acquires the relevant
nationality after the commission of the offence. In such cases, the offender is obviously denied fair
warning.
407 It is crucial to note that different considerations apply to crimes under general international law, as
specifically considered infra. In short, the principle of legality is not violated in cases of municipal
retroactivity where the impugned conduct constituted an offence under international law at the time of its
commission: see, e.g. Universal Declaration, Art. 11(2); ICCPR, Art. 15(1); ECHR, Art. 7(1), as consonant
with customary international law. This is highly relevant to the exercise of universal jurisdiction over
crimes under general international law, especially by means of subsequent nationality or subsequent
residency jurisdiction, as also discussed infra.
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on the basis of nationality acquired by the offender subsequent to the
commission of the offence.408 But, this, nonetheless, violates the prohibition on
the retroactive application of criminal laws,409 and cannot be said to be a valid
exercise of nationality jurisdiction in the eyes of public international law,410 even if
it has elicited no great reaction from states who do not assert it. The lack of
adverse response does not necessarily denote acquiescence. For one thing,
while such provisions are on the books, it seems that they have only very rarely
formed the basis of prosecutions; as such, there has been little opportunity for
the occasioning of injury to other states,411 and, hence, for protest. Moreover,
there is no indication of the opinio juris accompanying the apparent silence, and
the most likely explanation for it relates to the admissibility of claims under the
law of diplomatic protection: the offender’s change of nationality after the
commission of the offence implicates the rule on the continuous nationality of
claims; alternatively, the offender’s later assumption of an additional nationality
implicates questions of dual nationality. Whatever other subjective belief as might
exist is just as likely political as legal.412
6.3. Clarifying Universal Jurisdiction
A. Basic Definition
408 See, e.g. Penal Code (France), Art. 113–6. See also the sources cited in Z. Deen-Racsmány, ‘The
Nationality of the Offender and the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’, 95 American Journal
of International Law (AJIL) (2001) 606, at 614.
409 See also L. Sarkar, ‘The Proper Law of Crime in International Law’, 11 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly (ICLQ) (1962) 446, at 459. The question is floated but left open by Deen-Racsmany, supra
note 29, at 614–615, especially note 61, although she does suggest contra that ‘[n]ationality either at the
time of prosecution or at the time of the commission of the crime should be sufficient for jurisdiction’
(ibid., at 615).
410 Cf., contra, Harvard Law School Research in International Law, supra note 12, at 531–532, and the
sources referred to therein, even if the authors concede that such jurisdiction is ‘possibly a little difficult to
justify theoretically’ (ibid., at 532).
411 Recall supra note 22.
412 See, e.g. Lotus, diss. op. Altamira, at 98.
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It comes as something of a surprise that none of the judges in Arrest Warrant
explicitly posits a definition of universal jurisdiction, despite the concept’s
centrality to the case. In fact, Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert suggests, in her
dissenting opinion, that ‘[t]here is no generally accepted definition of universal
jurisdiction in conventional or customary international law’,413 stating that ‘[m]any
views exist as to its legal meaning’414 and that ‘uncertainties . . . may exist
concerning the definition [of the concept]’.415
In response to Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, one might fairly question
whether treaty or custom could be expected to provide such a definition, rather
than just permissive or prohibitive rules regarding a phenomenon defined
doctrinally. One might query, also, the genuineness or seriousness of the alleged
debate over the meaning of universal jurisdiction. And, one might, with reason,
point out that the absence of a customary or conventional definition and the
supposed plurality of doctrinal definitions do not mean that no single soundest
definition of universal jurisdiction cannot be given.
It would seem sufficiently well agreed that universal jurisdiction amounts to the
assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe in the absence of any other accepted
jurisdictional nexus at the time of the relevant conduct. (It should again be
stressed, in this light, that the term ‘universal jurisdiction’ is shorthand for
‘universal jurisdiction to prescribe’ or ‘universal prescriptive jurisdiction’ and that
the point by reference to which one characterizes the head of prescriptive
jurisdiction relied on in a given case is the moment of commission of the putative
offence.) In positive and slightly pedantic terms, universal jurisdiction can be
defined as prescriptive jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by persons
who, at the time of commission, are non-resident aliens, where such offences are
not deemed to constitute threats to the fundamental interests of the prescribing
413 Arrest Warrant, diss. op. Van den Wyngaert, at § 44.
414 Ibid., at § 45.
415 Ibid., at § 46.
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state or, in appropriate cases, to give rise to effects within its territory.416 This
positive definition is, needless to say, a mouthful, and universal jurisdiction is
probably more usefully defined in opposition to what it is not. Indeed, Ascensio
observes that universal jurisdiction ‘is usually defined negatively, as a ground of
jurisdiction which does not require any link or nexus with the elected forum’.417 As
stated by de la Pradelle:
La competence penale d’une juridiction nationale est dite ‘universelle’
quand . . . un tribunal que ne designe aucun des criteres ordinairement
retenus – ni la nationalite d’une victime ou d’un auteur presume, ni la
localisation d’un element constitutif d’une infraction, ni l’atteinte portee aux
interets fondamentaux de l’Etat – peut, cependant, connaitre d’actes
accomplis par des etrangers, a l’etranger ou dans un espace echappant a
toute souvereinete.418
Similarly, Reydams states:
Negatively defined, [universal jurisdiction] means that there is no link of
territoriality or nationality between the State and the conduct or offender,
nor is the State seeking to protect its security or credit.419
(By ‘nationality’, Reydams means both ‘the nationality of the perpetrator, and the
nationality of the victim’.420) Meron, likewise, defines universal jurisdiction as
416 See, similarly, Reydams, supra note 22, at 5: ‘Positively defined, a State exercises universal jurisdiction
when it seeks to punish conduct that is totally foreign, ie conduct by and against foreigners, outside its
territory and its extensions, and not justified by the need to protect a narrow self-interest.’
417 H. Ascensio, ‘Are Spanish Courts Backing Down on Universality? The Supreme Tribunal’s Decision in
Guatemalan Generals’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2003) 690, at 699. See also, in
a similarly negative formulation, M. Henzelin, Le principe de l’universalite en droit penal international
(Basel/Geneva/Munich: Helbing and Lichtenhahn; Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2000) 1 and 29, § 72.
418 G. de la Pradelle, ‘La competence universelle’, in H. Ascensio, E. Decaux and A. Pellet (eds), Droit
International Penal (Paris: Pedone, 2000) 905, at § 1. See also B. Stern, ‘A Propos de la Competence
Universelle . . .’, in E. Yakpo and T. Boumedra (eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (The
Hague: Kluwer, 1999) 735, at 737 (‘une competence universelle . . . signifie que l’Etat a le droit d’exercer
une competence pour certains actes qui ne sont pas produits sur son territoire, et a l’egard desquels il ne
serait pas normalement competent’).
419 Reydams, supra note 22, at 5.
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existing when ‘states that have no territorial or nationality (active or passive) or
“protective principle” links’ are permitted, by international law, ‘to prosecute those
who commit [offences]’.421 Paragraph 404 of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of
the United States provides an analogous definition.422 Other definitions
commonly offered are essentially identical, even if they often omit reference to
less common heads of prescriptive jurisdiction, such as the protective principle
and passive personality.423 All conceive of universal jurisdiction as permitting a
state to deem given conduct an offence against its law, ‘regardless of any nexus
the state may have with the offence, the offender, or the victim’.424
By way of aside, note that universal jurisdiction is often said to mean that ‘any’
state or ‘every’ state is permitted to criminalize the conduct in question.425 While
the gist of such statements is clear and obviously correct, the use of words like
‘any’ and ‘every’ can be unintentionally misleading, in so far as it might be
mistaken to suggest that universal jurisdiction can never be grounded in treaty
420 Ibid.
421 T. Meron, ‘International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities’, 89 AJIL (1995) 554, at 568. See,
similarly, Schachter, supra note 5, at 262.
422 See also comment (a) to § 404 of the Restatement (Third), supra note 5.
423 See, e.g. L.C. Green, ‘International Crimes and the Legal Process’, 29 ICLQ (1980) 567, at 568, as
endorsed by Brennan J. of the High Court of Australia in Polyukhovich v Commonwealth of Australia
(1991) 91 ILR 1, at 40; G. Triggs, ‘Australia’s War Crimes Trials: A Moral Necessity or Legal Minefield?’,
16 Melbourne University Law Review (1987) 382, at 389, as endorsed by Cory J. of the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v Finta (1994) 104 ILR 284, at 353; K.C. Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law’, 66 Texas Law Review (1988) 785, at 788; R. Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and
How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 57; Combacau and Sur, supra note 10, at 350; A. Cassese,
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 261; W.A. Schabas, An Introduction to the
International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 60; G. Danilenko, ‘ICC
Statute and Third States’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary. Volume II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1871, at
1878; G.P. Fletcher, ‘Against Universal Jurisdiction’, 1 JICJ (2003) 580, at 582.
424 S.R. Ratner and J.S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law (2nd edn,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 161. See, similarly, Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction,
available online at http://www.princeton.edu/_lapa/unive jur.pdf, Principle 1(1) (visited 18 May 2004).
425 See, e.g. Green, supra note 44, at 568; Bowett, supra note 10, at 11; Randall, supra note 44, at 788;
Oxman, supra note 6, at 58; Dinstein, supra note 5, at 18; Combacau and Sur, supra note 10, at 350; Stern,
supra note 39, at 735; Cassese, supra note 44, at 261; Schabas, supra note 44, at 60; Danilenko, supra note
44, at 1878; B. Conforti, Diritto Internazionale (6th edn, Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 2002), § 24.2.
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law, circumscribed as it is by the pacta tertiis principle. Such a misapprehension
would seem to underpin Higgins’ heterodox characterization (in a non-judicial
capacity) of a certain provision common to many international criminal
conventions and generally considered to mandate universal jurisdiction.426 She is
not, it must be said, alone. Cameron takes a similar line427 and Cassese states:
[A]s rightly pointed out by R. Higgins, these treaties do not provide for
universal jurisdiction proper, for only the contracting states are entitled to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over offenders on their territory. In
addition, it may be contended that such jurisdiction does not extend to
offences committed by nationals of states not parties, unless the crime (1)
is indisputably prohibited by customary international law . . . or (2) the
national of the non-contracting state engages in prohibited conduct in the
territory of a state party, or against nationals of that state.428
Cassese’s substantive points are sound, but his (and the others’) implicit
definition of ‘universal jurisdiction proper’ is open to question. The jurisdiction
mandated by the relevant treaty provision is, in fact, universal jurisdiction – that
is, prescriptive jurisdiction in the absence of any other recognized jurisdictional
nexus.
B. ‘Universal Jurisdiction In Absentia’
1. President Guillaume, Judge Ranjeva and Judge Rezek in Arrest Warrant
The relevant aspect of Arrest Warrant that is most open to question is several
judges’ treatment of what they call ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’, which they
426 See Higgins, supra note 44, at 63–65, referring to some of the provisions cited infra, note 51.
427 See I. Cameron, The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction (Aldershot: Dartmouth,
1994), 80.
428 A. Cassese, ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal
Jurisdiction’, 1 JICJ (2003) 589, at 594 (original emphasis, citation omitted). On the exercise of treaty-
based universal jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party states, cf. contra M.P. Scharf, ‘Application of
Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States’, 35 New England Law Review
(2001) 363.
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posit as some sort of undisaggregated jurisdictional category. For example,
President Guillaume- speaking of the jurisdictional provision common to many
international criminal conventions, whereby each State Party is obliged to ‘take
such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence
in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory . . . ’,429 without
any requirement that the offence should take place on the territory of that state or
that the alleged offender or victim should be one of its nationals – notes:
[N]one of these texts has contemplated establishing jurisdiction over
offences committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners when the
perpetrator is not present in the territory of the State in question. Universal
jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to international conventional law.430
Judge Ranjeva’s use of the term and his reasoning are markedly similar.431 What
is more, both judges, along with Judge Rezek, talk consistently of so-called
universal jurisdiction in absentia as if it were even less tolerable than universal
jurisdiction per se.432 President Guillaume, after observing that states ‘may
429 Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Guillaume, at §§ 7–8. Provisions to this effect are found in Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 December 1970 (‘Hague Convention’), 860 UNTS 1971,
Art. 4(2); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civilian Aircraft, 23
September 1971 (‘Montreal Convention’), 974 UNTS 177, Art. 5(2); Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 14
December 1973, 1035 UNTS 167, Art. 3(2); Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 17 December
1979, 1316 UNTS 205, Art. 5(2); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 3 March
1980, 1456 UNTS 124, Art. 8(2); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 112, Art. 5(2); Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March 1988 (‘Rome Convention’), 1678
UNTS 221, Art. 6(4); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf, 10 March 1988 (‘Rome Protocol’), 1678 UNTS 304, Art. 3(4);
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 4 December 1989, UN
Treaty Reg. No. 37789, Art. 9(2); Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 9
December 1994, 2051 UNTS 363, Art. 10(4); Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 15
December 1997, UN Treaty Reg. No. 37517, Art. 6(4); Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 14
May 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 26 March 1999,
reproduced in 38 ILM (1999) 769, Art. 16(1)(c); Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, 9 December 1999, UN Treaty Reg. No. 38349, Art. 7(4); Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, UN Treaty Reg. No. 39574, Art. 15(4).
430 Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Guillaume, at § 9; see also ibid., at § 12.
431 See Arrest Warrant, dec. Ranjeva, at § 7.
432 As regards universal jurisdiction per se, President Guillaume states explicitly that it is not recognized by
general international law except in relation to piracy: Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Guillaume, at § 16. Judge
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exercise jurisdiction in cases of piracy and in the situations of subsidiary
universal jurisdiction provided for by various conventions if the offender is
present on their territory’, concludes:
But apart from these cases, international law does not accept universal
jurisdiction; still less does it accept universal jurisdiction in absentia.433
Judge Ranjeva, noting by way of introduction that ‘la presente declaration
portera-t-elle sur l’interpretation que la Belgique donne de la competence
universelle’, 434 states:
5. La legislation belge qui institue la competence universelle in absentia
pour les violations graves du droit international humanitaire a consacre
l’interpretation la plus extensive de cette competence ..... L’innovation de
la loi belge reside dans la possibilite de l’exercice de la competence
universelle en l’absence de tout lien de la Belgique avec l’objet de
l’infraction, la personne de l’auteur presume de l’infraction ou enfin le
territoire pertinent. Mais apres les tragiques evenements survenus en
Yougoslavie et au Rwanda, plusieurs Etats ont invoque la competence
universelle pour engager des poursuites contre des auteurs presumes de
crimes de droit humanitaire; cependant, a la difference du cas de M.
Yerodia Ndombasi, les personnes impliquees avaient auparavant fait
l’objet d’une procedure ou d’un acte d’arrestation, c’est-a-dire qu’un lien
de connexion territoriale existait au prealable. 6. En droit international, la
même consideration liee au lien de connexite ratione loci est egalement
exigee pour l’exercice de la competence universelle . . ..
Ranjeva, while taking the view that ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’ is impermissible (Arrest Warrant,
dec. Ranjeva, at §§ 8–12), is silent on the status under general international law of universal jurisdiction
over offenders subsequently present in the territory of the prescribing state. Judge Rezek rejects, as a matter
of general international law, the attachment of universal jurisdiction to the war crimes and crimes against
humanity at issue in the case before the Court, both in principle as well as when enforced in absentia:
Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Rezek, at § 10.
433 Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Guillaume, at § 16. Reference by President Guillaume to ‘universal jurisdiction
in absentia’ is also found ibid., at §§ 13 and 17.
434 Arrest Warrant, dec. Ranjeva, at § 3.
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Judge Rezek declares:
L’activisme qui pourrait mener un Etat a rechercher hors de son territoire,
par la voie d’une demande d’extradition ou d’un mandat d’arret
international, une personne qui aurait ete accusee de crimes definis en
termes de droit des gens, mais sans aucune circonstance de
rattachement au for, n’est aucunement autorise par le droit international
en son etat actuel . . ..435
He concludes:
[L]e for interne de la Belgique n’est pas competent, dans les circonstances
de l’espece, pour l’action penale, faute d’une base de competence autre
que le seul principe de la competence universelle et faute, a l’appui de
celui-ci, de la presence de la personne accusee sur le territoire belge, qu’il
ne serait pas legitime de forcer a comparaitre.436
For her part, Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, while holding contra that
‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’ is not prohibited by conventional or
customary international law,437 also tends to treat it as a distinct head of
jurisdiction, the lawfulness of which is to be proved in its own right;438 but
close reading suggests that this is probably just a function of misplaced
emphasis.
It should be noted that the approach taken by President Guillaume and
Judges Ranjeva and Rezek is not without resonance in the academic
literature. Reydams uses the term ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’,439
435 Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Rezek, at § 6 (original emphasis).
436 Ibid., at § 10.
437 See Arrest Warrant, diss. op. Van den Wyngaert, at §§ 54–55 and 58.
438 See ibid., at §§ 52–58.
439 See Reydams, supra note 22, at 55, 74, 88–89, 156, 177, 222, 224, 225 and 227.
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and treats it as a form of jurisdiction whose lawfulness is to be considered
in its own right – that is, as distinct from universal jurisdiction per se.440 In
a related vein are the various doctrinal writings summarized by
Reydams,441 where what the author terms the ‘co-operative general
universality principle’ and the ‘co-operative limited universality principle’
are predicated on the presence of the offender, while the so-called
‘unilateral limited universality principle’ states that ‘any State may
unilaterally launch an investigation, even in absentia’.442 Similarly,
Cassese states that the principle of universality: . . .
has been upheld in two different versions. According to the most
widespread version, only the State where the accused is in custody
can prosecute him or her (so-called forum deprehensionis, or
jurisdiction of the place where the accused is apprehended) . . ..
Under a different version of the universality principle, a State may
prosecute persons accused of international crimes regardless … of
whether or not the accused is in custody in the forum State.443
Elsewhere, he distinguishes between ‘conditional’ universal jurisdiction
and
‘absolute’ universal jurisdiction.444
2. Discussion
The practice of states in this regard – sparse and ambivalent, to date –
does not point conclusively to the general recognition of so-called
universal jurisdiction in absentia as a distinct category of jurisdiction
whose lawfulness is to be established in its own right. As such, the
question can only be approached from first principles. In this light, the
440 See, e.g. ibid., at 224.
441 See ibid., at 29–42.
442 Ibid., at 38 (original emphasis).
443 Cassese, supra note 44, at 261.
444 See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 284–291.
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approach adopted by President Guillaume and Judges Ranjeva and
Rezek is not logically compelling. It conflates a state’s jurisdiction to
prescribe its criminal law with the manner of that law’s enforcement.
As a manifestation of ‘jurisdiction’ in some wholly notional unitary sense, there
can be no such thing as ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’. Universal jurisdiction
is a manifestation of jurisdiction to prescribe. Like all heads of jurisdiction to
prescribe, it might be that it is exercised in a given case with the accused present
in the court, consequent upon his or her arrest in the territory of the prosecuting
state, pursuant to a warrant issued while he or she was present in that territory.
Or, it might be exercised in personam, but consequent upon the accused’s arrest
in and extradition from a foreign state, pursuant to a warrant issued while he or
she was abroad or, equally, while he or she was in the territory of the prosecuting
state, having since absconded. Alternatively, it might be that it is exercised
without the accused present in the court, pursuant to an outstanding warrant,
issued while he or she was abroad. Or, it might be exercised in absentia but
pursuant to an outstanding warrant, issued while a subsequently absconding
accused was present in the prosecuting state. The fact is that prescription is
logically independent of enforcement. On the one hand, there is universal
jurisdiction, a head of prescriptive jurisdiction alongside territoriality, nationality,
passive personality and so on. On the other hand, there is enforcement in
absentia, just as there is enforcement in personam.
In turn, since prescription is logically distinct from enforcement, the legality of the
latter can in no way affect the legality of the former, at least as a matter of
reason. Universal jurisdiction to prescribe is either lawful or it is not. The
issuance of a warrant in absentia and trial in absentia is either lawful or it is not.
And, as far as international law goes, these last two are, in fact, lawful, in a
reflection of the position classically adopted by the civil-law tradition. As rightly
noted by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal:
... [s]ome jurisdictions provide for trial in absentia; others do not. If it is
said that a person must be within the jurisdiction at the time of the trial
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itself, that may be a prudent guarantee for the right of fair trial but has little
to do with bases of jurisdiction recognized under international law.445
In short, as a matter of international law, if universal jurisdiction is permissible,
then its exercise in absentia is logically permissible also. Whether it is desirable
is, needless to say, a separate question.
Of course, logic and the opinio juris of states do not always go hand in hand, and
it is always open to states to indicate unambiguously that the international
lawfulness of universal jurisdiction does, in fact, depend upon the presence of the
offender. But, ‘the great majority of the interested states’446 have not done so, to
date.
If the novel term ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’ must be used at all, it can
surely only be as shorthand (and potentially confusing shorthand, at that) for the
combined manifestation in a given case of two distinct aspects of national
criminal jurisdiction, namely the enforcement in absentia of universal prescriptive
jurisdiction. If one is to talk, however, of ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’, then
one might as well talk also of territorial jurisdiction in absentia, nationality
jurisdiction in absentia, passive personality jurisdiction in absentia, and so on.
But no one does.
As for President Guillaume’s more specific conclusion – based on the classic
treaty undertaking by each state party to ‘take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences [in question] in cases
where the alleged offender is present in its territory . . .’ – that the exercise in
absentia of universal jurisdiction ‘is unknown to international conventional law’447
(a view echoed by Judge Ranjeva448), this confuses what is mandatory with what
445 See Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at § 56.
446 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG/Denmark; FRG/Netherlands), ICJ Reports (1969) 3, at 229
(diss. op. Lachs).
447 Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Guillaume, at § 9.
448 Arrest Warrant, dec. Ranjeva, at § 7.
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is permissible, as pointed out by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal.449
It is clear that the territorial precondition to the exercise of the mandatory
universal jurisdiction envisaged in such treaty provisions is designed to take
account of the general unavailability of trial in absentia among states of the
common-law tradition. A conventional obligation to provide for the exercise of
universal jurisdiction in absentia would prevent these states from being able to
ratify the conventions in question. In this light, the territorial precondition serves
as a universally acceptable lowest common denominator, designed to encourage
maximum participation in these treaties.450 Moreover, as observed by Judge ad
hoc Van den Wyngaert, most of the international criminal conventions which
contain this provision also embody a provision to the effect that the convention
‘does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national
law’.451 It is also worth recalling that the mandatory universal jurisdiction provision
in question is accompanied, in every single instance, by an aut dedere aut
judicare provision;452 and, as remarked by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal:
. . . [t]here cannot be an obligation to extradite someone you choose not to
try unless that person is within your reach. National legislation, enacted to
give effect to these treaties, quite naturally also may make mention of the
necessity of the presence of the accused. These sensible realities are
449 Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at § 57.
450 See also Ascensio, supra note 38, at 700 (original emphasis): ‘The presence of the accused on the
territory of the prosecuting state, a prerequisite for the implementation of the universal jurisdiction doctrine
in many domestic legal systems, is not a link in the sense of a basis of jurisdiction, but only a procedural
condition for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, usually required for practical reasons. . . . Some
international conventions do mention it, in order to set up a minimum obligation for states to implement
universal jurisdiction.’
451 Arrest Warrant, diss. op. Van den Wyngaert, at § 61. See, in this regard, Hague Convention, Art. 4(3);
Montreal Convention, Art. 5(3); Internationally Protected Persons Convention, Art. 3(3); Hostages
Convention, Art. 5(3); Nuclear Material Convention, Art. 8(3); Torture Convention, Art. 5(3); Rome
Convention, Art. 6(4); Rome Protocol, Art. 3(5); Illicit Trafficking Convention, Art. 4(3); Mercenaries
Convention, Art. 9(3); UN and Associated Personnel Convention, Art. 10(5); Terrorist Bombings
Convention, Art. 6(5); Second Hague Protocol, Art. 16(2); Financing of Terrorism Convention, Art. 7(6);
Organized Crime Convention, Art. 15(6).
452 See Hague Convention, Art. 7; Montreal Convention, Art. 7; Internationally Protected Persons
Convention, Art. 7; Hostages Convention, Art. 8(1); Nuclear Material Convention, Art. 10; Torture
Convention, Art. 7(1) and (2); Rome Convention, Art. 10(1); Mercenaries Convention, Art. 12; UN and
Associated Personnel Convention, Art. 14; Terrorist Bombings Convention, Art. 8; Second Hague Protocol,
Art. 17(1); Financing of Terrorism Convention, Art. 10(1); Organised Crime Convention, Art. 16 (10).
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critical for the obligatory exercise of aut dedere aut prosequi jurisdiction,
but cannot be interpreted a contrario so as to exclude a voluntary exercise
of a universal jurisdiction.453
In addition, it is not clear how these treaty provisions could have a bearing either
way on the position of ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’ under general
international law.
There is an intriguing postscript to all of this. In the version of Arrest Warrant
originally made available on the ICJ website,454 the dissenting opinion of Judge
Rezek contained an additional paragraph (a paragraph 8) when compared with
the version now available electronically. In this excised paragraph, Judge Rezek
distinguishes the case before the Court from the request made by Spain ‘in
absentia’, as it were, for the extradition by the United Kingdom of Senator
Augusto Pinochet for crimes committed in Chile against Spanish nationals – a
request that Judge Rezek considers internationally lawful. In a further conflation
of jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce, Judge Rezek concludes:
. . . et surtout . . . la competence de la justice espagnole avait pour
fondement le principe de la nationalite passive, qui peut justifier – bien
que ce ne soit pas le cas de la totalite, peut-etre meme pas d’une majorite
d’Etats – l’engagement de l’action penale in absentia, donnant lieu de ce
chef a l’emission d’un mandat d’arret international et a la demande
d’extradition. The reason for the paragraph’s excision is a matter of
surmise.
C. ‘Classical’ Universal Jurisdiction, ‘True Universality’, Universal
Jurisdiction ‘Properly So Called’, ‘Pure’ Universal Jurisdiction, etc.
1. Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in Arrest Warrant
453 Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at § 57 (original emphasis).
454 Copy on file with author.
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Although recognizing that the legality of universal jurisdiction is unaffected by the
method of its enforcement, the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal is inconsistent in its use of the term ‘universal
jurisdiction’ and seemingly unclear as to what it encompasses. This opacity,
again, reflects a certain elision of prescription and enforcement, which is, in turn,
a function of the judges’ inattention to the moment at which the requisite
prescriptive jurisdictional nexus must be present.
The three judges observe at the outset:
As Mr Yerodia was a non-national of Belgium and the alleged offences
described in the arrest warrant occurred outside of the territory over which
Belgium has jurisdiction, the victims being non-Belgians, the arrest
warrant was necessarily predicated on a universal jurisdiction.455
They then ‘turn to the question whether States are entitled to exercise jurisdiction
over persons having no connection with the forum State when the accused is not
present in the State’s territory’,456 and note, by way of preface, that, with the
exception of the Belgian legislation in issue, ‘national legislation, whether in
fulfilment of international treaty obligations to make certain international crimes
offences also in national law, or otherwise, does not suggest a universal
jurisdiction over these offences’.457 The national legislation examined by Judges
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal includes the Australian War Crimes Act
1945, as amended by the War Crimes (Amendment) Act 1988, which provides
for the prosecution in Australia of war crimes committed during the Second World
War by persons who, at the time of prosecution, are Australian citizens or
residents; the United Kingdom’s War Crimes Act 1991, which allows for the
prosecution in the United Kingdom of certain war crimes committed in Europe
during the Second World War by persons who, inter alia, have subsequently
become nationals or residents of the United Kingdom; and the Criminal Code of
Canada 1985, which establishes Canadian jurisdiction over offences in
455 Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at § 6.
456 Ibid., at § 19.
457 Ibid., at § 20.
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circumstances, inter alia, where ‘at the time of the act or omission Canada could,
in conformity with international law, exercise jurisdiction over the person on the
basis of the person’s presence in Canada’.458 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal then conclude:
All of these illustrate the trend to provide for the trial and punishment
under international law of certain crimes that have been committed
extraterritorially. But none of them, nor the many others that have been
studied by the Court, represent a classical assertion of a universal
jurisdiction over particular offences committed elsewhere by persons
having no relationship or connection with the forum State.459
Turning to national case law, the judges point to Dutch and German
prosecutions:
23. In the Bouterse case the Amsterdam Court of Appeal concluded that
torture was a crime against humanity, and as such an ‘extraterritorial
jurisdiction’ could be exercised over a non-national. However, in the Hoge
Raad, the Dutch Supreme Court attached conditions to this exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction (nationality, or presence within the Netherlands
at the moment of arrest) on the basis of national legislation.
24. By contrast, a universal jurisdiction has been asserted by the Bavarian
Higher Regional Court in respect of a prosecution for genocide (the
accused in this case being arrested in Germany) . . ..
Next, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal survey the treaty law. They
draw attention to the first ‘grave breaches’ provision, common to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and incorporated by reference into Additional Protocol I of
1977, which provides that ‘Each High Contracting Party shall be under the
obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed . . . grave breaches,
458 See ibid.
459 Ibid., at § 21.
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and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts’,460 and they comment:
No territorial or nationality linkage is envisaged, suggesting a true
universality principle ….
But a different interpretation is given in the authoritative Pictet
Commentary . . ., which contends that this obligation was understood as
being an obligation upon States parties to search for offenders who may
be on their territory. Is it a true example of universality, if the obligation to
search is restricted to their own territory? Does the obligation to search
imply a permission to prosecute in absentia, if the search had no result?461
They also note the provision common to most international criminal conventions,
discussed by President Guillaume and Judge Ranjeva, which requires each
State Party to ‘take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences [in question] in cases where the alleged offender is
present in its territory . . .’, or like formulation.462 They state:
By the loose use of language [this] has come to be referred to as
‘universal jurisdiction’, though [it] is really an obligatory territorial
jurisdiction over persons, albeit in relation to acts committed elsewhere.463
The judges make subsequent reference to ‘this obligation (whether described as
the duty to establish universal jurisdiction, or, more accurately, the jurisdiction to
establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events)’464 and to
‘the inaccurately termed “universal jurisdiction principle” in these treaties’.465
460 See ibid., at § 28.
461 Ibid., at § 31.
462 See ibid., at §§ 33–41.
463 Ibid., at § 41.
464 Ibid., at § 42.
465 Ibid., at § 44.
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Turning to academic writings, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal refer
to ‘[t]he assertion that certain treaties and court decisions rely on universal
jurisdiction, which in fact they do not’.466 Finally, summing up their findings, the
judges declare:
That there is no established practice in which States exercise universal
jurisdiction, properly so called, is undeniable. As we have seen, virtually all
national legislation envisages links of some sort to the forum State; and no
case law exists in which pure universal jurisdiction has formed the basis of
jurisdiction.467
They even make passing reference to ‘universal criminal jurisdiction in
absentia’.468
2. Discussion
The marked terminological inconsistency of Judge Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal is frustrating, and leaves the reader scarcely able to tell whether
reference to ‘universal jurisdiction’ at any given point is to universal prescriptive
jurisdiction, as such, or to universal prescriptive jurisdiction enforced without the
offender’s being present within the territory of the prescribing state. Perhaps
even more to the point, the terminological distinctions drawn by the judges are
less than sound. ‘Universal jurisdiction’, as emphasized already, is shorthand for
universal jurisdiction to prescribe, and refers to the assertion of jurisdiction to
prescribe in circumstances where no other lawful head of prescriptive jurisdiction
is applicable to the impugned conduct at the time of its commission. The term
applies irrespective of whether this prescriptive jurisdiction is exercised in
personam or in absentia: just as prescription and enforcement are logically and
legally distinct, so too are they terminologically independent of each other.
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal’s references to ‘classical’ universal
466 Ibid.
467 Ibid., at § 45.
468 Ibid., at § 49.
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jurisdiction, ‘true universality’, universal jurisdiction ‘properly so called’ and ‘pure’
universal jurisdiction, when what they are in fact referring to is universal
prescriptive jurisdiction exercised in absentia, are misplaced. Indeed, universal
jurisdiction ‘properly so called’ is universal prescriptive jurisdiction tout court.
Similarly, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal characterize the common
treaty provision obliging each State Party to ‘take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences [in question] in cases
where the alleged offender is present in its territory . . .’ as a manifestation of ‘the
inaccurately termed “universal jurisdiction principle”’ – also including under this
rubric, by way of necessary implication, the Canadian Criminal Code’s provision
for jurisdiction in circumstances where ‘at the time of the act or omission Canada
could, in conformity with international law, exercise jurisdiction over the person
on the basis of the person’s presence in Canada’,469 as well as the exercise by
the Dutch courts of jurisdiction in circumstances where the only link to the
Netherlands is the arrest of the accused in Dutch territory. Such exercises of
criminal jurisdiction are, the judges assert, really examples of ‘territorial
jurisdiction over persons, albeit in relation to acts committed elsewhere’ or,
equally, of ‘a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events’. This
terminology is unhelpful and, with respect, a trifle silly.470 In reality, these three
exercises of jurisdiction are all manifestations of ‘universal
469 Note that the provision in question, s. 7(3.71–3.77) of the Canadian Criminal Code, has been repealed
by the subsequent Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 2000.
470 Consider also Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at §§ 53–54 (emphasis
added):
53. This brings us once more to the particular point that divides the Parties in this case: is it a
precondition of the assertion of universal jurisdiction that the accused be within the
territory?
54. Considerable confusion surrounds this topic, not helped by the fact that legislators, courts
and writers alike frequently fail to specify the precise temporal moment at which any
such requirement is said to be in play. Is the presence of the accused within the
jurisdiction said to be required at the time the offence was committed? At the time the
arrest warrant is issued? Or at the time of the trial itself? An examination of national
legislation, cases and writings reveals a wide variety of temporal linkages to the assertion
of jurisdiction. This incoherent practice cannot be said to evidence a precondition to any
exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction. . . .
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jurisdiction’, viz. universal jurisdiction to prescribe: that is, at the time of the
commission of the offence, no other accepted head of prescriptive jurisdiction
need link the prescribing state to the offender. All that is required is that the
offender subsequently be present (or, in the Dutch case, be arrested) in the
territory of the prescribing state – and this is a limitation strictly as to
enforcement. As such, the three examples all constitute exercises in personam of
universal jurisdiction. To call them ‘territorial jurisdiction’ is to confuse the
terminology of prescriptive jurisdiction with the separate concept of enforcement.
Similarly, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal do not characterize as
assertions of universal jurisdiction the Australian War Crimes Act (as amended)
and the United Kingdom’s War Crimes Act, both of which grant the courts
jurisdiction over persons accused of certain crimes committed during the Second
World War where those persons have subsequently become nationals or
residents of Australia and the United Kingdom, respectively. But both Acts do, in
fact, represent assertions of universal jurisdiction in that, at the time of the
commission of the offence, no other accepted head of prescriptive jurisdiction
need have existed. The criterion of subsequent nationality or subsequent
residency is a criterion only as to the scope of permissible enforcement. In other
words, these Acts are examples of universal jurisdiction, albeit enforced only as
against perpetrators who, at the time of enforcement, are nationals or residents
of the prescribing state. These Acts are not examples of prescriptive jurisdiction
on the basis of nationality or residency. Indeed, the Australian government
explicitly stated that it was providing for universal jurisdiction through the
subsequent nationality and subsequent residency provisions of the War Crimes
(Amendment) Act 1988 – a statement accepted in principle in the High Court of
It might be observed that if, as a precondition to the assertion of universal jurisdiction, the presence of the
accused were required at the time the offence was committed, it would not be an assertion of universal
jurisdiction at all, but a straightforward assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe on the basis of territoriality.
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Australia.471 Scholarly opinion has also characterized such provisions as
manifestations of universal jurisdiction.472
In turn, neither the requirement of the offender’s subsequent presence in the
territory of the prescribing state nor the limitation as to his or her subsequent
nationality or subsequent residency undermines the cogency of the above
legislative and judicial examples – where not pursuant to a treaty obligation – as
state practice in favour of the permissibility under general law of universal
jurisdiction to prescribe in relation to the offences in question. In each case, the
state in question clearly considers it permissible to assert criminal jurisdiction
over offences committed abroad by persons who, at the time of commission, are
non-resident aliens, in circumstances where such offences are not deemed to
constitute threats to the fundamental interests of the prescribing state (nor even
to give rise to effects within its territory). Indeed, it is no coincidence that, in each
example, the jurisdiction in question was exercised or is provided for in respect of
offences widely considered to give rise to universal jurisdiction under general
international law – in the Dutch prosecution, in respect of a crime against
humanity; in the Bavarian prosecution, genocide; and in the Australian, UK and
Canadian legislation, customary war crimes.473
471 For both the Australian government’s view and its acceptance, in principle, in the High Court, see
Polyukhovich v Commonwealth of Australia (1991) 91 ILR 1, at 116, 118, 138 and 144 (Toohey J.), and –
even if he held the legislation in question to have exceeded the bounds of international law – at 39
(Brennan J., dissenting).
472 As regards Australia’s War Crimes Act 1945, as amended by the War Crimes (Amendment) Act 1988,
see J.M. Wagner, ‘US Prosecution of Past and Future War Criminals and Criminals Against Humanity:
Proposals for Reform Based on the Canadian and Australian Experience’, 29 Virginia Journal of
International Law (1989) 887, at 926; M.P. Scharf, ‘The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-
Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position’, 64 Law and Contemporary Problems (2001) 67, at 82, note
83, cited with apparent approval by Deen-Racsmany, supra note 29, at 614–615, note 54. See also
Reydams, supra note 22, at 87; but cf. ibid., at 91, where Reydams states contradictorily that ‘the
proceedings against Polyukhovitch [sic.] were not an exercise of universal jurisdiction’ (original emphasis).
As regards the UK’s War Crimes Act 1991, see A.T. Richardson, ‘War Crimes Act 1991’, 55 Modern Law
Review (1992) 73, at 76, 77 and 78; Meron, supra note 42, at 573; Reydams, supra note 22, at 205.
473 See also now s. 68, in combination with s. 51, of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (UK),
providing for jurisdiction in respect of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes over an accused
‘who commits [the relevant] acts outside the United Kingdom at a time when he is not a United Kingdom
national, a United Kingdom resident or a person subject to UK service jurisdiction and who subsequently
becomes resident in the United Kingdom’, in the words of s. 68(1). See, also, to identical effect, s. 6 of the
International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001 (UK), in combination with s. 1(1). For the
characterization of these provisions as manifestations of universal prescriptive jurisdiction, see R. Cryer,
‘Implementation of the International Criminal Court Statute in England and Wales’, 51 ICLQ (2002) 733,
at 742; Reydams, supra note 22, at 206. For its part, however, the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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In each of these examples, the restriction on the enforceability of the offence
would seem to be largely political. As Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert remarks,
speaking specifically of the requirement of the offender’s subsequent presence in
the territory:
. . . [i]t may be politically inconvenient to have such a wide jurisdiction
because it is not conducive to international relations and national public
opinion may not approve of trials against foreigners for crimes committed
abroad. This does not, however, make such trials illegal under
international law.474
The same political considerations could be seen equally to underpin the
requirement of subsequent nationality or subsequent residency. Given the
Pinochet experience in relation to its more expansive enforcement of universal
jurisdiction over torture,475 such considerations almost certainly helped motivate
the United Kingdom, when enacting the International Criminal Court Act 2001, to
restrict the enforcement of the offences of genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes, when committed outside the United Kingdom by persons not, at
that time, UK nationals, UK residents or persons subject to UK service
jurisdiction, to the prosecution of those persons who subsequently become
resident in the United Kingdom.476 Indeed, the point about international relations
(FCO) made no reference to the international legal basis for the subsequent nationality and subsequent
residency provisions of the International Criminal Court Act in the Explanatory Notes to the Act which it
prepared: see Explanatory Notes. International Criminal Court Act 2001. Chapter 17 (2001), at § 109; and
the relevant government ministers did not characterize the Act as providing for universal jurisdiction: see
620 HL Deb (5s) 928–929 (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the FCO), 620 HL Deb (5s) 999–
1000 (Attorney-General) and 366 HC Deb (6s) 278 (Minister of State for the FCO). In the Scottish
Parliament (which, under constitutional devolution arrangements with Westminster, enjoys competence to
pass criminal laws), an amendment proposed by one of the smaller opposition parties, but defeated, sought
to replace what was termed the ‘partial universal jurisdiction’ of the International Criminal Court
(Scotland) Act – i.e. what was referred to as ‘the residence test’ - with so-called ‘absolute universal
jurisdiction’, i.e. jurisdiction based merely on the subsequent presence of the offender in the territory: see
Scottish Parliament Official Report, Thursday 13 September 2001, Session 1, col. 2418.
474 Arrest Warrant, diss. op. Van den Wyngaert, at § 56 (original emphasis). See similarly Ratner and
Abrams, supra note 45, at 185.
475 See Criminal Justice Act 1998 (UK), s. 134, at issue in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate,ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (1999) 119 ILR 135.
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was made in the devolved Scottish Parliament during the passage of the
analogous International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001, where the spectre of
‘political repercussions for Scotland’ was raised.477 Other compelling reasons for
the restrictive enforcement of universal prescriptive jurisdiction would appear to
be practical. As Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert again observes, referring
once more specifically to the requirement of the offender’s subsequent presence
in the territory:
. . . [a] practical consideration may be the difficulty in obtaining the
evidence in trials of extraterritorial crimes. Another practical reason may
be that States are afraid of overburdening their court system . . .. The
concern for a linkage with the national order . . . seems to be more of a
pragmatic than of a juridical nature. It is not, therefore, necessarily the
expression of an opinio juris . . .478
The need to avoid overburdening the courts was one explicit motivation behind
the subsequent nationality and subsequent residency restrictions in the United
Kingdom’s War Crimes Act 1991;479 and a similar desire not to become a ‘global
prosecutor’,480 along with reservations as to the practicability of evidence
gathering, 481 were cited in debate in the Scottish Parliament over the
jurisdictional provisions of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act. It
should also be kept in mind when considering the requirement of the offender’s
subsequent presence in the territory that municipal law might stipulate this as a
476 See supra note 94.
477 Scottish Parliament Official Report, supra note 94, col. 2423.
478 Arrest Warrant, diss. op. Van den Wyngaert, at § 56 (original emphasis, citations omitted). Recall also
Ascensio, supra note 38, at 700 (‘The presence of the accused on the territory of the prosecuting state, a
prerequisite for the implementation of the universal jurisdiction doctrine in many domestic legal systems, is
not a link in the sense of a basis of jurisdiction, but only a procedural condition for the exercise of
universal jurisdiction, usually required for practical reasons.’). See, also, Ratner and Abrams, supra note
45, at 185; D. Turns, ‘Aspects of National Implementation of the Rome Statute: The United Kingdom and
Selected Other States’, in D. McGoldrick, P. Rowe and E. Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International
Criminal Court. Legal and Policy Issues (Oxford: Hart, 2004) 337, at 347–348.
479 See HC Stand. Comm. 1989–1990, Vol. I, Standing Committee A. War Crimes Bill. 29 March–3 April
1990, cols 45–46 (Minister of State for the Home Office).
480 Scottish Parliament Official Report, supra note 94, cols 2422 and 2424.
481 Ibid., cols 2422, 2423, 2425 and 2427.
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precondition for the criminal courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. In sum, the
circumscribed enforcement of universal prescriptive jurisdiction is not, without
more, cogent evidence for an ambivalence on the part of states over the
permissibility under general international law of the assertion of such jurisdiction
in limine.
One important upshot of all this is that, when the assertion by states of so-called
subsequent presence, subsequent nationality and subsequent residency
jurisdiction over crimes under general international law is taken into account,
there is more state practice to support the permissibility of universal jurisdiction
over such offences than Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal – and, a
fortiori, President Guillaume and Judges Ranjeva and Rezek – credit.482 This is
potentially significant, given the latter three’s respective findings that general
international law does not recognize universal jurisdiction over war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Just how significant it is depends, of course, upon how
many states assert subsequent presence, subsequent nationality and
subsequent residency jurisdiction over such offences. This is something which
calls for empirical research. The point to be made here is that these three
manifestations of jurisdiction are rightly to be counted as exercises of universal
jurisdiction to prescribe.
Finally, it should be added, ex abundante cautela, that because the above
examples of subsequent nationality and subsequent residency jurisdiction are
actually, and merely, exercises of national criminal jurisdiction on the basis of
universality over crimes under general international law – and, critically, over
crimes that existed under general international law at the moment of their
commission – they do not in any way infringe the prohibition on ex post facto
criminalization embodied in international human-rights law.483 In accordance with
482 In this light, it should be noted that three prosecutions were initiated under the 1988 amendments to
Australia’s War Crimes Act 1945 and two under the UK’s War Crimes Act 1991: see Reydams, supra note
22, at 87 and 205 respectively. None of these apparently drew protest from the state of nationality of the
accused.
483 It is for this reason that Cassese, restricting his discussion to international crimes, is correct when he
states that ‘nationality may be possessed at either moment’, viz. either ‘when the crime is perpetrated, or
when criminal proceedings are instituted’: Cassese, supra note 65, at 282. The international criminality of
the relevant war crimes at the time at which they were committed (i.e. during the Second World War) was
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the major international human-rights instruments, which are consonant to this
extent with customary international law, the principle of legality is not violated in
cases of municipal retroactivity if the impugned conduct constituted an offence
under international law at the time of its commission.484 In such cases, all that
has happened is that a municipal procedural competence has later been
extended to encompass conduct that was substantively criminal, under
international law, when performed. At the same time, if a state’s municipal law
defines such crimes in a manner that is broader than the international definition
that prevailed at the time of their commission, then its exercise of subsequent
nationality or subsequent residency jurisdiction in relation to them is, to the extent
of the overbreadth, exorbitant in the eyes of international law.485
6.4. Conclusion
Governments, academics and students were looking to the ICJ’s judgment in
Arrest Warrant for a limpid elaboration of the international legal principles
governing national criminal jurisdiction, in particular of universal jurisdiction. But
the various judges ended up muddying the waters. It can only be hoped they take
the second chance provided by Certain Criminal Proceedings in France486 to
clarify the law.487
the explicit justification, in the face of concern over offensive retroactivity, for the subsequent nationality
and subsequent residency jurisdiction asserted by the War Crimes Act 1991 (UK): see War Crimes. Report
of the War Crimes Inquiry, Cmd 744 (1989), §§ 6.41–6.44 and 9.27; 513 HL Deb (5s) 604 and 607
(Minister of State for the Home Department); 169 HC Deb (6s) 928 (Attorney-General); 519 HL Deb (5s)
1083 (Minister of State for the Home Department); 188 HC Deb (6s) 24 (Secretary of State for the Home
Department).
484 See Universal Declaration, Art. 11(2); ICCPR, Art. 15(1); ECHR, Art. 7(1). By way of aside, it is
interesting to note that none of these international guarantees requires that the relevant crime under
international law must also, at the time of its commission, have been subject to universal jurisdiction on the
part of states, and it is worth speculating whether the drafters simply considered the latter to be an inherent
incident of the former. For a discussion of the relationship between the concept of a crime under
international law and the concept of universal jurisdiction in the specific context of the prohibition on
retroactive criminal laws, see Polyukhovich, supra note 92, at 120–121 (Toohey J.).
485 See, generally, Polyukhovich, supra note 92, at 41–51 (Brennan J., dissenting).
486 Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), International Court of
Justice, General List No. 129.
487 But cf., on a less optimistic concluding note, M. Henzelin, ‘La Competence Penale Universelle. Une
Question non Resolue par l’Arret Yerodia’, 106 Revue Generale de Droit International Public (2002) 819,
at 852: ‘[F]orce est d’admettre que les opinions [dans l’affaire du Mandat d’arret du 11 avril 2000]
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divergent du tout au tout, ce qui ne manque pas de faire craindre qu’un prochain litige soumis a la Cour
internationale de Justice ne soit tranche que par la force des majorites, alors que les consequences d’une
decision, quelle qu’elle soit, ne sont pas faciles a prevoir (impunite ou chaos).’
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CHAPTER 7
NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
7.1 The relevance and importance of nuremberg preinciples
Of late, there has been a sort of proliferation inwritings on International Criminal
Jurisprudence. A perusal of the voluminous literature shows, however, that
though much has been written on the subject, still some problems remain under-
studied if no neglected. The subject under consideration is a case in point.
The standards of accountability set in Nuremberg would apply evenly to all,
because as you recall, in Nuremberg, one of the major criticisms was that, that
was the victor's justice and that was the victor's tribunal and the victors were the
ones who were setting the standards, and they were not applying those
standards themselves, but they were simply applying those standards to the
vanquished. Today the need is evident: those standards be applied to all, that
there be effective mechanisms so that those standards are met and
implemented.
Contextually, the most important question: "What is Nuremberg's legacy in terms
of the principles ? What is their input ? What is their impact ? When there is an
explosion of human rights norms and instruments today, it is no longer just
fashionable to talk about human rights, to invoke human rights, but it has become
a common place to consider human rights as a common language of humanity.
We do that, then you can just see that Nuremberg is the one that began that
process. There were many obvious reasons for what happened in the post-
Second World War and the explosion of human rights norms, but I think we can
go back to Nuremberg to say that that is where it all began. Killing fields of
Cambodia, horrors and tragedies of Rwanda, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, the Congo
and there are many. I would not go into them.
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But at least at the present time, we need to look at what the International Law
Commission did. The International Law Commission adopted the principles in
1950. The General Assembly had directed the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal; and in the judgment of the Tribunal, it had said that the Commission
could formulate the principles of international law recognized in those - the
charter and the judgment. It was obviously the first international modern criminal
tribunal, which tried those people who had committed was crimes. It obviously is
the singular achievement that there was a trial and not just summary executions.
Churchill among others had said that there ought to be simply those executions.
He had sought those, but in 1945, after the Conference, we do have one stirring
example of how people at Nuremberg looked at it. The Chief Prosecutor at
Nuremberg Justice Robert Jackson eloquently articulated the sentiment and
many of us have heard it, but let me repeat it. 'There were four great nations
flushed with victory, but strangled with injury.' I will skip some of it. 'The stay we
had, of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment
of the law, he said, this is one of the most significant tributes that power has ever
pair to reason.' That is how it all began.
You remember that those principles, if I can just simply summarize them and not
to go through all of the, the first one would be that there is individual
accountability for individual international crimes; the second is the superior
orders is not going to be a defence anymore. I will very briefly summarize them. I
would look at the crimes under international law and made complexity in those
crimes, that is the common plan and conspiracy charge an international crime.
You recall them - let me simply mention them again to you to remind you, crimes
against peace. It is planning, preparation all of that, but waging a war of
aggression, war crimes, they are violation of laws or customs of war, crimes
against humanity, murder, inhuman acts against civilians on political, racial or
religious grounds carried on in execution or connection with any crime against
peace or any war crime.
There principles constitute a watershed. Indeed, a paradigm shift in international
law, a transition from the state centered system of unbridled state sovereignty,
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established in the peace treaty of West, and to an evolving international system,
based on the foundation of the Nuremberg Principles. Basically that was,
maintenance, restoration of international peace and security, constraints on the
use of force, criminal individual responsibility, primacy of human rights and
international humanitarian law.
We must recall that Westphalia, state centered system was a transformation from
the one that preceded it. The one which was before 1648, the Pope and Emperor
had jurisdiction over the local sovereign, claiming spiritual, temporal authority.
After Westphalia, what happened? That it was the rein of state sovereignty, with
almost unlimited powers to wage wars, even wars of aggression. The words are
classic: war is nothing more than a continuation of political relations with addition
of other means, Even Appar Heigm in the early 20th Century had said,
international law cannot object to states going to war, but does oblige them to
follow certain basic rules of conduct. Thus, there was no attempt to criminalize,
resort to war before Nuremberg.
Under customary international law, there was no conventional law, no recognized
category of such crime; only aliens were protected; you recall that there were
atrocities by foreign governments and how a nation treated its own citizens, was
nobody else's concern, not an international concern, but simply a nation state
could do what it wanted to. The example of the Swiss government that tried to
safe Swiss Zeus from camps, but did not talk about the German nationals at all.
The London Charter, limited prosecutions of crimes against humanity to those 'in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal'.
That is, they must be connected with wars and war crimes, and crimes against
peace. You remember that it has been changed. Even after that, there was a
change, not for Nuremberg, but for the latter trials that the US did conduct itself.
Application of international law norms in this area, especially in these kinds of
offences. You find that today; there are those changes. And I will touch very
briefly on them. But regarding was crimes, you have to mention that both the
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Conventions and laws - The Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions,
customary international law, it was better developed.
So, briefly outlining and not going into the details, what is the legacy ? How are
these principles important today ? On the aggressive wars, UN charter, Article
2(4), Article 51, Chapter VII, 'constraints on the use of force'. Security Council to
have responsibility - responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
Very certainly you can say that there is aggression, but still there is lack of
consensus on it. Now, there are specifics, collective security you have seen, this
last September, at the UN Summit, did not resolve much; it did talk about the
obligation to protect. Canada had taken the lead on it. The Secretary General
has asked the General Assembly that there ought to be a way to see that
Rwanda’s do not happen; he had asked that when the US has unilaterally gone
into Iraq, using force, talking about not simply preemption, but prevention as a
basis for its own unilateral use of force. He said that the time has come that we
ought to consider is the UN Charter and all those Nuremberg Principles being
reflected in it, adequate effective today in order to see that there are effective
constraints on the use of force. September meeting did not result in very specific
concrete changes, developments that you and I can touch upon and say that the
Security Council today is representative; India is not there, Japan is not there,
Germany is not there, Brazil is not there, African countries are not there and
there is no consensus as to how at the present time, to re-constitute the Security
Council.
On the use of force, not much has happened. The Human Rights, instead of that
body to have a Human Rights Council, it is lean and mean, not much has
happened there even. So4 at the present time, we are still struggling, searching,
seeking, and striving in order to bring about those changes that the principles
had brought on the use of force.
386
I can simply mention the Geneva Convention of 1949 and its two Additional
Protocols of 1977, fill the gaps that at the present time we find are filled and they
were at the time of Nuremberg, in international military law, especially on taking
of hostages and reprisals. Crimes against humanity, no longer, just there is
reliance on customary international law, because there is codification. Today you
do find that crimes against humanity as modified and controlled Council law
number 10. No longer just these was crimes are crimes against peace, but they
became the core of what we see as the genocide convention today. All these Ad
hoc tribunals are there; I was going to touch upon some.
The International Criminal Court is there; now there is code of crimes against the
security of mankind, but still all of that is in a very abstract kind of fashion, not in
very concrete terms, before us. Nuremberg trials had their own difficulties on
fairness, on due process, on loose evidence or hearsay evidence; many of those
problems were there. Justice Jackson did note also at the time wrongs; he said
'which we seek to condemn and punish have been so-calculated, so malignant,
so-devastating that civilization cannot tolerate; they are being ignored because it
cannot survive their being repeated'. These principles provided a blueprint for a
better world, a vision for a better future that is yet to be realized.
At the present time, we can say that they lay the foundation stones of this huge
structure that has been built on it. The one we see and study, the foundation
stones are hidden, but provide the buildings strength; they provide the buildings
integrity; they are constant reminders that individuals and states in this global
system are responsible; they are accountable and accountable internationally;
there are standards that ought to be applied universally; they must be fair; they
must be given due process in these trials to defend them. There must be
effective mechanisms for enforcement.
To conclude by saying that it is a pity that even after 60 years of the Nuremberg,
little attention has been paid to the subject is deals with. Could it be that we have
taken for granted all these developments in international human rights and the
institutions established to implement them or in our psyche could there be that
387
twinge, that perhaps nothing substantial has changed, that genocide, torture,
massacres, ethnic cleansing, gross human rights violations are still with us very
much a part of the landscape of humanity? That is, human rights laws lack
effective implementation, which the political will is still lacking to ensure the
dignity of the individual. And I further say; whichever scenario, one prefers the
conclusion is inescapable - as a civilization, we have miles to go.
7.2 Reflections on international criminal justice
It is intended to reflect here on the international criminal justice. I will be general
in my observations. Unfortunately, it so happens that there is dark cloud over the
landscape of human affairs, even in this so-called civilized age, the 21st century;
and we should be looking towards the platform of peace and justice, which all the
nations can enjoy.
Unfortunately, we started the century by resorting to war. It should have been a
century dedicated to the purpose of achieving peace. We still have this dark
cloud and we have very important task before us to see how law can, to some
extent, even mitigate this phenomenon in human affairs, mitigate war and at least
pass a few rays of sunshine into this rather thin scence. Now, we can do so,
through humanitarian law and humanitarian law is something which was not
debated yesterday. It is something that comes down to us from distant antiquity.
For thousands of years, human beings have been forced to go to war; so, at least
we should mitigate the suffering and behave with some humanity.
ICRC launched a study on customary international humanitarian law. It is a
tremendous study of about 3,000-4,000 pages where, over ten years of research,
the ICRC has got together and looked into every scrap of material that they could
in relation to customary international humanitarian law. So, works of scholarship
of that nature are very important in developing international criminal justice and it
is important that this information reached not only the statesmen- the Prime
Ministers and the Presidents of the world- not only the generals, but also the
public, also the schools, the diplomats, the judges, where there is so much
unawareness of the basic principles of international law. That is why the leaders
388
of the world are able to violate principles of international law rather grossly in
their dealings with other states. The people do not know are extent of these
violations and therefore, they are unable to restrain them. International law, as
we know, started mainly with the work of Grotius in 1625 and he quite rightly; for
reasons of the wars of religion at that time, distanced himself from the teachings
of religion and from religions as such. He tried to work out the international law,
on the basis of human experience. We are no longer living in the time of Grotius.
There are no longer the possibilities of all these various religious conflicts. We
have a common heritage of mankind from which we must draw the basic
reservoir of principles which will guide us into the future where we can look
forward, as I said, to a plateau of peace and justice, because if we take the other
road, we go down. But this way, if we make the right choice, we can lead
humanity upward towards justice, freedom and peace.
All those principles are there in the traditional systems, but in modern law, we
tended to ignore them. From time to time, I keep reminding my colleagues that
there is so much that we have not drawn upon. In fact, I made the proposal
yesterday to the ICRC that as a sequel to the wonderful work that they have
done, they should appoint a group to look into the customary rules of IHL in all
the great cultures of the world, appoint teams of scholars to story at length the
texts of Hinduism, the texts of Islam, the texts of Buddhism, the text of
Christianity, the texts of Judaism; and you will find enormous sets of principles
that you can evolve from those, which will guide us to the criminal law justice of
the future which we have to evolve.
Let me give you a few examples. Take Islamic law, for example. It has developed
so considerably ever since great renaissance of learning in Islam during the dark
ages of knowledge in the West. Eight centuries before
Grotius wrote his treaties, on war and peace, they have treaties on international
law in the Islamic world. For example, they have collections of teaching in regard
to what weapons one can use, how do you treat POWs, what are the rules of
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battle that you can engage in and so on and so forth. Here, we have Ten
Commandments of Abu Baker, based on the Prophet's Teaching. 'Do not kill a
woman or a child or an old man; do not cut down fruit-bearing trees; do not
destroy inhabited areas; do not slaughter sheep, cows or camels; do not burn
date-palms; do not embezzle; do not commit perfidy, etc.
All rules were worked out long years ago which everybody forgets. The
Keliforma, for example, has given his commanders these commandments; do not
commit perfidy, do not mutilate, do not kill children, do not kill the unarmed, etc.
Then there are rules against misappropriating booty, non-combatants are not to
be attacked; POWs are to be treated kindly. The tradition of the Prophet even
says that treat the POWs with great kindness; give them cloths and food. Not
only that, see that their correspondence is taken back to their homes, even
across the line of battle. It is in advance of any of the moral conventions. But it is
there in ancient teachings. So, we have got to show that all these things are
traditions of the whole of humanity, which we can draw upon. Likewise, in the
Ramayana and in Hindu Literature generally, there are most detailed rules in
relation to conduct in time of war. It is unethical to fight and kill unarmed people,
children, women, the aged, the person who is starved, which is equal to killing of
a child, and there are the traditions that are there in ancient times.
Even when there was an invading army, the farmers in the field could continue to
till their fields because they knew that under the laws of warfare, they could not
be attacked because they are non-combatants. There has been so much thought
given to these matters in ancient times. Also, it is thought like this - which has a
great deal of imagination behind it - because for example, the kind of weaponry
that they visualized is quite amazing to think that they visualized weaponry like
this. For example, you find these passages: Vishwamitra for example, the
teacher of Rama, had at one stage a whole set of missiles available to you,
including the following; note the description. The soporific missile, which will put
the enemy to sleep; the intoxicating missile, which will unhinge their minds,
missiles that are unbearably hot; the missiles that dries up everything; missiles
that tear things apart; missiles like the thunderbolt; missiles which shatters
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everything; missiles that are as deadly as death itself. So, those ancient writers
used their imaginations very vividly about how weapons could be devised and
they also used their imaginations to counter them. That is why we have those
passages, which said that weapons of hyper-destructive nature are totally
banned.
Likewise, if you go to other philosophies like Buddhism, which is amazingly rich
in its psychological insights on warfare. According to Buddhism, all warfare would
be completely banned, but there is this idea that it is important to prevent the
causes of war. It is very easy to talk of terrorism and countering terrorism. It is
much more important to see what are the causes of terrorism. To counter those
causes, this is what Buddhism teaches, violence begets violence, force begets
force and anger begets anger. There is no such thing like conquest by force
because every victor is a loser. He has incurred the hatred of the subjugated.
What is important is to settle the disputes.
When I was in the International Court, I had the idea of getting a great sculptor in
Sri Lanka to sculpt a huge bronze of the Buddha settling a dispute in Sri Lanka
between two warring parties; and the leaders of the two parties break their
weapons at his feet. That bronze now hangs outside the deliberation chamber of
the Judges of the court, reminding them that that is the main duty of international
law - the settlement of disputes and the avoidance of disputes rather than wars
as a means of resolving disputes because wars never settle anything.
Likewise, the counsels of the church - in Christianity the Church was very
concerned in early stages with the nature of weapons. For example, the Lateran
Counsel in 1137 said that even the crossbow, which had then been invented,
was too cruel an instrument to be used in warfare among Christian nations, and
the church went into all these matters in great detail. So, today while everybody
profess allegiance to one or other of these religions, they continue to do the very
opposite. It is time to remind them that the teachings of religion must be studied
and there is much of wisdom in that, which can be incorporated into modern law.
That religion must not be kept away, as a source of inspiration, as Grotius tried to
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do. But the time has come for us to look at all these religions and see about the
traditional teachings, which emerge. There is so much of commonality about the
teachings of these great religions.
One of the great things, which we have to do to salvage the world from the
destruction that was threatens it with, is to see that all the cultures of the world
are not clashing with each other. They are all congruent in regard to the basic
principles that they teach, about the humanitarian conduct, about the rules of
war, about justice, about international criminal justice, etc. Take African custom
for example. How, when there are wars, there are certain principles about the
war, how the war should be conducted, how people who have violated those
rules are to be punished, and a great deal of detailed research must go into
resurrecting those customs and finding out the concern there basic things.
Some while ago, when we were doing the Nauru Commission, we investigated
the practices in the Pacific and we found that in the Pacific, there is a custom
which dictates very strongly respect and reverence for environment. People like
Marinouske looked into the customs of the Tobrian Islands and found out, how
precise tribal rules were. So, this is one of these sources of inspiration, which we
must bring into it in developing international customary law. In regard to criminal
justice, there is a tremendous need to use international customary law to develop
its basic principles.
I have had no time to deal with institutions of international criminal law where
international criminal court is a wonderful achievement. Its jurisprudence has got
to be developed; its relationship with the Security Council with the host State with
the International Court of Justice, all of these are areas for development for the
international criminal justice for the future. But my theme generally is that the
great fertilizing source of international criminal justice will be the customs and
traditions of humanity. These have to be researched; these cannot be neglected;
and out of them, there will be rich reservoir of fundamentals, which all of us can
agree on, which can be the basis of the world order of the future.
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7.3 Law and politics in the global order : The problems and pitfalls of universal
jurisdiction
I would like to begin this paper with a quote from the judgment of Judge Radha
Binod Pal who was one of the judges of one of the Ad hoc Post World Was II
Tribunals. I consider his contribution to the development of international criminal
justice and to the doctrine of universal jurisdiction extremely important. There
was a conspiracy of silence about him and his role in post World War II criminal
justice ever since those years in the second half of the 1940s. Let me quote two
sentences from his judgement, which in fact was a dissenting opinion at the post
World War II Tribunal. He said in his judgement : "It has been said that a victor
can dispense to the vanquished everything from mercy to vindictiveness. But the
one thing the victor cannot give to the vanquished is justice." He further said in
his judgement : "The name of justice shall not be allowed to be invoked only for
the prolongation of the pursuit of vindictive retaliation". A similar guiding principle
has been advanced or formulated by the leading philosopher of law of the 20th
century, namely, Hans Kelsen. He wrote just a year before these two post World
War II Tribunals, established around a year before that. In his work, Peace
through law, he said : "Only if the victors submit themselves to the same law,
which they wish to impose on the vanquished states, will the idea of international
justice be preserved." These were the statements of Justices.
The post World War II exercise of universal jurisdiction failed in regard to those
principles; and they failed very clearly and miserably. In order to avoid any
misunderstanding, the achievement of the so-called Nuremberg Principles is
definitely that is list of international crimes have been established; a definition
has been made; of course, this list - as has been complimented in the light of the
development - is a historical legacy, which has to be emphasized and which has
to be preserved. But the way the principles of universal jurisdiction has been
implemented, that is not an exemplary one and should not be followed. The
question which interests me - which I have dealt with in more detailed in a book
which just has been published now in India with the title 'Global Justice' or 'Global
Revenge' - is, has the project of universal jurisdiction been advanced, has any
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progress been made in the decades following the period after the Second World
War.
For me, as a philosophical observer, who is interested in the theory of law and
not in the politics of law, the crucial question is the following : Will the beauty of
philosophical idea, namely the universal jurisdiction that there are beauties that
exist vis-a-vis all obligations and that it is the responsibility of the entire
international community to look after the implementation of these principles ? Will
the beauty of such a philosophical idea, which is similar to that idea, or to the
notion of perpetual peace, which stands the tests of political reality, survive ? Will
this rather fragile idea survive or will it be practicable under the harsh conditions
of power-driven international politics ? That question is even more burning and
pertinent today in a unipolar international environment in which there is no
balance of power than it was in the decades until around 1989 when at least
there was a kind of a bipolar balance.
My question is how can a concept that essentially requires a supra national
organizational structure be implemented in an environment that is characterized
by the interaction among the sovereign nation states ? Has the notion of
universal jurisdiction eventually arrived too early on the international scene ? So
far as I could see and I was myself observer appointed on the basis of a binding
Security Council Resolution in one of the major international criminal trials in the
case of international terrorism, so far, I would say universal jurisdiction has
almost exclusively been implemented or rendered in the form of victors' justice.
As far as the title of my presentation is concerned, this is unfortunate and I
cannot go into details because the space at my disposal does not allow that. The
title namely, the problems or pitfalls of universal jurisdiction has partly been
inspired by Henry Kissenger also, his motivation reflecting about universal
jurisdiction was quite different from mine because he, as a former actor on the
international scene does not only have an academic interest. But let me just
clarify what I mean. I would clarify the concepts and I would not have time to go
into the details. Firstly, as far as the problems of universal jurisdiction are
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concerned, I would distinguish between two levels - one is that of international
power politics namely, and excessive emphasis on state sovereignty and national
interest. That has been the predicament of universal jurisdiction up to the present
day, not only in the framework of the new Ad hoc Security Council Tribunals and
also the framework of the Rome Statute of the ICC, about which I would like to
speak, but I have no time. The second level as far as the problems of universal
jurisdiction are concerned, is that of enforcement. There is now a supra national
permanent structure, the ICC; but the judicial authorities asking questions and it
has been stated earlier by the President of that entity; he stated the obvious, that
they have to rely on the cooperation of the nation states; otherwise, they cannot
achieve anything.
As far as the pitfalls are concerned - that was the term Henry Kishinger has
introduced - I again see two levels or two connotations. First of all, I would use
the term, 'in regard to the inconsistencies in the application of universal
jurisdiction', there is a real credibility problem because of an almost unavoidable
judicial policy of double standards and that policy of double standards which I
could give dozens of examples for, is resulting from a lack of separation of
powers in the international context. I do not blame the institutions themselves,
whether the ad hoc courts or some of the new hybrid courts or the ICC, there are
structural problems which they cannot do away with. There is a real danger that
these courts are getting entangled in the wake of power politics and that they will
be held accountable by the international public for something about which they
can do nothing about.
Of course, there is another meanign of pitfall; that is exactly the one which Henry
Kishinger meant and which motivated him to write that article in foreign affairs;
that relates to the risks involved for leaders and officials of sovereign states; it
involves particularly the negation of sovereign immunity; that is, one of the
essential aspects of the idea of universal jurisdiction. Secondly, there is another
aspect which is so often overlooked by the supporters of international criminal
justice, namely the fact that judiciary within a trans-national context, particularly
one outside the framework of the Security Council based on an international
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treaty, is somehow beyond the political and that also means, democratic control
as far as the nation states are concerned. That problem has not sufficiently been
addressed so far, as I can see because time is so short which we have been
here, and I only would like to add a few more remarks on the international
criminal court.
It is now in an operational phase at least officially since the year 2002 and we
have already been able to identify some of the real difficulties as far as the
implementation of the idea of universal jurisdiction is concerned. One of those
difficulties as far as I can see is the relation of the ICC's operation to the Security
Council of the UN. That is a body which is in charge of measures for the
preservation or restoration of international peace and security. It is not in itself a
judicial body, but anyhow it has got certain things. In the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, it got assigned to it, a certain judicial function,
namely, the one described in Articles 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute.
There is a case which demonstrated the problematic nature of the influence of
the Security Council, on the proceedings or the operation of the ICC in a very
good manner and I mean, the referral of a situation namely that of Sudan to the
ICC. Undisputedly, referral of a situation in which international crimes may have
been committed, through the prosecutor of the ICC is a sufficient basis for
exercise of jurisdiction by that court. However, in my analysis, it clearly follows
from the wording Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute that any referral of a situation
by the Security Council must be made without conditions as to categories of
people to be investigated or prosecuted by the court and for that reason, I would
say that in an inadmissible way, the Security Council has tied the referral of the
situation in Sudan, according to Article 13(b) to a deferral of investigation or
prosecution according to Article 16 because the Council in that Resolution has
stipulated or has stated that this referral does not authorize the International
Criminal Court to prosecute any persons from states that are not states parties to
the Rome Statute. The Council has no such rights to insist on what we include
such a kind of collective and preventive deferral into a decision on a referral.
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The entire drafting or the text of this Resolution, in my view, is really a
scandalous aspect of international law and the International Criminal Court
should not have accepted it. However, the Court has now taken up investigations
on that particular issue, by the way, as far as we know, as of today and I have
studied the report of the International Court. There are only two other cases that
are being handed at the moment. These are related to two other African states.
No other case is officially being investigated or no  other prosecution has been
taken up. Of course, the report of the court to the UN has stated that they are
dealing with certain other situations, but they are keeping this as a secret and
they have not revealed anything about it.
My question now is, is a permanent structure such as that of the ICC which is
based on an international, inter-governmental agreement, really strong enough
and universal enough so as to practice universal jurisdiction in a credible manner
and is the ICC strong enough and sure enough of its position to take up
investigations and prosecutions when its prosecutor considers this appropriate
because the prosecutor may also act properly. He has not done that so far. One
question that many international observers ask is, why the ICC has not yet
initiated an investigation of the situation in Iraq ? Of course, there is no territorial
jurisdiction, that is quite clear. And there is also, no jurisdiction as far as the
crime of aggression is concerned; at least, not yet because that crime has not yet
been defined. But there would be nationality jurisdiction as far as one of the
countries that have waged an unauthorized war in Iraq, namely the UK. There is
plenty of documentation of war crimes, crimes against humanity. Recently also,
all those events that have been documented in the South of Iraq would be
enough reason as far as I can see, to initiate an investigation because the judicial
authorities of the country in question, namely the UK have not taken up any
credible measures of criminal prosecution. They have been trying, on the
contrary, to shield their own people, particularly soldiers and other people who
were engaged in subversive actions in the South of Iraq. They had been trying to
shield them from prosecution and they have tried to keep everything secret.
Another issue, as far as the ICC is concerned, of course, is that of its lack of
representability. It is the figure or the number of states parties is quite impressive.
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It is around 100 as of today. So, that is the majority of member-states of the UN.
But the question is which States have ratified the Rome Statute and when we o
through the list, we see that the majority of states with strong military capabilities
or with strong armies, that have a strong influence on the internal make up of the
respective political system have not ratified the Rome Statute or have not
acceded to the Rome Statute. That means, whether the ICC writes it or not, it
lacks certain credibility because the actors or those who are politically
responsible in those states that have the strongest capacity to eventually commit
breaches of international law  and commit war crimes cannot be prosecuted
because there is lack, either of territorial or of nationality jurisdiction because of
the other factor of course, that the only other entity, the decision of which can
lead to a prosecution in the Security Council; and what will you expect of such a
body where power politics is the supreme principle, where you have the veto
power of five permanent members. That means, whenever the Security Council
makes a referral, it will have gone, so to speak, through the channels of power
politics; it would have been filtered through those channels and really, grave
cases of international crimes committed by personnel or politicians of permanent
members of the Security Council or allies of those permanent members, will of
course, never be referred to the ICC and if it here is a referral, even this, in my
view, illegal precaution will be inserted into a Security Council Resolution
according to which the ICC should have no jurisdiction over military personnel
from non-state parties.
That brings me to the final remarks of my presentation. Nonetheless, all these
problems and pitfalls which I have described, even if the ICC transcends the Ad
hoc arrangements that have so far characterized the practice of universal
jurisdiction, the basic question remains whether such a court will be in a position
to establish its authority, in this prevailing system of international law and
whether they would be able to defend an essentially super-national ideal, vis-a-
vis. the often conflicting interests of states parties. The litmus test in that regard
will be whether the ICC will take up, as I said, suo motu high profile cases where
it has jurisdiction on the basis of nationality or territoriality or whether it will wait
for referrals, clear as they are through those channels of power politics from the
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Security Council as in the case of Sudan or whether it will wait for referrals of
situations in some poor African countries that have no influence in international
affairs.
The fate of universal jurisdiction - I say this very deliberately because the court
has no credibility if it is not so-encouraged and if it is only taking up  cases in
countries where it does not have or if its policy of investigation and prosecution is
determined by a desire, not to alienate important state parties such as UK and
not to alienate prospective future state parties. So, the fate of universal
jurisdiction will finally depend on whether the ICC will be given a  fair chance of
taming international power politics by shielding judicial proceedings from state
interference whether of unilateral or multilateral nature. Much will depend on the
ratification of the Rome Statutes by major powers from all continents, but also on
the goodwill of those states that has already ratified the Statutes.
Being the embodiment of supranational ideal of global justice, universal
jurisdiction must face the realities of unipolar international order. The lack of a
global balance of power has already seriously undermined the legitimacy of the
UN organization and hampered its ability of multilateral action. This state of
affairs may be considerably more detrimental to the nascent system of
supranational law enforcement on the basis of this notion of universal jurisdiction.
I have called in another context that the direct relationship of power politics and
law has proven to be the most intricate issue of the domestic rule of law. It is
infinitely more complex and complicated when the norms of jus cogens of
international law are eventually to be enforced against the most powerful
international actors in this highly fragile framework of universal jurisdiction.
7.4 The limits of exercise of universal jurisdiction
The subject under discussion is one of the most controversial areas in
international criminal jurisprudence. In an area of law where most principles are
very heavily contested, it takes something to occupy the position of a concept,
the very existence of which is still being debated by academicians and scholars;
and I do not propose to enter into that debate; I think people have tried to do that
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but which limited success. So, what I am going to do here is what is called the
philosophers' trick and assume that universal jurisdiction can be exercised and
that I am going to try and flush out its limits by focusing on a particularly
controversial aspect of that, which is the exercise of absolute universal
jurisdiction. The absolute universal jurisdiction, the way it has been defined is
essentially the exercise of universal jurisdiction, which requires absolutely no link
with the state that exercises the jurisdiction including the presence of the
accused in the territory of the foreign state.
The entire concept has a fairly tortured history in terms of its understanding by
academics and courts, which explains my current Endeavour to try and explain
the concept and I immediately am sympathetic about it. So, being a lawyer and,
therefore, being naturally obsessed with definitions, I am going to start off with
trying to define what I think is absolutely universal jurisdiction and what it is
about.
The confusion, which surrounds the concept itself, is this. I think, it is most
heavily encapsulated in the separate opinion of the Judges Higgins, Koijma and
Burgenthal, in the famous case, where they say, at what point of time, is the
presence of the accused in the territory of the foreign state required, is it at the
time of the commission of the offence, is it at the time of the issuance of arrest
warrants, is it at the time of the trial itself, I think, this question reflects the
amount of confusion that is inherent in understanding the concept of universal
jurisdiction and the way it is exercised. Because most commentators tend to treat
absolute universal jurisdiction as a separate category of universal jurisdiction.
There is something called universal jurisdiction which is to exercise jurisdiction
over a person who has no connection with the state, over crimes which have no
connection with your state, your state has not have any particular interest in
prosecuting the person, except the fact that this is an international crime and
therefore, it mandates universal jurisdiction. Then, there is something called
universal jurisdiction which is absolute, which does not even require his presence
in your territory, when you are exercising that jurisdiction.
400
That is where the problem of confusing something like prescriptive jurisdiction in
international law and enforcement jurisdiction in international law comes in
because prescriptive jurisdiction ion international law is simply the act of making
the law of your state applicable to certain acts or events that have taken place
and enforcement jurisdiction on the other hand is something that involves you
actually making your law applicable to them in the sense of being able to make
them subject to your state's criminal process and all the wonderful things that
states do to actually bring people to justice.
When you talk about universal jurisdiction it is, by definition, prescriptive
jurisdiction, which is that you are making your state's law applicable to a person
who has not connection with it to a crime, which has not happened in your state.
There is absolutely no connection, except the nature of the crime. Then, where
you choose to condition the exercise of that jurisdiction on something like having
the presence of the accused in your territory while exercising the jurisdiction - it
becomes a procedural matter. It has got nothing to do with the act of prescription.
Whether you choose to have that as a procedural requirement, is a matter for
your domestic law. It has got nothing really to do with whether universal
jurisdiction in international law recognizes that or not.
So, to answer the question that is posed by the separate opinion, is the presence
of the accused was required at the time of commission of the offence, it would be
a case of exercising territorial jurisdiction because prescriptive jurisdiction by
nature has to be exercised, when it is asserted and not when it is exercised in the
sense of enforced. Is the presence of the accused was required at the time of
issuing an arrest warrant, that will be again a question of procedure for the
domestic law of your state, and not a question of international law. Is his
presence was required at the time of the trial, then, that would be a matter for
enforcement jurisdiction; then again, it is a matter for your state, whether it
permits trials in absentia, or not, etc. and so, you could possibly exercise
jurisdiction in the sense of have a trial in absentia.
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So, once we recognize that there is this difference and the fact that universal
jurisdiction prescriptive absolute universal jurisdiction to use his term, is
permissible in international law, then the question about whether international law
recognizes the exercise becomes little different. The separate opinion again says
that international jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to
conventional international law. But it is not quite as simple as that. The question
that needs to be answered is that assuming that we do recognize universal
jurisdiction, can the exercise of it ever be conditional upon having the accused in
your territory? Whether that has an impact on the act of prescription ? The
answer is no; it says, even if your enforcement jurisdiction is something that is
territorial in nature and requires the consent of the other state, that has no
bearing on the act of prescription which can be territorial in nature and that is
proof by the more traditional way of exercising jurisdiction, such as nationality,
personality, which have nothing to do with territoriality.
The distinction has been recognized though implicitly in several recent cases, in
fact - it is recognized by the recently managed constitutional court's decision
which came out in October on universal jurisdiction. The issue was relating to the
Guatemalan civil war; the then Guatemalan regime had committed several acts
of atrocities on people who were not connected with Spain and the question
before the Spanish Constitutional Court was, can the court exercise jurisdiction
over these people, even though they were not present on Spanish territory. The
Spanish Constitutional Court answered in the affirmative. Based upon the
reasoning that as far as universal jurisdiction is concerned, you can ask, while
exercising the jurisdiction, you can ask for extradition procedures, you can get
the accused on your territory. But all this has no bearing whether in the first
place, your law by prescription can provide for universal jurisdiction to be
exercised, regardless of any other hierarchical limits or procedural limits or
subsidiary in the prescription of universal jurisdiction.
Germany is another state which is very proactive in this matter. The German
International Court of Crimes again recognizes that the presence of the accused
or any link is by definition unnecessary for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
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So, what are the reasons? We might still say that you must require the presence
of the accused in the territory; there can be several pragmatic or political
reasons, though not legal, theoretical reasons. The dramatic instrument of that is
provided by Belgium. Belgium, initially in its law, did not require any link at all with
the states when it was exercising jurisdiction; therefore, when they went ahead
and issued arrest warrants against Sharon, issued arrest warrants against
George Sharlagusthinia. The US was a little unhappy with the fact and so, they
said that you must do something about your law, you cannot just go on issuing
arrest warrants against these people.
So, Belgium amended its law under tremendous pressure from the US. The US
was still not happy because the Generals were still being subjected to
prosecution in Belgium. So, they said that we will shift the NATO headquarter
out, if you do not do something about it. So, Belgium went ahead and it had to
amend its laws and say that now we require the link of residence on nationality.
You cannot just go ahead and exercise jurisdiction in absentia. These can be
very practical and policy reasons, I guess, for a state, in order to limit its
jurisdiction and say that we have required the presence of the accused in our
territory.
These have really nothing to do with legal, theoretical basis of exercise of
universal jurisdiction, which by definition would always be in absentia, till the
point at which it is exercised. So, if we look at legal theoretical terms, there is
nothing special, despite the controversy it invited about universal jurisdiction in
absentia. Its exercise can always be conditioned because of policy reasons,
because of political reasons on having the accused in your territory. Even those
reasons usually have to do things like gathering evidence; there are international
relations, their precautions. All these reasons can be much better addressed by
limiting the exercise of universal jurisdiction in a different way, and not having the
procedural requirements saying that the accused need to be on your territory.
The different  ways probably to provide for subsidy add to the universal
jurisdiction, which is that when you recognize a state which has a closer link with
the crime in question or the offender in question, is willing and able to exercise
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jurisdiction, you give priority to that state - again, not for any theoretical reasons
connected with universal jurisdiction per se, but for political and pragmatic
reasons that take into account the reasons that people have been opposing the
exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia.
7.5 The principle of universality : A critical Evaluation
Let me begin with a question as to the exercise of universal jurisdiction and its
effectiveness. First and foremost, it is related to the crimes of universal
jurisdiction. There are certain crimes in the international field; there are certain
crimes that are considered to be international in content. In the sense that it
varies from one state to another; it goes and it passes from one state to another
and hence, various states elements are involved and hence, they call it
'international component is involved in that'. Next comes the concept of official
capacity. National legislatures should ensure that national courts can exercise
jurisdiction over anyone suspected or accused of heinous crimes under
international law. Whatever the official capacity of the suspect or the accused at
the time of alleged crime or anytime thereafter. This is with reference as to the
indispensable nature and kind of the universal jurisdiction principle, which every
court in law should take into account.
With respect to the retrospective effect and time limit, as well as the national or
the political influence or interference, the guarantee in fair trials as also with
respect to death penalty or punishment, the cruel or inhuman degrading
punishments, national legislation should ensure that grave crimes under
international law are not punishable by death penalty or other cruel inhuman
degrading punishment. As to the issue in question, we see in reality as well as in
practice, it remains still unclear as the states or the members in international
community of nations have different stance and points of view in taking the
treatment of crime as well as criminal.
The international cooperation, as well as investigation in the prosecution, as well
as the process involved in that, the states must fully cooperate with investigations
and the prosecution by the competent authorities of other states, exercising
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universal jurisdiction over grave crimes under international law, regarding
effective training of judges, prosecutors, investigators and defence lawyers,
national legislation should ensure that judges, prosecutors, investigators receive
effective training in this particular branch of law. So, with this, the exercise of
universal jurisdiction becomes very clear that the universal jurisdiction which is
an important component in the international administration of justice, particularly
with respect of the criminal justice system, these are the various outlines, the
broad themes that have to be taken into consideration while looking at enforcing
it.
With respect to justification, what type of justification is there, is there any
justification for universal jurisdiction as such, despite the acts of genocide crimes
against humanity, war crimes and cases of torture, since the end of the Second
World War, only a handful of individuals have been brought to the fore. In this
instance, we see why such a justification is very essential and how are we going
to go about that. One of the fundamental and foremost reasons is the state's
failure to act. Some states fail to act; the reasons being that they fail to fulfill their
obligations to bring those responsible for the grave crimes in international law to
justice. Often courts in the states where crimes occurred are unable to exercise
jurisdiction because the territorial state has not yet enacted the necessary
legislation. The crimes under international law or crimes under national law, are
such that the legislation that they have is inadequate.
Again we see that even when the territorial state has fulfilled its international
obligations, to enact such a legislation, there are a number of reasons why
prosecutors and investigation judges may fail to act. The entire legal system
might have collapsed; or we see that the courts could be functioning, but they
may be incapable of bringing those responsible to justice, for reasons such as
lack of resources or inability to provide security for suspects, victims, witnesses,
etc. Again, in another context we see that the absence of ICC, the limits and its
scope as to its jurisdiction which we are discussing, the community will continue
to rely on national prosecutions since it is unlikely and perhaps undesirable. It
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would be unable to handle all the cases that there were ever would be an ICC
with exclusive and comprehensive jurisdiction over crimes in international law.
In this context, we have seen a particular quotation given by Mr. Phillippe, the
President of ICC, which says : "It must be understood that no one expects the
ICC on its own to deter all crimes; the ICC must be a part of a framework of
measures to sustain a culture of accountability, including increased domestic
prosecution of such crimes, greater use of universal jurisdiction and greater
cooperation in suppressing international crimes". Then, we look into the
justification, being that the catalyst for action by territorial states, in which a
prominent international human rights lawyer explained: after the event of the
impact of arrest in London of the former President of Chile, previously the
Chilean Judges began looking for chinks in the dictator’s legal armour. After
decades of silence, the former collaborators stepped forward to tell of his role in
covering up atrocities, revelations that have had a snowball effect. The number of
criminal cases against him jumped into dozens and hundreds, by the time the
British Home Secretary, Jack Straw sent a note to him, ostensibly on health
grounds, which was later on revealed, the myth of his immunity has been totally
shattered. The last justification that we have for the exercise of universal
jurisdiction is this. IK again quote from a US Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial
Territorial content, in 1993, he has said that lessons should be drawn from the
past and the cycle of ethnic violence that has drenched both Burundi and
Rwanda in blood must be broken. To this end, the impunity of perpetrators of the
massacres must be definitely brought to an end and preventive measures to
avoid the recurrence of such tragedies must be designed.
While looking into the deterrence aspect, we see the effectiveness of the
deterrence is likely to depend firstly on factors applicable to the repression of the
crimes such as the certainty of arrest, prosecution and conviction, the severity of
punishment and the amount of reparation. Secondly, it is on special factors
related to jurisdiction. In this context, the effectiveness of deterrence, at the
international level is so difficult to document and yet, we have not seen a proper
documentation on this particular aspect. But various scholars have said
406
something on this that this is an effective deterrence. With respect to the other
approaches to universal jurisdiction I have got into the international legal order,
from the perspective of international law. Scholar F A M Man sighted that the
threat to the international legal order as providing a rationale for universal
jurisdiction over crimes under international law. He said and I quote; the second
exception to the general rule that states do not have criminal jurisdiction over
crimes committed by aliens abroad arise from the character of certain offences.
This is such as to affect and therefore, justify, perhaps even compel every
member of the family of nations to punish the criminal over whom the jurisdiction
can in fact be exercised. These are crimes which are found in international law
which the nations of the world have agreed, usually by treaty or to suppress
which are thus recognized, not merely as acts, commonly treated as criminals
but dangerous to, and indeed attacks upon the international order as such.
From the international community values' point of view, I again quote : This
universality principle is based upon the assumption that some crimes are so
universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people.
Therefore, any nation, which as the custody of perpetrators, may punish them
according to its law applicable to such offences'. From the national perspective -
this is the last submission, which I have - I would like to quote this. This was
argued during the parliamentary debates in The Netherlands, on the Bill to
implement the Convention against torture, in support of the universal jurisdiction,
and In quote : 'a shock wave would go through the Dutch legal order, if first with
the presence in this country a foreign national recognized as a torturer by the
witnesses and victims, the courts were to declare themselves incompetent to
hear in this case.' The last but not least, in conclusion, I would say that certain
crimes are invariably considered or accepted and regarded in international law as
to threaten the very international peace and security; indeed, the International
Law Commission has consistently treated the crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes, as crimes which threaten international peace and
security. The argument has its greatest force when the crimes are committed on
a large scale or were they lead to cross-border refugees laws and conflicts,
which may draw in other states'.
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7.6 Jurisdictional powers of International Criminal Tribunals : From Nuremberg
to Rome and beyond
I have identified four issues for the purpose of studying the problem at hand,
which are controversial. The first issue relates to temporal powers of the
International Criminal Tribunals. The second is the territorial jurisdiction. The third
is the relationship between international criminal tribunals and domestic courts.
The fourth is the relationship between the Security Council and the International
Criminal Tribunals. Let me begin by looking at the first issue, that is 'temporal
powers of tribunals'. All of us know that there is the principle of 'nullum crimen
sine lege'. You cannot have criminal laws ex post facto. This was one of the
major criticisms that arose in the context of Nuremberg. In Nuremberg this
principle seems to have been violated because the Nazis were tried for crimes,
which were not really defined as such, before the Charter of London. The
justification for this was basically given on three grounds : one, it was said that
this rule was not a rule of law, it is rule of equity or justice which really cannot be
enforced and so, you cannot say that this principle had been violated. The
second thing that was said was that as per the Kellog Bri- and Pact of 1928,
Japan and Germany had agreed that all disputes between them and other
countries will be resolved by peaceful methods and they will not resort to war and
hence, since they resorted to war now, they have been in violation of that and
also that they have signed a number of conventions between 1928 on a variety of
those issues, and hence, they were bound by them - though there were no penal
provisions in any of these conventions that they had signed, yet the fact that it
was defined that you cannot do something like this, it was taken as a justification
to punish the offenders. The third argument was that of the natural law. You
cannot say that something does not exist. God has given all these things earlier.
So, even before the Ten Commandments came about, 1600 years before that,
there had been situations where God had punished the offenders of the laws that
he had laid down and hence, you can really see that there is no argument
against doing something like this. If you do not punish people who have violated
the rights of so many people during these wars, it will really be unfair and go
against the natural law. The arguments against this argument are two. One was,
408
as Germans said, that the Charter of London is what laid  down the things as
crimes and hence you could not possibly prosecute people for things that were
not defined as crimes. The second is that they tried to counter the fact that
various treaties that had been signed, saying  the circumstances are such that
you cannot really require the states to follow these principles because they are
now in the state of war. Because of these two principles, you cannot really
exercise jurisdiction over these states.
Coming to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, they
were not really such a problem because of the situation there- because
Yugoslavia and Rwanda had signed most human rights conventions and also
had incorporated them into the national laws, because of which there was not
really a problem with respect to prosecution. But again, there are three
arguments that come up here. The first was that this is an internal armed conflict
and not an international conflict and so, can you really use chapter VII of the UN
Charter and can you set up an international tribunal ? That was the argument.
That was rebutted by saying that this is not really an international conflict; there
are shades of international armed conflict in this because of which the Security
Council can act. The second argument was the same - what I said in the context
of Nuremberg - that is, no penal element in any of the treaties that have been
signed by the two nations is there.
In the context of the ICTY, What it did was that the Statute refers to domestic
laws which I spoke about earlier and hence that problem is also taken care of.
The third but not really a tenable argument is the fact that tribunals are set up
after the offences were committed, which is not tenable and you cannot say that
the court should exist at that time. That again cannot be insisted upon really.
In the context of the ICC, it becomes quite clear because the Rome Statute says
that only after 1 July 2002, whatever crimes are committed, can be tried by the
ICC. But there are a couple of problems there. Firstly, there is a situation where a
state can become a signatory to the Statute and ratify  it. If that is done, look at
Articles 22 and 24, which reiterates this principle of temporal jurisdiction. There is
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a possibility that if the state ratifies the Statute, then there is a period of time, in
which you cannot prosecute situations and this can be effectively used to shield
people who have committed crimes. That is one problem. The second is a
situation of a non-party state, accepting jurisdiction with respect to an individual,
also from other non-party states, for crimes committed within its territories. So,
that could be used for political motives where you accept the jurisdiction just for
prosecuting a person.
In the context of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, it seems that victor's justice is being
re-visited because of the fact that it says that temporal jurisdiction extends from
17 July 1968, when the B'aath Prerty came to power, till 1 may 2003, when UN
took effective control; so, it means prosecuting Saddam Hussein and the rest of
the people for things that were not crimes at that point of time.
Coming now to the issue of territorial jurisdiction, there is one interesting principle
that arises in this context is that of delegated territorial jurisdiction. The argument
that every state has a territorial jurisdiction which is recognized, what has been
done in the Rome Statute, when the referral is made is that this territorial
jurisdiction is delegated to the ICC. You can counter this by saying that the entire
argument for territorial jurisdiction is that has taken place there.
If you are going to delegate this really, it does not make sense. The other issue
is, is there any other state practice in this regard. If you look at European
Convention on Transfer of Criminal Proceedings that is one place where you find
something like this happening, but there again, you cannot really bind states; you
cannot bind nations or states which have not consented to their nationals being
tried before any other tribunal. This is exactly what is happening here because
even if a person from a non-party state is tried before the ICC and if the state
does not consent, it does not make really any difference. So, delegated territorial
jurisdiction cannot really be used as an argument.
In the context of the next issue, which is relationship between domestic courts
and international tribunals, we see a new system which has been brought about
within the Rome Statute which is of complementarily. The doctrine of
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complementarity says that the ICC will not prosecute an offence if it is ably tried
by domestic courts and hence, in such a situation, its primacy is given to
domestic courts over international tribunals. In the ICTY and ICTR, the primacy
was given to the tribunal itself. The doctrine of complementarity seeks to say that
the ICC is a safety net which is trying to stop any sort of impunity. In this context,
there are three issues. Firstly we have complementarity and truth commissions.
We have situations of truth commissions coming up. Does that really mean that
states have effectively prosecuted these people and shielding the offenders or
there is no punishment as such, if the truth commission happens to give award,
what will happen, in the context of South Africa or in the context of what
happened in Sierra Leone when amnesty provisions were utilized. That is one
situation that you might have to look at.
There second is something that India rests on - complementarity in the context of
Article 13 (b). One of India's reasons for not really signing the Rome Statute
seems to have been that if there are situations, because of political reasons, the
ICC, might take up situations of alleged human rights violations in India. That is
something that can be done now because if you use Article 13(b) and the
Security Council does happen to refer any such situation to the ICC, the doctrine
lf complementarity does not apply to Article 13(b), and hence, there is no
question of domestic court really being able to say that, we have effectively
prosecuted and you cannot take over this issue.
Lastly, I will deal with the powers of the Security Council in International Criminal
Tribunals. The argument that first comes up is chapter VII? Chapter VII does not
talk about setting up of tribunals and so, can you really set up tribunals under
Chapter VII ? The referrals under Rome Statute where the Security Council can
refer, seem to be curtailed to a certain extent, which limits the powers of Security
Council because of the fact that even if it is referral, the court can even go into
the issue of whether there is actually a situation which has arisen, so, it limits that
to a certain extent. That has already been just discussed. The power of referral
really takes all this away because what are you doing with the power of referral ?
You are recognizing and seem to indicate the ICC is subordinate to the UN
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Security Council and the UN Security Council can ask the ICC to stop
proceedings, which in fact, has been done earlier in the context of US soldiers.
So, in this context, we can see that the Security Council is still playing a
controversial role with respect to its relationship with the International Criminal
Tribunals.
7.7 The Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction
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CHAPTER 8
EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
When Sulaiman Al-Adsani traveled from the United Kingdom to Kuwait to repel
Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1991, he never dreamed he would depart with
bruises and burns inflicted by the very government he had sought to defend.
According to Al-Adsani,488 his troubles began when he was accused of releasing
sexual videotapes of Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah Al-Saud Al- Sabah, a relative of the
emir of Kuwait, into general circulation. After the first Gulf war, with the aid of
government troops, the sheikh exacted his revenge by breaking into Al-Adsani’s
house, beating him, and transporting him to a Kuwaiti state prison, where his
beatings continued for days. Al-Adsani was subsequently taken at gunpoint in a
government car to the palace of the emir’s brother, where his ordeal intensified.
According to Al-Adsani, his head was repeatedly submerged in a swimming pool
filled with corpses and his body was badly burned when he was forced into a
small room where the sheikh set fire to gasoline-soaked mattresses.
Following his return to the United Kingdom, Al-Adsani brought suit against the
government of Kuwait in England’s High Court seeking damages for the physical
and psychological injury that had resulted from his alleged ordeal in Kuwait.489
The court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Kuwait was
entitled to foreign state immunity under the UK State Immunity Act, 1978.490 Al-
Adsani then appealed the decision to the English Court of Appeal but again lost
on grounds of state immunity.491
After Al-Adsani was refused leave to appeal by the English House of Lords, he
filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), arguing
488 The summary of ill-treatment that follows derives from Al-Adsani’s allegations in his case before the
European Court of Human Rights. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, paras 9–13 (Nov.
21, 2001), available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/judgments.htm> [hereinafter ECHR Judgment]. The
accuracy of these allegations has not been proven in a court of law.
489 Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 103 ILR 420 (Q.B. 1995).
490 State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33 (UK), reprinted in 17 ILM 1123 (1978).
491 Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 107 ILR 536 (C.A. 1996).
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principally that the United Kingdom had failed to protect his right not to be
tortured and had denied him access to legal process.492 Al-Adsani again lost, but
he convinced many of the Court’s judges to advocate an increasingly popular
legal theory, the “normative hierarchy theory,” aimed at challenging  seemingly
unjust outcomes such as these. Under the normative hierarchy theory, a state’s
jurisdictional immunity is abrogated when the state violates human rights
protections that are considered peremptory international law norms, known as jus
cogens.493 The theory postulates that because state immunity is not jus cogens,
it ranks lower in the hierarchy of international law norms, and therefore can be
overcome when a jus cogens norm is at stake. The normative hierarchy theory
thus seeks to remove one of the most formidable obstacles in the path of human
rights victims seeking legal redress.494
The recent emergence of the normative hierarchy theory on the international law
scene has sparked significant controversy among jurists and publicists. The
ECHR’s treatment of the issue in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom exemplifies the
492 The claimant alleged, inter alia, a violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 222. ECHR Judgment,
supra note 1, para. 3.
493 “Jus cogens is a norm thought to be so fundamental that it even invalidates rules drawn from treaty or
custom. Usually, a jus cogens norm presupposes an international public order sufficiently potent to control
states that might otherwise establish contrary rules on a consensual basis.” MARK W. JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 62–63 (4th ed. 2003); see also AKEHURST’S
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 57–58 (Peter Malanczuk ed., 7th rev. ed.
1997); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 514–17 (5th ed. 1998)
[hereinafter BROWNLIE (5th)]; 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 512–13 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). Jus cogens is a concept with a long lineage, whose most significant
modern manifestation is Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. Article 53 establishes the rule that “[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.” A “peremptory norm,” also
known as jus cogens, is defined as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.” See CHRISTOS L. ROZAKIS, THE
CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES (1976); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 203 (2d ed. 1984); JERZY SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS
AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1974); 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984).
494 While examples of the stymying effect of foreign state immunity on human rights claims abound, a
prototypical case is found in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), in which the plaintiff, who
alleged that he had been tortured by Saudi government officers, was barred from suing Saudi Arabia in
U.S. court on account of the government’s foreign sovereign status. See also Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, No. 00–CV–201372 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. May 1, 2002) (on file with author) (claims of torture barred by
Canadian State Immunity Act).
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spirited debate.495 While recognizing that the prohibition of torture possesses a
“special character” in international law, the ECHR rejected the view that violation
of such a norm compels denial of state immunity in civil suits.496 However, the
verdict evoked opposing commentary on the normative hierarchy theory from
various ECHR judges.497 On the one side, Judges Matti Pellonpää and Nicolas
Bratza concurred with the decision and renounced the theory on practical
grounds. They reasoned that if the theory were accepted as to jurisdictional
immunities, it would also, by logical extension, have to be accepted as to the
execution of judgments against foreign state defendants, since the laws
regarding execution, like state immunity law, are arguably not jus cogens
either.498 Consequently, acceptance of the normative hierarchy theory might lead
to execution against a wide range of state property, from bank accounts used for
public purposes to real estate and housing for cultural institutes, threatening
“orderly international cooperation” between states.499
On the other side, Judges Christos Rozakis, Lucius Caflisch, Luzius Wildhaber,
Jean-Paul Costa, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, and Nina Vajie dissented and
advocated resolution of the case on the basis of the normative hierarchy theory.
They wrote: “The acceptance… of the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of
torture entails that a State allegedly violating it cannot invoke hierarchically lower
rules (in this case, those on State immunity) to avoid the consequences of the
illegality of its actions.”500 Thus, the minority concluded that Kuwait could not
“hide behind the rules on State immunity to avoid proceedings for a serious claim
of torture made before a foreign jurisdiction.”501
495 For a detailed summary of the decision, see Marius Emberland, Case Report: McElhinney v. Ireland, Al-
Adsani v. United Kingdom, Fogarty v. United Kingdom, in 96 AJIL 699 (2002).
496 ECHR Judgment, supra note 1, para. 61.
497 The Grand Chamber presiding over the proceedings was composed of seventeen judges.
498 ECHR Judgment, supra note 1, Concurring Opinion of Judges Pellonpää and Bratza.
499 Id.
500 Id., Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Caflisch, Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto, and Vajie
501 Id.
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The difference of opinion in the Al-Adsani case foreshadows the coming
theoretical clash regarding the most appropriate and effective means of enforcing
human rights law against foreign states in national proceedings. Since its
inception just over a decade ago, the normative hierarchy theory has amassed
notable support among scholars and jurists alike. Despite its growing popularity,
however, the theory has never been comprehensively tested.502 To attempt to fill
this void, this article offers a critical assessment of the normative hierarchy theory
and concludes that the theory is unpersuasive because it rests on false
assumptions regarding the doctrine of foreign state immunity.
The doctrine of foreign state immunity, like most legal doctrines, has evolved and
changed over the last centuries, progressing through several distinct periods.503
The first period, covering the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has been
called the period of absolute immunity, because foreign states are said to have
enjoyed complete immunity from domestic legal proceedings.504 The second
502 There is limited criticism of the theory. In Al-Adsani, Judges Pellonpaa and Bratza focused primarily on
its potentially damaging impact on international relations, see text at note 12 supra. In Prefecture of Voiotia
v. Federal Republic of Germany, a minority on the Hellenic Supreme Court criticized the theory because of
its unproven status in international law. Prefecture of Voiotia v. Fed. Republic of Germany, No. 11/2000
(Areios Pagos [Hellenic Sup. Ct.] May 4, 2000) [hereinafter Greek Judgment II]; see text at notes 216–23
infra. In addition, one commentator pointed out that the theory is inherently contradictory in that it
presupposes an implied waiver of immunity in cases in which a foreign state would never be likely to
consent explicitly to waive immunity. JÜRGEN BRÖHMER, STATE IMMUNITY AND THE
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 191 (1997); see also HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE
IMMUNITY 523–25 (2002) (raising interesting general questions about the relationship between jus
cogens and state immunity). Unfortunately, the International Law Commission’s work on codifying the law
of foreign state immunity has not addressed the theory in detail. See Report of the Working Group on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.576, annex, at 58 (1999)
(noting that the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of states and their property do not address the
effect of a jus cogens violation).
503 For a general overview of the development of the doctrine, see GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE
IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 9–62 (1984); THEODORE R. GIUTTARI,
THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 26–102 (1970); JOSEPH M. SWEENEY,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (Policy Research Study, U.S. Dep’t of
State, 1963).
504 Indeed, in the nineteenth century national courts applied the rule of immunity rather broadly. See The
Parlement Belge, [1880] 5 P.D. 197, 217 (finding that “each and every one [state] declines to exercise by
means of any of its courts, any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign”); Spanish
Gov’t v. Lambège
et Pujol, Cass., D. 1849, I, 5, 9 (finding that “a government cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of
another against its will, and that the right of jurisdiction of one government over litigation arising from its
own acts is a right inherent to its sovereignty that another government cannot seize without impairing their
mutual relations”); see also BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, & CURTIS A. BRADLEY,
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period emerged during the early twentieth century, when Western nations
adopted a restrictive approach to immunity in response to the increased
participation of state governments in international trade.505 This period was
marked by the development of the theoretical distinction between acta jure
imperii, state conduct of a public or governmental nature for which immunity was
granted, and acta jure gestionis, state conduct of a commercial or private nature
for which it was not.506 This distinction rested on the growing notion that the
exercise of jurisdiction over acta jure gestionis did not affront a state’s
sovereignty or dignity. Since applying the public/private distinction proved difficult
for many courts,507 some states, particularly the common-law countries,
developed a functional variation on the restrictive approach in the 1970s and
1980s, replacing that hazy distinction with national immunity legislation.508
One of the more vexing topics in international law, state immunity is fraught with
complexity and uncertainty, which the normative hierarchy theory does not
adequately address. The theory operates conceptually on the international law
level, as one norm of international law, jus cogens, trumps another, state
immunity, because of its superior status. The theory thus assumes that state
immunity in cases of human rights violations is an entitlement rooted in
international law, by virtue of either a fundamental state right or customary
international law. However, both assumptions are false. State immunity is not an
absolute state right under the international legal order. Rather, as a fundamental
INTERNATIONAL LAW 547 (4th ed. 2003); Lakshman Marasinghe, The Modern Law of Sovereign
Immunity, 54 MOD. L. REV. 664, 668–78 (1991).
505 See RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 140–41 (1964); Peter D. Trooboff, Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus on
Principles, 200 RECUEIL DES COURS 235, 266–67 (1986 V).
506 Establishing the line between immune and nonimmune state conduct has proven to be a vexing task. See
Rosalyn Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 265,267–70 (1982). See generally James Crawford, International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing
Immune Transactions, 1983 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 75.
507 See, e.g., Ibrandtsen Tankers v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200 (2d Cir. 1971) (“The proposed
distinction between acts which are jure imperii (which are to be afforded immunity) and those which are
jure gestionis (which are not), has never been adequately defined, and in fact has been viewed as
unworkable by many commentators.”).
508 For example, the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602–1611
(2000), and the UK State Immunity Act, 1978, supra note 3, were products of this movement.
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matter, state immunity operates as an exception to the principle of adjudicatory
jurisdiction.509 Moreover, while the practice of granting immunity to foreign states
has given rise to a customary international law of state immunity, this body of law
does not protect state conduct that amounts to a human rights violation. These
realities yield the important conclusion—one that the normative hierarchy theory
ignores—that, with respect to human rights violations, the forum state, not the
foreign state defendant, enjoys ultimate authority, by operation of its domestic
legal system, to modify a foreign state’s privileges of immunity.510
This article, while critiquing the normative hierarchy theory, establishes a solid
theoretical foundation on which human rights litigation can proceed. The theory
of restrictive immunity, adopted by most states, draws the line between immune
and no immune state conduct roughly in accordance with the public
(imperii)/private (gestionis) distinction. However, the original aim of state
immunity law was to enhance, not jeopardize, relations between states. This
article contends that international law requires state immunity only as to state
activity that collectively benefits the community of nations. Thus, where state
conduct is clearly detrimental to interstate relations but still protected by domestic
state immunity laws, the restrictive approach is inconsistent with the strictures of
international law and should be amended. The most obvious example of this kind
is where state immunity bars claims against a foreign state brought in a forum
state for the murder, torture, or victimization of citizens of the forum state. In such
circumstances, foreign states are afforded immunity protections solely as a
509 Courts have made this assertion before, but with insufficient explanation. See, e.g., Verlinden v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
510 It must be emphasized that this conclusion is possible to reach because the field of foreign state
immunity has not been occupied completely by international law. See “The Status of State Immunity in
Relation to International Law” infra. In other areas of immunity law, however, this may not be the case.
For example, the field of diplomatic and consular immunities is clearly occupied primarily by the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, confirming its
international law character. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 UST 3227, 500
UNTS 95; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261. In the
recent decision in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held, after
assessing various international agreements, that incumbent heads of state also enjoy immunity as a matter
of customary international law. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Int’l Ct.
Justice, Feb. 14, 2002), 41 ILM 536 (2002) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant], available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm>. But see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, id. at 622
(disagreeing with the Court’s conclusion because there is neither treaty law nor customary international law
directly on point).
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matter of domestic law and their entitlement to immunity is revocable on the
basis of the forum state’s right to exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction over the
dispute.
Some have observed that the doctrine of foreign state immunity is poised on the
cusp of another period of doctrinal development-one in which a further restriction
of immunity will accrue in favor of human rights norms.511 Such an advancement
is welcome. However, it should proceed not on the basis of the normative
hierarchy theory, which fails to reflect the true nature and operation of the
doctrine of foreign state immunity, but, rather, on the basis of a theory of
collective benefit in state relations.
The normative hierarchy theory proceeds on the assumption that state immunity
in cases of human rights violations is an entitlement of states that derives from
international law.512 Indeed, the centerpiece of the theory is a proposed hierarchy
of international legal norms, which resolves the conflict between jus cogens and
state immunity in favor of the former. This hierarchy, quite clearly, operates on a
purely international level under the theory that the core interests of the
community of states, enshrined in jus cogens, outweigh the individual interests
of any one state, i.e., immunity from foreign domestic proceedings. As at present
there is no universally accepted multilateral treaty to govern state immunity
law,513 the normative hierarchy theory must rest on the assumption that state
immunity is either the product of a fundamental principle of international law—a
principle that arises from the very structure
511 See Richard Garnett, The Defence of State Immunity for Acts of Torture, 1997 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L.
97, 123–24; Hari M. Osafsky, 11 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 35 (1998); Georg Ress, The Changing Relationship
Between State Immunity and Human Rights, in THE BIRTH OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
STUDIES IN HONOUR OF CARL AAGE NØRGAARD 175 (Michele de Salvia & Mark E. Villiger eds.,
1998). But see ECHR Judgment, supra note 1, para. 66 (“[W]hile noting the growing recognition of the
overriding importance of the prohibition of torture, it [is not] established that there is yet acceptance in
international law of the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for
damages for alleged torture committed outside the forum State.”).
512 This aspect of the normative hierarchy theory is described in more detail in the text at notes 176–224
infra.
513 The only such treaty is the European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, Europ. TS No. 74,
11 ILM 470 (1972) (entered into force June 11, 1976) [hereinafter European Convention], which, as of
October 7, 2003, had only eight signatories.
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of the international legal order—or a rule of customary international law.514
8.1 State Immunity and Fundamental Principles of International Law
The original conflict of principles. The doctrine of foreign state immunity was born
out of tension between two important international law norms—sovereign
equality515 and exclusive territorial jurisdiction.516 The United States Supreme
Court’s decision in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,517 widely regarded as
the first definitive statement of the doctrine of foreign state immunity, presents
the classic example of this theoretical conflict.518 In 1812, while sailing off the
514 As the law of state immunity is largely uncodified on the international level, this article dwells primarily
in the area of the second established source of international law listed in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute,
international custom. Within that area, this article draws the same distinction that Professor Lauterpacht has
drawn between the law of state immunity as it relates to fundamental principles of international law and to
international custom. See generally Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of
Foreign States, 1951 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 220. The first concept relates to a principle of international lawthat arises from the very structure of the international legal order, in this case the principle of sovereign
equality. The second concept concerns a rule of international law whose creation is the product of
prevailing international custom among states.
515 Applying the test proposed by Professor Schwarzenberger, the principle of sovereign equality is
undoubtedly a fundamental principle of international law. He suggests that principles of international law
may be considered fundamental if they meet the following criteria:
(1) They must be exceptionally significant for international law; (2) they must stand out from
others by covering a relatively wide range of issues and fall without artificiality under one and the
same heading; (3) they must either form an essential part of any known system of international
law or be so characteristic of existing international law that if they were ignored there would be a
danger of losing sight of a characteristic feature of contemporary international law.
GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E. D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (6 th
ed. 1976). Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter enshrines the principle of sovereign equality,
reflecting its fundamental character. Many believe that the principle prevents one sovereign from
exercising jurisdiction over another. Thus, the sovereign equality of states is often cited as the boilerplate
explanation for the doctrine of foreign state immunity. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 5 Introductory Note, at 390–91 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
516 For a general discussion of the principle of territorial jurisdiction, see JANIS, supra note 6, at 318–20.
The principle of exclusive territorial jurisdiction is commonly included under the rubric of “adjudicatory
jurisdiction.” See RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, §421(2)(a) (jurisdiction to adjudicate exists in cases in
which “the person or thing is present in the territory of the state, other than transitorily”).
517 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
518 However, the doctrine pre-dates The Schooner Exchange, having originated in the period of monarchal
rule in Europe. As Professor Giuttari explains:
Historically, the roots of sovereign immunity have been traced to the time-honored personal
inviolability of sovereigns and their ambassadors when present or traveling in foreign countries.
Considerations of concern and respect for the inviolable character and dignity of sovereigns had
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American coast, a commercial schooner, the Exchange, owned by two citizens of
Maryland, was seized by the French navy. By general order of the emperor
Napoleon Bonaparte, the French navy converted the schooner into a ship of
war.519 When bad weather forced the Exchange into the port of Philadelphia, the
original owners brought an in rem libel action against the ship for recovery of
their property. The French government resisted the action, arguing that, as a ship
of war, the Exchange was an arm of the emperor and was thus entitled to the
same immunity privileges as the emperor himself.520
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall identified the
theoretical dilemma at issue. On the one hand, he observed, international law
dictated that “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute.”521 According to this long-established principle, the
moment the Exchange entered U.S. territorial waters off the eastern seaboard, it
became subject exclusively to the national authority of the U.S. government, an
authority that encompassed the U.S. district court’s initiation of adverse legal
proceedings against it.522 On the other hand, Justice Marshall took notice of
another fundamental principle of international law: that the world is composed of
distinct nations, each endowed with “equal rights and equal independence.”523
This principle of sovereign equality, he believed, discouraged one sovereign from
their initial and major impact during the transition from the feudal era to the modern age when
most states were ruled by kings and princes who “in a very real sense, personified the State.” In
[such] a setting…., it was not difficult to understand the tendency to interpret the exercise of
authority or jurisdiction on the part of one sovereign over another as indicative of hostility or a
condition of inferiority that was incompatible with their dignity and independence.
GIUTTARI, supra note 16, at 7; see also CHARLES LEWIS, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
11 (1980).
519 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 122.
520 Id. at 126–27.
521 Id. at 136
522 Justice Marshall made perfectly clear that “[t]he jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is
possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign power.” Id. This concept exists today in international
law and is commonly referred to as “adjudicatory jurisdiction.” See RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, §421.
The concept also exists as a subset of “prescriptive jurisdiction.”
523 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136.
421
standing in judgment of another, coequal sovereign’s conduct.524 If the Exchange
had been converted, as the French government argued, into an arm of the
French emperor (and was thus a direct extension of his sovereignty), then the
United States, as France’s equal under international law, would be remiss in
adjudging the ship’s ownership through its courts. International law thus
appeared simultaneously to grant the United States authority to adjudicate a
dispute over property present within its territory and to prohibit the exercise of
this jurisdiction because that property now purportedly belonged to a foreign
government.525
The conflict of principles in The Schooner Exchange resulted directly from what
Sompong Sucharitkul has described as “a concurrence of jurisdictions… over the
same location or dimension.”526 Normally, the principles of territorial jurisdiction
and sovereign equality work individually-and often collectively-to promote order
and fairness in the international legal system. The former serves to delineate
each state’s authority to govern a distinct geographical area of the world,527 while
the latter guarantees to all states, regardless of size, power, or wealth, equal
capacity for rights under international law.528 In The Schooner Exchange,
however, these principles were at odds because two nations, the United States
and France, asserted their sovereign “jurisdiction,” or authority, to settle the
dispute over the ship’s ownership. The United States claimed the right to
exercise jurisdiction because of the physical presence of the schooner in U.S.
524 Id. at 136–37.
525 In the end, Justice Marshall found that U.S. courts were barred from inquiring into the validity of title to
the Exchange because the schooner was “a national armed vessel, commissioned by, and in the service of
the emperor of France.” Id. at 146.
526 Sompong Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States Before National Authorities, 149 RECUEIL DES
COURS 87, 117 (1976 I). Sucharitkul further describes such a concurrence as follows: “Contact between
two States may result in a clash between two fundamental principles of international law, namely the
principle of territoriality or territorial sovereignty, and the principle of the State or national sovereignty.”
Id.; see also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
216–17, 233–34 (3d ed. 2003).
527 “International law is based on the concept of the state. The state in its turn lies upon the foundation of
sovereignty…” MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 331 (4th ed. 1997). See generally
Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal
Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373 (1995).528 See generally EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1920).
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territory.529 France, in stark contrast, argued that the conversion of the schooner
fell within the ambit of the emperor’s power and thus, by virtue of its sovereign
character, could not be reviewed in U.S. courts.530
This clash of authority-and, in turn, that of the associated international law
principles-is not confined to facts, such as those in The Schooner Exchange, that
involve the straightforward transfer of sovereign property, such as a ship of war,
to the territorial jurisdiction of another state.531 Rather, the conflict arises any time
a forum state seeks legitimately to exercise its right of jurisdiction under
international law over a foreign state defendant, regardless of the physical
location of the foreign state’s representatives.532 Thus, the most relevant
example for this study arises when a plaintiff sues a foreign state in domestic
proceedings for alleged human rights abuses that occurred outside the forum
state.533 Here, too, the authority of the forum state to adjudicate the dispute,
hereinafter referred to as “adjudicatory jurisdiction,” is at loggerheads with the
principle of sovereign equality.534 This disparity is usefully borne in mind because
529 The significance of the territorial connection between the defendant and U.S. territory was later
crystallized in the well-known case Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
530 “[T]he rights of a foreign sovereign cannot be submitted to a judicial tribunal. He is supposed to be out
of the country, although he may happen to be within it.” The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 132
(arguments of U.S. Attorney General Pinkney in favor of dismissing the case on the basis of France’s
sovereign immunity).
531 The concept that Justice Marshall cited as “territorial jurisdiction” refers to “authority over a
geographically defined portion of the surface of the earth and the space above and below the ground which
a sovereign claims as his territory, together with all persons and things therein.” SCHWARZENBERGER
& BROWN, supra note 28, at 74 (footnote omitted). This type of authority reflects only one aspect of the
concept of jurisdiction, which in other manifestations may include the power to project state authority
extraterritorially.
532 Under modern principles of international law, a state’s right of jurisdiction includes “particular aspects
of the general legal competence of states… [such as] judicial, legislative, and administrative competence.”
BROWNLIE (5th), supra note 6, at 301.
533 See, e.g., Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 507 U.S. 349 (1993); Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
534 In cases of human rights abuses by foreign states, “adjudicatory jurisdiction” may rest on other
principles of jurisdiction under public international law besides territoriality, including nationality, passive
personality, the protective principle, and universality. For a discussion of the traditional bases of
jurisdiction under public international law, see S.S. Lotus (Fr./Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10
[hereinafter Lotus case]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, §454; Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
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it means that the original clash of principles, as identified in The Schooner
Exchange, and, more important, its resolution, as proposed by Justice Marshall
and discussed below, provide a workable theoretical framework for resolving a
wide range of current problems of state immunity. Competing rationales and their
implications for state immunity. The doctrine of foreign state immunity emerged
from the theoretical conflict described above. Two leading rationales explain the
legal source of the doctrine.535 One asserts that state immunity is a fundamental
state right by virtue of the principle of sovereign equality. The other views state
immunity as evolving from an exception to the principle of state jurisdiction, i.e.,
when the forum state suspends its right of adjudicatory jurisdiction as a practical
courtesy to facilitate interstate relations. Not surprisingly, these two rationales-
like the principles of international law that they emphasize-find themselves in
deep conflict. Moreover, each gives rise to vastly different implications for the
nature and operation of the doctrine of foreign state immunity.536 The traditional
starting point for the view that foreign state immunity is a fundamental state right
is the maxim par in parem non habet imperium, meaning literally “An equal has
with Respect to Crime, 29 AJIL Supp. 439 (1935). While domestic state immunity laws are typically
predicated on civil jurisdiction, traditional bases of criminal jurisdiction under public international law are
most suitable where human rights violations are concerned. As Professor Bowett has argued, “where the
civil jurisdiction of the State is an instrument of State policy, used as a means of exercising control over
activities or resources in the interests of the State, then in principle such jurisdiction ought to be subject to
the same governing rules of [public] international law.” D.W. Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of
Authority over Activities and Resources, 1982 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 4.
Within the legal systems of certain countries, domestic law limitations may limit the reach of a court’s
jurisdiction under international law. In U.S. jurisprudence, it is debatable whether the Constitution’s Fifth
Amendment requires that there be “minimum contacts” between the foreign state defendant and the United
States, a precondition that would greatly limit U.S. courts’ ability to adjudicate human rights disputes. See
Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 313–15 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1148 (1982) (applying a separate constitutional due process analysis in the case of a suit against a
foreign state); see also David J. Bederman, Dead Man’s Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities
in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 255, 273–76 (1995). However, some have
argued that the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections should not benefit foreign states. Lee M.
Caplan, The Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States: The 1996 Amendment to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 369 (2001); Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffery
Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing State Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L.J. 675 (1999).
535 For a general discussion of the various rationales, see BROHMER, supra note 15, at 9; HELMUT
DAMIAN, STAATENIMMUNITÄTUND GERICHTSZWANG 12 (1985); GIUTTARI, supra note 16, at
5–7; Sucharitkul, supra note 39, at 117–20.
536 While it is not terribly difficult to find a discussion of the competing rationales for the doctrine of
foreign state immunity in the literature, an analysis of the significance of these rationales for the application
of the doctrine is virtually absent.
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no power over an equal.”537 Theodore Giuttari aptly explains the maxim’s
historical origins in the classic period of international law:
In this period, the state was generally conceived of as a juristic
entity having a distinctive personality and entitled to specific
fundamental rights, such as the rights of absolute sovereignty,
complete and exclusive territorial jurisdiction, absolute
independence and legal equality within the family of nations.
Consequently, it appeared as a logical deduction from such
attributes to conclude that as all sovereign states were equal in law,
no single state should be subjected to the jurisdiction of another
state.538
Thus, according to the “fundamental right” rationale, par in parem non habet
imperium is simply a specific application of the general principle of sovereign
equality. Despite the fact that modern international law has largely discarded the
classic notion of inherent state rights, the “fundamental right” rationale has
exhibited surprising resiliency. The Italian Corte di cassazione has opined, for
example, that state immunity is “based on the customary principle par in parem
non habet jurisdictionem, that has received universal acceptance.” 539 The Polish
Supreme Court found that “the basis of the immunity of foreign States is the
democratic principle of their equality, whatever their size and power, which
results in excluding the jurisdiction of one State over another (par in parem non
habet judicium).”540 Scholars, too, have embraced this rationale. An early edition
of Oppenheim’s International Law, for example, described the foundations of
537 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1673 (7th ed. 1999). Professor Badr has traced the origins of the
maxim back to the fourteenth-century Italian jurist, Bartolus, who wrote “Non enim una civitas potest
facere legem super alteram, quia par in parem non habet imperium.” BADR, supra note 16, at 89 (quoting
BARTOLUS, TRACTATUS REPRESSALIUM, Questio I/3, para. 10 (1354)).
538 GIUTTARI, supra note 16, at 5.
539 Special Representative of the Vatican v. Pieciukiewicz, Cass., jt. sess., 5 July 1982, n.4005, 1983
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E ROCESSUALE 379, translated in 78 ILR
120, 121, 1985 ITAL. Y.B. INT’L L. 179.
540 S. v. Brit. Treasury, PA STWO I PRAWO, NO. 4, 1949, at 119 (Pol. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 1948),
translated in 24 ILR 223, 224–25
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state immunity as a “consequence of State equality,” with reference to the maxim
par in parem non habet imperium.541
In recent history, Communist publicists have been among the strongest
supporters of the “fundamental right” rationale, which they found an attractive
response to the emergent theory of restrictive state immunity, a theory that
affords no immunity for acts of a commercial or private nature.542 The restrictive
view was antithetical to the prevailing socialist philosophy, which held that politics
and trade were inseparable aspects of the socialist state; in essence, a socialist
state acted qua state in all its dealings.543 M. M. Boguslavskij, the Russian
scholar, thus rejected the notion that a state could surrender its sovereignty, and
with it its right of state immunity, simply by engaging in commercial or private
activity.544 He, like many of the socialist scholars, adhered to the “fundamental
right” view.545
541 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 239–41 (6th ed. 1947). More recently, Professor
Sucharitkul, in his Hague Academy lectures, taught that the rationale for state immunity “may be expressed
in terms of Sovereignty, Independence, Equality and Dignity of States,” which collectively form “a firm
international legal basis for sovereign immunity.” Sucharitkul, supra note 39, at 117; see also Sompong
Sucharitkul, Immunity of States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 327,
327 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991) (“As a consequence of sovereignty and equality of States, each State
is presumed, in certain circumstances, to have consented to waive or to refrain from exercising its exclusive
territorial jurisdiction in a legal proceeding in which another State is a party without its consent.”).
Professor Riesenfeld, too, appears to have placed significant weight on the principle of state equality.
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Sovereign Immunity in Perspective, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 1 (1986)
(citing DICKINSON, supra note 41); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, ch. 5 Introductory Note, at
390–91; Harvard Research in International Law, Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26
AJIL Supp. 455, 527 (1932) [hereinafter Harvard Research]; COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY
REPORTS ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON STATE IMMUNITY AND THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL 5 (1985).
542 See sources cited supra note 18.
543 For a general discussion of the development of the Soviet theory of international law, see Grigory I.
Tunkin, Soviet Theory of Sources of International Law, in VÖLKERRECHT UND
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE: INTERNATIONALE FESTSCHRIFT FÜR STEPHAN VEROSTA 66, 66
(Peter Fischer, Heribert Franz Köck, & Albert Verdross eds., 1980); see also BRANIMIR M. JANKOVI ,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 60–65 (1984).
544 M. M. BOGUSLAVSKIJ, STAATLICHE IMMUNITÄT 168 (1965).
545 The Soviet view modernized the classic justification for par in parem non habet imperium, relying not
on the concept of international personality but, rather, on Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter, which
enshrines the principle of the sovereign equality of all United Nations members. See, e.g., L. A. LUNC,
MEZHDUNARODNOE CHASTNOE PRAVO, OSOBENNAIA CHAST (Private International Law) 77–
91 (1975); I. S. PERETERSKII & S. B. KRYLOV, MEZHDUNARODNOE CHASTNOE PRAVO
(Private International Law) 197–206 (2d. ed. 1959).
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Of particular interest to this study are the implications of the “fundamental right”
view regarding the nature and operation of state immunity. Here, Professor
Sucharitkul’s comments are illustrative. In resolving the clash of norms inherent
in problems of state immunity, he concludes: “It has become an established rule
that between two equals, one cannot exercise sovereign will or power over the
other, ‘Par in parem non habet imperium.’ ”546 While Sucharitkul acknowledges
that the principle of territorial jurisdiction is a basic principle of international law,
he emphasizes a state’s right to sovereign equality. Thus, according to
Sucharitkul, the principle of state jurisdiction must give way to the principle of
sovereign equality to effectuate a state’s right of immunity.547 This view, if correct,
presents substantial obstacles to human rights litigation, as plaintiffs must
contend with and overcome a state right to immunity, perhaps even of a
fundamental nature.548
According to another view, state immunity arises not out of a fundamental state
right but, rather, as an exception to the principle of state jurisdiction. On this
theory, state immunity is ascribed to “practical necessity or convenience and
particularly the desire to promote good will and reciprocal courtesies among
nations.”549 Clearly, this aim largely influenced Justice Marshall’s opinion in The
Schooner Exchange, where he recognized that “intercourse” between nations
and “an interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants
require” foster “mutual benefit.”550 States obtain such benefits, according to
546 Sucharitkul, supra note 39, at 117.
547 Professor Sucharitkul’s preference for state equality over state jurisdiction as the source of state
immunity is clear from his subsequent comments: “Reciprocity of treatment, comity of nations and
courtoisie internationale are very closely allied notions, which may be said to have afforded a subsidiary or
additional basis for the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
548 See “Resolving the conflict of principles” infra, which demonstrates that the “fundamental right”
rationale provides a less persuasive explanation for the creation of the doctrine of foreign state immunity.
549 GIUTTARI, supra note 16, at 6.
550 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). In The Parlement Belge, the court referred
to state immunity as a “consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority and of the
international comity which induces every sovereign state to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state.” [1880] 5 P.D. 197, 217 (emphasis added).
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Justice Marshall, by means of their exclusive territorial jurisdiction.551 In
particular, he noted that “all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in
practice… of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective
territories which sovereignty confers.”552 Justice Marshall went on to observe that
the forum state could advance international affairs by granting a foreign
sovereign “license” to conduct its affairs in the forum state.553 Such license was
often conferred as part of a bilateral arrangement by which the foreign sovereign
would afford reciprocal treatment to the representatives of the forum state when
present in the foreign sovereign’s territory. The effect of this “relaxation” of
jurisdictional authority, as Justice Marshall described it, was to permit a foreign
sovereign, together with his representatives and property, to enter and operate
within the forum state without fear of arrest, detention, or adverse legal
proceedings.554
551 Indeed, the first statement of law in Justice Marshall’s opinion affirms the exclusivity of the state’s
territorial jurisdiction. See text at note 34 supra.
552 11 U.S. at 136. Justice Marshall observed that this “relaxation” of state jurisdiction had become
established in three cases: (1) the exemption of the sovereign’s person from arrest or detention, (2) the
immunity of foreign ministers, and (3) the free passage of friendly foreign troops. Id. at 137–40.
553 Id. at 137. Thus, according to Justice Marshall, a state is said “to waive the exercise of a part of that
complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction.” Id. By way of clarification, the “waiver” of jurisdiction,
described by Justice Marshall as creating the doctrine of state immunity, and the implied “waiver” of state
immunity, which some argue occurs when a state violates jus cogens, are potentially confusing, yet distinct
concepts. Here, in describing Justice Marshall’s theoretical construct, the term “license” is used. See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (3d ed. 1979) (“By licence the
agents of one state may enter the territory of another and there act in their official capacity.” (footnote
omitted)) [hereinafter BROWNLIE (3d)]; Lauterpacht, supra note 28, at 229 (the language of The
Schooner Exchange clearly indicates that “the governing, the basic, principle is not the immunity of the
foreign state but the full jurisdiction of the territorial state and that any immunity of the foreign state must
be traced to a waiver—express or implied—of its jurisdiction on the part of the territorial state”).
554 An exemption to the forum state’s jurisdictional authority was not necessary with respect to aliens. As
Justice Marshall explained:
When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or caprice
may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels
enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and
would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such
individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to
the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such
exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign countries, are not employed by him, nor are they
engaged in national pursuits. Consequently there are powerful motives for not exempting persons
of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no one motive
for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter can never be construed to
grant such exemption.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 144.
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Support for Justice Marshall’s “practical courtesy” approach is evident in
international law scholarship. In his 1980 lectures at the Hague Academy, Ian
Sinclair, commenting on The Schooner Exchange, described the “true
foundation” of foreign state immunity as its “operation by way of exception to the
dominating principle of territorial jurisdiction.”555 He continued:
[O]ne does not start from an assumption that immunity is the norm, and
that exceptions to the rule of immunity have to be justified. One starts from
the assumption of no immunity, qualified by reference to the functional
need (operating by way of express or implied license) to protect the
sovereign rights of foreign States operating or present in the territory.556
Sir Robert Jennings echoed this sentiment when positing that in regard to state
immunity, “territorial jurisdiction is the dominating principle.”557
Unlike the “fundamental right” rationale, the “practical courtesy” view resolves the
theoretical clash between sovereign equality and state jurisdiction in favor of the
latter.558 As a consequence, the scope of the entitlement to state immunity is
555 Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments, 167 RECUEIL DES COURS 113,
215 (1980 II).
556 Id.
557 ROBERT JENNINGS, THE PLACE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW 19 (Vortrag vor dem Europa-Institut der Universitat des
Saarlandes No. 108, 1987); see also Higgins, supra note 19, at 271.
558 Professor Hyde explains:
Because the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction throughout the national domain is essential to the
maintenance of the supremacy of the territorial sovereign, the most solid grounds of international
necessity must be shown in order to justify a demand that a State consent to an exemption . . . . It
becomes important, therefore, to examine the reasons urged in behalf of exemptions habitually
demanded… [and] also to observe the nature and purpose of particular exemptions.
1 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 815-16 (2d rev. ed. 1945); see also General
Principle of Exemption,
2 Hackworth, DIGEST §169, at 393 (ascribing the origins of state immunity to the consent of the territorial
sovereign and the principle of equality, but also taking note of the “necessity of yielding the local
jurisdiction... as an indispensable factor in the conduct of friendly intercourse between members of the
family of nations”); 2 D. P. O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 915 (1965) (“Originally the waiver
may have been ex gratia, but probably the universal practice of granting immunity has produced a rule of
positive law.”).
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defined by the extent to which the forum state chooses to suspend its right of
jurisdiction. As Justice Marshall insightfully pronounced: “All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories,
must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source.”559 Accordingly, on this theory, no norm of international law,
not even the principle of sovereign equality, is capable of derogating a state’s
jurisdictional authority as exercised legitimately by its own courts, except in cases
where the forum state has agreed to waive this right.560
Resolving the conflict of principles: The primacy of adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Determining which of the above rationales more persuasively explains the
theoretical foundation of state immunity has profound implications for human
rights litigation.561 If state immunity is deemed a fundamental right of statehood,
then human rights litigants face nearly insurmountable obstacles. The state
defendant is entitled to presumptive immunity and even the normative hierarchy
theory cannot be effective because it is by no means clear that jus cogens norms
trump a fundamental state right to immunity. Such negative consequences,
however, need not be explored in detail here, as a critical examination of the two
rationales reveals that the “practical courtesy” rationale is more persuasive than
the “fundamental right” rationale. From this conclusion one may infer that the
regulation of state immunity falls, as a threshold matter, within the authoritative
domain not of the foreign state defendant but, rather, of the forum state. As
described below, three reasons support this conclusion.
559 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136.
560 As explained in part II, the practice of waiving adjudicatory jurisdiction in favor of state immunity has
crystallized into a rule of customary international law with respect to a limited core body of state conduct
that serves the collective interests of the community of nations.
561 In the last fifteen years, there has been little, if any, serious treatment of the significance of the
competing rationales for foreign state immunity. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Fortythird Session, [1991] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 32, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991 (Part
2) (choosing not to address the issue). One reason may be that with the general acceptance of the theory of
restrictive immunity among the Western states, the drive to ponder such abstractions waned considerably.
The loss of intellectual steam might have been further augmented by the decline of the Soviet Union and its
dogmatic promotion of the “fundamental right” rationale. However, at the inception of another broad
movement to restrict state immunity, now predicated on human rights protection, it is useful to revisit the
topic and to attempt to determine which rationale should control.
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The problem with the “fundamental right” rationale is that it assumes that the
principle of sovereign equality is the root of the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium, and thus that the maxim prohibits one state’s exercise of jurisdiction
over another. The true meaning of sovereign equality, however, disproves this
assumption.562 Sovereign equality does not mean that all states are equal in any
given circumstances but that, as Edwin Dickinson observed, every state enjoys
an “equality of capacity for rights.”563 Dickinson based his views on those of
Heffter, who wrote that sovereign equality “means nothing more nor less than
that each state may exercise equally with others all rights that are based upon its
existence as a state in the international society.”564 Thus, a state’s “capacity for
rights,” according to Dickinson, relates to the freedom and ability of states to
engage in official conduct typically associated with statehood, such as the
formulation and promotion of domestic and foreign policies, the execution of
treaties, and membership in international organizations.
This meaning of sovereign equality is further defined by the basic strictures of the
system of international law. It is axiomatic that international law allocates
sovereign authority to govern in accordance with national borders;565 the United
States governs within U.S. territory on behalf of Americans, France governs
within French territory on behalf of the French, and so on. Each state exercises
territorial jurisdiction within its political unit as a function of its sovereignty. Thus,
a state’s capacity for rights, like statehood itself, is linked to a defined
geographical area, i.e., the territory within the national borders of the state.566 It
562 Interestingly, Professor Brierly was quite skeptical about the principle of sovereign equality in general.
J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 130–32 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
563 DICKINSON, supra note 41, at 5 (emphasis added). “The meaning of equality as a legal principle is
explained by a few modern writers in a way that approaches scientific precision. Some define it in terms
that suggest equality of rights, and then proceed to explain it as equality of legal capacity.” Id. at 106.
564 Id. (quoting AUGUST WILHELM HEFFTER, VOLKERRECHT §§26–27).
565 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 ICJ REP. 12, 63–65 (Oct. 16); OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, at
121; SHAW, supra note 40, at 331.
566 In the Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice found that “the first and foremost
restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the
contrary-it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.” Lotus case, supra note
47, at 18. Indeed, territory is one of the fundamental conditions for statehood.
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follows that this capacity for rights, albeit equal in potential to that of every other
state, may have greater or lesser force, in relation to that of other states, in
proportion to its connection to national territory. For example, a state’s capacity
for rights stands at its apogee when applied in relation to its own territory and
citizens.567 Accordingly, “[a] sovereign state is one that is free to independently
govern its own population in its own territory and set its own foreign policy”-to the
exclusion of all other states.568
Conversely, by simple operation of the principle of sovereign equality, a state’s
capacity for rights will diminish when in direct conflict with another state’s sphere
of authority, i.e., the jurisdiction of that state over persons, property, and events
in its national territory.569 For example, a foreign sovereign present in an alien
forum state quite obviously may not govern on behalf of the local citizenry; again,
this is a right that the forum state generally enjoys to the exclusion of all other
states.570 Hence, the same principle of sovereign equality that entitles the foreign
sovereign to govern with respect to its own national territory now excludes it from
exercising authority in another state’s territory. In such cases, the foreign state’s
capacity for rights with respect to the forum state reaches its lowest ebb.571
Seen in this light, the literal meaning of par in parem non habet imperium, “an
equal has no authority over an equal,” fails to reflect the realities of the
international legal order. The principle of sovereign equality means that every
state enjoys an “equal capacity for rights” in relation to every other state, but it
does not alter the fact that a state may exercise the rights of statehood only with
respect to its own territory and population. If, according to international law, a
567 Id. at 18. Sovereignty is thus in the main a mutually exclusive concept; as with the laws of physics
governing matter, no two sovereigns can occupy the same space at the same time.
568 JANIS, supra note 6, at 186; see also Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1928).
569 As Professor Janis explains, the elements of statehood “impart a certain mutual exclusivity among states
that we know as sovereignty, one of international law’s most important principles.” JANIS, supra note 6, at
185–86.
570 Lotus case, supra note 47, at 18.
571 “Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.” Id.
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state is the sole master of its domain, persons and property located within the
forum state necessarily come within the forum state government’s control and
authority-even if endowed with foreign sovereign status.572 Were international law
to dictate otherwise, the present state-centric paradigm would crumble.
This is not to say that foreign states should be refused immunity privileges in all
circumstances but that an entitlement to immunity is not intrinsic to statehood.573
Thus, foreign state immunity is a privilege, not a right, and, accordingly, the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium is a distortion of the principle of
sovereign equality. Neither the maxim nor its purported progenitor, the principle
of sovereign equality, persuasively supports the conclusion that one state cannot
exercise jurisdiction over another, and the “fundamental right” rationale is fatally
flawed for assuming so.574
The view that state immunity is a fundamental state right has often been used to
support the absolute approach to immunity, which held that states enjoy
complete immunity from foreign domestic proceedings.575 Indeed, absolutists
572 Lauterpacht supports this conclusion on historical grounds. According to him, the relationship between
the principle of sovereign equality and state immunity “finds no support in classical international law.
Grotius does not refer to it. Bynkershoek occasionally deprecates it: ‘Principes dum contrahunt haberi
privatorum loco.’ Vattel, after admitting it with regard to the person of the foreign sovereign, is silent with
regard to the position of foreign states as such.” Lauterpacht, supra note 27, at 228 (citation omitted).
573 According to Professor Janis, the “rights” of statehood are not so broad as to include the right to be free
from foreign domestic proceedings. JANIS, supra note 6, at 188.
574 In the ninth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, Jennings and Watts agree, but for a different
reason:
It is often said that a third consequence of state equality is that—according to the rule par in parem non
habet imperium—no state can claim jurisdiction over another. The jurisdictional immunity of foreign states
has often also been variously-and often simultaneously—deduced not only from the principle of equality
but also from the principles of independence and of dignity of states. It is doubtful whether any of these
considerations supplies a satisfactory basis for the doctrine of immunity. There is no obvious impairment of
the rights of equality, or independence, or dignity of a state if it is subjected to ordinary judicial processes
within the territory of a foreign state-in particular if that state, as appears to be the tendency in countries
under the rule of law, submits to the jurisdiction of its own courts in respect of claims brought against it.
The grant of immunity from suit amounts in effect to a denial of a legal remedy in respect of what may be a
valid legal claim; as such, immunity is open to objection.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, at 341–42 (footnotes omitted).
575 This point formed the linchpin of the Communist position on foreign state immunity. See text at notes
55–58 supra.
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would argue that, as a product of the principle of sovereign equality, immunity
extends to the limits of a state’s sovereignty and, moreover, that a state acts qua
state in all of its affairs regardless of the nature of its conduct. Absolute immunity
is a myth, however—a fact that undermines the “fundamental right” approach on
which absolute immunity is understood to rest. A brief assessment of the
historical growth of the doctrine of state immunity proves this point.
First, it is a myth that states ever enjoyed absolute immunity from foreign
jurisdiction.576 While scholars often refer to an early period of “absolute
immunity,” typically citing The Schooner Exchange as the leading case of the
day, this title has more historical than legal significance and should not be
interpreted as meaning that states were exempt at that time from foreign
jurisdiction in all circumstances.577 Indeed, after a rigorous examination of The
Schooner Exchange, Gamal Badr persuasively argued:
For [Chief Justice] Marshall… the starting point [of the case] was the local
state’s exclusive territorial jurisdiction to which immunity was an exception
emanating from the will of the local state itself. He did not envisage a
blanket immunity for the foreign state as a general rule, to which
exceptions would be made to permit the exercise of the local state’s
territorial jurisdiction.578
576 As Michael Byers explains:
[A]n examination of the history of state immunity, which is primarily a history of national court judgments
and national legislation, suggests that absolute immunity was not an established rule. Rather, history
suggests that there was no rule regulating state immunity from jurisdiction prior to restrictive immunity
becoming a rule of customary international law, and that a mistaken belief in such a preexisting rule served
to retard that later development.
Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an
Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 109, 170 (1995); see also BROHMER, supra note 15,
at 14-15.
577 The organizational bifurcation of international law textbooks into sections on “absolute immunity” and
“restrictive immunity” tends to add to the confusion. See, e.g., BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note
39, at 234–36; CARTER, TRIMBLE, & BRADLEY, supra note 17, at 547–52; LORI F. DAMROSCH ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1200–42 (4th ed. 2001).
578 BADR, supra note 16, at 11.
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Indeed, this crucial observation led Professor Badr to conclude that The
Schooner Exchange “does not uphold the proposition that there exists a
peremptory rule of international law requiring that an absolute immunity from the
territorial jurisdiction be recognized in favour of foreign states.”579
The more realistic explanation of the absolute approach is that at one time
foreign states, as a practical matter, were immune from foreign jurisdiction.580 In
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sovereigns interacted with one another
in peacetime in a very limited way, predominantly through diplomatic intercourse
or military cooperation.581 Consequently, interstate disputes almost inevitably
touched upon sensitive foreign policy matters. The law of state immunity
reflected these sensitivities and the prevailing preference for resolving these
disputes by diplomacy, rather than adjudication. Most likely, claims against states
in respect of private conduct-though technically not barred from foreign
adjudication-were also handled diplomatically in accordance with the prevailing
state-centric paradigm.582 Thus, one cannot equate the fact that courts did not
exercise jurisdiction over foreign states in this early period with a general
prohibition against doing so on account of the principle of sovereign equality.
Second, the emergence and increasing acceptance of a restrictive approach to
immunity is itself antithetical to the “fundamental right” approach.583 The classic
justification for the distinction between public and private acts in the restrictive
immunity theory was that the sovereign, in effect, descends from his throne when
579 Id. at 13.
580 According to the American Law Institute, “Until the twentieth century, sovereign immunity from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts seemed to have no exceptions.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, ch. 5
Introductory Note, at 391 (emphasis added).
581 SHAW, supra note 40, at 494 (noting that the “relatively uncomplicated role of the sovereign and of
government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries logically gave rise to the concept of absolute
immunity”).
582 Such claims would most likely have been handled on the state level according to the law of diplomatic
protection. See generally EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
ABROAD (1927).
583 For a description of this position, see text at notes 50–61 supra.
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operating as a merchant and thereby subjects himself to the local laws of the
forum state.584 Though this distinction in state activity is admittedly somewhat
arbitrary, it nevertheless undermines the “fundamental right” position. If state
immunity were really based on a fundamental principle of international law, then
the movement toward restricting immunity would not have encountered so few
legal and political obstacles. In other words, if state immunity were a fundamental
state right, it would never be susceptible to theoretical division along
public/private lines.
The “practical courtesy” rationale furnishes the more persuasive and realistic
explanation for the doctrine of state immunity because it appropriately
emphasizes the vital role of the principle of adjudicatory jurisdiction.585 As a
logical matter, a foreign state cannot be entitled to immunity without the prior
existence of a jurisdictional anchor to establish the court’s competence.586 This
observation results from the plain fact that a court lacking jurisdictional
competence is completely devoid of authority to adjudicate a legal dispute.587
Thus, as the International Court of Justice explained in the Case Concerning the
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, “[I]t is only where a State has jurisdiction under
international law in relation to a particular matter that there can be any question
of immunities in regard to the exercise of that jurisdiction.”588 Addressing the role
of jurisdiction is thus crucial to any understanding of the true nature and
operation of the doctrine of state immunity. The Schooner Exchange highlights
this point, because there Justice Marshall realized, quite rightly, that jurisdiction
must be established before state immunity could be considered. Jurisdiction was
not contested in that case because the presence of the Exchange in U.S.
584 See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 145; BADR, supra note 16, at 11.
585 The “fundamental right” view provides no meaningful treatment of this topic.
586 See BADR, supra note 16, at 80–84; BROHMER, supra note 15, at 37–41; James Crawford, A New
Foreign State Immunities Act for Australia? 1983 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 71, 92; Christian Dominice, The
Relationship Between State Immunity and the Jurisdiction of Courts, in International Law Association,
Documentation for the Members of the Committee on State Immunity (prepared for the ILA Cairo
Conference, 1992).
587 In general, there must be a reasonable link between the dispute and the forum state. See BROWNLIE
(5th), supra note 6, at 301.
588 Arrest Warrant, supra note 23, para. 46; see also id., Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, & Buergenthal, para. 5, 41 ILM at 574.
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territorial waters constituted the necessary connection with the forum to establish
the district court’s in rem jurisdiction.589 With this matter established-one that the
“fundamental right” view neglects-state immunity could only obtain as an
exception to the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the forum state.
Nevertheless, the principle of sovereign equality cannot be said to have no
function in the state immunity equation. On the contrary, respect for the coequal
status of a foreign sovereign state serves typically as the primary motivation for
granting immunity privileges.590 On this theory, however, a state’s entitlement to
immunity is not compelled by the principle of sovereign equality but, rather,
derives from the forum state’s waiver of adjudicatory jurisdiction with the aim of
promoting mutually beneficial interstate relations.591
Finally, the “practical courtesy” rationale promotes a more sensible international
policy than the “fundamental right” rationale. States understood to possess a
fundamental right to immunity would be permitted to act with impunity. Carried to
the logical extreme, this notion would mean that foreign states acting in their
foreign capacity could never be held accountable by the forum state. On the
other hand, if state immunity is considered a practical courtesy, capable of being
modified (or even withdrawn, if need be), then a more balanced relationship is
maintained between the foreign state and the forum state. A foreign state will be
more cautious about treading on the interests of other states, fearing that
unacceptable conduct will result in the withdrawal of immunity and, in turn, the
review of such conduct by domestic courts.
Correcting false presumptions. The foregoing discussion has revolved primarily
around the broad principles animating the doctrine of foreign state immunity, and
589 See JENNINGS, supra note 72, at 22 (“For competence, both juridically and physically in respect of
persons and property within the territory of the forum is the normal basis of curial power and ultimately
therefore of curial authority.”).
590 Even states that have adopted the theory of restrictive immunity still cite these factors as a reason.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, ch. 5 Introductory Note, at 390.
591 See Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
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has shown, in particular, the theoretical persuasiveness of the “practical
courtesy” rationale. Indeed, this persuasiveness is significant because it
suggests that a forum state remains unrestricted, at least by a fundamental
principle of international law, from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign-state
human rights offender, so long as an appropriate connection exists between the
alleged offense and the forum state.592
Yet when one surveys the actual law of foreign state immunity, as formulated and
applied, an entirely different picture emerges. In practice, the rules that regulate
state immunity law assume that a foreign state is immune from suit, unless
demonstrated otherwise. Taking an example from national practice, section 1604
of the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) contains the
general rule that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States,” which may be abrogated only by application of one
of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in section 1605.593 According to the
FSIA’s legislative history, the statute “starts from a premise of immunity and then
creates exceptions to the general principle.”594 Similarly, the Swiss Federal
Tribunal wrote:
According to a generally recognized rule of public international law, the
sovereignty of each State is limited by the immunity of other States, in particular
with regard to the jurisdiction of municipal courts and proceedings for
enforcement. One State cannot be brought before the courts of another State
except in exceptional circumstances.595
592 The applicable bases of jurisdiction under international law are outlined supra note 47.
593 28 U.S.C. §§1604–1605 (2000).
594 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. The drafters did not intend that the
plaintiff should bear the burden of proving that a state was not immune, but the construction of the rule has
had this effect in practice. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 348 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting
that the “FSIA recognizes that sovereign immunity is the exception, rather than the rule . . .”).
595 Libyan Arab Socialist People’s Jamahiriya v. Actimon SA, translated in 82 ILR 30, 32 (Switz. Fed.
Trib. Apr. 24, 1985).
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These approaches, a function of codification in the American case and of
constitutional orientation in the Swiss (as described further in the next section),
unnecessarily build theoretical hurdles to human rights litigation.596
International instruments paint largely the same picture. Article 15 of the
European Convention provides: “A Contracting State shall be entitled to immunity
from the jurisdiction of courts of another Contracting State if the proceedings do
not fall within Articles 1 to 14,” which enumerate various exceptions to
immunity.597 Article 5 of the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of states
and their property of the International Law Commission (ILC) provides that “[a]
State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of
the courts of another State subject to the provisions of the present articles.”598
Articles 10 through 17 subsequently carve out various exceptions to the general
rule. In the case of the draft articles, the Drafting Committee’s rapporteur,
Professor Sucharitkul, stated the following about the draft articles’ theoretical
approach:
[T]he draft articles should begin to attempt the formulation of a basic rule of State
immunity. Based upon a series of the available source materials on State
practice…, the draft has to face two interesting sets of options. In the first place,
a rule of international law on State immunity could start from the very beginning
as a rule of State immunity, or it could go back beyond and before the beginning
of State immunity. It could… regard immunity not as a rule, nor less as a general
rule of law, but more appropriately…. as an exception to a more basic rule of
territorial sovereignty…. [T]he International Law Commission is more inclined
596 Some scholars have approached the doctrine of foreign state immunity similarly. See, e.g.,
BENEDETTO CONFORTI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 220 (5th ed. 1997) (explaining that state
immunity is the rule rather than the exception).
597 European Convention, supra note 26, Art. 15.
598 For the most recent version of the draft articles, see Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Jurisdictional
Immunities and Their Property, UN GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 22, annex, at 3–13, UN Doc. A/57/22
(2002), available at http://www.un.org/law/jurisdictionalimmunities/index.html>. For the 1991 draft
articles with commentary, see THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (1949–1998), at 2006–103
(Arthur Watts ed., 1999).
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towards cutting the Gordian knot at the beginning, and beginning with a general
rule of State immunity….599
Several practical reasons can help to explain why state immunity is treated as
the general rule, but unfortunately they have resulted in a misleading legal
framework.600 Indeed, viewing state immunity as the general rule obfuscates the
reality that state immunity derives from a forum state’s concession of jurisdiction
and is not presumptively a right under international law, as explained above.601
Reversing these false presumptions about foreign state immunity is no small
task. As Rosalyn Higgins has counseled, “It is very easy to elevate sovereign
immunity into a superior principle of international law and to lose sight of the
essential reality that it is an exception to the normal doctrine of jurisdiction.”602
However, by understanding that “[i]t is sovereign immunity which is the exception
to jurisdiction and not jurisdiction which is the exception to a basic rule of
immunity,”603 the possibilities for meaningful and effective human rights litigation
emerge. With jurisdiction as the rule and immunity as the exception, it is
incumbent upon the foreign state defendant, not the individual plaintiff, to point to
the rule, domestic or international, that requires immunity.
599 Sompong Sucharitkul, Developments and Prospects of the Doctrine of State Immunity: Some Aspects of
Codification and Progressive Development, 29 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 252, 261 (1982).
600 Other codification projects have established a similar legal framework based on a blanket rule of
immunity. See International Law Association, Revised Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity,
Art. II (66th Conf., 1994); Harvard Research, supra note 54, Art. 7. The work of the Institut de Droit
International is the notable exception, enumerating criteria indicative of the competence and incompetence
of the forum state in actions against foreign states. See Contemporary Problems Concerning the
Jurisdictional Immunity of States, [1991] 2 ANNUAIRE
DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 214.
601 As Professor Schreuer points out, both approaches may result in confusion.
If immunity is the starting point, a requirement of a positive universal practice for any restriction is bound
to lead to an assertion of absolute immunity. On the other hand, if we proceed from a general rule of
jurisdiction, we will find it difficult, if not impossible, to find proof of a uniform practice supporting
immunity.
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 5 (1988). Still,
weighing the options, the latter course of logic is more beneficial to the development of the doctrine of
foreign state immunity because it adds more flexibility to its scope and nature.
602 Higgins, supra note 19, at 271.
603 Id.
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8.2 The Status of State Immunity in Relation to International Law
If, as argued above, the doctrine of foreign state immunity does not derive from a
fundamental principle of international law, namely sovereign equality, then what
is the status of the doctrine in relation to international law? As previously noted,
there is only one comprehensive multilateral agreement that governs state
immunity, the European Convention on State Immunity, which has been ratified
by only a handful of countries.604 Thus, for the vast majority of states, state
immunity is unregulated by treaty as a general matter.605 The next question, then,
involves determining the extent to which foreign state immunity is binding on
states as customary international law. The following discussion demonstrates
that, although customary international law compels immunity protections as to a
limited core body of state conduct, a broader range of state behavior not included
in the core, such as state-sponsored human rights violations, is entitled to
immunity solely as a matter of domestic law.606
The scope of state immunity under customary international law. What is the
scope of immunity protection afforded foreign states under customary
international law? From Justice Marshall’s perspective in The Schooner
Exchange, determining the extent of immune conduct under international law
was a rather straightforward exercise. Viewing a state’s entitlement to immunity
as the exception, not the rule, he deduced readily from state practice those
“peculiar circumstances” in which states had waived jurisdiction in favor of
immunity. The prevailing international custom led Justice Marshall to conclude
that states had waived jurisdiction in favor of the following categories of
604 The European Convention has been adopted by eight countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany,
Great Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The Additional Protocol to the Convention,
May 16, 1972, Europ. TS No. 74A, has been ratified by six countries. For a discussion of other treaties of
peripheral relation, see BRÖHMER, supra note 15, at 121–25.
605 Indeed, the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States expressly provides that none of its provisions dealing with the recognition and enforcement of
an ICSID arbitral award “shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State
relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution.” Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, Art. 55, 17 UST 1270,
575 UNTS 159.
606 An exhaustive inductive study of the consistency and uniformity of state practice and the existence of
opinion juris in this area is unfortunately not possible in an article of this length.
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immunity: (1) the freedom of the foreign sovereign from arrest or detention, (2)
the diplomatic protection of foreign ministers, (3) the free passage of friendly
foreign troops, and (4) the passage of friendly warships present in the host
state.607 Immunity for conduct falling into one of these categories was warranted
because of the “mutual benefit” that such protection provides to the community of
nations.608 Any state conduct that fell outside the core of immune activity did not
require immunity protection.609
Twentieth-century developments, however, have obscured Justice Marshall’s
direct observations. As the globalization of trade and commerce increasingly
brought states and private merchants into contact, many states sought to expand
their entitlement to immunity beyond the strictures of customary international law
so as to evade any commercial liability in a transaction gone sour.610 This self-
serving policy laid the foundation for the myth that states were immune from suits
of all kinds.611 In time, principles of fairness in commercial dealing prevailed and
compelled the movement to restrict immunity as to a state’s commercial or
private conduct, acta jure gestionis. The primary justification for the restrictive
theory of immunity was said to be that judicial review of foreign state conduct of a
commercial or private nature did not affront the dignity of the state.
Approaching the question of immunity on the basis of the imperii / gestionis
distinction produced a metaphysical quandary: where should the line between
607 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S at 137–41.
608 Id. at 136.
609 As obiter dictum, Marshall stated:
[I]t may safely be affirmed, that there is a manifest distinction between the private property of the person
who happens to be a prince, and that military force which supports the sovereign power, and maintains the
dignity and independence of a nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may
possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered as so
far laying down the prince, and assuming the character of a private individual; but this he cannot be
presumed to do with respect to any portion of that armed force, which upholds his crown, and the nation he
is entrusted to govern.
Id. at 145.
610 As explained, a state’s right to absolute immunity is based on a myth. See text at notes 88–95 supra.
611 See text at notes 88–95 supra.
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public and private state conduct be drawn?612 For example, is a contract between
a foreign state entity and a private manufacturer for the purchase of army boots a
public or private act? To simplify matters, the restrictive approach came to focus
more on establishing undisputed categories of no immune conduct and neglected
to develop firm criteria for determining immune conduct.613 The codification
movement on both the national and international levels proceeded on a similar
basis. National state immunity legislation, the European Convention, and the
leading codification projects enumerated detailed categories of nonimmune
conduct, i.e., the “exceptions” to immunity, while leaving all other state conduct to
fall under a catchall rule of immunity. As explained above, this approach
inappropriately reversed the presumption of immunity in the doctrine of foreign
state immunity.614
As a result of its awkward development, the restrictive approach to immunity, as
adopted by most states, draws the line between immune and nonimmune
conduct at a point beyond that required by customary international law. In fact,
most states afford a range of immunity protections to foreign states that exceed
the demands of customary international law. Accordingly, the doctrine of foreign
state immunity is currently stratified into three types of state conduct: (1) conduct
that is immune by virtue of customary international law, (2) conduct that is
immune solely by virtue of domestic law, and (3) conduct that is not entitled to
immunity under either customary international law or domestic law.
The ICJ’s recent decision in Arrest Warrant of April 11, 2000 provides strong
evidence as to the existence and nature of the rule of state immunity under
customary international law. In that case, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
protested the issuance by a Belgian investigating magistrate of “an international
arrest warrant in absentia” against the incumbent minister for foreign affairs of
the Congo, alleging violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The ICJ
found that “in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and
612 William W. Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AJIL 93, 105 (1953).
613 BROHMER, supra note 15, at 22 (“The question why a state should enjoy immunity for governmental
acts was largely avoided.”).
614 See text at notes 105–16 supra.
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consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the
Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy
immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal.”615 Notably,
the ICJ’s conclusion squares precisely with Justice Marshall’s findings in The
Schooner Exchange regarding the immunities of foreign ministers and thus
reaffirms the status of customary international law in that area.
What is perhaps most interesting about the Arrest Warrant case is its rationale
for an international rule of state immunity. The ICJ concluded that customary
international law compels state immunity regarding foreign ministers “to ensure
the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States”
and to “protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of another
State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties.”616
The Arrest Warrant decision is again entirely consistent with the findings in The
Schooner Exchange, in which Justice Marshall concluded that states waive their
right to adjudicatory jurisdiction over a foreign state as to certain conduct that
promotes the “mutual benefit” of the community of nations, such as the exchange
of foreign ministers.617 From these cases, a persuasive rationale for granting
immunity with respect to certain state conduct emerges-a rationale that arguably
is a prerequisite to establishing the opinio juris necessary for a rule of customary
international law.618
615 Arrest Warrant, supra note 23, para. 51; see also id., para. 54 (concluding, on the basis of customary
international law, that “the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration
of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
inviolability”).
616 Id., paras. 53, 54.
617 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136.
618 Courts and commentators typically ascertain customary international law on the basis of two traditional
elements, the general practice of states and opinio juris. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), erits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14 ( June 27); Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 ICJ
REP. 13, 29 ( June 3). According to the ninth edition of Oppenheim, “A custom is a clear and continuous
habit of doing certain actions which has grown up under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are,
according to international law, obligatory or right.” OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, at 27. Professor Hudson
explains: “The elements necessary are the concordant and recurring action of numerous States in the
domain of international relations, the conception in each case that such action was enjoined by law, and the
failure of other States to challenge that conception at the time.” MANLEY O. HUDSON, THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920–1942, at 609 (1943); see also Luigi
Condorelli, Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 54,
at 179, 187.
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Conversely, when state conduct fails to promote “mutual benefit” among nations,
the international law status of a rule that immunizes such conduct is dubious at
best. Two examples from U.S. case law underscore this point. In Letelier v.
Republic of Chile and Liu v. Republic of China, U.S. courts found that
assassinations by foreign government agents committed in the United States
were not “discretionary” state conduct within the meaning of the FSIA and thus fit
into the FSIA’s exception to immunity for torts committed in U.S. territory.619
Under a strict application of the imperii / gestionis distinction, such conduct, i.e.,
state-sanctioned assassination, would be immune by virtue of its official
mandate.620 However, in Letelier and Liu the courts did not identify a rule of
international law that required immunity where the state conduct in question was
“clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and
international law.”621
The 1996 amendment to the FSIA622 further evidences that customary
international law does not immunize detrimental state conduct. The 1996
amendment creates an additional category of nonimmune conduct as to a limited
range of acts committed by states designated by the U.S. government as “state
sponsors of terrorism.”623 The amendment applies to actions by or on behalf of
U.S. citizens that allege “personal injury or death that was caused by an act of
The first element, state practice, represents the objective element of the test: a rule of international law
exists only if reflected in the general practice of states. KEHURST, supra note 6, at 39. The latter element,
opinio juris, represents the test’s subjective element: in addition to conforming to state practice, a state
must feel compelled to do so by an international law obligation. Id. at 44 (describing opinio juris as the
“psychological element” of the test).
619 Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980); Liu v. Republic of China, 642
F.Supp. 297, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
620 See SCHREUER, supra note 114, at 47.
621 Letelier, 488 F.Supp. at 673; Liu, 642 F.Supp at 305 (quoting Letelier). Prefecture of Voiotia, discussed
in detail in text at notes 279–86 infra, reaches the same conclusion.
622 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7) (2000). The amendment was promulgated as §221 of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996).
623 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7). At the time of this writing, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and
Syria were so designated. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2002, at 76
(2003), available at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct>.
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torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources” for such acts.624 The provision flatly rejects the
traditional imperii / gestionis distinction in its application to conduct that “is
engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting
within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.”625 Notably,
although the U.S. government expressed opposition to the 1996 amendment in a
previous form, it never asserted that curtailing immunity for state conduct that
violates human rights would constitute a breach of international law.626
To summarize: It is established that customary international law mandates
immunity as to a core body of state conduct. However, because of the awkward
development of the theory of restrictive immunity, insufficient attention has been
paid to defining the exact content of this core as it has developed since Justice
Marshall’s assessment in 1812. In fact, the prevailing approach to state immunity
obscures the reach of the international rule of state immunity by establishing a
false presumption of immunity and creating a catchall category for immune
conduct. As a consequence, the current formulation of the doctrine of foreign
state immunity, as adopted by most states, the European Convention, and the
leading codification projects,627 grants foreign states more immunity privileges
than customary international law dictates.
Emerging consensus regarding restrictive immunity. For much of the last century,
state immunity practice has been starkly divided between two groups of nations:
countries that have favored the theory of restrictive immunity, mainly the Western
capitalist countries; and countries that have clung to the theory of absolute
immunity, mainly the Communist and socialist countries. Recent developments
indicate that the gap between absolutist and restrictivist states is narrowing. The
collapse of the Soviet empire has brought about great social and political
624 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7).
625 Id. (emphasis added).
626 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearing on S.825 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 8, 10 (1994) (testimony of
Stuart Schiffer, deputy assistant attorney general, Civil Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Jamison S.
Borek, deputy legal adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State).
627 But see supra note 113 (describing the work of the Institut de Droit International).
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changes in Eastern Europe, which have slowly influenced state immunity practice
in the formerly Communist countries. The development of market economies and
the participation in global commerce by the former Soviet countries, especially
Russia, have strained the utility of the doctrine of absolute immunity and
undoubtedly will cause a policy shift toward restrictive immunity.628 Evidence
suggests that even the People’s Republic of China, a staunch supporter of
absolute immunity, may be moderating its position.629 Such tendencies, while not
yet etched in stone, show that the gap between absolutist and restrictivist
practice may be as narrow today as it has ever been.630
Still, setting aside the narrowing of the absolute/restrictive immunity split, one
finds a myriad of substantive variations in national approaches to state immunity
law. While each and every variation cannot possibly be addressed here, one
significant example is revealing. The FSIA, for instance, instructs U.S. courts to
look at the “nature” and not the “purpose” of a foreign state defendant’s conduct
in order to determine whether such conduct is commercial or public in nature
628 Daniel J. Michalchuk, Filling a Legal Vacuum: The Form and Content of Russia’s Future State
Immunity Law: Suggestions for Legislative Reform, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 487, 497 (2001)
(“With Russia’s emergence as a market economy, the theoretical and ideological foundations for an
absolute approach to state immunity no longer exist in the Russian Federation.”). New constitutional
regimes in the former Soviet republics will also permit a greater role for international law in domestic
systems by including constitutional provisions similar to those of the civil law systems of Western Europe.
See Gennady M. Danilenko, Implementation of International Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice, 10
EUR. J. INT’L L. 51 (1999); Gennady M. Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and International
Law, 88 AJIL 451 (1994); Oleg Tiunov, The Constitution Court of the Russian Federation and
International Law, in LIBER AMICORUM BENGT BROMS 627 (Matti Tupamäki ed., 1999). See
generally CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE (Rein Müllerson, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, & Mads Andenæs eds., 1998).
629 Compare Zhengyu Ni, supra note 68, and Jill A. Sgro, Comment, China’s Stance on Sovereign
Immunity: A Critical Perspective on Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 22 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 101 (1983), with Guiguo Wang, China’s Attitude Towards State Immunity—An Eastern
Approach, in JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 153, 171–72
(Nisuke Ando ed., 1999) (speculating that the People’s Republic of China would abide by the International
Law Commission’s draft articles on state immunity since its chairman, Shi Jiuyong, is a representative of
the PRC government).
630 Opinion is still in great flux. See Hazel Fox, A “Commercial Transaction” Under the State Immunity
Act 1978, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 193, 193 (1994) (“[U]nlike the Soviet Union, members of the CIS and
Central European States have indicated support for a restrictive rule, although the People’s Republic of
China and some Latin American States remain in favour of absolute immunity.”).
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and, thus, whether it is immune or nonimmune from suit.631 French courts, by
contrast, appear to place more emphasis on the purpose of the operative state
act, instead of its nature. The Cour de cassation, France’s highest court, held
that foreign states may be entitled to immunity not only for acta jure imperii, but
also for acts performed in the interest of public service.632 Thus, the real
possibility exists that U.S. and French courts may draw the line between immune
and nonimmune foreign state conduct in very different places.633
Accordingly, James Crawford’s earlier observation that the distinction between
immune and nonimmune state conduct is drawn less by international law and
more by national laws is equally relevant today.634 Hazel Fox similarly posits that
while there is a clear trend “away from an absolute doctrine to a restrictive
doctrine… the absence of a universal convention and the diversity of State
practice… produce[ ] extraordinary complexity and variety in the emerging
rules.”635 Such significant variations in national practice have led another state
immunity scholar, Joseph Dellapenna, to conclude his comparative study of
immunity practice in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany with the
following words:
All these countries, in grappling with the need to constrain the actions of
sovereigns by the rule of law, have developed roughly similar responses
that are collectively described by the rubric of the “restrictive theory of
foreign state immunity.” A closer examination of the details of the several
631 28 U.S.C. §1603(d) (2000). For a summary of the long struggle to distinguish public from private acts,
see JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS
148–52 (1988).
632 Cass. 1e civ., May 2, 1990, Bull. civ. I, No. 9. For a discussion of the implications of this case, see
BRÖHMER, supra note 15, at 110; Klaus Gabrinski, Staatenimmunität im Erkenntnisverfahren—die
französiche Rechtsprechung im internationalen, insbesondere deutschen Vergleich, 12 IPRAX 55 (1992).
633 Recognizing the varying practices of states in this regard, the International Law Commission proposed
draft Article 3(2), see supra note 111, which incorporates both aspects into the test for a commercial
transaction. D.W. Greig, Forum State Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity Under the International Law
Commission’s Draft Articles, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 243, 256–57 (1989).
634 Crawford, supra note 19, at 77–78.
635 FOX, supra note 15, at 127; see also Fox, supra note 143, at 194.
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approaches to foreign state immunity… demonstrates, however, that
consensus exists only at a rather high level of abstraction.636
Because the doctrine of foreign state immunity is a mix of international law and
domestic law, the reach of restrictive immunity, i.e., the extent to which states are
not immune, may or may not be an international law question. Indeed, the nature
of the inquiry depends on whether the core of immune conduct is implicated. In
the Arrest Warrant case, for example, the ICJ addressed the scope of a sitting
foreign minister’s immunities, a category of state conduct that clearly touches
upon established customary international law matters. In contrast, in the Letelier
and Liu cases, U.S. courts examined state conduct, namely assassination, that
clearly falls outside the core body of immune conduct. Thus, the issue of
immunity was decided solely as a matter of domestic law, and customary
international law played no role in the analysis.
The conceptual divide between the civil law and common law countries. The
mixed character of the doctrine of foreign state immunity has produced varying
emphasis on its component parts in the civil law and common law systems,
respectively. A review of the literature from the civil law and common law
countries reveals starkly divergent views on the roles that international law and
domestic law play in formulating state immunity policy. On the one side, the civil
law countries deem state immunity generally to be a principle of customary
international law that must be applied domestically by national courts. On the
other side, the common law countries place more emphasis on regulating state
immunity through domestic legislation, not customary international law.637
Even a brief look at the civil law literature shows that these countries are firmly
committed to the notion that state immunity originates in customary international
636 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State Immunity in Europe, 5 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 51, 61 (1992)
(emphasis added).
637 There are a few exceptions. Argentina, a civil law country, recently enacted national state immunity
legislation. Law No. 24488 (Inmunidad jurisdiccional de los Estados extranjeros ante los Tribunales
argentinos), June 22, 1995, BOLETÍN OFICIAL, June 28, 1995, at 1. In Ireland, a common law country,
the Supreme Court, in McElhinney v. Secretary of State, felt compelled to draw on customary international
law since Ireland had not enacted national immunity legislation. [1996] 1 I.L.R.M. 276.
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law. Regarding state immunity, Antonio Cassese writes that “limitations are
imposed upon State sovereignty by customary rules.”638 Jurgen Bröhmer also
writes: “The law of state immunity as it now stands as a customary rule of
international law is commonly based and justified on various general principles of
international law.”639 Professors Cassese and Brohmer, like other civil law
scholars, appear to accept state immunity’s status as international custom as a
given.640
The rationale for the civil law position largely derives from two factors: (1) the civil
law constitutional design; and (2) the lack of national immunity legislation in many
civil law countries.641 The Italian experience is illustrative. The Italian
Constitution, like many civil law constitutions, includes a broad and binding
mandate regarding national compliance with international law. Article 10 of the
Italian Constitution states: “The Italian legal system shall conform with the
generally recognized rules of international law.”642 This provision not only endows
Italian judges with the power to ensure national compliance with international
law, but also imposes a constitutional obligation to do so. Thus, Italian courts, like
most civil law courts, are generally inclined to view themselves as the chief
interpreters and enforcers of international law.643
638 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (2001).
639 BROHMER, supra note 15, at 9.
640 See id.; DAMIAN, supra note 48, at 10; see also CASSESE, supra note 151, at 91; CONFORTI, supra
note 109, at 226–27; Ress, supra note 24, at 177; Anna Wyrozumska, The State Immunity in the Practice of
Polish Courts, 1999–2000 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 77, 92, 94. But see JENÖ C. A. STAEHELIN, DIE
GEWOHNHEITSRECHTLICHE REGELUNG DER GERICHTSBARKEIT UBER FREMDE STAATEN
IM VOLKERRECHT 99–128 (1969) (arguing that foreign state immunity is regulated by the municipal
law of the forum state only).
641 See, however, the Argentine law, supra note 150.
642 COST. Art. 10, first sentence (“L’ordinamento giuridico italiano si conforma alle norme del diritto
internazionale generalmente riconosciute”). For similar provisions, see Article 25 of the German
Constitution, Article 20(1) of the Danish Constitution, Article 93 of the Spanish Constitution, Article 28 of
the Greek Constitution, and Article 8(1) of the Portuguese Constitution. For a general discussion, see
Vladlen S. Vereshchetin, New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the Relationship Between
International Law and National Law, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 29 (1996).
643 This point has been made effectively by one of Italy’s eminent scholars, Professor Conforti:
[T]he truly legal function of international law essentially is found in the internal legal systems of States.
Only through what we could term “domestic legal operators” can we describe the binding character of
international law or, better still, its ability to be implemented in a concrete and stable fashion….
[C]ompliance with international law relies not so much on enforcement mechanisms available at the
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Combined with the lack of immunity legislation in many civil law countries, this
constitutional obligation has given rise to the belief that state immunity law
derives from customary international law.644 According to one civil law scholar,
there can be no other possible origin.645 Indeed, the Italian Corte di cassazione in
the Pieciukiewicz case declared that the doctrine of state immunity is rooted in a
“customary principle” that “comes under the purview of Article 10(1)” of the Italian
Constitution.646
In contrast, the common law countries tend to perceive state immunity as more a
product of domestic law, although originally this was not the case. In The
Schooner Exchange, as seen, Justice Marshall looked to international custom to
determine the scope of entitlement to foreign state immunity.647 However, since
that early time, the common law approach has changed dramatically owing in
large part to an influential article published in 1951 by Hersch Lauterpacht
entitled The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States.648 In that
international level, but rather on the resolve of domestic legal operators such as public servants and judges
to use to their limits the mechanisms provided by municipal law to ensure compliance with international
norms. In other words, the sprawling body of international rules, pervasive in all sectors of the political,
economic and social life of each State and between States, but lacking in judicial and coercive enforcement
procedures at the international level, can be implemented only insofar as the basic values shared by all
people irrespective of nationalities are reflected by the domestic operators of all countries.
BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LEGAL
SYSTEMS 8-9 (1993).
644 The presence or absence of national immunity legislation is also significant. See the example of
McElhinney v. Secretary of State, supra note 150.
645 In the context of the immunities of international organizations, one scholar has written: “The absence of
a specific statute on the immunity of international organizations compels Italian courts to decide such
issues on the basis of international law.” Andrea Bianchi, Book Review, 88 AJIL 212, 212 (1994)
(reviewing SAVERIO DE BELLIS, L’IMMUNITA DELLE ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI
DALLA GIURISDIZIONE (1992)).
646 Pieciukiewicz, supra note 52, 78 ILR at 121. Similarly, the Greek Supreme Court stated: “We ascertain
the general practice of the nations of the international community, which is accepted as custom, that is, [we
ascertain] the formation of international custom, which is, according to article 28, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution, an integral part of the [Greek] domestic legal order, superseding any statutory provision to the
contrary.” Greek Judgment II, supra note 15, at 7. Scholars have echoed this proposition. See sources cited
supra note 153.
647 In noting states’ consent to a relaxation of absolute jurisdiction, see text at note 65 supra, Justice
Marshall added that “[t]his consent may, in some instances, be tested by common usage, and by common
opinion, growing out of that usage.” 11 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added).
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publication, the English scholar made the then-provocative declaration that there
was “no rule of international law which obliges states to grant jurisdictional
immunity to other states.”649 In support, Professor Lauterpacht relied on two
points of evidence. First, he noted that during the twentieth century when the
prevailing rule of absolute immunity began to lose its force, “international practice
show[ed] no frequent instances of protests against assumption of jurisdiction,
including execution, over foreign states.”650 Second, Lauterpacht cited the fact
that many states granted immunity privileges on the basis of reciprocity and
added that “[s]tates do not make the observance of established rules of
international law dependent upon reciprocity.”651 Free from the constraints of
international law, Lauterpacht went on to establish the “assimilative approach” to
state immunity, according to which a state is immune from suit only to the extent
that the host state enjoys immunity before its own courts.652
Upon assessing the development of state immunity law more than twenty-five
years later, Professor Brownlie, in the third edition of his treatise, observed: “it is
difficult as yet to see a new principle which would satisfy the criteria of uniformity
and consistency required for the formation of a rule of customary international
law.”653 Brownlie suggested a “fresh approach” to state immunity:
The concepts of sovereign immunity…, the exclusive jurisdiction of the state
within its own territory, and the need for an express license for a foreign state to
operate within that national jurisdiction…, can be taken as starting points. Each
state has an existing power, subject to treaty obligations, to exclude foreign
public agencies, including even diplomatic representation. If a state chooses, it
648 Lauterpacht, supra note 27. According to one leading commentator on state immunity, Lauterpacht’s
essay “had a strong stimulative effect in the United States.” Address by Monroe Leigh, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, STATE IMMUNITY: LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 3, 3 (Proceedings of a conference held on Nov. 17, 1978).
649 Lauterpacht, supra note 27, at 228.
650 Id. at 227.
651 Id. at 228.
652 Id. at 236–41.
653 See BROWNLIE (3d), supra note 66, at 333; see also Higgins, supra note 19, at 271.
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would enact a law governing immunities of foreign states which would enumerate
those acts which would involve acceptance of the local jurisdiction.654
After citing as examples of such acts the conclusion of contracts subject to
private law and consent to arbitration, Brownlie proposed that foreign trade
partners of the host state be notified about the new legislation, which would take
effect after sufficient time to allow them to withdraw, and that rights under such
agreements could be reserved. He continued:
States would thus be given a license to operate within the jurisdiction with
express conditions and the basis of sovereign immunity, as explained in
the Schooner Exchange, would be observed. Such a legal regime would
be subject to the inevitable immunity ratione materiae…, and the
principles of international law as to jurisdiction. The approach suggested
would avoid the difficulties of the distinction between acts jure gestionis
and acts jure imperii.655
Thus, Brownlie, like Lauterpacht, suggested that the doctrine of immunity was not
a rule of customary international law.
Lauterpacht and other commentators who agreed with him influenced the
contemporary common law view of state immunity.656 Indeed, Monroe Leigh, the
654 BROWNLIE (3d), supra note 66, at 334 (internal references omitted).
655 Id. (footnotes and internal reference omitted). Professor Brownlie reaffirmed his doubts as to the
existence of a customary rule of foreign state immunity more recently. Id. (5th), supra note 6, at 332–33.
656 Another scholar well versed in the common law concluded a significant study on state immunity
practice by stating: “[I]t has become difficult to say whether State immunity is a question of customary
international law, of treaty law or of domestic law.” SCHREUER, supra note 114, at 4. Some common law
scholars, however, have disagreed with Lauterpacht and Brownlie. The American Law Institute, for
example, maintains that “[t]he immunity of a state from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state is an
undisputed principle of customary international law.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, ch. 5 Introductory
Note, at 390. Professor Jennings has posited:
[I]t is difficult to see how immunity can be denied the status of a rule of international law when
certain constituents of the same general principle-e.g. the immunity enjoyed by visiting heads of
State, or foreign warships in port, as well as on the seas—have all the marks of firm and general
public international law. Diplomatic immunities,—of those who represent the sovereign, and
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FSIA’s chief architect, stated that in the years leading up to the U.S. change in
policy from the absolute to the restrictive approach to immunity, “there was no
agreement among the students of international law as to whether Sovereign
Immunity was a principle of customary international law or merely a matter of
comity between nations.”657 Consequently, when reforming U.S. state immunity
policy in the 1970s, the drafters of the FSIA undoubtedly felt free to operate on
the basis that, save for a limited area of immunity law governed primarily by
treaty, “the entire field is open to definition by domestic law.”658 That several
common law countries followed the U.S. lead and enacted their own domestic
immunity legislation reflects broad consensus on this matter.659
The distinct perspectives of the civil law and common law countries regarding the
source of state immunity law have yielded divergent approaches to solving the
human rights litigation problem. The civil law countries, with their emphasis on
international law, are arguably more inclined to address human rights issues on
the international law level and thus more receptive to approaches like the
normative hierarchy theory.660 The common law countries, with their skepticism
about state immunity’s broad reach under international law, generally prefer to
regulate state immunities through the application of domestic legislation.661 While
the merits of each approach are debatable, the civil law perspective has created,
which immunities can be waived by him-have recently been confirmed as rules of international
law by the International Court of Justice.
JENNINGS, supra note 70, at 4–5; see also FOX, supra note 15, at 68-70.
657 Leigh, supra note 161, at 4.
658 Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A Founder’s View, 35
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 302 (1986).
659 Professor Badr compiled a collection of many of these statutes. BADR, supra note 16, appendices, at
169. But see Andrea Bianchi, Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human Rights, 46 AUS. J. PUB. &
INT’L L. 195, 197 (1994) (“The fact that the rulings of domestic courts have shaped the developments of
state immunity and that, recently, some states have passed legislation on the subject, does not infringe upon
the international nature of the rule.”).
660 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, the only case to adopt the normative hierarchy
theory, originated in a civil law country, Greece.
661 Accordingly, the statement by the Swiss Federal Tribunal that a “state cannot be brought before the
courts of another state except in exceptional circumstances” is inaccurate. See text at note 108 supra.
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as explained below, a propensity for adopting the normative hierarchy theory and
thus unnecessarily complicates resolution of the human rights litigation problem.
8.4 The Relationship between Human Rights and State Immunity
In light of the discussion in part I, one must measure the normative hierarchy
theory against two fundamental legal realities: (1) state immunity arises not out of
a fundamental right of statehood but, rather, out of the concession of a forum
state’s right of adjudicatory jurisdiction; and (2) foreign states are not entitled to
immunity under customary international law as to most, if not all, activity that
constitutes human rights offenses.662 The common thread running through both
observations (and the crucial point that the normative hierarchy theory overlooks)
is that the forum state, not the foreign state defendant, holds the authority to
regulate the scope and content of the state immunity privilege. Part II presents a
summary of the normative hierarchy theory, as developed in the American and
European contexts, and then turns to a substantive critique of the theory.
The Anatomy of the Normative Hierarchy Theory
The American approach. The normative hierarchy argument had its genesis in
the United States. The notion that foreign sovereign immunity might be trumped
by superior international law norms first emerged as a reaction to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp.663 In that case, the plaintiffs sued in tort to reclaim losses arising out of the
unprovoked bombing of an oil tanker on the high seas by the government of
Argentina, allegedly a violation of international law.664 The Court ruled that the
FSIA was “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state” in U.S.
662 Such claims would also have to fall within the forum state’s right to exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction
with respect to them.
663 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
664 Id. at 431.
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courts.665 Moreover, the Court held that American courts may hear suits against
foreign states only where Congress has explicitly provided a statutory exception
to the FSIA’s general rule of immunity.666 A suit involving an armed attack against
a ship on the high seas was not one over which Congress had intended the
courts to exercise jurisdiction, the Court found, and thus it rejected the plaintiffs’
claim.667
The Court’s restrictive interpretation of the FSIA’s exceptions to immunity
prompted a group of three law students to publish an inventive Comment in 1991
entitled Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for
Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law.668 The authors propose that
states lose all entitlement to state immunity under international law when they
injure individuals in violation of jus cogens norms. Their theory starts from the
premise that, following the Nuremberg trials, the structure of international law
changed; in particular, the “rise of jus cogens” placed substantial limitations on
state conduct in the name of peaceful international relations.669 Indeed,
“[b]ecause jus cogens norms are hierarchically superior to the positivist or
voluntary laws of consent, they absolutely restrict the freedom of the state in the
exercise of its sovereign powers.”670
665 Id. at 434. Accordingly, the Court rejected each of the plaintiffs’ proposed bases of jurisdiction: the U.S.
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350, general admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §1333, and the
principle of universal jurisdiction under customary international law.
666 Id. at 434–35. The Court noted that Congress had clearly addressed international law violations in 28
U.S.C. §1605(a)(3), which denies foreign states immunity in cases “in which rights in property taken in
violation of international law are in issue.” Id. at 435–36.
667 The plaintiffs argued to no avail that the facts of the case triggered the FSIA’s noncommercial torts
exception, §1605(a)(5), and that the Argentine government’s ratification of certain treaties regulating state
conduct on the high seas triggered §1604, the “international agreements” exception. Id. at 439–43. Some
have argued that, while not a formal exception to immunity under the FSIA, the international agreements
exception is a mechanism for denying a state immunity for violations of international law. See, e.g., Von
Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F.Supp. 246, 255–56 (D.D.C. 1985); Jordan J. Paust,
Draft Brief Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity for
Violations of International Law Under the FSIA, 8 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 49, 61–65 (1985).
668 Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva, & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A
Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 365 (1989).
669 Id. at 381, 385-89.
670 Id. at 386.
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This conclusion has ramifications for the doctrine of state immunity, the authors
argue. Their theory turns on the assumption that state immunity is a product of
state sovereignty,
resting “on the foundation that sovereign states are equal and independent and
thus cannot be bound by foreign law without their consent.”671 Since state
immunity is not a peremptory norm, when invoked in defense of a violation of jus
cogens, it must yield to “the ‘general will’ of the international community of
states.”672 Accordingly,
[b]ecause jus cogens, by definition, is a set of rules from which states may
not derogate, a state act in violation of such a rule will not be recognized
as a sovereign act by the community of states, and the violating state
therefore may not claim the right of sovereign immunity for its actions.673
In causing harm to an individual in violation of jus cogens, a state may no longer
raise an immunity defense because the state may be regarded as having
implicitly waived any entitlement to immunity.674 To give domestic effect to this
waiver in U.S. courts, the authors point to section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA, which
empowers the exercise of district court jurisdiction in cases in which a state “has
waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication.”675
While the implied waiver argument has never formed the basis of a legal decision
in U.S. courts, it has not lacked influence on U.S. judges.676 In Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina,677 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
accepted the argument’s basic premise. The case involved the alleged torture of
671 Id. at 390.
672 Id.
673 Id. at 377.
674 Id. at 394.
675 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(1) (emphasis added).
676 The closest that a U.S. court has come was in Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in
which the Court concluded, on the basis of the FSIA’s “international agreements” exception, that the Soviet
Union could not claim immunity for certain acts that constituted breaches of treaties to which the Soviet
Union was a party. 623 F.Supp. 246, 256 (D.D.C. 1985).
677 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Belsky et al., supra note 181).
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an Argentine citizen and expropriation of property by Argentine military
officials.678 Following the logic of the implied waiver theory, the plaintiffs argued
that jus cogens trumps foreign state immunity, resulting in the defendant’s loss of
immunity for torturing the victim, José Siderman.679 The court determined that
Argentina was not immune from suit because Argentina had waived its
entitlement to immunity under section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA by involving itself in
U.S. legal proceedings,680 but in dicta it echoed the plaintiff’s arguments, stating
that “[a] state’s violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture
therefore would not be entitled to the immunity afforded by international law.”681
The normative hierarchy argument again received substantial consideration in
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,682 a case involving claims of personal
injury and forced labor arising from the plaintiff’s imprisonment in Nazi
concentration camps. In Princz, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia denied the plaintiff’s claims, specifically rejecting the normative
hierarchy argument.683 Judge Patricia Wald, however, advocated its application
in an impassioned dissent. “Germany waived its sovereign immunity by violating
the jus cogens norms of international law condemning enslavement and
genocide,” she wrote.684 To support this conclusion, Judge Wald contended: “Jus
cogens norms are by definition nonderogable, and thus when a state thumbs its
nose at such a norm, in effect overriding the collective will of the entire
international community, the state cannot be performing a sovereign act entitled
to immunity.”685 Judge Wald considered the waiver of immunity to be a fact of
678 Id. at 702–04.
679 Id. at 714–19.
680 Id. at 719–23.
681 Id. at 718.
682 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
683 The majority’s decision against the plaintiff turned on the determination that the “jus cogens theory of
implied waiver is incompatible with the intentionality requirement implicit in §1605(a)(1),” the waiver
exception. Id. at 1174.
684 Id. at 1179 (Wald, J., dissenting).
685 Id. at 1182.
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international law and thus urged that the FSIA’s waiver provision be construed
consistently, so as to allow plaintiffs to sue states for violations of jus cogens.686
Though never formally accepted as the basis for judicial decision in U.S. courts,
the normative hierarchy theory continues to spark interest among jurists and
scholars alike. Plaintiffs suing under the FSIA for alleged human rights violations
continually press for its application.687 Numerous scholars and international law
commentators have also become engaged in the debate over the validity of the
normative hierarchy theory.688 However, the current position of U.S. courts to
interpret the FSIA’s implied waiver provision strictly is likely to incapacitate the
normative hierarchy theory from amending U.S. state immunity policy.
The contribution of continental Europe.689 Though it originated in the United
States, the normative hierarchy theory has had a substantial impact in the
686 Id. at 1183–84.
687 In Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the court intimated acceptance of the normative
hierarchy theory, stating:
[W]e conclude that Congress’s concept of an implied waiver, as used in the FSIA, cannot be
extended so far as to include a state’s existence in the community of nations—a status that
arguably should carry with it an expectation of amenability to suit in a foreign court for violations
of fundamental norms of international law.
101 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs continue to raise the normative hierarchy theory in U.S. courts.
See, e.g., Boshnjaku v. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 2002 WL 1575067 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2002); Garb
v. Republic of Poland, 207 F.Supp.2d 16 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de
Fer Francais, 175 F.Supp.2d 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Joo v. Japan, 172 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001); In re
World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F.Supp.2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Hirsh v. State
of Israel, 962 F.Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
688 The theory has received considerable support among American scholars. See Bederman, supra note 47,
at 282; William Pepper, Iraq’s Crimes of State Against Individuals, and Sovereign Immunity, 18 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 313 (1992); Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some
Thoughts on Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 403 (1995); see also
KENNETH RANDALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PARADIGM (1990); Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23
VA. J. INT’L L. 191 (1983). A number of student-written notes have also supported the theory. See, e.g.,
Joseph G. Bergen, Note, Princz v. The Federal Republic of Germany: Why the Courts Should Find That
Violating Jus Cogens Norms Constitutes an Implied Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L.
169 (1999); Thora A. Johnson, Note, A Violation of Jus Cogens Norms as an Implicit Waiver of Immunity
Under the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 259 (1995); Scott A.
Richman, Comment, Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina: Can the FSIA Grant Immunity for
Violations of Jus Cogens Norms? 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 967 (1993).
689 This heading is not meant to imply that no consideration of the relationship between human rights and
foreign state immunity has occurred outside the United States and Europe. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 24,
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countries of continental Europe.690 For instance, in his treatise on public
international law, Professor Cassese writes that “peremptory norms [or jus
cogens] may impact on State immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign States, in
that they may remove such immunity.”691 In support, he cites, among other
sources, Judge Wald’s dissent in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany.692
Professor Bianchi states that “[r]eliance on the hierarchy of norms in the
international legal system is a viable argument to assert non-immunity for major
violations of international human rights.”693 The European brand of the theory is
nearly identical in concept to its American predecessor: because jus cogens, a
primary norm, is hierarchically superior to state immunity, a secondary norm, a
foreign state is not immune for violations of human rights norms of a peremptory
nature.
Where the European approach distinguishes itself is in its potential to affect
national state immunity policy. Since the civil law countries of continental Europe
have not enacted national immunity legislation and many of their constitutional
at 121 (stating that it is “unlikely that an Australian court would be prepared to recognise an implied
exception to immunity for jus cogens violations in the Australian [State Immunity] Act”); Niranjini
Vivekananthan, The Doctrine of State Immunity & Human Rights Violations of Foreign States, 8 SRI
LANKA J. INT’L L. 125 (1996) (supporting the normative hierarchy theory).
690 The United Kingdom is excluded from this category merely because its experience with the normative
hierarchy theory is similar to that of the United States. Indeed, in the area of foreign state immunity law,
the United Kingdom and the United States have traveled along a similar path. See generally Clark C.
Siewert, Note, Reciprocal Influence of British and United States Law: Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law
from The Schooner Exchange to the State Immunity Act of 1978, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 761
(1980). As with the U.S. approach to the theory, UK courts have restrictively interpreted the exceptions to
immunity in the State Immunity Act so as to stymie its application to human rights cases. See Al-Adsani v.
Kuwait, 103 ILR 420 (Q.B. 1995), aff’d, 107 ILR 536 (C.A. 1996). However, the normative hierarchy
theory has found some support. Id. at 547 (Ward, J., concurring) (interpreting the Act narrowly but
recognizing that the theory “is a powerful one”). The dissent in Al-Adsani before the European Court of
Human Rights also supported the theory. ECHR Judgment, supra note 1, at 29 (Rozakis, Caflisch,
Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto, & Vajie, JJ., dissenting).
691 CASSESE, supra note 151, at 145.
692 Id.
693 Bianchi, supra note 172, at 219. The European literature is replete with additional support for the
normative hierarchy theory. See, e.g., Magdalini Karagiannakis, State Immunity and Fundamental Human
Rights, 11 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9 (1998); Juliane Kokott, Mißbrauch und Verwirkung von
Souveranitatsrechten bei ravierenden Völkerrechtsverstößen, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND
BEWAHRUNG: VÖLKERRECHT—EUROPARECHT—STAATSRECHT, FESTSCHRIFT FUR
RUDOLF BERNHARDT 135 (1995); Norman Paech, Wehrmachtsverbrechen in Griechenland, 32
KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 380 (1999).
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systems oblige national courts to look to international law for guidance on foreign
state immunity,694 it comes as no surprise that the civil law Europeans approach
the normative hierarchy theory from the perspective of progressive jurisprudential
development. Professor Bianchi, for example, calls for “a coherent interpretation”
of the norms of the international legal order to resolve “the inconsistency
between the rule of state immunity and the principle of protection of fundamental
human rights.”695 According to Bianchi, ensuring that the application of
international law produces just results requires judges to undertake a “value-
oriented” interpretation of international law norms, giving preference to
peremptory norms, such as the protection of human rights, over norms of lesser
importance, such as state immunity.696
Largely free from the constraints of national immunity legislation and treaty
obligations, a civil law court not surprisingly would feel inclined to make the type
of “value-oriented” decision that Bianchi encourages. The adjudication of
Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany in the Greek courts
provides an apt example. The facts of the case arose out of the Nazi occupation
of southern Greece during World War II. During that period Nazi military troops
committed war atrocities against the local inhabitants of the Prefecture of Voiotia
in 1944, particularly in the village of Distomo, including willful murder and
destruction of personal property. Over fifty years later, the plaintiffs, mostly
descendants of the victims, sued the Federal Republic of Germany in the Greek
Court of First Instance of Leivadia for compensation for the material damage and
mental suffering endured at the hands of the Nazis.697
On the preliminary matter of jurisdiction, the court of first instance invoked the
normative hierarchy theory to rule that Germany was not immune from suit. The
694 See text at notes 151–59 supra.
695 Bianchi, supra note 172, at 220; see also Andrea Bianchi, Overcoming the Hurdle of State Immunity in
the Domestic Enforcement of International Human Rights, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 405 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997).
696 Bianchi, supra note 172, at 222.
697 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 137/1997 (Ct. 1st Inst. Leivadia, Oct. 30,
1997), translated in Maria Gavouneli, War Reparation Claims and State Immunity, 50 REVUE
HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 595 (1997) [hereinafter Greek Judgment I]. For an
English summary of the decision, see Ilias Bantekas, Case Report: Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal
Republic of Germany, 92 AJIL 765 (1998).
461
court found that, “according to the prevailing contemporary theory and practice of
international law opinion,… the state cannot invoke immunity when the act
attributed to it has been perpetrated in breach of a jus cogens rule.”698 The rule of
jus cogens that the court identified was contained in Articles 43 and 46 of the
regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land (Hague Regulations).699 Article 43 obligates an
occupying power to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory and to
ensure public order and safety, while Article 46 obliges occupying powers to
protect certain rights of the occupied, especially the rights to family honor, life,
private property, and religious convictions.700 The court concluded that the
demonstrated breach of this rule deprives a state of an immunity defense in
domestic proceedings.
The reasons that the court provided in support of its decision are revealing and
worth reiterating in their entirety:
a) When a state is in breach of peremptory rules of international law, it cannot
lawfully expect to be granted the right of immunity. Consequently, it is deemed to
have tacitly waived such right (constructive waiver through the operation of
international law); b) Acts of the state in breach of peremptory international law
cannot qualify as sovereign acts of state. In such cases the defendant state is not
considered as acting within its capacity as sovereign; c) Acts contrary to
peremptory international law are null and void and cannot give rise to lawful
rights, such as immunity (in application of the general principle of law ex iniuria
jus non oritur); d) the recognition of immunity for an act contrary to peremptory
international law would amount to complicity of the national court to the
promotion of an act strongly condemned by the international public order; e) The
invocation of immunity for acts committed in breach of a peremptory norm of
698 Greek Judgment I, supra note 210, at 599.
699 Id.
700 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 43, annexed to Hague Convention
[No. IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631
[hereinafter Hague Regulations].
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international law would constitute abuse of right; and finally f) Given that the
principle of territorial sovereignty, as a fundamental rule of the international legal
order, supersedes the principle of immunity, a state in breach of the former when
in illegal occupation of foreign territory, cannot possibl[y] invoke the principle of
immunity for acts committed during such illegal military occupation.701
The reasoning in subsections a) through e) bears the traditional marks of the
normative hierarchy theory. The court’s pronouncement in subsection d) would
appear to take the theory one step further, indicating that its nonapplication
would implicate the forum state in the foreign state defendant’s alleged breach of
international law. Subsection f) is somewhat incongruous, seemingly advocating
an entirely separate ground for denying immunity based on the forum state’s
authority to define its own state immunity law. Relying on this reasoning, the
court awarded the plaintiffs 9.5 billion drachmas (approximately $30 million) in
the form of a default judgment.702
The Hellenic Supreme Court, Areios Pagos, affirmed the holding of the lower
court and arguably supported its reasoning relating to the normative hierarchy
theory.703 The Court began its analysis with the so-called torts exception to
immunity. After reviewing the international law landscape,704 the Court concluded
that an exception to immunity for torts committed by a foreign state in the forum
state’s territory was established in customary international law, “even if the acts
were acta jure imperii.”705 Second, the Court identified what it perceived as an
obstacle to application of the torts exception in this case: the atrocities at issue
701 Greek Judgment I, supra note 210, at 599–600.
702 Ralph Atkins & Gerrit Wiesmann, Greek Reparations Move Angers Berlin, FIN. TIMES (London), July
12, 2000, World News—Europe, at 10.
703 Greek Judgment II, supra note 15. For an English summary and commentary on the case, see Maria
Gavouneli & Ilias Bantekas, Case Report: Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, 95 AJIL
198 (2001). For an analytical discussion of the case, see Bernhard Kempen, Der Fall Distomo: Griechische
Reparationsforderungen gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in TRADITION UND WELTOFFENHEIT
DES RECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT STEINBERGER 179 (Hans Joachim-Cremer et al. eds.,
2002).
704 The Court cited the European Convention on State Immunity, supra note 26, the ILC’s draft articles on
state immunity, supra note 111, and the work of the Institut de Droit International, supra note 113, as well
as U.S. case law.
705 Greek Judgment II, supra note 15, at 7.
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were probably committed in the course of armed conflict, a situation in which the
foreign state, even as occupier, would generally retain immunity.706 However, the
Court found that this rule of immunity was inapplicable, because
in the case of military occupation that is directly derived from an armed
conflict and that, according to the now customary rule of Article 43 of the
[Hague Regulations], does not bring about a change in sovereignty or
preclude the application of the laws of the occupied State, crimes carried
out by organs of the occupying power in abuse of their sovereign power
do not attract immunity.707
Accordingly, the Court determined that the Nazi atrocities were an “abuse of
sovereign power,” on which Germany could not base an immunity defense.708
The Court’s decision to apply the torts exception to deny immunity for acts
ostensibly of a public nature itself represents an interesting departure from the
traditional public/private distinction in state immunity law. What is more attention
grabbing about the decision, though, is that the Court, in reaching it, drew upon
the normative hierarchy theory. Specifically, the Court found that the Nazi acts in
question were “in breach of rules of peremptory international law (Article 46 of
the [Hague Regulations]),” and thus that “they were not acts jure imperii.”709
Consequently, the Court concluded that Germany had impliedly waived its
immunity.710 As a result, one may view the Court’s decision as the first
endorsement of the normative hierarchy theory by a significant national tribunal.
706 Id. The Court cited paragraph 4 of the commentary on Article 12 in the ILC’s draft articles on the
jurisdictional immunities of states, supra note 111, which limits the scope of that provision to “intentional
physical harm such as assault and battery, malicious damage to property, arson or even homicide, including
political assassination”; Article 31 of the European Convention, supra note 26, which provides: “Nothing
in this Convention shall affect any immunities or privileges enjoyed by a Contracting State in respect of
anything done or omitted to be done by, or in relation to, its armed forces when on the territory of another
Contracting State”; and Article 16(2) of the UK State Immunity Act, 1978, supra note 3, which states:
“This Part of this Act does not apply to proceedings relating to anything done by or in relation to the armed
forces of a State while present in the United Kingdom and, in particular, has effect subject to the Visiting
Forces Act 1952.”
707 Greek Judgment II, supra note 15, at 10.
708 Id. at 14–15.
709 Id. at 15.
710 Id.
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The Greek Supreme Court’s decision is a substantial contribution to state
immunity practice in itself. Yet it is perhaps more significant as a potential
harbinger of developments in state immunity policy in other similarly oriented
countries, which neither have enacted national immunity legislation nor are
parties to the European Convention on State Immunity. For this
group of states, the national courts possess the primary authority to define
foreign state immunity law and many, like Greece, may be bound to look to
international law for applicable
guidance.711
A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory
The misalignment of norms. Supporters of the normative hierarchy theory
perceive the human rights litigation problem as a conflict between two
international law norms, state immunity and jus cogens. In short, the superior
norm of jus cogens is capable of striking down the inferior norm of state
immunity, allowing the human rights victim to advance his or her claim.712
However, this approach is flawed conceptually because the norms that are
purportedly at odds with one another under the normative hierarchy theory in
reality never clash.
As part I demonstrated, state immunity is not a norm that arises from a
fundamental principle of international law, such as state equality, or from the
711 Pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Greek Constitution, a generally accepted rule of international law
constitutes an integral part of the Greek legal order, which may even supersede a contrary statutory
provision. For a discussion of the status of international law under Greek law, see A. A. Fatouros,
International Law in the New Greek Constitution, 70 AJIL 492, 501 (1976); Emmanuel Roucounas, Grèce,
in L’INTÉGRATION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMMUNAUTAIRE DANS L’ORDRE
JURIDIQUE NATIONAL 287 (Pierre Michel Eisemann ed., 1996).
712 As Judge Wald stated:
[A] state is never entitled to immunity for any act that contravenes a jus cogens norm…. The rise
of jus cogens norms limits state sovereignty “in the sense that the ‘general will’ of the
international community of states, and other actors, will take precedence over the individual wills
of states to order their relations.”
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting)
(quoting Mary Ellen Turpel & Philippe Sands, Peremptory International Law and Sovereignty: Some
Questions, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 364, 365 (1988)).
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latter’s purported theoretical derivative, the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium.713 To reiterate briefly: The principle of state equality guarantees that
states will enjoy equal capacity for rights. This capacity diminishes when a state
intrudes on another state’s sphere of authority, and becomes virtually dormant
within another state’s territorial borders. There is thus no inherent right of state
immunity, as, ironically, is often suggested in the writings in support of the
normative hierarchy approach.714
Moreover, the practice by states of waiving adjudicatory jurisdiction to create
immunity privileges has created binding norms through the development of
international custom as to only a core body of state conduct. Such norms do not
apply to state conduct, e.g., the violation of the human rights of another state’s
citizens, that undermines the aim and purpose of the international legal order. If a
foreign state receives immunity protection for such conduct, it is because that
protection is afforded by the domestic policies of the forum state or, in the case of
a few select states, pursuant to the European Convention. Accordingly, the
norms of state immunity and jus cogens do not clash at all insofar as human
rights violations are concerned. To accept otherwise, as the normative hierarchy
theory does, endows foreign states with more of a claim to state immunity than
reality dictates.
If there is any clash of international law norms that underpins the human rights
litigation problem, it is between human rights protections and the right of the
forum state to regulate the authority of its judicial organs, otherwise known as the
right of adjudicatory jurisdiction. As demonstrated in part I, as a threshold matter
state immunity operates as an exception to the overriding principle of
adjudicatory jurisdiction and as customary international law does not cover
human rights offenses.715 Any protections for human rights abuses on the
713 See text at notes 28–116 supra.
714 See, for example, the statement of the authors of Implied Waiver Under the FSIA in the text at note 184
supra; Judge Wald’s dissent in Princz, 26 F.3d at 1181, maintaining that state immunity “hinges on the
notion that a state’s consent to suit is a necessary prerequisite to another state’s exercise of jurisdiction.”
See also Greek Judgment II, supra note 15, at 3 (stating that state immunity is “a consequence of the
sovereignty, independence, and equality of states and purports to avoid any interference with international
affairs”).
715 See text at notes 74–104, 121–40 supra.
466
domestic level thus result purely from the exercise of the forum state’s right of
adjudicatory jurisdiction. That is, the forum state with ultimate authority to
establish the entitlement of state immunity has chosen to close its courts to
meaningful human rights litigation. Therefore, rather than being between jus
cogens and state immunity, the real conflict is between jus cogens and the
principle of adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Finally, even if state immunity were an international law norm that shields states
from liability for human rights claims, the normative hierarchy theory would fail to
explain persuasively how a clash of norms would arise. Lady Fox criticizes the
theory, asserting that, as “a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national
court,” state immunity “does not contradict a prohibition contained in a jus cogens
norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a different method of settlement.”716
Essentially, the norms of human rights and state immunity, while mutually
reinforcing, govern distinct and exclusive aspects of the international legal
order.717 On the one hand, human rights norms protect the individual’s
“inalienable and legally enforceable rights…. against state interference and the
abuse of power by governments.”718 On the other hand, state immunity norms
enable state officials “to carry out their public functions effectively and… to
secure the orderly conduct of international relations.”719 To demonstrate a clash
of international law norms, the normative hierarchy theory must prove the
existence of a jus cogens norm that prohibits the granting of immunity for
violations of human rights by foreign states. However, the normative hierarchy
theory provides no evidence of such a peremptory norm.
Questions surrounding the application of jus cogens. Unresolved issues
surrounding the application of jus cogens further undermine the appeal of the
716 FOX, supra note 15, at 525.
717 Those who find a conflict between these norms have overlooked the fact that state immunity protection
for human rights violations is not a product of international law.
718 AKEHURST, supra note 6, at 209.
719 FOX, supra note 15, at 1.
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normative hierarchy theory.720 While the existence of jus cogens in international
law is an increasingly accepted proposition, its exact scope and content remains
an open question.721 Proponents of the normative hierarchy theory, in particular,
have failed to generate a precise list of human rights norms with a peremptory
character.722 To be sure, consensus is emerging as to the status of certain
norms, such as the prohibitions against piracy, genocide, slavery, aggression,
and torture.723 Yet these norms, despite their importance to the community of
nations, represent only a small fraction of the norms that potentially may belong
to the body of peremptory norms.724 In Prefecture of Voiotia, for example, the
Greek courts identified the rights of family honor, life, private property, and
religious convictions, enshrined in Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, as the
operative jus cogens.725 Further, the concept of jus cogens is not confined solely
to the realm of human rights. Commentators have suggested that crucial
720 The existence of jus cogens in international law is a highly contentious matter. See the presentation of
opposing views on the topic in Colloquy, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 359, 359–69 (1988). To simplify matters,
this article assumes the existence of jus cogens. It also assumes that jus cogens is effective outside the field
of international treaty making, where the modern manifestation of the concept emerged. This, too, is a
controversial assumption. Compare CHRISTOS L. ROSENSTEIN-ROZAKIS, THE PEREMPTORY
NORMS OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (JUS COGENS) UNDER THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 15 (1973), with OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, at 8, and
Andreas Zimmermann, Sovereign Immunity and Violations of International Jus Cogens—Some Critical
Remarks, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433, 437–40 (1995). Note that the legitimacy of such assumptions has no
bearing on the central thesis of this article, which does not hinge on the existence or nonexistence of jus
cogens, but on the fact that state immunity protections for human rights violations are rooted in neither
fundamental principles of international law nor international custom.
721 See BROWNLIE (5th), supra note 6, at 516–17; OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, at 7.
722 See Anthony D’Amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Jus Cogens! 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1990)
(noting facetiously that “the sheer ephemerality of jus cogens is an asset, enabling any writer to christen
any ordinary norm of his or her choice as a new jus cogens norm, thereby in one stroke investing it with
magical power”); Karagiannakis, supra note 206, at 15–16 (ascribing immunity-piercing characteristics to
the general category of “fundamental human rights”).
723 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), held that state-sanctioned torture violates jus
cogens.
724 The body of literature considering the subject is rich. See, e.g., Antonio Gómez Robledo, Le Jus cogens
international: Sa genese, sa nature, ses fonctions, 172 RECUEIL DES COURS 9–217 (1981 III); Levan A.
Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law, id. at 219–70; Giorgio Gaja, Jus
Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention, id. At 279–89; Gordon Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding
Interests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (1988).
725 Greek Judgment I, supra note 210, at 599; Greek Judgment II, supra note 15, at 15.
468
fundamental international law norms, such as pacta sunt servanda, may also
constitute jus cogens.726
The undefined character of jus cogens,727 coupled with the general applicability
of the normative hierarchy theory, which invests all peremptory norms with
immunity-stripping potential, may present problems for the courts. Requiring
application of the theory beyond cases of genocide, slavery, and torture would
place national courts in an awkward position. The theory not only would deprive
the forum state of its right to regulate access to its own courts,728 but also would
force them to determine whether a particular norm of international law had
attained the status of jus cogens, a task that international legal scholars have
grappled with for decades with only limited success.729 Further, the normative
hierarchy theory logically requires courts to treat all violations of peremptory
norms uniformly, even violations of norms that do not implicate human rights but
are arguably jus cogens, such as pacta sunt servanda. In addition, allowing the
courts to determine the parameters of jus cogens through application of the
normative hierarchy theory may undermine the principle of separation of powers,
in some cases inappropriately transferring foreign-policymaking power from the
political branches of government to the judiciary.730 Finally, as Judges Pellonpaa
and Bratza warned in the Al-Adsani case, adoption of the normative hierarchy
726 See e.g., William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 257, 293 (1998). The American Law Institute maintains that “[i]t is generally accepted
that the principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force… have the character of jus
cogens.” RESTATEMENT, supra note 28, §102 cmt. K Professor Tunkin has even suggested that the
Brezhnev doctrine, or “proletarian internationalism,” as he describes it, is a jus cogens norm. GRIGORY
TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 444 (1974).
727 One may wish to criticize the normative hierarchy theory by capitalizing on this uncertainty, arguing
that many human rights norms are not jus cogens and thus that the theory is unfounded. Such criticism is
fruitless, however, as it simply provokes the equally sound and unprovable response that human rights
norms are indeed peremptory in nature. For that reason, this article avoids challenging the normative
hierarchy theory on these grounds.
728 Reimann, supra note 201, at 421.
729 For example, within the span of one case of interest, Prefecture of Voiotia, the Greek courts determined
(without significant support) that Articles 43 and 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 213, were
jus cogens. Greek Judgment I, supra note 210, at 599; Greek Judgment II, supra note 15, at 15.
730 This risk is perhaps most problematic in countries whose national legislatures have enacted immunity
legislation. In this situation, application of the normative hierarchy theory by the courts may thwart the
intent of the legislature.
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theory could be the first step on a slippery slope that begins with state immunity
from jurisdiction but could quickly extend to state immunity from execution
against sovereign property and ultimately threaten the “orderly international co-
operation” between states.731
Second, if, as mentioned above, the true clash of norms underpinning the human
rights litigation problem is between the protection of human rights and the
principle of adjudicatory jurisdiction, what, then, is the relationship between these
two norms? A thorough answer to this question cannot be offered in an article of
this length, but a brief exploration of the issue may be enlightening.
If jus cogens is defined as a body of norms representing the core, nonderogable
values of the community of states, then included in this body, arguably, is the
principle of state jurisdiction, i.e., a state’s freedom to exercise jurisdiction,
especially on the basis of territoriality, through its own governmental institutions,
including its national courts.732 Support for this proposition is reflected in the core
principles of international law, which consider the state the basic building block of
the international legal order.733 In fact, most of the foundational rules of
international law hold as the highest value the protection of the territorial integrity,
independence, and equality of states.734 Even taking account of recent
731 ECHR Judgment, supra note 1, at 27. Immunity from execution is a topic distinct from immunity from
judicial proceedings. For instance, even if a court denies a foreign state immunity and holds it liable to the
plaintiff in a quantified amount of damages, the law may still bar the forced execution of the court’s
judgment against the foreign state’s property. For a more in-depth explanation of immunity from execution,
see BADR, supra note 16, at 107-12; Sinclair, supra note 68, at 218-42.
732 Professor Scheuner has proposed three categories of jus cogens norms: (1) “the maxims of international
law which protect the foundations of law, peace and humanity in the international order and which at
present are considered by nations as the minimum standard for their mutual relations”; (2) “the rules of
peaceful cooperation in the sphere of international law which protect fundamental common interests”; and
(3) “norms regard[ing] the protection of humanity, especially of the most essential human rights.” Ulrich
Scheuner, Conflict of Treaty Provisions with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law, and Its
Consequences, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VÖLKERRECHT 520, 526–27 (1967). Thus, it appears conceptually feasible that the principle of state
jurisdiction, which arguably falls under one of the first two categories, could be jus cogens just like certain
human rights norms, which fall under category three. See also Alexidze, supra note 237, at 260 (identifying
“non-interference with domestic affairs” as jus cogens).
733 SHAW, quoted in note 40 supra, at 331 (further noting that “the principle whereby a state is deemed to
exercise exclusive power over its territory can be regarded as a fundamental axiom of classical international
law”).
734 Id. at 332.
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developments in international law that limit state sovereignty, such as in the
areas of human rights and environmental law,735 it cannot be said at this point in
time that any rule has emerged that would limit a state’s authority to determine its
own jurisdiction over foreign states.736
If the principle of state jurisdiction is so paramount to the community of states as
to place it within the body of jus cogens, the human rights litigation problem may
involve a clash of two peremptory norms, the protection of human rights and the
principle of exclusive state jurisdiction. This scenario raises perplexing questions
of international law. Can there be a hierarchy of norms within the body of
peremptory norms and, if so, which ranks higher, human rights or territorial
jurisdiction? The answers to these questions, if any, lie deep in uncharted
territory of international legal scholarship and cannot be ascertained here.737 The
very fact that the normative hierarchy theory would appear to lead courts into
such a theoretical abyss casts doubt on its practical viability and utility.
Denying immunity through fictions. Explaining how a state loses its immunity is a
critical element of the normative hierarchy theory. Two different, but interrelated,
explanations are offered in the literature. On one rationale, a state is said to
waive or forfeit its entitlement to immunity by implication when it commits a jus
cogens violation.738 On the other rationale, state conduct that violates a jus
735 See, e.g., HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950);
Richard A. Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals, 84 YALE L.J.
969 (1975).
736 In this regard, Justice Marshall’s age-old words in The Schooner Exchange still ring true: Jurisdiction is
exclusive and absolute; any exceptions to the jurisdiction of a state must be based on its consent. See text at
note 72 supra. Also, as editors Jennings and Watts admonish, limitations on state jurisdiction may not be
presumed. OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, at 391.
737 When jus cogens norms clash, it “raises questions-to which no firm answer can be given-of the
relationship between rules of ius cogens, and of the legitimacy of an act done in reliance on one rule of ius
cogens but resulting in a violation of another such rule.” OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, at 8. “If a state uses
force to implement the principle of self-determination, is it possible to assume that one aspect of jus cogens
is more significant than another?” BROWNLIE (5th), supra note 6, at 517.
738 The concept of “waiver” emerged from American experience. Some have argued that a state’s violation
of jus cogens implicates §1605(a)(1) of the FSIA, the so-called waiver exception, under which a foreign
state implicitly waives its entitlement to immunity. See, e.g., Belsky et al., supra note 181, at 394-401. U.S.
courts have consistently rejected this argument, refusing to interpret the waiver exception so broadly. In
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, for example, the court held that the “jus cogens theory of implied
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cogens norm is said to fall outside the category of protected state conduct known
as acta jure imperii, for which immunity is traditionally granted, such conduct
being devoid of legitimacy because it contravenes the will of the community of
nations.739
Neither of these explanations is persuasive because both are based on fictions
resulting from a misunderstanding of the true nature and operation of the doctrine
of foreign state immunity.
The notion that a foreign state implicitly waives or forfeits any entitlement to
immunity by acting against jus cogens is untenable for the reasons developed in
part I: a foreign state’s entitlement to immunity for human rights violations is not
derived from international law, so a foreign state cannot lose its right to immunity
by violating international law. Indeed, the entitlement in this respect-and therefore
also the waiver or forfeiture of immunity-is strictly a matter of domestic regulation.
This plain reality is illustrated in Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, in which Libya conceded, for the limited purpose of its appeal, that its
alleged participation in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 would consist of a jus
cogens violation, but disputed that “such a violation demonstrates an implied
waiver of sovereign immunity within the meaning of the FSIA.”740 The court
waiver is incompatible with the intentionality requirement implicit in §1605(a)(1).” The court went on to
say that this requirement is “reflected in the examples of implied waiver set forth in the legislative history
of §1605(a)(1), all of which arise either from the foreign state’s agreement (to arbitration or to a particular
choice of law) or from its filing a responsive pleading without raising the defense of sovereign immunity.”
26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145,
1150–51 (7th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.
1996). Indeed, the legislative history of the FSIA contemplates only a few types of implicit waivers:
“where a foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another country or where a foreign state has agreed that
the law of a particular country should govern a contract…. [or] where a foreign state has filed a responsive
pleading in an action without raising the defense of sovereign immunity.” HOUSE REPORT, supra note
107, at 18. The American Bar Association has recently recommended amending the FSIA “to limit
circumstances under which waivers may be implied.” Working Group of the American Bar Association,
Report, Reforming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 546
(2002). The idea of “forfeiture” of immunity by a foreign state is a European creation, developed outside
the statutory context, which some have argued operates as part of the general principles of international
law. See, e.g., Kokott, supra note 206.
739 For example, in Prefecture of Voiotia, the court of first instance held that state acts in breach of jus
cogens could not qualify as sovereign acts because the state would not be considered as acting within its
capacity as sovereign. See b) in text at note 214 supra; see also Paech, supra note 206, at 394; Belsky et al.,
supra note 181, at 377.
740 Smith, 101 F.3d at 242.
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ultimately held that Libya had not waived its immunity because the FSIA
anticipated implied waiver only under a few select circumstances.741 Smith, while
adjudicated under national immunity legislation, is of general appeal, if only to
raise the paradoxical question of how a foreign state can be said to have
implicitly waived its entitlement to immunity when it would be likely, if asked,
expressly to state the contrary.742
The purported exclusion of state-sponsored human rights violations from the
category of acta jure imperii is equally unpersuasive. Indeed, the distinction
between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis is “superficially attractive as a
means of keeping state immunity within reasonable limits” but “does not rest on
any sound logical basis.”743 As Judge Gerald Fitzmaurice wrote, “[A] sovereign
state does not cease to be a sovereign state because it performs acts which a
private citizen might perform.”744 Along similar lines of logic, a foreign state does
not cease to be a sovereign state simply because it commits acts of a criminal
nature, including violations of human rights norms. Moreover, if state conduct
that violates jus cogens is assertedly not jure imperii and obviously not jure
gestionis (private or commercial), then what is it? This question is not addressed
by supporters of the normative hierarchy theory. The real answer lies in the fact
that foreign states are entitled to immunity for human rights violations only to the
extent that a forum state grants them that privilege. Hence, the exclusion of jus
cogens–violating state conduct from the category of acta jure imperii can be
effectuated only through the expression of the forum state’s immunity policies to
that effect, not by international law.
Misplaced concerns regarding forum state complicity. Supporters of the
normative hierarchy theory sometimes argue that the failure to deny state
741 Id. at 244.
742 See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶104.12[1][a] (3d ed. 2003)
(“Courts will rarely find that a nation has waived its sovereign immunity without strong evidence that
waiver was what the state intended.”).
743 BRIERLY, supra note 75, at 250; see also Lauterpacht, supra note 27, at 224.
744 G. G. Fitzmaurice, State Immunity from Proceedings in Foreign Courts, 1933 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
101, 121; see also Lauterpacht, supra note 27, at 224.
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immunity for human rights violations amounts to complicity of the forum state with
the jus cogens transgression.745 A brief review of the ILC’s draft articles on state
responsibility reveals the shortcomings of this claim. Of the provisions in the draft
articles, only chapter IV on the responsibility of a state in connection with the act
of another state is even remotely relevant. Articles 16, 17, and 18 of chapter IV
address, respectively, situations in which one state aids or assists, directs and
controls, or coerces another state in the commission of an internationally
wrongful act.746 In all these provisions, the ILC included a knowledge requirement
for complicity of the third-party state, thus limiting the draft articles’ contemplated
application to cases of deliberate involvement in the internationally wrongful act
before or during its commission.747 Hence, a forum state cannot be considered
complicit for granting jurisdictional immunity to other states long before any
lawsuit has been filed.748
This does not mean, however, that the forum state cannot hold the foreign-state
offender accountable under principles of state responsibility, only that it cannot
be penalized for failing to do so.749 Moreover, immunity in the forum state does
not amount to global impunity for state conduct that violates human rights.
Indeed, the forum state may pursue a human rights claim in numerous alternative
political and judicial arenas. Nevertheless, repealing immunity protections that
745 See, for example, point d) in the court of first instance’s opinion in Prefecture of Voiotia, in text at note
214 supra. See also Paust, supra note 201, at 227; Vivekananthan, supra note 202, at 147.
746 A state is internationally responsible under Article 16 when it aids or assists another state in committing,
or under Article 17, when it directs and controls another state in committing, an internationally wrongful
act if “(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.” Under Article 18, “A State
which coerces another State to commit an act is internationally responsible for that act if: (a) the act would,
but for the coercion, be an internationally wrongful act of the coerced State; and (b) the coercing State does
so with knowledge of the circumstances of the act.” Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Arts. 16–18, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc>, reprinted in CRAWFORD, infra note 261.
747 See supra note 258.
748 For examples of the application of Articles 16, 17, and 18, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 148–58 (2002).
749 Draft Articles 42 and 48 permit a state to invoke another state’s responsibility for injury either to one of
the forum state’s citizens or, arguably, to a foreign state’s citizens.
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exist solely by virtue of the forum state’s domestic policies and are not compelled
by international law ranks high among all options.
8.5 New Prospects for the Progressive Development of Foreign State
Immunity Law
As demonstrated above, the normative hierarchy theory offers an unpersuasive
solution to the human rights litigation problem. Foreign states are not immune
from human rights litigation by virtue of a fundamental sovereign right or a rule of
customary international law.750 With ultimate authority both to grant and to
rescind the entitlement to immunity in these circumstances, the forum state may
establish a state immunity policy in this area unrestricted by international law.
This reality places the burden of providing meaningful human rights litigation not
on the foreign state defendant, as the normative hierarchy theory contends, but
on the government entities in each forum state with responsibility for establishing
the state immunity laws.
While the forum state has authority to repeal many state immunity privileges,
especially in the area of human rights protections, by exercising its right of
adjudicatory jurisdiction, a more comprehensive justification for curtailing
immunity is in order. Although an international rule of immunity exists, the
modern doctrine of foreign state immunity fails to delineate the scope of its
coverage. Accordingly, the line between international law and domestic law
protections is not always readily apparent. Neither the traditional gestionis/imperii
distinction of the theory of restrictive immunity nor the piecemeal approach of
national and international codification efforts of national state immunity legislation
accurately distinguishes between immune and nonimmune state conduct. These
approaches, as explained, focus primarily on establishing categories of
nonimmune conduct and in so doing promote excessive state immunity
protections.
750 However, the European Convention, supra note 26, requires a small group of states to provide immunity
protections as a matter of international obligation.
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Part III proposes an alternative approach to allocating state immunity
entitlements. The approach justifies granting immunity only in circumstances in
which such protection promotes orderly relations in the community of states, not
least between the forum state and the foreign state. As explained in more detail
below, state conduct that does not enhance interstate relations, such as the
abuse of citizens of the forum state, should not be entitled to immunity protection.
Developing a Theory of Collective Benefit
One way to identify the scope of the international rule of state immunity is to
conceptualize state immunity as arising out of an agreement forged between the
forum state and any foreign state with which it seeks to develop transnational
intercourse. This approach is consistent with the more persuasive rationale for
state immunity, i.e., that immunity protections result from the forum state’s waiver
of its right of adjudicatory jurisdiction. As Justice Marshall observed in The
Schooner Exchange, state immunity protections were originally created when the
forum state granted a foreign sovereign a “license” to operate within the forum
state’s jurisdiction free from arrest, seizure, or adverse legal proceedings.751 To
the extent that this practice has crystallized into international custom, the forum
state has consented to concede a right of adjudicatory jurisdiction on an enduring
basis. Thus, defining the scope of the international rule of state immunity
depends upon determining the circumstances in which forum states have
conceded their important right of adjudicatory jurisdiction permanently in favor of
immunity protections.
A look at the “agreement” that states have struck with one another regarding
state immunity protections is revealing. Traditionally, a forum state’s promise of
foreign state immunity has provided foreign states with guarantees against
arrest, seizure, and adverse legal proceedings sufficient to entice foreign
sovereigns and their representatives into entering and operating within the forum
state’s jurisdiction. This promise of immunity, however, is not limitless in scope.
As Justice Marshall observed, state immunity exists only for the “mutual benefit”
751 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137.
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of “intercourse” between states and for “an interchange of those good offices
which humanity dictates and its wants require.”752 Recently, the decision in the
Arrest Warrant case confirmed this justification for state immunity in the context
of immunities of foreign ministers. The ICJ found that such immunities are
designed to enable the ministers to fulfill their functions effectively and to protect
them from acts of authority of another state that would thwart them in fulfilling
those functions.753 Accordingly, the sole raison d’etre for state immunity under
customary international law is so that states can perform their public functions
effectively and ensure that international relations are conducted in an orderly
fashion.754
If one accepts this basic premise, then conduct of a foreign state that does not
conform with the development of beneficial interstate relations falls outside the
state immunity “agreement” and thus is not immune by virtue of international
custom. The most obvious example excludes foreign state conduct that does
significant harm to the vital interests of the forum state, such as the commission
of human rights abuses against the forum state’s nationals. Accordingly, the
basic test for distinguishing between immune and nonimmune transactions
should not be whether the state conduct is public or private, as the theory of
restrictive immunity requires, but whether such conduct would substantially harm
the vital interests of the forum state.755 Within these parameters, the forum state
can more accurately define its domestic state immunity laws in accordance with
customary international law requirements.
Although the forum state has wide discretion to modify its state immunity laws so
as to provide better judicial access to human rights victims, certain important
752 Id. at 136.
753 Arrest Warrant, supra note 23, paras. 52, 54.
754 FOX, supra note 15, at 1.
755 The exact parameters of beneficial interstate conduct are variable and likely to depend on the immunity
policies of each individual state. One can safely argue, however, that the protection of the forum state’s
“vital interests” is a universal common denominator in application of the state immunity agreement.
Professor Lauterpacht, while similarly believing that the immunity of foreign states may be greatly
curtailed, followed a different approach. He contended that immunity should be maintained in respect of
four areas: (1) the legislative acts of foreign states; (2) the executive and administrative acts of the foreign
state within its territory; (3) certain contracts forged with foreign states; and (4) diplomatic immunities.
Lauterpacht, supra note 27, at 237–39.
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limitations still condition the forum state’s approach. First, any changes in
domestic state immunity policy must be consistent with the international rules of
adjudicatory jurisdiction. Since state immunity, as a threshold matter, is an
exception to adjudicatory jurisdiction, the absence of jurisdiction over state
conduct would eliminate the state immunity question altogether.756 Thus, when
opening up domestic courts to human rights litigation, it is necessary to ensure
maintenance of an appropriate connection between the dispute and the forum
state under international law.757
Second, the forum state, like the foreign state, belongs to a community of states
and must abide by community rules, the rules of international law. For example,
several principles restraining state behavior are enshrined in the United Nations
Charter; they include, among others, the obligation to uphold the principles of
sovereign independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the protection
of human rights.758 Thus, any alteration in state immunity law that unjustifiably
endangers peaceful relations may be unlawful. This consideration would
preclude, for example, collusion between the forum state and the defendant state
to commit a crime that is mutually beneficial to them but outlawed by international
law.759 Additional obligations will likely arise out of international agreements to
which the forum state is a party or out of customary international law.760
Applying the Theory of Collective State Benefit
Two recent developments in state immunity law, in the United States and
Greece, exemplify the legitimate restrictions on immunity that states seeking to
756 See Arrest Warrant, supra note 23, para. 46.
757 See discussion supra note 47.
758 UN CHARTER pmbl., Arts. 1, 2.
759 See text at notes 258–62 supra.
760 A recent example appears in Roeder v. Iran, 195 F.Supp.2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002). There, the court held
that executive agreements entered into by the United States and Iran, known as the “Algiers Accords,”
barred the FSIA claims of former hostages detained at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Indeed, some scholars
maintain that conflicts between human rights and state immunity may be best resolved “through the
ratification of human rights conventions and the submission to international procedures of supervision such
as those provided by the UN Covenants.” SCHREUER, supra note 114, at 60.
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advance human rights litigation may impose in accordance with the theory of
collective state benefit. As mentioned above, in 1996 the U.S. Congress
amended the FSIA by creating an additional exception to the immunity of certain
foreign states for a limited range of human rights violations.761 Notably, the
newest FSIA exception requires no territorial connection to the United States.762
Instead, jurisdiction is predicated on the American nationality of the victim or the
claimant. 763The new exception is consistent with the theory of collective state
benefit in that it stands to protect one of the most vital interests of the democratic
state, the well-being of its citizenry.764 Indeed, the scope of the exception could
arguably be broader, consistent with the theory, and could extend to a broader
class of potential foreign state defendants, not only those designated as
sponsors of terrorism.765
The second development is the Greek Supreme Court’s decision in Prefecture of
Voiotia, discussed earlier,766 which held the Federal Republic of Germany liable
for Nazi acts of aggression against the civilian population of southern Greece. In
addition to its misguided acceptance of the normative hierarchy theory, the case
is notable for its advancement of the so-called torts exception to immunity. As
indicated above, the Court ruled that “national courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate damages, including compensation for offenses against people or
761 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7) (2000).
762 As noted, the amendment covers even “the provision of material support or resources” for the proscribed
conduct, which could occur in the foreign state defendant’s own territory. Id.
763 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27–28, Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996) (Nos. 95-7931, 95-7942). The brief states:
[B]y specifying that the victim and claimant must be a national of the United States…, the
legislation ensures that, where United States courts assume jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign,
there is a nexus to the United States. This limitation balances the United States’ interest in
providing a forum for American victims of specified outrageous conduct against the interest of
foreign governments in not being forced to defend actions with no connections to the U.S.
Id. (citation omitted).
764 However, the law may raise some concerns in cases in which the claimant was a U.S. national but the
victim was not, e.g., a married couple of mixed nationality. In these cases, the competence of U.S. courts is
predicated on an arguably weaker basis of jurisdiction.
765 For a criticism of the limited scope of the exception, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? 16 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 71, 81–82 (1998).
766 See text at notes 216–24 supra.
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property that took place in the territory of the forum by organs of a foreign country
that was present in the territory when the offense took place, even if it was acta
jure imperii.”767 In this regard, Prefecture of Voiotia not only adds to the corpus of
law defining the torts exception to immunity, but also contributes to the growing
consensus that such an exception has application even in cases of abuse of
sovereign power.768
The second contribution of Prefecture of Voiotia, really an extension of the first, is
its recognition that even in the field of armed conflict a state is not immune when
it abuses its official power to the detriment of citizens of the forum state. The
Court noted that the commentary to Article 12 of the ILC draft articles, Article 31
of the European Convention, and section 16(2) of the UK State Immunity Act all
indicate a rule of customary international law that entitles states to immunity in
regard to military activity.769 The Court determined, however, that this rule
contained a significant exception “for damages arising from crimes, such as
crimes against humanity, that affect, not necessarily as a consequence of war,
particular civilians, not civilians at large and which civilians have no connection
with that armed conflict during military occupation.”770 In the context of that case,
the Court concluded: “[T]here is no state immunity from criminal acts of the
organs of the occupying power that take place by abusing their sovereign power
767 Greek Judgment II, supra note 15, at 7.
768 This aspect of the torts exception has developed primarily in the context of §1605(a)(5) of the U.S.
FSIA. That provision denies immunity to a foreign state “for personal injury or death…. occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortuous act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee
of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” The torts exception does
not apply, however, to claims based upon the exercise of or failure to exercise a discretionary function. 28
U.S.C. §1605(a)(5)(A). In two cases already discussed, U.S. courts found that violations committed by
foreign government agents in U.S. territory were outside the application of the discretionary function
exception and thus denied the defense of immunity. See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.
1989) (the commission of murder by foreign government agents in violation of foreign law did not trigger
the discretionary function exemption); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980)
(the assassination committed in the United States by Chilean government agents was not covered by the
discretionary function exemption). For further discussion, see SCHREUER, supra note 114, at 57–61;
Trooboff, supra note 18, at 357–62.
769 Greek Judgment II, supra note 15, at 10.
770 Id
.
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as reprisals for acts of resistance movements against innocent and
nonparticipant persons.”771 The Court continued:
[T]he torts in question (murders that also constitute crimes against
humanity) were directed against specific persons limited in number who
resided in a specific place, who had nothing to do with the resistance
activity resulting in the death of German soldiers taking part in a terror
operation against the local population…. [They were] hideous murders
that objectively were not necessary in order to maintain the military
occupation of the area or subdue the underground action, carried out in
the territory of the forum by organs of the German Third Reich in an abuse
of sovereign power.772
Prefecture of Voiotia conforms with the theory of collective state benefit for many
of the same reasons as the 1996 FSIA amendment. The infliction of wanton
terror on Greek civilians by the Nazis during World War II was a direct affront to
the vital interest of Greece, the forum state. Regardless of the label it bears,
sovereign, military, jure imperii, or otherwise, a foreign state’s unlawful killing of
the forum state’s civilians destroys bilateral relations between forum and foreign
state and may even jeopardize the security and stability of the community of
states. Thus, putting aside its endorsement of the normative hierarchy theory,
Prefecture of Voiotia represents a legitimate solution to the human rights litigation
problem.773
771 Id.
772 Id. at 14–15.
773 Still, Prefecture of Voiotia is susceptible to some criticism. First, the Greek government arguably failed
to provide adequate notice to the Federal Republic of Germany of the change in Greek state immunity
policy. This fault is in large measure a function of Greece’s lack of national immunity legislation. Absent
an effective means of communication, i.e., through the promulgation of public laws, the affected state or
states learns of modifications in state policy only at the moment the policy-changing judicial decision is
rendered. Without fair warning, Prefecture of Voiotia came as a shock to the German government, evoking
strong diplomatic protestation. See Atkins & Wiesmann, supra note 215. Recent efforts to enforce the
Greek Judgment in Germany were denied. The Distomo Massacre Case (Greek Citizens v. FRG) (Fed. Sup.
Ct. June 26, 2003), translated in 42 ILM 1030 (2003). Second, Voiotia failed to place limits on the
retroactivity of the new immunity rule. Indeed, the claims at issue arose out of wartime events occurring in
1944, more than fifty years before the suit was filed. The adjudication of claims of this nature, especially
those possibly addressed previously by postwar reparations treaties, is likely to cause instability in bilateral
relations. Indeed, following World War II, the German government paid the Greek government DM 115
million in compensation for victims
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Taken together, the 1996 FSIA amendment and Prefecture of Voiotia
demonstrate that progress can be made in resolving the human rights litigation
problem in a manner consistent with the true nature of the doctrine of foreign
state immunity. That is to say that the forum state, through the agent it
designates to create and interpret foreign state immunity law (the U.S. Congress
in the case of the 1996 amendment and the Hellenic Supreme Court in the case
of Prefecture of Voiotia), is empowered to modify foreign state immunity law to an
extent consistent with the theory of collective state benefit. These developments
further show that such modifications are possible in two very different legal
settings: the 1996 amendment arose in a common law country with national
immunity legislation, while Prefecture of Voiotia resulted from the jurisprudential
application of international law in a civil law country without national immunity
legislation.
8.6 CONCLUSION
State immunity is the product of a conflict between two international law
principles, sovereign equality and adjudicatory jurisdiction, which conflict is
resolved more persuasively in favor of adjudicatory jurisdiction. Thus, state
immunity exists as an exception to the overriding principle of adjudicatory
jurisdiction.
The awkward development of the doctrine of foreign state immunity in the
twentieth century, which derived from the myth that states once enjoyed absolute
immunity from suit, has, however, distorted the perception of how state immunity
operates. Today, the prevailing formulation of state immunity laws improperly
reverses the presumption of adjudicatory jurisdiction by establishing a catchall
rule of immunity. Consequently, in many national jurisdictions state immunity
of Nazi persecution.
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laws grant foreign state defendants more protection than customary international
law requires.
With respect to certain core state conduct, the practice of waiving adjudicatory
jurisdiction has crystallized into a rule of customary international law binding on
states. While the existence of a rule of customary international law concerning
state immunity is firmly established, the exact scope of this rule is difficult to
discern. Nevertheless, despite uncertainty at the edges, sufficient evidence
testifies that customary international law does not compel immunity protections
for state conduct that violates human rights. Any immunity that a foreign state
receives for such conduct is solely conferred by domestic laws.
The normative hierarchy theory offers an unpersuasive solution to the human
rights litigation problem. The theory assumes a clash of international law norms
of human rights and state immunity that, in fact, does not occur. There is no
international norm of state immunity that shields foreign states from human rights
litigation and, even if there were, the normative hierarchy theory fails to explain
persuasively how human rights norms can trump state immunity norms when the
two types of norms govern mutually exclusive types of state conduct. The real
source of the human rights litigation problem is the forum state’s failure to
exercise its right of adjudicatory jurisdiction with respect to human rights cases.
However, this problem is rather difficult to resolve on a theory of normative
hierarchy, as the real conflict may involve a clash of two peremptory norms of
international law, human rights and adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Finally, because state immunity is at its root an exception to the overriding
principle of adjudicatory jurisdiction, the forum state may exercise its right of
adjudicatory jurisdiction to curtail any excess state immunity privileges that do not
emanate from international law, including protections for human rights violations.
A theory of collective state benefit guides the process of repealing extraneous
immunity protections and draws the line between immune and nonimmune
conduct more appropriately than the normative hierarchy theory. On the
collective state benefit theory, state conduct that fails to enhance interstate
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relations, particularly between the forum state and the foreign state, does not
warrant immunity protection. The clearest example of this kind of conduct is
activity by the foreign state defendant that harms the vital interests of the forum
state, such as abuse of the citizens of the forum state.
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CHAPTER 9
THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND NATIONAL COURTS
REGARDING THE DEFENCE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY MADE BY
VARIOUS HEADS OF STATES
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Professor Dinstein asserts that “[s]ince time immemorial, international law has
allowed other States774 . . . to prosecute persons . . . for war crimes.”775 Of
course this simple assertion raises two further questions: (1) What are “war
crimes”? (2) Under what theory of jurisdiction may any State prosecute war
criminals?776
In response to the first question, Article 8(2) of the 1998 Rome Statute,
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), “contains an extensive777 list
of acts constituting war crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction.”778 The list
includes: eight “[g]rave breaches of the Geneva Conventions”;779 twenty-six
“[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflict”;780 four “serious violations” of common article 3 for non-
774 This article uses the term "State" to refer to a country or nation-State.
775 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 228 (Cambridge University Press 2004).
776 It is important to distinguish between “war criminals” (universal jurisdiction over which is the topic of
this article) and “unlawful combatants” (which is beyond the scope of this article). Id. at 233-37.
777 Professor Dinstein considers Article 8(2)’s list “[t]he most recent-and most detailed- definition of war
crimes….” Id. at 230.
778 DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 668 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., Oxford
University Press 3rd ed. 2000). See also Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May-26 July 1996,
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 41, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), Art. 20, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2006)
[hereinafter ILC 1996 Draft Code].
779 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, Art. 8(2)(a),
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
780 Id. at Art. 8(2)(b).
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international armed conflicts;781 and twelve “[o]ther serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character.”782
Regarding the jurisdictional basis for any State to prosecute war crimes, “[i]t is
generally agreed that customary international law imposes limits on a nation’s
prescriptive jurisdiction” to five principle jurisdictional bases783: (1) territoriality;784
(2) nationality;785 (3) protective principle;786 (4) passive personality;787 and (5)
781 Id. at Art. 8(2)(c).
782 Id. at Art. 8(2)(e). It is interesting to note that in the Rome Statute, Article 8 is by far the longest and
most detailed article defining the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The other crimes currently within
the jurisdiction of the ICC are genocide (Article 6), crimes against humanity (Article 7), and the crime of
aggression, the latter of which is, as of yet, undefined. Id. at Art. 5(2). The length and level of detail in
Article 8 defining war crimes appears to be primarily due to the complexity and breadth of the modern Law
of War (a.k.a. Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), a.k.a. jus in bello) as it has evolved via the entry into force
of multilateral treaties and crystallization of customary international law, and less due to the intent of the
Rome Conference to “single out” war crimes for special attention.
783 CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, 534 (2003). See
United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899-903 (D.D.C. 1988) (describing the five traditional bases of
jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes). This very brief summary of jurisdictional bases necessarily
conflates “prescriptive” jurisdiction with “enforcement” jurisdiction, which are, from a theoretical basis,
quite distinct.
“Jurisdiction may describe a state's authority to make its law applicable to certain actors, events, or
things (legislative [a.k.a. prescriptive] jurisdiction); a state's authority to subject certain actors or
things to the processes of its judicial or administrative tribunals (adjudicatory jurisdiction); or a
state's authority to compel certain actors to comply with its laws and to redress noncompliance
(enforcement jurisdiction).”
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 786 (1988).
784 Territorial jurisdiction can be further broken down into “objective” territorial jurisdiction, based on
conduct occurring within a State’s territory, versus “subjective” territorial jurisdiction, based upon conduct
occurring outside a State’s territory, but which has, or intends to have, a substantial effect within the State’s
territory. David J. Anderson, Foreign Relations Law lecture at the George Washington University School of
Law (Nov. 1, 2005).
785 A State may prescribe law with regard to the conduct of its own nationals, both within and outside its
territory. Id. “Under customary international law, nations have almost unlimited authority to regulate the
conduct of their own nationals around the world.” BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 535.
786 BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 534; David J. Anderson, Foreign Relations Law lecture
at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 1, 2005).
787 BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 534; David J. Anderson, Foreign Relations Law lecture
at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 1, 2005).
The most controversial category of prescriptive jurisdiction is the passive personality category,
which would allow nations to assert jurisdiction over aliens who injure their nationals abroad.
Historically the United States disputed the validity of this category of jurisdiction, but in recent
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universality.788 The first four types of jurisdiction are subject to a nexus or
“reasonableness” requirement, which is that the State’s exercise of jurisdiction
must be “reasonable” vis-à-vis another State’s desire to exercise jurisdiction.789
However, the exercise of universal jurisdiction need not be “reasonable,”790 (or at
least need not show a nexus in order to be reasonable) because, “[u]niversal
jurisdiction allows any nation to prosecute offenders for certain crimes even when
the prosecuting nation lacks a traditional nexus with either the crime, the alleged
offender, or the victim.”791 This is because “the universality principle assumes
that every state has an interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat egregious
years, the United States and other countries have increasingly relied upon this category of
jurisdiction as a basis for regulating terrorist attacks on their citizens.
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 535.
788 A State may prescribe law with regard to certain criminal acts recognized by the international
community, such as piracy, slavery, genocide, aircraft hijacking, and possibly terrorism after the attacks on
11SEP2001. David J. Anderson, Foreign Relations Law lecture at the George Washington University
School of Law (Nov. 1, 2005). See, e.g., In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 558 (ND OH
1985), affirmed sub nom. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986) (finding that Israel had properly asserted jurisdiction over “Ivan the Terrible” under the
protective, passive personality, and universality principles).
789 Factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a particular exercise of jurisdiction would
include:
the connection between the regulating state’s territory and the regulated activity, the connection
between the regulating state and the person being regulated, the importance of the regulation to the
regulating state, the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal or economic
system, the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international law
system, the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating, and the likelihood of
conflict with the regulations of another nation.
BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 535. Although most States are circumspect in exercising
jurisdiction over non-nationals under the theory of reciprocity, if a State was to assert a form of jurisdiction
that was perceived to be unreasonable, other States could assert diplomatic protests or demarches in
response.
790 Chandra L. Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 301, 316 (2003). Accord BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 536 (noting that only
universal jurisdiction does not require a territorial or nationality connection between the regulating nation
and the conduct, offender or victim). See also Randall, supra note 10, at 788. However, at least one author
sees the exercise of universal jurisdiction as an “abrogation of sovereignty,” at least as applied by domestic
courts. M. O. Chibundu, Making Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A
Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1069, 1127-29 (1999).
791 Randall, supra note 10, at 785. See also BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 536 (noting that
“most U.S. criminal statutes expressly or implicitly require a connection to the United States or a U.S.
national and thus do not assert universal jurisdiction.”); id. (noting that although a U.S. federal torture
statute asserts universal jurisdiction by criminalizing “acts of official torture committed in foreign nations
by foreign citizens . . . But there are no reported cases applying that statute.”).
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offenses that states universally have condemned.”792 Each State is essentially
acting to vindicate the international community’s interests in prosecuting these
offenses.793 Thus, the sine qua non of exercising universal jurisdiction would
seem to be the punishment of international crimes.794
These raises the further question of which specific crimes may be considered
international in scope, and therefore justify the application of universal jurisdiction
by any State? Some commentators define the crimes that are subject to
universal jurisdiction as “certain heinous and widely condemned offenses”795 or
“the most atrocious offenses.”796 Of course, the mere fact that every State
criminalizes certain conduct (e.g. rape and murder) is not a sufficient condition-
the crime must threaten the international system as a whole if it were to go
unpunished,797 or the prohibited acts must be of an international character798 and
792 Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 384
(2001).
793 Sriram, supra note 17, at 316.
794 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Preamble: “Recalling that it is the duty of every State to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.” See also, Randall, supra
note 10, at 827-829; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 reporter's note 1
(1987); Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its second session, 5 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. 12, pt. 111, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950) (The “Nuremberg Principles” describe crimes against peace,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity as "international crime[s]”).
795 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, infra note 181, at 353.
796 Brief of Amicus Curiae Human Rights Watch, Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878 192 F.R.D. 133
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diana/karadzic/1june.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2006).
797 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121
(Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Higgins, J., Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J.), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF (last
visited Mar. 12, 2006).
798 Some writers argue that universal jurisdiction exists only over jus cogens (a.k.a. peremptory) norms.
See, e.g., Chibundu, supra note 17, at 1131-33; Garland A. Kelley, Does Customary International Law
Supersede A Federal Statute?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 517 (1999); Stephanie L. Williams,
Your Honor, I Am Here Today Requesting The Court's Permission to Torture Mr. Doe": The Legality of
Torture as a Means to an End v. The Illegality of Torture as a Violation of Jus Cogens Norms Under
Customary International Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 301, 324 (2004); Randall, supra
note 10, at 829-831. However, this merely seems to be overstating the requirement that such crimes be of
an international character, as does characterizing the perpetrator of such crimes as being hostis humani
generis (i.e. an enemy to all of mankind). United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232
(1844); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F.
Supp. at 556; Randall, supra note 10, at 832, 834. Nor does stating that the obligation to prosecute
international criminals is erga omnes (i.e. “flowing to all”) seem particularly helpful. Id. at 829-31. But see
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of serious concern to the international community as a whole.799 Although
piracy800 and the slave trade,801 may be the traditional exemplars,802 modern
lists803 of such universal crimes would also include war crimes,804 genocide,805
torture,806 attacks on, sabotage of or hijacking aircraft,807 and perhaps even
apartheid,808 terrorism,809 and other human rights violations.810 The assertion of
Id. at 841 (“Universal crimes, obligations erga omnes, and peremptory norms [a.k.a. jus cogens] may be
viewed as doctrinal siblings, sharing the common lineage of a modern world legal order concerned with
global peace and human dignity.”).
799 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, infra note 181, at 353. See also Chibundu, supra note 17, at 1132.
800 In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 556. However, the current definition of piracy
“Requir[es] that piratical acts be committed for private ends, [under] both the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Randall, supra note 10, at 797-98.
Thus, a crime committed on the high seas for other than private ends, such as the Achille Lauro hijacking
where “the hijackers' immediate objective was the release of certain Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in
Israel,” would not fall within the modern definition of piracy, and thus would not be subject to universal
jurisdiction unless the hijackers committed another universal crime. Id. This assumes, of course, that the
modern treaty-based definition of piracy has supplanted the earlier and arguably broader customary
international law definition. Cf. John Cerone, American Society of International Law, 100th Annual
Meeting, Wash., DC [hereinafter ASIL 100th Mtg.], “The Status of the Individual in International Law,”
Mar. 31, 2006 (arguing that although piracy was recognized as an international crime subject to universal
jurisdiction, it was always criminalized by domestic statutes). See infra notes 408-11 (discussing the
“universal jurisdiction plus” concept).
801 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN infra note 181, at 353.
802 Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg., 2002 I.C.J. 121. See also Randall, supra note 10, at 788.
803 See, e.g., Randall, supra note 10, at 839; Sriram, supra note 17, at 305.
804 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 236: “When charges are preferred against a war criminal, the overriding
consideration in the matter of jurisdiction is that the crimes at issue are defined by international law itself.
The governing principle is then universality: all States are empowered to try and punish war criminals.” Id.
805 Randall, supra note 10, at 834-37. The Genocide and Apartheid treaties are the only two that declare
violations to be international crimes per se, versus calling for States to criminalize the behavior
domestically. ILC 1996 Draft Code, supra note 5, at Commentary para. 4 to Art. 8. Yet the Genocide and
Torture Conventions did not foresee international prosecutions, calling instead for domestic prosecution or
extradition. Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington
University School of Law (Nov. 15, 2005).
806 Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal International Acts on The Customary
Law of Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 120 (1995). Randall, supra note 10, at 819.
807 Randall, supra note 10, at 818, 826.
808 In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 556; Chibundu, supra note 17, at 1132; Randall, supra
note 10, at 819.
809 David J. Anderson, Foreign Relations Law lecture at the George Washington University School of Law
(Nov. 1, 2005). Compare Peter Raven-Hansen, National Security Law lecture at the George Washington
University School of Law (Feb. 22, 2006) (universal jurisdiction depends on a universal definition of what
is prohibited, and no such universal definition of terrorism exists) with Randall, supra note 10, at 795, 796-
7, 815 (a lack of a common definition of “piracy” in the early 20th century did not stop it from being
considered a universal crime subject to universal jurisdiction).
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universal jurisdiction for many of these international crimes is based upon
multilateral treaties that provide for “domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial
offenses regardless of the actors' nationalities,” and thus implicitly allow for
universal jurisdiction, despite the fact that they lack “any reference to the
universality principle.”811
This article will focus on universal jurisdiction as it is applied to war crimes under
the Law of War812 (a.k.a. jus in bello),813 versus peacetime atrocities.814 First, it
will offer a brief history of the application of universal jurisdiction over war
crimes,815 beginning with the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg
and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) at Tokyo, and
then considering the two current ad hoc international tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Next the article will provide a summary of the current status of universal
jurisdiction over war crimes, which will necessarily include the ICC’s
810 Randall, supra note 10, at 789, 815, 837-39.
811 Id. at 819-20. Ironically, although these multilateral treaties (e.g. war crimes, hijacking, terrorism, and
torture conventions) do not mention universal jurisdiction, their requirement to “prosecute or extradite”
alleged offenders in their custody essentially transforms universal jurisdiction from a permissive basis of
jurisdiction to a mandatory one for State parties. Id. at 820-21. However, nonparty States may be able to
claim the “jurisdictional right” to prosecute or extradite under these multilateral treaties without being
under a “jurisdictional obligation” to do so. Id. at 824, 826-27, 829-34, 837.
812 This article will occasionally reference the (as of yet) undefined crime of aggression, which is
technically a matter of when States resort to the use of force, or jus ad bellum. Although the way in which
governments decide to go to war (jus ad bellum) influences how the war is waged (jus in bello). Sir
Franklin Berman, The George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Symposium: Lawyers and Wars: A Symposium in
Honor of Edward R. Cummings [hereinafter Cummings Symposium], Sep. 30, 2005. Moreover, the
distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello may be dissolving. ASIL 100th Mtg., supra note 27,
“The Relationship Between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello: Past, Present, Future,” Mar. 30, 2006.
813 Of course, “War crimes are not the only crimes against international law that can be committed in
wartime. The war itself (if it is waged contrary to the jus ad bellum) may constitute a crime against peace,
a.k.a. crime of aggression. In addition, acts committed in the course of the war may amount to crimes
against humanity or to genocide. However these crimes – which can also be committed in peacetime –
transcend the compass of LOIAC [Law of International Armed Conflict].” DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at
233. See also, Randall, supra note 10, at 834-35.
814 Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing
Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 371 (1999).
815 “The approaches to the doctrines of sovereign immunity and universal jurisdiction, and the issue of
superior orders all derived from Nuremberg.” Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 5, Georgetown Univ. Law
Ctr. Symposium: Nuremberg and the Birth of International Law: A Day to Commemorate the 60th
Anniversary of the Trials at Nuremberg [hereinafter 60th Nuremberg Anniversary], Nov. 11, 2005.
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jurisdiction816 over State parties to the Rome Statute, but also universal
jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law. Finally, the article will offer
a few brief conclusions regarding universal jurisdiction over war crimes.
9.2 HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER WAR CRIMES
The Law of War can be traced back to ancient times. The Sumerians,
Hammurabi King of Babylon, Cyrus I King of the Persians, and the Hittites all
formulated rules or codes that were designed to regulate and provide structure to
armed conflict. The idea that war should adhere to rules evolved throughout the
subsequent centuries.817
Despite the fact that the Law of War has an ancient lineage, Professor Dinstein
cites no authority for his assertion that war crimes have been subject to
prosecution by other States under international law “[s]ince time immemorial.”818
However, it is possible to find a few historical examples of (at least attempted)
universal jurisdiction, broken down into the periods of Antiquity, World War I Era,
and Post-World War II. More recently, various States have enacted domestic
legislation providing for universal jurisdiction over war crimes, and international
tribunals have been given universal jurisdiction over war crimes. Each of these
time periods or topics will be considered in turn.
A. Antiquity
The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and
unarmed. It is the very essence and reason for his being. When he violates this
sacred trust, he not only profanes his entire cult but threatens the very fabric of
816 This article will not discuss the other crimes currently within the ICC’s jurisdiction, namely genocide, or
crimes against humanity, both of which may be “prosecuted even if they are committed outside an armed
conflict.” ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 668.
817 Gregory P. Noone, The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War II, 47 NAVAL L.
REV. 176, 177 (2000).
818 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 228.
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international society. The traditions of fighting men are long and honorable. They
are based upon the noblest of human traits – sacrifice.819
Even before the medieval ages, there were “certain acts committed during war,
including the deliberate murder of civilians” and perfidy that were widely regarded
as morally wrongful, and as an affront to the professional character of an
honorable soldier.820 “The medieval code of chivalry… further developed this
martial code”821 of the law of arms or “jus armorum.”822
Violations of the medieval law of chivalry (a.k.a. “law of arms”)823 were
punishable by having one’s knighthood stripped.824 Moreover, a knight who
violated the laws of honor could be tried and punished by any court of honor.825
Arguably826 the first ‘international war crimes’ trial was in 1474 of Peter von
819 Statement of General Douglas MacArthur in Confirming the Death Sentence Imposed by a United States
Military Commission on Japanese General Tomayuki Yamashita for Command Responsibility in the
Murder of U.S. POWs (October 1946), quoted in William Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of
Compliance with the Laws of War, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1243, 1276 n.185 (2004).
820 Bradford, supra note 46, at 1275. See also Theodor Meron, Crimes And Accountability In Shakespeare,
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (Jan. 1988). See generally MAURICE H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE
LATE MIDDLE AGES (1965).
821 Bradford, supra note 46, at 1275. Cf. Judge Theodor Meron, Cummings Symposium, supra note 39,
Sep. 30, 2005 (noting that chivalry was the basis for international humanitarian law, and that honor and
shame played a vital role).
822 Theodor Meron, Shakespeare's Henry The Fifth and The Law of War, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (Jan.
1992).
823 Major Gerard J. Boyle, USMC, “Humanity In Warfare: The Law Of Civil War,” 2 Apr. 1984, War Since
1945 Seminar, Marine Corps Command & Staff Coll., Marine Corps Dev. & Educ. Command, Quantico,
Va. [hereinafter Humanity in Warfare], available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/BGJ.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
824 Bradford, supra note 46, at 1275.
825 Burrus M. Carnahan, Law of War lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Jan. 10,
2006). Contra Noone, supra note 44, at 181 (“These courts judged the accused knight on their manner with
which they treated fellow knights, and not on any number of other ‘lowly’ combatants.”). Cf. id. at 185-86;
Judge Theodor Meron, Cummings Symposium, supra note 39, Sep. 30, 2005 (noting that chivalry had a
very narrow scope in that it only protected: (1) knights, not peasants; (2) Christian knights; and (3) rape of
Christian women). Accord Meron, supra note 49, at 3; Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normand, The
Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 61 (1994). Of
course, despite the limited protections of chivalry, it still was an early example of universal jurisdiction
enforced by States that might bear no relation to the crime.
826 Some commentators would put the first recorded international war crimes trial as circa 1376, for the war
crimes committed by the Duke of Lorraine during the invasion of Alsace. Dinah L. Shelton, International
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Hagenbach for his violations of the law of war. Von Hagenbach was made
governor of the city of Breisach by Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, and he
subsequently proceeded to rape, murder, confiscate private property, and
illegally tax . . . its citizens. The court . . . [rejected] Von Hagenbach[’s] . . .
‘superior orders’ defense . . . and he was convicted. He was condemned to
death, but first “deprived of his knighthood” and then executed.827
“By the Renaissance a set of norms, internalized by a transnational professional
caste requiring, inter alia, minimization of civilian casualties consistent with
military objectives as a matter of honor, had perfused warfare.”828 This martial
code was based on the “conception of the foe as a fellow professional,” and thus
“directed the honorable soldier to renounce treachery and criminality in
combating him.”829 These martial norms were passed along via a “collective
narrative developed to inform soldiers in the discharge of their duties; when in
doubt, soldiers conformed to ‘stories about the great deeds of honorable soldiers’
drawn from the ‘collective narrative of [their] corps.’”830 This transnational martial
code shared by the professional caste of soldiers was the primogenitor for
twentieth century conceptions of universal jurisdiction over war crimes.
By the end of the Renaissance in the sixteenth century, the concept of universal
jurisdiction over piracy was also starting to take hold.831 Shortly after the end of
the Renaissance, the watershed Treaty of Westphalia,832 which ended the Thirty
Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Sep. 21, 2005 & Nov. 15,
2005). Obviously neither of these would be the first recorded episodes of war crimes having been
committed. For example, despite immunity of envoys as a principle of international law going back to the
Romans, the Vatican’s execution of Ghenghis Khan’s envoy prompted his worst abuses. Id. (Nov. 17,
2005).
827 Noone, supra note 44, at 181-82 & n.25.
828 Bradford, supra note 46, at 1275.
829 Id. at 1276.
830 Id.
831 Randall, supra note 10, at 791-95, 839.
832 Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their Respective Allies,
signed Oct. 24, 1648, reprinted in 1 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 7 (F. L. Israel
ed., 1967), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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Years War in 1648, marked the formation of a community of sovereign States,
and hence the foundations of modern public international law.833 Hugo Grotius
“considered the father of international law, had published his Law of War and
Peace [De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libi Tres]”834 in 1625 during the Thirty Years War,
in response to the atrocities he witnessed.835 Grotius put forth general principles
for the law of war (and hence war crimes, as violations of the law of war),836 that
were gradually accepted as customary international law.837 Grotius addressed
the concept of universal jurisdiction as follows:
The fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who possess
rights equal to those kings, have the right of demanding punishments not
only on account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects,
but also on account of injuries which do not directly affect them but
excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons
whatsoever. . . . Truly it is more honourable to avenge the wrongs of
others rather than one's own.838
During the middle of the nineteenth century, the principles developed by Grotius
were incorporated into various military manuals.839 By the nineteenth century,
universal jurisdiction over slave trading840 was also recognized. This ended what
833 William C. Bradford, International Legal Regimes and the Incidence of Interstate War in the Twentieth
Century: A Cursory Quantitative Assessment of the Associative Relationship , 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
647, 652 n.12 (2001).
834 Major Gerard J. Boyle, USMC, Humanity In Warfare, supra note 50.
835 Noone, supra note 44, at 187-88.
836 H. GROTIUS, RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, 361-67 (A. Campbell trans. 1901).
837 Major Gerard J. Boyle, USMC, Humanity In Warfare, supra note 50.
838 Theodor Meron, Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suarez, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 110,
112 (1991).
839 Major Gerard J. Boyle, USMC, Humanity In Warfare, supra note 50.
840 Randall, supra note 10, at 796-800.
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Professor Randall has coined the first of “three evolutionary stages” of universal
jurisdiction.841
B. World War I Era
Although “no specific precedent existed prior to the Second World War for
subjecting war crimes and crimes against humanity to the universality
principle,”842 there had been repeated attempts to establish a competent tribunal
of universal jurisdiction extending back to the nineteenth century. In 1872, the
“President of what was to be later called the ICRC [International Committee of
the Red Cross], proposed the establishment of an international criminal court to
adjudicate violations of the 1864 Geneva Convention.”843 “At the ‘First Peace
Conference’ in the Hague in 1899, [the] founder and President of the American
Society of International Law . . . was a strong advocate for international
tribunals.”844
Even as late as the first third of the twentieth century, before the commencement
of World War II, there had been repeated attempts at establishing a competent
tribunal of universal jurisdiction. In 1915, Great Britain, France and Russia
denounced Turkey’s massacre of its Armenian minority population as “crimes
against humanity,”845 leading to President Woodrow Wilson’s proposal “to
maintain peace via a League of Nations.”846 Because Turkey submitted to Allied
demands and prosecuted two Turkish officials for the Armenian massacre,847
calls for an international court were stillborn.848
841 Id. at 839.
842 Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
843 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 667.
844 Benjamin B. Ferencz, Misguided Fears About The International Criminal Court, 15 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 223, 241 (2003).
845 Id. at 241-42. See also Noone, supra note 44, at 201.
846 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 241-42.
847 Both Turkish officials were convicted, and one was sent to the gallows. Noone, supra note 44, at 201.
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Legal experts appointed by the League [also] concluded that an international
criminal court should be created to hold accountable those responsible for
Germany's aggressions and atrocities [during World War I].”849 In “1920, the
Allied Powers presented a list of 854 individuals for [international] trial to the new
German government . . . [but t]he German government . . . made a
counterproposal ‘that those accused of war crimes be tried before the German
Supreme Court in Leipzig’ [to which t]he Allied Powers ultimately agreed.”850
Thus, calls for an international war crimes tribunal over alleged Turkish and
German war criminals after World War I nevertheless gave precedence to
national courts, foreshadowing the complementarity principle of the International
Criminal Court (ICC).851
As Professor Ferencz so succinctly summarized: “World War I inspired efforts to
put the [German] Kaiser on trial for aggression and to hold German officers
accountable for their atrocities. The efforts failed.”852 The Kaiser was not indicted
for specific war crimes committing during World War I, but for general violations
of the law of nations, and dictates of the public conscience, which was a direct
reference back to the Martens853 clause in the 1907 Hague Regulations.854
848 The two Turkish officials who were convicted were the only two held accountable for the Armenian
massacre, and the other alleged perpetrators were granted amnesty in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Noone,
supra note 44, at 201.
849 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 242.
850 Noone, supra note 44, at 200.
851 See infra Parts II.E.4 and III.D.
852 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 243.
853 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205
Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention IV]:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem
it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the
law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.
Id. at preamble para. 8.
854 Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School
of Law (Sep. 21 & Nov. 15, 2005).
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However, in perhaps another foreshadowing of the ICC (this time of the United
States’ objections thereto), “[i]n 1919, in Paris, it was the American delegates at
the War Guilt Investigation Committee who opposed most strongly any legal
sentence on the Kaiser for the very reason of the incompatibility of such a
procedure with the sovereignty of the State.”855 Ultimately, the indictment of the
Kaiser for war crimes committed during World War I failed, not because of any
lack of support for an international tribunal to resolve the case, but because the
Netherlands (to which the Kaiser escaped after the war) refused to extradite
him.856 The Kaiser’s indictment for war crimes laid the groundwork for the
Nuremberg trials after World War II, and yet the failure of the Kaiser’s indictment
also foreshadowed the Article 98 agreements that the United States has
championed in an attempt to thwart the potential jurisdiction of the ICC over
American nationals.857
Subsequent attempts after World War I to establish a permanent international
criminal court also failed.
A French proposal to the League of Nations in 1934 for the creation of a
permanent international criminal court was aimed at punishing acts of
political terrorism [e.g. assassinations] rather than war crimes and, in [any]
event, the two treaties defining the crimes and establishing the court
adopted at a diplomatic conference in 1937 never entered into force.858
[
“The United States, catering to strong isolationist sentiments, remained aloof.”859
Unfortunately, America’s isolationism after World War I led to the rise of Adolf
855 International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 17, One Hundred And Seventy-
First Day, Thursday, 4 July 1946, Morning Session, Professor Dr. Hermann Jahrreiss (Counsel for
Defendant Jodl), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm) (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
See also Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University
School of Law (Nov. 15, 2005).
856 Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School
of Law (Sep. 21 & Nov. 15, 2005).
857 See infra Part II.E.4.
858 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 667. See also Ferencz, supra note 71, at 242.
859 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 242.
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Hitler in a disgruntled Germany.860 “The failure to hold high-ranking criminals
accountable [after World War I] was recalled years later by Adolf Hitler, who
commented contemptuously when launching the Holocaust: ‘Who remembers the
Armenians?’”861
C. Post-World War II
After World War II, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin recommended
summarily executing the Nazi leaders as war criminals.862 “But [U.S. Supreme
Court Justice] Robert Jackson and U.S. Secretary of War Henry
L. Stimson felt there was a better way – a legal way – to deal with the Nazi
leaders for their crimes. They wanted fairness rather than vengeance to be the
order of the day.”863 Besides the initial war crimes tribunals in Nuremberg and
Tokyo, subsequent trials were conducted years later as fugitive Nazi leaders
were found and brought to justice. Jurisdiction in each of these trials was
premised, at least in part, on universal jurisdiction.864
1. Nuremberg
Justice Jackson was granted leave from the Supreme Court to serve as the lead
U.S. prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg,865
860 Father Robert F. Drinan, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005.
861 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 242. Ferencz offers no source for this attribution, but it is commonly
attributed to Hitler. The Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust Web page contains a discussion of
the alleged statement, describes circumstances surrounding it, and offers evidence that it may not have
actually been made. http://forum.codoh.com/viewtopic.php?p=3709
862 Sean D. Murphy, The George Wash. Univ. Law Sch.: “Should the U.S. Join the International Criminal
Court?” A Moderated Panel Discussion [hereinafter ICC Panel], Feb. 13, 2006; Henry T. King, Jr.,
Remarks at 5, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005; ABA President-Elect Karen
Mathis, Id. Cf. In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 558 (noting that “It is a historical verity that
the victors in war have meted out punishment to the vanquished in the name of justice.”).
863 Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 5, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005.
864 Randall, supra note 10, at 800. See also Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 582.
865 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 225.
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which was administered jointly by the four Allied powers.866 The IMT was
responsible for prosecuting the major German war criminals,867 which included
the “German leaders responsible for planning or perpetrating the aggressions,
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in flagrant violation of
existing international laws.”868 Justice Jackson was careful to put together
overwhelming proof of the alleged war criminals’ guilt, realizing that this was an
historic endeavor: “We must never forget that the record on which we judge
these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow.”869
Historically, the IMT is generally viewed as the commendable exercise of
universal jurisdiction870 over Nazi war criminals,871 and that “[a]t Nuremberg, the
rule of law took a step forward.”872 “Hitler and his henchmen had been warned in
1942 that they would be held accountable for the atrocities being committed by
Nazi Germany,”873 and so they were. All but three of the Nazi defendants were
convicted after receiving putatively fair trials; seventy-one were hung, but many
were imprisoned, and eventually released after having been pardoned.874
866 United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia. Besides the four Allied powers, “[n]ineteen other states
assented to the London Agreement” which established the IMT.” Randall, supra note 10, at 801.
867 Id.
868 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 225.
869 Id. at 225-26
870 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 582. Cf. Randall, supra note 10, at 800, 805-06 (noting that the
Allies could also have based jurisdiction on the territoriality, nationality, and passive personality principles,
and that “while many sources view the IMT's proceedings as being partly based on the universality
principle, the IMT's judgment and records actually evidence little or no explicit reliance on universal
jurisdiction”). However, the perception that the IMT exercised universal jurisdiction grew out of its
attempts to define crimes of universal condemnation, for which the international community could not rely
on domestic courts to resolve.
871 See Randall, supra note 10, at 803-04 (comparing the Axis offenses to piracy in order to justify the
application of universal jurisdiction over the former). Cf. id. at 804 (recognizing that “the Allies' partial
reliance on the universality principle . . . represents a marked expansion of universal jurisdiction”).
872 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 226.
873 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 225.
874 Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006; ABA President-Elect Karen Mathis, 60th
Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005.
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“Nuremberg was designed to replace the ‘law of force’ with the ‘force of law,’”875
which it accomplished merely by providing judicial process instead of turning the
“final solution” back against the Nazi leaders themselves, as the British and
Russians proposed. Even the German people eventually came to regard the IMT
prosecutions as a just result for the holocaust, although this took decades to
come about.876
Yet the IMT is today (and was then) not without its critics. Professor Wedgwood
has pointed out that only the leaders and members of the Axis powers were
prosecuted, and that neither the United States nor the other Allies were ever held
accountable for potential war crimes, such as the firebombing of Dresden.877
Despite Justice Jackson’s role as chief U.S. prosecutor, the remainder of the
justices on the U.S. Supreme Court considered the IMT to be “victors’ justice.”878
In fact, Chief Justice Harlan Stone called the IMT, “Jackson’s high lynching
expedition.”879 In addition, Justice “Jackson did not have support of much of the
organized bar of the United States and Nuremberg [and] was excoriated by
Senator Robert A. Taft . . . . But Jackson withstood the slings and arrows of his
countrymen and held fast to his belief in the legitimacy of Nuremberg.”880
The IMT “was a long time coming. But it was only a beginning.”881 After the IMT
(generally known as “The Nuremberg Court”)882 tried the major Nazi officials, the
Allies created “courts within the four occupation zones of post-war Germany
which tried lesser Nazis,”883 again basing jurisdiction on universality.884 The
875 Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 1, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005.
876 Michael Scharf, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005. Professor Scharf predicted
that it may take equally long for the ICTR and ICTY to change people’s minds. Id.
877 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
878 Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
879 Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 7, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005.
880 Id.
881 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 225.
882 Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 1, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005.
883 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 582; Randall, supra note 10, at 801.
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United States conducted its twelve subsequent trials of lesser Nazis in the same
court in Nuremberg that had housed the IMT.885 The International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) conducted similar trials of Japanese war
criminals in Tokyo,886 ultimately convicting twenty-eight of them for war crimes
committed against Allied troops, and for offenses committed in various
Japanese-occupied territories.887
2. Eichmann
Years after the end of World War II, related war crimes trials were still being
conducted under the rubric of universal jurisdiction as alleged war criminals were
discovered hiding, often under assumed names, in foreign countries.888 The first
prominent example of such a belated war crimes trial was Israel's prosecution of
Adolph Eichmann889 in 1961, after having abducted him from Argentina.890 The
Israeli government sent a note verbale to the Argentine Government, expressing
its “hope that Argentina would overlook this violation of its sovereignty given 'the
special significance' of bringing to trial the man responsible for the murder of
884 Randall, supra note 10, at 806-10 (“The proceedings of the zonal tribunals…contain more explicit
references to the universality principle”).
885 Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 1, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005; Ferencz,
supra note 71, at 225.
886 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 243; DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10; Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note
89, Feb. 13, 2006.
887 Randall, supra note 10, at 802.
888 Id. For example, Adolph Eichmann was discovered in “Buenos Aires living under the alias of Ricardo
Klement.” Biography of Simon Wiesenthal, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Wiesenthal.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
889 Adolph Eichmann was the SS Lieutenant Colonel in charge of the Nazi Gestapo Jewish Section,” and
thus responsible for supervising the “final solution of the Jewish Question.” Randall, supra note 10, at 810.
See also Biography of Adolf Eichmann, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/eichmann.html (portraying Eichmann as more of a
bureaucrat than an anti-Semitic ideologue; last visited Apr. 10, 2006); Doron Geller, The Capture of Adolf
Eichmann, available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/eichcap.html (“at all the
Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals [Eichmann] was pointed to as the head butcher”; last visited Apr.
10, 2006).
890 Randall, supra note 10, at 802, 810 (1988). See also Biography of Adolf Eichmann, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/eichmann.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
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millions of Jewish people.”891 Although obviously “the universality principle did
not permit Israel to transgress Argentina's sovereignty,” and thus “[r]eturning
Eichmann to Argentina might have been the proper remedy for the illegal
abduction,” which Argentina initially demanded.892 Nevertheless, “Argentina
eventually waived its right to protest Israel's jurisdiction over Eichmann,”893 thus
paving the way for Israel to bring Eichmann to justice. “Israel based its
jurisdiction under international law on the passive personality, protective, and
universality principles.”894
However, Eichmann’s trial was not without its own hurdles. The first hurdle was
Eichmann’s claim that his irregular rendition from Argentina violated his rights
and deprived the Jerusalem court of jurisdiction. Yet “under Israeli law, the
‘irregularities’ of Eichmann's apprehension did not entitle him to challenge the
court's jurisdiction,” which is consistent with U.S. law as well.895
The second hurdle at trial was the fact that the State of Israel did not exist when
Eichmann committed his crimes during World War II.896 “Because Eichmann's
victims were not Israelis when Eichmann acted and because Eichmann never
threatened Israel's security, Israel's reliance on the passive personality and
protective principles expanded those jurisdictional bases [considerably].”897
However,
the fact that Israel was not a state when Eichmann acted does not affect
the legitimacy of Israel's jurisdiction under the universality principle. The
basic premise of universal jurisdiction holds that every state has an
891 Randall, supra note 10, at 812 & n. 171.
892 Id. at 813 & n. 174.
893 Id. at 813 & n. 175.
894 Id. at 811, 814.
895 Id. at 813 & n. 176 (1988). See also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (domestic interstate seizure), reh'g
denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (international seizure).
896 Randall, supra note 10, at 814 & n. 177 (noting that the State of Israel was not proclaimed until May 14,
1948).
897 Id. at 814 & n. 178.
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interest in bringing to justice the perpetrators of particular crimes of
international concern. Logically, that sovereign interest is not limited to
states that existed when the international crimes occurred… When any
state captures and punishes a universal offender, all states benefit. In light
of the universality principle's purpose of redressing a special category of
offenses, Israel's universal jurisdiction was valid despite Israel's lack of
existence when Eichmann acted.898
Israel’s claim to universal jurisdiction was also bolstered by the enactment of
“several significant multilateral treaties, including the [four] Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and the [Genocide] Convention… [which] confirmed the global
condemnation of crimes such as Eichmann’s, thus lending additional authority to
Israel's use of universal jurisdiction.”899 Thus, Israel’s jurisdiction over Eichmann
was more firmly based on universal jurisdiction than the earlier Nuremberg
trials.900
The third hurdle at Eichmann’s trial was more of a matter of comity between
States than jurisdiction: the possibility of extradition back to Germany to stand
trial.
The usual limitation is that the state which has apprehended the offender
must first offer his extradition to the state in which the offense was
committed. This limitation has no place in the circumstances of this case.
This limitation was a practical one, based on availability of witnesses and
evidence and therefore it becomes the forum conveniens for the conduct
of the trial. Here the great number of witnesses and documentary
evidence is in Israel.901
898 Id. at 814.
899 Randall, supra note 10, at 814-21.
900 See supra Part II.C.1. But see In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 556-57.
901 Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962). See also DUNOFF,
RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 353-56, 368-70 (providing excerpts of the Israeli Supreme
Court’s decision in the Eichmann case).
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Thus, the Israeli courts were not obligated to extradite Eichmann to Germany.902
After a thirteen-day trial, “[t]he District Court of Jerusalem convicted Eichmann
and [subsequently] sentenced him to death, and the Supreme Court of Israel
affirmed.”903 Eichmann’s conviction and execution put one more nail into the
coffin of World War II atrocities, but it was not to be the final nail.
3. Demjanjuk
The second prominent (and more recent) example of a war crimes trial held
decades after the end of World War II is the trial of John (Ivan) Demjanjuk (a.k.a.
“Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka”), also held in Israel.904 Demjanjuk was a Ukrainian
who was conscripted into the Soviet Red Army in 1940. He was captured by the
Germans in 1942 and volunteered for service in the SS [Schutzstaffel].”905
Demjanjuk allegedly served as an SS guard at various
concentration/extermination camps, where he operated the gas chambers,
“euthanizing” untold numbers of Jews.906 After World War II, Demjanjuk departed
902 This is consistent with the general principle of “prosecute or extradite” that is found in most multilateral
conventions. Prosecution and extradition are viewed as alternatives, not as steps to be followed seriatim,
with extradition necessarily being of primary importance or consideration. See, e.g., Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
903 Randall, supra note 10, at 811; Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Isr. Dist. Ct. -
Jerusalem 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962). An unofficial translation of the district court
opinion prepared by the Israeli Government is available at 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1962). The supreme
court opinion is available at 45 PESAKIM MEHOZIIM 3, published in part in 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1657 (L. Friedman ed. 1972).
904 Randall, supra note 10, at 802.
905 The Demjanjuk Case: Factual and Legal Details, July 28, 1993, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Demjanuk2.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006);
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 575.
906 At the Treblinka extermination camp where Demjanjuk allegedly operated the gas chambers, it is
estimated that “700,000 Jews were killed [t]here by carbon monoxide” in a seventeen-month period
between July 1942 and November 1943. Killing People Through Gas In Extermination and Concentration
Camps, available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/gascamp.html (last visited Apr.
10, 2006). This was the same time period that Demjanjuk allegedly operated the gas chambers at Treblinka.
In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 551.
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Europe, and emigrated to the United States in 1952, where he became a
naturalized citizen residing near Cleveland, Ohio.907
In 1975, “there came into the possession of certain members of the U.S. Senate
a list of Nazi war criminals living… in the U.S.”908 Demjanjuk’s name was on the
list.909 After conducting an international investigation, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) instituted denaturalization proceedings against
Demjanjuk in 1977, although his trial was delayed until 1981.910 In 1983, while
Demjanjuk’s appeals were pending, the State of Israel requested his extradition
“to stand trial in Israel for murder and other offenses alleged under the Nazis and
Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law.”911 The federal district court for the
Northern District of Ohio found that Demjanjuk “had made material
misrepresentations in his visa application by failing to disclose his service for the
German SS at the Trawniki and Treblinka prison camps in 1942-43, [and] …
ordered that [Demjanjuk]'s United States citizenship be revoked and his
certificate of naturalization cancelled.”912 The federal district court also certified to
the U.S. Secretary of State “that Demjanjuk was subject to extradition [to
Israel]… on the charge of murder.”913
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s
extradition certification, because all of the extradition requirements were met,
including the fact that “the State of Israel has jurisdiction to punish for war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed outside of its geographic boundaries”
907 In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 546.
908 The Demjanjuk Case: Factual and Legal Details, July 28, 1993, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Demjanuk2.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
909 Id. “The information listed evidently emanated from material collated in the Soviet Union, consisting of
authentic German documents captured by the Red Army when occupying territories under Nazi control in
the summer of 1944.” Id.
910 Id.
911 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. at 572.
912 In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 546; United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.
D. Ohio, 1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
913 In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 571.
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based on universal jurisdiction, which the U.S. also recognizes.914 Demjanjuk
was finally extradited to Israel in 1986,915 where he was tried and convicted on all
counts after a thirteen-month trial (versus Eichmann’s thirteen-day trial), and
sentenced to death.916 “After spending five years on death row, the Israeli
Supreme Court ruled [in 1993] there was reasonable doubt that he was Ivan [the
Terrible of Treblinka]917 and ordered that he be released.”918 The Israeli Supreme
Court held that although evidence of other crimes committed by Ivan Demjanjuk
had been found, “a change in the basis of the extradition, more than seven years
after the proceedings against [Demjanjuk] were opened, would be
unreasonable.”919
Demjanjuk returned to the U.S., where his U.S. citizenship was reinstated in
1998, but then stripped again in 2002,920 because although Demjanjuk
apparently wasn't “Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka,” he had been a guard at other
Jewish concentration camps, and thus had still lied on his U.S. naturalization
application.921 Demjanjuk (now eighty-five years old) recently was ordered
deported to his native Ukraine on December 28, 2005.922 Demjanjuk plans to
914 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d at 583. See also Randall, supra note 10, at 790 & n.26.
915 The Demjanjuk Case: Factual and Legal Details, July 28, 1993, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Demjanuk2.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). 143
Id.
916 Id.
917 Israeli prosecutors had obtained additional evidence from the former Soviet Union (which the Soviet
Army had seized after World War II), including a number of written depositions that Ivan the Terrible of
Treblinka was named Ivan Marchenko, not Ivan Demjanjuk. Asher Felix Landau, The Demjanjuk Appeal,
July 29, 1993, available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Demjanuk3.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2006).
918 Demjanjuk Loses U.S. Citizenship, Feb. 21, 2002, available at,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Demjanuk4.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
919 Asher Felix Landau, The Demjanjuk Appeal, July 29, 1993, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Demjanuk3.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
920 U.S. Court Rules John Demjanjuk Was Nazi Guard, Apr. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Demjanuk5.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
921 Demjanjuk Loses U.S. Citizenship, Feb. 21, 2002, available at,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Demjanuk4.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
922 Demjanjuk Ordered Deported, Dec. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Demjanuk6.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
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appeal the immigration judge’s order.923 The conclusion of Demjanjuk’s case may
very well mark the end to Professor Randall’s second of “three evolutionary
stages” of “universal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
other Axis offenses following the Second World War.”924
D. Domestic Statutes
The State of Israel based its jurisdiction over Demjanjuk’s trial on its domestic
“Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law.”925 Although Israel’s domestic
universal jurisdiction statute is, by definition, limited to Nazi offenders, other
States’ have enacted domestic statutes that are more broadly defined, taking
their cue from international treaties that purport to extend “universal jurisdiction
over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, hijacking, hostage taking,
crimes against internationally protected persons, apartheid, torture, genocide,
and possibly other offenses.”926 This is what Professor Randall calls the final of
“three evolutionary stages” of universal jurisdiction.927
Within this “general revival of the concept of universal jurisdiction,”928 is the
specific notion that “any nation has the right to try and prosecute war
criminals.”929 The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 specifically provide for
923 Appeal Possible for Alleged Nazi Guard, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10630835/ (last visited Apr.
10, 2006).
924 Randall, supra note 10, at 839.
925 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. at 572.
926 Randall, supra note 10, at 839. Cf. Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 302, 214
(Apr. 1999) (noting that while universal jurisdiction for genocide and crimes against humanity seems
almost universally accepted, universal jurisdiction for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions is only
“increasingly accepted,” and universal jurisdiction over human rights violations, such as torture or forced
disappearances, is only provided for “in some instances”).
927 Randall, supra note 10, at 839.
928 Burrus M. Carnahan, Law of War lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Jan. 10,
2006).
929 Id.
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universal jurisdiction under domestic statutes for “grave breaches” of the Geneva
Convention:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary
to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing… any of the
grave breaches of the present Convention… [and] to search for persons
alleged to have committed… such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts.
It may also . . . hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party
concerned.930 Thus, many States have enacted domestic legislation providing for
universal jurisdiction over war crimes, or at least those war crimes that represent
“grave breaches”931 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.932 As Professor Dinstein
explains, “self-discipline by a belligerent Party is not enough,” and thus military
and political leaders should anticipate that if they are unwilling to do so, other
States will prosecute their nationals for war crimes, which they have done “since
time immemorial.”933
930 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 129, at Art. 146 (emphasis added). See also Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art.
50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
931 Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 contains the following list of “grave breaches”:
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment … wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person,
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a
protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial …, taking of hostages and extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 129, at Art. 147
932 Nicole Barrett, Holding Individual Leaders Responsible For Violations Of Customary International
Law: The U.S. Bombardment Of Cambodia And Laos, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 429, 469-70
(Spring 2001).
933 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 228.
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For example, Spain “requested extradition of General Pinochet [former President
of Chile] from England to Spain for the murders of Spanish civilians in Chile in
violation of the Convention Against Torture to which both England and Spain
were signatories.”934 Spain asserted jurisdiction under both universal jurisdiction
and the “passive personality” theory,935 because the victims were Spanish. The
English House of Lords held that Pinochet could be extradited under universal
jurisdiction under the Convention Against Torture.936 However, if each State
decides for itself when another head-of-state’s act constitutes an international
crime, that could disrupt diplomatic relations – this being one of the main
justifications for creating the International Criminal Court (ICC).937
“Belgium enacted a law allowing for [universal] jurisdiction over certain egregious
violations of international law committed anywhere in the world, and convicted
four Rwandan Hutus of committing genocide in Rwanda.”938 “A later [Belgian]
decision held that a suspect had to be physically present in Belgium in order to
be investigated and tried,” thereby negating the possibility of in absentia trials.939
934 Barrett, supra note 159, at 430 n. 6.
935 Sriram, supra note 17, at 317; Barrett, supra note 159, at 472 & n. 183; Dinah L. Shelton, International
Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 17, 2005). See
generally Sriram, supra note 17, at 318-31 & n. 53.
936 Barrett, supra note 159, at 430 n. 6. Contra Sriram, supra note 17, at 323-25, 355-56 & n. 76-81, 225
(stating that universal jurisdiction was not “the central basis for the House of Lords’ willingness to
extradite”).
937 Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School
of Law (Nov. 17, 2005). See infra Part II.E.4.
938 BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 536. See also Barrett, supra note 159, at 470 & n. 176;
Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School of
Law (Nov. 17, 2005) (noting that the four Rwandan Hutu defendants had been Belgian residents, and that
Belgium had also been the colonial power in Rwanda, thus arguably supporting nationality jurisdiction as
well).
939 BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 537. Accord Belgium Bars Sharon War Crimes Trial,
BBC News, June 26, 2002 (reporting a Belgium court's ruling that the case against Ariel Sharon could not
be brought because he was not in Belgium), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2066808.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006). Requiring physical
presence of the defendant before exercising universal jurisdiction could be seen as simply requiring
personal (vs. subject matter) jurisdiction, rather than requiring some nexus to the State, such as that
required for territorial jurisdiction (i.e. conduct occurring within the State, or having an effect therein). See
also Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University
School of Law (Nov. 17, 2005) (noting that the Belgian law has been changed to now require a link to
Belgium, and that individuals can no longer initiate investigations, but only a Belgian prosecutor can). Cf.
Belgium Bars Sharon War Crimes Trial, BBC News, June 26, 2002 (noting that “[t]he cases have been an
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Belgium also tried to establish universal jurisdiction over the Foreign Minister of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for alleged genocide and crimes
against humanity; the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed the claim
based on the Minister’s immunity, rather than addressing the universal
jurisdiction issue.940
In an unrelated case, Republic of the Congo (ROC) vs. France, France sought to
establish universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law941 over
the ROC President and other high-ranking ROC officials for alleged crimes
against humanity and torture.942 The ICJ again ducked the issue of universal
jurisdiction by refusing to intercede at such a preliminary stage in France’s
investigation.943 Spain, Belgium and France are not alone in seeking to exercise
universal jurisdiction over war crimes and other international crimes:
Other states, including the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Australia,
and Germany have recently used the Geneva Conventions to prosecute
war criminals for acts committed by non-nationals against non-nationals
living abroad. England has similarly adopted an act easing the procedure
necessary to bring a case under the Geneva Conventions.944
embarrassment for the Belgian Government, which has promised to make it harder for international claims
to be launched in Belgian courts”), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2066808.stm (last
visited Mar. 27, 2006). International comity would seem to limit in absentia trials, particularly with regard
to sitting heads of State.
940 Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg., 2002 I.C.J. at paras. 41, 42, 43 & 45. Accord Belgium Bars Sharon War
Crimes Trial, BBC News, June 26, 2002 (reporting a Belgium court's ruling that the case against Ariel
Sharon could not be brought because he was not in Belgium), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2066808.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006). See also Barrett, supra
note 159, at 470 & n. 176; Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George
Washington University School of Law (Nov. 17, 2005) (despite the fact that the parties requested that the
ICJ not address the viability of universal jurisdiction, there appeared to be a fairly even split between the
ICJ judges on the issue).
941 See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 228.
942 Certain Legal Proceedings in France (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. 129, paras. 10 & 11 (July
11), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icof/icoforder/icof_iorder_20030617.PDF (last
visited Mar. 12, 2006).
943 Id. at paras. 35, 37, 38 & 41.
944 Barrett, supra note 159, at 471-72. See also Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the
Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM.J.INT’L L. 291, 297-98 (Apr. 1999). Cf.
Sriram, supra note 17, at 317-31 (noting that Spain, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland,
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By contrast, most U.S. criminal statutes either expressly or implicitly require a
connection to the United States or to a U.S. national, and thus do not assert
universal jurisdiction.945 Even the federal genocide statute requires that the
offense occur in the United States or that the offender be a U.S. national.946 A
federal torture statute does assert universal jurisdiction in that it criminalizes acts
of official torture committed in foreign nations by foreign citizens, but there are no
reported cases actually applying that statute.947 In terms of civil cases, a number
of U.S. courts have asserted universal jurisdiction in the context of international
human rights litigation.948 Thus, the United States does not appear as willing as
European States to assert extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction under the rubric of
universality, and yet appears more willing to assert extraterritorial civil
jurisdiction.
E. International Tribunals
The IMT in Nuremberg after World War II was the first modern ad hoc
international tribunal for the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and the crime of aggression. It was ad hoc because it was created after the
atrocities had been committed, and because it was not a permanent court – thus
its jurisdiction was limited both geographically and temporally.949 It was
international because it was run by the four Allied powers, and because it was
Germany, Ecuador, Amsterdam and Chile all had complaints filed against General Pinochet for crimes
during his rule, asserting universal jurisdiction inter alia). See generally id. at 318-55 (discussing various
cases where universal jurisdiction was asserted in a number of countries).
945 BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 536.
946 Id.
947 Id.
948 Id. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692 (2004).
949 Cf. supra note 104 and accompanying text (Professor Wedgwood’s criticism of the IMT for not
considering the Allied war crimes). Perhaps this is more of a “victor/vanquished” limitation than a
geographical limitation. Of course, the IMT was limited temporally to those atrocities committed during the
hostilities of World War II, beginning in 1939 and ending in 1945.
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supported by nineteen other signatories to the London Agreement.950 Therefore,
it is perhaps not overly surprising that when the need next arose for international
fora to adjudicate claims of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,
the United Nations (UN), also a product of the Second World War, would fall
back on the ad hoc Nuremberg model. Of course, no permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC) yet existed, and arguably, perhaps, there was insufficient
support for the establishment of a permanent ICC at the time.951
Thus, the ad hoc international tribunals may be viewed as preliminary efforts at
establishing a more permanent ICC, or as the UN ‘testing the waters.’
1. ICTY
The next occasion after the IMT when another international criminal tribunal was
both necessary and feasible952 was when “[t]he mass rapes and genocidal acts in
Yugoslavia induced the [UN] Security Council to set up a special [ad hoc] tribunal
in 1993 to punish those responsible.”953 Before the UN Security Council (UNSC)
950 Randall, supra note 10, at 801.
951 After coalition forces drove Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait in the First Gulf War in 1991, the lack of an
international criminal court prevented any type of war crimes trial for atrocities committed by Saddam.
Professor Ferencz has described this as a “political blunder,” where “[p]olitics prevailed over principle.”
Ferencz, supra note 71, at 227. Instead, a civil compensation commission was created to provide civil
remedies for people harmed in the war. Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the
George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 15, 2005). However, war crimes proceedings were
initiated in Belgium courts under the rubric of universal jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein, as well as
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Cuban President Fidel Castro, and
Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo. Belgium Bars Sharon War Crimes Trial, BBC News, June 26,
2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2066808.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
952 An international tribunal was not feasible until the end of the Cold War stalemate on the United Nations
Security Council. Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006; Ferencz, supra note 71, at
226: “The ideological war between the Soviet Union and the United States influenced every decision.
United Nations committees operated on the principle of consensus; that meant, in effect, that every member
could veto anything.” Another explanation for the resurrection of international fora was the sense that a
climate of impunity” had developed, whereby despised dictators made amnesty for their offenses the price
of their stepping down from power (e.g. Uruguay, Argentina, & Chile). Dinah L. Shelton, International
Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 16, 2005). “When
domestic leaders exempt themselves from liability, all you can do is hold individuals accountable at the
international level.” Id.
953 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 243. See also ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 565 (describing the
series of wars associated with the breakup of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as
“consist[ing] as much of successive actions against civilians as of organized combat between armed
forces,” and thus “necessarily involv[ing] violations of the laws of war”).
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decided to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague, Netherlands, other options were considered, including the
use of domestic criminal tribunals. These were judged to be of limited utility
because of the destruction of the physical and human resources necessary for
complex criminal trials, and due to divergent concerns that either hostile courts
would afford too little due process to defendants, or that sympathetic
governments would shield defendants from trial, perhaps by granting amnesty.954
Therefore it was recognized that an international criminal tribunal, such as the
IMT at Nuremberg, needed to be established, with primacy over domestic
courts.955 However, instead of pursuing this new international criminal tribunal
through the customary, tedious treaty process (by which the IMT Charter had
been created), interested governments and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) jump-started the process by convincing the UNSC to create the new
international criminal tribunal pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.956
On May 25, 1993 the UNSC established the ICTY by fiat, prescribed its structure,
defined its jurisdiction, and instructed all UN-member States to cooperate with
the new court by turning over custody of suspects, evidence and witnesses.957
More specifically, the UNSC established the ICTY’s jurisdiction over grave
breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs
of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity committed since January 1, 1991
954 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, 600 (2002).
955 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [hereinafter ICTY Statute],
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808, arts. 9 & 10 (1993), annexed to
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N.
Doc. S/25704 & Add. 1 (1993); ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 568.
956 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 600. Thus, the consent of States to support this
new tribunal (e.g. by entering a multilateral treaty establishing the court) was deemed less important than
establishing the ICTY efficiently and effectively. JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW, 260 (2002).
957 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 601. See also ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra
note 5, at 566.
513
in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.958 The
second category of “violations of the laws or customs of war” was included to
ensure that the ICTY could prosecute individuals for war crimes not rising to the
level of grave breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.959 A former
prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials opined that the ICTY “was a long-
overdue building block on the edifice started at Nuremberg.”960
The ICTY has carefully chosen which alleged crimes to investigate and to
prosecute,961 both to maintain the court’s legitimacy, and to maintain the support
of States upon which it relies to secure custody over criminal defendants, since
the ICTY lacks its own international police force.962 The ICTY has successfully
completed criminal proceedings against eighty-five defendants,963 although its
958 ICTY Statute, supra note 182, at Arts. 2–5, 8. The UNSC did not include the crime of aggression within
the ICTY’s jurisdiction because the topic was too politically-charged. Sean D. Murphy, International
Organizations lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Oct. 31, 2005). The fact that
the UNSC included grave breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions within the ICTY’s jurisdiction
supports the view that these rules had become rules of customary international law, because after the
breakup of the former Yugoslavia, it was unclear that all of the new national entities had acceded to the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions, and thus would not have been bound y their provisions as a matter of
treaty law. Burrus M. Carnahan, Law of War lecture at the George Washington University School of Law
(Feb. 21, 2006). It is also interesting to note the fact that the UNSC did not include violations of Additional
Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions within the ICTY’s jurisdiction, thus supporting the U.S. view
that provisions of AP I have not risen to the level of customary international law. Id.
959 ICTY Statute, supra note 182, at Art. 3. This was particularly important for atrocities committed during
those periods and locations of the Balkan conflict that were considered to be under civil war, because only
common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions would apply to such a noninternational armed
conflict. By including this category of “violations of the laws or customs of war,” the UNSC was
forestalling the possible defense, raised at Nuremberg, of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law).
DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 582-83. See also ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra
note 5, at 566-67.
960 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 228.
961 For example, the ICTY prosecutor elected not to investigate alleged excessive environmental damage
(caused by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of Kosovo) as a war crime, because
of lack of specificity in defining this as a war crime. Burrus M. Carnahan, Law of War lecture at the
George Washington University School of Law (Feb. 7, 2006); Final Report to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, June 8, 2000.
962 Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School
of Law (Nov. 15, 2005).
963 ICTY At a Glance, available at http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006:
Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School of
Law (Nov. 16, 2005); DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 380-382, 589-594;
KLABBERS, supra note 183, at 183-85.
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highest profile defendant, former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic,
recently died in captivity on March 11, 2006 while his trial was ongoing.964
2. ICTR
Only a year after the UNSC had established the ICTY to prosecute atrocities in
the former Yugoslavia, atrocities in another war-torn country presented the need
for the formation of a second international criminal tribunal:
In 1994, over half a million people were brutally butchered during ethnic
conflicts and genocidal slaughter in Rwanda. The massacres could have
been prevented but those with the power to halt the killings lacked the will,
wisdom or political courage to take the military risks. Instead, in response
to justified cries of universal indignation, the Security Council promptly
created another ad hoc tribunal [nearby in Arusha, Tanzania] for crimes
committed in Rwanda.965
There are important similarities between the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) and its predecessor, the ICTY. On November 8, 1994, the UNSC
established the ICTR again by fiat acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
prescribing a similar structure,966 defining similar primary jurisdiction over
genocide and crimes against humanity, and similarly directing UN-member
States to cooperate with the new court.967 Both courts lack the death penalty,
964 Milosevic Found Dead in His Cell, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4796470.stm (last
visited Apr. 10, 2006).
965 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 228, 243. See also ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 615 (noting that
“[d]uring the three-month period from April to July 1994 an estimated half million to one million people
were killed in Rwanda in massacres widely viewed… as the clearest case of genocide since the Second
World War.”); Justice Anthony Kennedy, ASIL 100th Mtg., supra note 27, Plenary Address, Mar. 30, 2006
(“the world was warned, but waited, watched, and wept but little [regarding Rwanda]”).
966 Initially the ICTY and ICTR even shared the same prosecutor, and they continue to share the same
appeals chamber. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [hereinafter ICTR Statute],
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, arts. 12 & 15 (1994).
967 Id. at Arts. 2, 3 & 8; ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 616. Although Rwanda, who happened to
be serving on the UNSC at the time, was in favor of establishing an international tribunal, it cast the sole
opposing vote for a number of reasons, including the fact that the ICTR lacked the death penalty and was
based outside Rwanda. Id.
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which is particularly ironic for the ICTR, since lesser cases of genocide were
prosecuted in domestic Rwandan courts, leading to the execution of those
convicted.968
Although the ICTR was patterned after the ICTY, there are also important
differences. The ICTR has a more restrictive temporal limit on its jurisdiction (only
covering offenses committed in 1994 versus offenses committed after January 1,
1991 for the ICTY), but a more relaxed geographical jurisdiction (territory of
Rwanda plus Rwandan citizens committing genocide and other violations in the
territory of neighboring States versus merely the territory of the former
Yugoslavia for the ICTY).969 Many of the differences between the ICTR and ICTY
arise from the fact that the conflict in Rwanda was almost exclusively an internal
conflict, whereas the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was both an international
and a non-international armed conflict.970 Therefore the ICTR Statute does not
require a connection between crimes against humanity and armed conflict as
does the ICTY Statute,971 and the ICTR refers to violations of Common Article 3
of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the
Geneva Conventions (covering noninternational armed conflict) rather than to
violations of the laws and customs of war as does the ICTY Statute.972 Although
the focus in Rwanda (like the former Yugoslavia) was on criminal punishment,
there was also a parallel process of “Truth and Reconciliation” in Rwanda to deal
with the 100,000 criminal suspects in custody973 as well as creating an
968 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 616, 617.
969 ICTR Statute, supra note 193, at Preamble & Art. 7.
970 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 616.
971 Compare ICTR Statute, supra note 193, at Art. 3 with ICTY Statute, supra note 182, at Art. 5. See also
ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 616; Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at
the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 15, 2005).
972 Compare ICTR Statute, supra note 193, at Art. 4 with ICTY Statute, supra note 182, at Art. 3. See also
ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 616.
973 Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School
of Law (Nov. 15, 2005). See also ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 617. Cf. Sriram, supra note 17,
at 385 (noting that “[t]ruth commissions may be one tool to address the pain of the victims”).
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acknowledged record of the atrocities.974 The ICTR has successfully completed
criminal proceedings against twenty defendants.975
3. Effectiveness of ICTY and ICTR
Reviews of the effectiveness of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals
have varied in their level of praise or criticism. On the one hand are
commendatory claims that “[d]espite initial start-up problems, the ad hoc tribunals
have been functioning reasonably well and have been creating important
precedents to uphold and expand international humanitarian law,”976 and at least
one claim that the number of internal armed conflicts has declined substantially
since the formation of the ICTY and ICTR.977
However, on the other hand are a variety of criticisms of the two ad hoc
international criminal tribunals: whether the UNSC had the authority to create
judicial sub-organs in the first place;978 whether ad hoc courts are effective as a
deterrent, since many of the most serious atrocities occurred in the former
Yugoslavia after the ICTY had been established;979 whether the two international
criminal tribunals are too far removed from the citizenry980 and too inefficient,981
974 United States Institute for Peace, Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide, available at
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwanda3.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006); Dinah L. Shelton,
International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 16,
2005).
975 ICTR Status of Cases, available at http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/cases/status.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2006).
976 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 228.
977 Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School
of Law (Nov. 17, 2005).
978 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 601; Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-
Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 15, 2005); KLABBERS,
supra note 183, at 183-85.
979 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 567.
980 Sriram, supra note 17, at 312-14 (concluding that “[p]ursuing such "globalitarian" concerns may come
at the cost of local needs,” and that mixed tribunals may pursue international justice while still pursuing
local needs). Accord Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington
University School of Law (Nov. 16, 2005) (promoting “mixed tribunals,” like the one in Sierra Leone,
which uphold international accountability as well as helping to remedy the defects in the domestic criminal
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which has led for a push for them to complete their temporary mandates and be
brought to an end;982 and even whether the two ad hoc tribunals invade the
province of military commanders if they engage in “micro-fact-finding” of
operational law versus enforcing “massacre law.”983 Thus, the two ad hoc
international criminal tribunals would appear to be at most a partial success.
However, the geographically and temporally limited jurisdiction of the ad hoc
tribunals, as well as their inefficiency,984 provided the incentive for finally
establishing a permanent International Criminal Court,985 which would “obviate[e]
the need to create such ad hoc tribunals in the future.”986
4. ICC
Although there is a long history of efforts to establish a permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC),987 the lessons learned from the ICTY and ICTR provided
the necessary impetus to finally bring the concept of an ICC into reality.988
Modern efforts to establish an ICC began with, and naturally followed from the
system, rather than establishing an international tribunal in another country with international judges, which
only leaves a broken and corrupt domestic judicial system).
981 Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School
of Law (Nov. 16, 2005) (promoting “mixed tribunals” as being more efficient than UN sponsored ad hoc
tribunals because of the voluntary contributions for mixed tribunals, which place a premium on efficiency).
In the ten years since their creation, each of the ad hoc tribunals has completed no more than half of their
respective caseloads. Compare Key Figures of ICTY Cases, available at http://www.un.org/icty/glance-
e/index.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) (89 cases completed out of 161 indictments for the ICTY) with
ICTR Status of Cases, available at
http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/cases/status.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) (20 cases completed out of 58
indictments for the ICTR).
982 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, Updates, Chapter 9, available a
http://teaching.law.cornell.edu/faculty/drwcasebook/updates9.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
983 Ruth Wedgwood, Cummings Symposium, supra note 39, Sep. 30, 2005.
984 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 228; Barrett, supra note 159, at 470.
985 Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006; Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-
Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 16, 2005).
986 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 667.
987 See supra Part II.B.
988 Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. Contra Ruth Wedgwood, id.
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International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. France proposed such
a court in 1947, and when the UN General Assembly adopted the Genocide
Convention in 1948, it asked the International Law Commission (ILC) to study the
possibility of establishing an ICC for the punishment of genocide and other
crimes.989 The ILC submitted its report in 1950, concluding that the establishment
of such a court was possible, but by then the Cold War had begun, and
“consideration of the question proved to be complex and contentious.”990
Specifically, “[t]he absence of an agreed upon definition of aggression was the
excuse given for lack of progress toward an international criminal court. Debates
were interminable and inconclusive.”991
Almost four decades later in 1989, Trinidad and Tobago revived the concept by
making the relatively modest suggestion of establishing an ICC to only handle
international drug trafficking cases – the UN General Assembly again passed the
idea to the ILC for study.992 The implosion of the former Soviet Union in 1990 had
two repercussions vis-à-vis the ICC: first, the lack of US/USSR pressures led to
outbreaks of violence (e.g. in Yugoslavia) and hence revealed the need for
international fora; second, East-West tensions eased, thereby removing the
major obstacle to the ICC.993 The UN Security Council primed the ICC pump by
establishing the two ad hoc international tribunals in 1993 and 1994.994 The ILC
kept the process going by submitting its draft statute for the ICC to the UN
989 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 667.
990 Id.; Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
991 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 226.
992 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 606. Cf. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5,
at 667 (noting that UN consideration of an ICC was within the framework of the ILC’s discussion of a draft
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, until the two issues were separated in 1992).
The ILC forwarded its draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind to the UN
General Assembly in 1996, but by that time, preparatory work for the ICC was in full swing, and the draft
Code was overcome by events. Randall, supra note 10, at 827-28.
993 Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
994 Id. See supra Part II.E.1-2.
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General Assembly in 1994.995 The next year, the UN General Assembly
established a “Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court,” which met six times from 1996 to 1998 to prepare a draft
convention “for consideration by an international conference in 1998, which
would coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the 1948 Genocide Convention.”996
Thus the stage was set for the Rome Conference.
The Rome Conference was a “final frenetic month of negotiations,”997 culminating
in the final vote on the Statute of the ICC:
On 15 June 1998, delegations from 160 states…(with thirty one
intergovernmental organizations… and 135 non-governmental
organizations attending as observers) met in Rome at the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court to finalize the Statute, which was adopted on
17 July 1998 with a vote of 120 in favour, seven against and twenty-one
abstentions, and opened for signature on the same day.998
The negative vote by the United States was a disappointment to the rest of the
Rome Conference for two reasons: first, the United States had been a somewhat
995 Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra
note 181, at 606.
996 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 667. See Ferencz, supra note 71, at 228; Sean D. Murphy, ICC
Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 606.
997 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 606. Cf. Ferencz, supra note 71, at 229. Besides
the desire to complete the ICC Treaty to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the 1948 Genocide
Convention, there was also a push to “finish by the millennium,” and “gotta get it done in five weeks.”
Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. Thus “the whole atmosphere in Rome was
wrong,” and major States did not join (Russia, India, China, US). Id. Ambassador Scheffer, the lead U.S.
representative at the Rome Conference, agrees that there was a “rush to judgment” in Rome and that the
fair request by the United States for an extension of time should have been granted. Ambassador David
Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. He also noted that the “U.S. team had deep
disappointment in the rush for gratification of concluding the treaty conference on time [when] often treaty
conferences extend their deadline[s].” Id. The “rush to judgment” in Rome also led to the UN Secretary
General, as the Depositary, needing to correct approximately seventy “technical errors” in the text of the
Rome Statute. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 668, 671.
998 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 667. Cf. DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181,
at 609 (noting that because the vote was not officially recorded, there is some uncertainty as to which States
other than the United States voted no, but most lists include China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar & Yemen).
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consistent supporter of the ICC over the years,999 and second, because many
concessions had been made to satisfy U.S. concerns.1000 The Rome Statute
garnered another 19 signatures by the end of 2000,1001 including that of
Ambassador Scheffer of the United States.1002 However, the United States
subsequently expressed its intent not to ratify the treaty, and its belief that the
United States was therefore under no legal obligations arising from Ambassador
Scheffer’s signature.1003 Nevertheless, the sixtieth State ratified the Rome
999 Compare Ferencz, supra note 71, at 243 (“For almost a century, the United States government was in
the forefront of those advocating an international criminal jurisdiction.”) and ROBERTS & GUELFF,
supra note 5, at 668 (U.S. opposition to ICC was ironic in having been an early and leading proponent of
such a court and a continuing strong supporter of the ICTY and ICTR) and Ferencz, supra note 71, at 228
(“In 1997, President Clinton addressed the United Nations and called for the early establishment of a
permanent International Criminal Court.”) with Ferencz, supra note 71, at 226 (U.S. support for the ICC
vacillated during the Cold War) and Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006 (US was
for the ICC originally, but a modest ICC to include UNSC referrals only).
1000 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 229.
1001 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 125(1); Associate Dean Susan L. Karamanian, ICC Panel, supra
note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1002 Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra
note 181, at 611-12. See also Ferencz, supra note 71, at 237-38:
After careful consideration in the White House, President Clinton instructed United States
Ambassador David Scheffer to sign the Rome Statute just as the deadline was about to expire on
December 31, 2000. Israel promptly followed suit. Signing was a reaffirmation of America's
historical commitment to international accountability ever since Nuremberg. Knowing that there
was no prospect of getting two-thirds of the Senators to consent, Clinton, seeking to mollify both
right-wingers and human rights activists, said he would not recommend that it be submitted for
ratification. He wanted the United States to stay engaged in order to help shape the Court and
remain a key player.
1003 Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2006). Accord Ferencz, supra note 71, at 238; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 612.
Not too unsurprisingly, President Bush had the protégé of Senator Jesse Helms (a staunch opponent of the
ICC) write the letter to the UN Secretary General. Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman,
International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). That protégé was, of course,
John Bolton, who is now the U.S. Ambassador to the UN. Announcement of Nomination of John Bolton as
U.S. Ambassador to the UN, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43062.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2006). Ambassador Bolton apparently believes that “international law is not really law since it is
not binding or enforceable” and “[h]e considered the Rome Statute too vague.” Ferencz, supra note 71, at
233-34. The purpose of “unsigning” the Rome Statute was in order not to be bound by the requirement not
to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, which is required by treaty signatories even before
ratification, pursuant to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. Sean D. Murphy, ICC
Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. Although the United States is not a party to the VCLT, it considers the
VCLT to represent customary international law. Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
See infra note 314. This “unsigning” may have been in anticipation of a more active opposition to the ICC,
such as entering Article 98 agreements with other States to circumvent the ICC’s jurisdiction. Ferencz,
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Statute on April 11, 2002,1004 and the Convention entered in to force on July 1,
2002.1005
Before discussing the U.S. objections to the ICC, it is important to note the five
significant hurdles that must be overcome before a case can be brought before
the ICC. First, temporally the ICC only has jurisdiction over war crimes and other
offenses committed after the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, or
when a State subsequently signs the treaty, unless a State agrees to apply the
Rome Statute retroactively.1006 This period can be delayed by seven years
specifically for war crimes, as France has so elected.1007
The second significant jurisdictional hurdle for the ICC is geographical: generally,
the crime either has to have been committed within the territory of a State
party,1008 or committed by a national of a State party.1009 The only two exceptions
to this general geographical rule are if a non-party State enters into an ad hoc
agreement to allow crimes committed within its territory or by its nationals to go
to the ICC,1010 or if the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN
supra note 71, at 236. See infra Part II.E.4. However, the fact that the United States is still technically a
signatory to the Rome Statute means that it retains the right to sit as an observer in the Assembly of States
Parties. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 112(1). See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
1004 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 238; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 612. See also
Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Arts. 11, 126(1). Ninety-four States had ratified the Rome Statute by May 3,
2005. Associate Dean Susan L. Karamanian, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. Requiring sixty
States to ratify the Rome Statute before it went into force was a fairly high threshold, comparable to “the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and close to the sixty-five [ratifications necessary] for the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention.” ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 668.
1005 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 238; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 612.
1006 Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1007 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Arts. 8 & 124; ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 670; Ruth
Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1008 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 12(2)(a); Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13,
2006.
1009 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 12(2)(b); Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
Thus, technically the ICC itself does not rely upon the principle of universal jurisdiction, but on the more
traditional jurisdictional bases asserted on behalf of its State parties.
1010 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 12(3). For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly
Zaire) entered into such an ad hoc agreement in April 2004. Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89,
Feb. 13, 2006.
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Charter, refers matters to the ICC, regardless of whether the State involved is a
party to the treaty or not.1011
The third important hurdle before a case can be brought before the ICC relates to
subject matter jurisdiction: Article 5 of the Rome Statute provides that “[t]he
jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole,” and then lists only four general crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.1012
Only the first three crimes are defined with any more specificity.1013 The second
paragraph of Article 5 notes that the crime of aggression is as of yet undefined
the earliest this could happen would be in the year 2009, when State parties may
first revise the Rome Statute, but the definition of the crime of aggression would
not apply to State parties who do not ratify the amendment.1014
The fourth major hurdle to ICC jurisdiction is the principle of complementarity:
unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which have primacy over domestic courts,1015 the ICC
1011 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 13(b). For example, in March 2005, the UN Security Council
referred Sudan to the ICC. Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. The United States
agreed that genocide was being committed in Darfur, and therefore it and the other three nonparties to the
Rome Statute on the UN Security Council abstained from voting on the matter. Joan E. Donoghue,
International Law lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 17, 2005).
1012 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 5(1) (emphasis added). See also id. at Art. 17(1)(d) (noting that the
ICC shall rule a case inadmissible if it “is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court”).
1013 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Arts. 6-8. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
1014 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Arts. 5(2), 121, 123; Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 3-4, 60th Nuremberg
Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005; ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 670. Another irony of
the ICC is that while Justice Jackson thought the crime of aggression was the most serious crime at the IMT
in Nuremberg (Ferencz, supra note 71, at 225; Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 3, 60th Nuremberg
Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005), it was also the excuse given during the Cold War for lack of
progress towards an ICC (see supra note 220 and accompanying text), and yet the crime of aggression
remains “inherently politicized” and is a “huge albatross around the ICC’s neck, which could kill it,” (Sir
Franklin Berman, Cummings Symposium, supra note 39, Sep. 30, 2005) and is one of the arguments the
United States puts forth in opposition to the ICC (see infra notes 311-16 and accompanying text).
1015 See supra notes 184, 194 and accompanying text.
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turns primacy on its head by giving precedence to domestic courts.1016 The ICC
will not assert jurisdiction over a case if:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over
it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned,
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State
genuinely to prosecute;
[or]
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the
subject of the complaint.1017
“Unwillingness” is defined as either shielding the person from criminal
responsibility, or unjustifiably delaying or conducting the proceedings in a way
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice,” or not
conducting the proceedings in an independent and impartial manner.1018
“Inability” is defined as the “total or substantial collapse” of the domestic judicial
system to the point where the State can either not gain custody over the
accused, or the necessary evidence and testimony, or otherwise is unable to
carry out its proceedings.1019 A person who has “already been tried” is subject to
similar requirements as the definition of unwillingness.1020
1016 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 17; ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 668-69.
1017 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 17(1) (emphasis added).
1018 Id. at Art. 17(2).
1019 Id. at Art. 17(3).
1020 Id. at Art. 20(3).
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A fifth principal hurdle to ICC jurisdiction is that the ICC prosecutor may only take
action on a case if referred by: (a) the UN Security Council acting under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, as already noted,1021 (b) one of the State parties to the
Rome Statute,1022 or (c) the prosecutor acting proprio motu (on his own
accord).1023 The ICC Prosecutor must “conclude[] that there is a reasonable basis
to proceed with an investigation” before submitting an investigation authorization
request to the Pre-Trial Chamber.1024 A majority of a panel of the Pre-Trial
Chamber must determine “that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court”
before authorizing the ICC Prosecutor to commence the investigation.1025 The
ICC Prosecutor must then “notify all States Parties and those States which,
taking into account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction
over the crimes concerned.”1026 A State has thirty days to inform the ICC “that it
is investigating or has investigated its nationals or others within its jurisdiction
with respect to criminal acts which may constitute crimes [within the ICC’s
1021 Id. at Art. 13(b). See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
1022 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Arts. 13(a) & 14.
1023 Id. at Arts. 13(c) & 15.
1024 Id. at Arts. 15(3) & 53(1). In fact, it appears that the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, has carefully exercised his responsibilities to ensure an investigation is warranted. In response to
over 240 communications regarding alleged war crimes committed in Iraq, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo wrote a
ten-page, carefully considered letter explaining the limits of his and the ICC’s mandate, and concluding that
“the available information did not provide a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court had been committed” with regard to targeting of civilians or clearly excessive attacks. ICC
Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Iraq Response letter [hereinafter Iraq Response Letter] at 4-7, Feb.
9, 2006, available at
http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf (last visited
Apr. 10,2006). With regard to allegations of “wilful killing or inhuman treatment of civilians,” Mr. Moreno
Ocampo “concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court had been committed” for “four to twelve victims of wilful killing” and less than twenty victims of
inhuman treatment. Id. at 7-8. Nevertheless, Mr. Moreno Ocampo concluded that the alleged willful killing
and inhuman treatment were not “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes” as required by Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute before the ICC will exercise its
jurisdiction over alleged war crimes. Id. At 8. Moreover, he found that the number of victims was of a
much smaller magnitude than the three situations his office was investigating in Uganda, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and the Darfur region of Sudan, and thus “did not appear to meet the required threshold
of the Statute.” Id. at 9. Without addressing complementarity, Mr. Moreno Ocampo noted that “national
proceedings had been initiated with respect to each of the relevant incidents.” Id.
1025 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Arts. 15(4) & 57(2)(a).
1026 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 18(1).
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jurisdiction] and which relate to the information provided in the notification to
States,” and to request that the ICC Prosecutor defer his investigation.1027 “[T]he
Prosecutor shall defer to the State's investigation of those persons unless a
majority of the seven judges on the Pre Trial Chamber, on the application of the
Prosecutor, decides to [nevertheless] authorize the investigation,” in which case
the State concerned may appeal to the Appeals Chamber on an expedited
basis.1028 The State concerned may again subsequently challenge the
admissibility of the case before the ICC will hear the case.1029 Finally, the UN
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, may defer the
investigation or prosecution of any case for renewable twelve-month periods.1030
Despite these extensive controls on the ICC Prosecutor’s discretion, the fear that
he might conduct politicized investigations remains one of the U.S. concerns
about the ICC.1031
5. U.S. Objections to the ICC
The United States has a number of objections to the ICC, which appear to fall
into four broad categories: (a) contrary to U.S.-centric view; (b) criminal exposure
of U.S. service members; (c) criminal exposure of U.S. civilian and military
leaders; and (d) efficiency.1032 Each of these will be examined in turn.
1027 Id. at Art. 18(2).
1028 Id. at Arts. 18(2), 18(4), 57(2)(a) & 82.
1029 Id. at Arts. 19(2)(b) & 19(4).
1030 Id. at Art. 16.
1031 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, The International Criminal
Court [hereinafter ICC Fact Sheet], Aug. 2, 2002, available at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2002/23426.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). Professor Ferencz has noted
that “no other Prosecutor in human history has been subjected to as many controls as exist in the ICC
Statute.” Ferencz, supra note 71, at 231. See infra notes 301, 305-06 and accompanying text.
1032 See generally Jennifer Elsea, U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court [hereinafter U.S.
ICC Policy], September 3, 2002, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/13389.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2006).
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a. Contrary to U.S.-Centric View
As one of the permanent five members1033 of the UN Security Council, the United
States can remain above the international fray, knowing that it effectively
possesses a unilateral veto1034 over any substantive actions taken by the UN
Security Council, which has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.”1035 Thus, not too surprisingly, the United States
initially proposed that the ICC only have jurisdiction over matters referred to it by
the UN Security Council, essentially making the ICC a permanent version of the
two ad hoc tribunals with their limited mandates.1036 Most other States and NGOs
pressed for a court independent of the UN Security Council and the veto of the
permanent members.1037 The U.S. argued in support of its proposal that an ICC
prosecution may delay or complicate the peace process,1038 particularly if
amnesty is the only means to achieve peace.1039 However, as previously noted,
the UN Security Council may defer the investigation or prosecution of any case
for renewable twelve-month periods,1040 which logically should allay U.S.
concerns about interference with the UN Security Council’s control over the
peace process.
A second U.S.-centric concern is the progressive development of international
humanitarian law as interpreted by the ICC. The ICC’s interpretation of
international humanitarian law might perhaps be at variance with the U.S. view,
1033 U.N. Charter art. 23(1). The permanent five (or P-5) members are: “The [People’s] Republic of China,
France, the [former] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [now Russia], the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.” Id.
1034 U.N. Charter art. 27(3). Technically, each of the permanent members does not possess a veto over
substantive decisions made by the UN Security Council. However, their “concurring votes” are required for
decisions on any non-procedural matters. Id.
1035 U.N. Charter art. 24(1).
1036 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 606; Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note
89, Feb. 13, 2006. See also U.S. ICC Policy, supra note 259.
1037 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 606.
1038 Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1039 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1040 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 16. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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particularly in areas of non-international armed conflict, the unsettled tension
between human rights law and the law of war, or customary international law as it
is developed by State practice.1041 Ambassador Scheffer’s response is that the
two ad hoc tribunals have effectively dealt with the issue of the progressive
development of the law,1042 and thus there is no reason to expect that the ICC
would be any different.
A third U.S.-centric concern is that U.S. nationals would not receive a fair trial as
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.1043 Yet the due process guarantees of the
Rome Statute far exceed what would otherwise be available in domestic courts of
foreign nations for war crimes committed abroad, and more closely mirror those
guaranteed by the U.S. Bill of Rights than the rights guaranteed by other
States.1044 An accused person is presumed innocent, and the ICC Prosecutor
has the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.1045 In addition, the
accused has the following rights:
1. In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a
public hearing . . . to a fair hearing conducted impartially, and to the
following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content
of the charge, in a language which the accused fully understands and
speaks;
1041 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1042 Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1043 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 231-32. Accord Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Statement on the
ICC Treaty [hereinafter SECDEF ICC Statement], May 6, 2002, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2002/b05062002_bt233-02.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006); U.S. ICC
Policy, supra note 259. There may be at least some indication that “[t]he majority of the American people
do not agree with the position on the ICC taken by the Bush Administration.” Ferencz, supra note 71, at
245.
1044 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 231-32.
1045 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 66.
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(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence
and to communicate freely with counsel of the accused's choosing in
confidence;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) … to be present at the trial, to conduct the defence in person or
through legal assistance of the accused's choosing, to be informed, if the
accused does not have legal assistance, of this right and to have legal
assistance assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of
justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient
means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and
to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her. The accused
shall also be entitled to raise defences and to present other evidence
admissible under this Statute;
(f) To have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and
such translations as are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness, if
any of the proceedings of or documents presented to the Court are not in
a language which the accused fully understands and speaks;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent,
without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or
innocence;
(h) To make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence;
and
(i) Not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof
or any onus of rebuttal.
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2. . . . the Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence
evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she
believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to
mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of
prosecution evidence. In case of doubt as to the application of this
paragraph, the Court shall decide.1046
Even with respect to admissions of guilt, the Rome Statute ensures that the
admission was voluntarily made, is supported by the facts, and that the accused
understands the nature and consequences of his admission.1047 The ICC has
rules of evidence to ensure relevancy and admissibility of evidence, as well as
rules of procedure.1048 There are also provisions for appeals of convictions.1049
The only two significant incidents of U.S. jurisprudence missing at the ICC are
jury trials and the death penalty. Jury trials would likewise be missing in many
foreign domestic criminal trials for war crimes committed abroad, to which the
protections of the U.S. Constitution also would not apply.1050 Although the ICC
lacks the death penalty,1051 the penalties imposed by the ICC do not “affect[] the
application by States of penalties prescribed by their national law,” which would
arguably include the imposition of the death penalty.1052 The absence of jury
trials and the imposition of the death penalty do not otherwise detract from the
fairness of ICC trials.
1046 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 67.
1047 Id. at Art. 65.
1048 Id. at Arts. 68-74, 76-78.
1049 Id. at Arts. 81-85.
1050 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 233.
1051 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1052 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 80; ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 670.
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A fourth U.S.-centric concern is the possibility of domestic tribunals “dumping”
their cases on the ICC rather than dealing with them directly.1053 However, the
ICC will find that a case is inadmissible if “[t]he case is not of sufficient gravity to
justify further action by the Court.”1054 Moreover, this would seem to be, at this
point, merely a theoretical concern since the ICC currently has only had four
situations referred to it.1055 Should this problem present itself at some point in the
future, it could be addressed at that time.
The fifth and final U.S.-centric concern is that the ICC judges are unqualified, or
as Professor Wedgwood put it so succinctly: “can a panel of criminal law, human
rights, and civil judges make the correct decisions?”1056 This statement implies
that the “correct” decisions are those that are in accordance with U.S. views. The
eighteen judges currently serving on the ICC were required to either:
(i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the
necessary relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or
in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings; or
(ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law
such as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and
extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance
to the judicial work of the Court.1057
1053 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. Cf. Joan E. Donoghue, International Law
lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 17, 2005) (noting that the ICC will often
have more available resources and targeted xpertise than that found in most national governments,
particularly those of developing countries, and thus successful prosecutions may be more likely under the
ICC; therefore, governments now have an added tool to increase leverage on groups within their countries
by initiating ICC proceedings).
1054 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 17(1)(d).
1055 ICC Situations and Cases, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006)
(noting that the Republic of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic
have referred situations to the ICC, and that the UN Security Council has referred the situation in the
Darfur region of the Sudan to the ICC).
1056 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1057 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 36(3)(b).
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The ICC judges were nominated and elected by State parties to the Rome
Statute,1058 and appear to have a wealth of experience in international
humanitarian law, international human rights law, international criminal law and
public international law.1059 Nine of the eighteen ICC judges have prior judicial
experience (four on their country’s highest court and six on either the ICTY or the
ICTR), nine are former law professors, three are former ministers of government,
two are former attorneys general, one is a former national vice president, and
one is a former law school dean.1060 The ICC judges appear to be at least as
qualified as judges within the United States’ federal judicial branch, the vast
majority (if not all) of whom are political appointees.
b. Criminal Exposure of U.S. Service members
Besides the U.S.-centric concerns, another major fear has been exposing U.S.
military service members to potential criminal liability for military related activities
committed abroad, such as the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.1061 More
specifically, the fear is that the principle of complementarity may be insufficient to
protect U.S. service members from ICC jurisdiction.1062 However, “[t]he duty not
to commit the crimes is not new; only the mechanism for enforcement is being
added via the ICC.”1063
In addition to exposure for obvious war crimes, the United States is troubled by
potential criminal liability where U.S. interpretations of the Law of War differ from
1058 Id. at Art. 36(4)-(7).
1059 ICC, The Judges – Biographical Notes, available at http://www.icccpi.int/chambers/judges.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2006).
1060 Id.
1061 Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. See generally Wikipedia, Abu Ghraib
Torture and Prisoner Abuse, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghraib_torture_and_prisoner_abuse (last visited Apr. 10, 2006)
(discussing detainee abuse that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq).
1062 ICC Fact Sheet, supra note 258. Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. Accord
SECDEF ICC Statement, supra note 270.
1063 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 233-234.
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that of other countries. Although the general Law of War has fairly clear
principles, “applications of the Law of Armed Conflict are mixed questions of fact
and law, which are murky; for example, the 1999 NATO Intervention [in Kosovo,
specifically regarding] …choice of targets in an air war,” or shooting “technicals”
in Somalia on sight, or when conducting a freedom of navigation operation in the
Gulf of Sidra, firing back in response to being “painted with fire control radar.”1064
Under the U.S. Rules of Engagement (ROE), responding to being “painted” with
fire control radar is an act of self defense, whereas the British ROE require an
actual attack before you can respond in self-defense.1065 Professor Wedgwood
suggests that perhaps the ICC would side with the United Kingdom’s view on
self-defense.1066
Ambassador Scheffer has two responses to this concern about the criminal
exposure of U.S. service members due to conflicting interpretations of the Law of
War: first, ad hoc tribunals have successfully dealt with the issue of conflicting
ROE,1067 and there is no indication that the ICC would not follow their lead;
second, Title 18, the Crimes and Criminal Procedure section of the United States
Code, “requires modernizing amendments to more accurately define prosecution
for crimes against humanity, genocide, and a fuller definition of war crimes,” as
well as “looking at the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] regarding
exposure symmetry.”1068 The United States is significantly behind other countries
in revising our law.1069 If we take these steps, Ambassador Scheffer is confident
that “complementarity would work.”1070 A third response might be that one
1064 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1065 Id.
1066 Id.
1067 Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1068 Id. See also Ferencz, supra note 71, at 233 (citing Chief Judge Everett on the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces as “suggest[ing] that Federal Statutes could be amended to completely cover all the crimes
under ICC jurisdiction”).
1069 Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. Other States have begun to
revise their criminal laws, in order “to conform to their obligations as signatories to the … ICC[ ] Statute;
Belgium and Canada are among the nations that have already made such revisions.” Sriram, supra note 17,
at 310.
1070 Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
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hundred States1071 have decided they are comfortable with the principle of
complementarity, including many strong U.S. allies such as Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, which may indicate that the United
States is “out of line” with the rest of the world on this issue.1072
Besides differing interpretations of the Law of War, the United States is worried
that its service members face greater potential criminal exposure for two
reasons: first, “no other State regularly has 200,000 troops outside its
borders”;1073 second, that U.S. service members may be subjected to politically
motivated prosecutions, despite the United States not being a party to the Rome
Statute.1074 In response to fears that U.S. troops engaged in UN peacekeeping
efforts potentially would be subjected to ICC jurisdiction, the United States
pressured1075 the UN Security Council “to request the ICC Prosecutor to defer for
one year (with the possibility of renewal) any investigation into crimes by
members of UN operations who are nationals of states not party to the Rome
Statute.”1076
1071 The States Parties to the Rome Statute [hereinafter ICC State Parties], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
1072 Joan E. Donoghue, International Law lecture at the George Washington University School of Law
(Nov. 17, 2005).
1073 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 609. Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note
89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1074 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 669. Accord SECDEF ICC Statement, supra note 270; U.S.
ICC Policy, supra note 259; Sean D. Murphy & Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006;
DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 606, 610.
1075 The “pressure” was in the form of vetoing a resolution that “extend[ed] the mandate of United Nations
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.” Ferencz, supra note 71, at 239; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN,
supra note 181, at 612.
1076 S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (July 12, 2002); DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra
note 181, Updates, Chapter 9, available at
http://teaching.law.cornell.edu/faculty/drwcasebook/updates9.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006); Rome
Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 16. The one-year deferral was renewed in 2003. S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1487 (June 12, 2003); DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, Updates, Chapter 9,
available at http://teaching.law.cornell.edu/faculty/drwcasebook/updates9.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
See supra notes 257, 267 and accompanying text. The U.S. tactic was seen as an act of defiance against the
ICC, since the Rome Statute was due to enter into force the following day. Ferencz, supra note 71, at 239.
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The greater exposure due to the sheer number of deployed U.S. service
members could be mitigated by ensuring proper pre-deployment training on the
Law of War, and enforcing the high moral standards of the U.S. military within the
military justice system, which would then trigger the complementarity principle of
the ICC.1077 Moreover, as previously discussed, “no other Prosecutor in human
history has been subjected to as many controls as exist in the ICC Statute.”1078 In
addition to those procedural controls previously discussed:
The ICC is under the complete control of the very many countries that
form the Assembly of State Parties… They control the budget and can fire
anyone who might be tempted to politicize the office… The ICC has no
police force or other effective enforcement mechanism. The acceptance of
its judgments depends upon the Court's reputation for integrity and
competence. A frivolous Prosecutor could not remain in office.
Politi[ci]zation of the Court would amount to its suicide… It should be
noted that early United States demands that only the Security Council
could authorize prosecutions, were turned down by the others because
they insisted upon an independent Prosecutor free of political
influence.1079
Another way to phrase this particular concern is arguing that exposing U.S.
service members to criminal liability at the ICC for alleged war crimes committed
abroad detracts from U.S. sovereignty because the United States is not a party to
the Rome Statute.1080 However, in the absence of the Rome Statute, U.S. service
1077 See notes 242-47 and accompanying text. Ambassador Scheffer argues that the United States “has to be
willing to submit to some risk [of criminal exposure for its service members] to ensure the ICC reviews
courts-martial of other States’ military justice systems, which may not be as well managed.” Ambassador
David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1078 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 231. See supra notes 248-58 and accompanying text. Contra Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice, ASIL 100th Mtg., supra note 27, “A Conversation with Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice,” Mar. 29, 2006.
1079 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 232. See also supra note 251 and accompanying text (summarizing the Chief
Prosecutor to the ICC’s carefully considered response to over 240 communications regarding alleged war
crimes in Iraq).
1080 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 669. Accord SECDEF ICC Statement, supra note 270; ICC
Fact Sheet, supra note 258; U.S. ICC Policy, supra note 259; Sean D. Murphy & Ruth Wedgwood, ICC
Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006; DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 606, 610.
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members would still be criminally liable in foreign domestic courts for alleged war
crimes committed abroad, under either the territoriality or universality
principles.1081
Many treaties, such as hijacking or anti-terrorism conventions, provide for states
other than state of nationality to exercise jurisdiction over persons accused of
having committed serious crimes within their scope. These treaties, like the ICC
treaty, do not require the state of nationality be a party to the treaty or consent to
prosecution. The United States has in fact exercised jurisdiction over non-U.S.
nationals in a number of cases on the basis of treaty provisions empowering it to
do so. U.S. courts do not consider that the non-ratification of the relevant treaty
by the suspect’s state of nationality might somehow render overreaching or
otherwise questionable the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction.1082
Moreover, the lesson of the IMT at Nuremberg is that sovereignty cannot be used
as a defense to war crimes.1083
The United States is also concerned about potential criminal exposure under
newly defined crimes (such as the crime of aggression).1084 However, as
previously noted, the earliest that definitions or elements of ICC crimes could be
amended would be in the year 2009.1085 Moreover, the crimes, as amended,
would not apply to State parties who do not ratify the amendment.1086 Thus,
somewhat ironically, the United States would be more protected against any
1081 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 611. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying
text. Contra Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006 (noting that the traditional
architecture for Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) for NATO and UN Peacekeeping operations is that
the sending State has responsibility for prosecuting war crimes, and the receiving State has responsibility
for prosecuting off-duty crimes).
1082 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 611.
1083 Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 1, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005.
1084 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 233-34. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
1085 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
1086 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Arts. 5(2), 121, 123. Accord ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at
670; ICC Fact Sheet, supra note 258.
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amendments to the definitions of ICC crimes if it were to ratify the Rome Statute
before 2009, since after that date, it would appear to be bound by the amended
treaty.1087 To the extent that the United States is concerned that its service
members would be exposed to criminal liability for newly defined crimes in States
that do ratify the amendments, or for crimes committed in States that have
ratified the treaty but delayed its jurisdiction for seven years,1088 this is the same
sovereignty argument as previously addressed.1089
c.  Criminal Exposure of U.S. Civilian and Military Leaders
The United States’ unease about how the ICC might define the crime of
aggression goes beyond concern for its service members, and extends to
trepidation about the “command responsibility” of U.S. civilian and military
leadership.1090 As previously noted, the crime of aggression was the most
serious charge at the IMT in Nuremberg,1091 and if it is defined by the State
parties to the Rome Statute,1092 de facto “State-to-State” complaints would be
1087 The Rome Statute itself is silent on whether States that ratify the treaty after it has been amended are
bound by the amendments. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Arts. 121-23, 125. However, the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is fairly clear that “[a]ny State which becomes a party
to the treaty after the entry into force of the amending agreement shall, failing an expression of a different
intention by that State… be considered as a party to the treaty as amended.” VCLT, supra note 230, at Art.
40(5). Since no reservations to the Rome Statute may be made (Art. 120), it would appear that the United
States would be bound to accept any amendments to the Rome Statute if it ratified the treaty afterwards.
Again, although the United States is not a party to the VCLT, it considers the VCLT to represent customary
international law. Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. See supra note 230.
1088 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
1089 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 670. See supra notes 307-310 and accompanying text.
1090 ICC Fact Sheet, supra note 258. Accord Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006;
SECDEF ICC Statement, supra note 270. See also Benjamin B. Ferencz, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary,
supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005 (noting that “perhaps the U.S. has reason to worry about the ICC shining the
‘crime of aggression’ spotlight on the U.S. …. in Iraq II, the U.S. jumped the gun, which was the supreme
crime of aggression”); ASIL 100th Mtg., supra note 27, Resolution, Mar. 30, 2006 (stating seven
foundational concepts of international law, including “[i]n some circumstances, commanders (both military
and civilian) are personally responsible under international law for the acts of their subordinates). Cf.
Philippe Sands, “Lawless World” Presentation, Oct. 25, 2005 (arguing that the U.S. removal of Saddam
Hussein was “done in a bad way” [i.e. without UN Security Council approval], and that by March 2003,
“there was no longer a good reason to get rid of Saddam”). Ironically, “Saddam’s trial will be the first
prosecution for the crime of aggression since Nuremberg.” Michael Scharf, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary,
supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005. Accord Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 3, Id.
1091 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
1092 See supra notes 241, 311 and accompanying text.
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permitted.1093 High-ranking civilian and military leaders would not be able to
shield themselves from criminal liability beneath the banner of “head of State
immunity,” because the Rome Statute, as the Statute of the IMT before it,
considers official capacity to be irrelevant.1094
Ambassador Scheffer agrees that:
The United States should be most worried about the definition of the crime
of aggression and should want U.S. input regarding referral [of the crime
of aggression] to the ICC, and how the crime of aggression is defined for
individual criminal responsibility, instead of taking the position of total
resistance to the ICC and having a policy of denial.1095
Rather than continue in our “policy of fear,” Ambassador Scheffer argues that the
United States should exercises its heretofore unexercised right to be present as
an observer at the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute.1096
1093 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. Although technically only individuals are
subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction, a State party could refer another State’s Secretary of War or Head of State
to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation based on the alleged crime of aggression. This would be a de facto
State-to-State complaint.
1094 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 27. Official immunity and “merely following orders” were also
rejected as defenses at the IMT in Nuremberg. See Report of Justice Jackson to President Truman, June 6,
1945, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/jackson/jack08.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2006):
With the doctrine of immunity of a head of state usually is coupled another, that orders from an
official superior protect one who obeys them. It will be noticed that the combination of these two
doctrines means that nobody is responsible. Society as modernly organized cannot tolerate so
broad an area of official irresponsibility.
Accord Sriram, supra note 17, at 316 (2003).
1095 Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1096 Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 112(1); U.S. ICC Policy, supra note 259. See also Philippe
Sands, “Lawless World” Presentation, Oct. 25, 2005 (noting the “climate of fear” within the current U.S.
administration); Judge Buergenthal, Mar. 28, 2006 (noting that both the ICC and the United States would
benefit from U.S. participation). See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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d. Efficiency
The final U.S. objection to the ICC is also made about the two ad hoc tribunals:
lack of efficiency.1097 With an estimated total annual budget of $150 million,1098
and approximately 475 staff members1099 in addition to the eighteen sitting
judges,1100 the ICC has achieved the following progress in approximately three
years of operations:1101 the initiation of three investigations into four
situations,1102 and the recent indictment and arrest of the ICC’s first criminal
defendant,1103 “Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a Congolese national and alleged
founder and leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC),”1104 a militia that
conscripted child soldiers in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.1105 Of course, the depth and breadth of the ICC investigations is belied
by these simple statistics.1106
1097 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
1098 Dinah L. Shelton, International Law-Human Rights lecture at the George Washington University
School of Law (Nov. 17, 2005).
1099 ICC Newsletter, Latest Recruitment Figures, Nov. 2005, available at
http://www.icccpi.int/library/about/newsletter/index_30.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
1100 ICC, The Judges – Biographical Notes, supra note 286.
1101 ICC, Historical Introduction, available at http://www.icccpi.int/about/ataglance/history.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2006).
1102 ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, Sep. 16, 2005, available at
http://www.icccpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-4-16_English.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). Accord ICC
Situations and Cases, supra note 282.
1103 The ICC had previously issued arrest warrants against five other defendants involved in the Uganda
situation. D.R. Congo: ICC Arrest First Step to Justice, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/17/congo13026.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) (noting that “On
October 14, 2005, the court unsealed its first arrest warrants, for Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti and three other
officers of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda. To date they have not been apprehended.”).
1104 First Arrest for the International Criminal Court, Mar. 17, 2006, available at
http://www.icccpi.int/press/pressreleases/132.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). Accord D.R. Congo: ICC
Arrest First Step to Justice, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/17/congo13026.htm (last
visited Apr. 10, 2006).
1105 Statement by ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, available at
http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20060318_En.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
Accord D.R. Congo: ICC Arrest First Step to Justice, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/17/congo13026.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
1106 Statement by ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 332, at 2 (noting that “[s]ince the
Court’s jurisdiction began in July 2002, 8,000 people were killed in the [Ituri] region, and 600,000 people
displaced.”). Accord D.R. Congo: ICC Arrest First Step to Justice, available at
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The U.S. concerns about the ICC appear related to its general distrust of
international organizations, and international courts in particular. As Judge
Buergenthal, the American judge on the International Court of Justice, recently
remarked, the United States has very little experience dealing with international
courts compared to European States, and thus is more critical of international
courts.1107 However, Ambassador Scheffer points out that:
the ICC was initially a force protection objective of the U.S., to hold
militaries accountable to the Law of War. The dominant issue during the
ICC negotiations was not the potential U.S. liability, but “atrocity lords”
who seek to massacre people. We cannot be obsessed with U.S.
concerns and overlook the fundamental purpose of the ICC, which was
[addressing] war atrocities.1108
9.3. U.S. Opposition to the ICC
Besides raising a number of concerns, the United States has actively opposed
the ICC in a variety of ways. As previously discussed, the United States
“unsigned” the Rome Statute,1109 and pressured the UN Security Council to
request one year deferrals from the ICC Prosecutor before he investigates any
crimes allegedly committed by members of UN peacekeeping operations who are
nationals of States not party to the Rome Statute.1110 The United States also cut
off any funding or other support of the ICC,1111 and introduced legislation “to
prohibit and penalize any cooperation with the ICC.”1112
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/17/congo13026.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) (noting that the
violence in the Ituri region is part of a broader conflict in the Great Lakes region).
1107 Judge Thomas Buergenthal, Cummings Symposium, supra note 39, Sep. 30, 2005.
1108 Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1109 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
1110 See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
1111 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 236, 239.
1112 Id. at 236.
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In addition, the United States launched “[a] worldwide campaign… to obtain
bilateral agreements to block all assistance to the ICC and guarantee that no
Americans would ever be handed over to the international court.”1113
Ambassador Bolton collected these bilateral agreements1114 pursuant to Article
98 of the Rome Statute, which prevents the ICC from requesting a State party to
surrender an accused if doing so would require it to act inconsistently with other
international obligations it might have with regard to a third State.1115 Under these
“Article 98 agreements” as written, the U.S. President may waive their prohibition
against cooperating with the ICC with respect to a particular named defendant for
renewable one-year periods.1116 To date, the United States has entered into one
hundred Article 98 agreements with other States; thus there are now as many
Article 98 agreements as there are State parties to the Rome Statute.1117
Article 98 agreements are offensive to other States, particularly to European
States, for at least three reasons. First, they are written expansively in
overbroad1118 terms to include not only U.S. service members deployed overseas
and engaged in official duties, but also “current or former officials, employees
1113 Id.
1114 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. Accord Ferencz, supra note 71, at 240.
1115 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 98. Article 98 had been inserted into the Rome Statute at United
States insistence, in order to respect pre-existing treaty obligations known as Status of Forces Agreements
(SOFAs), which “require[] American soldiers arrested for crimes committed on foreign soil to be
surrendered to the United States for trial rather than being tried under the local national laws.” Ferencz,
supra note 71, at 240. See generally Status-of-Forces-Agreements (SOFA), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/sofa.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) (explaining SOFAs).
Arguably, these Article 98 agreements are perceived as contrary to the spirit and intent of the Rome Statute,
if not the letter. Ferencz, supra note 71, at 231, 240. Contra Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Fact Sheet, Frequently Asked Questions About the U.S. Government's Policy
Regarding the International Criminal Court (ICC) [hereinafter ICC FAQs], July 30, 2003, available at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/23428.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
1116 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1117 Compare Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement, May
3, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006) with ICC
State Parties, supra note 298.
1118 ASIL President-elect Jose Alvarez, ASIL 100th Mtg., supra note 27, “A Conversation with Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice,” Mar. 29, 2006.
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(including contractors), military personnel and all other U.S. nationals”1119 acting
even in their private capacities.1120 Second, the Article 98 agreements serve as a
kind of U.S.-created loophole or double standard because the United States
appears to have one standard for foreigners, and a higher one for U.S.
citizens.1121 The United States is willing to send suspected foreign war criminals
to the ad hoc and other international tribunals, including the ICC,1122 but not
Americans.1123 This argument that Americans are somehow above international
law is what Europeans find particularly offensive.1124 Third and finally, the fact
that the United States has openly expressed its opposition to the ICC, and is
willing to pull the levers of economic and military assistance to enforce its will,
illustrates that the United States is using its clout to influence other States’
behavior.1125 The European Union grudgingly agreed on a set of “Guiding
Principles” whereby its member-States could enter into these Article 98
agreements, so long as: (1) they only applied to nationals of non-parties to the
Rome Statute, (2) they only applied to persons sent by the United States on
official business, and (3) the United States agreed to conduct bona fide
investigations of crimes committed by Americans that would otherwise fall under
ICC jurisdiction.1126
1119 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, Updates, Chapter 9, available at
http://teaching.law.cornell.edu/faculty/drwcasebook/updates9.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). Accord
Philippe Sands, “Lawless World” Presentation, Oct. 25, 2005.
1120 Philippe Sands, “Lawless World” Presentation, Oct. 25, 2005. Accord ICC FAQs, supra note 342; Sean
D. Murphy, “Lawless World” Presentation, Oct. 25, 2005; Ferencz, supra note 71, at 246.
1121 Philippe Sands, “Lawless World” Presentation, Oct. 25, 2005. Accord Joan E. Donoghue, International
Law lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 17, 2005). Cf. Ferencz, supra note
71, at 231 (“Those who oppose the ICC insist upon absolute guarantees in advance that no United States
nationals will ever come under its jurisdiction”). Contra ICC FAQs, supra note 342.
1122 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
1123 Philippe Sands, “Lawless World” Presentation, Oct. 25, 2005.
1124 Id. ICJ President Judge Rosalyn Higgins, ASIL 100th Mtg., supra note 27, “A Conversation with
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice,” Mar. 29, 2006. Contra ICC FAQs, supra note 342.
1125 Joan E. Donoghue, International Law lecture at the George Washington University School of Law
(Nov. 17, 2005); ASIL President-elect Jose Alvarez, ASIL 100th Mtg., supra note 27, “A Conversation
with Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice,” Mar. 29, 2006.
1126 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, Updates, Chapter 9, available at
http://teaching.law.cornell.edu/faculty/drwcasebook/updates9.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
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The final significant move by the United States in opposition to the ICC was
enacting the “American Service members Protection Act (ASPA) of 2002,”
otherwise known as “The Hague Invasion Act.”1127 The ASPA essentially serves
as an umbrella framework for opposition to the ICC, combining:
(1) cutting off all U.S. cooperation to the ICC (no funding, court assistance,
assistance with investigations, etc.);
(2) barring U.S. military assistance and economic support to ratifying States
unless they are either
a. a fellow NATO member;
b. the President waives the prohibition; or
c. if the State signs an Article 98 bilateral agreement not to surrender
U.S. citizens1128
(3) the United States refuses to provide UN peacekeepers unless there is an
assurance of no potential liability for U.S. military
(4) the President may use all means necessary to free any U.S. person
detained by the ICC (hence the nickname “Hague Invasion Act”).1129
The ASPA was “meant to emphasize how serious the United States was…
about no third party liability.”1130
1127 U.S. ICC Policy, supra note 259; Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. Accord
Ferencz, supra note 71, at 236. Apparently President Clinton had opposed the ASPA and “headed it off”
twice before. Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1128 See supra notes 340-53 and accompanying text.
1129 American Service members' Protection Act of 2002, 22 USCS §§ 7401 et seq. (2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/23425.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). See also Sean D. Murphy,
ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1130 Ruth Wedgwood, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
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Although U.S. opposition to the ICC was not unexpected after the numerous
concerns it raised, “no one anticipated the vehemence of [U.S.] efforts to abort
the court or cripple it in its cradle.”1131 The irony of U.S. opposition to the ICC is
readily apparent:
It is indeed ironic that the United States, which led the world in creating
the Nuremberg principles, is now fighting so vehemently against the
International Criminal Court which would institutionalize those principles,
whereas Germany, whose leaders were the target of Nuremberg, is in the
forefront of the fight to sustain the Nuremberg principles in today’s
world.1132
Although Professor Dinstein argues that the “[p]rospects of [the ICC’s] success
are still a matter of conjecture,”1133 Ambassador Scheffer argues that it is time for
the United States to accept the existence of the ICC and stop opposing it,
because the ICC is “here to stay.”1134 As he so succinctly put it, “the ICC is here
to stay-get over it, get used to it, and get on with it.”1135 Instead, Ambassador
Scheffer argues that the United States needs to remain engaged in order to
affect how the ICC is implemented, and to assist in managing the future cases
and situations referred to it.1136
One final comment with regard to the ICC: it is important to remember the big
picture, that the target of the ICC is not the United States, with its established
domestic and military justice systems that are largely effective in punishing the
occasional war criminal. Instead, the ICC is focused on the “‘atrocity lords’ who
seek to massacre people [by the thousands]. We cannot be obsessed with U.S.
1131 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 229.
1132 Henry T. King, Jr., Remarks at 4, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005. Accord
id. at p. 5 (providing that the “Nuremberg principles… are good principles and they must guide our
behavior by adherence to them – with no country exemptions (including the U.S.)”).
1133 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 229.
1134 Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1135 Ambassador David Scheffer, 60th Nuremberg Anniversary, supra note 42, Nov. 11, 2005.
1136 Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
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concerns and overlook the fundamental purpose of the ICC, which was war
atrocities.”1137
Since genocide, crimes against humanity and major war crimes are almost
invariably committed with the connivance and support of a government,
the absence of any international tribunal will almost surely mean that,
unless the guilty regime is overthrown, the perpetrators will never be
tried.… the time has come for such impunity to end….a country torn by
civil strife will lack the political will or legal institutions needed to try
wrongdoers. If tyrants are able to evade justice, their victims will seek
vengeance and take the law into their own hands. Thus, there can be no
justice without peace and no peace without justice.1138
9.4 CURRENT STATUS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER WAR CRIMES
In order to assess the current status of universal jurisdiction over war crimes, let
us assume the following hypothetical1139: an uncooperative Afghan detainee is
being held by U.S. personnel at the American military base in Bagram,
Afghanistan in December 2005.1140 The American personnel strip the detainee of
his clothing, strike him repeatedly with their rifle butts on his torso and legs, drag
him around on the cold, damp floor of his cell, chain him to the concrete floor,
and leave him there overnight in an unheated cell without any blankets-by the
1137 Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006. See also note 335 and
accompanying text.
1138 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 230.
1139 This incident is truly intended as a hypothetical, although certain facts have been borrowed from earlier
allegations of detainee abuse. See, e.g., U.S. Army News Release, Fact Sheet [hereinafter Army Fact
Sheet], March 3, 2005, available at http://www4.army.mil/OCPA/read.php?story_id_key=6955 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2006); Tim Golden, Army Faltered in Investigating Detainee Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/22/international/asia/22abuse.html?ex=1274414400&en=35951e7
2c65a2185&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (last visited Apr. 10, 2006); Dana Priest, CIA Avoids
Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment, WASH. POST, March 3, 2005, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2576-2005Mar2.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006);
Shafiq Rasul, The George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Symposium: Voices of Guantanamo, Mar. 20, 2006.
1140 It is important to note that Afghanistan acceded to the Rome Statute on February 10, 2003. ICC State
Parties, supra note 298 (follow “Afghanistan” hyperlink).
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next morning the Afghan detainee has died of hypothermia. Assuming the
Geneva Conventions apply to U.S. forces present in Afghanistan in 2005,1141 this
would appear to be a relatively clear case of a “grave breach” of the “Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949”
(Third Geneva Convention),1142 and thus constitute a war crime.1143 We will use
this hypothetical to review the current status of universal jurisdiction vis-à-vis the
other relevant traditional jurisdictional bases.
1141 Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions provides that the Convention applies in international
armed conflict, and “to all cases of partial or total occupation.” See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra
note 157, at Art. 2. Even if the continued U.S. involvement in Afghanistan does not rise to the level of
“partial occupation,” Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions extends the following minimum level
of protection to non-international armed conflicts:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including … those placed hors de combat by . . .
detention . . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely . . . . To this end the following acts are
and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture.
See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 157, at Art 3. The U.S. administration has admitted that the
Geneva Conventions applied to Taliban forces fighting in the conflict in Afghanistan, although not to al
Qaeda forces. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at
Guantanamo, (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-
13.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006); Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, ASIL 100th Mtg., supra note 27,
“A Conversation with Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice,” Mar. 29, 2006. Further consideration of this
issue is beyond the scope of this article. Compare William H. Taft, Symposium: The Geneva Conventions
and the Rules of War in the Post-9/11 and Iraq World: Keynote Address, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 149
(2005) (arguing that the Geneva Conventions do not apply) with Evan J. Wallach, War Crimes Research
Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial": The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to Deny Application of the
Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib,
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541 (2005) (arguing that the Geneva Conventions do apply). See also
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 549-50 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that the United States Government may be violating Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention
by not treating captives as prisoners of war until their status has been determined by a competent tribunal).
1142 Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention defines grave breaches to include “torture or inhuman
treatment.... wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” to a “protected person.”
Geneva Convention III, supra note 157, at Art. 130.
1143 Is every violation of the Law of War a war crime, or only serious violations? Compare U.S. Dep't of
Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare para. 499 (1956) ("Every violation of the law of war
is a war crime.") with Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, in 71 International
Law Studies, The Law of Armed Conflict: Into The Next Millennium, 17, 21 (Michael Schmitt & Leslie
Green, eds., 1998) (State practice only supports serious violations of the Law of War, such as the grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, as constituting war crimes, and not mere technical violations). Accord
DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 229.
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A. Nationality Jurisdiction
Where “all States are empowered to try and punish war criminals,” the nationality
of the perpetrator is a sufficient “linkage” to establish jurisdiction over the alleged
war criminal.1144 This is true as a matter of “customary international law, [where]
nations have almost unlimited authority to regulate the conduct of their own
nationals around the world.”1145 Thus, in general terms, the United States would
have jurisdiction to enforce its national laws against the American personnel who
abused the detainee in the above hypothetical. Moreover, the U.S. jurisdiction
arguably would be predominant or “[i]n the first instance.”1146 More specifically,
the Geneva Conventions obligate “High Contracting Parties” to criminalize grave
breaches of the Conventions.1147 Having ratified the four Geneva
Conventions,1148 the United States fulfilled its commitment to criminalize “grave
breaches” by enacting the War Crimes Act.1149 The War Crimes Act covers grave
breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions,1150 as well as violations of
Common Article 3.1151 It would appear that the United States could charge any
American civilians involved in the detainee abuse hypothetical with having
committed a war crime in violation of the War Crimes Act.
In addition, the United States could charge any American service members
involved in the detainee abuse hypothetical with having committed various
1144 Id. at 236.
1145 BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 535. See supra note 12.
1146 ILC 1996 Draft Code, supra note 5, at Commentary para. 1 to Art. 9.
1147 See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 157, at Art. 129.
1148 The Unites States ratified all four Geneva Conventions on August 2, 1955. ROBERTS & GUELFF,
supra note 5, at 361, 368.
1149 18 USC § 2441 (2006).
1150 18 USC § 2441(c)(1) (2006).
1151 18 USC § 2441(c)(3) (2006).
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crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.1152 Specifically, any American
service members involved in the detainee abuse hypothetical above could be
charged with conspiracy,1153 failure to follow orders,1154 dereliction of duty,1155
cruelty and maltreatment,1156 murder,1157 manslaughter,1158 assault,1159 and
“conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.”1160 While these
various crimes would not carry the moniker of “war crimes,” they would
collectively carry a maximum punishment of life imprisonment, total forfeitures of
all pay and allowances, and a Dishonorable Discharge from the military.1161
Thus, the United States could effectively establish traditional nationality
enforcement jurisdiction over any Americans involved with the detainee abuse
hypothetical above, be they civilians or military service members.1162
1152 10 USC §§ 801 et seq. (2006)
1153 Id. § 881.
1154 Id. §892(1).
1155 Id. §892(3).
1156 Id. at §893.
1157 Id. at § 918(3).
1158 Id. at §919(b).
1159 Id. at §928.
1160 Id. at §934.
1161 Appendix 12, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (2005). The charge of murder by being “engaged
in an act that is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton disregard of human life” alone may
be punished by life imprisonment. 10 USC § 918(3) (2006); Uniform Code of Military Justice Art. 118(3),
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (2005). Even without a conviction on the murder charge, the
remaining charges carry a maximum punishment of over thirty years of confinement. Id.
1162 In addition to the War Crimes Act and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) provides jurisdiction over anyone “employed by or accompanying
the Armed Forces outside the United States,” or for members of the Armed Forces after they have left
active duty for crimes committed abroad while they were on active duty. 18 USC §§ 3261 et seq. (2006).
See generally Glenn R. Schmitt, Closing the Gap in Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying
the Armed Forces Abroad – A First Person Account of the Creation of the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 51 CATH. U.L. REV. 55 (2001).
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B. Territoriality and Passive Personality Jurisdiction
Just as the nationality of the perpetrator is a sufficient “linkage” to establish
jurisdiction over an alleged war criminal,1163 so too is the fact that the war crime
was committed within a State’s territory.1164 Territoriality is perhaps the most
widely accepted basis for jurisdiction.1165 Just as the United States has extended
jurisdiction over crimes committed within its territory,1166 so too may Afghanistan
extend jurisdiction over crimes committed within its territory, such as the detainee
abuse hypothetical.1167
Under the “passive personality” form of jurisdiction,1168 the United States extends
jurisdiction over war crimes committed against U.S. victims pursuant to the War
Crimes Act.1169 Afghanistan would likewise be legally justified in extending
jurisdiction over perpetrators of war crimes against Afghan nationals. Nationality
of the victim is therefore a sufficient linkage to establish jurisdiction.1170 Thus,
Afghanistan would be justified in extending its jurisdiction over the Americans
involved with the detainee abuse hypothetical, under either the territoriality or
passive personality principles.
One complicating factor for the exercise of either territoriality or passive
personality jurisdiction by Afghanistan over the Americans involved with the
detainee abuse hypothetical above, would be the presence of a Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) between Afghanistan and the United States, whereby
1163 See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
1164 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 236.
1165 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
1166 See, e.g., 18 USC § 7 (2006) (defining the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States”).
1167 See supra notes 366-70 and accompanying text.
1168 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
1169 18 USC § 2441(b) (2006).
1170 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 236.
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Afghanistan may have agreed to limit its otherwise legitimate jurisdiction over
U.S. personnel.1171 As far as is publicly known, there is no SOFA between
Afghanistan and the United States.1172 However, even in the absence of a SOFA,
any Afghan attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the Americans involved with the
hypothetical would depend on a number of factors, including: whether
Afghanistan had physical custody over the Americans involved, existing
diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and the United States, diplomatic
pressures brought to bear between Afghanistan and the United States, and
whether the United Nations Security Council decided to intervene.1173
C. Universal Jurisdiction
Despite the proliferation of international tribunals, domestic prosecutions are still
possible for certain universal crimes, including war crimes.1174 As mentioned
earlier, a few States have either exercised, or sought to exercise, universal
jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad, either as a matter of customary
international law or pursuant to domestic statutes.1175 One commentator has
categorized three distinct approaches taken by States with regard to universal
jurisdiction: “pure universal jurisdiction,” “universal jurisdiction plus,” and “non-
use.”1176
1171 There are apparently 110 permanent SOFAs between the United States and other nations. Joan E.
Donoghue, International Law lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Nov. 17,2005).
1172 Anthony Dworkin, Not Above the Law: U.S. Special Operations in the War on Terror, Crimes of War
Project, September 20, 2004, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/special/afghan/notabovethelaw.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2006). Contra Draft Plaintiffs’ complaint, Idema et al. v. Afghanistan, No. ________
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at http://www.superpatriots.us/aboutthecase/karzaisuit.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2006) (conjecturing that a classified SOFA exists between the United States and Afghanistan).
1173 See, e.g., DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 911-23 (UN Security Council
intervening in trial of the alleged skyjackers involved in the Lockerbie case. Accord S.C. Res. 731, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992); S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992); Case Concerning
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montréal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 114 (Apr. 14).
1174 DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 181, at 611.
1175 See supra notes 152-75 and accompanying text.
1176 Sriram, supra note 17, at 358-67.
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“Pure universal jurisdiction” is evidenced when a court does not feel the need to
rely on any additional domestic legislation in order to establish jurisdiction over
an international criminal, such as an alleged war criminal.1177 The exercise of
universal jurisdiction, even in its purest form, does not detract from other States’
sovereignty, since “recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set
of norms is consistent with principles of international comity.”1178 The State
exercising such pure universal jurisdiction over war crimes need not bear any
relation to the conflict itself, and could even be a neutral State.1179 Nevertheless,
“[t]hese [pure] cases represent the boldest use of universal jurisdiction,” and
thus, not too surprisingly, are relatively rare.1180
The second approach, “universal jurisdiction plus,” links universal jurisdiction with
more traditional bases of jurisdiction: “Judges in national courts have usually
been more comfortable combining what is to them a novel basis for jurisdiction
with more familiar bases like those linked to a state’s territory or interests.”1181
However, even Belgian law requires “that a suspect be physically present in
Belgium in order to be investigated and tried.”1182 So if a State like Belgium,
which has domestic legislation supporting the exercise of universal jurisdiction,
were to gain physical custody over any of the Americans involved with the
detainee abuse hypothetical,1183 that State could exercise “universal jurisdiction
plus” over the alleged grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.1184
1177 Sriram, supra note 17, at 310, 359-60.
1178 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
1179 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 236.
1180 Id.
1181 Sriram, supra note 17, at 310. See generally id. at 360-66. See also Barrett, supra note 159, at 470.
1182 BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 10, at 537. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
1183 See supra notes 366-70 and accompanying text.
1184 See supra notes 371-72 and accompanying text.
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The third and more common approach is the “non-use” of universal jurisdiction
altogether, in the absence of domestic legislation supporting its exercise.1185
Thus, the courts in most States would rather rely on traditional bases for
jurisdiction, such as nationality and passive personality,1186 than rely exclusively
on universal jurisdiction.1187
D. ICC Complementarity
Under the principle of “complementarity,”1188 the International Criminal Court
(ICC) would first give “precedence to national courts”1189 exercising one of the
five principle jurisdictional bases.1190 Thus, for the detainee abuse
hypothetical1191: the State of nationality of the accused (United States), the State
in whose territory the incident occurred (Afghanistan), the State of nationality of
the victim, a.k.a. “passive personality” (Afghanistan), or some other State under
the principle of universality (e.g. Belgium) would all have precedence before the
ICC would consider prosecution.1192 Only if these States were “unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”1193 would the case
be admissible before the ICC.1194
1185 Sriram, supra note 17, at 311.
1186 See supra parts III.A & III.B.
1187 See generally Sriram, supra note 17, at 366-67; Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-
Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of
Human Dignity, 93 AM.J. INT’L L. 316, 330 (Apr. 1999).
1188 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Arts. 1, 17.
1189 ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 669, 672.
1190 See supra notes 10-21.
1191 See supra notes 366-70 and accompanying text.
1192 The remaining jurisdictional basis, “protective principle,” would not seem to apply to this detainee
abuse hypothetical, because the detainee abuse is neither directed against the security of the State, nor does
it threaten the integrity of governmental functions. See supra note 13.
1193 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 17(1)(a).
1194 Id. at Art. 17; ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 5, at 669.
552
More specifically, the ICC Prosecutor:
is required to consider three factors. First, [he] must consider whether the
available information provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime
within the jurisdiction of the [ICC] has been . . . committed. . . . [Second,
he] must then consider admissibility before the [ICC], in light of the
requirements relating to gravity and complementarity with national
proceedings. Third, ... [he] must give consideration to the interests of
justice. 1195
In the detainee abuse hypothetical, it would appear at first blush that the ICC
Prosecutor should have little difficulty in determining that the first factor has been
met, since the language of the 1998 Rome Statute defining “war crimes” mirrors
that of the relevant Geneva Conventions.1196 However, the Rome Statute adds
an additional requirement that the war crimes be “part of a plan or policy or as a
part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.”1197 There was no evidence in
the hypothetical that the detainee abuse met these requirements.1198 Thus, not
even the first factor would be met, and the ICC could not assert jurisdiction over
the Americans involved in the detainee abuse hypothetical.
The second factor of admissibility is the specific articulation of the principle of
complementarity1199 in terms of the ability and willingness of a State to genuinely
investigate, and if warranted, prosecute the individuals involved.1200 If the United
States military responded to the hypothetical detainee abuse similarly to other
1195 Iraq Response Letter, supra note 251, at 4-7.
1196 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 8.2(a) & (c). See supra notes 368-70 and accompanying text.
1197 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 8.1. See generally supra note 251.
1198 Secretary of State Rice has stated that the vast majority of U.S. soldiers serve honorably, and that there
are usually only a few people involved in detainee abuse. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, ASIL 100th
Mtg., supra note 27, “A Conversation with Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice,” Mar. 29, 2006.
1199 See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
1200 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 17.
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allegations of detainee abuse,1201 this would arguably demonstrate a genuine
ability and willingness to investigate and prosecute, and would thus satisfy the
ICC’s principle of complementarity.1202 Thus, the second factor considered by the
ICC Prosecutor would likewise fail to support ICC jurisdiction over the Americans
involved in the hypothetical detainee abuse.
The third and final factor for the ICC Prosecutor to consider is: “[t]aking into
account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve
the interests of justice.”1203 The detainee abuse hypothetical is of even less
gravity than the 240 actual communications received by the ICC Prosecutor
concerning, inter alia, allegations of willful killing of four to twelve victims, and the
inhuman treatment of less than twenty civilians in Iraq.1204 The ICC Prosecutor
found that even this more significant number of alleged victims “did not appear to
meet the required threshold of the Statute,” and refused to seek authorization to
initiate an investigation.1205 Similarly, the third factor of “interests of justice” is not
satisfied, under the broader rubric of complementarity. This does not even
consider the moderating influence that Article 98 agreements1206 and the “Hague
Invasion Act”1207 would have on the ICC’s decision to seek to impose jurisdiction
over the Americans involved.
1201 See, e.g. Army Fact Sheet, supra note 366 (noting that of 109 cases with substantiated allegations of
detainee abuse, 32 went to courts-martial, 56 were handled by non-judicial punishment, and there were 32
related administrative actions, totaling 120 actions). But see, e.g. Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel,
supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006 (arguing that the United States did not properly investigate alleged detainee
abuse in Afghanistan, and that the United States would have to submit to some risk in order to ensure that
the ICC is able to review the courts-martial of other States).
1202 This deference to State investigations and prosecutions was supposed to reassure the UnitedStates,
with its established military justice system. Sean D. Murphy, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1203 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at Art. 53(1)(c).
1204 Iraq Response Letter, supra note 251, at 7-8
1205 Id. at 9.
1206 See supra notes 340-53 and accompanying text.
1207 See supra notes 354-65 and accompanying text.
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9.5 CONCLUSIONS
States have asserted universal jurisdiction over war crimes “[s]ince time
immemorial,”1208 even without a nexus to “either the crime, the alleged offender,
or the victim.”1209 The universal condemnation of war crimes justifies their
prosecution1210 by any State in order to vindicate the international community’s
interests in prosecuting these offenses.1211 Although authors may quibble on the
margins, the core definition of war crimes would seem to be fairly well
established, particularly in light of the general acceptance by one hundred State
parties of the ICC’s definition.
Historical efforts at establishing an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes
culminated in the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg following
World War II. Recognizing the tribunal’s place in history, IMT chief prosecutor
Justice Jackson ensured that the rule of law supplanted mere victors’ justice.
However, the IMT’s jurisdiction was relatively short-lived, and States
subsequently intent on prosecuting war criminals had to resort back to universal
jurisdiction to do so. The fact that the State of Israel successfully prosecuted
Adolph Eichmann for his war crimes during World War II, and yet ultimately failed
to convict John (Ivan) Demjanjuk for his alleged involvement in Nazi
extermination camps, reinforces the legitimacy of universal jurisdiction as having
the rule of law as its foundation.
For a myriad of reasons, there has been a “general revival of the concept of
universal jurisdiction.”1212 Many States enacted domestic legislation providing for
universal jurisdiction over war crimes that represent “grave breaches” of the 1949
1208 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 228.
1209 Randall, supra note 10, at 785.
1210 Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 384
(2001).
1211 Sriram, supra note 17, at 316.
1212 Burrus M. Carnahan, Law of War lecture at the George Washington University School of Law (Jan. 10,
2006).
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Geneva Conventions. A handful of European States have gone further to
authorize universal jurisdiction over lesser war crimes and other international
crimes, even those committed by non-nationals against nonnationals in foreign
territory. The United States is more restrictive in asserting extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction under the rubric of universality (requiring some nexus to the United
States), and yet is more willing to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in civil suits
seeking monetary damages.
Ad hoc international tribunals served as preliminary efforts at establishing a more
permanent ICC in 2002, which both supports and supplants the domestic
exercise of universal jurisdiction over war crimes. The ICC supports the
application of universal jurisdiction domestically by enforcing the primacy of
domestic courts over the ICC via its complementarity principle, by only
considering the most serious, systematic and factually supported allegations of
war crimes, and by imposing a number of substantial hurdles before the ICC can
assert its jurisdiction, including placing significant controls on the ICC Prosecutor.
The ICC supplants the application of universal jurisdiction domestically for States
that are either unable or unwilling to genuinely investigate or prosecute alleged
war criminals found within their jurisdiction. Yet by supplanting a State’s inaction
or inability to exercise universal jurisdiction over alleged war crimes, the ICC is in
effect bolstering the application of universal jurisdiction by ensuring that the most
heinous war criminals neither continue to commit atrocities with impunity, nor
escape responsibility for their past war crimes.
The U.S. objections to the ICC do not seem particularly well-founded. U.S.-
centric concerns have either been adequately addressed (e.g. noninterference
with the UN Security Council’s control over the peace process), are unrealistic
(e.g. the absence of jury trials and the death penalty when the ICC’s due process
guarantees otherwise closely mirror those of the United States), or are patently
wrong (e.g. inadequate qualifications of the ICC judges). The concern that U.S.
military service members would be exposed to potential criminal liability at the
ICC for military-related activities abroad ignores the fact that in the absence of
the Rome Statute, U.S. service members already would be criminally liable in
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foreign domestic courts for alleged war crimes committed abroad. Ironically, the
concern about potential criminal exposure for U.S. civilian and military leaders for
the as-of-yet undefined crime of aggression could be more effectively addressed
if the United States were to ratify the Rome Statute before 2009 (when the State
parties could first potentially amend the Rome Statute to define the crime of
aggression), since after that date, the United States could be bound by the
amended treaty. Perceived inefficiency may be a valid objection, but it would
seem to be somewhat premature. Finally, the U.S. objections appear to be
myopic, and ignore the fact that the ICC’s impetus was not to impose potential
liability on Americans, but to deal with war crimes committed by “‘atrocity lords’
who seek to massacre people” on a wide scale.1213
Objections to the ICC have led to a campaign of active U.S. opposition, including
using economic leverage to deny support to the ICC, domestic legislation to
penalize cooperation with the ICC, and strong-arming allies into signing Article 98
“bilateral agreements to block all assistance to the ICC and guarantee that no
Americans would ever be handed over to the international court.”1214 These
Article 98 agreements are overbroad (protecting all Americans acting even in
their private capacities (e.g. American tourists) versus merely U.S. service
members engaged in official military duties), serve as a double standard (since
the United States is willing to send suspected foreign war criminals to the ICTY,
ICTR, and the ICC, but not Americans), and reveal that the United States is
willing to use its economic and political clout as blunt instruments to influence
other States’ behavior. The “American Service members Protection Act (ASPA)
of 2002” (a.k.a. “The Hague Invasion Act”) merely ‘adds fuel to the fire.’ All of
these opposition efforts are diplomatically offensive and bitterly ironic, given the
United States’ nurturing support for the IMT at Nuremberg, and earlier efforts at
establishing an ICC.
1213 Ambassador David Scheffer, ICC Panel, supra note 89, Feb. 13, 2006.
1214 Ferencz, supra note 71, at 236.
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A simple detainee abuse hypothetical1215 reveals why the United States should
have little reason to fear the ICC (other than possibly defining the crime of
aggression in 2009, for which U.S. interests would be better served by ratifying
the Rome Statute before then as previously discussed).1216 If the detainee abuse
hypothetical had occurred before the advent of the ICC in 2002, both the United
States would have jurisdiction (based on the nationality of the alleged American
perpetrators), and Afghanistan would have jurisdiction (based on either the
territoriality or passive personality principles). Neither the ICC nor the U.S.
opposition measures (i.e. Article 98 agreements and “The Hague Invasion Act”)
have affected the primacy of domestic jurisdiction over the alleged war crimes. In
fact, the ICC principle of complementarity has reinforced the primacy of domestic
jurisdiction.1217
Another State could also assert universal jurisdiction over the alleged American
war criminals in the detainee abuse hypothetical, which has likewise not been
affected by the ICC.1218 Only if the United States, Afghanistan, and another State
asserting universal jurisdiction (e.g. Belgium) were either unable or unwilling to
genuinely investigate or prosecute the alleged war criminals found within their
jurisdiction would the case be admissible before the ICC, and then only if the
alleged war crime was sufficiently serious (i.e. part of a plan, policy, or large-
scale commission of such crimes),1219 and the alleged war crime could surpass
the other hurdles to ICC jurisdiction.1220 Thus, despite the U.S. concerns and
active opposition, the ICC does not operate as a usurper of domestic jurisdiction,
but rather as a safety net for when domestic jurisdiction fails.
1215 See supra notes 366-70 and accompanying text.
1216 See supra notes 239-41, 311-14, 317-22, and text preceding note 440.
1217 See supra notes 415-34 and accompanying text.
1218 For example, if Belgian authorities arrested the alleged American war criminals while they were
transiting through Belgium en route to the United States, Belgium could assert universal jurisdiction over
them. See supra notes 408-11 and accompanying text.
1219 Rome Statute at Art. 8(1).
1220 See supra notes 233-58 and accompanying text.
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As Professor Dinstein so eloquently commented:
Absent effective mechanisms of supervision and dispute settlement, there
is no way to guarantee that [the Law of International Armed Conflict, or
LOIAC] is actually implemented….. There is a growing acknowledgement
of the need to ensure individual penal accountability of war criminals for
serious breaches of LOIAC, but the future of the International Criminal
Court is still shrouded in doubt.1221
The continued application of universal jurisdiction over war crimes by States’
domestic courts, and international tribunals such as the ICC, would appear to fill
“the need to ensure individual penal accountability of war criminals for serious
breaches”1222 of the Law of War.
1221 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 257.
1222 Id.
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CHAPTER 10
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND ICTR. TOWARDS RECONCILIATION:
GLOBAL APPROACHES
Reconciliation can be one of the mail goals of conflict resolution …. but, how to
achieve it?. Several studies are known to state either explicitly or in a veiled
manner that the path of the administration of justice stands at odds or is even
incompatible with peace building venues. In fact, this situation is very often
regarded as a dilemma. Aware of the strain that can possibly arise, not just from
the differences between these two ways, but first and foremost among the
different players and professionals involved in the latter, this short paper aims at
contributing elements that can integrate both approaches. The paper argues
forcibly in a short and incomplete manner-how the system of observance of
human rights in place for the last sixty years, and the recent emergence of
victims as international players together with other individual and collective
players from civil society and ethnic groups-, can offer more integrative
approaches to reconcile both paths under the common umbrella of non-violent
conflict resolution.
Above and beyond the decisive involvement of governmental players and of
international, regional and universal institutions, a crucial question arises: what
role do non-governmental players have? What role do the latter play not only in
generating, fostering, channeling, neutralizing or perpetuating violent conflicts of
today’s day and age, but also in preventing, handling, solving or transforming
them in a non-violent way? We refer here to national and transnational civil
societies, to victims both as individuals or collectively, to ethnic groups and
peoples, or even to multinational companies, some of which hold more power,
more resources and more leverage and influence than many nations in the
planet. What role do victims play or should play, both in the processes of justice
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as well as in peace-building processes? Should they be involved, and, if so, how
and to what extent? Regarding processes of justice, what role do victims play or
should play in investigating or revealing hidden truths or truths that have been
concealed about the violent conflict and in the fight against impunity? What role,
more specifically, in investigating, producing and/or enabling evidence; in
pressing direct or indirect charges for international crimes or systematic human
rights violations, in indictments in application of current international law – or the
rising ability to improve or create new concepts of international law? What role
should victims play in matters dealing with moral and/or material compensation
or damages, among others? All of the above refers to their potential involvement
in universal and/or international justice processes which apply international law to
the more serious international crimes, such as genocide crimes, crimes against
humanity, war crimes – including gender crimes and large-scale pillage of natural
resources, torture, etc.
When it comes to peacemaking and peace-building, what role do victims play –
or could play – in the following areas: in national and international negotiations, in
mediation and reconciliation related to violent conflict; in processes of multilateral
dialogue at varying levels; in other peacemaking or peace-building processes in
a general sense; in initiatives known as preventive of future violent conflict; in the
process of transformation of existing violent conflict; in moral and/or material
compensation and damages; in post-conflict or post-war rehabilitation; in security
systems and systems of protection of human rights; civil diplomacy; historical
memory; processes of truth, forgiveness and reconciliation; in the restatement of
the Rule of Law; in the political system, the security and defense systems, in
humanitarian crises, among others?
These questions could broaden to include the potential involvement of other non-
governmental players, especially that of national and international civil society.
Clearly, the answers to these questions will affect, in fundamental ways, both the
processes of justice and/or peace building themselves as well as the outcome of
their outcome.
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10.1 CIVIL SOCIETIES, VICTIMS, JUSTICE PROCESSES AND PEACE
PROCESSES.
10.1.1 CIVIL SOCIETY, VICTIMS AND JUSTICE PROCESSES.
Undoubtedly, civil society at large, and victims in particular, have gone from
being mere spectators falling prey to violent and/or armed conflict to getting
actively involved at varying lengths in processes of justice and/or peace. Their
participation has also extended to exerting an increasing influence on political
and democratic processes related to armed or diplomatic intervention in armed or
violent conflicts, both at the national and international levels. Many governmental
players, formal diplomacies, as well as national and international organizations
have not concealed their misgivings as they watched these developments, often
perceiving them as invasive of a turf which ‘does not belong’ to victims or civil
society, but rather only to those “with the knowledge and expertise” and those
“who count.” On the other hand, many other governmental players, formal
diplomacies, as well as national and international organizations follow this
process with careful attention and even foster this development within the
periods of time and frameworks that institutions and civil society have agreed on.
It is not my intent to be exhaustive, but with regard to Spain1223 and other
countries with Roman Germanic or continental justice systems which to
varying degrees allow for victims to participate and be legally represented in
processes of justice, it is worth highlighting the decisive involvement and
intervention shown by Argentina’s ‘Madres y Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo’; by
Spanish, Argentine and Chilean victims; Spanish and Guatemalan Maya victims;
Catalonian, Spanish, Rwandan and Congolese victims; Tibetan victims;
Palestinian victims, etc.  all of them with regard to their roles in articulating,
presenting, investigating – and even filing formal charges – in processes of
universal justice in application of current international law. In turn, given the
1223 See Articles 101 and 270 of the Criminal Procedures Act in agreement with Article 23,4 of Spain’s
Organic Law of the Judiciary (L.O.P.J.) concerning international crimes mentioned there. For a more
detailed analysis of the established rule and of universal justice trials featuring the involvement of victims
in different countries; see Martínez, 2008, Pages 10-11; as well as Palou-Loverdos, 2007, Pages 60- 63.
562
practices of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, or of ad-hoc Courts for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or of other mixed courts, most of which were inspired
on the Anglo Saxon system of justice where the intervention or legal
representation of victims is deemed unthinkable, the new International Criminal
Court has created a new system of justice. A hybrid between the Continental and
Anglo-Saxon systems, this new system marks the first time ever that an
international court offers victims1224 the real possibility of participating and having
legal representation albeit in a more restricted way than in continental national
systems of justice.
10.1.2 CIVIL SOCIETY, VICTIMS AND PEACE PROCESSES
Likewise, it is worth noting the increasing involvement which representatives of
civil society including victims and relatives of victims are having in peace
processes, as well as the impact that their participation can make on the latter.
Several different scholars investigating these processes have underlined in their
empirical studies that participation of civil society in peace negotiations makes it
easier for agreements to be more feasible and sustainable1225. There is no
shortage of examples showing that representatives of civil society have made
important contributions to formal peace talks in countries as diverse as Sierra
Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Aceh or Uganda. In these cases they have to varying
degrees strengthened the content of the agreement, expanded and reinforced
their legitimacy, as well as created conciliatory and integrative dynamics between
the parties more reluctant to reach an agreement1226. This paper gives below a
brief account of processes in Rwanda and in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
1224 See Articles 68, 69 and concordant articles of the Statute of Rome of the International Criminal Court
and Rules 63, 85 and concordant rules of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, as well as
Article 42 and concordants of the Regulation of the Trust Fund for Victims
(http://www2.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/0CE5967F-EADC-44C9-8CCA-
A7E9AC89C30/140126/ICCASP432Res3_English.pdf) (June 4 2009 search). 108 countries have signed
the ICC’s Statute of Rome, 30 of them are African nations, 14 are from Asia, 16 from eastern Europe, 23
nations are from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 25 nations are from Western Europe and elsewhere.
1225 Pfaffenholz, Kew and Wanis, 2006.
1226 Hayner, 2009, Pages, 12-13.
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10.2 HUNGER AND THIRST FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE: DO THE
GODDESSES STRUGGLE OR COOPERATE?
We hear it again and again everywhere on our planet. Literally and figuratively,
the world starves and thirsts for justice and peace. In past papers I have talked
about notions of law and mediation, looked at their etymological roots and
principles, and delved into the symbols linked to mythological characters
mentioned since times immemorial.1227 Both Goddess Maat or Goddess Themis,
who stand for the administration of justice among clashing parties, hold a sword
as their major symbol. On the other hand, Goddess Nefertem or the Goddess of
Temperance, who stand for mediation and enabling peace-building among
opposing parties, feature water as their main symbol. Whether acting as ruling
judge or as facilitator/restorer, this third middle character standing between the
two adversary parties who represent the duality of the conflict, makes use of
tools and symbols which are at the same time analogous and different. Since
times past, human beings have satisfied their hunger by resorting to sharp and
cutting linear elements, such as the flint, teeth or knives tools which find their
equivalent in the sword that rules justice between the two weighing pans of a
scale. To quench thirst, human beings have used flexible, round elements, such
as their hands, a leaf or a bowl, to contain water element akin to the liquid that
flows between the two amphorae of Temperance.
Justice and law experts, on the one hand, and experts in mediation and peace-
building, on the other, often claim their respective venues and methods to be the
most efficient when it comes to tackling or managing, solving or transforming
violent conflict. When mediators, negotiators and facilitators of peace processes
step in, legal professionals frequently regard them to be meddling with the
evidence or sentences they have had a hard time securing. This is particularly
the case when there is talk of possible peace agreements that would allow for
partial or total amnesties or impunities. In turn, once they have reached an
agreement with one or many key players in an armed or violent conflict, peace-
builders or peacemakers perceive any arrest warrants, trial orders or sentences
1227 Palou-Loverdos, 1999, Pages 88-109; and Palou-Loverdos, 2006.
564
resulting from legal proceedings held in application of international law to be an
outright attack to the peace process or to their hard-won agreements. Such
tensions don’t merely arise between these two fields which seem to start apart in
terms of their methodology, principles and dynamics. They also appear within a
same field, for example, between retributive and restorative justice; or between
those which advocate abiding by the guidelines of the Rule of Law or those which
focus on the range of measures known as Transitional Justice1228 which
comprises a useful mix of judicial and non-judicial measures centering on the
responsibility for international crimes of the past. This approach includes
initiatives for criminal accountability; truth commissions, reparations programs;
reform of the security and judiciary sectors; demobilization and integration of ex-
combatants and community-based justice initiatives1229, among others. Legal
professionals are well aware that during the course of the legal proceedings1230,
they sometimes need to replace the sword with the water. Peace-builders, in
turn, know that they more often than not have to brandish the sword when
negotiating, mediating or facilitating among opposing parties1231, for the benefit of
the two parties involved, the process itself and the actual outcome. There is
increasing agreement that mediators should not validate an agreement between
the parties which grants amnesty to the perpetrators of the most serious
international crimes1232, since this would prove unacceptable to both the
international community and the United Nations system.
Some authors point to these tensions or alleged dilemmas and conclude, through
various arguments, that we are better off saying that the systems complement
each other. They argue that establishing one single model applicable on a
1228 See Lekha, Martin-Ortega and Herman, 2009, Pages 3-4.
1229 See, op.cit., Negotiating justice: guidance for mediators, Pages 11-12.
1230 Especially in the case of protected witnesses or particularly traumatized victims.
1231 Mediators or facilitators must occasionally resort to ‘sharp tools’ in order to maintain the balance
between the parties, ensure one party’s capacity of self determination, preserve respect towards both
parties’ dignity and face and react to issues of responsibility for serious international crimes, among other
similar situations.
1232 See op.cit. Priscilla Hayner, Pages 6-7; and Monica Martinez, 13-14.
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universal scope is ill-advised. It is preferable, they continue, to devise a distinct,
custom-tailored approach to suit each individual territory, taking into account the
historical cross-roads, the potential players, as well as the content, magnitude
and degree of the violent conflict at stake, while at the same time bearing in mind
certain principles or guidelines derived from past experience.1233 Although there
doesn’t yet appear to be consensus on this approach, it would seem advisable
for the two goddesses to work with each other in a joint effort to alleviate as
much as possible humankind’s hunger and thirst in body and soul. In their
endeavor these deities should make available their complementary venues of
peaceful justice1234 and just peace1235, placing truth as the cornerstone and
backbone of all other principles, interests and needs.
10.3 RWANDA/DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: A TWO-TRACK
COMBINED APPROACH
This paper does not attempt to make even a brief analysis of the large scope of
the conflict which has raged in Rwanda and in the Democratic Republic of Congo
and the international crimes that have been and still are- executed in both
nations,1236 nor of the number of peace processes conducted and/or stalled
there.1237 Nor, for that matter, can it look at the various interventions which
1233 Op.cit., Monica Martinez, 2008, Pages 12-13 and 15-17, Priscilla Hayner, 2009 pages, 5-6 and 20-22, ;
Chandra Lekha Sriram-Olga Martin Ortega and Johana Herman, 2009, pages 2-6. Pages 12-13 and 15-17,
5-6 and 20-22, 2-6.
1234 That is, justice processes not centered on repression, punishment or revenge, (while not disregarding
applicable sentences) but carried out by adversarial means, with all due guarantees and respect for
fundamental human rights. These justice processes establish an internationally accepted criterion to
determine responsibility and put an end to the impunity of perpetrators of serious international crimes- all
along taking the utmost care to address the basic needs of the people and adhere to the truth of the facts.
1235 That is, peace-building processes that don’t aim at securing partial and provisional agreements that may
only make do. Rather, those processes which strongly observe the principles of mediation, reconciliation or
the facilitation of dialogue, while at the same time not leaving out issues of social justice and formal justice
in order to merely reach a visible agreement (particularly issues that address the granting of amnesties and
the establishment of some kind of accountability for the most serious international crimes). Likewise, these
approaches take great care to address the basic needs of the people and adhere to the truth of historical
processes.
1236 For more information on the alleged war crimes and a factual and judicial analysis, see: Palou
Loverdos, 2007.
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international justice venues (International Criminal Court for Rwanda1238)
undertook to investigate the countless international crimes perpetrated in Central
Africa. Causing the death of almost 8 million people - Rwandan, Congolese,
Burundian, Spanish, Canadian, Belgian and British victims, among others – this
conflict has claimed the lives of more civilians than any other conflict since the
Second World War1239.
This paper merely looks at a modest but forceful example of a joint initiative
where civil society and the victims of this conflict have come together to create a
mixed approach which combines the path of justice with that of peace1240 in an
1237 Although a wide range of violent incidents have continued to occur in Rwanda since October 1, 1990,
the UN and many international NGOs consider there aren’t any violent conflicts or systematic violations of
human rights which deserve special attention; in addition, most peace experts don’t mention the Arusha
Peace Agreement in their papers. The Arusha Agreement had been subsequently frustrated by several
episodes, especially by the April 6, 1994 assassination of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi that
unleashed the infamous genocide in Rwanda as well as the chain of ongoing serious international crimes in
this country and in the Democratic Republic of Congo which have only recently been subject to formal
investigation.
1238 Considering that ICTR Statute stands, among other provisions: “ … Determined to put an end to such
crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them,
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would
contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace,…”,
but for that main purposes –national reconciliation and restoration and maintenance of peace- limits it’s
competence differently to what it’s stated for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, as following “… The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring
States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the present
Statute” (article 1 ICTR Statute, http://www.un.org/ictr/statute.html), I leave for the more ICTR experts and
co-panelists (of the Conference “International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: an independent Conference
on its legacy from the Defence Perspective”) the analysis whether those goals have been achieved partially
or totally. A large number of Rwandans –and also a large number of “invisible” Congolese victims affected
by Rwandan military operations after 1996 up to present- have the perception not only the ICTR goals have
not yet been achieved but its incomplete and biased output fuels violent conflict not only in Rwanda but in
Central Africa.
1239 For a condensed analysis of the conflict and the two strategic paths used to transform it through the
impetus given by civil society and victims: http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/material/sintesi_en.pdf
1240 To cite another example, in Colombia, institutional bodies have opted for using transitional justice
mechanisms even though many experts believe this is happening at a time when the conflict is still alive
(and hence talk of transition and post-conflict proves difficult). In this case, it is the government and its
branches that hold this commitment, basing it on the Law of Justice and Peace passed in 2005 which the
Colombian Constitutional Court reinterpreted in a resolution the following year. To this effect, see Felipe
Gomez Isa, Paramilitary Demobilization in Colombia: Between Peace and Justice. Working Paper Nr. 57,
April 2008. Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are both at different phases; it is difficult to
speak of post-conflict situations in their case as well. Especially in Rwanda; no process of transition has
taken place. The two-path initiative explained in this section thus applies mechanisms of transitional justice
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attempt to transform the conflict by non violent means and achieve its resolution
for the benefit of current and future generations in Central Africa. The initiatives,
as we will see, do not aim at becoming a universal model to be applied on a
global scale. Rather, they represent an example of how the venues of justice, on
the one hand, and those of dialogue, on the other, can enhance and reinforce
each other in order to reconstruct the social, political and economic fabric of a
society devastated by armed conflict.
10.3.1 THE JUSTICE APPROACH
At the end of the nineties a number of prominent personalities, victims, relatives
of Spanish, Rwandan and Congolese victims, national and international non-
governmental organizations and some public institutions all of whom constitute
the organization International Forum for Truth and Justice in the African Great
Lakes Region joined forces and resources to initiate an international process to
investigate major international crimes perpetrated in Rwanda and the Democratic
Republic of Congo between October 1990 and July 20021241 (start of the
International Criminal Court’s temporal competence) and which had not been
subject to investigation by any national or international jurisdictional body.
10.3.2 Justice and the struggle against impunity for international crimes in
Central Africa
In 2005, after years collecting information and documentary evidence and
gathering witnesses, these parties1242 filed a lawsuit at the Spanish courts in
application of the principle of universal justice. On February 6, 2008, after years
conducting their formal investigative proceedings, the Spanish courts issued a
Bill of Indictment and international arrest warrants against 40 top officials of
to a situation of conflict where there is in fact an absence of transition. In contrast to Colombia, the
initiative originates in the involvement civil society has had and coordinated at the national and
international levels.
1241 For more information: http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/querella.htm.
1242 See victims, family victims, NGO’s, personalities and public institution claimants
http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/querellantes_en.htm.
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Rwanda’s1243 incumbent political military helm which has held power in Rwanda
since 1994. The arrest warrants charge them with the crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and terrorism, among others. According to that
decision1244 that Spanish courts decided to make public1245 considering its entity,
the Judge has obtained numerous pieces of testimonial and documentary
evidence, as well as evidence from expert witnesses, regarding the afore-
mentioned crimes allegedly perpetrated by the RPA/RPF in Rwanda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo in the period 1990-2000, primarily. This
investigation has allowed to reveal that the RPA/RPF’s rigid, hierarchical chain of
command, headed by current President Paul Kagame, is responsible for three
major and closely interrelated blocks of crime1246.
The investigation has shown that large scale crimes took place in Central Africa
at all different stages: prior to, during and after the mass killings of the Tutsi
population that took place in the period April-June 1994 all of them classified as
genocide by the UN Security Council in its ad hoc resolution1247. The official
version that has managed to prevail in international public opinion, however, only
points to the killings occurred in the above-mentioned period. The judicial
1243 At least 9 of them were away from Rwanda the moment the decision was made public, holding
important positions, even within the UN organization: 4 of them worked for the hybrid peace-keeping
forces in Sudan (UNAMID), including a Rwandan army general who is the second commander of such
forces. A fifth one served at the demobilization arm of the UN Development Program (UNDP) in Nepal.
Several public institutions had formally requested the UN to destitute them and turn them over to justice
(see all at: http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/dosier/resol_Ban_Ki_Moon_es.pdf.).
1244 See judicial resolution: http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/dosier/resol_auto_esp_06022008.pdf; See
also mistrust of Rwanda and African Union related to universal and international justice initiatives, (Martin
Vidal, 2008), pags 3-6.
1245 A lot of international media and international experts reported about that universal jurisdiction
preliminary decision. See a selection of it in various languages at
http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/dossier_40ordres.htm. Se also experts reports as “The Spanish
Indictment of High-ranking Rwandan Officials”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol 6 Num 5, pp
1003-1011, http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/6/5/1003
1246 Synthetically, a) crimes perpetrated against 9 Spanish victims - missionaries and aid workers- whose
first priority was helping the local population and by so doing, were all inconvenient observers of the
killings of Hutu inhabitants in both countries; b) crimes against Rwandans and Congolese, either
perpetrated pointedly against various specific leaders, or systematically carried out as mass murders of
hundreds of thousands of civilians; and c) crimes of war pillage- the systematic, large-scale plundering of
natural resources, especially strategically valuable minerals.
1247 See also ICTR decisions (http://www.un.org/ictr/judgement.html).
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decision brings to light an array of facts: first, that RPA/RPF army units and
around 2,400 military men – backed by military, logistical and political support
from Uganda – had already, as early as October 1, 1990, invaded northern
Rwanda, causing the death of countless Hutu civilians. Secondly, that from 1991
to 1993, the RPA/RPF had carried out a great number of open and carefully
targeted military operations against civilians through its two executor agents the
RPA’s regular army and the Directorate Military Intelligence or DMI’s secret
services- , creating likewise special death squads such as the “Network
Commando”. Thirdly, that in 1994 the RPA buried and hid in Uganda large
amounts of weapons (to be smuggled later into Rwanda) before planning the
attack against J. Habyarimana, Rwandan president at the time, which was the
event that triggered the entire chaos. Further to that action in 1994, as well as in
1995, the RPA and DMI perpetrated mass and targeted crimes against civilians,
mostly Hutu, following Paul Kagame’s explicit instructions to eliminate the
population indiscriminately. Following the decision the RPA and DMI also
organized collective burials in mass graves and mass incinerations of corpses in
Akagera or Nyungwe Parks. The investigation had also revealed that in 1996 and
1997, the RPA/RPF set out to systematically attack Hutu refugee camps in
former Zaire, killing hundreds of thousands of Rwandans and Congolese.
According to the decision and the UN reports- it also organized the plundering of
mineral resources such as diamonds, coltan and gold, thereby creating the
intricate web of corruption led by the “Congo Desk”, the DMI and Rwandan
companies among them, Tristar Investment- all of whom were backed by
multinational corporations and Western powers1248. During its second military
invasion which started in 1998, it continued to engage in these activities setting
forth its trail of killing and plundering which continues to date in the eastern part
of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
1248 See various UN Group of Experts Report on Illegal Exploitation in DR Congo (S/2001/357, 12 April
2001; S/2002/1146; 16 October 2002; and last S/2008/773 12 December 2008, among others).
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10.3.3 Approach to Universal Jurisdiction and last changes in Spanish Law
As you may be aware, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction allows national courts
to try cases of the gravest crimes against humanity, even if these crimes are not
committed in the national territory and even if they are committed by government
leaders of other states. Those courts apply international law. These initiatives
have been both widely applauded and criticised1249. Last year, after the 2008
Spanish courts decision against the 40 high ranking Rwandan officials, the
current President of the Republic of Rwanda asked to United Nations, African
Union and European Union to stop the abuse of universal jurisdiction and not to
execute the international arrest warrants. He had success with African Union in
its 11th Summit in Sharm el Sheikh (7/1/2008)1250, in a previous decision to the
well known decision about Sudanese President Al Bashir International Criminal
Court indictment. This year 2009 at the General Assembly of United Nations he
addressed a speech congratulating himself that this initiative is taking place at
UN1251.
On June 25th 2009 a bill to amend existing universal jurisdiction legislation in
Spain was passed by the Spanish Congress and was later approved in the
Senate on October 7th 2009. The bill follows an agreement between Spain's two
1249 See two examples: “The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction” By Henry Kissinger (US former Secretary
of State and National Security Advise) for one side (Global Policy,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163/28174.html) and “The case for Universal
Jurisdiction”, by Kenneth Roth (Executive Director of Human Rights Watch) for the other (Global Policy,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163/28202.html.)
1250 See the 2008 AU Summit Resolution in :
http://www.taylorreport.com/Documents/DECISION_ON_THE_REPORT_OF_THE_COMMISSION_ON
_THE_ABUSE_OF_THE_PRINCIPLE_OF_UNIVERSAL_JURISDICTION.doc. This was also
internationally reported, I quote “the assembly made eight resolutions where it noted that the abuse of the
principle of universal jurisdiction is a development that could endanger international law and order. It
further noted that the political nature and abuse of the principles of universal jurisdiction by judges from
some non-African states against African leaders, particularly Rwanda, is a clear violation of their
sovereignty and territorial integrity”, http://allafrica.com/stories/200807071845.html.
1251 Read his speech at UN General Assembly, October 5th 2009, “Improving global governance has also
to address international justice. International justice should be fair to all - rich and poor; strong or weak.
We are pleased to note that the sixty third session of the United Nations General Assembly undertook to
comprehensively examine the issue of universal jurisdiction.” See:
http://www.maximsnews.com/news20091005RwandapresidentUNGA1091000106.htm. See works and
contents at 2009 UN General Assembly about this matter (and the different positions of the countries) in
http://www.un.org:80/News/Press/docs//2009/gal3371.doc.htm.
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main political parties on amending Article 23.4 of the Spanish Organic Law on
the Judicial Power (LOPJ in its Spanish acronym). The purpose of this
amendment is to limit the capacity of Spanish courts to exercise jurisdiction over
international crimes committed abroad by non-Spanish nationals. This can be
considered as a loss to our common humanity1252. Spanish courts have been
exercising universal jurisdiction for over a decade now. They have made an
extraordinary contribution to the development of international criminal law and
the fight against impunity. Article 23.4 LOPJ establishes that the Audiencia
Nacional has jurisdiction over acts perpetrated by Spanish nationals and acts
perpetrated by foreigners outside of Spain if such acts are alleged to constitute:
genocide, terrorism, war crimes, and any other crime which should be
prosecuted by Spain in accordance with international treaties.
The Spanish courts first exercised universal jurisdiction in 1998 when the
Audiencia Nacional indicted several Argentinean and Chilean officials for their
alleged roles in abuses committed as part of Plan Condor1253. Spanish courts
have continued to address serious violations around the globe for which no
alternate forum has been found. Such efforts include a case initiated by the
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Rigoberta Menchu concerning the genocide, torture,
terrorism, assassinations, and illegal detention in Guatemala, the above
mentioned case against officials of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) for crimes allegedly committed against Hutu
Rwandans, Congolese, and nine Spanish victims surrounding the Rwandan
genocide (1990-2002). The courts have also addressed such human rights
issues as Chinese abuses in Tibet and the US torture of Guantanamo detainees.
1252 See also “Preserving Spain's Universal Jurisdiction Law in the Common Interest”, Jurist, University of
Pittsburg School of Law, by author of this paper and Olga Martin Ortega (Centre of Human Rights in
conflict, University of East of London): http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/06/protecting-
spainsuniversal.php.
1253 General Augusto Pinochet and other high ranking members of the former junta were among the 99
current or former members of the Argentinean military charged in the case. The fate of the proceedings
against Pinochet is well known. While most of the indicted Argentineans were not extradited by Argentina,
Mexico extradited former Argentinean military official Ricardo Miguel Cavallo in 2000. In 2001, Adolfo
Scilingo was also detained, processed, and sentenced to a long prison term by the Audiencia Nacional for
crimes against humanity committed in Argentina.
572
States have not only a right but a duty to guarantee that the most severe crimes-
those which are considered to be committed not only against the victims, but
against the international community as a whole-do not remain unpunished1254.
The amendments introduced to the Spanish law constitute an important step
backwards in the effort to develop coherent global processes of accountability for
human rights atrocities. International law has developed since the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials to provide norms and venues for the exercise of universal
justice, as seen in the ad hoc Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the Special Courts for Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia, and
the International Criminal Court. Each of these mechanisms, acting in tandem
with domestic courts, serve as instruments for the enforcement of human rights
and international humanitarian law. Universal jurisdiction is only one of the tools
available in the fight against impunity for severe human rights violations. Until
now, the Spanish universal jurisdiction law had managed to withstand political
pressure rising to the level of that which ultimately compelled Belgium to revise
its own universal jurisdiction legislation. It was in the interest of the international
community as a whole - of all of us - to preserve this instrument as another
avenue of justice, complimentary to the International Criminal Court and potential
hybrid courts. As Human Rights Watch spokesperson Reed Brody recently put it,
the Spanish universal jurisdiction rule belongs not only to the Spaniards, but to all
of us. It is -it was- part of the heritage of the international community.
10.3.4 THE CHANNEL OF DIALOGUE AMONG MEMBERS OF RWANDAN
SOCIETY.
Aware that the justice approach represented an important yet insufficient step
towards transforming the Rwandan conflict, preventing further violent incidents
1254 Spain, therefore, is not acting as a “world policeman,” but is exercising both its right and its duty in
international law. Now, Spanish courts would have to prove Spain’s specific interest in prosecuting any
given crime. In order to do so, courts will have to evidence one of the following: the involvement of
Spanish victims in the claim, the residence of the suspect in Spain’s territory, or a “special relation”
between the crimes and Spain. The introduction of these conditions will severely restrict the use of
universal jurisdiction as a complementary tool for the achievement of universal justice. In practice, this
would mean that those crimes committed where there is no other option for justice - where the international
community is unwilling or unable to establish international tribunals, or where the crime was committed
before the International Criminal Court was established - will not be addressed. In such cases, victims will
not be vindicated and justice will not be served.
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and overcoming the tragedy of the two former decades, a group of prominent
members of Rwandan civil society living abroad set out to start a dialogue from
exile. Two persons initiated the dialogue: the Hutu president of a victims’
association who lived in Brussels and the Tutsi former plenipotentiary
ambassador of the current Rwandan government to the United Nations who lived
in New York.
In 2004 ten Rwandan men and women of the diaspora met for the first time at a
meeting organized by international facilitators in Mallorca (Spain). The
Rwandans, both Tutsi and Hutu, were able to ascertain the different ways in
which they each understood Rwandan history and the past according to their
own personal, family and community experiences. At the same time, they also
discovered the extent to which they agreed on constructive proposals for the
future. In 2006, after two years in the works, a second encounter by then referred
to as the Intra Rwandan Dialogue took place in Barcelona (Spain), giving rise to
the International Network for Truth and Reconciliation in Central Africa. Twenty
Rwandan nationals, both Hutu and Tutsi from the diaspora and the Rwandan
heartlands, took part in this event. The meeting was organized with the
sponsorship of Nobel Peace Prize nominee/candidate Juan Carrero and the
support of both Nobel Peace Laureate Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, present at the
meeting, and of the  resident of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade. The protocol of
findings of the 2006 event, which called for a more inclusive Inter-Rwandan
Dialogue– served as the foundation for the talks held at five subsequent
meetings entitled Dialogue Platforms in 2007 and 20081255: These five events
took place in Washington DC for 20 participants from the USA and Canada; in
Amsterdam for 20 participants from Holland, Belgium and Germany; in Orleans
(France) for 20 participants from France and Italy; in Barcelona, where the
Platform for Rwandan women was held; and finally in Kinshasa (Democratic
Republic of Congo) where a special ad hoc platform was organized for
Congolese participants coming from the eastern region of this country bordering
with Rwanda.
1255 With the support of, among others, Nobel Peace Laureate Adolfo Perez Esquivel; and of Federico
Mayor-Zaragoza., former UNESCO Secretary General (1987-1999), President of “Cultura de Paz” and co-
chairman of a top level UN group of Alliance of Civilizations.
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In 2007 the Spanish Parliament extended its support to this initiative and passed
a resolution where all political parties unanimously agreed to offer technical,
legal, diplomatic and political support and urged to take it to an international1256
level.
In early 2009 the eighth Dialogue held in Mallorca, Spain, featured the
participation of thirty Rwandan men and women from all Rwandan ethnic groups-
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa-, as well as two Congolese, who had come from Africa,
Europe and North America. Celebrating five years since the dialogue started,
they agreed to formally ask a Central African government to hold a Highly
Inclusive Inter-Rwandan Dialogue, and request institutional and financial support
from the international community.1257 During the course of these five years,
almost 150 Rwandan leaders have participated in the process. Among them, it is
worth noting the involvement of two former prime ministers, various former
cabinet ministers, former ambassadors, political leaders, representatives from
civil society, from victims’ as well as human rights organizations, from institutions
devoted to peace and economic research. All of the above have set their eyes on
the future and on carrying on this inter-Rwandan dialogue as the legitimate
foundation upon which to build a new Rwanda that can be widely accepted by all
political, ethnic, social and economic groups as well as by the international
community.
10.4 INVESTING IN GLOBAL PEACE PROCESSES
Numerous studies study and analyze military expenditures worldwide. Military
spending for 2007 alone, for example, reached 1,339 trillion dollars1258. That
1256 See original Proposal of Non-Legislative Motion of support to Intra-Rwandan Dialogue dated April 25
2007: http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/dosier/congreso_diputados_eng.pdf (June 4 2009 search).
1257 All documents with Findings and Proposals of the eight Intra-Rwandan Dialogue sessions to date
(2004-2009) are available in several languages at: http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/dialogo.htm (June 4
2009 search).
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same year, 61 “peace operations” were carried out worldwide (41% of them in
Africa), deploying a total of 169,467 people in missions which were almost
entirely military: 119 countries sent troops, military observers or police officers
totaling 150,651 people, a stark contrast to the 18,816 civilians1259 overall.
There is no knowledge about the existence of studies that look at the amount
spent worldwide on national and international processes of justice. Yet, if we
want to have a rough idea of the huge disparity between military spending and
expenditures on justice, we only need to point out the annual budget of the
world’s leading international court: in 2009, the International Criminal Court,
which is currently investigating four major situations in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, in Uganda, in the Central African Republic and in Sudan, has a total
budget of Euro 101.229.9001260. Ad hoc Tribunals have an impressive budget
even considering its partial results-: the General Assembly of the United Nations
allocated a budget of 267, 356, 200 million dollars to the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for the 2008/2009 period1261, which constitutes 6,4%
of the total budget of the United Nations for the two years to come.
1258 See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2008, Catalan translation,
Fundacio per la Pau 2008, Petter Stalenheim, Catalina Perdomo e Elisabetk Skons- Page 10. This
organization notes that military spending increased by 6% in 2007 compared to 2006, and by 45% since
2008, and that it accounted for 2.5% of the Global Gross Domestic Product, or US$ 202 per capita
worldwide. Spain ranks 15th in terms of military spending, with military expenditures of 14.6 billion
dollars that constitute 1% of the total amount spend worldwide.
1259 Op.cit., Sharon Wiharta, Pages 7-8. There is no information about the cost of the 61 afore-mentioned
peace processes which were primarily carried out by military parties. Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult
to tell whether these operations were aimed at maintaining peace or at securing geostrategic military
objectives. While serving in Sudan for the UNAMID, four Rwandan military officials were prosecuted in
February 2008 (see footnote Nr. 20). Months later, on September 3, 2008 the US Department of State made
a donation of military equipment worth US$ 20 million to the Rwandan defense force led by one of the
above-mentioned prosecuted officials, whose UN appointment in Sudan was, in fact, ratified by UN
Secretary General a few weeks later and extended for an irrevocable 6-month period until March 2009. (see
official information from the US Embassy in Rwanda:
http://rwanda.usembassy.gov/u.s._embassy_donates_equipment_to_the_rwanda_defense_forces).
1260 See Report of the Assembly of Member States of the International Criminal Court ICC-ASP/8/5 dated
May 13 2009, http://www2.iccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/ICC-ASP-8-5-ENG.pdf (June 4 2009 search).
1261 See official UN ICTR site: http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/index.htm
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Compared to military spending, this amount is clearly a drop in the bucket - even
if we compare it to military spending in Spain which accounts for 1% of military
expenditures worldwide1262.
Many scholars and experts on peace and peaceful conflict resolution continue
urging for an increase and restructuring of private and public investment in favor
of peace1263. Investing in global peace processes is imperative. There are no
studies which look at how much has been invested in theoretical analysis,
research,1264 infrastructure and the practical implementation of the different
venues for peace-building worldwide. It took ages before a global criminal Court
was created, and even now, it still needs to grow, become stronger and spread
out around the world. We need to roll up our sleeves to establish a true Global
Center for Peace and International Conflict Mediation. This center should be the
outcome of an international agreement between the different countries of the
world, have an adequate and sufficiently endowed budget1265, and operate in a
concerted effort with regional and global institutions, governments, public and
private entities. It should be authorized to intervene within the framework of
accredited international experts–governmental, non-governmental and
independent-, work on the basis of multidisciplinary teams comprising people
from different geographical, social, racial, ethnic, religious and intellectual
backgrounds and viewpoints, and focus on preventing violent conflict and on
solving and transforming conflict by peaceful means. We cannot wait for ages,
1262 This amount pales when compared even to weapon sales figures of leading North American weapon
manufacturer Boeing which had a turnover of 30.69 billion dollars in 2006. Op. Cit, SIPRI, Page 12. See an
other example: African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) approved budget for
$1, 569.26 million (A/C.5/62/30) for financing that mission from July 2007 to June 2008 (see:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/facts.html, June 4 2009 search). UNAMID was established
by the Security Council, in resolution 1769 (2007) for an initial period of 12 months, to help achieve a
lasting political solution and sustained security in Darfur. This budget provides for the deployment of 240
military observers, 19,315 military contingent, 3,772 United Nations police, 2,660 formed police units,
1,542 international staff, 3,452 national staff, 548 United Nations Volunteers and 6 Government-provided
personnel. In addition, the budget includes 55 international and 30 national staff under general temporary
service (see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/gaab3828.doc.htm, June 4 2009 search).
1263 See, as example, Anatol Rappoport, 1989.
1264 See Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2008, Page 13. This study shows that most Spanish research centers do
not reveal their budgets, but notes that the budget of four centers totaled 6 million euros.
1265 To set it in motion, it would suffice that all countries contribute 0,1% of what they presently allot to
military spending and earmark it to establish and authorize the first annual budget of this Global Center.
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we cannot even wait for decades. We are jointly responsible for making it happen
in the next decade for the sake of the earth and all present and future
generations.
Sovereign excesses in the twentieth century resulted in the murder of
approximately 170,000,000 persons by their sovereign.1266 This statistic, a potent
testimony of sovereign excesses through gross and systematic human rights
violations, firmly places human rights and humanitarian problems on the
international plane. This reality firmly mandates a fundamental rethinking about
the basis of sovereignty's political and associational organization in the new
millennium. 1267
Since the end of World War II, a body of international rights law has emerged
that considers a government's treatment of its own citizens as a concern of
international regulation instead of internal state prerogatives. 1268 No longer is
state conduct immune from international scrutiny, or even from sanction.
Mechanisms are being created through which "sovereign" conduct is held
accountable to international norms without the ability simply to claim lack of
continuing consent to those norms. This demonstrates that the nineteenth
century notion of a second-tier social contract is no longer appropriate to the
conduct of international relations. 1269 International criminal law runs directly to
the individual. "It is therefore inevitable that states would regard egregious
1266 R.J. Rummel,Death by Government 9 (New Brunswick:Transactions Publishers 1994).
1267 See, e.g., United Nations, Executive Summary, Report of the Secretary General's Higb-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change 1 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/brochure.pdf,
accessed December 20,2004. The full report is available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report3.pdf.
1268 See generally Myres S. McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order The Basic Policies of
an International Law of Human Dignity 313-332 (New Haven: Yale University Press 1980);Anthony
D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms, 25
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 47, 75-80 (1996)
1269 In terms of a Lockean, second-tier social contract, sovereignty treats the relationship among states in
forming the international order as parallel to the relationship among citizens in forming the order that is the
state.The internationalization of the individual in the aftermath of World War II and his/her elevation from
the subordinate status of an object of international law to a subject means that international law fractured
the second-tier social contract structure by bringing first-tier social contract subjects directly into second-
tier relationships and thus effectively placing the individual within the international legal framework.
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violations of human rights as subject to individual criminal responsibility instead
of only state liability." 1270 Lynn S. Bickley extrapolates and substantiates this
point thus:
Consistent with a sovereign responsibility to protect its
citizens, the increasingly active role of the international
community in human rights protection enhances rather than
diminishes the notion of sovereignty. Although a nation
sacrifices some sovereignty when it becomes a party to an
international agreement, it also gains certain protections that
broaden and enhance its sovereignty. The interdependence of
the international community assists and fortifies sovereignty as
the power of a nation to protect its citizens. 1271
Distinguished international law publicists recognize what they regard as the
"inescapability of the concept of sovereignty as a quality of the state under
present-day international law." 1272 They also recognize it as a "fundamental
principle of the law of nations."1273 However, even the strongest proponents of
this positivist view of international law conditioned by sovereign states assert that
international law strongly rejects the admissibility of absolute sovereignty as the
basic principle of international law. 1274 This article has as its modest aim a
general overview of the role of the development of human rights and
humanitarian norms in reshaping the content and contour of Westphalian
sovereignty. 1275
1270 Lynn Sellers Bickley, US. Resistance to the International Criminal Court: Is the Sword Mightier Than
the Law? 14 EMORY INT'L L. R. 213, 265 (2000).
1271 Bickley, supra note 5, at 261.
1272 Marek Stanislaw Korowicz, Some PresentAspects of Sovereignty in International Law (1961) 102
Recuil Des Cours 1-120; but cf. Arthur Larson et al., Sovereignty within the Law (Dobbs Ferry, NewYork:
Oceana Publications 1965).
1273 Korowicz and Larson et al., supra note 7.
1274 Arthur Larson et al., Sovereignty within the Law (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications 1965).
Surveys of the writings of diverse authors such as Korowicz, Larsen and Jenks indicate a clear repudiation
of any absolutist notion of sovereignty implicit in the command theory of law and its progeny.
1275 The modern indeoendent Nation-State is founded upon a reverence of sovereignty emanated from the
Peace of Westphalia of 1648 which ended the ward of religion between the Protestant and Catholic States.
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CHAPTER 11
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN CONTEMPORARY AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE.
World War I was a watershed conflict. Apart from inaugurating total war, the end
of the war saw an unsuccessful attempt to prise open the iron curtain of
Westphalian sovereignty by individualizing criminal responsibility for violations of
the emerging law of war. The punishment provisions of the peace treaties of
Versailles and Sevres sought to limit the scope of the principle of sovereign
immunity by punishing military and civilian officials, while at the same time
extending universal jurisdiction to cover war crimes and crimes against humanity.
In a dramatic break with the past, and in a bid to build a normative foundation of
human dignity, the chaos and destruction of World War I gave rise to a yearning
for peace and a popular backlash against impunity for atrocity.
The war provoked criticism by many of both the outrageous
behaviour by a government towards its own citizens (Turkey)
and aggression against other nations (Germany). Both types
of atrocity evoked demands for increased respect for humanity
and the maintenance of peace. 1276
The devastation of the war provided a catalyst for the first serious  attempt to
crack the Westphalian notion of sovereignty. This dramatic new attitude was
encapsulated in the enthusiasm for extending criminal jurisdiction over sovereign
states, such as Germany and Turkey, with the aim of apprehension, trial and
Westphalian sovereignty enshrined the internal and external autonomy of the State. The accompanying
soverign tenets of political independence and territorial supremacy enshrined the State's freedom of action
and unlimited use of power internally, forbidding and exercise of jurisdiction by any State over issues and
individuals within another State's territorial boundaries thus precluding external interference and
unsolicited intervention. See Jackson Maogoto, International Criminal Law and State Sovereignty:
Versailles to Rome I
(New York:Transnational Publishers Inc. 2003)
1276 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, International Criminal Law and State Sovereignty: Versailles to Rome 33
(Ardsley:Transnational Publishers 2003).
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punishment of individuals guilty of committing atrocities through supranational
trials. 1277
However the emerging commitment to human dignity was to be first derailed and
then swept aside by resurgent nationalistic ambitions brewed in the cauldron of
sovereignty and distilled by politics. The "iron curtain" of Westphalian sovereignty
was the primary objection advanced by both Germany and Turkey, against Allied
calls for the establishment of supranational tribunals to try the officials and
personnel of these countries implicated in wartime atrocities. Both nations, in the
light of these international efforts, strongly advocated against such a move,
arguing that sovereignty over territory and authority over nationals, a sacrosanct
principle of international law, was threatened if the proposed supranational
tribunals proceeded.
The anticipated international penal process yielded to the demands of national
sovereignty, which lead to sham national trials in Germany and Turkey after a
major revision and scaling down of the defendant list in both countries.
Subsequently, the German and Turkish regimes that gained power in the post-
war era successfully relied on principles of national sovereignty to reject the
authority of the European Powers to intervene in the domestic trials held in lieu of
anticipated supranational trials.
While the envisaged international efforts to secure international criminal liability
failed to materialize, important principles were established. Firstly, the 1919
Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of
Penalties articulated crimes against humanity, and attempted to limit the
previously solid conception of sovereign immunity that shielded Heads of State
as well as officials from the reach of international law. Secondly, for the first time,
the idea that the state did not hold exclusive criminal jurisdiction was challenged.
Finally, the recognition of the need of international penal institutions to repress
violations of international criminal law in the face of state recalcitrance
1277 The peace treaties of Versailles and Sevres envisaged liability for individuals even if their crimes were
committed in the name of their states.
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questioned the state's exclusive right to legal competence over management of
its affairs.
It took the Second World War, about two decades later, to spur states into giving
international criminal law life and vitality. The surge of moral unrest over the
unlimited right of states to go to war whenever they wanted to, coupled with
political and economic chaos, provided the basis for focusing on international
accountability through penal process. It was at the post-World War II trials at
Nuremberg (and later at Tokyo) that the iron curtain of sovereignty was
dramatically drawn back. The post-World War II trials were designed to change
the anarchic context in which nations and peoples of the world related to one
another. The rejection of "obedience to superior orders”, “acts of state" and
"sovereign immunity" for the first time exposed the state to inquiry into its
freedom of action and law-making competence.
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials are the visible symbol of the transition from the
classical Westphalian system of state sovereignty to an international system
based on the credo of "common interest" that surfaced in the middle of the last
century. In a sense these trials represent the foundation of modern thinking about
international law, with an emphasis on the maintenance of peace and the
responsibility of the state and its officials to international standards. The
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of major war criminals were a landmark event in the
development of international law. Besides infusing international law with
fundamental moral principles in a manner not seen for centuries and giving birth
to the modern international law of human rights, the trials also gave clear notice
to the nations of the world that claims of absolute sovereignty must hereafter
yield to the international community's claim on peace and justice.
Nuremberg and Tokyo marked a paradigmatic shift from the externalisation of
domestic norms under the statist Westphalian system of sovereignty to an
international system determined to internalize international norms within the
national sphere. It was at these post-World War II trials that unabashed claims of
national sovereignty, stimulated by the nation-state system recognized at
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Westphalia, were subjected to the test of international standards and universalist
claims for peace and the sanctity of human rights. For the first time in history, at
Nuremberg and later Tokyo, individuals who had abused power in violation of
international law were held to answer in international courts of law for crimes
committed during war in the name of their state. The Nuremberg judgment
(echoed subsequently by the Tokyo judgment) clearly brought crimes against
humanity from the realm of vague exhortation into the domain of positive
international law. This generated the idea that grave and massive violations of
human rights can become the concern of the international community, not just
that of the individual state.
The decision by the Allies at the end of World War II to try major war criminals for
violations of international law was a turning point in modern history concerning
the relationship between individuals and international law. 1278 The lesson of
Nuremberg, echoed at Tokyo, was that never again would atrocities in war or
peace be carried out with impunity and that the world was determined to bring to
account, individuals who carried out massive and heinous atrocities against other
warring parties and civilians. The Nuremberg tribunal was not merely to establish
that the rules of public international law should and do apply to individuals; it was
also intended to demonstrate that the protection of human rights was too
important a matter to be left entirely to states. This proposition was earlier
enshrined in the Preamble and Article 55 of the United Nations ("U.N.")
Charter.1279
The post-World War II trials were a pivotal event in international law. In some
ways they marked a return to venerable doctrines of natural justice that had
fallen into disuse and disfavour with the rise of legal positivism starting in the
eighteenth century. Naturalistic doctrines were resurrected and infused into the
1278 Mark WJanis,An Introduction to International Law 246 (Boston: Little Brown 1993).
1279 The UN. Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 (and entered into force on October 24, 1945). Shortly
after the San Francisco Conference which gave birth to the U.N., representatives of the four MajorAllied
Powers (Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.) met in London on 26 June 1945 to negotiate on
the law and procedures according to which the Nazi leaders ought to be prosecuted, tried and punished
resulting in the adoption of the Nuremberg Charter on August 8, 1945.
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new thought and philosophy that was behind the decision to hold the trials. The
belief in natural law helped to ensure that the tribunals would apply international
law in the interests of fundamental moral values. This reversed the nineteenth
century trend (the heyday of legal positivism), during which natural law lost much
ground as positivism gained sway and infused international law with the agenda
of maximising state sovereignty and cutting back concerns with following any
fundamental precepts of morality.
The significance of the post-World War II trials is captured by Justice Robert H
Jackson, Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg. Writing in 1949, he described the
Nuremberg international trials as the twentieth century's most "definite challenge"
to the "anarchic concepts of the law of nations." 1280 He argued that Nuremberg
was the first step towards limiting the unfettered discretion of sovereign states to
resort to armed force. 1281 Government officials could no longer credibly claim
legal immunity based upon the act of state and superior orders defenses. 1282
Jackson noted that international institutions were so undeveloped and in decline
that, absent the Nuremberg trial, it is unlikely that these "catastrophic doctrines"
would have been challenged and modified. 1283
11.1 THE COLD WAR: A NOBLE CRUSADE IN STORMY WATERS?
The "internationalization" of the legal status of the human being became one of
the most prominent features of the post-World War II period after the Nazi and
fascist violations of elementary human rights. 1284 The post-World War II era was
a period in which the freedom and independence of the state in law-making was
subjected to limitations by international law in respect of certain international
interests. What had been unthinkable before World War II became
1280 Robert H. Jackson, Nuremberg in Retrospect. Legal Answer to International Lawlessness, 35 A.B.A J.
813 (1949).
1281 Id.
1282 Id.
1283 Id at 813-814.
1284 See Professor Bedjaoui's general introduction in Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed), International Law:
Achievements and Prospects 13 (Paris: UNESCO Publishing/ Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991).
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commonplace. The dozens of human rights and humanitarian instruments
adopted after the post-World War II trials are based on the premise that
sovereign states are not free to abuse their own citizens with impunity. The
instruments are designed to secure adherence to the international human rights,
recognized at the post World War II international trials. Besides demonstrating
that legal values arising from international law impose obligations directly on the
state, these instruments are a sign that the citizen is not subject only to the
dictates of the national sovereign but a subject of the dictates of international law
as well. Even as international human rights and humanitarian law instruments
marked the important steps by the international law to limit sovereignty, the Cold
War was to tie the issue of sovereignty to ideological and revolutionary agendas.
The world experienced the third struggle for hegemonic domination of the
twentieth century hot on the heels of the conclusion of the second. The U.S.S.R.
increasingly saw the notion of "restriction of sovereignty" and the conceptions of
"common interest" and "common good" as nothing more than a diplomatic screen
hiding the predatory aims of western imperialist powers.1285 Coupled with this
stance by one of the world's only two superpowers was the outcome of the
decolonisation and self-determination process which saw a radical increase in
internationally recognized claims to national state sovereignty. Vast numbers of
newly independent sovereign states were weak in terms of national integration
and foreign relations. This led to widespread reification of sovereignty in the vast
numbers of newly independent states, justified under the internal affairs domestic
jurisdiction clause of the U.N. Charter.1286 These states sought to claim
widespread immunity from international duties and obligations (especially in the
human rights sphere) and expanded sovereign rights as a form of compensation
for the wrongs of colonial-imperialist exploitation and hegemony. The net effect of
these factors was to strengthen sovereignty considerations, as the U.N. became
a ground for cultivating the agenda of nationalism brought to the fore with the
appearance of the "Third World" as a force in the years after World War II.
1285 See, e.g., I. E. Korovin, Respect for Sovereignty. An Unchanging Principle of Soviet Foreign Policy
Int'l Affairs (Moscow) 11, 32, 37-9 (1956).
1286 UN. Charter, supra note 13, art. 2(7).
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With sovereignty viewed as a vital element of global international society, the
power politics of the Cold War era served to curtail the expected benefits from
the limitation of sovereignty articulated at the post-World War II trials.
Consequently, an increasingly evident contradiction in the Cold War appeared.
International law continued to pursue its original, and still topical, ambition which
is to regulate the relations between states in their international dimensions while
at the same time tending more and more to defer to the municipal dimension of
states and their domestic affairs. The interpenetration between international
dimensions and national aspects in inter-state relations, against a background of
rivalries in a divided world, was a feature of the Cold War that threatened to
expand and strengthen state sovereignty, which had undergone a major battering
at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.
The Cold War largely put an end to the spurt of international judicial activity
inaugurated at Nuremberg and Tokyo and contributed to the preservation of a
statist international order. Many states were reluctant to enthusiastically embrace
any form of international penal process and displayed a great deal of
ambivalence in the normal conduct of their foreign affairs. Though a series of
conflicts in the Cold War era set the arena for violations of international criminal
law, the lack of a systematic international enforcement regime contributed to the
lack of respect for the legitimacy of the international justice and even to a degree
of cynicism about it. With lack of state cooperation, the blood-soaked Cold War
era was characterized by impunity. The ad hoc international criminal tribunals in
the 1990s represented an international effort to put in place an international
enforcement regime, the lack of which had helped ensure impunity during the
Cold War era. The War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Courts at
Nuremberg were the forerunners at the heart of the United Nations Security
resolutions of the 1990s, which created the two ad hoc international criminal
tribunals.
586
11.2 POST-COLD WAR: OLD SOVEREIGNTY, NEW SOVEREIGNTY
The creation of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda raised questions concerning the appropriate relationship
between these international ad hoc penal institutions and national courts. This is
in view of the fact that traditionally sovereignty over territory and authority over
nationals are two of the most basic aspects of statehood, and therefore the
territorial and nationality principles are more fundamental than other competing
principles of jurisdiction. While the statutes of the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals recognize that national courts have concurrent jurisdiction, they clearly
assert the primacy of the international tribunals, an extraordinary jurisdictional
development. Though states, by definition, have international independence,
"combined with the right and power of regulating [their] internal affairs without
foreign dictation,”1287 the weakening of its denotation of full and unchallengeable
power over territory and all the persons therein, is illustrated by the establishment
of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals. It was not lost on the
'international community that concessions to the ideals of international justice
were a necessity. This was in order to create effective international mechanisms
necessitating trumping the wishes of many states insisting upon preserving the
totality of their sovereign prerogatives.
The new balance achieved between the jurisdiction of national courts and that of
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals marks the end of an era when the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction fell within the unfettered prerogatives of the
sovereign state. The Security Council created each of the two existing
international criminal tribunals ad hoc as an extraordinary response to a specific
and narrowly defined threat to international peace and security. To enable them
to address these threats, it granted them unprecedented primacy over the
jurisdiction of all national courts. The practice and application of primacy, in both
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), foreshadowed the political
and legal disputes over the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court
1287 Black's Law Dictionary 971(abridged 6th ed., 1993).
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("ICC") and the possible contours of its jurisdiction during the Rome Diplomatic
Conference.
The dilemma of building agreement among state parties without diluting core
principles essential to an effective international penal regime coloured the Rome
conference.1288 The process of making the Rome Statute was a battleground for
supranational and international regimes. The challenge was the need for a trade-
off between achieving consistency and building a consensus. This was arguably
more pronounced because the state was being called upon to reconfigure certain
key aspects of its domestic jurisdiction as well as state crafted international
regimes in favour of a functioning international regime.1289 Consultations,
consensus and compromise were at the heart of the Statute making process.1290
The Rome Statute embodies a carefully created compromise between a state
centred idea of jurisdiction, and a more inclusive international vision. In its
extreme manifestation, the state centred idea would uphold a state's exclusive
jurisdiction to prosecute and try its own citizens for war crimes, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and to prosecute citizens of other states who commit such acts
on the territory of the forum state. An inclusive vision would promote the idea of
universal jurisdiction, whereby individuals of any nationality could be tried for
certain crimes by any state acting on behalf of humanity as a whole. The ICC
follows a middle path. The Rome Statute assigns primary jurisdiction to the ICC's
Member states. However, in ratifying the Rome Statute and becoming members
of the ICC, states agree that, if they are unwilling or unable to carry out their
1288 Chimene Keitner, Crafting the International Criminal Court: Trials and Tribulations in Article 98(2) 6
UCLA J. Int'l L.& Foreign Aff. 215,271 (2001).
1289 Id., at 215.
1290 In the articulate encapsulation of this triad, Professor M Plachta states:
Triple "C" was a dominant tone at the Conference. Consultations-Consensus-
Compromise describes both the organisational framework and the tools that were adopted
at the Conference. While the first element is procedure-oriented, the last two are result-
oriented, with one important distinction between them. The second component sets the
threshold, whereas the third determines the contents of the final result. The first two
elements out of this triad facilitate and encourage achieving the last one. That
compromise will be a matter of "life and death" became apparent at the very beginning of
the Conference, when the delegates started presenting their positions specified in
instructions from their capitals.
Michael Plachta, Contribution of the Rome Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of the ICC to the
Development of International Criminal Law 5 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 181, 186-187 (1999).
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obligation to investigate and prosecute these crimes, the ICC has
"complementary" jurisdiction to do so in their stead.
The ICC will provide an indispensable backup to national jurisdictions in
deterring, investigating, and prosecuting serious international crimes. The
momentum behind the ICC testifies to the increasing realisation by countries that
international norms may require international enforcement mechanisms,
especially where individual perpetrators beyond the reach of their own domestic
courts are concerned. The frequent observation that an individual who commits
one murder may face life imprisonment, but another who murders thousands
may enjoy impunity, has driven efforts to rectify this incongruity, especially
insofar as it constitutes a by-product of an international system of sovereign
states.1291 The ICC will eliminate the need to create additional ad hoc
international tribunals when domestic legal systems lack the will or ability to
investigate and prosecute these crimes themselves.
A An Ageing Ideology Facing a New Reality
Sovereignty has several basic difficulties- some conceptual, and some of an
empirical nature. From a conceptual point of view, the term has contradictory
characteristics of being both reified and porous.1292 All too often though, the
sovereignty doctrine is an "impenetrably rigid juridical artefact as states incant
the ritual of brooking no interference with their internal affairs.”1293 The
constitutional position of the existing ad hoc international criminal tribunals, as
well as the international criminal court, is instructive. The common interest of
sovereign entities is better protected when exclusive parochial interests of reified
sovereignty are bypassed in the interests of mankind. The basis for this is
through mapping and locating sovereignty more precisely within the context of
1291 Signing, ratifying, and implementing the ICC provides states with an opportunity to review their
existing criminal procedures, and to ensure that these comport with international standards such as those
relating to due process, the protection of victims and witnesses, and jurisdiction over internationally
recognised crimes.
1292 Operational constitutions often exhibit the characteristics of being reified and porous at the same time.
1293 Winston P Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty International Criminal Law and the
Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 127,137-143 (1995).
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global power and constitutive processes. Professor Winston Nagan postulates
that:
To strengthen the conceptual and doctrinal basis of humanitarian
law we must purge the sovereignty precept of the conceptual and
normative confusion it generates. We need more precision about
the nature of the specific problems in which sovereignty is invoked
as a sword or a shield, a clearer perception of the common and
special interest it sometimes seeks to promote, protect or
compromise, and a clearer delineation of its precise role in the
constitutional order and promise of the UN Charter. We must map
and locate sovereignty more precisely within the context of global
power and constitutive processes. 1294
Since the end of the Cold War, international law has come to recognize the
permissibility of intervention in circumstances other than in response to a nation's
external acts of aggression. This growth has focused primarily on the violation of
basic human rights norms as a basis for intervention. Current consensus
indicates that a state's violation of its citizens' most basic rights may permit
intervention into its affairs. Indeed, "international law today recognizes, as a
matter of practice, the legitimacy of collective forcible humanitarian intervention,
that is, of military measures authorized by the Security Council for the purpose of
remedying serious human rights violations."1295
State sovereignty, which for centuries was conceptualized as “the absolute
power of the state to rule,”1296 has opened up by recognition that the state may
be responsible for a breach of certain international obligations. Among these
obligations, a state must provide for the general safety of the human person and
may not permit widespread human rights violations against its citizens, such as
1294 Id.,at 146.
1295 Fernando R.Tes6n, Changing Perceptions of Domestic Jurisdiction and Intervention, in Beyond
Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas 29 (Tom Farer ed., Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press 1996).
1296 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001).
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the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, slavery, and apartheid.1297
Though state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility are separate
concepts under international law,1298 a state that undertakes the prosecution of a
foreign citizen for crimes committed in a foreign state assumes that state's
domestic jurisdiction. In this regard, the author concurs with Anthony Sammons
conclusion that:
...the valid assertion of universal jurisdiction as the sole basis for
the prosecution of international crimes requires a conclusion that
the State of the perpetrator's nationality, or of the crime's
commission, either has breached or failed to enforce its
international obligations to such a degree that partial assumption of
its domestic jurisdiction is permissible.1299
Sammons postulation is especially relevant in view of the fact that classical
Westphalian sovereignty hinders the development of a more rational approach to
the international, constitutional allocation of competence in controlling and
regulating criminal behaviour that requires effective international community
intervention. Further elaboration of Sammons's view is encapsulated in Professor
Nagan's concise observation that:
From an operational perspective, the practical question generally
has been how far a State may go in establishing the external reach
of its criminal jurisdiction under international law. The phrase "under
international law" suggests some accommodating prudential limit of
the reach of a state's competence from the perspective of other
States whose interest may be compromised when a State allocates
for itself the right to try the nationals of other States under its own
criminal justice standards.1300
1297 Id., at 7 (citing art 19, §3(c) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility).
1298 Id., at 9.
1299 Anthony Sammons, The "Under-Theorization" of Universal Jurisdiction :Implications for Legitimacy
on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 111,115 (2003).
1300 Nagan, supra note 27, at 137.
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The destructive impact of massive and systematic human rights violations
impinges directly on important world order values which no state has dared
suggest are not common and shared. If human rights are considered serious
values and matters of international concern, effective policing is required from
local to global levels in the name of the world community as a whole.1301 A
complete denial of the principles of human rights and humanitarian law,
especially when grave breaches of that law are involved, represents a rejection
of fundamental human rights precepts. This may point to an alternative normative
order that essentially disparages the basic principle of human dignity.
Though sovereignty in the external or international context continues to be
strong, it is not as absolute as its definition suggests.1302 No state, however
powerful, has been able to shield its affairs completely from external
influence.1303 “Although sovereignty continues to be a controlling force affecting
international relations, the powers, immunities and privileges it carries have been
subject to increased limitations.” 1304 These limitations often result from the need
to balance the recognized rights of sovereign nations against the greater need for
international justice.1305
Since one of the main roles of a sovereign state is to provide security and
protection for its own people.1306 The author concurs with McKeon's view that a
state forfeits its sovereignty when its actions are universally condemned.1307
From a legal perspective, each instance of enforcement serves to legitimize
1301 Id.,at 145-146.
1302 See Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past
Objections, 23 Denv.J. Int'l L. 419,432 (1995) (asserting that notion of absolute sovereignty is 'no longer
tenable');see also W Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,
84 AM. J. INT't, L. 866, 866-869 (1990).
1303 See J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 48-50 (4th ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1949) (finding problems
with implication that sovereignty exempts states from being subject to international law).
1304 See Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 Fordham Int'l L. J. 1685,1695
(1995).
1305 Patricia A. McKeon, An International Criminal Court: Balancing The Principle of Sovereignty Against
The Demands For International Justice, 12 St. John's J. Legal Comment 535,541 (1997).
1306 See Brand, supra note 38, at 1696 (describing sovereign state's obligation to protect and provide
security for its citizens).
1307 See generally Michael Ross Fowler &Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power and the Sovereign State: The
Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty 41-45 (University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State
University Press 1995) (explaining that sovereign state's failure to protect its inhabitants is tantamount to
transferring its sovereign power to one who will).
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norms of international criminal law. These norms reflect a collective judgment by
all countries that certain acts are by their very nature criminal. The enforcement
of criminal law is innately tied to a nation's sovereignty and it can be argued that
by enforcing international criminal law governments are not ceding sovereignty
but instead are exercising sovereignty.
... if the role of the sovereign is to provide security for its subjects,
and effective means present themselves for increasing security
through international law, then the role of the sovereign must be to
participate in the development of that law. It is not an abdication of
sovereign authority to delegate functions and authority to a global
system of law; it is in many cases an abdication of that authority not
to do so.1308
If international law is to be relevant in the twenty-first century, it must
acknowledge the principal social contract focus on the relationship between the
citizen and the state for purposes of defining sovereignty in both national
(internal) and international (external) relations. In place of a social contract of
states, this redefinition of sovereignty recognizes that international law has
developed direct links between the individual and international law.
Consequently, an active role on the part of the international community in
promoting human rights and humanitarian norms is consistent with a sovereign's
responsibility to protect its people, and enhances rather than detracts from this
notion of sovereignty.1309 Patricia McKeon notes that:
Although a nation cedes some sovereignty when it becomes a party
to an international agreement, it also receives certain protections
which broaden its sovereignty. If sovereignty is viewed as the
power of a nation to protect its citizens, as it should, fortifying itself
1308 Brand, supra note 38, at 1696.
1309 See M. M. MARTIN Martinez,National Sovereignty and International Organizations 66 (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International 1996); Nancy Arniston, International Law and Non- Intervention: When Do
Humanitarian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 199, 207 (1993).
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with the aid of the international community only enhances this
objective. 1310
McKeon's observation is echoed and amplified by the Report of the Secretary
General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
The Report firstly endorses the emerging norm of a responsibility to protect
civilians from large-scale violence, a responsibility that is held, first and foremost,
by national authorities.1311 It however, goes on to note that:
When a State fails to protect its civilians, the international
community then has a further responsibility to act, through
humanitarian operations, monitoring missions and diplomatic
pressure-and with force if necessary, though only as a last resort.
And in the case of conflict or the use of force, this also implies a
clear international commitment to rebuilding shattered societies.1312
Support for the Report is found in the reality that the U.N. Charter is part of a
world constitutional instrument and hence the formal basis of an international rule
of law. One of the Charter's primary purposes is to constrain sovereign
behaviours inconsistent with its key precepts. Professor Nagan notes that: "The
term 'sovereignty' in the UN Charter is most visible in the context of sovereign
equality.1313 However he goes on to observe that: "Outside this context, the term
is rarely used in the text of the Charter. Indeed, Charter Article 2(7) uses the term
'domestic jurisdiction' as a precept that seems intentionally less inclusive than the
term 'sovereign' suggests.”1314 This particular interpretation provides the basis
for the author to contend that it seeks to demonstrate de-linkage of the external
nature of sovereignty from its internal contours and thus shed the all-
encompassing conception that is frequently and regularly attributed to
1310 McKeon, supra note 39, 542-43.
1311 Report of the Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 2, at
4.
1312 Id., at 4.
1313 Nagan, supra note 27, at 146.
1314 Id., at 146.
594
Wesphalian sovereignty. "Commentaries that disregard state sovereignty as an
eradicable hindrance to denationalization fail to recognize the possible benefits to
be gained by simply redrawing the balance between sovereignty's empowering
and limiting aspects.”1315
Recent international legal theory supports the view of sovereignty as an
"allocation of decision-making authority between national and international legal
regimes.”1316 A state's total "bundle" of sovereign rights remains extensive, as
sovereignty remains the pre-emptive international norm. However, the
international legal regime obligates all states to maintain a minimum standard of
observation of human rights. By the existence of this minimum standard,
international law imposes obligations which a state must meet continuously in
order to maintain legitimacy under the international system. Elaborating on this
new sovereignty reconceptualisation, Kurt Mills asserts that:
[A state's] rights and obligations come into play when a State, or at
least certain actions of a State, has been found to be illegitimate
within the framework of the New Sovereignty. That is, when a State
violates human rights or cannot meet its obligations vis4-vis its
citizens, those citizens have a right to ask for and receive
assistance and the international community has a right and
obligation to respond in a manner most befitting the particular
situation, which may involve ignoring the sovereignty of the State in
favour of the sovereignty of individuals and groups.1317
The significance of the assertion above is captured in Sammons observation
that: "when a state instigates or acquiesces in the commission of serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian norms, it exceeds its
1315 John R. Worth, Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty. Reconsidering the "Un-
Signing" of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker, 79 IND. L.J. 245,261 (2004).
1316 Gregory H. Fox, New Approaches to International Human Rights, in State Sovereignty: Change and
Persistence in International Relations 107 (Sohail H. Hashimi ed., University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press 1997).
1317 Kurt Mills, Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order.'A New Sovereignty? (Great Britain:
MacMillan Press 1998) 163-164.
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allocation of authority as a matter of law.”1318 Sammons goes on to note that this
position recognizes that a state's sovereign rights with "regard to the internal
treatment of its population are not absolute and, by implication, states are subject
to international oversight.”1319 It would appear, that the evolution of sovereignty
and the increasing need for international justice have now converged. This in turn
means that the future development of international criminal law hinges upon the
continuing evolution of this paradigm.
When Sulaiman Al-Adsani traveled from the United Kingdom to Kuwait to repel
Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1991, he never dreamed he would depart with
bruises and burns inflicted by the very government he had sought to defend.
According to Al-Adsani,  his troubles began when he was accused of releasing
sexual videotapes of Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah Al-Saud Al- Sabah, a relative of the
emir of Kuwait, into general circulation. After the first Gulf war, with the aid of
government troops, the sheikh exacted his revenge by breaking into Al-Adsani’s
house, beating him, and transporting him to a Kuwaiti state prison, where his
beatings continued for days. Al-Adsani was subsequently taken at gunpoint in a
government car to the palace of the emir’s brother, where his ordeal intensified.
According to Al-Adsani, his head was repeatedly submerged in a swimming pool
filled with corpses and his body was badly burned when he was forced into a
small room where the sheikh set fire to gasoline-soaked mattresses.
Following his return to the United Kingdom, Al-Adsani brought suit against the
government of Kuwait in England’s High Court seeking damages for the physical
and psychological injury that had resulted from his alleged ordeal in Kuwait.  The
court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Kuwait was entitled to
foreign state immunity under the UK State Immunity Act, 1978.  Al-Adsani then
appealed the decision to the English Court of Appeal but again lost on grounds of
state immunity.
1318 Sammons, supra note 33, at 121.
1319 Id.,at 122.
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After Al-Adsani was refused leave to appeal by the English House of Lords, he
filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), arguing
principally that the United Kingdom had failed to protect his right not to be
tortured and had denied him access to legal process.  Al-Adsani again lost, but
he convinced many of the Court’s judges to advocate an increasingly popular
legal theory, the “normative hierarchy theory,” aimed at challenging  seemingly
unjust outcomes such as these. Under the normative hierarchy theory, a state’s
jurisdictional immunity is abrogated when the state violates human rights
protections that are considered peremptory international law norms, known as jus
cogens.  The theory postulates that because state immunity is not jus cogens, it
ranks lower in the hierarchy of international law norms, and therefore can be
overcome when a jus cogens norm is at stake. The normative hierarchy theory
thus seeks to remove one of the most formidable obstacles in the path of human
rights victims seeking legal redress.
The recent emergence of the normative hierarchy theory on the international law
scene has sparked significant controversy among jurists and publicists. The
ECHR’s treatment of the issue in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom exemplifies the
spirited debate.  While recognizing that the prohibition of torture possesses a
“special character” in international law, the ECHR rejected the view that violation
of such a norm compels denial of state immunity in civil suits.  However, the
verdict evoked opposing commentary on the normative hierarchy theory from
various ECHR judges.  On the one side, Judges Matti Pellonpää and Nicolas
Bratza concurred with the decision and renounced the theory on practical
grounds. They reasoned that if the theory were accepted as to jurisdictional
immunities, it would also, by logical extension, have to be accepted as to the
execution of judgments against foreign state defendants, since the laws
regarding execution, like state immunity law, are arguably not jus cogens either.
Consequently, acceptance of the normative hierarchy theory might lead to
execution against a wide range of state property, from bank accounts used for
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public purposes to real estate and housing for cultural institutes, threatening
“orderly international cooperation” between states.
On the other side, Judges Christos Rozakis, Lucius Caflisch, Luzius Wildhaber,
Jean-Paul Costa, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, and Nina Vajie dissented and
advocated resolution of the case on the basis of the normative hierarchy theory.
They wrote: “The acceptance… of the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of
torture entails that a State allegedly violating it cannot invoke hierarchically lower
rules (in this case, those on State immunity) to avoid the consequences of the
illegality of its actions.”  Thus, the minority concluded that Kuwait could not “hide
behind the rules on State immunity to avoid proceedings for a serious claim of
torture made before a foreign jurisdiction.”
The difference of opinion in the Al-Adsani case foreshadows the coming
theoretical clash regarding the most appropriate and effective means of enforcing
human rights law against foreign states in national proceedings. Since its
inception just over a decade ago, the normative hierarchy theory has amassed
notable support among scholars and jurists alike. Despite its growing popularity,
however, the theory has never been comprehensively tested.  To attempt to fill
this void, this article offers a critical assessment of the normative hierarchy theory
and concludes that the theory is unpersuasive because it rests on false
assumptions regarding the doctrine of foreign state immunity.
The doctrine of foreign state immunity, like most legal doctrines, has evolved and
changed over the last centuries, progressing through several distinct periods.
The first period, covering the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has been
called the period of absolute immunity, because foreign states are said to have
enjoyed complete immunity from domestic legal proceedings.  The second period
emerged during the early twentieth century, when Western nations adopted a
restrictive approach to immunity in response to the increased participation of
state governments in international trade.  This period was marked by the
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development of the theoretical distinction between acta jure imperii, state
conduct of a public or governmental nature for which immunity was granted, and
acta jure gestionis, state conduct of a commercial or private nature for which it
was not.  This distinction rested on the growing notion that the exercise of
jurisdiction over acta jure gestionis did not affront a state’s sovereignty or dignity.
Since applying the public/private distinction proved difficult for many courts, some
states, particularly the common-law countries, developed a functional variation
on the restrictive approach in the 1970s and 1980s, replacing that hazy
distinction with national immunity legislation.
One of the more vexing topics in international law, state immunity is fraught with
complexity and uncertainty, which the normative hierarchy theory does not
adequately address. The theory operates conceptually on the international law
level, as one norm of international law, jus cogens, trumps another, state
immunity, because of its superior status. The theory thus assumes that state
immunity in cases of human rights violations is an entitlement rooted in
international law, by virtue of either a fundamental state right or customary
international law. However, both assumptions are false. State immunity is not an
absolute state right under the international legal order. Rather, as a fundamental
matter, state immunity operates as an exception to the principle of adjudicatory
jurisdiction.  Moreover, while the practice of granting immunity to foreign states
has given rise to a customary international law of state immunity, this body of law
does not protect state conduct that amounts to a human rights violation. These
realities yield the important conclusion—one that the normative hierarchy theory
ignores—that, with respect to human rights violations, the forum state, not the
foreign state defendant, enjoys ultimate authority, by operation of its domestic
legal system, to modify a foreign state’s privileges of immunity.
This article, while critiquing the normative hierarchy theory, establishes a solid
theoretical foundation on which human rights litigation can proceed. The theory
of restrictive immunity, adopted by most states, draws the line between immune
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and nonimmune state conduct roughly in accordance with the public
(imperii)/private (gestionis) distinction. However, the original aim of state
immunity law was to enhance, not jeopardize, relations between states. This
article contends that international law requires state immunity only as to state
activity that collectively benefits the community of nations. Thus, where state
conduct is clearly detrimental to interstate relations but still protected by domestic
state immunity laws, the restrictive approach is inconsistent with the strictures of
international law and should be amended. The most obvious example of this kind
is where state immunity bars claims against a foreign state brought in a forum
state for the murder, torture, or victimization of citizens of the forum state. In such
circumstances, foreign states are afforded immunity protections solely as a
matter of domestic law and their entitlement to immunity is revocable on the
basis of the forum state’s right to exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction over the
dispute.
Some have observed that the doctrine of foreign state immunity is poised on the
cusp of another period of doctrinal development-one in which a further restriction
of immunity will accrue in favor of human rights norms.  Such an advancement is
welcome. However, it should proceed not on the basis of the normative hierarchy
theory, which fails to reflect the true nature and operation of the doctrine of
foreign state immunity, but, rather, on the basis of a theory of collective benefit in
state relations.
The normative hierarchy theory proceeds on the assumption that state immunity
in cases of human rights violations is an entitlement of states that derives from
international law.  Indeed, the centerpiece of the theory is a proposed hierarchy
of international legal norms, which resolves the conflict between jus cogens and
state immunity in favor of the former. This hierarchy, quite clearly, operates on a
purely international level under the theory that the core interests of the
community of states, enshrined in jus cogens, outweigh the individual interests of
any one state, i.e., immunity from foreign domestic proceedings. As at present
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there is no universally accepted multilateral treaty to govern state immunity law,
the normative hierarchy theory must rest on the assumption that state immunity
is either the product of a fundamental principle of international law—a principle
that arises from the very structure of the international legal order—or a rule of
customary international law.
11.3 STATE IMMUNITY AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The original conflict of principles. The doctrine of foreign state immunity was born
out of tension between two important international law norms—sovereign equality
and exclusive territorial jurisdiction.  The United States Supreme Court’s decision
in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,  widely regarded as the first definitive
statement of the doctrine of foreign state immunity, presents the classic example
of this theoretical conflict.  In 1812, while sailing off the American coast, a
commercial schooner, the Exchange, owned by two citizens of Maryland, was
seized by the French navy. By general order of the emperor Napoleon
Bonaparte, the French navy converted the schooner into a ship of war.  When
bad weather forced the Exchange into the port of Philadelphia, the original
owners brought an in rem libel action against the ship for recovery of their
property. The French government resisted the action, arguing that, as a ship of
war, the Exchange was an arm of the emperor and was thus entitled to the same
immunity privileges as the emperor himself.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall identified the
theoretical dilemma at issue. On the one hand, he observed, international law
dictated that “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute.”  According to this long-established principle, the
moment the Exchange entered U.S. territorial waters off the eastern seaboard, it
became subject exclusively to the national authority of the U.S. government, an
authority that encompassed the U.S. district court’s initiation of adverse legal
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proceedings against it.  On the other hand, Justice Marshall took notice of
another fundamental principle of international law: that the world is composed of
distinct nations, each endowed with “equal rights and equal independence.”  This
principle of sovereign equality, he believed, discouraged one sovereign from
standing in judgment of another, coequal sovereign’s conduct.  If the Exchange
had been converted, as the French government argued, into an arm of the
French emperor (and was thus a direct extension of his sovereignty), then the
United States, as France’s equal under international law, would be remiss in
adjudging the ship’s ownership through its courts. International law thus
appeared simultaneously to grant the United States authority to adjudicate a
dispute over property present within its territory and to prohibit the exercise of
this jurisdiction because that property now purportedly belonged to a foreign
government.
The conflict of principles in The Schooner Exchange resulted directly from what
Sompong Sucharitkul has described as “a concurrence of jurisdictions… over the
same location or dimension.”  Normally, the principles of territorial jurisdiction and
sovereign equality work individually-and often collectively-to promote order and
fairness in the international legal system. The former serves to delineate each
state’s authority to govern a distinct geographical area of the world, while the
latter guarantees to all states, regardless of size, power, or wealth, equal
capacity for rights under international law.  In The Schooner Exchange, however,
these principles were at odds because two nations, the United States and
France, asserted their sovereign “jurisdiction,” or authority, to settle the dispute
over the ship’s ownership. The United States claimed the right to exercise
jurisdiction because of the physical presence of the schooner in U.S. territory.
France, in stark contrast, argued that the conversion of the schooner fell within
the ambit of the emperor’s power and thus, by virtue of its sovereign character,
could not be reviewed in U.S. courts.
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This clash of authority-and, in turn, that of the associated international law
principles-is not confined to facts, such as those in The Schooner Exchange, that
involve the straightforward transfer of sovereign property, such as a ship of war,
to the territorial jurisdiction of another state.  Rather, the conflict arises any time a
forum state seeks legitimately to exercise its right of jurisdiction under
international law over a foreign state defendant, regardless of the physical
location of the foreign state’s representatives.  Thus, the most relevant example
for this study arises when a plaintiff sues a foreign state in domestic proceedings
for alleged human rights abuses that occurred outside the forum state.  Here,
too, the authority of the forum state to adjudicate the dispute, hereinafter referred
to as “adjudicatory jurisdiction,” is at loggerheads with the principle of sovereign
equality.  This disparity is usefully borne in mind because it means that the
original clash of principles, as identified in The Schooner Exchange, and, more
important, its resolution, as proposed by Justice Marshall and discussed below,
provide a workable theoretical framework for resolving a wide range of current
problems of state immunity. Competing rationales and their implications for state
immunity. The doctrine of foreign state immunity emerged from the theoretical
conflict described above. Two leading rationales explain the legal source of the
doctrine.  One asserts that state immunity is a fundamental state right by virtue of
the principle of sovereign equality. The other views state immunity as evolving
from an exception to the principle of state jurisdiction, i.e., when the forum state
suspends its right of adjudicatory jurisdiction as a practical courtesy to facilitate
interstate relations. Not surprisingly, these two rationales-like the principles of
international law that they emphasize-find themselves in deep conflict. Moreover,
each gives rise to vastly different implications for the nature and operation of the
doctrine of foreign state immunity.  The traditional starting point for the view that
foreign state immunity is a fundamental state right is the maxim par in parem non
habet imperium, meaning literally “An equal has no power over an equal.”
Theodore Giuttari aptly explains the maxim’s historical origins in the classic
period of international law:
603
In this period, the state was generally conceived of as a juristic entity having a
distinctive personality and entitled to specific fundamental rights, such as the
rights of absolute sovereignty, complete and exclusive territorial jurisdiction,
absolute independence and legal equality within the family of nations.
Consequently, it appeared as a logical deduction from such attributes to
conclude that as all sovereign states were equal in law, no single state should be
subjected to the jurisdiction of another state.
Thus, according to the “fundamental right” rationale, par in parem non habet
imperium is simply a specific application of the general principle of sovereign
equality. Despite the fact that modern international law has largely discarded the
classic notion of inherent state rights, the “fundamental right” rationale has
exhibited surprising resiliency. The Italian Corte di cassazione has opined, for
example, that state immunity is “based on the customary principle par in parem
non habet jurisdictionem, that has received universal acceptance.”   The Polish
Supreme Court found that “the basis of the immunity of foreign States is the
democratic principle of their equality, whatever their size and power, which
results in excluding the jurisdiction of one State over another (par in parem non
habet judicium).”  Scholars, too, have embraced this rationale. An early edition of
Oppenheim’s International Law, for example, described the foundations of state
immunity as a “consequence of State equality,” with reference to the maxim par
in parem non habet imperium.
In recent history, Communist publicists have been among the strongest
supporters of the “fundamental right” rationale, which they found an attractive
response to the emergent theory of restrictive state immunity, a theory that
affords no immunity for acts of a commercial or private nature.  The restrictive
view was antithetical to the prevailing socialist philosophy, which held that politics
and trade were inseparable aspects of the socialist state; in essence, a socialist
state acted qua state in all its dealings.  M. M. Boguslavskij, the Russian scholar,
thus rejected the notion that a state could surrender its sovereignty, and with it its
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right of state immunity, simply by engaging in commercial or private activity.  He,
like many of the socialist scholars, adhered to the “fundamental right” view.
Of particular interest to this study are the implications of the “fundamental right”
view regarding the nature and operation of state immunity. Here, Professor
Sucharitkul’s comments are illustrative. In resolving the clash of norms inherent
in problems of state immunity, he concludes: “It has become an established rule
that between two equals, one cannot exercise sovereign will or power over the
other, ‘Par in parem non habet imperium.’ ”  While Sucharitkul acknowledges that
the principle of territorial jurisdiction is a basic principle of international law, he
emphasizes a state’s right to sovereign equality. Thus, according to Sucharitkul,
the principle of state jurisdiction must give way to the principle of sovereign
equality to effectuate a state’s right of immunity.  This view, if correct, presents
substantial obstacles to human rights litigation, as plaintiffs must contend with
and overcome a state right to immunity, perhaps even of a fundamental nature.
According to another view, state immunity arises not out of a fundamental state
right but, rather, as an exception to the principle of state jurisdiction. On this
theory, state immunity is ascribed to “practical necessity or convenience and
particularly the desire to promote good will and reciprocal courtesies among
nations.”  Clearly, this aim largely influenced Justice Marshall’s opinion in The
Schooner Exchange, where he recognized that “intercourse” between nations
and “an interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants
require” foster “mutual benefit.”  States obtain such benefits, according to Justice
Marshall, by means of their exclusive territorial jurisdiction.  In particular, he
noted that “all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice… of that
absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which
sovereignty confers.”  Justice Marshall went on to observe that the forum state
could advance international affairs by granting a foreign sovereign “license” to
conduct its affairs in the forum state.  Such license was often conferred as part of
a bilateral arrangement by which the foreign sovereign would afford reciprocal
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treatment to the representatives of the forum state when present in the foreign
sovereign’s territory. The effect of this “relaxation” of jurisdictional authority, as
Justice Marshall described it, was to permit a foreign sovereign, together with his
representatives and property, to enter and operate within the forum state without
fear of arrest, detention, or adverse legal proceedings.
Support for Justice Marshall’s “practical courtesy” approach is evident in
international law scholarship. In his 1980 lectures at the Hague Academy, Ian
Sinclair, commenting on The Schooner Exchange, described the “true
foundation” of foreign state immunity as its “operation by way of exception to the
dominating principle of territorial jurisdiction.”  He continued:
[O]ne does not start from an assumption that immunity is the norm, and that
exceptions to the rule of immunity have to be justified. One starts from the
assumption of nonimmunity, qualified by reference to the functional need
(operating by way of express or implied licence) to protect the sovereign rights of
foreign States operating or present in the territory.
Sir Robert Jennings echoed this sentiment when positing that in regard to state
immunity, “territorial jurisdiction is the dominating principle.”
Unlike the “fundamental right” rationale, the “practical courtesy” view resolves the
theoretical clash between sovereign equality and state jurisdiction in favor of the
latter.  As a consequence, the scope of the entitlement to state immunity is
defined by the extent to which the forum state chooses to suspend its right of
jurisdiction. As Justice Marshall insightfully pronounced: “All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories,
must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other
legitimate source.”  Accordingly, on this theory, no norm of international law, not
even the principle of sovereign equality, is capable of derogating a state’s
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jurisdictional authority as exercised legitimately by its own courts, except in cases
where the forum state has agreed to waive this right.
Resolving the conflict of principles: The primacy of adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Determining which of the above rationales more persuasively explains the
theoretical foundation of state immunity has profound implications for human
rights litigation.  If state immunity is deemed a fundamental right of statehood,
then human rights litigants face nearly insurmountable obstacles. The state
defendant is entitled to presumptive immunity and even the normative hierarchy
theory cannot be effective because it is by no means clear that jus cogens norms
trump a fundamental state right to immunity. Such negative consequences,
however, need not be explored in detail here, as a critical examination of the two
rationales reveals that the “practical courtesy” rationale is more persuasive than
the “fundamental right” rationale. From this conclusion one may infer that the
regulation of state immunity falls, as a threshold matter, within the authoritative
domain not of the foreign state defendant but, rather, of the forum state. As
described below, three reasons support this conclusion.
The problem with the “fundamental right” rationale is that it assumes that the
principle of sovereign equality is the root of the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium, and thus that the maxim prohibits one state’s exercise of jurisdiction
over another. The true meaning of sovereign equality, however, disproves this
assumption.  Sovereign equality does not mean that all states are equal in any
given circumstances but that, as Edwin Dickinson observed, every state enjoys
an “equality of capacity for rights.”  Dickinson based his views on those of
Heffter, who wrote that sovereign equality “means nothing more nor less than
that each state may exercise equally with others all rights that are based upon its
existence as a state in the international society.”  Thus, a state’s “capacity for
rights,” according to Dickinson, relates to the freedom and ability of states to
engage in official conduct typically associated with statehood, such as the
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formulation and promotion of domestic and foreign policies, the execution of
treaties, and membership in international organizations.
This meaning of sovereign equality is further defined by the basic strictures of the
system of international law. It is axiomatic that international law allocates
sovereign authority to govern in accordance with national borders;  the United
States governs within U.S. territory on behalf of Americans, France governs
within French territory on behalf of the French, and so on. Each state exercises
territorial jurisdiction within its political unit as a function of its sovereignty. Thus,
a state’s capacity for rights, like statehood itself, is linked to a defined
geographical area, i.e., the territory within the national borders of the state.  It
follows that this capacity for rights, albeit equal in potential to that of every other
state, may have greater or lesser force, in relation to that of other states, in
proportion to its connection to national territory. For example, a state’s capacity
for rights stands at its apogee when applied in relation to its own territory and
citizens.  Accordingly, “[a] sovereign state is one that is free to independently
govern its own population in its own territory and set its own foreign policy”-to the
exclusion of all other states.
Conversely, by simple operation of the principle of sovereign equality, a state’s
capacity for rights will diminish when in direct conflict with another state’s sphere
of authority, i.e., the jurisdiction of that state over persons, property, and events
in its national territory.  For example, a foreign sovereign present in an alien
forum state quite obviously may not govern on behalf of the local citizenry; again,
this is a right that the forum state generally enjoys to the exclusion of all other
states.  Hence, the same principle of sovereign equality that entitles the foreign
sovereign to govern with respect to its own national territory now excludes it from
exercising authority in another state’s territory. In such cases, the foreign state’s
capacity for rights with respect to the forum state reaches its lowest ebb.
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Seen in this light, the literal meaning of par in parem non habet imperium, “an
equal has no authority over an equal,” fails to reflect the realities of the
international legal order. The principle of sovereign equality means that every
state enjoys an “equal capacity for rights” in relation to every other state, but it
does not alter the fact that a state may exercise the rights of statehood only with
respect to its own territory and population. If, according to international law, a
state is the sole master of its domain, persons and property located within the
forum state necessarily come within the forum state government’s control and
authority-even if endowed with foreign sovereign status.  Were international law
to dictate otherwise, the present state-centric paradigm would crumble.
This is not to say that foreign states should be refused immunity privileges in all
circumstances but that an entitlement to immunity is not intrinsic to statehood.
Thus, foreign state immunity is a privilege, not a right, and, accordingly, the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium is a distortion of the principle of
sovereign equality. Neither the maxim nor its purported progenitor, the principle
of sovereign equality, persuasively supports the conclusion that one state cannot
exercise jurisdiction over another, and the “fundamental right” rationale is fatally
flawed for assuming so.
The view that state immunity is a fundamental state right has often been used to
support the absolute approach to immunity, which held that states enjoy
complete immunity from foreign domestic proceedings.  Indeed, absolutists
would argue that, as a product of the principle of sovereign equality, immunity
extends to the limits of a state’s sovereignty and, moreover, that a state acts qua
state in all of its affairs regardless of the nature of its conduct. Absolute immunity
is a myth, however—a fact that undermines the “fundamental right” approach on
which absolute immunity is understood to rest. A brief assessment of the
historical growth of the doctrine of state immunity proves this point.
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First, it is a myth that states ever enjoyed absolute immunity from foreign
jurisdiction.  While scholars often refer to an early period of “absolute immunity,”
typically citing The Schooner Exchange as the leading case of the day, this title
has more historical than legal significance and should not be interpreted as
meaning that states were exempt at that time from foreign jurisdiction in all
circumstances.  Indeed, after a rigorous examination of The Schooner Exchange,
Gamal Badr persuasively argued:
For [Chief Justice] Marshall… the starting point [of the case] was the local state’s
exclusive territorial jurisdiction to which immunity was an exception emanating
from the will of the local state itself. He did not envisage a blanket immunity for
the foreign state as a general rule, to which exceptions would be made to permit
the exercise of the local state’s territorial jurisdiction.
Indeed, this crucial observation led Professor Badr to conclude that The
Schooner Exchange “does not uphold the proposition that there exists a
peremptory rule of international law requiring that an absolute immunity from the
territorial jurisdiction be recognized in favour of foreign states.”
The more realistic explanation of the absolute approach is that at one time
foreign states, as a practical matter, were immune from foreign jurisdiction.  In
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sovereigns interacted with one another
in peacetime in a very limited way, predominantly through diplomatic intercourse
or military cooperation.  Consequently, interstate disputes almost inevitably
touched upon sensitive foreign policy matters. The law of state immunity
reflected these sensitivities and the prevailing preference for resolving these
disputes by diplomacy, rather than adjudication. Most likely, claims against states
in respect of private conduct-though technically not barred from foreign
adjudication-were also handled diplomatically in accordance with the prevailing
state-centric paradigm.  Thus, one cannot equate the fact that courts did not
exercise jurisdiction over foreign states in this early period with a general
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prohibition against doing so on account of the principle of sovereign equality.
Second, the emergence and increasing acceptance of a restrictive approach to
immunity is itself antithetical to the “fundamental right” approach.  The classic
justification for the distinction between public and private acts in the restrictive
immunity theory was that the sovereign, in effect, descends from his throne when
operating as a merchant and thereby subjects himself to the local laws of the
forum state.  Though this distinction in state activity is admittedly somewhat
arbitrary, it nevertheless undermines the “fundamental right” position. If state
immunity were really based on a fundamental principle of international law, then
the movement toward restricting immunity would not have encountered so few
legal and political obstacles. In other words, if state immunity were a fundamental
state right, it would never be susceptible to theoretical division along
public/private lines.
The “practical courtesy” rationale furnishes the more persuasive and realistic
explanation for the doctrine of state immunity because it appropriately
emphasizes the vital role of the principle of adjudicatory jurisdiction.  As a logical
matter, a foreign state cannot be entitled to immunity without the prior existence
of a jurisdictional anchor to establish the court’s competence. This observation
results from the plain fact that a court lacking jurisdictional competence is
completely devoid of authority to adjudicate a legal dispute.  Thus, as the
International Court of Justice explained in the Case Concerning the Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000, “[I]t is only where a State has jurisdiction under
international law in relation to a particular matter that there can be any question
of immunities in regard to the exercise of that jurisdiction.”  Addressing the role of
jurisdiction is thus crucial to any understanding of the true nature and operation
of the doctrine of state immunity. The Schooner Exchange highlights this point,
because there Justice Marshall realized, quite rightly, that jurisdiction must be
established before state immunity could be considered. Jurisdiction was not
contested in that case because the presence of the Exchange in U.S. territorial
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waters constituted the necessary connection with the forum to establish the
district court’s in rem jurisdiction.  With this matter established-one that the
“fundamental right” view neglects-state immunity could only obtain as an
exception to the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the forum state.
Nevertheless, the principle of sovereign equality cannot be said to have no
function in the state immunity equation. On the contrary, respect for the coequal
status of a foreign sovereign state serves typically as the primary motivation for
granting immunity privileges.  On this theory, however, a state’s entitlement to
immunity is not compelled by the principle of sovereign equality but, rather,
derives from the forum state’s waiver of adjudicatory jurisdiction with the aim of
promoting mutually beneficial interstate relations.
Finally, the “practical courtesy” rationale promotes a more sensible international
policy than the “fundamental right” rationale. States understood to possess a
fundamental right to immunity would be permitted to act with impunity. Carried to
the logical extreme, this notion would mean that foreign states acting in their
foreign capacity could never be held accountable by the forum state. On the
other hand, if state immunity is considered a practical courtesy, capable of being
modified (or even withdrawn, if need be), then a more balanced relationship is
maintained between the foreign state and the forum state. A foreign state will be
more cautious about treading on the interests of other states, fearing that
unacceptable conduct will result in the withdrawal of immunity and, in turn, the
review of such conduct by domestic courts.
Correcting false presumptions. The foregoing discussion has revolved primarily
around the broad principles animating the doctrine of foreign state immunity, and
has shown, in particular, the theoretical persuasiveness of the “practical
courtesy” rationale. Indeed, this persuasiveness is significant because it
suggests that a forum state remains unrestricted, at least by a fundamental
principle of international law, from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign-state
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human rights offender, so long as an appropriate connection exists between the
alleged offense and the forum state.
Yet when one surveys the actual law of foreign state immunity, as formulated and
applied, an entirely different picture emerges. In practice, the rules that regulate
state immunity law assume that a foreign state is immune from suit, unless
demonstrated otherwise. Taking an example from national practice, section 1604
of the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) contains the
general rule that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States,” which may be abrogated only by application of one
of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in section 1605.  According to the
FSIA’s legislative history, the statute “starts from a premise of immunity and then
creates exceptions to the general principle.”  Similarly, the Swiss Federal
Tribunal wrote:
According to a generally recognized rule of public international law, the
sovereignty of each State is limited by the immunity of other States, in particular
with regard to the jurisdiction of municipal courts and proceedings for
enforcement. One State cannot be brought before the courts of another State
except in exceptional circumstances.
These approaches, a function of codification in the American case and of
constitutional orientation in the Swiss (as described further in the next section),
unnecessarily build theoretical hurdles to human rights litigation.
International instruments paint largely the same picture. Article 15 of the
European Convention provides: “A Contracting State shall be entitled to immunity
from the jurisdiction of courts of another Contracting State if the proceedings do
not fall within Articles 1 to 14,” which enumerate various exceptions to immunity.
Article 5 of the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of states and their
property of the International Law Commission (ILC) provides that “[a] State
613
enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of the
courts of another State subject to the provisions of the present articles.”  Articles
10 through 17 subsequently carve out various exceptions to the general rule. In
the case of the draft articles, the Drafting Committee’s rapporteur, Professor
Sucharitkul, stated the following about the draft articles’ theoretical approach:
[T]he draft articles should begin to attempt the formulation of a basic rule of State
immunity. Based upon a series of the available source materials on State
practice…, the draft has to face two interesting sets of options. In the first place,
a rule of international law on State immunity could start from the very beginning
as a rule of State immunity, or it could go back beyond and before the beginning
of State immunity. It could… regard immunity not as a rule, nor less as a general
rule of law, but more appropriately…. as an exception to a more basic rule of
territorial sovereignty…. [T]he International Law Commission is more inclined
towards cutting the Gordian knot at the beginning, and beginning with a general
rule of State immunity….
Several practical reasons can help to explain why state immunity is treated as
the general rule, but unfortunately they have resulted in a misleading legal
framework.  Indeed, viewing state immunity as the general rule obfuscates the
reality that state immunity derives from a forum state’s concession of jurisdiction
and is not presumptively a right under international law, as explained above.
Reversing these false presumptions about foreign state immunity is no small
task. As Rosalyn Higgins has counseled, “It is very easy to elevate sovereign
immunity into a superior principle of international law and to lose sight of the
essential reality that it is an exception to the normal doctrine of jurisdiction.”
However, by understanding that “[i]t is sovereign immunity which is the exception
to jurisdiction and not jurisdiction which is the exception to a basic rule of
immunity,” the possibilities for meaningful and effective human rights litigation
emerge. With jurisdiction as the rule and immunity as the exception, it is
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incumbent upon the foreign state defendant, not the individual plaintiff, to point to
the rule, domestic or international, that requires immunity.
The Status of State Immunity in Relation to International Law
If, as argued above, the doctrine of foreign state immunity does not derive from a
fundamental principle of international law, namely sovereign equality, then what
is the status of the doctrine in relation to international law? As previously noted,
there is only one comprehensive multilateral agreement that governs state
immunity, the European Convention on State Immunity, which has been ratified
by only a handful of countries.  Thus, for the vast majority of states, state
immunity is unregulated by treaty as a general matter.  The next question, then,
involves determining the extent to which foreign state immunity is binding on
states as customary international law. The following discussion demonstrates
that, although customary international law compels immunity protections as to a
limited core body of state conduct, a broader range of state behavior not included
in the core, such as state-sponsored human rights violations, is entitled to
immunity solely as a matter of domestic law.
The scope of state immunity under customary international law. What is the
scope of immunity protection afforded foreign states under customary
international law? From Justice Marshall’s perspective in The Schooner
Exchange, determining the extent of immune conduct under international law
was a rather straightforward exercise. Viewing a state’s entitlement to immunity
as the exception, not the rule, he deduced readily from state practice those
“peculiar circumstances” in which states had waived jurisdiction in favor of
immunity. The prevailing international custom led Justice Marshall to conclude
that states had waived jurisdiction in favor of the following categories of
immunity: (1) the freedom of the foreign sovereign from arrest or detention, (2)
the diplomatic protection of foreign ministers, (3) the free passage of friendly
foreign troops, and (4) the passage of friendly warships present in the host state.
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Immunity for conduct falling into one of these categories was warranted because
of the “mutual benefit” that such protection provides to the community of nations.
Any state conduct that fell outside the core of immune activity did not require
immunity protection.
Twentieth-century developments, however, have obscured Justice Marshall’s
direct observations. As the globalization of trade and commerce increasingly
brought states and private merchants into contact, many states sought to expand
their entitlement to immunity beyond the strictures of customary international law
so as to evade any commercial liability in a transaction gone sour.  This self-
serving policy laid the foundation for the myth that states were immune from suits
of all kinds.  In time, principles of fairness in commercial dealing prevailed and
compelled the movement to restrict immunity as to a state’s commercial or
private conduct, acta jure gestionis. The primary justification for the restrictive
theory of immunity was said to be that judicial review of foreign state conduct of a
commercial or private nature did not affront the dignity of the state.
Approaching the question of immunity on the basis of the imperii / gestionis
distinction produced a metaphysical quandary: where should the line between
public and private state conduct be drawn?  For example, is a contract between a
foreign state entity and a private manufacturer for the purchase of army boots a
public or private act? To simplify matters, the restrictive approach came to focus
more on establishing undisputed categories of nonimmune conduct and
neglected to develop firm criteria for determining immune conduct.  The
codification movement on both the national and international levels proceeded on
a similar basis. National state immunity legislation, the European Convention,
and the leading codification projects enumerated detailed categories of
nonimmune conduct, i.e., the “exceptions” to immunity, while leaving all other
state conduct to fall under a catchall rule of immunity. As explained above, this
approach inappropriately reversed the presumption of immunity in the doctrine of
foreign state immunity.
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As a result of its awkward development, the restrictive approach to immunity, as
adopted by most states, draws the line between immune and nonimmune
conduct at a point beyond that required by customary international law. In fact,
most states afford a range of immunity protections to foreign states that exceed
the demands of customary international law. Accordingly, the doctrine of foreign
state immunity is currently stratified into three types of state conduct: (1) conduct
that is immune by virtue of customary international law, (2) conduct that is
immune solely by virtue of domestic law, and (3) conduct that is not entitled to
immunity under either customary international law or domestic law.
The ICJ’s recent decision in Arrest Warrant of April 11, 2000 provides strong
evidence as to the existence and nature of the rule of state immunity under
customary international law. In that case, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
protested the issuance by a Belgian investigating magistrate of “an international
arrest warrant in absentia” against the incumbent minister for foreign affairs of
the Congo, alleging violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The ICJ
found that “in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and
consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the
Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy
immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal.”  Notably, the
ICJ’s conclusion squares precisely with Justice Marshall’s findings in The
Schooner Exchange regarding the immunities of foreign ministers and thus
reaffirms the status of customary international law in that area.
What is perhaps most interesting about the Arrest Warrant case is its rationale
for an international rule of state immunity. The ICJ concluded that customary
international law compels state immunity regarding foreign ministers “to ensure
the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States”
and to “protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of another
State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties.”  The
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Arrest Warrant decision is again entirely consistent with the findings in The
Schooner Exchange, in which Justice Marshall concluded that states waive their
right to adjudicatory jurisdiction over a foreign state as to certain conduct that
promotes the “mutual benefit” of the community of nations, such as the exchange
of foreign ministers.  From these cases, a persuasive rationale for granting
immunity with respect to certain state conduct emerges-a rationale that arguably
is a prerequisite to establishing the opinio juris necessary for a rule of customary
international law.
Conversely, when state conduct fails to promote “mutual benefit” among nations,
the international law status of a rule that immunizes such conduct is dubious at
best. Two examples from U.S. case law underscore this point. In Letelier v.
Republic of Chile and Liu v. Republic of China, U.S. courts found that
assassinations by foreign government agents committed in the United States
were not “discretionary” state conduct within the meaning of the FSIA and thus fit
into the FSIA’s exception to immunity for torts committed in U.S. territory.  Under
a strict application of the imperii / gestionis distinction, such conduct, i.e., state-
sanctioned assassination, would be immune by virtue of its official mandate.
However, in Letelier and Liu the courts did not identify a rule of international law
that required immunity where the state conduct in question was “clearly contrary
to the precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international law.”
The 1996 amendment to the FSIA  further evidences that customary international
law does not immunize detrimental state conduct. The 1996 amendment creates
an additional category of nonimmune conduct as to a limited range of acts
committed by states designated by the U.S. government as “state sponsors of
terrorism.”  The amendment applies to actions by or on behalf of U.S. citizens
that allege “personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material
support or resources” for such acts.  The provision flatly rejects the traditional
imperii / gestionis distinction in its application to conduct that “is engaged in by an
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official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of
his or her office, employment, or agency.”  Notably, although the U.S.
government expressed opposition to the 1996 amendment in a previous form, it
never asserted that curtailing immunity for state conduct that violates human
rights would constitute a breach of international law.
To summarize: It is established that customary international law mandates
immunity as to a core body of state conduct. However, because of the awkward
development of the theory of restrictive immunity, insufficient attention has been
paid to defining the exact content of this core as it has developed since Justice
Marshall’s assessment in 1812. In fact, the prevailing approach to state immunity
obscures the reach of the international rule of state immunity by establishing a
false presumption of immunity and creating a catchall category for immune
conduct. As a consequence, the current formulation of the doctrine of foreign
state immunity, as adopted by most states, the European Convention, and the
leading codification projects, grants foreign states more immunity privileges than
customary international law dictates.
Emerging consensus regarding restrictive immunity. For much of the last century,
state immunity practice has been starkly divided between two groups of nations:
countries that have favored the theory of restrictive immunity, mainly the Western
capitalist countries; and countries that have clung to the theory of absolute
immunity, mainly the Communist and socialist countries. Recent developments
indicate that the gap between absolutist and restrictivist states is narrowing. The
collapse of the Soviet empire has brought about great social and political
changes in Eastern Europe, which have slowly influenced state immunity practice
in the formerly Communist countries. The development of market economies and
the participation in global commerce by the former Soviet countries, especially
Russia, have strained the utility of the doctrine of absolute immunity and
undoubtedly will cause a policy shift toward restrictive immunity.  Evidence
suggests that even the People’s Republic of China, a staunch supporter of
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absolute immunity, may be moderating its position.  Such tendencies, while not
yet etched in stone, show that the gap between absolutist and restrictivist
practice may be as narrow today as it has ever been.
Still, setting aside the narrowing of the absolute/restrictive immunity split, one
finds a myriad of substantive variations in national approaches to state immunity
law. While each and every variation cannot possibly be addressed here, one
significant example is revealing. The FSIA, for instance, instructs U.S. courts to
look at the “nature” and not the “purpose” of a foreign state defendant’s conduct
in order to determine whether such conduct is commercial or public in nature
and, thus, whether it is immune or nonimmune from suit.  French courts, by
contrast, appear to place more emphasis on the purpose of the operative state
act, instead of its nature. The Cour de cassation, France’s highest court, held
that foreign states may be entitled to immunity not only for acta jure imperii, but
also for acts performed in the interest of public service.  Thus, the real possibility
exists that U.S. and French courts may draw the line between immune and
nonimmune foreign state conduct in very different places.
Accordingly, James Crawford’s earlier observation that the distinction between
immune and nonimmune state conduct is drawn less by international law and
more by national laws is equally relevant today.  Hazel Fox similarly posits that
while there is a clear trend “away from an absolute doctrine to a restrictive
doctrine… the absence of a universal convention and the diversity of State
practice… produce[ ] extraordinary complexity and variety in the emerging rules.”
Such significant variations in national practice have led another state immunity
scholar, Joseph Dellapenna, to conclude his comparative study of immunity
practice in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany with the following words:
All these countries, in grappling with the need to constrain the actions of
sovereigns by the rule of law, have developed roughly similar responses that are
collectively described by the rubric of the “restrictive theory of foreign state
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immunity.” A closer examination of the details of the several approaches to
foreign state immunity… demonstrates, however, that consensus exists only at a
rather high level of abstraction.
Because the doctrine of foreign state immunity is a mix of international law and
domestic law, the reach of restrictive immunity, i.e., the extent to which states are
not immune, may or may not be an international law question. Indeed, the nature
of the inquiry depends on whether the core of immune conduct is implicated. In
the Arrest Warrant case, for example, the ICJ addressed the scope of a sitting
foreign minister’s immunities, a category of state conduct that clearly touches
upon established customary international law matters. In contrast, in the Letelier
and Liu cases, U.S. courts examined state conduct, namely assassination, that
clearly falls outside the core body of immune conduct. Thus, the issue of
immunity was decided solely as a matter of domestic law, and customary
international law played no role in the analysis.
The conceptual divide between the civil law and common law countries. The
mixed character of the doctrine of foreign state immunity has produced varying
emphasis on its component parts in the civil law and common law systems,
respectively. A review of the literature from the civil law and common law
countries reveals starkly divergent views on the roles that international law and
domestic law play in formulating state immunity policy. On the one side, the civil
law countries deem state immunity generally to be a principle of customary
international law that must be applied domestically by national courts. On the
other side, the common law countries place more emphasis on regulating state
immunity through domestic legislation, not customary international law.
Even a brief look at the civil law literature shows that these countries are firmly
committed to the notion that state immunity originates in customary international
law. Regarding state immunity, Antonio Cassese writes that “limitations are
imposed upon State sovereignty by customary rules.”  Jurgen Bröhmer also
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writes: “The law of state immunity as it now stands as a customary rule of
international law is commonly based and justified on various general principles of
international law.”  Professors Cassese and Brohmer, like other civil law
scholars, appear to accept state immunity’s status as international custom as a
given.
The rationale for the civil law position largely derives from two factors: (1) the civil
law constitutional design; and (2) the lack of national immunity legislation in many
civil law countries.  The Italian experience is illustrative. The Italian Constitution,
like many civil law constitutions, includes a broad and binding mandate regarding
national compliance with international law. Article 10 of the Italian Constitution
states: “The Italian legal system shall conform with the generally recognized rules
of international law.”  This provision not only endows Italian judges with the
power to ensure national compliance with international law, but also imposes a
constitutional obligation to do so. Thus, Italian courts, like most civil law courts,
are generally inclined to view themselves as the chief interpreters and enforcers
of international law.
Combined with the lack of immunity legislation in many civil law countries, this
constitutional obligation has given rise to the belief that state immunity law
derives from customary international law.  According to one civil law scholar,
there can be no other possible origin.  Indeed, the Italian Corte di cassazione in
the Pieciukiewicz case declared that the doctrine of state immunity is rooted in a
“customary principle” that “comes under the purview of Article 10(1)” of the Italian
Constitution.
In contrast, the common law countries tend to perceive state immunity as more a
product of domestic law, although originally this was not the case. In The
Schooner Exchange, as seen, Justice Marshall looked to international custom to
determine the scope of entitlement to foreign state immunity.  However, since
that early time, the common law approach has changed dramatically owing in
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large part to an influential article published in 1951 by Hersch Lauterpacht
entitled The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States.  In that
publication, the English scholar made the then-provocative declaration that there
was “no rule of international law which obliges states to grant jurisdictional
immunity to other states.”  In support, Professor Lauterpacht relied on two points
of evidence. First, he noted that during the twentieth century when the prevailing
rule of absolute immunity began to lose its force, “international practice show[ed]
no frequent instances of protests against assumption of jurisdiction, including
execution, over foreign states.”  Second, Lauterpacht cited the fact that many
states granted immunity privileges on the basis of reciprocity and added that
“[s]tates do not make the observance of established rules of international law
dependent upon reciprocity.”  Free from the constraints of international law,
Lauterpacht went on to establish the “assimilative approach” to state immunity,
according to which a state is immune from suit only to the extent that the host
state enjoys immunity before its own courts.
Upon assessing the development of state immunity law more than twenty-five
years later, Professor Brownlie, in the third edition of his treatise, observed: “it is
difficult as yet to see a new principle which would satisfy the criteria of uniformity
and consistency required for the formation of a rule of customary international
law.”  Brownlie suggested a “fresh approach” to state immunity:
The concepts of sovereign immunity…, the exclusive jurisdiction of the state
within its own territory, and the need for an express licence for a foreign state to
operate within that national jurisdiction…, can be taken as starting points. Each
state has an existing power, subject to treaty obligations, to exclude foreign
public agencies, including even diplomatic representation. If a state chooses, it
would enact a law governing immunities of foreign states which would enumerate
those acts which would involve acceptance of the local jurisdiction.
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After citing as examples of such acts the conclusion of contracts subject to
private law and consent to arbitration, Brownlie proposed that foreign trade
partners of the host state be notified about the new legislation, which would take
effect after sufficient time to allow them to withdraw, and that rights under such
agreements could be reserved. He continued:
States would thus be given a licence to operate within the jurisdiction with
express conditions and the basis of sovereign immunity, as explained in the
Schooner Exchange, would be observed. Such a legal regime would be subject
to the inevitable immunity ratione materiae…, and the principles of international
law as to jurisdiction. The approach suggested would avoid the difficulties of the
distinction between acts jure gestionis and acts jure imperii.
Thus, Brownlie, like Lauterpacht, suggested that the doctrine of immunity was not
a rule of customary international law.
Lauterpacht and other commentators who agreed with him influenced the
contemporary common law view of state immunity.  Indeed, Monroe Leigh, the
FSIA’s chief architect, stated that in the years leading up to the U.S. change in
policy from the absolute to the restrictive approach to immunity, “there was no
agreement among the students of international law as to whether Sovereign
Immunity was a principle of customary international law or merely a matter of
comity between nations.”  Consequently, when reforming U.S. state immunity
policy in the 1970s, the drafters of the FSIA undoubtedly felt free to operate on
the basis that, save for a limited area of immunity law governed primarily by
treaty, “the entire field is open to definition by domestic law.” That several
common law countries followed the U.S. lead and enacted their own domestic
immunity legislation reflects broad consensus on this matter.
The distinct perspectives of the civil law and common law countries regarding the
source of state immunity law have yielded divergent approaches to solving the
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human rights litigation problem. The civil law countries, with their emphasis on
international law, are arguably more inclined to address human rights issues on
the international law level and thus more receptive to approaches like the
normative hierarchy theory.  The common law countries, with their skepticism
about state immunity’s broad reach under international law, generally prefer to
regulate state immunities through the application of domestic legislation.  While
the merits of each approach are debatable, the civil law perspective has created,
as explained below, a propensity for adopting the normative hierarchy theory and
thus unnecessarily complicates resolution of the human rights litigation problem.
11.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE
IMMUNITY
In light of the discussion in part I, one must measure the normative hierarchy
theory against two fundamental legal realities: (1) state immunity arises not out of
a fundamental right of statehood but, rather, out of the concession of a forum
state’s right of adjudicatory jurisdiction; and (2) foreign states are not entitled to
immunity under customary international law as to most, if not all, activity that
constitutes human rights offenses.  The common thread running through both
observations (and the crucial point that the normative hierarchy theory overlooks)
is that the forum state, not the foreign state defendant, holds the authority to
regulate the scope and content of the state immunity privilege. Part II presents a
summary of the normative hierarchy theory, as developed in the American and
European contexts, and then turns to a substantive critique of the theory.
The Anatomy of the Normative Hierarchy Theory
The American approach. The normative hierarchy argument had its genesis in
the United States. The notion that foreign sovereign immunity might be trumped
by superior international law norms first emerged as a reaction to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp.  In that case, the plaintiffs sued in tort to reclaim losses arising out of the
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unprovoked bombing of an oil tanker on the high seas by the government of
Argentina, allegedly a violation of international law.  The Court ruled that the
FSIA was “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state” in U.S.
courts.  Moreover, the Court held that American courts may hear suits against
foreign states only where Congress has explicitly provided a statutory exception
to the FSIA’s general rule of immunity.  A suit involving an armed attack against a
ship on the high seas was not one over which Congress had intended the courts
to exercise jurisdiction, the Court found, and thus it rejected the plaintiffs’ claim.
The Court’s restrictive interpretation of the FSIA’s exceptions to immunity
prompted a group of three law students to publish an inventive Comment in 1991
entitled Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for
Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law.  The authors propose that
states lose all entitlement to state immunity under international law when they
injure individuals in violation of jus cogens norms. Their theory starts from the
premise that, following the Nuremberg trials, the structure of international law
changed; in particular, the “rise of jus cogens” placed substantial limitations on
state conduct in the name of peaceful international relations.  Indeed, “[b]ecause
jus cogens norms are hierarchically superior to the positivist or voluntary laws of
consent, they absolutely restrict the freedom of the state in the exercise of its
sovereign powers.”
This conclusion has ramifications for the doctrine of state immunity, the authors
argue. Their theory turns on the assumption that state immunity is a product of
state sovereignty, resting “on the foundation that sovereign states are equal and
independent and thus cannot be bound by foreign law without their consent.”
Since state immunity is not a peremptory norm, when invoked in defense of a
violation of jus cogens, it must yield to “the ‘general will’ of the international
community of states.”  Accordingly, [b]ecause jus cogens, by definition, is a set of
rules from which states may not derogate, a state act in violation of such a rule
will not be recognized as a sovereign act by the community of states, and the
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violating state therefore may not claim the right of sovereign immunity for its
actions.
In causing harm to an individual in violation of jus cogens, a state may no longer
raise an immunity defense because the state may be regarded as having
implicitly waived any entitlement to immunity.  To give domestic effect to this
waiver in U.S. courts, the authors point to section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA, which
empowers the exercise of district court jurisdiction in cases in which a state “has
waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication.”
While the implied waiver argument has never formed the basis of a legal decision
in U.S. courts, it has not lacked influence on U.S. judges.  In Siderman de Blake
v. Republic of Argentina,  the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accepted
the argument’s basic premise. The case involved the alleged torture of an
Argentine citizen and expropriation of property by Argentine military officials.
Following the logic of the implied waiver theory, the plaintiffs argued that jus
cogens trumps foreign state immunity, resulting in the defendant’s loss of
immunity for torturing the victim, José Siderman.  The court determined that
Argentina was not immune from suit because Argentina had waived its
entitlement to immunity under section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA by involving itself in
U.S. legal proceedings,  but in dicta it echoed the plaintiff’s arguments, stating
that “[a] state’s violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture
therefore would not be entitled to the immunity afforded by international law.”
The normative hierarchy argument again received substantial consideration in
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,  a case involving claims of personal
injury and forced labor arising from the plaintiff’s imprisonment in Nazi
concentration camps. In Princz, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia denied the plaintiff’s claims, specifically rejecting the normative
hierarchy argument.  Judge Patricia Wald, however, advocated its application in
an impassioned dissent. “Germany waived its sovereign immunity by violating the
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jus cogens norms of international law condemning enslavement and genocide,”
she wrote.  To support this conclusion, Judge Wald contended: “Jus cogens
norms are by definition nonderogable, and thus when a state thumbs its nose at
such a norm, in effect overriding the collective will of the entire international
community, the state cannot be performing a sovereign act entitled to immunity.”
Judge Wald considered the waiver of immunity to be a fact of international law
and thus urged that the FSIA’s waiver provision be construed consistently, so as
to allow plaintiffs to sue states for violations of jus cogens.
Though never formally accepted as the basis for judicial decision in U.S. courts,
the normative hierarchy theory continues to spark interest among jurists and
scholars alike. Plaintiffs suing under the FSIA for alleged human rights violations
continually press for its application.  Numerous scholars and international law
commentators have also become engaged in the debate over the validity of the
normative hierarchy theory.  However, the current position of U.S. courts to
interpret the FSIA’s implied waiver provision strictly is likely to incapacitate the
normative hierarchy theory from amending U.S. state immunity policy.
The contribution of continental Europe.  Though it originated in the United States,
the normative hierarchy theory has had a substantial impact in the countries of
continental Europe.  For instance, in his treatise on public international law,
Professor Cassese writes that “peremptory norms [or jus cogens] may impact on
State immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign States, in that they may remove
such immunity.”  In support, he cites, among other sources, Judge Wald’s dissent
in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany.  Professor Bianchi states that
“[r]eliance on the hierarchy of norms in the international legal system is a viable
argument to assert non-immunity for major violations of international human
rights.”  The European brand of the theory is nearly identical in concept to its
American predecessor: because jus cogens, a primary norm, is hierarchically
superior to state immunity, a secondary norm, a foreign state is not immune for
violations of human rights norms of a peremptory nature.
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Where the European approach distinguishes itself is in its potential to affect
national state immunity policy. Since the civil law countries of continental Europe
have not enacted national immunity legislation and many of their constitutional
systems oblige national courts to look to international law for guidance on foreign
state immunity, it comes as no surprise that the civil law Europeans approach the
normative hierarchy theory from the perspective of progressive jurisprudential
development. Professor Bianchi, for example, calls for “a coherent interpretation”
of the norms of the international legal order to resolve “the inconsistency
between the rule of state immunity and the principle of protection of fundamental
human rights.”  According to Bianchi, ensuring that the application of international
law produces just results requires judges to undertake a “value-oriented”
interpretation of international law norms, giving preference to peremptory norms,
such as the protection of human rights, over norms of lesser importance, such as
state immunity.
Largely free from the constraints of national immunity legislation and treaty
obligations, a civil law court not surprisingly would feel inclined to make the type
of “value-oriented” decision that Bianchi encourages. The adjudication of
Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany in the Greek courts
provides an apt example. The facts of the case arose out of the Nazi occupation
of southern Greece during World War II. During that period Nazi military troops
committed war atrocities against the local inhabitants of the Prefecture of Voiotia
in 1944, particularly in the village of Distomo, including willful murder and
destruction of personal property. Over fifty years later, the plaintiffs, mostly
descendants of the victims, sued the Federal Republic of Germany in the Greek
Court of First Instance of Leivadia for compensation for the material damage and
mental suffering endured at the hands of the Nazis.
On the preliminary matter of jurisdiction, the court of first instance invoked the
normative hierarchy theory to rule that Germany was not immune from suit. The
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court found that, “according to the prevailing contemporary theory and practice of
international law opinion,… the state cannot invoke immunity when the act
attributed to it has been perpetrated in breach of a jus cogens rule.”  The rule of
jus cogens that the court identified was contained in Articles 43 and 46 of the
regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land (Hague Regulations).  Article 43 obligates an occupying
power to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory and to ensure public
order and safety, while Article 46 obliges occupying powers to protect certain
rights of the occupied, especially the rights to family honor, life, private property,
and religious convictions.  The court concluded that the demonstrated breach of
this rule deprives a state of an immunity defense in domestic proceedings.
The reasons that the court provided in support of its decision are revealing and
worth reiterating in their entirety:
a) When a state is in breach of peremptory rules of international law, it cannot
lawfully expect to be granted the right of immunity. Consequently, it is deemed
to have tacitly waived such right (constructive waiver through the operation of
international law); b) Acts of the state in breach of peremptory international law
cannot qualify as sovereign acts of state. In such cases the defendant state is
not considered as acting within its capacity as sovereign; c) Acts contrary to
peremptory international law are null and void and cannot give rise to lawful
rights, such as immunity (in application of the general principle of law ex iniuria
jus non oritur); d) the recognition of immunity for an act contrary to peremptory
international law would amount to complicity of the national court to the
promotion of an act strongly condemned by the international public order; e)
The invocation of immunity for acts committed in breach of a peremptory norm
of international law would constitute abuse of right; and finally f) Given that the
principle of territorial sovereignty, as a fundamental rule of the international
legal order, supersedes the principle of immunity, a state in breach of the
former when in illegal occupation of foreign territory, cannot possibl[y] invoke
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the principle of immunity for acts committed during such illegal military
occupation.
The reasoning in subsections a) through e) bears the traditional marks of the
normative hierarchy theory. The court’s pronouncement in subsection d) would
appear to take the theory one step further, indicating that its nonapplication
would implicate the forum state in the foreign state defendant’s alleged breach
of international law. Subsection f) is somewhat incongruous, seemingly
advocating an entirely separate ground for denying immunity based on the
forum state’s authority to define its own state immunity law. Relying on this
reasoning, the court awarded the plaintiffs 9.5 billion drachmas (approximately
$30 million) in the form of a default judgment.
The Hellenic Supreme Court, Areios Pagos, affirmed the holding of the lower
court and arguably supported its reasoning relating to the normative hierarchy
theory.  The Court began its analysis with the so-called torts exception to
immunity. After reviewing the international law landscape,  the Court concluded
that an exception to immunity for torts committed by a foreign state in the forum
state’s territory was established in customary international law, “even if the acts
were acta jure imperii.”  Second, the Court identified what it perceived as an
obstacle to application of the torts exception in this case: the atrocities at issue
were probably committed in the course of armed conflict, a situation in which
the foreign state, even as occupier, would generally retain immunity.  However,
the Court found that this rule of immunity was inapplicable, because in the case
of military occupation that is directly derived from an armed conflict and that,
according to the now customary rule of Article 43 of the [Hague Regulations],
does not bring about a change in sovereignty or preclude the application of the
laws of the occupied State, crimes carried out by organs of the occupying
power in abuse of their sovereign power do not attract immunity.
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Accordingly, the Court determined that the Nazi atrocities were an “abuse of
sovereign power,” on which Germany could not base an immunity defense.
The Court’s decision to apply the torts exception to deny immunity for acts
ostensibly of a public nature itself represents an interesting departure from the
traditional public/private distinction in state immunity law. What is more
attention grabbing about the decision, though, is that the Court, in reaching it,
drew upon the normative hierarchy theory. Specifically, the Court found that the
Nazi acts in question were “in breach of rules of peremptory international law
(Article 46 of the [Hague Regulations]),” and thus that “they were not acts jure
imperii.”  Consequently, the Court concluded that Germany had impliedly
waived its immunity.  As a result, one may view the Court’s decision as the first
endorsement of the normative hierarchy theory by a significant national tribunal.
The Greek Supreme Court’s decision is a substantial contribution to state
immunity practice in itself. Yet it is perhaps more significant as a potential
harbinger of developments in state immunity policy in other similarly oriented
countries, which neither have enacted national immunity legislation nor are
parties to the European Convention on State Immunity. For this group of states,
the national courts possess the primary authority to define foreign state
immunity law and many, like Greece, may be bound to look to international law
for applicable guidance.
A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory
The misalignment of norms. Supporters of the normative hierarchy theory
perceive the human rights litigation problem as a conflict between two
international law norms, state immunity and jus cogens. In short, the superior
norm of jus cogens is capable of striking down the inferior norm of state
immunity, allowing the human rights victim to advance his or her claim.
However, this approach is flawed conceptually because the norms that are
purportedly at odds with one another under the normative hierarchy theory in
reality never clash.
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As part I demonstrated, state immunity is not a norm that arises from a
fundamental principle of international law, such as state equality, or from the
latter’s purported theoretical derivative, the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium.  To reiterate briefly: The principle of state equality guarantees that
states will enjoy equal capacity for rights. This capacity diminishes when a state
intrudes on another state’s sphere of authority, and becomes virtually dormant
within another state’s territorial borders. There is thus no inherent right of state
immunity, as, ironically, is often suggested in the writings in support of the
normative hierarchy approach.
Moreover, the practice by states of waiving adjudicatory jurisdiction to create
immunity privileges has created binding norms through the development of
international custom as to only a core body of state conduct. Such norms do not
apply to state conduct, e.g., the violation of the human rights of another state’s
citizens, that undermines the aim and purpose of the international legal order. If a
foreign state receives immunity protection for such conduct, it is because that
protection is afforded by the domestic policies of the forum state or, in the case of
a few select states, pursuant to the European Convention. Accordingly, the
norms of state immunity and jus cogens do not clash at all insofar as human
rights violations are concerned. To accept otherwise, as the normative hierarchy
theory does, endows foreign states with more of a claim to state immunity than
reality dictates.
If there is any clash of international law norms that underpins the human rights
litigation problem, it is between human rights protections and the right of the
forum state to regulate the authority of its judicial organs, otherwise known as the
right of adjudicatory jurisdiction. As demonstrated in part I, as a threshold matter
state immunity operates as an exception to the overriding principle of
adjudicatory jurisdiction and as customary international law does not cover
human rights offenses.  Any protections for human rights abuses on the domestic
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level thus result purely from the exercise of the forum state’s right of adjudicatory
jurisdiction. That is, the forum state with ultimate authority to establish the
entitlement of state immunity has chosen to close its courts to meaningful human
rights litigation. Therefore, rather than being between jus cogens and state
immunity, the real conflict is between jus cogens and the principle of adjudicatory
jurisdiction.
Finally, even if state immunity were an international law norm that shields states
from liability for human rights claims, the normative hierarchy theory would fail to
explain persuasively how a clash of norms would arise. Lady Fox criticizes the
theory, asserting that, as “a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national
court,” state immunity “does not contradict a prohibition contained in a jus cogens
norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a different method of settlement.”
Essentially, the norms of human rights and state immunity, while mutually
reinforcing, govern distinct and exclusive aspects of the international legal order.
On the one hand, human rights norms protect the individual’s “inalienable and
legally enforceable rights…. against state interference and the abuse of power by
governments.”  On the other hand, state immunity norms enable state officials “to
carry out their public functions effectively and… to secure the orderly conduct of
international relations.”  To demonstrate a clash of international law norms, the
normative hierarchy theory must prove the existence of a jus cogens norm that
prohibits the granting of immunity for violations of human rights by foreign states.
However, the normative hierarchy theory provides no evidence of such a
peremptory norm.
Questions surrounding the application of jus cogens. Unresolved issues
surrounding the application of jus cogens further undermine the appeal of the
normative hierarchy theory.  While the existence of jus cogens in international
law is an increasingly accepted proposition, its exact scope and content remains
an open question.  Proponents of the normative hierarchy theory, in particular,
have failed to generate a precise list of human rights norms with a peremptory
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character.  To be sure, consensus is emerging as to the status of certain norms,
such as the prohibitions against piracy, genocide, slavery, aggression, and
torture.  Yet these norms, despite their importance to the community of nations,
represent only a small fraction of the norms that potentially may belong to the
body of peremptory norms.  In Prefecture of Voiotia, for example, the Greek
courts identified the rights of family honor, life, private property, and religious
convictions, enshrined in Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, as the operative
jus cogens.  Further, the concept of jus cogens is not confined solely to the realm
of human rights. Commentators have suggested that crucial fundamental
international law norms, such as pacta sunt servanda, may also constitute jus
cogens.
The undefined character of jus cogens, coupled with the general applicability of
the normative hierarchy theory, which invests all peremptory norms with
immunity-stripping potential, may present problems for the courts. Requiring
application of the theory beyond cases of genocide, slavery, and torture would
place national courts in an awkward position. The theory not only would deprive
the forum state of its right to regulate access to its own courts,  but also would
force them to determine whether a particular norm of international law had
attained the status of jus cogens, a task that international legal scholars have
grappled with for decades with only limited success.  Further, the normative
hierarchy theory logically requires courts to treat all violations of peremptory
norms uniformly, even violations of norms that do not implicate human rights but
are arguably jus cogens, such as pacta sunt servanda. In addition, allowing the
courts to determine the parameters of jus cogens through application of the
normative hierarchy theory may undermine the principle of separation of powers,
in some cases inappropriately transferring foreign-policymaking power from the
political branches of government to the judiciary.  Finally, as Judges Pellonpaa
and Bratza warned in the Al-Adsani case, adoption of the normative hierarchy
theory could be the first step on a slippery slope that begins with state immunity
from jurisdiction but could quickly extend to state immunity from execution
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against sovereign property and ultimately threaten the “orderly international co-
operation” between states.
Second, if, as mentioned above, the true clash of norms underpinning the human
rights litigation problem is between the protection of human rights and the
principle of adjudicatory jurisdiction, what, then, is the relationship between these
two norms? A thorough answer to this question cannot be offered in an article of
this length, but a brief exploration of the issue may be enlightening.
If jus cogens is defined as a body of norms representing the core, nonderogable
values of the community of states, then included in this body, arguably, is the
principle of state jurisdiction, i.e., a state’s freedom to exercise jurisdiction,
especially on the basis of territoriality, through its own governmental institutions,
including its national courts.  Support for this proposition is reflected in the core
principles of international law, which consider the state the basic building block of
the international legal order.  In fact, most of the foundational rules of
international law hold as the highest value the protection of the territorial integrity,
independence, and equality of states.  Even taking account of recent
developments in international law that limit state sovereignty, such as in the
areas of human rights and environmental law,  it cannot be said at this point in
time that any rule has emerged that would limit a state’s authority to determine its
own jurisdiction over foreign states.
If the principle of state jurisdiction is so paramount to the community of states as
to place it within the body of jus cogens, the human rights litigation problem may
involve a clash of two peremptory norms, the protection of human rights and the
principle of exclusive state jurisdiction. This scenario raises perplexing questions
of international law. Can there be a hierarchy of norms within the body of
peremptory norms and, if so, which ranks higher, human rights or territorial
jurisdiction? The answers to these questions, if any, lie deep in uncharted
territory of international legal scholarship and cannot be ascertained here.  The
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very fact that the normative hierarchy theory would appear to lead courts into
such a theoretical abyss casts doubt on its practical viability and utility.
Denying immunity through fictions. Explaining how a state loses its immunity is a
critical element of the normative hierarchy theory. Two different, but interrelated,
explanations are offered in the literature. On one rationale, a state is said to
waive or forfeit its entitlement to immunity by implication when it commits a jus
cogens violation.  On the other rationale, state conduct that violates a jus cogens
norm is said to fall outside the category of protected state conduct known as acta
jure imperii, for which immunity is traditionally granted, such conduct being
devoid of legitimacy because it contravenes the will of the community of nations.
Neither of these explanations is persuasive because both are based on fictions
resulting from a misunderstanding of the true nature and operation of the doctrine
of foreign state immunity.
The notion that a foreign state implicitly waives or forfeits any entitlement to
immunity by acting against jus cogens is untenable for the reasons developed in
part I: a foreign state’s entitlement to immunity for human rights violations is not
derived from international law, so a foreign state cannot lose its right to immunity
by violating international law. Indeed, the entitlement in this respect-and therefore
also the waiver or forfeiture of immunity-is strictly a matter of domestic regulation.
This plain reality is illustrated in Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, in which Libya conceded, for the limited purpose of its appeal, that its
alleged participation in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 would consist of a jus
cogens violation, but disputed that “such a violation demonstrates an implied
waiver of sovereign immunity within the meaning of the FSIA.”  The court
ultimately held that Libya had not waived its immunity because the FSIA
anticipated implied waiver only under a few select circumstances.  Smith, while
adjudicated under national immunity legislation, is of general appeal, if only to
raise the paradoxical question of how a foreign state can be said to have
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implicitly waived its entitlement to immunity when it would be likely, if asked,
expressly to state the contrary.
The purported exclusion of state-sponsored human rights violations from the
category of acta jure imperii is equally unpersuasive. Indeed, the distinction
between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis is “superficially attractive as a
means of keeping state immunity within reasonable limits” but “does not rest on
any sound logical basis.”  As Judge Gerald Fitzmaurice wrote, “[A] sovereign
state does not cease to be a sovereign state because it performs acts which a
private citizen might perform.”  Along similar lines of logic, a foreign state does
not cease to be a sovereign state simply because it commits acts of a criminal
nature, including violations of human rights norms. Moreover, if state conduct
that violates jus cogens is assertedly not jure imperii and obviously not jure
gestionis (private or commercial), then what is it? This question is not addressed
by supporters of the normative hierarchy theory. The real answer lies in the fact
that foreign states are entitled to immunity for human rights violations only to the
extent that a forum state grants them that privilege. Hence, the exclusion of jus
cogens–violating state conduct from the category of acta jure imperii can be
effectuated only through the expression of the forum state’s immunity policies to
that effect, not by international law.
Misplaced concerns regarding forum state complicity. Supporters of the
normative hierarchy theory sometimes argue that the failure to deny state
immunity for human rights violations amounts to complicity of the forum state with
the jus cogens transgression.  A brief review of the ILC’s draft articles on state
responsibility reveals the shortcomings of this claim. Of the provisions in the draft
articles, only chapter IV on the responsibility of a state in connection with the act
of another state is even remotely relevant. Articles 16, 17, and 18 of chapter IV
address, respectively, situations in which one state aids or assists, directs and
controls, or coerces another state in the commission of an internationally
wrongful act.  In all these provisions, the ILC included a knowledge requirement
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for complicity of the third-party state, thus limiting the draft articles’ contemplated
application to cases of deliberate involvement in the internationally wrongful act
before or during its commission.  Hence, a forum state cannot be considered
complicit for granting jurisdictional immunity to other states long before any
lawsuit has been filed.
This does not mean, however, that the forum state cannot hold the foreign-state
offender accountable under principles of state responsibility, only that it cannot
be penalized for failing to do so.  Moreover, immunity in the forum state does not
amount to global impunity for state conduct that violates human rights. Indeed,
the forum state may pursue a human rights claim in numerous alternative political
and judicial arenas. Nevertheless, repealing immunity protections that exist solely
by virtue of the forum state’s domestic policies and are not compelled by
international law ranks high among all options.
11.5 NEW PROSPECTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF
FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY LAW
As demonstrated above, the normative hierarchy theory offers an unpersuasive
solution to the human rights litigation problem. Foreign states are not immune
from human rights litigation by virtue of a fundamental sovereign right or a rule of
customary international law.  With ultimate authority both to grant and to rescind
the entitlement to immunity in these circumstances, the forum state may
establish a state immunity policy in this area unrestricted by international law.
This reality places the burden of providing meaningful human rights litigation not
on the foreign state defendant, as the normative hierarchy theory contends, but
on the government entities in each forum state with responsibility for establishing
the state immunity laws.
While the forum state has authority to repeal many state immunity privileges,
especially in the area of human rights protections, by exercising its right of
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adjudicatory jurisdiction, a more comprehensive justification for curtailing
immunity is in order. Although an international rule of immunity exists, the
modern doctrine of foreign state immunity fails to delineate the scope of its
coverage. Accordingly, the line between international law and domestic law
protections is not always readily apparent. Neither the traditional gestionis/imperii
distinction of the theory of restrictive immunity nor the piecemeal approach of
national and international codification efforts of national state immunity legislation
accurately distinguishes between immune and nonimmune state conduct. These
approaches, as explained, focus primarily on establishing categories of
nonimmune conduct and in so doing promote excessive state immunity
protections.
Part III proposes an alternative approach to allocating state immunity
entitlements. The approach justifies granting immunity only in circumstances in
which such protection promotes orderly relations in the community of states, not
least between the forum state and the foreign state. As explained in more detail
below, state conduct that does not enhance interstate relations, such as the
abuse of citizens of the forum state, should not be entitled to immunity protection.
Developing a Theory of Collective Benefit
One way to identify the scope of the international rule of state immunity is to
conceptualize state immunity as arising out of an agreement forged between the
forum state and any foreign state with which it seeks to develop transnational
intercourse. This approach is consistent with the more persuasive rationale for
state immunity, i.e., that immunity protections result from the forum state’s waiver
of its right of adjudicatory jurisdiction. As Justice Marshall observed in The
Schooner Exchange, state immunity protections were originally created when the
forum state granted a foreign sovereign a “license” to operate within the forum
state’s jurisdiction free from arrest, seizure, or adverse legal proceedings.  To the
extent that this practice has crystallized into international custom, the forum state
has consented to concede a right of adjudicatory jurisdiction on an enduring
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basis. Thus, defining the scope of the international rule of state immunity
depends upon determining the circumstances in which forum states have
conceded their important right of adjudicatory jurisdiction permanently in favor of
immunity protections.
A look at the “agreement” that states have struck with one another regarding
state immunity protections is revealing. Traditionally, a forum state’s promise of
foreign state immunity has provided foreign states with guarantees against
arrest, seizure, and adverse legal proceedings sufficient to entice foreign
sovereigns and their representatives into entering and operating within the forum
state’s jurisdiction. This promise of immunity, however, is not limitless in scope.
As Justice Marshall observed, state immunity exists only for the “mutual benefit”
of “intercourse” between states and for “an interchange of those good offices
which humanity dictates and its wants require.”  Recently, the decision in the
Arrest Warrant case confirmed this justification for state immunity in the context
of immunities of foreign ministers. The ICJ found that such immunities are
designed to enable the ministers to fulfill their functions effectively and to protect
them from acts of authority of another state that would thwart them in fulfilling
those functions.  Accordingly, the sole raison d’etre for state immunity under
customary international law is so that states can perform their public functions
effectively and ensure that international relations are conducted in an orderly
fashion.
If one accepts this basic premise, then conduct of a foreign state that does not
conform with the development of beneficial interstate relations falls outside the
state immunity “agreement” and thus is not immune by virtue of international
custom. The most obvious example excludes foreign state conduct that does
significant harm to the vital interests of the forum state, such as the commission
of human rights abuses  against the forum state’s nationals. Accordingly, the
basic test for distinguishing between immune and nonimmune transactions
should not be whether the state conduct is public or private, as the theory of
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restrictive immunity requires, but whether such conduct would substantially harm
the vital interests of the forum state.  Within these parameters, the forum state
can more accurately define its domestic state immunity laws in accordance with
customary international law requirements.
Although the forum state has wide discretion to modify its state immunity laws so
as to provide better judicial access to human rights victims, certain important
limitations still condition the forum state’s approach. First, any changes in
domestic state immunity policy must be consistent with the international rules of
adjudicatory jurisdiction. Since state immunity, as a threshold matter, is an
exception to adjudicatory jurisdiction, the absence of jurisdiction over state
conduct would eliminate the state immunity question altogether.  Thus, when
opening up domestic courts to human rights litigation, it is necessary to ensure
maintenance of an appropriate connection between the dispute and the forum
state under international law.
Second, the forum state, like the foreign state, belongs to a community of states
and must abide by community rules, the rules of international law. For example,
several principles restraining state behavior are enshrined in the United Nations
Charter; they include, among others, the obligation to uphold the principles of
sovereign independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the protection
of human rights. Thus, any alteration in state immunity law that unjustifiably
endangers peaceful relations may be unlawful. This consideration would
preclude, for example, collusion between the forum state and the defendant state
to commit a crime that is mutually beneficial to them but outlawed by international
law.  Additional obligations will likely arise out of international agreements to
which the forum state is a party or out of customary international law.
Applying the Theory of Collective State Benefit
Two recent developments in state immunity law, in the United States and
Greece, exemplify the legitimate restrictions on immunity that states seeking to
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advance human rights litigation may impose in accordance with the theory of
collective state benefit. As mentioned above, in 1996 the U.S. Congress
amended the FSIA by creating an additional exception to the immunity of certain
foreign states for a limited range of human rights violations.  Notably, the newest
FSIA exception requires no territorial connection to the United States.  Instead,
jurisdiction is predicated on the American nationality of the victim or the claimant.
The new exception is consistent with the theory of collective state benefit in that it
stands to protect one of the most vital interests of the democratic state, the well-
being of its citizenry.  Indeed, the scope of the exception could arguably be
broader, consistent with the theory, and could extend to a broader class of
potential foreign state defendants, not only those designated as sponsors of
terrorism.
The second development is the Greek Supreme Court’s decision in Prefecture of
Voiotia, discussed earlier,  which held the Federal Republic of Germany liable for
Nazi acts of aggression against the civilian population of southern Greece. In
addition to its misguided acceptance of the normative hierarchy theory, the case
is notable for its advancement of the so-called torts exception to immunity. As
indicated above, the Court ruled that “national courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate damages, including compensation for offenses against people or
property that took place in the territory of the forum by organs of a foreign country
that was present in the territory when the offense took place, even if it was acta
jure imperii.”  In this regard, Prefecture of Voiotia not only adds to the corpus of
law defining the torts exception to immunity, but also contributes to the growing
consensus that such an exception has application even in cases of abuse of
sovereign power.
The second contribution of Prefecture of Voiotia, really an extension of the first, is
its recognition that even in the field of armed conflict a state is not immune when
it abuses its official power to the detriment of citizens of the forum state. The
Court noted that the commentary to Article 12 of the ILC draft articles, Article 31
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of the European Convention, and section 16(2) of the UK State Immunity Act all
indicate a rule of customary international law that entitles states to immunity in
regard to military activity.  The Court determined, however, that this rule
contained a significant exception “for damages arising from crimes, such as
crimes against humanity, that affect, not necessarily as a consequence of war,
particular civilians, not civilians at large and which civilians have no connection
with that armed conflict during military occupation.”  In the context of that case,
the Court concluded: “[T]here is no state immunity from criminal acts of the
organs of the occupying power that take place by abusing their sovereign power
as reprisals for acts of resistance movements against innocent and
nonparticipant persons.”  The Court continued:
[T]he torts in question (murders that also constitute crimes against humanity)
were directed against specific persons limited in number who resided in a
specific place, who had nothing to do with the resistance activity resulting in the
death of German soldiers taking part in a terror operation against the local
population…. [They were] hideous murders that objectively were not necessary
in order to maintain the military occupation of the area or subdue the
underground action, carried out in the territory of the forum by organs of the
German Third Reich in an abuse of sovereign power.
Prefecture of Voiotia conforms with the theory of collective state benefit for many
of the same reasons as the 1996 FSIA amendment. The infliction of wanton
terror on Greek civilians by the Nazis during World War II was a direct affront to
the vital interest of Greece, the forum state. Regardless of the label it bears,
sovereign, military, jure imperii, or otherwise, a foreign state’s unlawful killing of
the forum state’s civilians destroys bilateral relations between forum and foreign
state and may even jeopardize the security and stability of the community of
states. Thus, putting aside its endorsement of the normative hierarchy theory,
Prefecture of Voiotia represents a legitimate solution to the human rights litigation
problem.
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Taken together, the 1996 FSIA amendment and Prefecture of Voiotia
demonstrate that progress can be made in resolving the human rights litigation
problem in a manner consistent with the true nature of the doctrine of foreign
state immunity. That is to say that the forum state, through the agent it
designates to create and interpret foreign state immunity law (the U.S. Congress
in the case of the 1996 amendment and the Hellenic Supreme Court in the case
of Prefecture of Voiotia), is empowered to modify foreign state immunity law to an
extent consistent with the theory of collective state benefit. These developments
further show that such modifications are possible in two very different legal
settings: the 1996 amendment arose in a common law country with national
immunity legislation, while Prefecture of Voiotia resulted from the jurisprudential
application of international law in a civil law country without national immunity
legislation.
11.6 CONCLUSION
State immunity is the product of a conflict between two international law
principles, sovereign equality and adjudicatory jurisdiction, which conflict is
resolved more persuasively in favor of adjudicatory jurisdiction. Thus, state
immunity exists as an exception to the overriding principle of adjudicatory
jurisdiction.
The awkward development of the doctrine of foreign state immunity in the
twentieth century, which derived from the myth that states once enjoyed absolute
immunity from suit, has, however, distorted the perception of how state immunity
operates. Today, the prevailing formulation of state immunity laws improperly
reverses the presumption of adjudicatory jurisdiction by establishing a catchall
rule of immunity. Consequently, in many national jurisdictions state immunity
laws grant foreign state defendants more protection than customary international
law requires.
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With respect to certain core state conduct, the practice of waiving adjudicatory
jurisdiction has crystallized into a rule of customary international law binding on
states. While the existence of a rule of customary international law concerning
state immunity is firmly established, the exact scope of this rule is difficult to
discern. Nevertheless, despite uncertainty at the edges, sufficient evidence
testifies that customary international law does not compel immunity protections
for state conduct that violates human rights. Any immunity that a foreign state
receives for such conduct is solely conferred by domestic laws.
The normative hierarchy theory offers an unpersuasive solution to the human
rights litigation problem. The theory assumes a clash of international law norms
of human rights and state immunity that, in fact, does not occur. There is no
international norm of state immunity that shields foreign states from human rights
litigation and, even if there were, the normative hierarchy theory fails to explain
persuasively how human rights norms can trump state immunity norms when the
two types of norms govern mutually exclusive types of state conduct. The real
source of the human rights litigation problem is the forum state’s failure to
exercise its right of adjudicatory jurisdiction with respect to human rights cases.
However, this problem is rather difficult to resolve on a theory of normative
hierarchy, as the real conflict may involve a clash of two peremptory norms of
international law, human rights and adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Finally, because state immunity is at its root an exception to the overriding
principle of adjudicatory jurisdiction, the forum state may exercise its right of
adjudicatory jurisdiction to curtail any excess state immunity privileges that do not
emanate from international law, including protections for human rights violations.
A theory of collective state benefit guides the process of repealing extraneous
immunity protections and draws the line between immune and nonimmune
conduct more appropriately than the normative hierarchy theory. On the
collective state benefit theory, state conduct that fails to enhance interstate
646
relations, particularly between the forum state and the foreign state, does not
warrant immunity protection. The clearest example of this kind of conduct is
activity by the foreign state defendant that harms the vital interests of the forum
state, such as abuse of the citizens of the forum state.
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CHAPTER 12
GENERAL AUGUSTO PINOCHET CASE: JURISPRUDENTIAL MILESTONE
Individual accountability for crimes of international law is a topic which recently
has gained considerable momentum. It should thus be of little surprise that the
legal proceedings, currently under way in the United Kingdom, for the extradition
to Spain of the former head of state of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet Duarte,
have spurred a wave of interest which goes well beyond academic circles and
reaches out to the world public opinion at large. Inevitably, the numerous legal
facets of the case have been largely overshadowed by the highly sensitive
political aspects of the matter. In fact, the Pinochet case should be a cause for
international lawyers to inquire afresh whether former heads of state and other
state officials may be held responsible before the municipal courts of a foreign
state for acts, qualified as criminal under international law, which have allegedly
been committed when they were in post. In essence, this is the query around
which the recent decision of the House of Lords in the Pinochet case revolves.
1320
Although the Law Lords were bound to apply the relevant provisions of the State
Immunity Act, which regulates the jurisdictional immunities of foreign states and
their organs in the United Kingdom, international law played a crucial role in the
interpretation of the municipal statute. The interplay of municipal law and
international law has long secured the adjustment of the doctrine of jurisdictional
immunities to the changing demands of the international community. Recent
attempts to resort to municipal courts for the adjudication of cases involving
issues of state or individual responsibility for serious violations of international
law call for a reassessment of this interaction. In particular, due heed should be
paid to the issue of whether municipal courts may aptly complement international
1320 House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others
(Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent)(On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench
Division); Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others
(Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) (On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench
Division) (No. 3), Judgment of 24 March 1999, reported as R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and
others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and others intervening) (No. 3) in [1999] 2 All
E.R. 97 [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2)].
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law enforcement mechanisms whenever this is necessary to foster those
common interests and values which are perceived as fundamental by the
international community as a whole.
Little, if any, doubt exists that the charges originally brought by Spain against
General Pinochet are of the utmost gravity. Genocide, torture, hostage-taking
and murder on a massive and systematic scale attain the status of crimes of
international law either via customary or treaty law.1321 Nor is the principle of
individual criminal responsibility under international law any longer disputed.1322
What remains controversial is whether the domestic courts of a foreign state are
a proper forum for prosecuting individuals for crimes of international law and, if
so, what immunity, if any, should be granted to former heads of state. While there
is a concordance of views among scholars and many provisions can be traced in
the statutes and recent practice of international tribunals to the effect that no plea
of immunity is available in case of crimes of international law, the case law of
domestic courts is scant and hardly conclusive on the point. Most cases concern
civil suits brought against individuals whose states have either waived their
immunity or even acted as plaintiffs in the relevant legal proceedings. Also the
cognate doctrine of act of state or non-justiciability, alternatively referred to by
some Law Lords as a possible bar to criminal proceedings against General
Pinochet in the United Kingdom, is worth addressing. In particular, the availability
of a plea of non-justiciability in cases concerning the responsibility of individuals
for crimes of international law must be the object of careful scrutiny as it may
considerably restrain the role of municipal jurisdictions in enforcing applicable
rules of international law.
1321 See, inter alia, S. R. Ratner and J. S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in
International Law (1997); L. S. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law (1997); J. J.
Paust et al., International Criminal Law (1996); M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International
Criminal Law (1992); L. S. Sunga, Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human
Rights Violations (1991).
1322 See by this author, ‘Individual Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity. Reckoning with the Past,
Thinking of the Future’, 19 SAIS Review (1999), at 223 et seq.
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The remarkable impact which the decision will most likely have on the future
development of a fair and comprehensive system of international criminal law
enforcement is a cause for testing its correctness against the background of
contemporary standards of international law. The aim of this paper is to address
the legal issues, sketchily outlined above, with a view to ascertaining whether the
House of Lords was right in interpreting international law to the effect of denying
immunity to the former head of a foreign state indicted of acts of torture and
crimes against humanity, thus allowing extradition proceedings to continue.
Before turning to the relevant issues, however, a cursory account of the legal
proceedings in the United Kingdom may be apt.
12.1 Legal Proceedings in the UK: the Interaction of Municipal and International
Law
A The High Court Decision
As is well known, General Pinochet entered the United Kingdom in September
1997. Just before his return to Chile, after undertaking surgery in London, he was
arrested on the basis of two provisional arrest warrants issued by UK
magistrates, at the request of Spanish courts,1323 pursuant to the European
Convention on Extradition.1324 General Pinochet’s counsel immediately moved
to have the two arrest warrants quashed by the High Court. On 28 October the
Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division ruled1325 that the first arrest
warrant was bad as the crimes for which extradition had been requested by
Spain were not extradition crimes under the UK Extradition Act.1326 As regards
1323 The first provisional warrant had been issued, on the basis of the 1989 Extradition Act, by Mr Nicholas
Evans, a Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate on 16 October 1998. The allegations concerned the murder of
Spanish citizens in Chile, which offences were within the jurisdiction of Spain. The second provisional
arrest warrant was issued by another Stipendiary Magistrate, Mr Ronald Bartle. This time more offences
were alleged, including conspiracy to commit acts of torture, hostage-taking and conspiracy to murder.
1324 European Convention on Extradition, 1957, incorporated in the UK by the European Convention on
Extradition Order 1990 (SI 1507 of 1990) as amended.
1325 The High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Divisional Court, In the Matter of an Application
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjicendum. Re: Augusto Pinochet Duarte, 28 October, 1998, reproduced
in 38 ILM (1999) 68.
650
the second arrest warrant, the Lord Chief Justice held that General Pinochet was
immune from jurisdiction as the acts that he had allegedly committed were official
acts performed in the exercise of his functions of head of state. The legal basis of
the decision was Section 20 of the UK State Immunity Act, which grants to heads
of states the same privileges and immunities as those conferred on the heads of
diplomatic missions under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
incorporated by reference into the Act and applicable ‘with necessary
modifications’ to heads of states.1327 Particularly relevant to the instant case
was Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention which, with the necessary
adjustments to the position of heads of states, provides that heads of states shall
continue to be immune from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign states, once they
are no longer in post, for acts performed in the exercise of their functions as
heads of state. Lord Bingham rejected the argument that a distinction could be
made, within the category of the official acts of a head of state, between crimes
of a different gravity and, consequently, upheld the claim of immunity. In his
opinion the Lord Chief Justice indirectly relied on the decision of the English
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) in Al Adsani v. Government of Kuwait1328 to state
that if a state is entitled to immunity for acts of torture, it should not be surprising
that the same immunity is enjoyed by a head of state. Justice Collins, concurring
in the Lord Chief Justice’s opinion, added that ‘history shows that it has indeed
on occasions been state policy to exterminate or to oppress particular groups’
and that he could see ‘no justification for reading any limitation based on the
nature of the crimes committed into the immunity which exists’.1329 The
quashing of the second warrant, however, was stayed, as the Court granted
leave to appeal to the House of Lords, certifying as a point of law of general
1326 According to the principle of double criminality, an extradition crime is an act which is criminal in
both the requesting and the requested state. Since the murder of a British citizen by a non-British citizen
outside the United Kingdom would not constitute an offence in respect of which the UK could claim
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the murder of Spanish citizens by non-Spanish citizens in Chile cannot be
qualified as an extradition crime.
1327 Part I of the SIA was deemed inapplicable to criminal proceedings under Art. 16(4), which expressly
excludes criminal proceedings from the scope of application of Part I. Also the House of Lords agreed on
this construction.
1328 Decision of 12 March 1996, reported in 107 ILR 536.
1329 See para. 80 of the High Court’s judgment.
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public importance ‘the proper interpretation and scope of the immunity enjoyed
by a former head of state from arrest and extradition proceedings in the United
Kingdom in respect of acts committed while he was head of state’.1330
B The First Ruling by the House of Lords
The House of Lords on 25 November 1998 reversed the lower court’s ruling and
held, by a three to two decision, that a former head of state is not entitled to
immunity for such acts as torture, hostage-taking and crimes against humanity,
committed while he was in his post.1331 Lord Nicholls, in whose opinion Lord
Hoffman concurred, held that international law, in the light of which domestic law
has to be interpreted,1332 ‘has made it plain that certain types of conduct . . . are
not acceptable on the part of anyone’ and that ‘the contrary conclusion would
make a mockery of international law’.1333 In the view of Lord Nicholls, General
1330 Ibid, at para. 88.
1331 House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others
(Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent)(On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench
Division); Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others
(Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent)(On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench
Division), Judgment of 25 November 1998, 37 ILM (1998) 1302 [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 1)].
For a comment see Fox, ‘The First Pinochet Case: Immunity of a Former Head of State’, 48 ICLQ (1999)
207. The House of Lords took into account also the formal request of extradition transmitted by the Spanish
Government on 6 November to the UK Government. In the official request further charges were added,
including genocide, mass murders, enforced disappearances, acts of torture and terrorism. The Spanish
Audiencia Nacional had upheld Spanish jurisdiction over the above offences on the basis of the Ley
Organica del Poder Judicial of 1985, Art. 23 of which allows Spanish courts to exercise jurisdiction over
crimes committed by Spanish or foreign citizens outside Spain when such crimes can qualify, under
Spanish law, as genocide, terrorism or any other crime which, according to international treaties or
conventions, must be prosecuted in Spain. The ruling of the Audiencia Nacional sitting in plenary was
rendered on 30 October 1998 and the reasoning of the court was released on November 5 (the judgment can
be retrieved from the Internet at the following site: ,http://www.elpais.es/p/d/especial/auto/ chile.htm. (10
Nov. 1998)). The same conclusion was reached by the Audiencia Nacional as regards prosecution in Spain
of crimes committed in Argentina at the time of the military junta (the judgment can be retrieved from the
Internet at the following site: ,http://www.elpais.es/p/d/especial/auto/ argenti.htm. (10 Nov. 1998). The two
decisions as well as Judge Garzon’s extradition order were promptly published in Spain: El caso de España
contra las dictaduras Chilena y Argentina (1998).
1332 See Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529. It is of note that also Lord
Slynn of Hadley referred to Trendtex to state that the principle of immunity should be evaluated in the light
of the developments of international law relating to international crimes (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 1), supra
note 12, at 1311).
1333 Ibid, at 1333. Lord Nicholls limited his analysis to torture and hostage-taking.The relevant international
conventions have been incorporated into the UK legal system respectively by the Criminal Justice Act 1988
and the Taking of Hostages Act 1982.
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Pinochet was not immune under Section 20 of the SIA, as the Act confers
immunity only in respect of acts performed in the exercise of functions ‘which
international law recognises as functions of a head of state, irrespective of the
terms of his domestic constitution’. Nor was he entitled to any customary
international law doctrine of residual immunity, potentially covering all state
officials, for acts of torture and hostage-taking, ‘outlawed as they are by
international law, cannot be attributed to the state to the exclusion of personal
liability’. Finally, both the Torture and Hostage-Taking Conventions permit the
extraterritorial exercise of criminal jurisdiction by municipal courts. On a similar
line of reasoning Lord Steyn maintained that genocide, torture, hostage-taking
and crimes against humanity, condemned by international law, clearly amount to
conduct falling beyond the functions of a head of state.1334 By contrast, the two
dissenting Law Lords held that it is not right to distinguish ‘between acts whose
criminality and moral obliquity is more or less great’ and that the test is ‘whether
the conduct in question was engaged under colour of or in ostensible exercise of
the Head of State’s public authority’.1335 Consequently, ‘where a person is
accused of organizing the commission of crimes as the head of the government,
in cooperation with other governments, and carrying out those crimes through the
agency of the police and the secret service, the inevitable conclusion is that he
was acting in a sovereign capacity’.1336 Lord Lloyd basically agreed with the
construction offered by Lord Bingham that the only  meaningful distinction for the
purpose of head of state immunity is that between private acts and official acts
performed in the execution or under colour of sovereign authority. A former head
of state would be entitled to immunity for the latter acts under both common law
and statutory law, as the acts in question were clearly of a governmental
character. Lord Slynn of Hadley admitted the possibility that the immunity ratione
materiae retained by a former head of state after ceasing service could be
1334 Ibid, at 1338.
1335 Ibid, at 1309 (Lord Slynn). The latter quote is from Watts, ‘The Legal Position in International Law of
Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers’, 247 RdC (1994), at 56.
1336 Ibid, at 1323 (Lord Lloyd). Part of the allegations against General Pinochet concerned his coordinating,
in cooperation with other governments, the so-called ‘Operation Condor’, aimed at the systematic
repression of political opponents.
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affected by the emerging notion of individual crimes of international law. He
added, however, that this could be so only to the extent that an international
convention clearly defines the crime and gives national courts jurisdiction over it,
and that the convention, which must, expressly or impliedly, exclude the
immunity of the head of state, is incorporated by legislation in the UK.1337
On 10 December, the Home Secretary issued an authority to proceed in order to
allow the continuation of extradition proceedings. In doing so he said to have had
regard to such relevant considerations as the health of General Pinochet, the
passage of time since the commission of the alleged acts and the political
stability of Chile. While denying authority to proceed on the charge of
genocide,1338 the Home Secretary stated that all the other charges alleged in
the Spanish request of extradition amounted to extradition crimes and were not
of a political character.1339
C The Rehearing of the Case and the New Judgment of the House of Lords
On 17 December 1998 the House of Lords decided to set aside its prior
judgment, on the grounds that Lord Hoffman, who cast the deciding vote, by
failing to disclose his ties to Amnesty International, which, incidentally, had been
admitted as an intervener in the proceedings,1340 was disqualified from
1337 Ibid, at 1313–1314 (Lord Slynn). Lord Slynn found nothing in international conventions and UK
implementing legislation which could take away immunity. Art. 4 of the Genocide Convention which
clearly does so as regards ‘constitutionally responsible leaders’ was not incorporated into UK law, whereas
neither the Torture Convention nor the Hostage-Taking Convention contain any express exclusion of
immunity for heads of states.
1338 Interestingly enough, the Spanish National Audience in upholding the jurisdiction of Spanish courts
over the alleged acts of genocide had interpreted broadly the definition of the expression ‘genocide’ in the
Genocide Convention. After stating, generally, that ‘[s]in distingos, es un crimen contra la humanidad la
ejecución de acciones destinadas a exterminar a un grupo humano, sean cuales sean las caracteristícas
diferenciadoras del grupo’, the Court interpreted the Convention systematically within the broader context
of the logic of the international legal system and held that the genocide ‘no puede excluir, sin razón en la
lógica del sistema, a determinados grupos diferenciados nacionales, discriminándoles respecto de otros’.
Therefore, also acts committed against ‘aquellos ciudadanos que no respondían al tipo prefijado por los
promotores de la represion como proprio del orden nuevo a instaurar en el pays’ could be qualified as
genocide (see El caso de España, supra note 12, at 313–316).
1339 The Home Secretary acted pursuant to section 7(4) of the Extradition Act 1989.
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sitting.1341 A new hearing before a panel of seven Law Lords was scheduled
and, eventually, on 24 March 1999, the House of Lords rendered its decision on
the case.1342 By a majority of six to one, the House of Lords in a lengthy and
rather convoluted judgment held that General Pinochet was not immune for
torture and conspiracy to commit torture as regards acts committed after 8
December 1988, when the UK ratification of the Torture Convention, following the
coming into force of section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 implementing
the Convention, took effect. The second judgment of the House of Lords
profoundly differs from the previous one for the treatment given to two issues: the
qualification of extradition crimes and the role that some of the Law Lords
attributed to the Torture Convention for the purpose of denying immunity to
General Pinochet.1343 On the one hand, the international law question of which
critical date is relevant for the double criminality principle was solved by
interpreting the applicable provisions of the Extradition Act to the effect of
requiring that the alleged conduct constituted an offence in both the requesting
and the requested state at the date of the actual conduct. While Lord Bingham
for the Divisional Court and Lord Lloyd in the first ruling of the House of
Lords,1344 had held that the critical date was the date of the request of
extradition, the large majority of the Law Lords sitting in the second Appellate
Committee agreed that the critical date was the date of the actual conduct.1345
Besides being contrary to the wording of the Extradition Act and to settled
practice,1346 this interpretation had the effect of remarkably narrowing down the
1340 Lord Hoffman chaired the charitable arm of Amnesty International in the UK (Amnesty (Charity)
International Ltd.): see The Times, 8 December 1998.
1341 The Times, 18 December 1998. The opinions of the Lords of Appeal are reproduced in 38 ILM (1999)
430.
1342 Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2), supra note 1.
1343 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 10 December 1984, 23
ILM (1984) 1027, as modified 24 ILM (1985) 535.
1344 Ex Parte Pinochet (High Court), Lord Bingham, at para. 44; Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 1), Lord Lloyd, at
1318. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated, probably at the first hearing it was conceded that all the charges
against General Pinochet were extradition crimes.
1345 Lord Browne-Wilkinson reached this conclusion via a systematic interpretation of the Extradition Act
1989, also in the light of its predecessor, the Extradition Act 1870. No other Law Lords objected to this
construction.
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number of offences for which General Pinochet can be extradited.1347 Since
torture only became an extraterritorial offence after the entry into force of section
134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, alleged acts of torture and conspiracies to
commit torture outside the UK before that time did not constitute an offence
under UK law.1348 Therefore, they could not be qualified as extradition crimes
under the principles of double criminality. Only Lord Millett maintained that UK
courts would have jurisdiction at common law over acts of torture from a much
earlier date, when international law recognized that such acts could be
prosecuted by any state on the basis of universal jurisdiction.1349
On the issue of immunity, only Lord Goff of Chieveley, entirely endorsing Lord
Slynn’s opinion in the first ruling, held that General Pinochet enjoyed immunity. In
particular, Lord Goff maintained that nothing in the Torture Convention could be
construed as an express waiver of state immunity. Nor could such a waiver be
1346 On the double criminality principle see G. Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law (1991) at 47 et seq. See
also M. C. Bassiouni, International Extradition. United States Law and Practice (1996), stating that for the
purpose of double criminality US and Swiss law do not require that the relevant conduct be criminal in both
the requesting and the requested state at the time the alleged crime was committed (at 391–392). On UK
extradition law see A. Jones, Jones on Extradition (1995).
1347 A schedule of the charges against General Pinochet had been prepared by Alun Jones of the Crown
Prosecution Service. The charges are analysed and discussed in detail in Lord Hope’s opinion (Ex Parte
Pinochet (HL 2) at 132b et seq.). Only charges of torture and conspiracy to commit torture after 29
September 1988 (the date in which Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act came into force) were thought
to be extradition crimes (charges 2 and 4 of the above schedule) as well as a single act of torture alleged in
charge 30. Also the charge of conspiracy in Spain to murder in Spain (charge 9) and such conspiracies in
Spain to commit murder in Spain, and such conspiracies in Spain prior to 29 September 1988 to commit
acts of torture in Spain, as can be shown to form part of the allegations in charge 4, were deemed to be
extradition crimes. The majority, however, held Pinochet immune for such acts. As to the charges related to
hostage-taking (charge 3), Lord Hope found them not to be within the scope of the Taking of Hostages Act
1982, as the relevant statutory offence consists of taking and detaining a person to compel somebody else
to do or to abstain from doing something, whereas the charges alleged that the person detained was to be
forced to do something under threat to injure other parties (which is exactly the opposite of the statutory
offence). It might be worth remembering that the charges of genocide were not the object of discussion as
the Home Secretary had refused to issue an authority to proceed as regards those charges.
1348 No one argued that section 134 could operate retrospectively so as to make torture committed outside
the UK before the coming into force of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 a crime under UK law.
1349 Lord Millett held that the jurisdiction of English courts, although mainly statutory, is supplemented by
the common law. Therefore, ‘English courts have and always have had extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction
in respect of crimes of universal jurisdiction under customary international law’, including ‘the systematic
use of torture on a large scale and as an instrument of state policy’ which had already attained the status of
an international crime of universal jurisdiction. Eventually, Lord Millett yielded to the view of the majority
and proceeded on the basis that Pinochet could not be extradited for acts of torture committed prior to the
coming into force of section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act. (Ex PartePinochet (HL 2) at LI 78b–d).
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reasonably implied.1350 The other Law Lords, albeit on different grounds, found
non-immunity in the circumstances of the case. In particular, Lord Browne
Wilkinson, the presiding Law Lord, after stating that the prohibition of torture
became ‘a fully constituted international crime’ only by the adoption of the Torture
Convention, which set up a ‘worldwide universal jurisdiction’,1351 held that the
‘notion of continued immunity for ex-heads of state is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Torture Convention’ and that torture, as defined in the
Convention, ‘cannot be a state function’.1352 Therefore, starting from the
1350 Besides finding no trace in the travaux preparatoires of discussions concerning the waiver of state
immunity, Lord Goff’s stance against immunity heavily relied on policy considerations. The fear of
malicious allegations against heads of state, particularly of powerful countries in which they often perform
an executive role, should cause one to be cautious in ruling out immunity. By way of example, Lord Goff
cites the possibility that a Minister of the Crown or other lower public official may be sued on allegations
of acts of torture in Northern Ireland in countries supportive of the IRA. Furthermore, the scope of the rule
of state immunity would be limited to what he considers exceptional cases, such as when the offender is
found in a third state or in a state where one of its nationals was a victim, the more frequent occurrence
being that the offence is committed in the national state of the offender, in which case the latter would have
no immunity (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 128–129a).
1351 Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s reasoning is not deprived of ambiguities. After recognizing that torture on a
large scale is a crime against humanity which has attained the status of jus cogens (relying on Prosecutor v.
Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95–17/1-T, Trial Chamber of the ICTY, Judgment of 10 December 1998,
reproduced in 38 ILM (1999) 317 para. 153) and which justifies states in taking jurisdiction on the basis of
the universality principle, he said that he doubted that before the entry into force of the Torture Convention
‘the existence of the international crime of torture as jus cogens was enough to justify the conclusion that
the organization of state torture could not rank for immunity purposes as performance of an official
function’ (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 14 et seq.). This reasoning is inherently flawed. If one characterizes
— as Lord Browne-Wilkinson does — the prohibition of torture on a large scale as a jus cogens norm, the
inevitable conclusion is that no other treaty or customary law rule, including the rules on jurisdictional
immunities, can derogate from it. Another aspect in Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s opinion which remains
rather unclear is what he means by saying that the crime of torture did not become ‘a fully constituted
international crime’ until the Torture Convention set up a system of ‘worldwide universal jurisdiction’ (via
the joint operation of Articles 5, 6 and 7). The tautology inherent in the argument is apparent: on the one
hand a crime against humanity would entail universal jurisdiction, on the other only when universal
jurisdiction can be established over it would an offence become an international
crime. A much more coherent argument would have been that torture on a large scale as a crime against
humanity entails universal jurisdiction, whereas single acts of torture have become a crime and are subject
to universal jurisdiction only via the Torture Convention (see the reasoning of Lord Millett). No such
distinction, however, appears in Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s opinion.
1352 Among the reasons for holding that acts of torture cannot be qualified as a function of a head of state,
Lord Browne-Wilkinson mentioned the following: i) international law cannot regard as official conduct
something which international law itself prohibits and criminalizes; ii) a constituent element of the
international crime of torture is that it must be committed ‘by or with the acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity’. It would be unacceptable if the head of state escaped liability
on grounds of immunity while his inferiors who carried out his orders were to be held liable; iii) immunity
ratione materiae applies to all state officials who have been involved in carrying out the functions of the
state; to hold the head of state immune from suit would also make other state officials immune, so that
under the Torture Convention torture could only be punished by the national state of the official (Ex Parte
Pinochet (HL 2) at 114J–115a–e).
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moment in which the UK became party to the Convention, Spain and Chile
having already ratified it, all the parties involved had agreed to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of torture committed by or with the
acquiescence of state officials.1353 On a similar line of reasoning, Lord Hope of
Craighead held that Chile had lost its right to object to the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the UK upon its ratification of the Convention, which would prevent
the parties from invoking immunity ratione materiae ‘in the event of allegations of
systematic or widespread torture’.1354 Both Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord
Hope followed Lord Slynn’s analysis,1355 their views departing from his only as
regards the impact of the Torture Convention on the rule of immunity ratione
materiae. Lord Saville concurred in holding that the provisions of the Torture
Convention are inconsistent with immunity, which, consequently, is inapplicable
to the conduct in question, at least in the reciprocal relations among the
parties.1356 Lord Hutton found that acts of torture, already outlawed by
international law at the time of adoption of the Torture Convention, are not
amenable within the functions of a head of state and that ‘there is no waiver
1353 See Art. 1 of the Torture Convention. The Convention entered into force on 26 June 1987. Spain
ratified on 21 October 1987, Chile on 30 September 1988 and the UK on 8 December 1988.
1354 Immunity ratione materiae would shield General Pinochet as regards the other charges. Lord Hope
qualifies as an international crime divesting a former head of state of his immunity only systematic or
widespread torture. Only such an offence would attain the status of jus cogens, compelling states to refrain
from such conduct under any circumstances and imposing an obligation erga omnes to punish this conduct.
Although state torture was already at the time of the early allegations against General Pinochet an
international crime under customary international law it was not until the Torture Convention, which
enabled states to assume jurisdiction over such offences, that ‘it was no longer open to any state which was
a signatory to the convention to invoke the immunity ratione materiae in the event of allegations of
systematic or widespread torture committed after that date being made in the courts of that state against its
officials or any other person acting in an official capacity’ (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 152c). Lord Goff’s
analysis is not entirely convincing. If one assumes, as he does, that the prohibition of systematic torture,
which most of the time requires state action, is a jus cogens rule, violations of which every state is under an
obligation to punish, it is difficult to see how such an obligation could be discharged unless domestic courts
are given the possibility of investigating, prosecuting and punishing the individuals who have committed
such heinous acts. Furthermore, it is hard to see how the distinction between systematic torture and single
instances of torture for the purpose of state immunity can be drawn on the basis of the Torture Convention.
1355 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
1356 Since the Convention prohibits so-called ‘official torture’, to Lord Saville, ‘a former head of state who
it is alleged resorted to torture for state purposes falls ….fairly and squarely within those terms’ (Ex Parte
Pinochet (HL 2) at 169J). States parties to the Convention have clearly and unambiguously accepted, in the
view of Lord Saville, that official torture can be punished ‘in a way which would otherwise amount to an
interference in their sovereignty’ (ibid, at 170c). For the same reason, Lord Saville held that also a plea
based on act of state would fail in the circumstances of the case (ibid, at 170e).
658
issue as the immunity to which Pinochet is entitled as a former head of state
does not arise in relation to, and does not attach to acts of torture’.1357 Lord
Millett’s opinion is at variance with that of his colleagues. According to Lord
Millett, universal jurisdiction existed well before the Torture Convention over
crimes committed in violation of jus cogens and which gravity and scale could be
regarded ‘as an attack on the international legal order’.1358 Relying on Eichmann
and Demjianjuk,1359 he said that any state is permitted under international law to
assert its jurisdiction over such crimes and that the commission of such crimes in
the course of one’s official duties as a responsible officer of the state and in the
exercise of his authority as an organ of that state is no bar to the exercise of
jurisdiction by a national court. The Torture Convention simply expanded the
cover of international crimes to single instances of torture, imposing on states the
obligation to exercise their jurisdiction over the crime. According to Lord Millett,
recognition of immunity would be ‘entirely inconsistent with the aims and object of
the Convention’.1360 Finally, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers held that crimes of
such gravity as to shock the consciousness of mankind cannot be tolerated by
the international community and that state immunity ratione materiae cannot
coexist with international crimes and the right of states to exercise extraterritorial
1357 (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 166e. According to Lord Hutton, although the alleged acts were carried
out by General Pinochet ‘under colour of his position as head of state… they cannot be regarded as
functions of a head of state under international law when international law expressly prohibits torture as a
measure which a state can employ in any circumstances whatsoever and has made it an international
crime.’ (ibid, at 165d) Lord Huttton, while accepting the limitation inherent in the qualification of
extradition crimes under UK law, which prevents consideration of allegations of torture prior to the coming
into force of section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act, said in dictum that ‘acts of torture were clearly crimes
against international law and that the prohibition of torture had acquired the status of jus cogens by that
date’ (ibid, at 164c). He later added that not only torture committed or instigated on a large scale but also a
single act of torture qualifies as a crime of international law.
1358 Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 177d. Lord Millett correctly notes that the very official or governmental
character of the offences characterizes crimes against humanity and that ‘large scale and systematic use of
torture and murder by state authorities for political ends had come to be regarded as an attack upon the
international legal order’ by the time General Pinochet seized power in 1973 (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at
177a).
1359 Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 ILR 5 (District Court of Jerusalem,
1961), aff’d 36 ILR 277 (Supreme Court of Israel, 1962); Demjanjiuk v. Petrovsky, 603 F. Supp. 1468,
aff’d 776 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
1360 The reasoning of Lord Millett is clear and straightforward. Since the offence can only be committed by
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity, ‘[t]he official or governmental nature of the act, which forms the basis of the immunity, is
an essential ingredient of the offence. No rational system of criminal justice can allow an immunity which
is co-extensive with the offence.’ (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 179a.)
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jurisdiction over them. While doubting that customary international law
recognizes universal jurisdiction over crimes of international law, Lord Phillips
held that on occasion states agree by way of treaty to exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction, which, once established, should not exclude acts done in an official
capacity.1361
While all the Lords agreed on the need for the Home Secretary to reconsider his
decision on allowing extradition proceedings to go ahead, in the light of the new
ruling, no one stressed that the UK has the obligation under the Torture
Convention either to extradite General Pinochet to Spain or to any other country
that has submitted an extradition request or to refer the case to its judicial
authorities for prosecution in the UK.1362 On 15 April the Home Secretary issued
an authority to proceed, thus allowing extradition proceedings to continue with
regard to the remaining charges.1363
D A Tentative Appraisal
Given the impact that the Pinochet case may have on the future development of
the law of jurisdiction and jurisdictional immunities, a tentative appraisal of the
way in which the House of Lords interpreted the relevant rules of international
law pertaining to the case may be useful. While the decision of the House of
Lords turns mainly on the application of UK law, the extensive reliance of the Law
Lords on international law arguments for construing municipal law makes such
1361 Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 188J and 189a–b. Lord Phillips of Matravers found that no rule of
international law requiring states to grant immunity ratione materiae for crimes of international law can be
traced in state practice. Lord Phillips was the only one to object to the construction of section 20 of the SIA
being applicable to acts of the head of state wherever committed. He held that the provision had to be
interpreted simply to the effect of equating the position of a visiting head of state with that of the head of a
diplomatic mission in the UK. In fact, other Law Lords had considered the issue but eventually found in the
light of parliamentary history that the original intent to limit section 20 to heads of state ‘in the United
Kingdom at the invitation or with the consent of the Government of the United Kingdom’ had been
superseded by an amendment of the Government. Lord Phillips maintained that the relevant statutory
provision should be interpreted against the background of international law and consequently be limited to
visiting heads of state (ibid, at 191–192).
1362 The obligation is imposed by the joint operation of Art. 7 and Art. 5. By the end of 1998 several states,
including Switzerland, France and Belgium, had submitted requests of extradition to the UK.
1363 See The Times, 16 April 1999.
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an endeavour a legitimate exercise. Indeed, recourse to international law for
interpreting domestic law is the first noticeable feature of the case.1364 The
somewhat convoluted reasoning of some of the individual opinions, the frequent
lack of clarity in framing the relevant issues as well as occasional incongruities in
construing and presenting arguments should not overshadow the willingness of
the Law Lords to decide the case consistently with international law standards.
Secondly, the principle that individuals may be held accountable for acts which
are regarded as criminal at international law was clearly asserted. Whether
individual responsibility may be enforced before foreign municipal courts was
thought to be an issue to be determined in casu, depending on the nature of the
crime as well as on relevant international and municipal law provisions
concerning enforcement, but the very outcome of the case proves that this may
occur. Yet another important finding to be derived from the House of Lords
decisions is that contrary to what the High Court had held, a distinction can be
aptly drawn at international law between the wrongful acts of state organs and
acts which for their gravity can be regarded as crimes of international law.
Different consequences would be attached to the latter under international law,
particularly as regards the permissibility of the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction over them and the inapplicability of immunity ratione materiae before
international tribunals and, under certain circumstances, before foreign municipal
courts. Overall, the frequent reference to such notions as jus cogens, obligations
erga omnes and crimes of international law attests to the fact that the emerging
notion of an international public order based on the primacy of certain values and
common interests is making its way into the legal culture and common practice of
municipal courts.
As regards the issue of immunity more specifically, a large majority of the Law
Lords agreed that, while current heads of state are immune ratione personae
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts, both civil and criminal, a plea of immunity
ratione materiae in criminal proceedings may be of no avail to former heads of
state depending on the nature of the crime. While the majority in the first
1364 See Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia [1984] AC 580, 597 per Lord Diplock. See also the reliance of
some Law Lords on Trendtex Trading Co. v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529 for the relevance of
customary international law.
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Appellate Committee held that this is so because acts which amount to
international crimes can never be qualified as official acts performed by the head
of state in the exercise of his functions, most of the Law Lords sitting in the
second Committee confined their analysis to acts of torture. In the view of many
of them, immunity would simply be incompatible with the provisions of the Torture
Convention, which clearly indicates the official or governmental character of
torture as a constituent element of the crime. Only Lord Phillips went a step
further in saying that no rule of international law requires that immunity be
granted to individuals who have committed crimes of international law and that
the very notion of immunity ratione materiae cannot coexist with the idea that
some crimes, in light of their gravity, offend against the very foundation of the
international legal system. If one were to follow strictly the reasoning of the
majority probably the plea of immunity ratione materiae could only be defeated
by those crimes of international law which presuppose or require state action.
Arguably, this would include crimes against humanity in a wider sense.
On universal jurisdiction under international law, regardless of any treaty-based
regime, Lord Browne-Wilkinson maintained that torture on a large scale is a
crime against humanity and attains the status of jus cogens, which, in turn, would
justify the taking of jurisdiction by states over acts of torture wherever committed.
Lord Millett went as far as to say that universal jurisdiction exists under
customary international law with regard to crimes which have attained the status
of jus cogens and are so serious and on such a scale as to be regarded as an
attack on the international legal order. Lord Millett added that the increasing
number of international tribunals notwithstanding, prosecution of international
crimes by national courts ‘will necessarily remain the norm’. This latter remark
paves the way for broaching one of the most important and controversial issues
underlying the proceedings against General Pinochet.
12.2 Are Municipal Courts a Proper Forum for Prosecuting Individual Crimes of
International Law?
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A preliminary issue to be addressed concerns the long-debated issue of whether
municipal courts can be a proper forum for prosecuting crimes of international
law. This problem can be framed in the more general debate on the suitability of
municipal courts to enforce international law. As is known, some authors have
argued that municipal courts can aptly subrogate for the scant number of
enforcement mechanisms at international law.1365 Others have rightly stressed
that the extent to which municipal courts can apply international law depends,
especially in dualist countries, on how international law is incorporated into the
state’s domestic legal system.1366 Legal culture and individual judges’
backgrounds in international law are other factors which are relevant to
explaining the more or less active role that municipal courts can play in enforcing
international law in different jurisdictions.1367
Be that as it may, the case for having municipal courts adjudicate cases involving
individual crimes of international law seems compelling. Theoretical and practical
considerations mandate this solution. The very notion of crimes of international
law postulates that they constitute an attack against the international community
as a whole1368 and, therefore, any state is entitled to punish them. On a more
practical level, the absence of a permanent international criminal court makes
international prosecution merely illusory. Nor can the establishment of
international criminal tribunals by way of Security Council resolutions be an
effective strategy of enforcement.1369 Consensus within the Security Council
may be difficult to reach and the creation of ad hoc judicial bodies to deal with
1365 See, generally, B. Conforti, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal Systems (1993); R. A.
Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (1964).
1366 See A. Cassese, ‘Modern Constitutions and International Law’, 192 RdC (1985-III) 331.
1367 R. Higgins, Problems & Process. International Law and How We Use It (1994), at 206 et seq.
1368 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic´, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-96–22-T, Trial Chamber I, 29 Nov.
1996 (108 ILR 180), defining crimes against humanity as ‘…. inhumane acts that by their very extent and
gravity go beyond the limits tolerable to the international community, which must per force demand their
punishment. But crimes against humanity also transcend the individual because when the individual is
assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated. It is therefore the concept of humanity as victim
which essentially characterises crimes against humanity.’ (at 193)
1369 See SC Resolutions 808 and 827 (1993) and SC Resolution 955 respectively establishing, under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The statutes of the two tribunals are reproduced,
respectively, in 32 ILM (1993) 1192 and 33 ILM (1994) 1602.
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particular situations in specific countries entails an element of selectivity in the
enforcement of international criminal law which may seriously jeopardize its
consolidation and further development. Even with the prospective entry into force
of the International Criminal Court, the Statute of which was opened for signature
last year,1370 it would be unrealistic to expect that international criminal law can
effectively be enforced only by international tribunals. International tribunals may
play a strong symbolic role and are more likely to be perceived as an impartial
forum, but prosecution by municipal courts will remain crucial.1371 It is of note
that Article 17 of the ICC Statute somewhat defers to the jurisdiction of municipal
courts, stipulating the inadmissibility of a case when the latter is being
investigated or prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction over it or when the accused
has already been tried for the conduct which is the subject of the complaint.1372
Although the record of national prosecution of crimes of international law after the
end of World War II is far from being satisfactory, domestic courts have lately
manifested an increased activism, especially as regards the prosecution of war
crimes and violations of humanitarian law during armed conflict.1373 This
1370 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998,
A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998, reprinted in 37 ILM (1998) 999. For a comment see Arsanjani, ‘The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 93 AJIL (1999) 22.
1371 See Meron, ‘International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities’, 89 AJIL (1995) 554, at 555.
1372 The Court may determine that a state is unable or unwilling genuinely to carry out an investigation or
prosecution. Paras 2 and 3 of Art. 17 list the circumstances which the Court will take into account in
determining the unwillingness or inability of national courts to prosecute. These factors include unjustified
delays, instances in which the proceedings are not conducted independently or impartially, or when, due to
the substantial collapse or unavailability of the interested state’s judicial system, the state is unable to carry
out the proceedings.
1373 In 1997 the Supreme Court of Bavaria condemned one Mr Dzajic, a former Yugoslav national, for
abetting murder in 14 cases and for attempting murder in another case during the conflict in former
Yugoslavia (Public Prosecutor v. Dzajic, No. 20/96, Supreme Court of Bavaria, 3rd Strafsenat, May 23,
1997, excerpted in 1998 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 392, comment by Safferling in 92 AJIL (1998)
528). See also the recent case in which a Swiss military tribunal tried, on the basis of the universality
principle of jurisdiction, and eventually acquitted a former Yugoslav national, born in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, for having beaten and injured civilian prisoners at the prisoner-of-war camps of Omarska and
Keraterm in Bosnia (In re G., Military Tribunal, Division 1, Lausanne, Switzerland, April 18, 1997,
comment by Ziegler in 92 AJIL (1998) 78). A few years earlier in a decision of 25 November 1994, the
Danish High Court had convicted one Mr Saric for having committed violent acts against prisoners of war
in the Croat camp of Dretelj in Bosnia, in violation of the Geneva Conventions (see Maison, ‘Les premiers
cas d’application des dispositions penales des Conventions de Geneve par les juridictions internes’, 6 EJIL
(1995) 260).
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development has been favoured by the enactment in several jurisdictions of
statutes which expressly allow the exercise of jurisdiction over this type of
offence.1374 With specific regard to crimes against humanity, their prosecution
by domestic courts has been episodic. Despite occasional and mostly
unsuccessful attempts by some countries to investigate, prosecute and punish
individuals for crimes committed under past regimes in the same country,1375
most prosecutions have been carried out by foreign courts. Besides the well-
known Eichmann case,1376 in which the Supreme Court of Israel convicted on
charges of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity the Head of the
Jewish Office of the Gestapo, who was among the principal administrators of the
policy of extermination of the Jews in Europe, French courts convicted to life
imprisonment for crimes against humanity Klaus Barbie,1377 head of the
Gestapo in Lyons and Paul Touvier,1378 a French national heading the French
Militia in Lyons during the Vichy regime. In another interesting case, Regina v.
Finta,1379 the Canadian High Court of Justice convicted a Hungarian national for
deporting Jews during the war. The latter case is particularly interesting for it
1374 Some statutes provide for universal jurisdiction over war crimes (see Articles 109–114 of the Swiss
Military Penal Code); some are limited to crimes committed during World War II (War Crimes Act, 1991,
ch. 13, para. 1(1) (UK)); War Crimes Amendment Act, 1989 Austl. Acts No. 3, para. 9(1)(Australia); Nazi
and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710/1950, para. 1(a), as quoted in Attorney-General of the
Government of Israel v. Eichmann, supra note 40; some others are more general in character and cover also
crimes against humanity (see Articles 211–1 and 212–1 (amending the French Penal Code), in the annex to
‘Lois n. 92–684 du 22 Juillet 1992 portant reforme des dispositions du Code penal relatives a la repression
des crimes et des delits contre le personnes’, J.O., 23 Juillet, 1992, at 9875 (France)) and Sec.
6(1.91),(1.94),(1.96) of the Canadian Criminal Code permitting the prosecution of foreign persons for
crimes committed abroad against foreigners, provided that at the time of the crime Canada could exercise
its jurisdiction over that person, based on his presence in Canada, and later that person is found in Canada.
1375 See Ratner and Abrams, supra note 2, at 146 et seq. See also the current debate on the prosecution by
Cambodia of the leaders of the Khmer Rouge, who surrendered at the end of 1998, for crimes against
humanity, to which Prime Minister Hun Sen seems to have eventually consented (see Keesing’s Record of
World Events, vol. 45/1 (1999), at 42733). Under Art. VI of the Genocide Convention, to which Cambodia
is a party, there is an obligation on the part of the state in which territory the acts of genocide took place to
try the responsible persons. It should be noted that the crime of genocide is widely believed to attract
universal jurisdiction.
1376 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, supra note 40.
1377 Federation National des Deportees et Internes Resistants et Patriots and Others v. Barbie, 78 ILR 124
(French Cour de Cassation 1985); 100 ILR 330 (French Cour de Cassation 1988).
1378 100 ILR 338 (French Cour de Cassation 1992). Touvier was convicted to life imprisonment for giving
instructions for and thereby becoming an accomplice in the shooting of seven Jews at Rillieux on 29 June
1944, as a reprisal for the assassination of the Vichy Government Minister for Propaganda.
1379 Regina v. Finta, Canada, High Court of Justice, 10 July 1989, 93 ILR 424.
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establishes that any state may exercise its jurisdiction over an individual found in
its territory, irrespective of the place where the alleged offences took place, when
such offences can be categorized as crimes against humanity.1380 While not
unprecedented, the assertion of universal jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity by domestic courts is relatively rare,1381 given the wide doctrinal
consensus on its applicability under general international law.1382
The practice of enforcement, briefly summarized above, highlights the
importance of the Pinochet case, as one of the few cases not concerning the
prosecution of crimes committed during World War II either by Nazis or by Nazi
collaborators, as if the international community had deliberately chosen only to
reckon with the atrocities committed at that time. In fact, the prosecution of
crimes committed during the war has simply paved the way for consolidating the
notion of individual accountability for crimes of international law. Current
investigations concerning crimes against humanity and other human rights
violations in Chile and Argentina by European courts further attest to the
increasing activism of municipal courts in enforcing international criminal
law.1383
Mention should be made also of civil remedies as a complementary means of
enforcement of international criminal law. In some jurisdictions civil redress may
be sought by plaintiffs under particular statutes. In the United States, for
instance, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)1384 and the Torture Victim Protection
1380 Ibid, at 426–427.
1381 See Eichmann, supra note 40; In the Matter of Extradition of John Demjanjuk, 776 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir.,
1985) at 582–583, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1016 (1986). See also the quote from the decision of the Cour
d’Appel, reported by the Cour de Cassation Chambre Criminelle, in its judgment of 6 October 1983 in
Federation National des Deportees et Internes Resistants et Patriots and Others v. Barbie (78 ILR 128):
‘by reason of their nature, the crimes against humanity with which Barbie is indicted do not simply fall
within the scope of French municipal law, but are subject to an international criminal order to which the
notions of frontiers and extradition rules arising therefrom are completely foreign’.
1382 See, among others, P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th ed.,
1997), at 113; Meron, supra note 52, at 554 and 569; Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law’, 66 Texas L. Rev. (1988) 785, at 814; Restatement, infra note 72, § 404.
1383 See supra note 12.
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Act (TVPA)1385 provide such a remedy. Under the ATCA district courts have
jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations. On this basis, starting from the landmark case of
Filartiga v. Pena Irala,1386 federal courts have been able to assert their
jurisdiction over tortious conduct abroad in violation of international law,
particularly human rights abuses. The TVPA, in turn, provides a cause of action
in civil suits in the United States against individuals who, under actual or
apparent authority, or colour of law of any foreign nation, subject an individual to
torture or extrajudicial killing. The record of enforcement of the two statutes bears
witness to the willingness of municipal courts to implement the legislator’s intent
that human rights abuses be effectively punished.1387
While it is arguable that customary international law requires states to punish the
perpetrators of crimes of international law,1388 many treaties lay down the
obligation either to prosecute or extradite individuals who have committed certain
offences of universal concern.1389 It is unfortunate that too often states fail in
1384 28 U.S.C. (1994) § 1350.
1385 28 U.S.C. (1994) § 1350 note.
1386 630 F. 2d 876 (2nd Cir., 1980) and 577 F. Supp. 860 (EDNY, 1984).
1387 Cabiri v. Assasia Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (SDNY, 1996) (arbitrary detention and acts of torture);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232 (2nd Cir., 1995) (genocide, war crimes, torture, summary executions);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (DMA, 1995) (torture, arbitrary detention, summary executions and
enforced disappearance); In re, Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F. 3d 1467 (9th
Cir., 1994) (torture, summary executions, disappearances); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F. 2d 493 (9th Cir.,
1992) (torture); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (SD Florida, 1992) (torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention); Forti v. Suarez Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal., 1987)
(torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances and prolonged arbitrary detention).
1388 See Condorelli, ‘Le Tribunal Penal International pour l’Ex-Yougoslavie et sa jurisprudence’, in
Bancaja Euromediterranean, Courses of International Law, vol. I, (1997) 241, at 270. See also Paust,
‘Individual Criminal Responsibility for Human Rights Atrocities and Sanction Strategies’, 33 Tex. Int’l L.
J. (1998) 631, at 640–641.
1389 See, inter alia, the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft
(2 ILM (1963) 1042); the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Hijacking)(10 ILM (1971) 133); the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage)(10 ILM (1971) 1151); the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (16 ILM
(1977) 41); the 1976 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (15 ILM (1976) 1272); the
1998 International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (37 ILM (1998) 249). As regards
specifically terrorism, whose status as an international crime remains controversial, a thorough review of
the complex network of international treaties and other instances of state practice has been made recently
by Kolb, ‘Universal Criminal Jurisdiction in Matters of International Terrorism: Some Reflections on
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applying directly the relevant treaty provisions or in enacting implementing
legislation whenever this is necessary to enforce them. This is particularly true for
international criminal law which often requires the enactment of ad hoc criminal
rules. It would be desirable indeed that states, regardless of any particular treaty
obligation, exercised their jurisdiction over acts which by the communis opinio
are regarded as crimes of international law. Since the end of World War II states
have made it clear that certain acts are attacks against the fundamental interests
and values of the international community as a whole. If their statements are to
be taken as more than an exercise in political rhetoric, then they must bring their
legislation in conformity with international law and give domestic courts the tools
to enforce its rules.1390 The rule of statutory construction, widely applied in both
common law and civil law jurisdictions, whereby domestic law should be
interpreted as much as possible in conformity with international law, has a
potential of application which should not be underestimated.1391 As the Pinochet
case shows, the interpretation of domestic statutes in light of contemporary
standards of international law may, at least in principle, remedy domestic
legislation ambiguities and correctly implement the principles and rules of
international law which have a bearing on the case at hand.
Status and Trends in Contemporary International Law’, 50 Revue Hellenique de Droit International (1997)
42–88. It is of note that terrorism does not appear in the list of crimes over which the International Criminal
Court (see supra, note 51 and accompanying text) will have jurisdiction.
1390 Attention to this problem has been drawn also in the press commenting on the proceedings against
Pinochet: see The Economist, 28 Nov.–4 Dec. 1998, at 26.
1391 On the rule, generally, see Conforti, ‘Cours general de droit international public’, 212 RdC (1988-V)
56–57. On the application of the rule in common law countries see F. A. Mann, Foreign Affairs in English
Courts (1986), at 130; Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 1987, § 114.
In the United States this rule of statutory construction dates back to the last century: see The Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) (1804) 132, 143. On the use of international human rights law to interpret
domestic law, see Possner, ‘Recent US and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A
Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis’, 41 Hastings L. J. (1990) 824 and with
specific regard to the United Kingdom, Higgins, ‘The Role of Domestic Courts in the Enforcement of
International Human Rights: the United Kingdom’, in B. Conforti and F. Francioni (eds), Enforcing
International Human Rights
Before Domestic Courts (1997) 37.
668
12.3 What Immunity for Former Heads of State?
The immunity of heads of state in international law is a complex topic.1392 The
early view that monarchs enjoy an absolute immunity has given way to other
considerations. After the formation of modern states the position of head of state
has radically changed and nowadays it may remarkably vary depending on the
constitutional organization of the state.1393 The immunity of heads of state may
become relevant in many different ways before foreign municipal courts. It may
concern current heads of state visiting officially another country or leading an
official mission,1394 or, regardless of their physical presence in the forum state, it
may arise in connection with acts carried out by them in their own state.1395
Moreover, the issue of immunity may vary depending on the nature of their
activities and on the type of proceedings in which they are involved.1396 As
1392 The complexity of the regime was hardly acknowledged by the House of Lords. In the first ruling of the
House of Lords, all the parties agreed that current heads of state enjoy an absolute immunity. The fact that
the issue was irrelevant to the case at hand may have played a role in achieving unanimity on this point of
law. In the second ruling, perhaps for not too dissimilar reasons, the immunity enjoyed by current heads of
state was deemed to be absolute and was described as an immunity ratione personae, which pertains to the
particular status of the holder. The person of the head of state is inviolable and his conduct would be
immune from the legal process of foreign courts regardless of the public or private nature of his acts. Lord
Hope went as far as to qualify this type of immunity as a jus cogens norm (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at
149e). An immunity which is attached to the office is lost when the individual is no longer in post. All the
Law Lords agreed that after loss of office the former head of state continues to be immune for official acts
performed in the exercise of his authority as head of state. This immunity ratione materiae is of an entirely
different nature from the immunity ratione personae enjoyed by serving heads of state. Otherwise referred
to as residual or functional immunity it is meant to cover all those official activities performed by state
organs in the exercise of their functions. Such acts would be more properly attributed to the state rather
than to the individual organs who, in principle, could not be held accountable for them.
1393 See Watts, ‘The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and
Foreign Ministers’, 247 RdC (1994) 9, at 21 et seq.
1394 See the 1969 Convention on Special Missions. Heads of states are also included in the scope of
application of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons.
1395 See Re Honecker (80 ILR 365), in which the then Chairman of the Council of State of the GDR was
held to be immune as head of state of a foreign country from criminal proceedings brought in the FRG
against him on charges of arbitrary deprivation of liberty. See also Saltany v. Regan, 80 ILR 19, in which a
US District Court (DC) granted head of state immunity, upon the suggestion of the executive, to the Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom in an action in tort for personal injuries and damage to property brought by
civilian residents of Libya, in the aftermath of the US bombing of Libya. The Prime Minister of the UK had
allowed military bases in the UK to be used by US air forces for the operation against Libya. Interestingly
enough, head of state immunity was also granted in the US to Prince Charles as heir to the British throne
(Kilroy v. Windsor, 1978 Dig. U.S. Practice Int’l L. 641–643).
1396 The UK State Immunity Act makes a distinction between civil proceedings, to which the general
regime of state immunity under Part I is applicable, and criminal proceedings covered by Part III, Section
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rightly noted, this is an area of the law ‘which is in many respects still unsettled,
and on which limited state practice casts an uneven light’.1397
Even more troubling is the question of what, if any, immunity protects former
heads of state, once they lose their office. Are they still entitled to claim
immunity? If so, on what basis and for what acts should they be held immune?
Should one distinguish between private acts and official acts performed in the
exercise of their functions? Is the alleged criminal character of the acts
committed while they were in post relevant for the purpose of immunity? Can one
distinguish between offences of a different gravity? Last, would any such
immunity apply to the conduct of heads of state in particular or would it rather be
applicable to any foreign state’s official regardless of his rank? All these issues
underlined the Pinochet case. For the first time, a former head of state faced
criminal proceedings in a foreign municipal court on charges concerning crimes
of international law allegedly committed while he was the serving as head of
state of Chile. The unique character of the case may well justify the difficulties in
framing the relevant issues in their proper legal context.
As a matter of methodology, any attempt to evaluate the content of the rules
concerning the jurisdictional immunities of heads of state should be made in the
light of contemporary standards of international law. Reliance on precedents
dating back to the last century is inherently contradictory with the asserted
intention of interpreting the SIA in the light of contemporary standards of
international law. Their many peculiarities notwithstanding, the Duke of
Brunswick and Hatch cases were decided at a time when the unfettered
deference to the status of foreign sovereigns was the obvious tribute to the
20 of the Act. The legislative history of Section 20 is fairly interesting. Originally devised to equate the
position of a head of state visiting the country to that of the head of the diplomatic mission within the
country, following an amendment proposed by the executive, the words which made the Act applicable to
heads of states who were ‘in the United Kingdom at the invitation or with the consent of the Government of
the United Kingdom’ were deleted (the matter is discussed in Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s opinion). Only
Lord Phillips disagreed with the majority, saying that the conduct of a head of state outside the United
Kingdom remains governed by the rules of public international law (see supra note 42).
1397 See Watts, supra note 74, at 52.
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indisputable principle of absolute respect for state sovereignty.1398 Nor is the
argument that the slow and uncertain progress made by the doctrine of individual
crimes should yield to the long and firmly established rule of head of state
immunity particularly convincing.1399 In historical perspective, the opposite
stance should be taken.1400 While the development of the human rights doctrine
and the principle of individual responsibility for crimes of international law have
rapidly emerged as the fundamental tenets of the international community,
jurisdictional immunities of foreign states and their organs have been the object
of a process of steady erosion.
A closer look at recent practice shows that there is no clear-cut answer to the
above queries. Immunity for heads of state and lower state officials for acts
performed in the exercise of their functions has given rise to a scant and fairly
inconclusive case law. While some authority supports the view that former heads
of state would not enjoy immunity for their private acts during their term of
office,1401 few are the cases which deal with criminal conduct amenable within
1398 Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover (1848) 2 H.L. Cas. 1 (action brought by the former reigning
Duke of Brunswick against his former guardian, the reigning King of Hanover, for the latter’s involvement
in removing him from his ruling position and for the maladministration of his estate): ‘A foreign Sovereign,
coming into this country cannot be made responsible here for an act done in his Sovereign character in his
own country; whether it be an act right or wrong, whether according to the constitution of that country or
not, the Courts of this country cannot sit in judgment upon an act of a Sovereign, effected by virtue of his
Sovereign authority abroad …’; Hatch v. Baez (1876) 7 Hun. 596 (action for injury suffered at the hands of
the former President of the Dominican Republic): ‘The wrongs and injuries of which the plaintiff
complains were inflicted upon him by the Government of St. Domingo, while he was residing in that
country, and was in all respects subject to its laws. They consist of acts done by the defendant in his official
capacity of President of that Republic…. The general rule, no doubt is that all persons and property within
the territorial jurisdiction of a state are amenable to the jurisdiction of its courts. But the immunity of
individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own states, in the exercise of
the sovereignty thereof, is essential to preserve the peace and harmony of nations, and has the sanction of
the most approved writers on international law’ (at 599–600); Underhill v. Hernandez (1897) 168 U.S. 250
(action for wrongful imprisonment brought by American citizen residing in Venezuela against the former
commander of revolutionary forces which later prevailed): ‘Every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory’ (at 252).
1399 See Lord Slynn’s opinion (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 1) at 1313), subsequently endorsed by Lord Goff (Ex
Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 116h–j; 117a–d).
1400 See Lord Millett’s opinion (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 180a).
1401 Reference was made in the Pinochet case to the following cases: Ex King Farouk of Egypt v. Christian
Dior, S.A.R.L.: (1957) 24 ILR 228; Soc. Jean Desses v. Prince Farouk (1963) 65 ILR 37; Jimenez v.
Aristeguieta, 311 F. 2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962). For a complete and detailed account of the legal status of
deposed heads of state see Decaux, ‘Le Statut du Chef d’Etat Dechu’, 26 AFDI (1980) 101. Presumably,
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the range of official functions.1402 As Lord Phillips rightly stressed, it is difficult to
provide sufficient evidence that customary international law entitles a former
head of state to immunity from criminal process in respect of crimes committed in
the exercise of his official functions. Most of the existing case law is concerned
with civil proceedings and is strongly influenced by the content and interpretation
by courts of domestic codification of state immunity and related issues. In the
recent Canadian case Jaffe v. Miller, concerning an action in tort against a
foreign state’s officials for laying false criminal charges and for conspiracy to
kidnap, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that immunity should be granted to
them, otherwise state immunity could be easily circumvented by suing state
functionaries.1403 In the United Kingdom, the SIA had been recently interpreted,
in the context of civil proceedings, to the effect of granting to heads of states of
recognized states the same immunity the state has when the former act in their
official capacity, whereas when they act in their private capacity they would be
entitled to the immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents under Section 20 of the
SIA.1404
even the type of criminal acts mentioned by way of example by Lord Steyn in the first ruling of the House
of Lords (the
killing of the gardener in a fit of rage or the torturing of a person for his own pleasure) could be amenable
within the category of private acts.
1402 Counsel for Chile made reference to the case Marcos & Marcos v. Department of Police (102 ILR
198), in which a Swiss Federal Court held that public international law grants immunity to former heads of
states, even with regard to criminal acts allegedly committed while they were in power, unless the
immunity is waived by their state (which the Republic of the Philippines did in the case at hand). Perhaps
reference could have been made to the Honecker case, in which proceedings had been brought against the
former Chairman of the GDR State Council for homicide. Although the proceedings against him were
discontinued after the Supreme Constitutional Court of Berlin held that the continuation of proceedings
against a person who is expected to die before they come to an end is an infringement of the human dignity
of the defendant, the fact that he was standing trial for acts committed while he was in post can be
interpreted to the effect that he was not held immune for criminal acts performed in the exercise of his
functions (Honecker Prosecution Case (Case No. VerfGH 55/92), Federal Republic of Germany, Supreme
Constitutional Court (VerfGH) of Berlin, 12 January 1993, 100 ILR 393), although other considerations
concerning the unification of Germany may explain his not being granted immunity (see Watts, supra note
74, at 89, note 201).
1403 Jaffe v. Miller, [1993] 95 ILR 446, at 458–459.
1404 See Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd (In Liquidation) v. Price Waterhouse
(A Firm) and Others, England, High Court, Chancery Division, 5 November 1996, reported in 111 ILR
604: ‘In so far as the sovereign or head of state is acting in a public capacity on behalf of that state, he is
clothed with the immunity that the state has. When acting in this capacity, the head of state and the state
are, to some extent, indistinguishable. On the other hand, when acting in any other capacity, it is sensible
that he should have immunity equivalent to that enjoyed by the state’s diplomatic staff’ (at 610).
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In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not
expressly include provisions on heads of state and the Act has been deemed
inapplicable by American courts to heads of states. The prevailing view seems to
be that the head of state immunity is a common law doctrine applicable to the
person the United States government acknowledges as the official head of state
and that courts defer to the executive’s determination of who qualifies as a head
of state.1405 This attitude has been recently confirmed in Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran et al., holding that head of state immunity, regarded by the court
as more a matter of grace and comity than of right, applies only to individuals
qualified by the political branch of government as legitimate heads of recognized
states.1406 Immunity would also be denied if the foreign state has expressly
waived it.1407 Interestingly enough, the FSIA has been held to apply to officials
of foreign states acting in their official capacity,1408 unless the relevant acts
exceed the lawful boundaries of a defendant’s authority.1409 The latter
qualification was instrumental in Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah1410 to deny immunity
to the Deputy Chief of National Security of Ghana for arbitrary detention and acts
1405 See U.S. v. Noriega, 117 F. 3d 1206 (Court of Appeals 11th Cir., 1997); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d
232 (2nd Cir., 1995); Alicog et al. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia et al., 860 F. Supp. 379 (SD Texas, Houston
Division, August 10, 1994); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (EDNY January 27, 1994). See also the
interesting dictum of the Court in United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla, 1990), in which
the court, denying head of state immunity to General Noriega, as he had never been recognized as the head
of state of Panama, held that the grant of immunity is a privilege which the United States may withhold
from any claimant. Furthermore, the court held that had head of state immunity been granted to Noriega
‘illegitimate dictators [would be granted] the benefit of their unscrupulous and possibly brutal seizure of
power’ (at 1521).
1406 99 F. Supp. 1 (DC Columbia, 1998), in which denial of immunity to Iran, to Ayatollah Khomeini,
qualified as the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and to Mr. Rafsanjani, former president of
the Islamic Republic of Iran for providing material support and resources to the Shaqaqi faction of the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which caused the wrongful death of an American citizen in Israel was justified
under the recent amendment to the FSIA (see infra, note 130 and accompanying text), which expressly
provides for the denial of immunity to foreign states and their officials that facilitate terrorist activities. The
statutory provision (see infra, note 130) overrides the common law doctrine of head of state immunity.
1407 See Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (SD Florida, 1993).
1408 See Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F. 2nd 1095, 1103 (9th Cir., 1990). For a comment and
comparison with English law see Whomersley, ‘Some Reflections on the Immunity of Individuals for
Official Acts’, 41 ICLQ (1992) 848.
1409 The FSIA was held to be inapplicable to activities not carried out under the authority of the state: see In
re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F. 2d 493 (9th Cir., 1992), at 498 and In re
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F. 3d at 1472.
1410 921 F. Supp. 1189 (SDNY, April 18, 1996).
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of torture against a Ghanaian citizen. Similarly, in Xuncax v. Gramajo1411 an
action brought by citizens of Guatemala against former Guatemala’s Minister of
Defence for acts of torture, arbitrary detention, summary executions and
enforced disappearance was thought not to be barred by the FSIA, which is
‘unavailable in suits against an official arising from acts that were beyond the
scope of the official’s authority’. While the latter case law is of some relevance to
our analysis for the distinction it draws between official acts and acts which
exceed the lawful boundaries of official authority, it should be stressed that both
cases relate to civil proceedings.1412 Although there seems to be no case law on
this specific point, it is fair to presume that heads of state would also be entitled
to the residual immunity provided by the FSIA.1413
As recent studies purport, apart from the case of the immunity of diplomats and
consuls for their official (and authorized by the territorial state) activities, it is
difficult to establish the existence, under customary international law, of either a
general regime of residual or functional immunity for high and low rank foreign
state officials for acts performed in the exercise of their functions, or an ad hoc
rule on heads of state.1414
On the other hand, considerable support can be drawn from state practice to
maintain that individuals are accountable for crimes of international law
regardless of their official position. Besides the well-known quotes from the
Nuremberg judgment,1415 many provisions can be traced in treaties proscribing
1411 886 F. Supp. 162 (DMA, April 12, 1995).
1412 On issues of immunity and justiciability in the United States involving foreign heads of states see also
Paust, ‘It’s No Defense: Nullum Crimen, International Crime and the Gingerbread Man’, 60 Albany Law
Review (1997) 657, at 658 et seq. On the availability of civil remedies for grave violations of human rights
see Damrosch, ‘Enforcing International Law through Non-forcible Measures’, 269 RdC (1997) 13, at 155 et
seq.
1413 On the uncertain status of head of state immunity in the United States see Mallory, ‘Resolving the
Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings’, 86 Columbia Law Review (1986)
169.
1414 P. De Sena, Diritto internazionale e immunità funzionale degli organi statali (1996).
1415 ‘The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances, protects the representative of a
state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these
acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment in
appropriate proceedings … individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of
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specific crimes1416 as well as in the statutes1417 and practice of international
tribunals1418 to the effect that no plea of immunity is available in case of crimes
of international law. The principle was endorsed also by the Israel Supreme
Court in the judgment against Eichmann.1419 Most recently, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Furundzija held that the
principle that individuals are personally responsible for acts of torture, whatever
their official position, even if they are heads of state or government ministers, is
‘indisputably declaratory of customary international law’.1420 Nor does the
argument that the responsibility of heads of state and other government officials
for crimes of international law can only be enforced before international tribunals
carry much force with it.1421 Besides the difficulty of establishing international
criminal tribunals, it would be odd indeed, were the international normative
standards to vary depending on the court which has to apply them.
Even if one is not convinced that the above instances of state practice can be
persuasively interpreted to the effect of demonstrating the existence of a positive
rule which requires states not to grant immunity to heads of state in cases in
obedience imposed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while
acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves outside its
competence under international law’ (22 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal (1949) 466).
1416 See, for instance, Art. IV of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948).
1417 See Art. 7 of the Nuremberg Charter (1945); Art. 2 of the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (1945);
Art. 6 of the Tokyo Charter (1946); Principle III of the Principles of Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal (UN Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in 4 AJIL (1950)
126); Art. 7(2) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (1993); Art. 6(2) of the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994); Art. 7 of the UN Draft Code of Offences
against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996) and Art. 27 of the Statute of the International Criminal
Court (1998). It is also of note that, according to the UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security
Council, pursuant to SC Res. 808 (1993), concerning the establishment of an International Criminal Court,
there was universal consensus among states that the Statute of the Court should contain provisions
providing for the personal criminal responsibility of heads of state, government officials and other persons
acting in an official capacity (UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 55).
1418 Top political leaders and high military commanders have been indicted by the ICTY (see Prosecutor v.
Karadzic & Mladic, No. IT-95–18-I, Indictment (14 Nov. 1995) and the former Prime Minister of Rwanda,
Kambanda, has been recently convicted to serve a life term in prison for crimes against humanity (see
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, No. ICTR 97–23-9, 4 Sept. 1998, reprinted in 37 ILM (1998) 1411).
1419 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, supra note 40, at 47–48.
1420 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, supra note 32, at para 140.
1421 See Watts, supra note 74, at 82.
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which the commission of crimes of international law is involved, the same
conclusion could be reached via a different reasoning. It is not infrequent that
courts have to decide cases for which there is no precedent or where no
established or accepted rule comes in handy to provide the rule of decision. In
any such case, the court ought to interpret the law systematically and in
accordance with what are perceived as the basic principles and goals of the legal
system it is called upon to interpret. The more the rule of decision is grounded on
and consistent with accepted general principles, the more the decision will be
perceived as legitimate and fair. In many respects, this is the type of analysis
which several Law Lords endeavoured to carry out. The divide between the Law
Lords sitting in the first Appellate Committee is evidence of the sense of
uncertainty over which values and principles should be accorded priority in
contemporary international law. The two opposite poles of the spectrum are
evident. On the one hand, there stands the principle of sovereignty with its many
corollaries including immunity; on the other, the notion that fundamental human
rights should be respected and that particularly heinous violations, be they
committed by states or individuals, should be punished. While the first principle is
the most obvious expression and ultimate guarantee of a horizontally-organized
community of equal and independent states, the second view represents the
emergence of values and interests common to the international community as a
whole which deeply cuts across traditional precepts of state sovereignty and non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states. The two views are not mutually
exclusive. Occasionally, however, they may come to clash as the interests and
values they support are remarkably different. This is all the more likely when no
established rule exists to provide the rule of decision in a case and courts have to
make recourse to general principles to fill in the lacunae or to interpret
controversial points of law.
The inconsistency of the very notion of crimes of international law with any form
of immunity which shields individuals behind the screen of their official position is
apparent. Immunity as a form of protection which international law grants, under
certain circumstances, to particular categories of individuals is incompatible with
conduct which runs counter to the fundamental principles of the international
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legal system. The argument is one of logic. International law cannot grant
immunity from prosecution in relation to acts which the same international law
condemns as criminal and as an attack on the interests of the international
community as a whole. Nor can the principle of sovereignty, of which immunity is
clearly a derivative, be persuasively set forth to defeat a claim based on an
egregious violation of human rights.1422 As the ICTY held in Tadic, ‘[it] would be
a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, should the
concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human
rights’.1423 The compelling force of the argument cannot be limited to cases
involving the immunity ratione materiae of former heads of state or other state
officials. The alleged commission of international law crimes should also dispose
of a claim of immunity ratione personae.1424 Were it not so, one would be left
with the impression that it is power more than law which protects office holders
and that no matter whether they place themselves well beyond the legitimate
boundaries of their official authority, they will be protected by law as long as they
retain their power, whereas they will be left to their fate once that power comes to
an end.1425 Incidentally, the need to reassess the scope of diplomatic
1422 Besides the well-known dicta of the Nuremberg Tribunal (see supra note 96), see also Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic´, supra note 49 in which the Trial Chamber of the ICTY characterized crimes against humanity
as crimes which ‘transcend the individual, because when the individual is assaulted, humanity comes under
attack and is negated’ (at 149).
1423 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Decision on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), Judgment of 2 October 1995, 105
ILR 453, at 483.
1424 While extensive reliance was placed on Sir Arthur Watts Hague Lectures on the position of heads of
states in international law, particularly where he recognizes that heads of states may be personally held
accountable for ‘international crimes which offend against the public order of the international
community’, no heed was paid to the circumstance that this statement was not confined to the position of
heads of state after loss of office.
1425 See Decaux, supra note 82, at 139: ‘La moralisation du droit international trouve tres vite ses limites.
Se contenter de mettre en accusation les souverains dechus, c’est oublier la responsabilite des Chefs d’Etat
au pouvoir. Seul un paradoxe permet de dire que le chef d’Etat criminel perd toutes ses immunites de
juridiction parce qu’il est criminel: il les perd parce qu’il est vaincu et detrone. C’est le pouvoir qui le
protegeait, non le droit. Et, le pouvoir dechu, l’ancien chef d’Etat se trouve soumis à la lois du vainquer.’
Given the extreme fragmentation of the legal position of former heads of state, Decaux expressed the need
for international law to fix general standards to direct state practice. Although sceptical, he acknowledged
that agreement could be reached as regards the punishment of crimes of international law as defined in
Nuremberg (ibid).
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immunities for violations of human rights had been signalled long before the
Pinochet case.1426
The objection can be raised that denial of immunity may cause misguided or
even malicious allegations to be brought against heads of state or lower state
officials.1427 While it would be simplistic to reject such a concern as unfounded,
the point can be made that several instruments exist to limit vexatious claims.
First, immunity should only be denied in relation to offences recognized as
crimes of international law. Secondly, such remedies as sanctions against
frivolous claims and such instruments of judicial administration as the
discretionary power of prosecutors to start proceedings could be aptly used at
the domestic law level to reduce the alleged risk.1428 In any event, practical
considerations, however important, cannot by themselves direct a change in the
interpretation of the law to the detriment of the primary value of securing respect
for some fundamental aspects of human dignity.
A last note concerns the link established in the opinion of some of the Law Lords
between immunity, crimes of international law and universality of jurisdiction. To
hold that under customary international law there can be no immunity for crimes
of international law and that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain
grave offences is permitted on the basis of the universality principle does not
exclude that immunity can be granted by treaty or, unilaterally, by states on the
basis of either municipal legislation or considerations of comity and international
courtesy to visiting heads of state. However, if one characterizes the prohibition
of torture and, arguably, other crimes of international law as norms of jus cogens,
it becomes difficult to argue that immunity, whatever its legal basis, can coexist
with them. As was argued in Siderman, quoted and relied upon by some Law
1426 See Orrego Vicuna, ‘Diplomatic and Consular Immunities and Human Rights’, 40 ICLQ (1991) 34,
holding that ‘by no standard can such acts [the violation of human rights] be considered as part of the
diplomatic function, and thus neither can be considered an official act’ (at 47).
1427 This concern was expressed by Lord Goff of Chieveley in his opinion (see supra note 31).
1428 See the decision of the Amsterdam Public Prosecutors Department not to initiate proceedings against
General Pinochet while on a private visit to Amsterdam. The decision, appealed by the Dutch branch of the
Chile Committee, was upheld by the Court of Appeal (see 28 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
(1997) 363).
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Lords in the second ruling on the Pinochet case, since jus cogens norms enjoy
the highest status within international law, they prevail and invalidate other rules
of international law.1429 It is perhaps not unfair to speculate that some of the
Law Lords, whose reasoning on the characterization of the prohibition of torture
as a jus cogens norm may have been influenced also by the recent Furundzjia
case,1430 did not fully grasp the consequences of qualifying a rule of
international law as peremptory.
12.4 The Inconsistency between Head of State and State Immunity
State immunity and the immunity ratione materiae enjoyed by heads of state are
closely intertwined doctrines, as a large majority of the Law Lords acknowledged.
Given such a close link, one may wonder what impact, if any, the decision of the
House of Lords will have on the future development of the law of state immunity.
As is known, foreign sovereign immunity is a doctrine of international law, whose
origins remain uncertain. While many maintain that the doctrine is grounded on
the principle of sovereign equality and independence of states, authoritative
commentators have traced its origin to heads of state immunity, at a time in
which the state and the sovereign coincided.1431 With the formation of modern
states, the entitlement to immunity was passed to the state and to its agents and
instrumentalities. According to the mainstream of legal scholarship, the
jurisdictional immunity of states before foreign municipal courts used to be
absolute. Only when governments and their agencies became frequently
involved in international trade and finance did the law change. Particularly, due to
the judicial activism of some municipal courts, immunity started being denied for
private or commercial acts of the foreign state. At some point, in order to facilitate
the task of domestic courts in determining which acts of the foreign states should
be qualified as private or commercial, the law of state immunity was codified by
statute in many jurisdictions. All domestic statutes list a series of exceptions,
1429 Susana Siderman de Blake et al. v. the Republic of Argentina, 965 F. 2d 699 (9th Cir., 1992), at 717.
Accord Smith v. Libya, 101 F. 3d 239 (2nd Cir., 1996), at 243.
1430 See Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, supra note 32, discussing the consequences at both state and
individual levels of the qualification of torture as a jus cogens norm (see, esp. paras 153–157).
1431 See Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States’, 28 BYbIL (1951) 220.
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mainly, though not exclusively,1432 concerned with private and commercial
transactions, and retain immunity as the general rule.1433
When individuals started seeking redress for violations of human rights before
domestic courts against foreign states, mainly alleging acts of torture by state
officers, domestic courts were bound to apply the residual rule of immunity under
their domestic legislation. While lower courts, especially in the United States, had
resorted to a variety of interpretative devices to avoid granting state immunity to
foreign violators of human rights,1434 in 1993 the Supreme Court in Nelson held
that, however monstrous, acts of torture by police officers are by definition
sovereign acts and as such they entitle the foreign state to immunity.1435 The
binding force of the Supreme Court precedent has caused lower courts, although
in some cases reluctantly,1436 to adjust their case law accordingly. In 1996 the
English Court of Appeal (Civil Division) reached the same conclusion in Al
Adsani, concerning the torture of a dual British/Kuwaiti national by Kuwaiti
officials in Kuwait.1437 In both cases the upholding of the claim to immunity was
thought to be prompted by the plain and unambiguous text of the relevant
statutes on state immunity.1438 Particularly in the United Kingdom, the rule of
1432 The most notable exception is the so-called ‘tort exception’, which allows denying immunity to foreign
states for their illegal acts which cause death or personal injury or loss of or damage to property in the
forum state. Occasionally, this exception has been applied to cases of political assassination allegedly
committed by the foreign state in the forum: see Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. (1980) and Liu
v. Republic of China, 892 F. 2d 1419 (9th Cir., 1989).
1433 The best account of the development of the international law of state immunity, with particular regard
to recent developments, remains C. H. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments (1988).
1434 Such practice is reviewed in Bianchi, ‘Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human Rights’, 46
Austrian J. Publ. Int’l L. (1994) 195.
1435 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993), at 1480.
1436 See Susana Siderman de Blake et al. v. the Republic of Argentina, supra note 110: ‘when a state
violates jus cogens, the cloak of immunity provided by international law falls away, leaving the State
amenable to suit’ (at 718). See also Smith v. Libya, supra note 110, recognizing that, as a matter of
international law, state immunity would be abrogated by jus cogens norms (at 244).
1437 Al Adsani v. Government of Kuwait, England, Court of Appeal, 12 March 1996 (107 ILR 536).
1438 In the United States the Supreme Court before Nelson had already authoritatively determined that
violations of international law not expressly mentioned in the FSIA are not admissible exceptions to the
general rule of immunity (see Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428, 109 S. Ct.
683, 102L. Ed. 818 (1989). For a comment see Bianchi, ‘Violazioni del diritto internazionale ed immunità
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statutory construction, whereby Parliament cannot be presumed to have
legislated contrary to the international obligations of the United Kingdom, can
only be triggered by the unclear or ambiguous character of the relevant statutory
provisions.1439
The Al Adsani case was relied on by Lord Bingham in the Divisional Court to
maintain that ‘[i]f the Government there could claim immunity in relation to
alleged acts of torture, it would not seem surprising if the same immunity could
be claimed by a defendant who had at the relevant time been the ruler of that
country’.1440 In fact, after the ruling of the House of Lords there should be no
surprise if the argument is reversed. The Law Lords, with a few exceptions,1441
generally regarded the above case law as irrelevant for its being concerned
exclusively with civil proceedings.1442 Some of them, however, recognized,
although without enthusiasm, that there is some authority to maintain that in the
field of civil litigation immunity should be granted to state officials, regardless of
the lawful character of their conduct.1443 Presumably, after the Pinochet case,
while state and state officials would continue to be held immune in civil
proceedings in the United Kingdom for acts of torture and, arguably, other crimes
of international law, as regards criminal proceedings they might be held
accountable and no plea of immunity might be available to them.1444 To the
degli Stati dalla giurisdizione civile negli Stati Uniti: il caso Hercules’, 72 Rivista di diritto internazionale
(1989) 546).
1439 The rule has been restated recently in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex Parte Brind
[1991] 1 AC 696. As Ward LJ put it: ‘Unfortunately the Act is as plain as it can be. A foreign state enjoys
no immunity for acts causing personal injury committed in the United Kingdom and if that is expressly
provided for the conclusion is impossible to escape that state immunity is afforded in respect of acts of
torture committed outside the jurisdiction.’ (Al Adsani v. Government of Kuwait, supra note 118, at 549).
1440 Ex Parte Pinochet (High Court), supra note 6, at para. 73.
1441 Lord Lloyd (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 1) at 1324) quoted Al Adsani and Siderman to hold that allegations
of torture may not trump a plea of immunity.
1442 See, for example, the opinions of Lord Nicholls (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 1) at 1331) and Lord Hutton
(Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 158c–d).
1443 See Lord Phillips (Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 187f ), quoting the ‘impressive, and depressing’ list of
cases in which the immunity of the foreign state has been upheld in cases concerning serious human rights
violations.
1444 See the opinion of Lord Millett, Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 2) at 179f–j. Lord Millett saw nothing wrong in
drawing the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings and noted that ‘the same official or
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present writer this creates a manifest inconsistency which ought to be remedied
by denying immunity also to state and state officials in civil proceedings.
The pros and cons of having domestic courts adjudicating cases involving the
international responsibility of states have been highlighted by scholars.1445 It is
not within the scope of this paper to reopen that debate.1446 It will suffice here to
note that the argument that the immunity ratione materiae of state officials is
necessary not to circumvent the immunity of the state can be used to maintain
that once it is held that no plea of immunity is available to state officials for
crimes against international law which presuppose or require state action, the
immunity of the state can be easily circumvented by bringing criminal
proceedings against state officials. Nor is the argument that the degree of
interference would be higher if the state is directly impleaded particularly
persuasive. For such systematic and massive violations of human rights as the
ones allegedly committed by General Pinochet close and extensive scrutiny of
state policies and actions is required. Ultimately, any argument based on state
sovereignty is inherently flawed. First, external scrutiny of state action as regards
human rights is permitted under contemporary standards of international law and
sovereignty can no longer be invoked to justify human rights abuses. Secondly,
and perhaps most importantly, human rights atrocities cannot be qualified as
sovereign acts: international law cannot regard as sovereign those acts which
are not merely a violation of it, but constitute an attack against its very foundation
and predominant values.1447 Finally, the characterization of the prohibition of
governmental character of the acts which is necessary to found a claim to immunity ratione materiae, and
which still operates as a bar to the civil jurisdiction of national courts, was now to be the essential element
which made the acts an international crime’ (ibid, at 175a). Before the Pinochet case, the inconsistency
between allowing extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of torture committed by individuals and upholding
immunity for acts of torture in the context of civil proceedings against foreign states had been noticed by
Marks, ‘Torture and the Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States’, 8 Cambridge Law Journal (1997), at
10.
1445 A particularly exhaustive account of the reasons why domestic courts should not be permitted to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign states for acts of torture in defiance of state immunity is given by Garnett,
‘The Defence of State Immunity for Acts of Torture’, 18 Australian Yearbook of Int’l Law (1997) 97.
1446 The views of this writer were expressed in Bianchi, supra note 115.
1447 See also Higgins, supra note 72, at 53: ‘Acts in the exercise of sovereign authority (acta jure imperii)
are those which can only be performed by states, but not by private persons. Property deprivation might fall
in this category; torture would not.’ (footnote omitted).
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torture and other egregious violations of human rights as jus cogens norms
should have the consequence of trumping a plea of state immunity by states and
state officials in civil proceedings as well. As a matter of international law, there is
no doubt that jus cogens norms, because of their higher status, must prevail over
other international rules, including jurisdictional immunities.
If interpretative techniques are of no avail in securing the adjustment of domestic
law to contemporary standards of international law, it would be desirable that in
those countries where domestic laws have, perhaps inadvertently,1448 had the
effect of granting immunity, the law should be amended accordingly.1449
12.5 Crimes of International Law and Non-justiciability
Contrary to foreign sovereign immunity, act of state is a domestic law doctrine of
judicial self-restraint whereby domestic courts will abstain from passing judgment
over the acts of a foreign sovereign done in its own territory. This doctrine
1448 The use of the adverb is not fortuitous. It seems unlikely that at the time of enactment of the relevant
statutes, domestic legislators were aware of the possibility that foreign states would be sued for serious
violations of human rights before domestic courts. Furthermore, as rightly observed by some
commentators, the choice of leaving immunity as the residual rule of general applicability is questionable
as a matter of international law (see Sucharitkul, ‘Developments and Prospects of the Doctrine of State
Immunity. Some Aspects of the Law of Codification and Prospective Development’, 29 Netherlands Int’l
L. Rev. (1982) 252; Higgins, ‘Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity’, 29 Netherlands
Int’l L. Rev. (1982), at 265 et seq.).
1449 See the recent amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104–132, Title II, § 221(a), (April 24, 1996), 110 Stat. 1241, codified at
28 U.S.C.A. 1605), creating an exception to immunity ‘for personal injury or death that was caused by an
act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or
resources . . . for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official,
employee, or agent of such foreign State while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or
agency’ (§ 1605(a)(7)). It is unfortunate that the amendment applies only to the immunity of those states
that are currently designated by the Department of State as states sponsors of terrorism (Cuba, Syria, Iraq,
Lybia, Sudan and North Korea), when the act has been committed outside the foreign state and when the
claimants and victims are US nationals. Recently a further amendment to § 1605 (a)(7) has made punitive
damages available in actions brought under the state-sponsored exception to immunity (see Civil Liability
for Acts of Terrorism (September 30, 1997), enacted as part of the 1997 Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104–208, Div. A, Title I § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009–172, reprinted at 28 U.S.C. §
1605 note). This latter amendment is known as the Flatow Amendment. For the first judicial applications of
the above amendments to the FSIA see Alejandre v. The Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (SD Florida,
17 December 1997)(concerning Cuba Air Force’s extrajudicial killing of pilots of civilian aircrafts flying
above international waters); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (DC Columbia, 11 March
1998) (wrongful death of US citizen in Israel resulting from an act of state-sponsored terrorism); Cicippio
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, (DC Columbia, 27 August 1998) (tortious injuries suffered by US citizens
kidnapped, imprisoned and tortured by agents of Iran in Beirut).
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generally applies to the merits of the case and can be pleaded by anyone
regardless of the status of the defendant in the instant case.1450 While there
might be international law underpinnings to the doctrine, the modern view is that
act of state is neither a rule of international law nor is its application mandated by
the international legal system.1451
The doctrine, not unknown in civil law countries,1452 has mainly developed in
common law jurisdictions. Although cross-references between the case law of
their respective courts is frequent, the doctrine has taken up different
connotations in the United States and in the United Kingdom.1453
Despite early assertions of the doctrine in fairly sweeping terms,1454 its scope of
application in the United States has been remarkably narrowed down over the
years. An increasing number of exceptions to its operation has been conceived
since the seminal Sabbatino case1455 and, recently, the US Supreme Court in
Environmental Tectonics1456 has restricted its scope of application to cases
1450 Contra, see the submission of Iraqi Airways Co. (Mr Plender, counsel) in Kuwait Airways Corpn. v.
Iraqi Airways Co. (House of Lords), 1 WLR 1147 at 1164 ff., according to which the principle of non-
justiciability, as set forth by the House of Lords in Buttes (see infra, note 141, and accompanying text)
would be one which limits the jurisdiction of courts, rather than operating as a substantive defence.
1451 See A. Watts and R. Jennings (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed., 1992), at 369. That the
act of state doctrine is not a general rule of international law was held by the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht in the Border Guards case (100 ILM 364 at 372).
1452 See Conforti, supra note 46, at 20 et seq.; Weil, ‘Le controle par les tribuneaux nationaux de la liceite
internationale des actes des Etats etrangers’, Annuaire Français de Droit International (1971), at 9 et seq.;
P. Kinsch, Le fait du prince etranger (1994), esp. at 384 et seq.
1453 Singer, ‘The Act of State of the United Kingdom: An Analysis with Comparison to the United States’,
75 AJIL (1981), at 283 et seq.
1454 See the classical formulation of the act of state doctrine by the US Supreme Court in Underhill v.
Hernandez (168 U.S. 250 (1897) at 252): ‘Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own territory.’ Quite curiously, the Supreme Court took almost
verbatim, but without quoting, a passage of the House of Lords in Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover
(1848) 2 H.L. Cas. 1, at 17 (Lord Cottenham).
1455 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The Sabbatino litigation arose from the
action brought by a Cuban state-owned bank seeking recovery of sugar delivered to a US purchaser that
had refused to pay, alleging, inter alia, that the bank lacked title to the property, as the sugar had been
expropriated by Cuba in violation of international law.
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requiring courts to ascertain the validity of the sovereign acts of foreign states. As
regards more specifically human rights, it is arguable whether a specific
exception to the application of the doctrine has emerged.1457 The Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States maintains that any plea
based on act of state would probably be defeated in cases involving violations of
human rights, as human rights law permits external scrutiny of states’
conduct.1458
It is quite interesting to note that US lower courts, in order to avoid the application
of both the foreign sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrines, have drawn
a distinction between official and unofficial public acts. Certain crimes such as
torture and other clearly established violations of fundamental human rights could
not be regarded as official public acts of a foreign state. Regardless of the colour
of authority under which state organs act when committing such crimes, their
acts cannot be qualified as governmental, as foreign states are unlikely to have
enacted legislation or overtly adopted policies to direct their organs to violate
human rights.1459
In the United Kingdom the scope of application of the doctrine seems wider than
in the United States. The modern English version of the act of state doctrine was
formulated in fairly sweeping terms by Lord Wilberforce in the Buttes Gas case in
the early 1980s. According to Lord Wilberforce, there would be in English law a
1456 W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics 493 U.S. 400 (1990). The case concerned two US
companies bidding for a Nigerian defence contract. Allegedly, one bidder had paid bribes to Nigerian
government officials. The other company filed a federal antitrust and RICO action against the former
successful bidder.
1457 On the numerous exceptions to the application of the act of state doctrine in the United States see G. B.
Born, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts (3rd ed., 1996) at 729 et seq.
1458 Restatement (Third), supra note 72, § 443, Comment c: ‘A claim arising out of an alleged violation of
fundamental human rights . . . would . . . probably not be defeated by the act of state doctrine, since the
accepted international law of human rights is well established and contemplates external scrutiny of such
acts.’
1459 See, inter alia, Filartiga v. Peña Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2nd Cir., 1980); Forti v. Suarez Mason, 672 F
Supp 1531 (ND Cal., 1987); Evans et al. v. Avril, 812 F Supp 207 (SD Florida, 1993); Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F. 3d 232, (2nd Cir., 1995). See also Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F. 2d 1419 (9th Cir., 1989). For a
similar reasoning applied in the context of the applicability of the FSIA see Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921
F. Supp. 1189 (SDNY, April 18, 1996) and Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (DMA, April 12, 1995).
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general principle of judicial abstention, inherent in the very nature of the judicial
process, which would prevent courts from adjudicating directly on the
transactions of foreign sovereign states.1460 This all-encompassing principle of
non-justiciability is rather unique as it precludes judicial scrutiny of any
transactions between foreign states. Since the doctrine applies to transactions of
foreign states which have a direct bearing on the private claims before the court,
the practical effect of holding such issues non-justiciable is to prevent the courts
from discharging their natural function of administering the law. Although the
doctrine is probably a derivative of foreign sovereign immunity in its early
absolute version, its consistency could be aptly disputed in light of the many
instances in which courts are allowed to rule upon transactions between a state
and a private party. 1461
From the different perspective of conflict of laws, UK courts in Oppenheimer had
refused to give effect in the forum on grounds of public policy to the 1941 Nazi
decree depriving German Jews residing abroad of German citizenship and
confiscating their properties.1462 The House of Lords held that ‘so grave an
infringement of human rights’ should lead to the refusal of recognition of the
German decree as law.1463 More importantly for our purposes, the House of
Lords, while acknowledging that judges ought to be cautious in refusing
recognition of foreign laws in matters in which the foreign state clearly has
jurisdiction – as they may not have adequate knowledge of the circumstances in
which legislation was passed and may cause embarrassment to the executive
branch of government in the field of foreign relations – unambiguously stated to
be the public policy of the United Kingdom to give effect to clearly established
rules of international law.1464 While limited to defining public policy as a limit to
the operation of foreign laws in the United Kingdom, this passage from
1460 Buttes Gas v. Hammer (Nos. 2 & 3), [1981] 3 All ER 616 at 628; (no. 3) [1982] AC 888 at 931 et seq.
Accord, J.H. Rayner Ltd. v. Department of Trade (House of Lords) [1989] 3 WLR 969 at 1001–1002.
1461 Higgins, supra note 48, at 212–213.
1462 Oppenheimer v. Cattermole 1976 AC 249.
1463 Ibid, at 278.
1464 Ibid, at 277–278.
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Oppenheimer seems to imply that UK courts would generally enforce
international law rules, provided that they have been duly incorporated into the
legal system and that no act of Parliament conflicts with them. It is somewhat
surprising that Lord Steyn, who stated that ‘the act of state doctrine depends on
public policy as perceived by the courts in the forum at the time of the suit’, did
not rely on Oppenheimer to support his view.1465
The dicta of the Law Lords in the first Pinochet case, touching upon the non-
justiciability doctrine, proved that Buttes is the controlling precedent as far as the
application of the doctrine in the UK is concerned. The Law Lords in the majority,
while acknowledging that no justiciability issue had actually arisen in the case at
hand, held that any plea based on act of state would be defeated by
parliamentary intent.1466 By enacting legislation implementing both the
Convention against Torture and the Convention on the Taking of Hostages, the
British Parliament had clearly intended that UK courts could take up jurisdiction
over foreign governmental acts.1467 Moreover, Lord Steyn, in language
reminiscent of the recent case law developed by US courts, added that the high
crimes with which General Pinochet had been indicted could not be regarded as
official acts performed in the exercise of the functions of a head of state and
therefore could not trigger the non-justiciability doctrine.1468 While the doctrine
was given less consideration in the second judgment of the House of Lords, Lord
Saville held that any plea based on act of state or non-justiciability must fail
because the parties to the Torture Convention, which expressly prohibits torture
by state officials, have accepted that foreign domestic courts may exercise
jurisdiction over the acts of their organs in violation of the Convention. Lord
Millett, in turn, by holding that the immunity ratione materiae denied to Pinochet
for the acts in question is almost indistinguishable from the act of state doctrine,
indirectly agreed that the doctrine was of no avail in the case at hand.
1465 Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 1), at 1338.
1466 Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 1), at 1332 and 1338.
1467 See, esp., Criminal Justice Act 1988 as regards acts of torture and Taking of Hostages Act 1982. While
the former expressly permits the scrutiny of state officials’ conduct, parliamentary intent was indirectly
inferred from the latter in the light of the type of situations the act covers.
1468 Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 1), at 1338.
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Neither the act of state nor other related judicial self-restraint doctrines should
stand in the way of adjudicating cases involving individual crimes of international
law.1469 It is widely believed that the doctrine originates from and is grounded on
separation of powers concerns. In particular, a ruling by domestic courts on
foreign policy issues might embarrass the executive branch of government in the
conduct of foreign relations and trespass on its prerogatives. Furthermore, its
application would be required especially when international normative standards
are unclear.1470 In the view of this writer there cannot be any embarrassment by
the executive, nor any prejudice to its prerogatives, when domestic courts are
called upon to enforce clear and unambiguous standards, which are shared by
the international community as a whole.1471 To hold the contrary view would
amount to an acknowledgement that the wide support manifested by states to
both human rights and international criminal law instruments is nothing but
political propaganda. Finally, even if one identifies the rationale of the rule with
the same principle of respect for the independence and sovereign equality of
foreign states which also inspires the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine,
compelling reasons exist to hold the doctrine inapplicable. To prevent the
adjudication of the merits of a case on grounds of non-justiciability, once the
jurisdictional bar of immunity has been done away with, would have the effect,
hardly justifiable as a matter of logic, of upholding the validity of the same
considerations which had been deemed inapplicable in the early stages of the
proceedings when jurisdictional issues were addressed. In fact, although the two
doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity and non-justiciability remain logically
distinct, it is hard to envisage how a court could reasonably abstain from passing
1469 Reference can be made also to the US ‘political question doctrine’, imposing self -restraint on courts
when required to review congressional or executive acts pertaining to the conduct of foreign affairs (see D.
F. Vagts, H. J. Steiner and H. H. Koh, Transnational Legal Problems (4th ed., 1994), at 124 et seq). On the
inapplicability of the doctrine to human rights violations see Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F. 2d 332 (11th
Cir., 1992).
1470 Both reasons were set forth in Sabbatino, supra note 136, by the US Supreme Court. The idea that the
rationale of the act of state doctrine has to be traced to separation of powers concerns was restated by
Justice Scalia in Environmental Tectonics, supra note 137.
1471 On the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine to crimes against humanity see alanczuk, supra note
63, at 122.
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judgment on the conduct of individuals who have committed crimes of
international law, after having recognized that international law grants no
immunity either rationae personae or ratione materiae in such cases. To uphold
the applicability of the act of state doctrine after denying immunity would amount
to reintroducing in the guise of non-justiciability the immunity which had been
removed.1472
This is not to deny that political considerations are relevant, but – as stressed by
Lord Nicholls1473 – they should be considered by the executive when deciding,
exercising its discretion within the limits of international obligations and national
legislation, whether or not to extradite.
12.6 The Asynchronous Development of International Law and the Quest for
Normative Coherence
To attribute the aura of controversy surrounding the proceedings against General
Pinochet solely to the highly sensitive aspects of international politics involved in
the case would be a rather simplistic exercise. In fact, most of the controversial
issues underlying the case are of a legal character. The conflicting arguments
submitted by the parties before the House of Lords go well beyond the dynamics
of argumentation strategies inherent in the judicial process. They reflect also
different conceptions of international law, which eventually have come to clash.
Indeed, the Pinochet case may well signal ‘a shift from a State-centred order of
things’.1474 The notion of individual accountability for crimes against humanity,
the active role of municipal courts in the enforcement of international criminal law
as well as the steady process of erosion of the foreign sovereign immunity
doctrine are all elements which are hardly amenable within the traditional
representation of the international legal system as a horizontally-organized
1472 See A Limited Bank v. B. Bank and Bank of X, England, Court of Appeal, judgment of 31 July 1996
(111 ILR 591), quoting Kerr LJ in Maclaine Watson & Co. v. International Tin Council [1988] 3 WLR
1169 at 1188.
1473 Ex Parte Pinochet (HL 1), Lord Nicholls, at 1334.
1474 The expression is used by Fox, supra note 12, at 207.
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community of sovereign and independent states. The disagreement among the
Law Lords involved in the proceedings, however, attests to the fact that the
current state of evolution of international law is the object of divergent
evaluations. This discrepancy can be partly due to the asynchronous
development of different areas of international law. The emergence and relatively
rapid consolidation of both human rights and international criminal law has
deeply affected, but not decisively altered, the structure and process of
international law.1475 The understandable resilience of states to accepting a
moving away from a strictly ‘State-centred order of things’ creates a strain
between yet unsystematized notions of  international public order and the
traditional precepts of international law, largely based on the sovereignty
paradigm. The Pinochet case is illustrative of this situation. In strictly positivistic
terms it would have been equally difficult to demonstrate conclusively on the
basis of state practice either that former heads of states enjoy immunity or that
they do not. Between two legally plausible solutions, the House of Lords faced a
policy choice in finding for or against immunity. Although one may doubt that this
was intended by the Law Lords, the House of Lords’ final finding against
immunity provided the result which best conforms with the ends and values of the
international legal system.
As noted earlier, the notion of individual accountability for crimes against
humanity can be fully grasped only in connection with the international human
rights doctrine and other recent developments in the structure and process of
international law. Particularly relevant, in this respect, is the notion of obligations
erga omnes, namely obligations which are not owed to any particular state but to
the international community.1476 This, in turn, entails that every state has a legal
interest in their fulfillment. The pre-eminence of these obligations over others, in
light of their content,1477 stipulates a hierarchy of values in the international legal
system in which norms concerning the protection of fundamental human rights
1475 See Bianchi, ‘Globalization of Human Rights: the Role of Non-state Actors’, in G. Teubner (ed.),
Global Law without a State (1997), at 179 et seq.
1476 See Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co. Ltd., ICJ Reports (1970), at 32.
1477 On obligations erga omnes see, recently, M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga
Omnes (1997).
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certainly enjoy the highest-ranking status. The persuasive force of the argument
is reinforced by the emergence of jus cogens, i.e. a set of norms from which no
derogation is ever admitted under international law. The importance of certain
rules and principles to the international community is such that any unilateral
action or international agreement which violates them is absolutely
prohibited.1478 Elementary logic supports this conclusion, as the law cannot
tolerate acts which run against its very foundation. Despite scholarly disputes as
to what norms qualify for the category of jus cogens, there is hardly any doubt
that genocide, apartheid, torture and, when committed on a large scale or as a
matter of state policy, murder, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of
individuals can be legitimately included in the list.1479
All the above developments converge in purporting the existence of an
international public order based on a commonality of core values and interests
which are regarded as fundamental by the international community as a
whole.1480 Inevitably, the perceived fundamental character attached to these
values and interests implies special consequences for their violation. The rapid
consolidation of the notion of individual criminal responsibility is coupled by the
attempt to introduce similar notions of criminal responsibility at the inter-state
level.1481 Scholarly disputes and political opposition by some states as to their
consequences might prevent the codification of state crimes from being included
1478 See Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Generally, on jus cogens see L.
Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law (1988).
1479 The list is clearly non-exhaustive and refers mainly to the charges alleged in the Pinochet case. For an
in-depth analysis of which norms in the field of human rights attain the status of jus cogens, see
Hannikainen, supra note 159, at 425 et seq. For an interesting discussion on the relationship between non-
derogable rights in human rights treaties and norms of jus cogens see Meron, ‘On a Hierarchy of
International Human Rights’, 80 AJIL (1986) 1. The Restatement, supra note 72, lists as jus cogens norms
genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention and systematic racial
discrimination, and a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,
when practised, encouraged or condoned as a matter of state policy (§ 702 Comm. N, Reporters’ Note 11).
1480 See H. Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community (1980).
1481 See Art. 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, adopted by the International Law Commission
on second reading in 1996, distinguishing between international delicts and crimes. The latter may result,
inter alia, from a serious violation on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential
importance for safeguarding the human being.
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in the International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, but
can hardly hide the widespread acceptance by large sectors of the international
community and the world public opinion of the idea that violations of fundamental
international obligations must be treated differently from other wrongful acts.1482
This implies not only attaching a sense of opprobrium to the violation but also
devising ways and means to punish effectively the wrongdoer, possibly allowing
states, other than the injured one, to react individually or collectively to the
violation.1483
This novel structure of international law is slowly making its way into traditional
precepts of classical doctrine. However, still many principles, rules and doctrines
of both international and domestic law are reminiscent of an old-fashioned and
no longer viable approach to international law, which regards respect for the
sovereignty of states as the fundamental value of the international system. While
state sovereignty remains one of the pillars on which the system hinges,1484 its
actual content has undergone a gradual process of erosion. Matters which once
indisputably belonged to the domestic jurisdiction of states, such as the way a
state treats persons under its jurisdiction, nowadays may be the object of
international scrutiny.
The strain between old rules and new principles causes inconsistencies in the
international legal system which should be gradually reduced. The achievement
of a higher degree of normative coherence is going to be an important challenge
for international law in the near future. Coherence of single rules and particular
regimes with the fundamental principles and goals of the system is likely to
1482 See the First Report of the newly appointed Rapporteur to the International Law Commission on State
Responsibility, Professor James Crawford, proposing the deletion of Art. 19 of the Draft Articles and
separate treatment of the subject of international crimes (see UN Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.3, para. 101, 11
May 1998); see also the articles in the Symposium on State Responsibility in this issue.
1483 See Abi-Saab, ‘The Concept of “International Crimes” and its Place in Contemporary International
Law’, in J. H. H. Weiler, A. Cassese and M. Spinedi (eds), International Crimes of State: A Critical
Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (1989) 150.
1484 For an interesting re-assessment of the role of state sovereignty in international law see Kingsbury,
‘Sovereignty and Inequality’, 9 EJIL (1998) 599.
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enhance the latter’s credibility and legitimacy.1485 As regards the subject at
hand, namely individual responsibility for crimes against humanity, normative
consistency would require, in the view of this writer, a number of adjustments in
international law-making and law enforcement.
First, a comprehensive code of crimes universally accepted as crimes against
humanity should be adopted.1486 Existing definitions are strongly influenced by
the particular contexts in which they were formulated and it is controversial
whether certain particular acts are amenable within the category of crimes
against humanity or rather stand in their own way. The proliferation of ad hoc
treaties and attempts at codification have not necessarily favoured uniform
definitions and standards. The issue is not deprived of practical relevance when
one realizes that the characterization of a crime as a crime against humanity is
not meant merely to convey a sense of moral reprobation but also to entail a set
of specific legal consequences, including the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by any state over such offences. Also the inapplicability of statutes of
limitation and the unavailability of the superior orders defence as an exonerating
circumstance, should not be controversial elements of the regime.
Perhaps the most astonishing example of the inconsistencies between different
areas and doctrines of international law is the one concerning consideration of
the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine and its ancillary act of state doctrine as
potential bars to judicial enforcement at the level of domestic courts. Reliance on
such obsolescent doctrines, which express an unfettered deference to the status
of certain subjects, is oblivious of contemporary standards of international law
which clearly condemn certain conduct as crimes against the very foundations of
1485 On the role of coherence as a means of legal justification see MacCormick, ‘Coherence in Legal
Justification’, in Theorie der Normen. Festgabe für Ota Weinberger zum 65 Geburstag (1984) 37. On
coherence as a fundamental element for determining the legitimacy of international law rules and,
consequently, state compliance with them see T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990);
Idem, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995) 38 et seq. Accord, R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire
(1986), at 190–192.
1486 See Bassiouni, ‘ “Crimes against Humanity”: The Need for a Specialized Convention’, 31 Columbia J.
of Transnat’l L. (1994) 457. Upon its entry into force, the ICC Statute will be the only binding international
law instrument providing a definition of crimes against humanity: see Robinson, ‘Defining “Crimes against
Humanity” at the Rome Conference’, 93 AJIL (1999) 43.
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the international system. Moreover, their application may hamper the adjustment
of legal standards and cultures to the new demands of the international
community. There should be no ambiguity on the fact that international law does
not and cannot require any deference to states and states’ organs, including
heads of state, when they commit crimes against humanity or other comparable
human rights atrocities. Neither should domestic courts abstain from passing
judgment as a matter of comity or on the basis of other judicial self-restraint
doctrines when sufficiently clear and judicially manageable standards exist.
Obviously, municipal courts must be given the tools to help enforce international
criminal law. Particularly, states should incorporate properly their international
law obligations in accordance with their constitutional rules. Attaching
reservations to fundamental treaty provisions or denying by statutory provision
the self-executing character of entire treaties, rather than leaving it to the courts
to determine in each particular case which provisions are self-executing in the
light of their content, are policies which may undermine any serious efforts at
effectively prosecuting human rights violators.1487
Another noticeable inconsistency concerns the different treatment of crimes of
war and crimes against humanity in terms of legal entitlement to prosecution by
states. Universal jurisdiction, whose applicability to war crimes is almost
uncontested, should also be uncontroversial as regards the prosecution of crimes
against humanity. If the rationale of the principle is that of ensuring the
punishment of individuals who are regarded as hostes humani generis for
committing crimes which, by their very nature, affect the interests of all states,
elementary logic seems to require that any such crime, be it a war crime or a
crime against humanity, should be subject to the same jurisdictional regime.
The latter remark paves the way for addressing another issue of compelling
interest in setting the agenda for the future: consistent enforcement. The
1487 See Henkin, ‘U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker’, 89 AJIL
(1995) 348, and Stewart, ‘U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: the Significance
of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations’, 14 Human Rights L.J. (1993) 77 and the text of the
reservations, ibid, at 123–124.
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argument has been made that the attempt to prosecute individuals for
international law crimes is going to be a vain effort, as their systematic
prosecution is a naive expectation or utopic ambition. Moreover, given the many
practical difficulties in apprehending and bringing to justice high-ranking state
officials or top political leaders, prosecution will only concern a scant number of
individuals with minor responsibilities. First, as the Pinochet case indicates, these
allegations are not entirely founded. Secondly, even in domestic legal systems
the apprehension and prosecution of offenders is far from systematic. What really
matters is to set clear normative standards and to enforce them consistently
whenever prosecution is possible under the circumstances. Consistent
enforcement requires that no double standard be used in determining
jurisdictional and substantive rules, as is a fundamental principle of justice,
common to all jurisdictions, that like cases should be treated alike. Over time, the
risk of being punished is likely to produce in would-be criminals a deterrent effect
which should not be underestimated.
At this point it may be noticed that some states have chosen to deal with their
past of human rights atrocities by enacting amnesty laws which have the effect of
barring proceedings against the perpetrators of such crimes, thus leaving them
unpunished. The underlying policy is meant to restore political and social stability
and foster the process of democratization of countries which have either
undergone long periods of social and political unrest or endured oppressive or
dictatorial regimes.1488 While it may be argued that many treaties impose an
obligation to punish certain conduct,1489 it would be difficult to prove that
customary international law prohibits the enactment by states of such laws.
Surely, however, there is no duty by other states to recognize their effects. Nor
1488 See the interesting decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa of 25 July 1996, Azanian
Peoples Organization v. President of the Republic of South Africa, Case CCT 17/96, comment by Wilhelm
in 91 AJIL (1997) 360, upholding the constitutionality of the Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act of 1991.
1489 See General Comment No. 20 to Art. 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
drafted by the Human Rights Committee in 1994, holding amnesty laws ‘generally incompatible with the
duty of States to investigate such acts, to guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to
ensure that they do not occur in the future. States may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective
remedy, including compensation and such full rehabilitation as may be possible.’
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would a defence based on them be likely to succeed before an international
criminal tribunal or a foreign domestic court.1490
Finally, to ensure the firm rooting of the principle of accountability in the
international community, prosecution of crimes against humanity ought to be
perceived as legitimate and fair.1491 This, in turn, entails the further refinement
of the principle of fairness of judicial proceedings. Defendants must be tried by
an impartial tribunal, be it national or international, on the basis of clear laws, not
having a retroactive effect, and must be in the position to effectively exercise
their fundamental rights of defence.1492 In this respect, it is worthy of note that in
recent practice, both international and domestic, plenty of evidence can be traced
to show that due process requirements have been fully met and the rights of the
defendants duly respected. By way of example, one may refer to the decision of
the ICTY in the Erdemovic case where, after a long and controversial discussion
among the judges, the Appeals Chamber remitted the case to the Trial Chamber
to give the opportunity to the defendant to re-plead in full knowledge of the nature
of the charges and the consequences of his plea.1493 As regards the legitimacy
of the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, both tribunals have addressed
allegations that they would not have been established by law and that they would
lack the necessary independence. Due consideration was given to the objections
raised by the defence, respectively in Tadic’ and Kanyabashi, and, eventually,
the arguments were rejected on legally founded and persuasive grounds.1494
1490 The best analysis of the above issues is Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’, 100 Yale L. J. (1991) 2537. See also Nino, ‘The Duty to Punish Past
Abuses of Human Rights Put in Context: the Case of Argentina’, 100 Yale L. J. (1991), at 2619 et seq. and
Orentlicher’s response, 100 Yale L. J. (1991), at 2641.
1491 On the fundamental importance of perceptions of legitimacy and fairness for ensuring compliance with
international principles and rules see Franck, The Power of Legitimacy, supra note 166; Idem, Fairness,
supra note 166.
1492 The list of factors is somewhat reminiscent of Fuller’s requirements for the inner morality of law (see
L. L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. ed., 1969)).
1493 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic’ (Sentencing Appeal), Case No. IT-96–22-A, 111 ILR 298 (1998). As regards
domestic case law, see the acquittal of John Demjanjuk, indicted for serving as operator of the gas
chambers in the Treblinka extermination camp, by the Supreme Court of Israel on the basis of a reasonable
doubt concerning the real identity of the defendant: see Ivan (John) Demjanjuk v. State of Israel, Cr. A.
(Criminal Appeal) 347/88, summarized in English in 24 Israel Y.B. of Human Rights (1994) 323.
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The fulfillment of the three policy goals expounded above, namely normative
coherence, consistent enforcement and judicial fairness, will give further strength
to the principle of individual accountability for crimes of international law. More
generally, it would contribute to further consolidating the restructuring of the
international community on the basis of a commonality of values and interests,
respect for which must be secured by all of its members.
12.7 Concluding Remarks
The decision of the House of Lords in the Pinochet case is the first judgment
rendered by a municipal court in which a former head of state of a foreign country
has been held accountable at law for acts of torture committed while in post.
Whether this is going to be a landmark in the history of international criminal law
depends on what interpretation will be given to it by scholars and to what extent
other courts in different jurisdictions will follow it. While in the first ruling the Law
Lords had taken a clear, albeit conflicting, stance on the matter of immunity of a
former head of state for acts of torture and other crimes of international law, the
narrow focus of the second ruling as well as the convoluted reasoning of some of
the Law Lords’ individual opinions partly obfuscated the most relevant points of
international law. In many respects the decision is a missed opportunity to shed
light on issues whose relevance extends well beyond the boundaries of the law
of jurisdiction and jurisdictional immunities to reach out to some fundamental
aspects concerning the structure and process of contemporary international law.
Presumably, scholars too will split over the interpretation and assessment of the
likely impact of the case drawing on those parts of the judgment which best fit
their beliefs. It would be desirable that they overtly state their premises in doing
so. As for this writer, he believes that the very notion of crimes of international
law is inconsistent with the application of jurisdictional immunities and domestic
1494 See supra note 104; Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Decision on Jurisdiction Case No. ICTR-96–15-T (18
June 1997); comment by Morris in 92 AJIL (1998) 66. In Kanyabashi, the Court referred to the Tadic’
decision and held that in determining whether or not the Tribunal had been ‘established by law’ due
account had to be taken of the Tribunal’s keeping with the proper international standards providing all the
guarantees of fairness and justice. Furthermore, the independence of the judges would guarantee that any
accused had a fair trial in the light of the Statute and Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal (ibid, at 10).
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doctrines of judicial abstention, particularly as regards those crimes which by
their very nature either presuppose or require state action. If immunity were
granted to state officials or courts refused to adjudicate cases on the merits,
prosecution of such crimes would be impossible and the overall effectiveness of
international criminal law irremediably undermined. The emergence and
subsequent consolidation of the notions of jus cogens and obligations erga
omnes provide a solid conceptual background to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by state over individuals, regardless of their official position, who
commit offences which are universally regarded as attacks against the common
interests and values of the international community. The majority of the Law
Lords acknowledged the non-derogable character of the rules of international law
proscribing torture and crimes against humanity, but eventually failed to draw the
inevitable conclusion that no immunity can be granted to their violators.
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CHAPTER 13
POSSIBLE SOLUTION UNDER THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Ron Jones stopped for a cigarette outside a bookstore in central Riyadh on
March 15, 2001, when a trash can exploded.1495 His wounds and one-night
hospital visit, however, were probably the least painful part of the nightmarish
chapter of his life that then unfolded. From his hospital bed, Saudi officials seized
and imprisoned Jones on suspicion that he planted the bomb.1496 Officials held
the fifty-year-old British tax specialist in a Saudi prison for sixty-seven days,
during which Jones says he was beaten on his hands, buttocks, and the soles of
his feet with a cane and axe handle; deprived of sleep; cuffed and shackled; and
threatened with execution.1497
They punched me, kicked me, bounced me off the walls. Then the caning
started. They caned the soles of my feet and then they started caning my
hands, sometimes with pickaxe handle. They told me they had arrested
my wife and son and that they were doing all this to them as well.1498
“The pain of the torture you forget about,” Jones told the Globe and Mail, a
Canadian newspaper. “The psychological effects of it are a lot more difficult to
recover from.”1499
After returning home to England, Jones, a British national, sued Saudi Arabia in
British court, seeking damages for assault and battery, trespass to the person,
1495 Alan Freeman, Saudis Arrested Second Canadian, Colleague Says, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto),
July 9, 2003, at A12; Paul Kelso, Saudi Bomb Victim’s Torture Ordeal—and Britain’s Silence, Guardian
(London), Jan. 31, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/saudi/story/0,11599,642109,00.html.
1496 Kelso, supra note 1.
1497 Alan Freeman, Briton Fails in Bid to Sue Saudi Arabia for Alleged Torture, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), July 31, 2003, at A18.
1498 Kelso, supra note 1.
1499 Id.
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false imprisonment, and torture.1500 Jones’ case pits the staunch international
condemnation of torture against the sovereign immunity that has been a
cornerstone of the international legal system for centuries. By filing his case in
the United Kingdom, Jones forced the House of Lords to decide whether it would
develop an exception to the default rule of civil sovereign immunity for egregious
acts that violate settled principles of international law-in this case, the prohibition
against torture. In the summer of 2006, the House of Lords decided that the
principle of sovereign immunity remained an inviolable tenet of international law
subject to no exceptions for grave international crimes, and dismissed Jones’ suit
against the Kingdom and the police officers who tortured him.1501
The House of Lords relied both on Britain’s Sovereign Immunity Act and the
breadth of international decisions supporting a blanket sovereign immunity from
civil suit.1502 Lord Bingham noted that the prohibition against torture is likely a
jus cogens norm of international law, but said he found no compelling evidence
to demonstrate that states allow allegations of torture to overcome the
presumption of sovereign immunity.1503 Instead, the applicable law seemed to
confirm that the principle of sovereign immunity remains impenetrable when a
state faces civil suit in a foreign court. Lord Bingham extended sovereign
immunity to the individual Saudi police officials accused of torture by arguing that
these individuals are merely agents of the state, and therefore become folded
into the cloak of immunity that protects Saudi Arabia.1504
The House of Lords missed the larger import of the decision and ignored
developments in international law that should have shaped their approach to
Jones’ request. The Jones decision poses a significant setback for international
human rights lawyers working to ensure that survivors of torture can seek
1500 Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26 (appeal taken from E.W.C.A.).
1501 Id.
1502 Id.
1503 Id. ¶ 27.
1504 Id. ¶ 10.
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reparations for the atrocities they endured. Ironically, the United Kingdom’s own
decision to extradite Augusto Pinochet despite perceptions that this might violate
sovereign immunity is one in a series of cases that developed space to bring suit
against perpetrators of torture.1505 The United States, the United Kingdom, Italy,
and international tribunals have all taken small but significant steps toward
ensuring that torture victims have access to their courtrooms.1506
Although a world where all victims have the guarantee of judicial recognition of
their claims is far from realized, human rights activists remain increasingly
optimistic that foreign courts are ready to litigate torture claims when state courts
and international law have failed.1507 Head of state immunity has been
significantly derailed as an impenetrable defense in torture claims. In 1997, the
United States amended its Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,1508 under which
torture victims can now bring civil suits against governments in federal court.1509
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
emphasized that grave breaches of international criminal law, like torture, can
never be official acts for purposes of immunity.1510 Sovereigns can no longer
rely on immunity when facing criminal charges of horrific human rights abuses.
The next logical space would be to pave the way for the civil suits upon which
many victims rely for personal restitution. The Jones decision is a drastic blow to
that hope.
1505 R v. Bow Street Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (appeal
taken from Q.B.).
1506 Id.; Siderman De Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1991); Prosecutor v. Furund_ija, Case No.
IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998); Andrea Bianchi, Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, 99
AM. J. INT’L L. 242, 244 (2005).
1507 See, e.g., Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights
Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 141, 156–57
(2001); Human Rights Watch, The Pinochet Precedent: How Victims can Pursue Human Rights Criminals
Abroad, http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/chile98/precedent.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
1508 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
1509 See, e.g., Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2003).
1510 Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 148.
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In this paper, I will analyze the international legal context of the concept of state
sovereignty to frame a discussion of the Jones decision. The ultimate dismissal
of Jones’ claims was flawed on several grounds. First, the judges conflated the
definition of torture as an “official” state act with the protection of legitimate state
behavior afforded by sovereign immunity, ignoring the numerous tribunals that
have found torture can never be a legitimate official act for immunity purposes.
Second, the Lords relied on an overly technical distinction between civil and
criminal immunity to avoid determining when the jus cogens prohibition of torture
overcomes sovereign immunity, ignoring the important purpose served by civil
reparations in cases of grave human rights abuse. Third, the Lords significantly
underestimated the degree of growth and movement in case law, particularly
coming out of international criminal tribunals, that has begun to restrict the
concept of sovereign immunity. Recent case law indicates that the protection is
not as ironclad as Lord Bingham and his colleagues argued.
The second part of this paper will discuss an alternate understanding of state
sovereignty more appropriate for an international legal order concerned with
human rights and individual security. The importance of human rights today
cannot be divorced from the evolution of natural law in centuries past, and
exploring the moral and ethical demands of natural law theory will help outline
why human rights deserve paramount respect. Natural law helps shape human
rights as ethical, not purely legal, demands around which the court must shape
positive law. The Jones case demonstrates how absolute notions of sovereign
immunity can preempt adherence to these ethical demands. Sovereign immunity
should not be viewed as an unbending rule, but instead should be approached
with an eye toward the purpose of immunity. Immunity emerged to ensure comity
between states; state sovereign immunity is thus rooted in the idea that legal
rules should promote international peace and equity.1511 Sovereignty is a
functional, practical idea, and should be adapted to the functions and purposes of
the twenty-first century legal order and the shift toward individual rights.
Sovereign immunity should apply only to acts that are consistent with our global
1511 ERNEST K. BANKAS, THE STATE IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PRIVATE SUITS AGAINST SOVEREIGN STATES IN DOMESTIC COURTS 41 (2005).
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legal ideals, and should be denied for acts that directly contravene mandates of
international law.
13.1 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Jones brought squarely in front of the court the tension between longstanding
principles of state sovereignty and the newer human rights norms that formed the
basis for the petitioners’ claims. State sovereignty is the right of a state to
independently order its domestic affairs without the intervention of a third-party
state.1512 Deriving force from the idea that states are equal members of the
international legal community,1513 sovereignty was the bedrock principle of the
Westphalian system in the seventeenth century. In that system, sovereignty was
defined as a state’s exclusive internal competence and the external equality of all
states.1514 A principle contributor to the idea was Thomas Hobbes; his
Leviathan-the sovereign state to which all individuals owed their loyalty-became
a central part of the concept of sovereignty.1515 Hugo Grotius argued that the
law of nations generated force from the mutual consent of state sovereigns, who
divined the sole power to make laws for their subjects from God.1516
The importance of state sovereignty in generating decades of peace and stability
cannot be underestimated. One scholar calls sovereignty the “grund norm of
international law”1517 while another claims that today’s international system is
1512 Id. at 34.
1513 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (Sir Robert Jennings ed., 1992).
1514 HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 24 (2002).
1515 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (2003).
1516 Id. at 166–67. Grotius also put forth a secular notion of natural rights; he felt natural law could not even
be changed by God. “Human rights from this secularized perspective would be considered as nonarbitary,
natural, self-evident principles based on the insight of all natural beings.” Alan S. Rosenbaum,
Introduction: The Editor’s Perspective, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 12 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1980).
1517 William J. Aceves, Relative Normativity: Challenging the Sovereignty Norm Through Human Rights
Litigation, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 261, 261 (2002).
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founded on a “reverence of sovereignty.”1518 On the basis of state sovereignty,
states promised not to intervene in the business of other states so long as sister
states pledged to do the same.1519 As Ernest Bankas explains, “But one
question that must be grappled with is whether an equal can exercise dominion
over another equal. Certainly, no! A sovereign state, given its attributes, has
jurisdiction over every individual living under its protection and over all acts that
take place within its territorial boundaries.”1520
Sovereign states were thus immune from suit in the courts of other states. On a
practical level, sovereign immunity recognizes that a national Court has no power
to enforce a verdict against a foreign state, rendering its judgments null and
void.1521 More theoretically, sovereign immunity maintains the independence of
states to administer internal policies without outside interference. Sovereign
immunity is deemed necessary to maintain comity between states and ensure
that each state has the independence to direct its own domestic policies.1522
Initially, sovereign immunity was an absolute bar to proceedings against a foreign
state.1523 When a state asserted immunity before a court, the Court lacked
jurisdiction to proceed.1524 Sovereign immunity rested on the act of state
doctrine: a national court may not adjudicate an act of a foreign government
within the foreign state’s own territory.1525 Over time, however, commercial and
1518 JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: VERSAILLES TO ROME 1 (2003).
1519 Id. at 30.
1520 BANKAS, supra note 17, at 34.
1521 FOX, supra note 20, at 29.
1522 BANKAS, supra note 17, at 255; see also Controller and Auditor-General v. Sir Ronald Davison,
[1996] 2 NZLR 278 (C.A.). Harold Koh, in his detailed exploration of transnational litigation in U.S.
courts, explained that the three main justifications for sovereign immunity in American courts were comity,
separation of powers, and judicial incompetence. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347, 2356 (1991).
1523 BANKAS, supra note 17, at 21.
1524 FOX, supra note 20, at 18.
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trade links penetrated the isolationist walls of state borders, and citizens of one
state began to bear the consequences of actions by a second state.1526 National
courts thus began making exceptions in trade disputes by distinguishing between
the public powers of the state and the state’s role as a private, commercial
entity.1527 As a result, most states now embrace a “restrictive doctrine of
immunity” that upholds immunity from suit only according to the former, official
category of state behavior.1528 State behavior is divided into acta jure imperii,
where immunity is accorded to official and sovereign activities, and acta jure
gestionis, when states are treated as private entities with no immunity for
commercial transactions.1529
State sovereignty and sovereign immunity fall into the category of customary
international law - “the general and consistent practices of states that they follow
from a sense of legal obligation”1530 which, combined with treaties, forms the
main source of international law.1531 State practice and statements of
international organizations largely reflect the content of customary law.1532 A
principle that is determined to be customary law becomes “binding on all [s]tates,
with the exception of persistent objectors.”1533 Excluding several states
(including the United Kingdom) with statutes outlining immunity, states will
1525 Fiona McKay, Civil Reparation in National Courts for Victims of Human Rights Abuse, in JUSTICE
FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 283, 299 (Mark Lattimer and Philippe Sands eds., 2003).
1526 BANKAS, supra note 17, at 36.
1527 FOX, supra note 20, at 22.
1528 Id. at 2.
1529 David P. Stewart, The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 99
AM. J. INT’L. L. 194, 194 (2005).
1530 JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (2005).
1531 JANIS, supra note 21, at 43.
1532 Id. at 48–51.
1533 Human Rights Committee, International Law Association (British Branch), Report on Civil Actions in
the English Courts for Serious Human Rights Violations Abroad, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 129, 130
(2001).
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generally accord other states immunity out of the belief that this is an unwritten
but obligatory international rule.1534
The fundamental basis for the immunity doctrine-that a state alone possesses
the power to organize its internal affairs-gives the state the discretion to treat its
citizens as it wishes. Herein lies the tension between a world of sovereign states
and a world striving for the universal recognition of human rights norms: the
existence of human rights norms requires a state to treat its citizens with a basic
level of human dignity.1535 As Louis Henkin explains, “Human rights are
universal: they belong to every human being in every human society. They do not
differ with geography or history, culture or ideology, political or economic system,
or stage of societal development.”1536 As such, the demands of human rights
conventions and law reach inside state borders to dictate how a government
must interact with its citizens. Michael Ignatieff aptly calls human rights “a
language of moral intervention”1537 for this very reason.
In the context of the sweeping language of human rights, certain human rights
principles are recognized as jus cogens peremptory norms of international law.
Jus cogens norms are fundamental tenets of international law considered
accepted by and binding on all states, from which no derogation is permitted.1538
Customary rules allow objectors to abstain from following the rule; jus cogens
1534 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 342.
1535 Alison Brysk, Introduction: Transnational Threats and Opportunities, in GLOBALIZATION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 3 (Alison Brysk ed., 2002). Koh argues that “Tokyo and Nuremberg pierced the veil
of state sovereignty and dispelled the myth that international law is for states only, re-declaring that
individuals are subjects, not just objects, of international law.” Koh, supra note 28, at 2358-59. The origins
of this ideal, from a moral and ethical perspective, will be explored in section III.
1536 Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
LAW, TREATIES, CASES AND ANALYSIS 941, 941 (Francisco Forest Martin et al. eds., 2006).
1537 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 19 (2001).
1538 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a jus cogens or peremptory norm of
international law as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53,
May 31, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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rules require objectors’ obedience.1539 Jus cogens norms restrain state
behavior1540 and only the emergence of another norm possessing the same
character can modify them.1541 War crimes, crimes against humanity, and
prohibitions on piracy, genocide, and slavery are all considered jus cogens
norms of peremptory international law.1542 However, “there is very little
agreement as to which other norms fall within the category of jus cogens norms,”
or how a norm reaches this level.1543
Though some debate still exists, jurists and academics generally agree that the
prohibition against torture has reached the status of a jus cogens norm.1544 The
Ninth Circuit wrote, “[W]e conclude that the right to be free from official torture is
fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under
international law, a norm of jus cogens.” 1545The House of Lords recognized the
jus cogens nature of the torture prohibition in Pinochet.1546 The ICTY held that
“[b]ecause of the importance of the values it protects, this principle has evolved
into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in
1539 Human Rights Committee, supra note 39, at 130.
1540 Pamela J. Stephens, A Categorical Approach to Human Rights Claims: Jus Cogens as a Limitation on
Enforcement?, 22 WIS. INT’L L. J. 245, 265 (2004).
1541 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 44, art. 64.
1542 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 8.
1543 Stephens, supra note 46, at 252.
1544 Siderman De Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1991). But see Stephens, supra note 46, at
249. Stephens explains that “[t]here is little agreement about the source of jus cogens norms.” Much has
been written about the utility of the jus cogens classification, and the difficulty of determining whether
prohibitions like that on torture rise to the level of jus cogens. Several notable jurists, including Richard
Posner, disagree that the prohibition of torture can never be derogated from: “If torture is the only means of
obtaining the information necessary to prevent the detonation of a nuclear bomb in Times Square, torture
should be used-and will be used - to obtain the information.” Richard Posner, The Best Offense, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 30.
Alan Dershowitz similarly posits that in the ticking time bomb scenario, if a terrorist knows the location of
a bomb about to go off, the argument for torture is at its strongest, and may even be mandated. Sanford
Levinson, “Precommitment” and “Postcommitment”: The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 2013, 2024 (2003). Though these are important questions, I am not going to analyze them in
this paper and instead will presume the validity of commonly understood jus cogens violations.
1545 Siderman De Blake, 965 F.2d at 717.
1546 R v. Bow Street Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (appeal
taken from Q.B.).
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the international hierarchy than treaty law and even ‘ordinary’ customary
rules.”1547
Cases like Jones present the clash of the customary rule of sovereign immunity
with the mandate that countries may never deviate from certain international
human rights principles. With the birth of human rights as a cognizable
movement, “the international community has recognized the existence of other
norms that now compete with the sovereignty norm for primacy.”1548 As a result,
traditional concepts of sovereign immunity are under attack as never before. In
the 1999 United Nations (“U.N.”) general debate, held almost ten years before
Jones, then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan heralded that “[s]tate sovereignty [is]
being redefined by the forces of globalization and internal cooperation.”1549
Bankas later wrote: “the conceptualization of state equality is losing its irresistible
force and the concept of sovereignty is not as compelling as before.”1550 Aceves
reports that the “sovereignty norm … sits on a precarious perch.”1551 For human
rights norms to have primacy, a state must be held accountable for their
violations, and doing so may require the intervention of a national court:
The argument increasingly being advanced before National Judicial
Authorities is that although restrictive immunity is still evolving and has not
yet attained the character of customary international law, immunity should
be denied in the case of death or personal injury resulting from blatant
disrespect for human rights norms which have attained the character or
statutes of Jus Cogens … e.g. the prohibition of torture, crimes against
humanity and genocide.1552
1547 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 153 (Dec. 10, 1998).
1548 Aceves, supra note 23, at 262.
1549 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 584 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds.,
2000).
1550 BANKAS, supra note 17, at 255.
1551 Aceves, supra note 23, at 262.
1552 BANKAS, supra note 17, at 252.
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Human rights activists have successfully eroded the corners of immunity for
international crimes of the gravest magnitude, such as torture, genocide, or
crimes against humanity.1553
Immunity still remains largely unimpeded for states brought before foreign courts
in a civil capacity,1554 and this is where Jones arrives. The case pushes at the
boundaries of immunity, asking not whether states receive immunity for
international criminal claims, but whether immunity may continue to bar civil
claims by the victims of those international crimes. Sovereign immunity that
prevents a victim from seeking any restitution seems wholly at odds with
universal human rights, and the petitioners in Jones asked the court to revisit the
proper balance between the norms of immunity and human rights.
13.2 THE HOUSE OF LORD’S OPINION IN Jones v. Saudi Arabia
A. The Lordship’s Holding
In Jones, the House of Lords unanimously ruled against revoking sovereign
immunity. Lords Bingham and Hoffman wrote separate but similar opinions for
the case, with the remaining Lordships concurring in these two judgments.
Lord Bingham’s holding rested on several grounds. First, he rejected the
petitioner’s contention that the international prohibition of crimes like torture is of
a higher status, and thus trumps, sovereign immunity.1555 Lord Bingham instead
held that sovereign immunity operates as a procedural  rule regardless of the
substantive claim before the court.1556 Next, he noted that nowhere does the
Convention Against Torture provide for universal civil jurisdiction, nor does the
U.N. Immunity Convention of 2004 provide exceptions to immunity for civil claims
1553 Geoffrey Robertson, Ending Impunity: How International Criminal Law Can Put Tyrants on Trial, 38
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 649, 667 (2005).
1554 McKay, supra note 31, at 284.
1555 Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, ¶ 27 (appeal taken from E.W.C.A).
1556 Id. ¶ 33.
709
based on acts of torture.1557 Finally, and most importantly, Lord Bingham said
he could identify “no evidence that states have recognized or given effect to
international law” requiring universal jurisdiction over claims from breaches of
peremptory norms.1558 As a result, he declined to exercise jurisdiction.
Lord Hoffman surveyed the decisions of many national courts before concluding
that peer tribunals did not support the assertion of jurisdiction for Jones’
claim.1559 He found that the immunity of the state extended to its agents-in this
case, the individual police officials charged with torturing Jones and his co-
petitioners.1560 Finally, Lord Hoffman’s opinion argued that the proper place for
the petitioners’ claim was an international body or tribunal, rendering
inappropriate the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts.1561
A major stumbling block in the petitioners’ case, and similar civil claims to come,
is the United Kingdom’s 1978 Sovereign Immunity Act, which provides states
with immunity from suit in U.K. courts subject to a series of exceptions.1562 The
Act further extends the state’s immunity to anything that might affect the property,
rights, or interests of the state, as well as any representatives of the state.1563
Both Lords Bingham and Hoffman found the existence of the Sovereign
Immunities Act extremely persuasive in resolving the case. The petitioners
conceded, as Lord Bingham noted, that the case did not qualify for any of the
exceptions. Instead, the petitioners argued that the court must understand the
Act in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) Article
1557 Id. ¶¶ 25–26.
1558 Id. ¶ 27.
1559 Id. ¶ 48.
1560 Id. ¶ 52.
1561 Id. ¶ 74.
1562 State Immunity Act of 1979, Ch. 33 (Eng.).
1563 Id.
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6,1564 which guarantees parties access to court, and Section 3 of the United
Kingdom’s Human Rights Act, which mandates that U.K. legislation be read to
give full effect to ECHR rights.1565 The petitioners alleged that immunity was
contrary to a peremptory norm of international law and therefore inapplicable to
the case.1566 Lord Bingham found the Sovereign Immunity Act to be inviolable
and further noted that the U.N. Immunity Convention of 2004 similarly provided
no exception for civil claims based on torture.1567
B. Flaws in the Lordships’ Opinions
Several flaws mark the Lordships’ opinions. The opinions ignored recent
decisions stating that torture can never be considered an official act for immunity
purposes. The House of Lords overplayed the distinction between civil and
criminal cases, refusing to import key principles from criminal decisions into the
civil claim before them. The Lordships also overlooked recent international case
law that allows civil claims for human rights abuses to transcend immunity.
1. Torture is No Longer a Permissible Act of State
The Lordships grounded their decision in the fact that torturous acts are only
defined as torture when committed by a public official or an individual acting in an
official capacity, rendering torture an act of state.1568 The petitioners argued that
1564 ECHR Article 6 states: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, Sept. 21, 1970, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
1565 Human Rights Act of 1998, Ch. 42 (Eng.).
1566 Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, ¶ 17 (appeal taken from E.W.C.A).
1567 Id. ¶¶ 7–10, 26.
1568 The Convention Against Torture defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat.382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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torture, as a violation of jus cogens peremptory norms of international law, can
never be a permissible official act that generates state immunity.1569 Therefore,
petitioners claimed, neither the Sovereign Immunities Act nor the U.N. Sovereign
Immunities Convention should apply. The Lordships dismissed this argument
with little discussion. Lord Bingham wrote, “It is, I think, difficult to accept that
torture cannot be a governmental or official act, since under article 1 of the
Torture Convention torture must, to qualify as such, be inflicted by or with the
connivance of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”1570
Because torture is by definition committed by an official, by Bingham’s reasoning,
these heinous acts unquestionably rest under the umbrella of sovereign
immunity.
This explanation suffers from two fatal shortcomings. One, the Lordships
confused the use of “official” for purposes of defining torture with the
understanding of official behavior that generates sovereign immunity.
Increasingly, courts are defining official behavior for the purposes of immunity as
only those acts that are legally sanctioned.1571 By this standard, only
permissible state action is immune from suit in a foreign court. The Lordships
failed to recognize this qualification for state immunity, and in doing so,
committed a second significant error: overlooking the array of cases holding that
torture may never be an official act for purposes of immunity.
As far back as the Nuremberg trials, international courts have operated under the
assumption that certain behavior is not a legitimate act of state. The Charter of
the International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg states that the official position of
defendants “shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or
mitigating punishment,” expressly negating any sovereign immunity for
individuals engaged in war crimes or crimes against humanity.1572 More
1569 Jones, [2006] UKHL 26, ¶ 14.
1570 Id. ¶ 19.
1571 Controller and Auditor-General v. Sir Ronald Davison, [1996] 2 NZLR 278 (C.A.).
1572 Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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recently, the charters for the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”) have declared that states may not torture individuals as part of
their official policies and acts.1573 In Prosecutor v. Furundzija, the ICTY held that
the “official” nature or policy of torture did not immunize torturers from
punishment:
What is even more important is that perpetrators of torture acting upon or
benefiting from those national measures may nevertheless be held
criminally responsible for torture, whether in a foreign State, or in their own
State under a subsequent regime. In short, in spite of possible national
authorisation by legislative or judicial bodies to violate the principle
banning torture, individuals remain bound to comply with that
principle.1574
A host of cases under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act have similarly invalidated
the notion that torture can ever be a permissible official act. In the landmark case
of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, for example, the Second Circuit expressed “doubt
whether action by a state official in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation’s government, could
properly be characterized as an act of state.”1575 Numerous other U.S. courts
have reaffirmed the Second Circuit’s understanding.1576
1573 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, May 25, 1993,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, Nov.
8, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955.
1574 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 155 (Dec. 10, 1998).
1575 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980). Koh argued that the Second Circuit’s decision
“reaffirmed the Nuremberg ideal: that torture (like genocide) is never a legitimate instrument of state
power.” Koh, supra note 28, at 2367.
1576 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Fernando Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 1995); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Cabiri v. Assassi-Gyimah, 921
F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See
also Letelier v. Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980), discussed infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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A consensus is emerging: egregious violations of jus cogens peremptory norms
cannot be official acts of states. The House of Lords itself has already found this
to be the case. Noting the “bizarre results” that would ensue if torture were
considered a legitimate official act, Lord Browne-Wilkinson queried in Pinochet,
“How can it be for international law purposes an official function to do something
which international law itself prohibits and criminalises?”1577 He ultimately found
torture to be outside the official acts generating sovereign immunity.
The general rejection of torture as an official act demonstrates two things. One, it
reflects the now nearly universal acceptance of the jus cogens character of the
torture prohibition.1578 Two, and perhaps more importantly, holding that torture is
not a legitimate act of state indicates the link between state immunity and an
understanding of immunity tailored to its central purpose. Rather than giving
blanket immunity to all actions that could arguably trace back to official sources,
some courts now implicitly analyze whether an act is permissible act and, in the
case of torture, deny immunity to actions that do not further the purpose of
immunity: a peaceful, working international legal order.1579
The Lordships took a step back from Pinochet and failed to do this in the Jones
case, ignoring international precedent and coming to a result that undermines
present efforts to rein in immunity. In rather circuitous reasoning, the Lordships
dismissed the idea that torture could not be an official act purely based on the
Torture Convention’s definition of the act.1580 By that logic, then, when could the
act of torture, or for that matter genocide, ever generate liability? The definition of
torture should not absolve the perpetrators of liability and punishment as the
Lordships did in Jones. The Lordships confused the use of the word “official” for
1577 R v. Bow Street Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (appeal
taken from Q.B.).
1578 Though many agree that the “compulsory nature of the prohibitions on unlawful killing and torture by
the State is clear—these are non-derogable duties,” jus cogens “is still in some respects a controversial
topic in international law.” Human Rights Committee, supra note 39, at 137. See also supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
1579 See, e.g., Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v.
Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter Congo v. Belgium].
1580 Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, ¶ 19 (appeal taken from E.W.C.A).
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the purposes of defining torture with the act of state doctrine, and failed to look at
state immunity through a more purposive lens, inquiring into the nature of the
activity and whether that activity serves the general purpose of immunity.
2. The Independent Importance of Civil Liability
The outcome of the Jones case illustrates the widening gap between criminal
liability for torturers and civil reparations for their victims. The petitioners relied on
the growing body of case law suspending immunity for criminal prosecutions of
torturers, but the Lordships dismissed this reasoning as inapplicable to the
petitioners’ present civil claims.1581 For example, a key component of the
petitioners’ argument was the House of Lords’ decision in the Pinochet case in
2000.1582 After Pinochet sought medical treatment in the United Kingdom in
1998, Spain issued an arrest warrant based on the myriad torture allegations
leveled against the Senator. The U.K. Commissioner of Police accordingly issued
the warrant, which Pinochet promptly moved to quash as contrary to the head of
state immunity he enjoyed as Chile’s former leader. His challenge ultimately
reached the House of Lords.1583
The House of Lords held that the torture allegations were outside the head of
state immunity that Pinochet argued precluded extradition. Lord Brown-Wilkinson
focused his inquiry on the narrow question of “whether the alleged organisation
of state torture by Senator Pinochet (if proved) would constitute an act committed
by Senator Pinochet as part of his official functions as head of state.”1584 He
answered no, citing the enormous legal loophole such a holding would create:
1581 Id.
1582 Pinochet, 1 A.C. 147.
1583 Id. The House of Lords heard arguments in the Pinochet case three times. Its first decision was
challenged, and consequently set aside, due to one of the Lord’s close ties to Amnesty International, which
intervened on the plaintiff’s behalf.
1584 Id.
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[A]n essential feature of the international crime of torture is that it must be
committed ‘by or with the acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.’ As a result, all defendants in torture cases
will be state officials. Yet, if the former head of state has immunity, the
man most responsible will escape liability while his inferiors (the chiefs of
police, junior army officers) who carried out his orders will be liable. I find it
impossible to accept that this was the intention.1585
The Pinochet decision created an express exception to head of state immunity
for criminal prosecutions of torture. In Jones, the petitioners requested that the
House of Lords again declare that torture could not be an official act for the
purposes of immunity, this time in the context of a civil case.1586 The House of
Lords squarely rejected this proposition, citing the difference between criminal
and civil proceedings as rendering Pinochet inapplicable.1587 Lord Bingham
wrote, “the distinction between criminal proceedings (which were the subject of
universal jurisdiction under the Torture Convention) and civil proceedings (which
were not) was fundamental to that decision. This is not a distinction we could
wish away.”1588
And with this, the House of Lords dismissed the Pinochet decision that had been
heralded as providing a new chapter in seeking justice for torture survivors.1589
While the distinctions between civil and criminal proceedings should certainly not
be ignored, they should not necessarily erase the fundamental message of
Pinochet: some acts are not part of the official behavior that immunity is intended
to protect. The House of Lords provided little justification for granting such
importance to the civil-criminal distinction, and overlooked several reasons that
they should extrapolate principles from the Pinochet decision.
1585 Id.
1586 Jones v. Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, ¶ 19 (appeal taken from E.W.C.A).
1587 Id. ¶ 14.
1588 Id. ¶ 32.
1589 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13.
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That criminal sanctions exist for a particular wrong does not lift the need for
accompanying civil liability. The two forms of liability coexist for separate, but
complementary, purposes. Criminal liability provides the state-or, in this case,
international legal order-with a mechanism to punish those who violate the
principles society views as essential to maintaining a safe, cohesive community.
The proper unit of analysis is the community, and the accused has breached his
or her obligation to the state. Civil liability shifts the inquiry to the individual
sufferer of the harm; here, the legal system tries to make a victim whole through
the recovery of damages. The violator this time has breached his or her
obligation to the individual victim, and civil sanctions concern the victim’s well-
being.
The two forms of liability work together and reinforce each other frequently. Both
criminal and civil remedies “play an important declarative function in society.”1590
Ideally, the holding of a civil or criminal case can even shape emerging
international norms.1591 It is not unusual for a survivor or victim’s family to seek
civil damages after the state has prosecuted a criminal case against a defendant.
Together, civil and criminal liability provide a holistic solution to a particular harm.
When the criminal justice system is unable to provide a remedy for a crime, civil
proceedings at least offer hope that the assailant will, quite literally, have to pay
for his crime. This is precisely what Jones and his co-petitioners asked for in
seeking damages from the Kingdom and the individual assailants.
International law has long recognized the right to an effective remedy for
violations of human rights, as the U.N. Commission on Human Rights concluded
several years ago.1592 The U.N. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to
Remedy and Reparations affirms that “adequate, effective and prompt reparation
is intended to promote justice.”1593 The Principles evince a concern for civil as
1590 Donald Francis Donavan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction,
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 154 (2006).
1591 Koh, supra note 28, at 2398.
1592 McKay, supra note 31, at 285.
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well as criminal protection. The state, not the victim, controls criminal trials; a civil
case channeled by the accuser provides a greater opportunity for empowerment
and restoration.1594 Money damages can compensate the victim for emotional
distress, lost wages, and bodily harm, and can fund the therapy necessary for
healing.1595
That the two forms of liability work closely together indicates that principles
guiding criminal liability should not be so easily dismissed when it comes to civil
cases. The key tenet of the Pinochet case is that some acts cannot be of the
“official” nature necessary for state immunity. There is nothing inherently
“criminal” about that principle. As a minority of the European Court of Human
Rights recently explained:
the distinction . . . between civil and criminal proceedings, concerning the
effect of the rule of the prohibition of torture, is not consonant with the very
essence of the operation of a jus cogens rule. It is not the nature of the
proceedings which determines the effects that a jus cogens rule has upon
another rule of international law, but the character of the rule as a
peremptory norm …….1596
The court provided little explanation as to why the distinction between criminal
and civil liability, for the purposes of the Pinochet holding, is so sacrosanct. The
Lords’ dismissal of Pinochet as criminal, and therefore entirely inapplicable,
seems more likely to stem from a reluctance to deal with the consequences of
what might happen when immunity is lifted, as is explored later in this paper.
1593 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law ¶
(2)(C), U.N. Doc. 60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005) (emphasis added).
1594 Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 156–57.
1595 Id.
1596 Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, [2001] Eur. Cr. H.R. 761, ¶¶ 1, 4 (2001) (Rozakis and Caflisch. J.,
dissenting).
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3. Current Case Law and the Lordships’ Decision
Though a universal consensus has by no measure emerged, the strict sovereign
immunity that the Lordships envisioned is hardly ironclad. Courts and
commentators are recognizing that judges may, and in some cases urging them
to, reject immunity in civil cases for acts contrary to international law. The United
States has taken a leadership role in this realm, amending the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to exempt immunity in cases of torture when the act is committed
by an official of a foreign state.1597 This provision, combined with the Alien Tort
Claims Act1598 and the Torture Victim Protection Act,1599 has spawned dozens
of civil claims for violations of international human rights.1600
As a result, the United States has a breadth of case law focusing on the universal
nature of the torture prohibition, a full exploration of which would consume the
totality of this paper. In Letelier v. Republic of Chile, the D.C. District Court
allowed families of assassinated Chilean government leaders to sue the Chilean
government in the United States, holding that the suit was not barred. The court
held that sovereign immunity was revoked because the act was “contrary to the
precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international law.”1601
The Ninth Circuit found Argentina to have implicitly waived sovereign immunity
by violating international law in torturing its citizens.1602
1597 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1997). The act creates an exception for
immunity in cases where “money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death
that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision
of material support or resources … for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in
by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office,
employment, or agency.”
1598 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
1599 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
1600 Stephens, supra note 46, at 245. In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could sue a sovereign, foreign state in U.S. court, although the “sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction” must be the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, not the Alien Tort Statute.
488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
1601 Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980).
1602 Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Overseas, in Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Court of
Cassation awarded damages in a tort action brought by an Italian citizen
deported and enslaved during World War II. The court determined that “[t]he
argument that no express human rights exception to state immunity exists in
international law is flawed because respect for the inalienable rights of human
beings has attained the status of a fundamental principle of the international legal
order.”1603 A persuasive minority of the European Court of Human Rights in Al-
Adsani v. United Kingdom similarly argued that the torture prohibition “overrides
any rule which does not have the same status,” and that “the jurisdictional bar is
lifted by the very interaction of the international rules involved.”1604
Finally, the ICTY viewed the torture prohibition as “particularly stringent and
sweeping,” requiring states to “put in place all those measures that may pre-empt
the perpetration of torture.”1605 The tribunal also emphasized that the obligation
extends beyond state borders and creates a responsibility to non-citizens as well
as to citizens.1606 Even a cursory overview of case law demonstrates that the
ICTY, U.S. courts, Italian courts, members of the ECHR, and members of the
House of Lords have all rescinded immunity for grave international crimes.
The Lordships, by contrast, relied on the majority’s reasoning in Al-Adsani, which
was a closely decided case, and the International Court of Justice’s decision in
Congo v. Belgium to buttress their finding of immunity. In Al-Adsani, the
European Court held that the United Kingdom was not obligated to waive
immunity when a Kuwaiti citizen brought a torture suit against the Kuwaiti
government.1607 Rather than holding that immunity could never be revoked for
grave human rights abuses, the body only held that there was no firm
1603 Bianchi, supra note 12, at 244.
1604 Al-Adsani, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 85, 111–13 (Rozakis and Caflisch, J., dissenting).
1605 Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 148.
1606 Id. ¶ ¶ 151–52.
1607 Al-Adsani, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 103.
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acceptance that a victim must be entitled to pursue “civil claims for damages for
alleged torture committed outside the forum State.”1608 Nowhere, however, did
the European Court bar a state from pushing past immunity, as the Lordships
suggested.
The ICJ case also merits a second look, particularly since the Lordships rejected
the applicability of criminal cases in most other circumstances, but used this
criminal case to support its argument. Here, the ICJ invalidated a Belgian Arrest
warrant for the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs because to arrest him would
interfere with the effective functioning of his office.1609 Noting that a foreign
minister must frequently travel overseas without inhibition, the ICJ
conclude[d] that the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such
that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad
enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That
immunity. . . protect[s] the individual concerned against any act of
authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the
performance of his or her duties.1610
The ICJ rested its decision not on the universality of state immunity, but on the
benefits to international diplomacy and stability that comes from affording foreign
ministers this immunity. The court examined immunity for what it could contribute
to the international legal order rather than simply stopping the inquiry once
Congo asserted that such immunity existed. These cases do not, when taken in
sum, support a blanket protection of sovereign immunity, but demonstrate that it
is tailored to and analyzed for individual situations, which the Lordships failed to
do.
1608 Id.
1609 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 21 (Feb. 14).
1610 Id. at 22.
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C. Possible Implications of the Lordships’ Decision
The House of Lords decision in Jones contravened applicable case law and
international understandings of torture. The holding also expressly undermined a
prior decision by the same body that found torture to be an act of state for which
immunity could never have been granted. Given this, reasons outside the
courtroom likely influenced the Lordships as much, if not more, as the legal briefs
submitted.
Allowing Jones to proceed for allegations of extraterritorial torture might prompt
thousands of similarly situated potential plaintiffs to theoretically flood the U.K.
legal system, transforming England into the clearinghouse for civil claims that
plaintiffs cannot adjudicate elsewhere. Second, the difficulty of enforcing findings
against Saudi Arabia carries significant costs, both logistically and politically.1611
Enforcement would require great expenditures of British resources to collect
money from Saudi Arabia. Third, a key component of the concept of state
sovereignty is reciprocity: one state leaves another state alone in exchange for
peace in the administration of domestic affairs.1612 If the United Kingdom
asserted jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian interests, the principle of reciprocity
would allow Saudi Arabia to do the same.
On a symbolic level, the House of Lords sent a loud and clear message that the
United Kingdom owes no obligation to survivors of torture abroad. The Lords
ignored the advice of Amartya Sen: “A foreigner does not need the permission of
a repressive government to try and help a person whose liberties are being
violated.”1613 The Lordships hid behind the concept of sovereign immunity to
avoid having to determine what obligations the United Kingdom had to Jones and
the other survivors of torture.
1611 FOX, supra note 20, at 29.
1612 BANKAS, supra note 17, at 42.
1613 Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 14 & 21, 1997, at 33, 39,
available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sen.htm.
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Answering the above question requires deep ethical and moral reflection.
Allowing torture survivors to turn to the United Kingdom1614 for suits against
perpetrators outside British borders implies equal access to justice. Waiving
sovereign immunity would demonstrate that survivors of atrocities by Saudi
Arabia have just as much a right to restitution as do survivors of atrocities by the
United States. The United Kingdom should be compelled to waive immunity and
allow suit by the sheer fact that it can; as Peter Singer outlined in his famous
1972 essay on the Bangladesh famine, “if it is in our power to prevent something
bad from happening, without sacrificing anything comparable” ourselves, it is our
moral obligation to take that action.1615 Thus if suing the government of Saudi
Arabia helps prevent another brutal session of fingernail pulling, waterboarding,
or beating, the United Kingdom has a moral obligation to allow the suit. The
second part of this paper, analyzing a revised version of sovereign immunity,
attempts to carve out a human rights-centered approach to immunity, allowing
survivors access to restitution.
13.3 THE TENSIONS BETWEEN NATURAL AND POSITIVE LAW
The House of Lords’ decision relied almost unilaterally on a discussion of positive
international law-to the extent that it exists, a proposition many challenge1616-
rather than exploring the moral or ethical undertones to the decision they faced.
This part will explore the moral foundations of human rights, whether a natural
rights approach would challenge the Lordships’ decision-making process, and
1614 The United Kingdom had, historically, been seen as a comparative leader in the world of human rights.
With the Human Rights Act, European human rights law became enforceable in U.K. courts, sending a
symbolic message. Douglass Cassel, The Globalization of Human Rights: Consciousness, Law, and Reality,
NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS., Spring 2004, at 2, 5.
1615 Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 231 (1972).
1616 There is also some debate as to whether international law is properly considered as between two states
or between a state and an individual; many think that individual human beings are not the subject of
international law. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100
Yale L.J. 2277, 2293 (1991). Skeptics of considering international norms as law point out that there is no
world government with police power and enforcement mechanisms, and without a means of enforcement,
“norms cannot count as ‘law.’” Id. Lea Brilmayer responds that any seeming disjuncture between domestic
and international law is misplaced; in domestic law, “[a]ssassination of one’s political opponents is out of
bounds, as are torture and suppression of religious freedoms. There is nothing metaphysically suspect about
recognizing comparable standards under international law.” Id. At 2298.
723
the moral obligations of countries like the United Kingdom to victims of human
rights abuses.
A. Natural Law and the Philosophy of Human Rights
The International Bill of Rights-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-prioritizes the dignity of
humankind above all else. The preamble of each document holds that the
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world.”1617 Such bold statements embrace the idea of pre-existing rights for
all human beings that, in the view of some scholars, results in an innate
inviolability of humankind.1618
The legitimacy of human rights (and, by extension, their invocation in legal
systems) largely relies on the ethical or moral underpinnings of the human rights
system. Different scholars all appear to have their own definitions of human
rights, yet a common strand-some notion of unassailable human integrity-runs
through them all. Michael Perry would describe human rights as those stemming
from the idea that “because every human being has inherent dignity, no one
should deny that any human being has, or treat any human being as if she lacks,
inherent dignity.”1619 Amartya Sen defines human rights as “articulations of
ethical demands . . . . that . . . will survive open and informed scrutiny.”1620
Professor Johan D. van der Vyver suggests that human rights are only those
“rights and freedoms that are considered particularly fundamental to the
1617 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/180 (Dec. 12, 1948) (emphasis added); International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights
preamble, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Ex. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (emphasis added); International Covenant for
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights preamble, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added).
1618 Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious Ground?, 54 EMORY L.J. 97, 101–
03 (2005).
1619 Id. at 102.
1620 Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 315, 320 (2004).
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existence of the individual as a human being and as a citizen within the social
structures of the body politic.” 1621Professor Brian Tierney offers that “natural
rights or human rights are rights that inhere in person by reason of their very
humanity.”1622 Martha Nussbaum defines rights as entitlements to
capabilities.1623 These definitions are only a few of many that continue in this
tone.
Yet at their core, all of these definitions are built around the idea that there is
something special about being human, conferring upon every human being a
certain degree of dignity that can never be surrendered forcibly. 1624 Compiling,
sorting, and synthesizing these definitions produces an understanding of human
rights as the dignity, impenetrable without the rule of law, a person derives simply
by being human. This commonality demonstrates the search for a foundation.
The broader human rights movement needs a deeper justification than simply the
Universal Declaration or any one of a host of human rights treaties. Though the
language and world of human rights as such is often considered a product of the
atrocities of the Nazi regime, the idea that humanity’s dignity is sacred is nothing
new.
1621 Johan D. van der Vyver, Morality, Human Rights, and Foundations of the Law, 54 Emory L.J. 187,
188–89 (2005).
1622 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights—Origins and Persistence, 2 NW. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 2, 2
n.2 (2004). Note that Tierney’s definition essentially equates natural rights with human rights, a conflation
that many scholars would disagree with; not all human rights are per se natural rights. Tierney explains:
I have used the term [sic] “natural rights” and “human rights” indifferently. “Human rights” is
preferred nowadays because this usage dissociates the idea of universal rights from the particular
medieval context where the idea of natural rights first emerged. But the two terms have essentially
the same meaning.
Id.
1623 Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 273, 275 (1997).
1624 Some argue that the inherent dignity of humans does not automatically lead to the proposition that
fundamental rights attain some “absolute standard of inviolability.” Morgan Cloud, Human Rights for the
Real World, 54 Emory L.J. 151, 155 (2005). Cloud argues that even the most fundamental human rights,
such as the right to life, can be violated if the rule of law is followed, and even the commitment to the rule
of law can be derogated from at times, such as in an imminent terrorist attack. Id. at 156–57; see also supra
text accompanying note 50.
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Before the world had human rights, the world relied on the force of natural
law,1625 which emerged as far back as the first century B.C.1626 and expanded
into the Roman legal system’s jus naturale: the basic law common to all
humankind, regardless of citizenship, purely by membership in the human
race.1627 Natural law theories reached new heights in the middle ages, when
Catholic philosophers, most notably Saint Thomas Aquinas, conceptualized a
system of natural law as the result of divine will.1628 Saint Augustine held that “a
law cannot be present where there is no justice”1629 and “where true justice
does not exist, the law also cannot be.”1630 Natural law met new interpretations
because social contract theorists believed natural rights-such as those to life,
liberty, and property-to be the byproduct of a natural law, the protection of which
was the sole mission of government. 1631Many, if not most, of these thinkers
relied on the divine will of a higher being as a basis for certain objective truths
about humanity.
After a brief decline in popularity in the late nineteenth century,1632 natural law
experienced resurgence in the aftermath of the horrors of the Nazi regime. In this
revival, however, the rhetoric of dignity and humanity earned the title of human
rights: “It is commonplace to assume that human rights are nearly synonymous
with natural rights ….. Indeed, human rights cannot be understood apart from the
1625 The history of natural law takes up volumes, and this paper does not provide an exhaustive discussion;
however, thinking about human rights from the perspective of natural law helps build a foundation for the
universality of some human rights when positive law fails.
1626 LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 1 (1987).
1627 ROSENBAUM, supra note 22, at 11.
1628 Id.
1629 Van der Vyver, supra note 127, at 192, quoting Aurelius Augustinus, DE LIBERO ARBITRIO 395
(William M. Green ed. Vindobonae (1956)) (“Nam mihi lex esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit.”).
1630 Id. at 192, quoting Aurelius Augustinus, DE CIVITATE DEI: LIBRI XI-XXII 688 ¶ 1 (Bernardus
Dornbart and Alphonsus Kalb eds., Tunholti (1955)) (“[U]bi ergo iustitia vera non est, nec ius potest
esse.”).
1631 ROSENBAUM, supra note 22, at 12.
1632 Rosenbaum attributes its momentary “eclipse” to a variety of factors, including European nationalism
and imperialism, attacks on natural law’s abstract and formal character, and rejections of the liberal theory
of the state. Id. at 21.
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evolutionary history of [the] concept[ ] ….”1633 However, the rebirth of the natural
rights ideal has, for political and pragmatic reasons, generated one stumbling
block for modern day human rights activists. If human rights cannot be divorced
from natural law and natural rights, then they necessarily cannot be divorced
from the religious thinkers who laid their foundations. The proponents of human
rights, however, seek to put forth a universal truth that does not divide across
racial, ethnic, or religious lines; this is the modern human rights project. Aligning
human rights with natural law prompts the question of whether human rights, too,
rest on the divine will. Religious alliances, however, may not be politically savvy;
convincing the House of Lords to accept a case because of a religious-based
natural right requires a collapse of church and state that putting forth a secular
natural right does not. Similarly, when trying to promote human rights across
cultural and ethnic boundaries, avoiding a conflict with a state’s dominant religion
may be essential.
Consequently, human rights law needs a natural law that does not rely on
religion. The intellectual ancestors of human rights, as noted above, may be
faith-based. However, the human rights movement can choose the secular parts
of natural law just as philosophers have chosen to embrace certain parts of
Greek philosophy while rejecting the culture’s reliance on slavery. 1634 As Robert
George, one of today’s leading natural rights theorists, explains, “The natural law
is, thus, a ‘higher’ law, albeit a law that is in principle accessible to human reason
and not dependent on (though entirely compatible with and, indeed, illuminated
by) divine revelation.”1635 George’s assessment insightfully describes the
tension many human rights theorists face: although belief in a higher power is not
necessary for a belief in natural law, belief in the divine makes it infinitely easier
1633 Id. at 4.
1634 Importantly, many of the strongest defenders of human rights share a cultural and religious tradition. It
is certainly no accident that Western and, more recently, Latin American countries have been able to rely
on shared religious tradition to voice ethical and moral obligations. The power of liberation theology is a
quintessential example of the importance of faith in shaping human rights and development movements.
That there is a shared religious background, however, does not mean that the fundamental ideals cannot be
packaged without a religious basis for countries and policymakers that may not share these same religious
beliefs.
1635 Robert P. George, Natural Law, The Constitution, and The Theory and Practice of Judicial Review, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 2269, 2269 (2001).
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to provide a logical source for such rights. Michael Perry, for example, denies
that natural law can exist apart from a belief in a god and is skeptical of a secular
human rights system:
The morality of human rights is, for many secular thinkers, problematic,
because it is difficult-perhaps to the point of impossible to align with one of
their reigning intellectual convictions, what Bernard Williams called
“Nietzsche’s thought”: “There is not only no God, but no metaphysical
order of any kind . . . .”1636
Perry’s rather somber conclusion has negative implications for today’s human
rights movement, a movement frequently charged with Western imperialism and
cultural domination.1637 Basing human rights on religion could be dangerous for
some parts of the world (such as Saudi Arabia, the subject of this paper). The
danger to a non-secular natural law is the charge of relativism.1638 It is certainly
true that religious moralities ensure some degree of consensus; a shared mode
of thinking can provide a baseline of natural “rights” to which everyone who
subscribes to that particular religion can agree.1639 However, religious baselines
can generate as much exclusion as they can build consensus. Regardless of the
power of divine will to Robert George and Michael Perry, or St. Thomas Aquinas
and St. Augustine before them, today’s globalized world requires an arguably
1636 Perry, supra note 124, at 150, quoting Bernard Williams, Republican and Galilean, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS 45, 48 (1990) (reviewing CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF
MODERN IDENTITY (1989)). Earlier in the essay he admits, “I doubt that a natural law morality of
human rights can stand without theological support.” Id. at 133.
1637 Fernando R. Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in The Philosophy of Human
Rights 379, 390 (Patrick Hayden ed., 2001).
1638 Id. at 380 (“A central tenet of relativism is that no transboundary legal or moral standards exist against
which human rights practices may be judged acceptable or unacceptable.”).
1639 But see Cloud, supra note 130, at 160. Cloud points out that many of the seemingly religious ideals of
human rights are not wholly rooted in religious doctrine or scripture:
[A] laundry list of allegedly inadequate secular equivalents to religious claims about the
sacredness of the human being-‘that all human beings are inestimably precious, that they are ends
in themselves, that they are owed unconditional respect, that they possess inalienable rights, and,
of course, that they possess inalienable dignity’-are secular ideas that can be as deeply held and as
compelling as any religious belief. Id.
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more objective1640 basis of belief. The human rights movement, for better or for
worse, will hardly be able to convince Saudi Arabia of the validity of the right to
be free from torture if such a right is linked to a particular religious conception of
human integrity.
Human rights lawyers must focus on the purely ethical constructs of human
rights, that there is something fundamental about humankind that deserves
respect regardless of whether created by a divine will or evolution. There is
certainly nothing inherently religious about this claim, particularly when
understood in opposition to legal positivism, the idea that there is no necessary
link between legal and moral demands.1641 The emphasis on necessary is
important: legal positivists do not dispute that the law and morality frequently
coincide, but they do not require that all laws reflect an underlying moral
assumption.1642 The important contribution of positivism is to realize that natural
law cannot always stand on its own to generate compliance, and, as such,
1640 There is certainly a danger here, with the use of the word objective, of implying that religious natural
rights are not objective. I use the word objective to respond to the criticisms, discussed infra text
accompanying note 149, that natural law is entirely too subjective.
1641 WEINREB, supra note 132, at 3. Legal positivism was very much in vogue in the early twentieth
century, until the vagaries and atrocities of the Nazi regime exposed the dangers of adhering to morally
dubious laws that met a legal positivist’s definition of what a law is. In fact, the Nuremberg tribunals, in
many ways, revived natural law to explain that there was some law outside the positive legal system that
operated to render the Nazi’s behavior criminal, even if the law of the state did not:
[T]he law violated in [that] case did not derive from a system of positive law but from the
conscience of all civilized men. The conviction that it was impossible to leave these horrible
crimes unpunished, although they fell outside a system of positive law, has prevailed over the
positivistic conception of the grounding of the law.
Ch. Perelman, Can the Rights of Man be Founded? in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 47 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1980). Douglass Cassel also notes
that under the positive law, if Germany had only slaughtered German Jews, the legal system would have no
recourse: “how a country treated its own citizens within its own borders was generally a matter exclusively
within its domestic jurisdiction.” Cassel, supra note 120, ¶ 35.
1642 Robert P. George, Reason, Freedom, and the Rule of Law: Their Significance in the Natural Law
Tradition, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 249, 251 (2001). However, to assume that legal positivists care little about the
moral content of law is not quite accurate; “[l]egal positivists agree that positive law is an appropriate
subject of moral inquiry and that a law inconsistent with overriding moral principles does not, simply
because it is the law, obligate one to comply.” WEINREB, supra note 132, at 99.
Even the most ardent proponents of natural law recognized that rooting their moral demands in the rule of
law or legal tradition gave the widest appeal possible. According to Tierney, Las Cass “saw the need to
defend Indian rights in terms of reason and law that could have the widest appeal. Indeed, his work is
especially interesting . . . because he appealed overtly and frequently to the juridical tradition that
undergirded the earlier development of natural rights theories.” Tierney, supra note 128, ¶ 28.
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natural law needs to be offered to policymakers as a viable source for positive
law systems.
Natural law has certainly met its fair share of challenges in recent years,
particularly given recent criticism that the human rights movement is the
imposition of Western values on the rest of the world. Critics dispute the
objectivity of natural law; despite the allegation that natural law is the
accumulation of ethical truths, common criticisms emerge that so-called objective
truths are merely the subjective, biased feelings or emotions of their
proponents.1643 In light of such concerns about relativity, Richard Rorty has
urged human rights activists to abandon the project he calls “human rights
foundationalism.”1644 From this perspective, the goal for human rights theorists
should not be to find a fundamental, natural law like basis for their claims but
should instead be to improve existing institutions.1645 Trying to reach a single
agreement on the source of obligations distracts from the actual fulfillment of
those obligations. It seems hard to reconcile the human rights movement with a
lack of a foundation-particularly given the tenuous nature (at best) of international
law. What motivates the human rights movement but the fundamental belief that
there is something about humanity that deserves respect?1646 The human rights
movement is, if anything, an effort to codify positive law according to higher
ideals; the belief in these ideals is so strong that even after centuries of violations
in different forms, individuals continue to seek greater ways to protect a core
definition of rights. Understanding human rights as a form of natural law helps
one see that human rights norms “form a floor below which international behavior
should not fall.”1647
1643 ROBERT P. George, In Defense of Natural Law 2 (1999).
1644 Perry, supra note 124, at 145.
1645 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope xvii (1999). Rorty himself admits that this has opened
himself to the charge of moral or cultural relativism.
1646 In responding to Rorty’s claim, Tierney argues, “Surely in all societies people have preferred life to
death, freedom to servitude, nutrition to starvation, dignity to humiliation. And human rights claims are one
way of addressing these common needs and aspirations of all human beings.” Tierney, supra note 128, ¶
31.
1647 Brilmayer, supra note 122, at 2298.
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B. Positive Obligations Under Natural Law
Establishing the moral and ethical underpinnings of human rights, and
understanding the movement as a modern incarnation of natural rights is helpful
from an academic standpoint, but what does this mean for Ron Jones? The
philosophical entitlement is only the first part of the inquiry; the more important
question, in practical terms, is what understanding human rights through a
natural law lens means in the modern courtroom. If there is something inherent
about being human that makes human rights worth protecting, it naturally
becomes the job of a just and legitimate judicial system to protect them.1648
The case at hand illustrates the danger of relying on a positive law system,
divorced from morality, to protect basic natural rights that are incident to being
human and not only the product of a formalist legal system.
The deciding factor for the House of Lords was the positivist rule in favor of state
sovereignty, which runs into two shortfalls: one, this ignores any ethical
obligations under a natural law system, and two, overstates the degree to which
state sovereignty is truly a positive law at all.1649 This section will analyze how
courts should make decisions when faced with assertions of natural rights, even
if the positive law has not yet codified them (or has not codified them to the
extent necessary for full enforcement). The House of Lords, when it received
Jones’ case, should have balanced its ethical obligation-as Amartya Sen points
out, human rights are ethical demands above all else1650 against their
perception of a positive law. After all, in the words of Robert George, “respect for
1648 A legal positivist might dispute this point, but as discussed supra note 147 and in the accompanying
text, most positivists tend to believe the law should relate to morality in some fundamental ways.
1649 Lon L. Fuller has identified eight aspects of the rule of law: prospectivity, absence of impediments to
compliance by those subject to the law, the promulgation of rules, clarity, coherence with one another,
constancy, generality of application, and congruence between official action and declared rule. George,
Reason, Freedom and the Rule of Law, supra note 148, at 250. Though state sovereignty will be examined
infra section IV(B), natural law and state sovereignty are arguably violations of the requirements for
coherence and constancy, given changes in the application of the rule over time.
1650 Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, supra note 126, at 320.
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the rule of law does not exhaust the moral obligations of rulers or officials . . .
.”1651
In deciding how to handle the Jones case, the separation between Immanuel
Kant’s concept of perfect and imperfect obligations is particularly instructive.
Take, for example, the case of torture.1652 The obligation, in the face of the
importance of freedom from torture for all, of a would-be torturer is obvious: not
to torture a particular individual.1653 However, as Sen explains, the “perfectly
specified demand not to torture anyone is supplemented by the more general,
and less exactly specified, requirement to consider the ways and means through
which torture can be prevented and then to decide what one should, thus,
reasonably do.”1654 The House of Lords’ decision falls into the latter category,
that of imperfect obligations: the responsibilities of those beyond the would-be
torturer.
As a human right-and perhaps one of the most central human rights the
obligation not to torture is more than a legal obligation; it is an ethical obligation.
That the right to be free from torture is a “significant ethical claim[ ],” and not a
legal claim is “quite irrelevant to the discipline of human rights.”1655 In other
words, in the face of a human rights argument, the House of Lords was to make
an ethical, not purely legal, decision. Instead, because the ethical command
against torture was codified as a legal or semi-legal norm, the Lords forewent the
moral inquiry under the guise of the legal discussion. This, in a legal system
motivated by natural law, is a failure to meet an ethical obligation.
1651 George, supra note 148, at 252.
1652 Sen used the torture example in his essay, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, which was helpful
for thinking about this section. Sen, supra note 126, at 321–22.
1653 Id. at 321.
1654 Id. at 322.
1655 See id. at 325.
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I take as a given that the purpose of a legal system is to provide justice, rather
than simply to provide the rules of capitalism or ensure efficient economic
transactions.1656 A court must decide how to do so in the face of competing
legal obligations (such as, in this case, state sovereignty). For a court, the
difficulty of deciding when to intervene arises when one realizes that not all
human rights are the proper bases for judicial intervention. Imperfect obligations
require the judge to examine the importance of the right at hand, the extent to
which he or she can make a difference, and whether others are going to act in
the absence of his or her own action.1657 The ethical obligation, above all, is to
consider whether one will act by evaluating such factors.1658 The obligation is to
make a reasonable choice, which includes considerations of morality and
justice.1659 The right to be free from torture is undoubtedly a law well-suited for
litigation: the right to bodily integrity is of paramount importance in any hierarchy
of human rights, penalizing perpetrators with civil damages not only recognizes
the occurrence of a harm but may dissuade similar perpetration in the future
when, particularly in the Jones case, other mechanisms have simply failed our
victims.
The Jones case is one of many examples of how formalistic adherence to
positive law can violate natural law tenets. Natural law, to British courts, is not as
foreign as the Jones opinion would make it seem. English common law is close
to a positive embodiment of natural law; it is “a body of law which is the fruit of
(juristic) reason.”1660 The common law tradition of the state contradicts such
1656 See, e.g., van der Vyver, supra note 127, at 199. “The essence of the legal idea is justice, which in one
of its many manifestations requires persons in authority to apply political power to protect basic human
rights and fundamental freedoms of persons under their domain.” Id. The debate over the correlation
between a legal system and a system of ethics has a long and contentious history, and the best consensus is
articulated by HLA Hart: “There is of course no simple identification to be made between moral and legal
rights, but there is an intimate connection between the two, and this itself is one feature which distinguishes
a moral right from other fundamental moral concepts.” HLA Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 Phil.
Rev. 175, 177 (1955).
1657 Sen, supra note 126, at 340. Sen explains this is “an acknowledgement that if one is in a plausible
position to do something effective in preventing the violation of such a right, then one does have an
obligation to consider doing just that.” Id. at 340–41.
1658 Id.
1659 George, supra note 141, at 2276.
1660 Id.
733
positive law adherence in the face of moral demands. Perhaps it was this very
tradition that led to the Pinochet outcome. Regardless, the demands of natural
law or human law would have required the House of Lords to exercise
jurisdictions despite positive assertions of state sovereignty.1661
A court choosing to assert jurisdiction based on some conception of natural rights
would likely face criticisms that the court sought to impose Western values
worldwide.1662 Values are not neutral, and the post-modern world has certainly
highlighted the appeal of moral relativism: that what is good for one part of the
world is not necessarily good for another. This conflicts with human rights based
on natural rights, which embrace universality. Human rights based on natural
rights “embody core values. Among them are the dignity of all human beings,
their equality of fundamental worth, and their need to live in community, with
respect and empathy for others, but also with some measure of individual liberty.
Historically, the West has no monopoly on these values.”1663 Here, we need to
separate the type of human right alleged and recognize that some things today
called “human rights” are not necessarily natural rights. For example, the newly
ratified U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities guarantees a
right to sport,1664 but this is not, to take the definition explored above, something
so fundamental to human integrity that it cannot be taken away. Bodily integrity is
an altogether different form of right, and tracing back to natural rights helps
separate one right from another. Only those that could be understood as natural,
as part of human dignity as it has been understood over time, should receive
standing in court when the positive law and natural law collide.
1661 In this way, sovereign immunity and natural law are inconsistent, as is explored from a legal
perspective infra section IV(B).
1662 Some theorists argue that human rights is inherently, necessarily, and permissibly Western. Brian
Tierney notes that a presentation of human rights history is “necessarily … describing a Western
construct.” Tierney, supra note 128, ¶ 4.
1663 Cassel, supra note 120, ¶ 9.
1664 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities,
G.A. Res. 61/67, art. 30(5), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/611 (Jan. 24, 2007) (“States Parties shall take appropriate
measures (a) To encourage and promote the participation, to the fullest extent possible, of persons with
disabilities in mainstream sporting activities at all levels.”). I do not wish to minimize the importance of
this treaty and the promises it provides, but I do hesitate to elevate this protection to the same level as the
prohibition on torture.
734
Interpreting human rights through natural law establishes both the ethical power
of the human rights movement and exposes the trouble of following positive law
despite persuasive ethical demands. State sovereignty-largely a positive law
concept built on practical, outdated concerns, without extensive ethical
considerations-should not supersede ethical demands in a just legal system.
13.4 A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF IMMUNITY
For a court to make an ethical, not legal decision, it must be willing to reanalyze
legal obligations, such as sovereign immunity, that challenge moral obligations.
The decision in Jones points to the gap between legal and moral duties that
exists for survivors of torture. Victims must either persuade states to conduct
lengthy, expensive, and politically contentious prosecutions of alleged torturers,
or they must accept that the atrocities they endured will go unrecognized. In civil
cases, absolute state immunity for breaches of jus cogens norms ensures that
perpetrators go unpunished and victims unprotected when criminal sanctions fail.
In recognition of this legal black hole, there is a “growing acceptance that
international law might permit the courts of one state to hear a civil action
regarding serious human rights violations that took place in another.”1665 Torture
victims, and similarly situated individuals, should be able to recover civil
reparations.1666 This section will analyze how courts should reinterpret the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to allow victims of grave human rights abuses to
seek reparations in foreign courts.
A. Immunity in a New International Legal Order
The rationale for providing individual reparations aligns with an international
order increasingly concerned with protecting individuals. Historically, international
law was concerned with mediating between co-equal, independent states.1667
1665 McKay, supra note 31, at 287.
1666 For analysis of the importance of reparations for torture victims, see supra section II(b)(3).
1667 FOX, supra note 20, at 25.
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The Westphalian system overlooked what happened within state borders so long
as all states reciprocally recognized the sovereignty of others. Although the
individual was not entirely lost-Grotius himself argued that the individual is the
focal point of all law1668 state primacy remained the best way to achieve the
peace necessary to protect the individual.
This description no longer accurately depicts the international legal order.
1669Protecting the individual from abuse at the hands of the state is now central.
Documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention
Against Torture, and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
demonstrate that the system now prioritize the sanctity of the individual over the
sovereignty of the state; the state is no longer able to subject its citizens to
whatever treatment it deems fit.1670 As Sen writes, “Since the conception of
human rights transcends local legislation and the citizenship of the individual, the
support for human rights can come from anyone whether or not she is a citizen of
the same country as the individual whose rights are threatened.”1671
Sen’s description of human rights points to the degree to which human rights rely
on an international, not purely national, system of enforcement. The Westphalian
state does not fit a scheme designed to protect individuals regardless of their
ethnicity or nationality. Richard Falk explains that “the state is simultaneously too
large to satisfy human needs and too small to cope with the requirements of
guidance needed by an increasingly interdependent planet.”1672 Falk importantly
points out that neither can an individual always access the state for help, nor the
state necessarily guarantee aid when needed; an international community can
1668 LYAL SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 149 (1992).
1669 Certainly, borders are not irrelevant. The past century demonstrates that these borders have become less
important and more porous, not that they no longer exist.
1670 Jean-Marc Coicaud, Human Rights in Discourse and Practice: The Quandary of International Justice,
in THE GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 180 (Jean-Marc Coicaud et al. eds., 2003).
1671 Sen, supra note 119.
1672 Richard Falk, The End of the World Order: Essays on Normative International Relations, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW, TREATIES, CASES AND
ANALYSIS 936, 938 (Francisco Forest Martin et al. eds., 2006).
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address the problems that fall through the fingers of the state. Citizenship is no
longer the core requirement for the enjoyment of particular rights.1673
Globalization has only compounded the shift in attention from the state to the
individual, and the international legal order has had to readjust to accommodate
the rapid flow of immigration and emigration. Genocide, political instability, and
economic upheaval have created a tide of migration across the planet.1674 The
mass movement of people increases the degree to which foreign states are
responsible for the human rights and well-being of strangers. Today, the specter
of terrorism means that countries like the United Kingdom may bear the results of
ignoring deplorable conditions of neighboring countries; the effects of human
rights abuses will not be internalized to the abusing state.
In the case of grave human rights abuses, then, a unilateral focus on state
prosecution of state criminality shifts attention away from the individual that
human rights law has elevated over the past fifty years. Allowing for civil
reparations helps restore focus on, and humanity to, the individual who raised the
allegations in the first place. As Beth Van Shaack explains: “Civil suits provide a
mechanism by which individual victims can initiate and control the legal process.
They contribute toward the rehabilitation of victims, the deterrence of future
abuses, and the enunciation of norms in ways that other forms of redress may
not.”1675 The individualized focus of a civil suit-individualized counsel,
reparations, opportunities to rebuild-is entirely consistent with an international
legal order that increasingly recognizes the importance of the individual.1676
1673 Scholars like T. Alexander Aleinkoff argue that separating between citizen and alien is no longer
appropriate, and that this distinction is “too binary.” Sanford Levinson, Book Review, Shards of
Citizenship, Shards of Sovereignty: On the Continued Usefulness of an Old Vocabulary: Semblances of
Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citizenship, 21 CONST. COMMENTARY 601,
605 (2004).
1674 Gil Loescher, Refugees: A Global Human Rights and Security Crisis, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
GLOBAL POLITICS 229, 233 (Tim Dunne & Nicholas Wheeler eds., 1999).
1675 Van Shaack, supra note 13, at 155.
1676 Rosalyn Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. INT’L L. REV.
265, 271 (1982).
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Universal jurisdiction for civil suits for individual human rights abuses ensures
restitution or rehabilitation when other mechanisms fall short. The courts of the
territory where the abuse occurred are often unwilling or unable to adjudicate
claims stemming from violations of international law. Courts outside this territory
may similarly be unwilling or unable to take on the burden of criminal
prosecution. And despite the proliferation of human rights treaties and
institutions, individuals have recourse to few, if any, international or regional
institutions in times of abuse.1677 In many cases, citizens cannot count on their
domestic courts or on international institutions to remedy rights infringements,
and in those situations, other states’ courts can fill a much-needed gap in
international adjudication.1678 An international system changes the traditional
boundaries of the common good,1679 which an individual’s state can no longer
wholly secure.1680 As John Finnis explains, If it now appears that the good of
individuals can only be fully secured and realized in the context of international
community, we must conclude that the claim of the national state to be a
complete community is unwarranted and the postulate of the national legal order,
that it is supreme and comprehensive and an exclusive source of legal obligation,
is increasingly what lawyers call a “legal fiction.”
In recognition of this legal fiction and the broader community responsible for
common good, all courts, regardless of their location, will thus have an important
role to play in cases needing individualized restitution.
B. Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights Considerations
1677 Id.
1678 Douglass Cassel argues that domestic courts can play a support role, providing “jurisprudential
guidance” to other courts. Cassel, supra note 120, at 65. Right now, he says, “we cannot count on effective
national implementation,” necessitating some degree of intervention by the international community. Id. at
62.
1679 John Finnis defines the common good as “the set of conditions which enables the members of the
community to attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonable for themselves the
value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively or negatively) in
a community.” John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 155 (1980) (quoted in Robert P. George, In
Defense of Natural Law 235 (1999)).
1680 George, supra note 185, at 235. George asserts that natural law theory, in today’s world order,
necessitates the development of a world government.
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Despite the increasing recognition that civil reparations have a crucial role in
addressing torture and similar abuses, principles of sovereign immunity
frequently preempt claims, as was the case in Jones. The Lordships’ vision of
state sovereignty no longer resonates with a global order focused on human
rights. A shift away from understanding immunity as an absolute, unyielding rule
of law would allow petitioners to succeed. Restrictive forms of immunity are not
as uncommon as the Lordships seemed to think they are, and are entirely
justifiable under norms of international law.
1. Traditional Immunity was not Absolute
The notion of sovereign immunity as an absolute, natural right is inconsistent with
the historical understanding of immunity. Rosalyn Higgins argues that this vision
of immunity is backwards: “It is sovereign immunity which is the exception to
jurisdiction and not jurisdiction which is the exception to a basic rule of
immunity.”1681 The presumption is generally in favor of jurisdiction.1682
Historically, courts approached assertions of immunity by examining the purpose
of the act in question, and would only accept immunity if the act had a pure state
purpose.1683 Though jurists have largely invalidated this test in recent years by
examining the nature, rather than purpose of the act, it demonstrates the initial
flexibility of immunity.1684
One of the most cited early codifications of sovereign immunity came from the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1812. Under the orders of Napoleon, French officials
seized a ship belonging to two Maryland citizens as the vessel sailed to
Spain.1685 When the ship returned to an American port, the citizens attempted to
1681 Id.
1682 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 96, at 142.
1683 Id. at 167.
1684 Id.
1685 The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
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reclaim it, but the district Court presumed that it lacked jurisdiction.1686 Writing
for the majority, Justice Marshall found that the ship was a national vessel
commissioned by the state of France, and as such, enjoyed exemption from U.S.
jurisdiction by virtue of sovereign immunity.1687
Justice Marshall grounded his analysis in the purpose of sovereign immunity, and
implied that the outcome would have been different France had used the ship for
commercial purposes: “Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for
wishing such an exemption. His subjects … are not employed by him, nor are
they engaged in national pursuits.”1688 However, when, for example, foreign
ministers arrive in the United States on a diplomatic mission, the nature of the
work justifies sovereign immunity:
A sovereign committing the interests of his nation with a foreign power …
cannot intend to subject his minister in any degree to that power; and,
therefore, a consent to receive him, implies a consent that he shall
possess those privileges which are essential to the dignity of his
sovereign, and to the duties he is bound to perform.1689
Even in the early nineteenth century, it was not possible to fully justify absolute
immunity.
In fact, the emergence of a modern state embroiled in commercial transactions,
as well as political and diplomatic affairs, captivated English judges decades
before Jones. Lord Tom Denning, one of the most celebrated figures in English
law, said in a 1958 speech in Rahimtoola v. The Nizam of Hyderabad that,
“sovereign immunity should not depend on whether a foreign government is
impleaded, directly or indirectly, but rather on the nature of the dispute ….. Is it
1686 Id.
1687 Id.
1688 Id. at 144.
1689 Id. at 139.
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properly cognizable by our courts or not?”1690 Lord Denning rooted his
comments in case law as early as 1820 that denied immunity to claims of
sovereigns regarding ship accidents. For the Lordships of the nineteenth century,
presence within the United Kingdom was enough for the court’s jurisdiction over
commercial state acts.1691 Courts in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries
misread the early case law and failed to draw a distinction based on the nature of
an activity, as Lord Denning urged.1692 Even in the United Kingdom,
“[h]istorically then, the absolute view is devoid of authority. The immunity of the
sovereign was in fact a limited one.”1693
The ease with which states adopted the restrictive conception of immunity
demonstrates that sovereign immunity is not a fundamental, inalterable right.1694
The restriction of immunity when trade and commercial activities crossed state
boundaries implies that immunity can, and should, be modified for an ever-
changing international order. This forces the question: “if contracts, why not
torture?”1695 Just as “the adoption of this restrictive attitude to state immunity
has been encouraged by the vast expansion of activities of the modern state in
the economic sphere,” recognition of human rights has “tended to render
unworkable” an absolute rule.1696 The emergence of human rights norms and a
globalized world are changes that may necessitate recognition of a new balance
between law and sovereignty.1697
1690 Lakshman Marasinghe, The Modern Law of State Immunity, 54 MOD. L. REV. 664, 667 (1991).
1691 Id.
1692 Id. at 670.
1693 Id. at 674.
1694 Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy
Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 754 (2003).
1695 Koh, supra note 28, at 2365. He continues: “If a court could hold a foreign sovereign defen- dant in
violation of a commercial contract without usurping the executive function, why couldn’t it hold the same
defendant in violation of a human rights treaty, or a clearly defined jus cogens norm against torture?” Id. at
2365–66. This is the basis for the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga, discussed supra in text
surrounding note 81, where the court compared the torturer to the commercial pirate or slave trader as an
“enemy of all mankind.” Id.
1696 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 357.
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2. Immunity Based on the Nature of the Act
The existing restrictions on sovereign immunity are based on a classification of
the act as either official or commercial in nature. A human rights centered
sovereignty would add a third classification for acts contrary to jus cogens norms
of international law. Under this system, only official acts that are both non-
commercial and legal under the international order would receive immunity. This
alteration incorporates the increasing recognition that torture is never a
permissible state act. One commentator, urging for a similar reorganization of
sovereignty, calls for a “theory of collective benefit,” claiming that “international
law requires state immunity only as to state activity that collectively benefits the
community of nations.”1698 This model more accurately takes into account the
original purpose of sovereign immunity: to facilitate comity amongst states.1699
Such a reconceptualization of immunity is consistent with existing law. The
International Court of Justice’s decision in Congo v. Belgium found the main
rationale for upholding the foreign minister’s immunity not to be blanket state
sovereign immunity, but the function of the minister’s work in the international
order.1700 The court focused on the nature of his position, rather than the
purpose of the particular act producing the arrest warrant. Both approaches
produce the same result: immunity should be justified by the role it serves in the
international order. Using somewhat differing reasoning, the Wellington Court of
Appeal also found that refusing sovereign immunity was justified when the
impugned activity breaches a fundamental principle of justice.1701 The basis for
the Wellington Court’s finding was less from the nature of the act and more from
the inviolability of certain legal principles, but the message was the same: certain
behavior cannot be considered official acts of state subject to immunity.
1697 JANIS, supra note 21, at 160.
1698 Caplan, supra note 200, at 744.
1699 Id. at 755.
1700 Id.
1701 Controller and Auditor-General v. Sir Ronald Davison, [1996] 2 NZLR 278 (C.A.).
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Others have argued that torture claims should trump assertions of sovereign
immunity under the normative hierarchy theory. This approach identifies the
competing norms at issue in this case, human rights and state immunity and
determines whether “the fundamental character of [one]… is such as to place [it]
on a higher rank with the consequence that they prevail over ‘ordinary’
international law.”1702 Both the prohibition of torture and the promise of state
immunity are customary rules of international law; however, because torture is a
jus cogens obligation and immunity is not, immunity must fall to the torture
prohibition when the two conflict.1703
Normative hierarchy theory is a useful but incomplete way to approach situations
when two fundamental international norms conflict. The theory rests on formalist
distinctions between different sorts of international laws, between jus cogens and
mere customary rules, between unbending obligations and those that do not bind
states. This is important theoretically but limited practically; as many academics
have noted, discerning the exact status of an international legal rule is far from
simple: “oftentimes state practice is so diverse that it may be difficult or even
impossible to find enough consistency of practice to warrant drawing a customary
international legal rule from it.”1704 Normative hierarchy theory may actually
generate as much confusion as it aims to solve when claims of immunity are
brought.
In another approach to sovereign immunity, Harold Koh argues that courts
should approach civil claims for human rights abuses on a case by case basis,
adjusting the controlling doctrines of “federal jurisdiction, civil procedure, and
foreign sovereignty law to target separation of powers, judicial competence, and
comity concerns as they arise.”1705 Though his “doctrinal targeting approach” is
1702 Stefan Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes, and other Rules the- Identification of
Fundamental Norms, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
25 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-March Thouvenin eds., 2006).
1703 See FOX, supra note 20, at 517; see also Caplan, supra note 200, at 741–42.
1704 JANIS, supra note 21, at 53.
1705 Koh, supra note 28, at 2382-83.
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tailored for U.S. courts (clearly federalism doctrine is not an issue in U.K. courts,
nor are separation of powers concerns of the same magnitude for the House of
Lords as for the American judiciary), his case-by-case approach mandates
considered application of sovereignty to see if its invocation is actually serving its
purpose.1706 Koh would have a court ask whether the plaintiff is a member of the
particular class protected by a treaty, the nature of a claim (and the degree to
which it is too political for a court), and the identity of the defendant to determine
whether comity, separation of powers, or judicial competency concerns arise.
This analysis urges the same considerations described above to determine
whether the commitment to sovereign immunity justified in a particular case. In
cases of egregious human rights violations, Koh would argue that it is not.
Somewhat similar to Koh’s approach, courts should evaluate each claim of
sovereign immunity with an eye toward reconciling state immunity with its
purpose. This is what led many states to abandon immunity for purely private or
commercial functions of the state. Adjudicating claims related to trade did not
challenge the peace and equality among states that sovereign immunity emerged
to protect.1707 If torture can no longer be an official act under current law, then it
must be a private act for immunity purposes as well. Adjudicating claims for
breaches of jus cogens norms of international law safeguards and reinforces the
justification for immunity, by forcing states into compliance with the international
legal order. Accountability facilitates the international comity that gave birth to
sovereign immunity in the first place.
States should and do care about ensuring that fellow countries follow the
dominant rules of the international legal order, particularly in the case of jus
cogens peremptory norms. Violations of jus cogens norms, such as waging an
aggressive and unprompted war on a peer state, can directly threaten foreign
states. More indirectly, these violations create refugee populations who are
victims of torture and crimes against humanity, many of whom ultimately land on
1706 Id.
1707 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 357.
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the streets of the United Kingdom, stretching the resources of host states. The
aftermath of genocide, war crimes, and grave human rights abuses creates
humanitarian emergencies that other states must coordinate and fund.
Globalization enables criminal and terrorist activities to cross borders with
ease.1708 In these ways, migration has changed how we think about human
rights.1709
In this self-interested but very real way, states like the United Kingdom have a
concrete and particularized interest in preventing internationally devastating
situations.1710 Civil liability is just one of many tools available that may stem the
tide of grave human rights abuses, and it may have only a limited effect on
torture. Nevertheless, when states do commit these crimes, they strain the ties of
the international community, threatening the peace and stability that the
international system is supposed to provide. This threat induced the Italian Court
of Cassation to hold that “international crimes undermine the very foundations of
international existence,” and give other states the right to take measures to
prevent them.1711 Civil suits could encourage states to consider international
treaties when setting the standards of behavior to which their officials must
adhere, influencing the evolution of new norms.1712 Moreover, even if civil suits
fail to deter violence, they offer a degree of restoration that is unavailable
elsewhere.
1708 Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 Cornell Int’l L.J. 429, 431 (1997).
1709 Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, Globalizing Flows, and State Power, in GLOBALIZATION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 230 (Alison Brysk ed., 2002).
1710 Seita argues that countries like the United Kingdom, which have enjoyed many of the fruits of
globalization by virtue of their position as industrialized democracies, have a special obligation to ensure
that the benefits of globalization accrue to other countries. “The industrialized democracies have an
essential, indispensable role in determining the policies and programs for globalization that will promote
common values, balance competing values, solidify respect for the rule of law, and increase empathy
among nations. This role is given . . . by a simple fact of economics. . . .” Seita, supra note 214, at 471.
1711 Bianchi, supra note 12, at 244.
1712 Koh, supra note 28, at 2398.
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Punishment in foreign courts can be a disincentive for torture.1713 This is not to
say that allowing civil claims in foreign courts will prevent or solve all instances of
human rights abuse. To the contrary, it will make a limited dent on human rights
abuses. However, the significance for the individual victim is substantial, even if
imposing liability offers little deterrence. Adopting a particularized interest in how
foreign states treat their citizens by penetrating immunity is consistent with
facilitating comity among states. An absolute version of immunity is unnecessary;
immunity can be tailored to recognize jus cogens norms without compromising-in
fact, while augmenting-good foreign relations. A rule like this would demonstrate
that immunity does “not apply to state conduct, e.g., the violation of the human
rights of another state’s citizens, which undermines the aim and purpose of the
international legal order.”1714
3. Criticisms
Challenges will arise if jurisdiction widens, but these should be dealt with not by
closing the door to jurisdiction, but by developing strict criteria.1715 In fact, many
of these criticisms are no different for criminal cases, and courts have already
considered them.1716 The first and most obvious criticism of a human rights-
centered immunity, or the “theory of collective benefit,” is the difficulty in
distinguishing what violations sufficiently challenge the “collective benefit” to
necessitate jurisdiction. All human rights violations are potentially detrimental to
the collective benefit and threaten the interests of a foreign state. This could
create a situation where, for example, the execution of juveniles in the United
States prompts civil suits abroad.
1713 Importantly, Douglass Cassel notes that part of what is important about evolving human rights norms is
their uncertainty and unpredictability. Cassel, supra note 120, ¶ 91. He explains:
The risk to governments is further compounded by the constantly changing rules of the game.
Standards are constantly ratcheted up, and ingenious new traps and penalties devised. The only
certainty may be that whatever the costs to a government of human rights violations today, they
may be higher tomorrow. Human rights enforcement is not so much a moving target as a moving
marksman.
Id. ¶ 93.
1714 Caplan, supra note 200, at 771.
1715 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 96, at 157
1716 Van Shaack, supra note 13, at 197.
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This is where the distinction between jus cogens and non-peremptory norms of
international law will prove useful. The importance of a jus cogens norm is that it
is binding on all states regardless of explicit consent,1717 and all states can
therefore be accountable for their violations. Limiting the exception to jus cogens
violations ensures that courts exercise jurisdiction over foreign states only in
cases of the most egregious violations, stymieing the value-laden and culturally
sensitive discussions that can accompany issues like religious freedom or gender
equality. Without the jus cogens modification, a human rights exception to
sovereign immunity could potentially include infinite claims for breaches to
environmental and economic norms.1718
A related concern is the fear that universal civil jurisdiction will have no limitations
and that all states will find themselves subject to liability in another state.1719
Limiting the immunity exception to jus cogens norms helps ameliorate this
concern. Experience with universal criminal prosecutions also helps here; the few
convictions of grave human rights abusers demonstrate that these are norms that
“are not at risk of over enforcement…. [T]he grant of jurisdiction has not been
fully utilized for its purpose of ending impunity for serious violations of
international law.”1720
Some feel that the existence of civil remedies is unnecessary in an age when
states or heads of states can be criminally liable. This, however, misses the
independent importance of civil adjudication, as discussed in section II(b)(ii). Civil
jurisdiction allows victims to control the litigation and directly confront the
perpetrator; victims can turn to civil claims when the state is unwilling or unable
to prosecute. Damages compensate the victim, while criminal claims focus on
1717 JANIS, supra note 21, at 65.
1718 FOX, supra note 20, at 528.
1719 Donovan & Roberts, supra note 96, at 156.
1720 Id.
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punishing the perpetrator. Criminal trials do not obviate the need for civil claims.
“It would be paradoxical if a victim of a human rights violation could exercise
universal jurisdiction in a criminal context, but not obtain civil redress under the
same basis of jurisdiction.”1721
A revised form of immunity will hardly undermine international comity. Many of
the criticisms reflect the concern that international law does not belong in
domestic court because it is different; international law is less law than diplomacy
and politics, and judicial intervention would threaten the diplomatic channels
upon which international harmony relies.1722 However, this is no different from
the many other instances in which the judicial branch has the power to question
the actions of the executive or the legislative branch. Some scholars further
question the importance of immunity, arguing that appearing before a foreign
court does not impair equality, independence, or dignity.1723 The consequences
of a civil ruling are less threatening from a comity perspective; the remedy will
only be money, and will result in less exceptional measures against a
government.1724 In his concurrence to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Justice Breyer
emphasized that universal jurisdiction for civil claims is “consistent with principles
of international comity.”1725 He argued that “allowing every nation’s courts to
adjudicate foreign conduct involving foreign parties in such cases will not
significantly threaten the practical harmony that comity principles seek to
protect.”1726
1721 Van Shaack, supra note 13, at 196.
1722 Brilmayer, supra note 122, at 2279.
1723 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 342.
1724 Van Shaack, supra note 13, at 196.
1725 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
1726 Id.
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13.5 CONCLUSION
Ron Jones suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder.1727 There is still a week
in the midst of the sixty-seven days of torture that he cannot recall because he
was given a sedative that buried the memories.1728 Recovering damages in
British court would not have brought back these missing days, and may not have
fully funded the therapy needed to overcome PTSD. A judgment against Saudi
Arabia, however, could have given Jones and the other survivors the global
recognition that they had been wronged in a way the international community has
said nobody should ever be harmed.
The Lordships’ decision prioritized the customary rule of sovereign immunity over
the jus cogens prohibition on torture. The reasoning was flawed in
misunderstanding the definition of torture, in its emphasis on the division
between civil and criminal proceedings, and in the dismissal of many persuasive
cases from other jurisdictions. The real flaw in the Lordships’ decision, however,
is the ethical message that the decisions send: survivors of torture and other
crimes, no matter how egregious, can find no restitution in the United Kingdom.
In an era when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights promises that “all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,”1729 the House of
Lords prioritized the sanctity of the state.
The inability of survivors like Jones to find civil restitution demonstrates the need
to revisit our understanding of state immunity in light of the overwhelming growth
of the human rights field and its ethical demands. Principles of human rights
determined to be inviolable, like the prohibition on torture or crimes against
humanity, are no longer legitimate acts of the state in the eyes of numerous
courts, and the shield of sovereign immunity cannot apply to them. If our
international legal system gives some tenets the label of jus cogens, states must
1727 Kelso, supra note 1.
1728 Id.
1729 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 123.
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be willing and able to support that assertion by punishing those who violate these
norms. And if criminal punishment is unattainable, civil liability provides a
measure of deterrence, recognition, and restitution.
Without this, perpetrators may go forever unpunished and victims forever
wounded. For Ron Jones, the lack of recognition by the U.K. Court system was
just another shock for him to bear. “They had won,” he said of his torturers after
his release.1730 And with the Lordships’ recent decision brushing aside ethical
obligations, the perpetrators of this abuse did, quite truly, win.
1730 Kelso, supra note 1.
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CHAPTER 14
CONCLUSIONS: PROPOSED REFORMS
14.1 Introduction
The recent judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning
the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (the Congo v. Belgium), delivered on 14
February 2002, confirms the tendency of the Court to be seized and deal with
topical issues confronting the international community. States, particularly
developing countries, increasingly turn to the Court for the settlement of disputes
that touch upon sensitive questions arising in their international dealings.
In this case the Congo claimed that Belgium, by issuing an arrest warrant against
the then Congolese foreign minister for grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and for crimes against humanity allegedly perpetrated
before he took office, breached international law. In particular, according to the
Congo, Belgium violated the ‘principle that a state may not exercise its authority
on the territory of another state’, the principle of sovereign equality of member
states of the United Nations, as well as the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of a sovereign state. Belgium contended, instead, that there had
been no breach of international law, as the foreign minister concerned enjoyed
immunity from prosecution while on official visits to Belgium; he was only liable
for criminal prosecution during visits in a private capacity to Belgium.
Clearly, the question underlying this dispute belongs in the range of crucial
issues facing the current international community: the tension between the need
to safeguard major prerogatives of sovereign states and the demands of
emerging universal values which may undermine those prerogatives. On the one
hand, states cling to the notion that, when it comes to the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction, it is up to the territorial or national state to prosecute and punish
criminal offences. On the other hand, faced with the failure of territorial or
national states to punish odious international crimes, there is a tendency to shift
from territoriality or nationality: states other than the territorial or national state
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claim the right to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over those crimes.
Similarly, international criminal tribunals or courts are set up, precisely to
substitute for states unable or unwilling to prosecute and try alleged authors of
international crimes.
The Court has handed down a judgment that is remarkable for its brevity: it is
both concise and stringent. The Court has pronounced only upon the scope of
immunities accruing to foreign ministers and ruled that Belgium violated
international law, as those immunities cover all acts performed abroad by
incumbent foreign ministers, designed as they are to ensure the effective
performance of their functions on behalf of their respective states. According to
the Court, a foreign minister enjoys immunities from foreign criminal jurisdiction
and inviolability, whether the minister is on foreign territory on an official mission
or in a private capacity, whether the acts are performed prior to assuming office
or while in office, and whether the acts are performed in an official or private
capacity. The Court has, however, excluded that the granting of such immunities
could imply impunity in respect of any crime that a foreign minister may have
committed. In an important passage of the judgment, amounting to an obiter
dictum, the Court has envisaged four exceptions in this regard,1731 none of
which was present in the case at issue.
14.2 The Court’s Spelling Out of the Law on the Personal Immunities Accruing to
Foreign Ministers
The judgment under discussion makes an important contribution to a clarification
of the law of (what one ought to correctly term) personal immunities (including
inviolability) of foreign ministers. This is an area where state practice and case
law are lacking. To make its legal findings, the Court, therefore, did not have to
establish the possible content of customary law. Rather, it logically inferred from
the rationale behind the rules on personal immunities of senior state officials,
such as heads of states or government or diplomatic agents, that such
immunities must perforce prevent any prejudice to the ‘effective performance’ of
1731 See the Judgment, at para. 61; see infra.
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their functions. They therefore bar any possible interference with the official
activity of foreign ministers. It follows that an incumbent foreign minister is
immune from jurisdiction, even when he is on a private visit or acts in a private
capacity while holding office. Clearly, not only the arrest and prosecution of such
a minister while on a private visit abroad, but also the mere issuance of an arrest
warrant, may seriously hamper or jeopardize the conduct of international affairs
of the state for which that person acts as a foreign minister.
By and large, this conclusion is convincing, despite the powerful objections
raised by Judge Al-Khasawneh in his important Dissenting Opinion.1732 The
Court must be commended for elucidating and spelling out an obscure issue of
existing law. In so doing it has considerably expanded the protection afforded by
international law to foreign ministers. It has thus given priority to the need for
foreign relations to be conducted unimpaired.
In contrast, one ought to express misgivings on two issues. First, the Court’s
failure to rule, prior to tackling the question of immunity from jurisdiction, on
whether states are authorized by international law to exercise extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction. Second, the Court’s failure to distinguish between
immunities inuring to state officials with respect to acts they perform in their
official capacity (so-called functional or ratione materiae immunities) and
immunities from which some categories of state officials benefit not only for their
private life but also, more generally, for any act and transaction while in office
(so-called personal immunities). This second flaw involves, as we shall see, legal
consequences that prove extremely questionable.
14.3 The Court’s Failure to Pronounce on Belgium’s Assertion of Absolute
Universal Jurisdiction
It would have been logical for the Court to first address the question of whether
Belgium could legitimately invoke universal jurisdiction and then, in case of an
affirmative answer to this question, decide upon the question of whether the
1732 See Dissenting Opinion, paras 1–2.
753
Congolese foreign minister was entitled to immunity from prosecution and
punishment. That the Court should have proceeded in this manner has been
cogently argued by a number of Judges in their Separate Opinions (President
Guillaume, Judges Ranjeva, Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal, Rezek)1733 as
well as by Judge ad hoc van den Wyngaert in her Dissenting Opinion. It is
therefore not necessary to dwell on the matter. Suffice it to point out that the
Court has thus missed a golden opportunity to cast light on a difficult and topical
legal issue.
Fortunately, some Judges deemed it necessary to discuss the point in their
Separate Opinions; they have thus made a significant contribution to elucidating
existing law. For instance, some of these Separate Opinions clarify terminology.
President Guillaume distinguishes between universal jurisdiction (competence
universelle) denoting jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes by foreigners, based
on the presence of the accused in the forum state, and universal jurisdiction by
default (competence universelle par defaut), that is, jurisdiction asserted by a
state without any link with the crime or the defendant, not even his presence on
the territory, when that jurisdiction is first exercised (by initiating investigations,
issuing an arrest warrant, etc.).1734 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal
distinguish instead between ‘universal jurisdiction properly so called’, that is
jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners,
without the accused being in the territory of the forum state, and ‘territorial
jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events’, that is jurisdiction over
persons present in the forum state who have allegedly committed crimes
abroad.1735 Perhaps, in order to emphasize the ‘meta-national’ dimension of the
jurisdiction, one should speak of ‘absolute universal jurisdiction’ (that is,
jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by foreigners, the exercise of which
is not made subordinate to the presence of the suspect or accused on the
1733 See President Guillaume’s Separate Opinion, paras 1–17; Judge Ranjeva’s Opinion, paras 1–12; Judges
Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal’s Joint Separate Opinion, paras 2–18; Judge Rezek’s Opinion, paras 3–
11; Ad hoc Judge van den Wyngaert, paras 4 and 7.
1734 See paras 5, 9.
1735 See paras 31–52.
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territory), and ‘conditional universal jurisdiction’ (which is instead contingent upon
the presence of the suspect in the forum state).
As to the question of whether either category of jurisdiction is authorized by
international law, President Guillaume answers in the negative, holding the view
that international law only authorizes, at customary level, universal jurisdiction by
default for piracy, whereas treaties may, and indeed do, oblige contracting
parties to exercise universal jurisdiction proper.1736 Judge Rezek takes a similar
view.1737
In contrast, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal maintain that
international customary law, in addition to authorizing ‘universal jurisdiction
properly so called’ over piracy, does not prohibit such jurisdiction for other
offences, subject to a set of conditions they carefully set out.1738 The
enunciation of these conditions whether or not one can fully subscribe to all of
them1739 indubitably constitutes a commendable contribution to the careful
delineation of general legal principles on the question of universal jurisdiction. It
seems correct to hold the view that universal jurisdiction properly so called (or,
1736 See paras 5–9, 12–13.
1737 See para. 6.
1738 These conditions are as follows: (i) the state intending to prosecute a person must first ‘offer to the
national state of the prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the charges concerned’;
(ii) the charges may only be laid by a prosecutor or investigating judge who is fully independent of the
government; (iii) the prosecution must be initiated at the request of the persons concerned, for instance at
the behest of the victims or their relatives; (iv) criminal jurisdiction is exercised over offences that are
regarded by the international community as the most heinous crimes; (v) jurisdiction is not exercised as
long as the prospective accused is a foreign minister (head of state, or diplomatic agent) in office; after he
leaves office, it may be exercised over ‘private acts’ (see paras 59–60 and 79–85).
1739 Some of the conditions may however give rise to objection. For instance, one fails to see why, in the
first of the five conditions set out by the three judges, it is required that ‘the national state of the prospective
accused’ be ‘offered’ the opportunity to act upon the charges. Why should one leave aside the territorial
state (normally the forum conveniens) or the state of which the victim is a national? In addition, why should
one envisage that the state exercising universal jurisdiction should ‘offer’ to another state the chance to
prosecute the suspect? To make such an offer would involve shifting the whole matter from the judiciary to
foreign ministries and might imply making a bilateral agreement. It would be easier to require that the
Court intending to exercise jurisdiction should first establish whether courts of the territorial or national
state have (deliberately) failed to prosecute the suspect at issue; only then should a court proceed to assert
universal jurisdiction.
It is submitted that also the fifth condition should be couched differently, to take account of the existence of
the customary rule referred to in the text above, and which is intended to remove functional immunity in
the case of international crimes.
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according to the terminology I would prefer, absolute universal jurisdiction) is
permitted by general international law, subject to the conditions set out by these
three distinguished Judges regardless of whether or not, as a matter of legal
policy, the upholding of absolute universal jurisdiction is considered inadvisable
in current international relations1740 or even likely to lead to the eventual
substitution of ‘the tyranny of judges for that of governments’.1741
An issue on which most judges seem to agree and is perhaps in need of some
clarification is the view that under customary law piracy constitutes the only case
where states are undoubtedly authorized to exercise ‘universal jurisdiction
properly so called’ (or absolute universal jurisdiction). With respect, it may be
contended that in fact the exercise of ‘universal jurisdiction’ by states over pirates
belongs to the category of ‘territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial
events’ (or conditional universal jurisdiction); in other words, it is predicated on
the presence of the accused on the territory of the forum state. States may try
pirates only after apprehending them, hence only when the pirates are on their
territory or at any rate under their physical control: this is a typical application of
the well-known maxim ubi te invenero, ibi te judicabo. One of the reasons most
likely motivating this legal regulation is that, at a time when piracy was rife and all
states of the world were therefore eager to capture persons engaging in this
crime, potentially innumerable ‘positive conflicts of jurisdiction’ were settled in this
way. Indeed, if all states had been entitled to claim jurisdiction over pirates
wherever they were, very many positive conflicts would have ensued. Instead,
granting jurisdiction to the state apprehending the pirates neatly resolved the
matter. Furthermore, had the universal jurisdiction over pirates been absolute (or
‘universal properly so called’), any state of the world could have issued arrest
warrants against pirates. State practice, however, does not show any such trend,
1740 I, for one, have expressed doubts about the expediency of upholding ‘absolute universality’ rather than
‘conditional universality’, at least with regard to persons having the status of senior state officials, in my
paper ‘Y a-t-il un conflit insurmontable entre souverainete des Etats et justice penale internationale?’, in A.
Cassese and M. Delmas-Marty (eds), Crimes internationaux et jurisdictions internationales (2002), at 22–
28.
1741 See Kissinger, ‘The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction’, 80 Foreign Affairs (2001), at 86 (and see 86–
92).
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and this, together with national legislation1742 and the restatement in the 1932
Harvard Law School Draft Convention and Comment1743 bears out the
‘conditional’ nature of such category of universal jurisdiction. True, under
customary law, restated in Article 105 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea, ‘on the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State’,
every state may seize a pirate ship (or aircraft) and arrest the pirates. It would
seem, however, that this action does not constitute an exercise of jurisdiction in
the sense used by the various Judges in their Opinions, that is, judicial
jurisdiction. It only constitutes an exceptionally authorized use of enforcement
powers over private ships not belonging to the capturing state (executive
jurisdiction). Jurisdiction, in the sense of exercise of judicial power by courts, will
follow. It is the state that has the alleged pirates in its hands that will exercise
jurisdiction: as Article 105 provides, ‘The courts of the State which carried out the
seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed.’1744
Probably, the twofold significance of the word ‘jurisdiction’ accounts for the
questionable language one can find in some of the Separate Opinions. It is well
known that ‘jurisdiction’ means, depending on the context, either effective
authority or control by a state, or state officials, over persons or territory
(executive jurisdiction), or exercise of judicial authority by courts of law (judicial
jurisdiction). The two notions ought to be distinguished. It would seem that when
speaking of piracy and stating that jurisdiction over pirates is ‘universal’ or
1742 See, e.g., Section 290 of the US Criminal Code of 4 March 1909 (35 Stat. 1088) (‘Whoever, on the high
seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found
in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life’ (in 26 AJIL (1932) Suppl., at 899), Article 20(5) of the
1890 Penal Code of Colombia (‘National or foreigners who commit acts of piracy and are apprehended by
the Colombian authorities’ ‘shall be punished according to this Code’ (ibid, at 955), Article 2(2) of the
1916 Penal Code of Panama (ibid, at 997–998), Article 4(9) of the Penal Code of Venezuela, of 1926 (ibid,
at 1013). However, most national laws do not specify whether the pirate must be in the custody of the
prosecuting state, although the laws of Greece (ibid, at 973–974) and Brazil (ibid, at 908) seem to envisage
a very broad jurisdiction, regardless of the presence of the pirate on the territory.
1743 Under Article 14(1) of the Harvard Law School Draft Convention, ‘A state which has lawful custody of
a person suspected of piracy may prosecute and punish that person.’ (26 AJIL (1932), Suppl., at 745). In the
Comment on Article 14 the views of such writers as Halleck, Pradier-Fodere, Bluntschli, as well as the
Report of the Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive
Codification of International Law are quoted in support of the Article (ibid, at 852-854).
1744 In the Comment on the ‘Draft Convention, with Comment’ prepared in 1935 by the ‘Research in
International Law of the Harvard Law School’, it is stated that in the case of the crime of piracy ‘the
competence to prosecute and punish may be founded simply upon a lawful custody of the person charged
with the offence’ (29 AJIL (1935), Supplement, at 564; see also 565).
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‘universal properly so called’ the Judges in question referred wrongly to the
second meaning.
14.4 Is Absolute Universal Jurisdiction Admissible?
Let us return to a major legal issue, namely the view set out by the three Judges
referred to above, that absolute universal jurisdiction is legally admissible under
international law. It seems appropriate to make a few points, which are all
intended to bear out and fortify this view.
First, one should not be misled by the fact that in the case at issue and in other
similarly striking cases, the person accused held a high position in government.
Universal jurisdiction may also be, and indeed is, envisaged for cases involving
lower-rank officers or state agents, or even civilians, culpable of alleged crimes
such as torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and so on. With regard to
such persons, one is at a loss to understand why, if the national or territorial state
fails to take proceedings, another state should not be entitled to prosecute and
try them in the interest of the whole international community. As far as these
persons are concerned, the initiation of criminal proceedings in their absence, the
gathering of evidence and the issuance of an arrest warrant would have the
advantage of making their subsequent arrest and trial possible. Normally these
persons are not well known, and their travels abroad do not make news, unlike
those of foreign ministers or heads of state. Hence the only way of bringing them
to trial is to issue arrest warrants so that they are at some stage apprehended
and handed over to the competent state.
Secondly, it is commonly admitted that under traditional international law states
are allowed to act upon the so-called protective principle, that is, for the
safeguard of national interests, and can thus prosecute foreigners who commit
crimes abroad (for instance, counterfeiting of national currency). In other words,
states are authorized to take proceedings with regard to extraterritorial acts
whose link with the forum state exclusively lies in the infringement by these acts
of a national interest of that state. If this is so, it would seem warranted to hold
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that in the present world community, where universal values have emerged that
are shared by all states and non-state entities, states should be similarly
authorized to act upon such values. To put it differently, it would seem that any
state is currently authorized to try foreigners who perpetrate abroad criminal
offences which have no personal or territorial link with that state, but which attack
and seriously infringe upon those universal values; in so doing, the state acts not
to protect a national interest but with a view to safeguarding values of importance
for the entire world community.
Thirdly, it is a fact that United States courts have for many years asserted
universal jurisdiction by default, admittedly in civil proceedings, over serious
violations of international law perpetrated by foreigners abroad.1745 Although
civil jurisdiction is less intrusive than criminal jurisdiction, when it is exercised
over foreigners who possess official status (for instance, high-ranking state
officials), it nevertheless amounts to interference with the internal organization of
foreign states. Whether or not this trend of US courts is objectionable as a matter
of policy, or on legal grounds, it is a fact that it has not been challenged, or in
other words has been acquiesced in, by other states.
This implicit acceptance through non-contestation would seem to evidence the
generally shared legal conviction that, in case of serious and blatant breaches of
universal values, national courts are authorized to take action, subject to
fulfillment of some fundamental requirements, such as ensurance of a fair trial.
Fourthly, for the purpose of confirming that customary international law or
general principles of international law do indeed authorize - subject to the
conditions set out by the Judges at issue, or to similar conditions1746 the
exercise of absolute universal jurisdiction, one ought to also take into account
some significant elements of state practice. I will briefly recall some of these
elements.
1745 See, e.g., Damrosch, ‘Enforcing International Law through Non-Forcible Measures’, 269 HR (1997), at
161–167.
1746 See my remarks in supra note 9.
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Article 23(4) of the Spanish law of 1985 as amended in 19991747 provided for
absolute universal jurisdiction even in advance of the Belgian law. Furthermore,
the relevant Spanish case law is worthy of mention (in addition to a judgment of
the Constitutional Court,1748 the decisions of the Audiencia Nacional in
Pinochet,1749 Scilingo1750 and Fidel Castro1751 should be recalled). In
1747 Under Article 23 para. 4 that Spanish jurisdiction also extends to ’facts committed by Spaniards or
foreigners abroad and liable to be considered, under Spanish law, as one of the following crimes: (a)
Genocide; (b) Terrorism ….(g) any other crime that, pursuant to international treaties or conventions, must
be prosecuted in Spain’.
1748 See the judgment of 10 February 1997 (no. 1997/56). The ship of the accused (flying Panama’s flag)
had been chased and seized on the high seas for drug trafficking; the accused had been prosecuted before
Spanish courts for one of the crimes over which the Law of 1985 granted universal jurisdiction to those
courts. In its lengthy decision, the Constitutional Court took the opportunity to state in an obiter dictum that
Article 23 para. 4 of the 1985 Law, granting universal jurisdiction, was in keeping with the Constitution:
the Spanish legislator had ‘conferred a universal scope (un alcance universal) on the Spanish jurisdiction
over those crimes, corresponding to their gravity and to the need for international protection’ (Legal
Ground 3 A). Spanish text on CD Rom on Spanish Legislation and case law, EL DERECHO, 2002,
Constitutional decisions.
1749 See, in particular, the Order (auto) of 5 November 1998 (no. 1998/22605). In this order the Spanish
National High Court (Audiencia nacional) confirmed that national courts have jurisdiction over genocide
and terrorism committed in Chile (see Legal Grounds nos 3 and 4; as for torture, where the Court held that
Spanish jurisdiction was based on Article 23(4)(g), on the strength of the 1984 Torture Convention, see
Legal Ground no. 7). It should be noted that the Court concluded that ‘Spain has jurisdiction to judge the
acts (conocer de los hechos), based on the principle of universal prosecution of certain crimes… enshrined
in our domestic law. It also has a legitimate interest (interes legítimo) in exercising that jurisdiction as more
than fifty Spaniards were killed or made to disappear in Chile, victims of the repression reported in the
orders’ (Legal Ground no. 9). In other words, as is apparent both from the words reported and the entire
text of the decision, Spanish jurisdiction was not grounded on passive nationality; the presence of
Spaniards among the victims of the alleged crimes only amounted to a ‘legitimate interest’ of Spain in the
exercise of universal jurisdiction. This order was confirmed by the decision of the Audiencia Nacional of
24 September 1999 (no. 1999/28720). There, the Court reiterated that the Spanish Court had jurisdiction
over the crimes attributed to Pinochet, namely genocide, terrorism and torture (Legal Grounds 1 and 10–
12), and also stated that Pinochet could not invoke the immunities pertaining to heads of states, for he no
longer held this status (Legal Ground no. 3). For the (Spanish) text of the order and the subsequent
decision, see the Spanish case law on CD Rom, EL DERECHO, 2002, Criminal jurisprudence, as well as
on line: www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana.
1750 See the Order (auto) of 4 November 1998 (no. 1998/22604), very similar in its tenor to that of 5
November referred to in supra note 17.
1751 See Order (auto) of 4 March 1999 (no. 1999/2723). The Audiencia Nacional held that the Spanish
Court could not exercise its criminal jurisdiction, as provided for in Article 23 of the Law on the Judicial
Power, for the crimes attributed to Fidel Castro. He was an incumbent head of state, and therefore the
provisions of Article 23 could not be applied to him because they were not applicable to heads of states,
ambassadors etc. in office, who thus enjoyed immunity from prosecution on the strength of international
rules to which Article 21(2) of the same Law referred (this provision envisages an exception to the exercise
of Spanish jurisdiction in the case of ‘immunity from jurisdiction or execution provided for in rules of
public international law’). See Legal Grounds nos. 1-4. The Court also stated that its legal finding was not
inconsistent with its ruling in Pinochet, because Pinochet was a former head of state, and hence no longer
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particular, Fidel Castro bears underlining. This case was material to the matter
submitted to the Court, for it dealt with charges laid against an incumbent head of
state. The Spanish court ruled that, as long as he was in office, Fidel Castro
could not be prosecuted in Spain, not even for international crimes envisaged
under the Spanish law of 1985. In addition, it is worth considering a recent
German case, Sokolovic, where the Bundesgerichtshof ruled that when the
jurisdiction of German courts is provided for in an international treaty, those
courts are entitled to try genocide and other international crimes even absent any
link between the crime, or the offender, or the victim, and Germany.1752 Also
worthy of note is that in the course of the drafting process of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Germany forcefully expressed the view that
international customary law at present authorizes universal jurisdiction over
major international crimes.1753 In line with this view, Article 1 of the bill on
enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction (see Legal Ground no. 5). For the (Spanish) text of the order, see the
CD Rom, EL DERECHO, 2002, Criminal case law.
1752 The German Criminal Code contains a provision (Section 6 para. 1), whereby ‘Regardless of the law of
the place of commission, the German criminal law is also applicable to the following acts committed
outside of Germany: para. 1. Genocide’ (whereas Section 6 para. 9 refers to ‘Acts committed abroad which
are made punishable by the terms of an international treaty binding in the Federal Republic of Germany’).
While in the past courts tended to interpret Sections 6 paras 1 and 9 to the effect that in any case a link was
required with Germany for German courts to exercise jurisdiction (see thereon Ambos and Wirth,
‘Genocide and War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia before German Criminal Courts’, in H. Fischer, C.
Kress and S. Rolf Luder (eds), International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law
(2001), 778), in Sokolovic’ the Federal Supreme Court held that a factual link was not required. The Court
noted that in its decision of 29 November 1999 that the Court of Appeal (Oberlandsgericht Dusseldorf),
following the traditional German case law, had held that a factual link was required by law (legitimierender
Anknupfungspunkt) for a German court to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by foreigners
(in the case at issue the offender was a Bosnian Serb accused of complicity in genocide perpetrated in
Bosnia). The Court of Appeal had found this link in the fact that the accused had lived and worked in
Germany from 1969 to 1989 and had thereafter regularly returned to Germany to collect his pension and
also to seek work. After recalling these findings by the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court added: ‘The
Court however inclines, in any case under Article 6 para. 9 of the German Criminal Code, not to hold as
necessary these additional factual links that would warrant the exercise of jurisdiction . . . Indeed, when, by
virtue of an obligation laid down in an international treaty, Germany prosecutes and punishes under
German law an offence committed by a foreigner abroad, it is difficult to speak of an infringement of the
principle of non-intervention’ (Judgment of 21 February 2001, 3 StR 372/00, still unreported, at 19–21 of
the typescript in German).
1753 In a document submitted in 1998 to the Preparatory Committee drafting the Statute, Germany stated the
following: ‘Under current international law, all States may exercise universal criminal jurisdiction
concerning acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, regardless of the nationality of the
offender, the nationality of the victims, and the place where the crime was committed. This means that, in a
given case of genocide, crime against humanity or war crimes, each and every state can exercise its own
national criminal jurisdiction, regardless of whether the custodial State, territorial State or any other State
has consented to the exercise of such jurisdiction beforehand. This is confirmed by extensive practice.’ (UN
Doc.A/AC.249/1998/DP.2, 23 March 1998).
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international criminal law proposed by the German government and now pending
before the German Bundesrat (Senate), namely the Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Einführung des Volkerstrafgesetzbuches, provides that German law applies to all
criminal offences against international law envisaged in the law (namely
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes), even when the criminal conduct
occurs abroad and does not show any link with Germany.1754
All of these elements of state practice, in addition to showing that states tend
increasingly to resort to absolute universal jurisdiction for the purpose of
safeguarding universal values, also point to the gradually increasing diffusion and
acceptance of the notion that this form of jurisdiction is regarded as admissible
under international law.
14.5 The Court’s Failure to Distinguish between Immunities Ratione Materiae (or
Functional Immunities) and Immunities Ratione Personae (or Personal
Immunities)
Let us move on to the second issue on which one can respectfully disagree with
the Court, namely its failure to draw a distinction between two different categories
of immunities from foreign jurisdiction: (i) those which a foreign minister, like any
state official, enjoys for any official act (so-called functional, or ratione materiae,
or organic immunities), and (ii) those which instead are intended to cover any act
that some classes of state officials perform while in office (so-called personal or,
with regard to diplomatic agents, diplomatic immunities).1755
1754 ‘Dieses Gesetz gilt für alle in ihm bezeichneten Straftaten gegen das Volkerrecht, fur die in ihm
bezeichneten Verbrechen auch dann, wenn die Tat im Ausland begangen wurde und keinen Bezug zum
Inland aufweist.’ (see Bundesrat, Drucksache 29/02, 18 January 2002, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung,
at 3; German text online at www.bmj.bund.de/images/10185.pdf). See the precisions made in the
Commentary, at 29).
1755 Perhaps the Court hinted at this distinction in para. 60 of its judgment, when it stated that ‘Immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While
jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law.
Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot
exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibilities’. However, what the Court states
both before and after these propositions would seem to disregard the fundamental importance of the
distinction referred to above.
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The first category is grounded on the notion that a state official is not accountable
to other states for acts that he accomplishes in his official capacity and that
therefore must be attributed to the state. The second category is predicated on
the notion that any activity of a head of state or government, or diplomatic
agent1756 or foreign minister must be immune from foreign jurisdiction to avoid
foreign states either infringing sovereign prerogatives of states or interfering with
the official functions of a foreign state agent under the pretext of dealing with an
exclusively private act (ne impediatur legatio). This distinction, oddly denied by
Belgium in its Counter-Memorial,1757 is made in the legal literature,1758 and is
based on state practice. With regard to the first class of immunities, suffice it to
refer to the famous McLeod incident and the Rainbow Warrior case1759 as well
as some recent judicial decisions (one can mention the judgment rendered by the
1756 However, as is well known, international rules provide for exceptions to immunities of diplomatic
agents for private acts (see Article 31 para. 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18
April 1961).
1757 See Counter-Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium, of 28 September 2001, at 33, para 3.5.141.
1758 See, e.g., G. Morelli, Nozioni di diritto internazionale (1943, 7th ed., 1967), at 215–216; H. Kelsen,
Peace through Law (1944), at 81–86; Niboyet, ‘Immunite de juridiction et incompetence d’attribution’, 39
RCDIP (1950), 139; H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (1952), at 236–237 (according to Kelsen,
‘the principle that no state has jurisdiction over another state excludes individual - civil or criminal —
responsibility for acts of state’); G. Dahm, Volkerrecht, vol. I, (1958), at 225, 237, 303–305, 338–339 (also
for Dahm the immunity of state organs for officials acts is a consequence of state immunity); G. Sperduti,
Lezioni di diritto internazionale (1958), at 117–121; Giuliano, ‘Les relations et immunites diplomatiques’,
in 100 HR (1960-II), at 166–180 (only with reference to the functions of diplomatic agents); van Panhuys,
‘In the Borderland between the Act of State Doctrine and Questions of Jurisdictional Immunities’, 13 ICLQ
(1964), 1193, at 1205–1208; Seyersted, ‘Jurisdiction over Organs and Officials of States, the Holy See and
Intergovernmental Organizations’, 14 ICLQ (1965), 31–82 and 493–527, at 33–43; Dinstein, ‘Diplomatic
Immunity from Jurisdiction ratione materiae’ 15 ICLQ (1966), at 76–89; Bothe, ‘Die strafrechtliche
Immunität fremder Staatsorgane’, in 31 Zeit. Ausl. Off. Recht Volk (1971) 246; Akehurst, ’Jurisdiction in
International Law’ 46 BYbIL (1972–3), 240–244; A. Verdross and B. Simma, Universelles Volkerrecht (3rd
ed., 1984), at 773–774 (para. 1177); R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. I
(9th ed., 1992), at 346; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed., 1998), at 361–362; P.
De Sena, Diritto internazionale e immunita funzionale degli organi statali (1996), esp. at 109–250; P.
Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th ed., 1997), at 122; A. Cassese,
International Law (2001), at 93–96; Zappala, ‘Do Heads of States in Office Enjoy Immunity from
Jurisdiction for International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case before the French Cour de Cassation’, 12 EJIL
(2001), 595; Gaeta, ‘Official Capacity and Immunities’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. Jones (eds), The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - A Commentary, vol. 1 (2002) 975-1002.
1759 For the McLeod case, see British and Foreign Papers, vol. 29, at 1139, as well as Jennings, ‘The
Caroline and McLeod Cases’, 32 AJIL (1938), at 92–99; for the Rainbow Warrior case, see UN Reports of
International Arbitral Awards, XIX, at 213. See also the Governor Collot case, in J. B. Moore, A Digest of
International Law, vol. II (1906), at 23–24.
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Supreme Court of Israel in Eichmann1760 and that delivered by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber in Blaskic (subpoena)1761).
The distinction is relevant, for the first class of immunity (i) relates to substantive
law, that is, it is a substantive defence (although the state agent is not
exonerated from compliance with either international law or the substantive law
of the foreign country, if he breaches national or international law, this violation is
not legally imputable to him but to his state; in other words, individual criminal or
civil liability does not even arise); (ii) covers official acts of any de jure or de facto
state agent; (iii) does not cease at the end of the discharge of official functions by
the state agent (the reason being that the act is legally attributed to the state,
hence any legal liability for it may only be incurred by the state); (iv) is erga
omnes, that is, may be invoked towards any other state.
In contrast, the second class of immunities (i) relates to procedural law, that is, it
renders the state official immune from civil or criminal jurisdiction (it is a
procedural defence); (ii) covers official or private acts carried out by the state
agent while in office, as well as private or official acts performed prior to taking
office; in other words, assures total inviolability; (iii) is intended to protect only
some categories of state officials, namely diplomatic agents, heads of state,
heads of government, perhaps (in any case under the doctrine set out by the
Court) foreign ministers and possibly even other senior members of cabinet; (iv)
comes to an end after cessation of the official functions of the state agent; (v)
may not be erga omnes (in the case of diplomatic agents it is only applicable with
regard to acts performed as between the receiving and the sending state, plus
third states whose territory the diplomat may pass through while proceeding to
take up, or to return to, his post, or when returning to his own country: so called
jus transitus innoxii).
1760 Judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel of 29 May 1962, in 36 ILR, 277–342, at 308–309.
1761 See Blaskic (subpoena), ICTY Appeals Chamber’s judgment of 29 October 1997, at paras 38 and 41.
For other cases see in particular Bothe, supra note 26, at 248–253.
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14.6 The Distinction between the Two Classes of Immunities and the Coming
into Operation of the Rule Removing Functional Immunities for International
Crimes
The above distinction is important. It allows us to realize that the two classes of
immunity coexist and somewhat overlap as long as the foreign minister (or any
state official who may also invoke personal or diplomatic immunities) is in office.
While he is discharging his official functions, he always enjoys functional
immunity, subject to one exception that we shall soon see, namely in the case of
perpetration of international crimes. Nevertheless, even when one is faced with
that exception, the foreign minister is inviolable and immune from prosecution on
the strength of the international rules on personal immunities. This proposition is
supported by some case law (for instance, Pinochet1762 and Fidel Castro,1763
which relate respectively to a former and an incumbent head of state), and is
authoritatively borne out by the Court’s judgment under discussion. In contrast,
as soon as the foreign minister leaves office, he may no longer enjoy personal
immunities and, in addition, he becomes liable to prosecution for any
international crime he may have perpetrated while in office. This is rendered
possible by a customary international rule on international crimes that has
evolved in the international community. The rule provides that, in case of
perpetration by a state official of such international crimes as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, torture (and I would add serious crimes of
international, state-sponsored terrorism), such acts, in addition to being imputed
to the state of which the individual acts as an agent, also involve the criminal
liability of the individual. In other words, for such crimes there may coexist state
responsibility and individual criminal liability.
That such a rule has crystallized in the world community is evidenced by a whole
range of elements: not only the provisions of the various treaties or other
international instruments on international tribunals, but also international and
national case law (see below). The Court has instead taken a rather ambiguous
1762 See references infra in note 39.
1763 See reference supra in note 21.
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stand on the existence and purport of this rule. Addressing the Belgian
contention that immunities accorded to incumbent foreign ministers do not
protect them when they are suspected of international crimes, and the contrary
submission of the Congo, the Court first excluded the existence of a specific
customary rule lifting immunity from criminal jurisdiction for incumbent foreign
ministers accused of those crimes; it then considered the provisions of the
various international tribunals, whereby the official position of defendants does
not free them from criminal responsibility; it concluded that ‘rules concerning the
immunity or criminal responsibility of persons having an official capacity
contained in the legal instruments creating international criminal tribunals’ only
apply to such tribunals. No ‘such an exception exists in customary international
law in regard to national courts’.1764
Although the Court’s proposition is very sweeping, the context of the Court’s
ruling would seem to indicate that the Court did not intend to deny the possible
existence of a customary rule lifting functional immunities for state officials in the
case of international crimes. In fact, it did not take any stand on such a
customary rule. What it intended to state was that in any case such a rule,
assuming it existed, did not remove that immunity for incumbent senior state
officials.
If this is so, it is respectfully submitted that the Court’s proposition is
questionable. It seems warranted to argue that the customary rule at issue (on
whose existence and purport I shall come back to below) has a broad scope and
importance and does not distinguish between incumbent and former state
officials. The treaty provisions that are at the origin of this customary rule point in
this direction. Article 7 of the Charter of the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal and all the subsequent treaties or at any rate written stipulations
providing in this regard clearly intended to remove the substantial defence based
on the official status of the accused with regard both to incumbent and former
1764 Para. 58 of the judgment. It should be stressed that the clear wording of the Court’s holding (in the
second paragraph of para. 58 of the judgment) excludes that such holding is only intended to apply to
foreign ministers. In other words, it seems clear that the Court has ruled out the existence of a customary
rule concerning any state official, not solely foreign ministers.
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state agents. Actually, given the historical circumstances in which those
provisions were adopted, it can be said that they were primarily intended to cover
persons who were state officials when they committed the alleged crime, but no
longer had such status when brought to trial.
Should one consequently conclude that under customary international law the
lifting of functional immunities in case of international crimes, brought about by
this rule, entails that an incumbent foreign minister may be brought to trial before
a national court for such alleged crimes? The answer is no. However, this is so
only because that minister is protected by the general rules on personal
immunities, as long as he is in office of course. In this respect the Court may be
right in pointing to a difference between the provisions of statutes of international
tribunals and the customary rule (at least, the Court is right with regard to the
practice of the ICTY1765 and the text of the ICC Statute1766). Under customary
law the rule we are discussing must be applied in conjunction with, and in the
light of, customary rules on personal immunities, whereas the statutes of
international criminal tribunals and courts (other than the ICC, where the text is
clear) may perhaps be construed as removing, at treaty level, even personal
immunities.
The above propositions are borne out by some recent cases, such as the
decision mentioned above of the Spanish Audiencia nacional in Fidel Castro,1767
by the French Court of Cassation on 13 March 2001 in Ghadafi, or the decision
of the House of Lords in Pinochet. In Fidel Castro, the Spanish court clearly
stated that as long as the Cuban head of state was in office, no prosecution
could be initiated against him, on account of his entitlement to enjoy personal
immunities. In Ghadafi the French Court held that ‘la coutume internationale
s’oppose a ce que les chefs d’Etats en exercice puissent, en l’absence de
dispositions internationales contraires s’imposant aux parties concernees, faire
1765 See the indictment made by the chief Prosecutor against Milosevic when he was an incumbent head of
state. The indictment was confirmed by a Judge and did not give rise to any objection from other states.
1766 See Articles 27 and 98 of the ICC Statute.
1767 See supra note 21.
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l’objet de poursuites devant les jurisdictions penales d’un Etat étranger’.1768 This
view is absolutely compatible with the rule whereby state officials accused of
international crimes may not plead as a defence, before national or international
courts, their having acted in an official capacity. Indeed, as stated above, under
customary international law this rule only becomes operational after the state
official’s cessation of functions. The shield protecting state agents from criminal
jurisdiction is only removed after that moment. The same holds true for Pinochet,
where their Lordships held that he would have enjoyed immunities were he still in
office as head of state, but that, having left office, he no longer enjoyed such
(personal) immunities.1769
14.7 The Court’s Ruling on the Immunity of Former Foreign Ministers from
Criminal Jurisdiction A The Questionable Resort to the Distinction between
Private and Official Acts
The Court has admittedly recognized that personal or diplomatic immunities are
only procedural in nature. Thus, it states in paragraph 60 of its judgment that ‘the
immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs
does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have
committed, irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional
immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of
substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain
period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies
from all criminal responsibility’.
This proposition is indisputably sound and must be subscribed to. However, in
the following paragraph of its judgment, in an important obiter dictum, the Court
infers from that proposition (paragraph 61 starts with ‘Accordingly’) that the
1768 See text in 105 RGDIP (2001), at 474.
1769 See, e.g., the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in R. v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others,
ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, House of Lords, Judgment of 24 March 1999, in [1999] 2 All ER, at 112–115, as
well as those of Lord Hope of Craighead, at 145–152, Lord Saville of Newdigate, at 169–170, Lord Millett,
at 171-191 and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, at 181–190.
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immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent foreign minister do
not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in four different circumstances that, as
it would seem from the text of the judgment, are given as an exhaustive
enumeration:1770 (i) when the national state institutes proceedings against its
state official; (ii) when the national state (or the state for which the person acts as
an agent) waives the immunities; (iii) when the person has ceased to discharge
his official functions; at that stage ‘[p]rovided that it has jurisdiction under
international law, a court of one state may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs
of another state in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her
period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of
office in a private capacity’; (iv) when an incumbent or former foreign minister
may be subject to criminal proceedings before an international criminal court.
In this paper I shall concentrate on the third hypothesis (some of the Judges to
the case set forth cogent misgivings on the first two in their Joint Separate
Opinion,1771 while the fourth hypothesis obviously becomes relevant when treaty
law or binding international instruments such as Security Council resolutions
taken under Chapter VII are at stake). One can raise two important objections to
the Court’s holding concerning this third hypothesis.
First, the Court wrongly resorted, in the context of alleged international crimes, to
the distinction between acts performed ‘in a private capacity’ and ‘official acts’, a
distinction that, within this context, proves ambiguous and indeed untenable.
Second, the Court failed to apply, or at least to refer to, the customary rule lifting
functional immunities for international crimes allegedly committed by state
agents, a rule that becomes operational as soon as the rules on personal
immunities are no longer applicable (or in other words, as soon as state agents
enjoying personal immunities are no longer in office).
1770 Curiously, in a Press Statement of 14 February 2002, President Guillaume, in summarizing the Court’s
judgment, stated that the Court ‘also pointed out that immunity from jurisdiction and individual criminal
responsibility are two separate concepts’ and went on to say ‘By way of example, the Court emphasized that
Ministers for Foreign Affairs’ did not enjoy immunity in the cases mentioned by the Court (emphasis
added).
1771 See Joint Separate Opinion, supra note 3, at para. 78.
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Let me expound the first objection. For this purpose, it may prove helpful to
envisage four different hypothetical cases: (i) a foreign minister orders, aids and
abets or  willingly participates in, genocide or crimes against humanity before
assuming his official functions of foreign minister (for example, when he was a
senior member of the military); (ii) a foreign minister orders or aids and abets or
willingly participates in the commission of genocide or crimes against humanity
while acting as foreign minister; (iii) a person steals goods or bribes state officials
before becoming foreign minister; (iv) a foreign minister, while in office, kills his
servant in a fit of rage.
Under the Court’s proposition, once the foreign minister has terminated his
ministerial functions, he may be brought to trial before a foreign court having
jurisdiction under international law for acts perpetrated prior to his taking office
(cases sub (i) and (iii)); instead, if he engages in criminal offences while in office,
he may be prosecuted and punished only if those acts are considered as being
performed ‘in a private capacity’ (‘à titre privé’). If this is so, it would follow that he
could only be prosecuted for the murder of his servant (case sub (iv)). What
about international crimes? Can international crimes such as genocide or crimes
against humanity be regarded as being committed ‘in a private capacity’?
It would seem warranted to infer from the holding of the Court that, as crimes are
not normally committed ‘in a private capacity’, state agents do enjoy immunity for
these crimes, even if they have terminated their official functions. That
international crimes are not as a rule ‘private acts’ seems evident. These crimes
are seldom perpetrated in such capacity. Admittedly, a civilian or a serviceman
acting in a private capacity may indeed commit war crimes (think for instance of
the rape or torture of an enemy civilian). It is however hardly imaginable that a
foreign minister may perpetrate or participate in the perpetration of an
international crime ‘in a private capacity’. Indeed, individuals commit such crimes
by making use (or abuse) of their official status. It is primarily through the position
and rank they occupy that they are in a position to order, instigate, or aid and
abet or culpably tolerate or condone such crimes as genocide or crimes against
humanity or grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. In the case of torture
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(not as a war crime or a crime against humanity), the ‘instigation or consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity’ is
one of the objective requirements of the crime (see Article 1 of the 1984
Convention against Torture).
Hence, if one construes the legal propositions of the Court literally, it would follow
that foreign ministers could never, or in any event rarely, be prosecuted for
international crimes perpetrated while in office. However, a more radical question
to be raised is as follows: why should one confine trials by foreign courts to acts
performed ‘in a private capacity’? Which international rules would exclude official
acts?
In fact, the distinction between ‘private’ and ‘official’ acts made by the Court with
regard to international crimes that may have been committed by a foreign
minister while in office, has a twofold origin. First, it is the transposition to the
area of immunities of foreign ministers of the well-established distinction,
applicable to diplomatic agents, between their private and their official acts (the
latter being, pursuant to Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on diplomatic
immunities, the ‘acts performed by such a person [i.e. a diplomatic agent] in the
exercise of his functions as a member of the mission’).1772 This distinction is
designed to emphasize that, when his functions come to an end, the diplomatic
agent stops enjoying personal immunities, whereas ‘with respect to acts
performed . . . in the exercise of his functions as a member of the [diplomatic]
1772 It seems less probable that the distinction under discussion is a transposition of, or grounded on, the old
distinction between acts performed by states jure gestionis (that is, acts of a commercial nature), and acts
done jure imperii. As is well known, this is a relatively outmoded distinction made in recent international
law with regard to acts of states and aimed at establishing when a state enjoys immunity from the civil (not
criminal) jurisdiction of foreign states. While this distinction makes sense with regard to privileges and
immunities of foreign states, it does not hold water with regard to functional (or organic) immunity of state
officials. Let me give an example: if a foreign minister signs abroad, on behalf of his state, a contract for
the purchase of a building to house the state’s embassy, and then fails to pay, he may not be sued, for he is
covered by functional and personal immunities (on account of the former he may not be sued even after
leaving office), whereas the state may be (under the restrictive doctrine of state immunity). If, in contrast,
the foreign minister, after participating in a cabinet decision for the expulsion of nationals of a particular
country, contrary to treaty provisions, is sued before the courts of that country for compensation, he again
is sheltered by functional and personal immunity; in addition, the state enjoys immunity from jurisdiction
for the act was clearly done jure imperii, with the consequence that the matter may only be settled at a
diplomatic or political level. As is clear from these examples, the distinction at issue may be germane to
acts of states, but is irrelevant to acts performed by state officials.
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mission, immunity shall continue to exist’. The distinction, however, in addition to
being of rather complex application,1773 only applies, even in relation to
diplomatic agents, as long as the customary rule removing functional immunities
of state agents in the case of international crimes does not come into operation.
A fortiori the distinction evaporates as a result of that customary rule when what
is at stake are the acts of foreign ministers that may amount to international
crimes. Secondly, the distinction seems to derive from that between ‘official’ and
‘unofficial public acts’ made by some US courts in cases where actions for
damage in tort had been brought against foreign states for acts of torture by state
officials.1774 This distinction manifestly aimed at arguing that, as torture could
not be regarded as an official public act, the foreign state at issue could not claim
state immunity from US jurisdiction. In other words, the distinction was a practical
expedient for circumventing the strictures of the US Act on state immunities (the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, as amended in 1988). Although in this
respect it was meritorious, it is however unsound and even preposterous from
the strictly legal viewpoint.1775
The distinction under discussion, if applied to international crimes committed by
senior state officials, could lead to the consequence that such crimes should be
considered as ‘private acts’ in order that their authors be amenable to judicial
process. The artificiality of this legal construct is evident. This would mean, for
example, that the crimes for which Joachim von Ribbentrop (Reich Minister for
Foreign Affairs from 1938 to 1945) was sentenced to death, namely crimes
1773 As Brownlie, supra note 28, points out (at 361), ‘The definition of official acts is by no means self-
evident.’
1774 See for instance Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F 2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980), Forti v. Suarez Mason, 672 F
Supp.1531 (ND Cal 1987), Evans and others v. Avril, 812 F Supp 207 (SD Florida, 1993). On these cases
see Bianchi, ‘Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human Rights’ 46 Austrian Journal of Public and
International Law (1994), 227–228. See also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp.162 (DMA, 12 April 1995).
Some Lords in Pinochet (iii) have taken up the distinction. See for instance the speeches of Lord Goff of
Chieveley (at 125–126), of Lord Hutton (at 165), and of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (at 187). Lord
Slynn and Lord Lloyd had propounded the same view in their speeches in the first judgment by the House
of Lords in the same case (Judgment of 25 November 1998, in 37 ILM (1998), at 1309 and 1323
respectively).
1775 It should be noted that three Judges were aware of the possible consequences of the Court’s
proposition. In their Joint Separate Opinion, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal mentioned the
view that international crimes may not be regarded as ‘official acts’ ‘because they are neither normal State
functions nor functions that a State alone (in contrast to an individual) can perform’ (para. 85). It would
however seem that they did not necessarily endorse such view.
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against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, should be regarded as
‘private acts’;1776 or that the crime of having failed ‘to secure observance of and
prevent breaches of the laws of war’, for which Mamoro Shigemitsu (Japanese
Foreign Minister from 1943 to 1945) was sentenced to seven years’
imprisonment, should be considered ‘private acts’.1777
B The Court’s Failure to Refer to the Customary Rule Lifting Functional
Immunities for State Officials Accused of International Crimes
Let me now move on to my second objection to the Court’s decision. On the
question of the amenability to trial of former state agents accused of committing
international crimes while in office, the Court, instead of relying upon the
questionable distinction between private and official acts, should clearly have
adverted to the customary rule that removes functional immunity.
National case law proves that a customary rule with such content does in fact
exist. Many cases where military officials were brought to trial before foreign
courts demonstrate that state agents accused of war crimes, crimes against
humanity or genocide may not invoke before national courts, as a valid defence,
their official capacity (leaving aside cases where tribunals adjudicated on the
strength of international treaties or Control Council Law no. 10, one can recall, for
instance, Eichmann in Israel,1778 Barbie in France,1779 Kappler and Priebke in
Italy,1780 Rauter, Albrecht and Bouterse in the Netherlands,1781 Kesserling
1776 For the charges against him see Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal - Nuremberg 14 November 1945–1 October 1946, Nuremberg 1947, I, at 69; for the Judgment
see ibid., at 285–288.
1777 For the judgment of the IMTFE concerning Shigemitsu, see B. V. A. Roling and C. F. Ruter (eds), The
Tokyo Judgment vol. I (1977), at 457–458.
1778 See judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel of 29 May 1962, in 36 ILR, 277–342.
1779 See the various judgments in 78 ILR, 125 et seq, and 100 ILR 331 et seq.
1780 For Kappler, see the Judgment delivered on 25 October 1952 by the Tribunal Supremo Militare, in 36
Rivista di diritto internazionale (1953) 193–199; as for Priebke see the decision of the Rome Military
Court of Appeal of 7 March 1998, in L’Indice Penale (1999), 959 et seq.
1781 For Rauter see the decision of the Special Court of Cassation of 12 January 1949, in Annual Digest
1949, 526–548; for Albrecht see the judgment of the Special Court of Cassation of 11 April 1949 in
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before a British Military Court sitting in Venice and von Lewinski (called von
Manstein) before a British Military Court in Hamburg,1782 Pinochet in the
UK,1783 Yamashita in the US,1784 Buhler before the Supreme National Tribunal
of Poland,1785 Pinochet and Scilingo in Spain,1786 Miguel Cavallo in
Mexico1787). True, most of theses cases deal with military officers. However, it
would be untenable to infer from that that the customary rule only applies to such
persons. It would indeed be odd that a customary rule should have evolved only
with regard to members of the military and not for all state agents who commit
international crimes. Besides, it is notable that the Supreme Court of Israel in
Eichmann1788 and more recently various Trial Chambers of the ICTY have held
that the provision of, respectively, Article 7 of the Charter of the IMT at
Nuremberg and Article 7(2) of the Statute of the ICTY (both of which relate to any
person accused of one of the crimes provided for in the respective Statutes)
‘reflect[s] a rule of customary international law’ (see Karadzic and others,1789
Furundzija,1790 and Slobodan Milosevic (decision on preliminary motions).1791
Furthermore, Lords Browne-Wilkinson, Hope of Craighead, Millett, and Phillips of
Worth Matravers in their speeches for the House of Lords’ decision of 24 March
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1949, 747–751 (in Dutch), summarized in Annual Digest 1949, 397–398; for
Bouterse, see the decision of 20 November 2000 of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal online, at
www.icj.org/objectives/decision.html.
1782 See von Lewinski in Annual Digest 1949, 523–524; for Kesserling see Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals (1947), vol. 8, at 9 ff.
1783 See references in note 39.
1784 See the judgment of the US Supreme Court in L. Friedman, The Law of War, A Documentary History,
vol. II, (1972), at 1599 et seq.
1785 See Annual Digest 1948, at 682.
1786 See references in supra notes 20 and 21.
1787 See the decision of 12 January 2001 delivered by Judge Jesus Guadalupe Luna and authorizing the
extradition of Ricardo Miguel Cavallo to Spain, text (in Spanish) on line in
www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/espana/mex.html.
1788 Supra note 30, at 311.
1789 ICTY, Trial Chamber I, Decision of 16 May 1995, at para. 24.
1790 ICTY, Trial Chamber II, Judgment of 10 December 1998, at para. 140.
1791 ICTY, Trial Chamber III, Decision of 8 November 2001, at para. 28 and more generally paras 26–33.
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1999 in Pinochet took the view, with regard to any senior state agent, that
functional immunity cannot excuse international crimes.1792
In addition, important national Military Manuals, for instance those issued in 1956
in the United States and in 1958 in the United Kingdom, expressly provide that
the fact that a person who has committed an international crime was acting as a
government official (and not only as a serviceman) does not constitute an
available defence.1793
One can also recall that on 11 December 1946 the UN General Assembly
unanimously adopted Resolution 95, whereby it ‘affirmed’ ‘the principles
recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the
Tribunal’. These principles include Principle III, as later formulated (in 1950) by
the UN International Law Commission.1794 All of these Principles, Israel’s
Supreme Court noted in Eichmann, ‘have become part of the law of nations and
must be regarded as having been rooted in it also in the past’.1795
Furthermore, it seems significant that, at least with regard to one of the crimes at
issue, genocide, the International Court of Justice implicitly admitted that under
1792 See supra note 39, at 107–115 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 146–153 (Lord Hope of Craighead), 171-179
(Lord Millet) and 188–192 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers).
1793 See the US Department of the Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare (July 1956). At para. 498
it states that: ‘Any person, whether a member of the armed forces or a civilian, who commits an act which
constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment. Such offenses
in connection with war comprise: a. Crimes against peace; b. Crimes against humanity; c. War crimes.
Although this manual recognizes the criminal responsibility of individuals for those offenses which may
comprise any of the foregoing types of crimes, members of the armed forces will normally be concerned
only with those offenses constituting “war crimes”.’ At para. 510 it is stated that: ‘The fact of a person who
committed an act which constitutes a war crime acted as the head of a state or as a responsible government
official does not relieve him from responsibility for his act.’
See also the British manual, The Law of War on Land (1958), at para. 632 (‘Heads of States and their
ministers enjoy no immunity from prosecution and punishment for war crimes. Their liability is governed
by the same principles as those governing the responsibility of State officials except that the defence of
superior orders is never open to Heads of States and is rarely open to ministers’).
1794 Principle II provides as follows: ‘The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime
under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him
from responsibility under international law’. See YbILC (1950, II), at 192.
1795 Supra note 30, at 311.
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customary law any official status does not relieve responsibility. In its Advisory
Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, the Court held that ‘the
principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by
civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional
obligation’.1796 Among these principles one cannot but include the principle
underlying Article IV, whereby ‘Persons committing genocide …. shall be
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals.’ It is notable that the UN Secretary-General took the same
view of the customary status of the Genocide Convention (or, more accurately, of
the substantive principles it lays down), a view that was endorsed implicitly by the
UN Security Council,1797 and explicitly by a Trial Chamber of the ICTR in
Akayesu and of the ICTY in Krstic.1798
A further element supporting the existence of a customary rule having a general
purport can be found in the pleadings of the two states before the Court: the
Congo and Belgium. In its Memoire of 15 May 2001, the Congo explicitly
admitted the existence of a principle of international criminal law, whereby the
official status of a state agent cannot exonerate him from individual responsibility
for crimes committed while in office; the Congo also added that on this point
there was no disagreement with Belgium.1799
Arguably, while each of these elements of practice, on its own, cannot be
regarded as indicative of the crystallization of a customary rule, taken together
they may be deemed to evidence the formation of such a rule (a rule, it should be
added, on whose existence legal commentators seem to agree, although
1796 ICJ Reports (1951), at 24.
1797 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para. 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN
Doc. S/25704, at para. 45.
1798 ICTR, Trial Chamber I, judgment of 2 September 1998, at para. 495; ICTY, Trial Chamber I, judgment
of 2 August 2001, at para. 541.
1799 Memoire, at 39, para. 60 (<< . . . la R.D.C. ne conteste pas qu’est un principe de droit international
penal, notamment forge par les jurisprudences de Nuremberg et de Tokyo, la regle suivant laquelle la
qualite officielle de l’accuse au moment des faits ne peut pas constituer une cause d’exoneration de sa
responsabilite penale ou un motif de reduction de sa peine lorsqu’il est juge, que ce soit par une
jurisdiction interne ou une juridiction internationale. Sur ce point, aucune divergence existe avec l’Etat
belge.>>)
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admittedly without producing compelling evidence concerning state or judicial
practice,1800 and which the Institut de droit international has recently restated, at
least with regard to heads of state or government).1801
Let me emphasize that the logic behind this rule, which was forcefully set out as
early as 1945 by Justice Robert H. Jackson in his Report to the US President on
the works for the prosecution of major German war criminals,1802 is in line with
contemporary trends in international law. At present, more so than in the past, it
is state officials, and in particular senior officials, that commit international
crimes. Most of the time they do not perpetrate crimes directly. They order, plan,
instigate, organize, aid and abet or culpably tolerate or acquiesce, or willingly or
negligently fail to prevent or punish international crimes. This is why ‘superior
responsibility’ has acquired, since Yamashita (1946), such importance. To allow
these state agents to go scot-free only because they acted in an official capacity,
except in the few cases where an international criminal tribunal has been
established or an international treaty is applicable, would mean to bow to and
1800 See, e.g., Glaser, ‘L’Acte d’Etat et le probleme de la responsabilite individuelle’, Revue de droit penal
et de criminologie (1950), 1 et seq; S. Glaser, Introduction à l’Etude du Droit International Penal (1954),
at 71–76; G. Hoffmann, Strafrechtliche Verantwortung im Volkerrecht – Zum gegenwärtigen Stand des
Volkerrechtlichen Strafrechts (1962), at 135–139 (only with regard to war crimes); Bothe, supra note 28, at
254–257; Akehurst, supra, note 28, at 241; Dinstein, ‘International Criminal Law’, in 5 Israel Yearbook on
Human Rights (1975), at 82–83; De Sena, supra note 28, at 139–187; Malanczuk, supra note 28, at 122;
Bianchi, ‘Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case’, 10 EJIL (1999), at 259–260, 269–270.
1801 See the Resolution on ‘Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of
Governments in International Law’ adopted at the Session of Vancouver (August 2001). At Article 13(2) it
is stated that, although a former head of state (or government) enjoys immunity in respect of acts performed
in the exercise of official functions and related to the exercise thereof, he or she nevertheless may be
prosecuted and tried ‘when the acts alleged constitute a crime under international law’.
1802 In his Report to the US President of 6 June 1945, Justice R. H. Jackson (who had been appointed by
President Roosevelt as ‘Chief Counsel for the United States in prosecuting the principal Axis War
Criminals’) illustrated as follows the first draft of Article 7 of the London Agreement (whereby ‘The
official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government
departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment’),
contained in a US memorandum presented at San Francisco on 30 April 1945: ‘Nor should such a defence
be recognized as the obsolete doctrine that a head of state is immune from legal liability. There is more
than a suspicion that this idea is a relic of the doctrine of the divine right of kings. It is, in any event,
inconsistent with the position we take toward our own officials, who are frequently brought to court at the
suit of citizens who allege their rights to have been invaded. We do not accept the paradox that legal
responsibility should be the least where power is the greatest. We stand on the principle of responsible
government declared some three centuries ago to King James by Lord Justice Coke, who proclaimed that
even a King is still “under God and the law”’ (in Report of Robert H. Jackson United States Representative
to the International Conference on Military Trials, London 1945, US Department of State, 1949, at 47).
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indeed strengthen traditional concerns of the international community (chiefly,
respect for state sovereignty), which in the current international community
should instead be reconciled with new values, such as respect for human dignity
and human rights. These last values require that all those who gravely attack
human dignity and fundamental rights be prosecuted and punished.
To ignore or play down the customary rule in question may lead to ensuring
impunity for the perpetrators as well as denying compensation to the victims,
given that in such cases, although the state on whose behalf the authors of
crimes acted formally incurs responsibility, in practice it is not held accountable
by anybody. Furthermore, as no one denies that soldiers and other military
personnel may be brought to trial for war crimes (but also for crimes against
humanity or genocide), one would come to the preposterous conclusion that
lower-ranking state agents could be punished for such crimes, while those in
power (heads of states or governments, senior members of cabinet, senior
military commanders), who are endowed with greater power and normally bear
greater responsibility for international crimes, would be absolved of any liability
for participation in such crimes, only on account of their seniority.
14.8 The Court’s Balancing of the Requirements of State Sovereignty with the
Demands of International Justice
Finally, the Court’s judgment lends itself to some general considerations. The
Court of course had to strike a balance between two conflicting requirements,
which were lucidly expounded by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal.1803 They are the requirements of smooth and unimpaired conduct
of foreign relations, a traditional concern of sovereign states, on the one side,
and the need to safeguard new community values, in particular the need to
prosecute and punish the perpetrators of grave crimes seriously infringing
fundamental rights of human beings, on the other side. In the event, the Court
put greater weight on one scale of the balance and markedly favoured the former
requirements. Absent any state practice or opinio juris seu necessitatis, it
1803 See Joint Separate Opinion, supra note 3 at paras 73–75.
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logically deduced from the whole system of the law of international immunities
that foreign ministers enjoy a broad range of immunities while in office. However,
by ambiguously excluding that state agents could be brought to trial after leaving
office for acts other than ‘private’ ones performed while in office, the Court has
arguably left in the event the demands of international justice unheeded. One
might be tempted to recall what another international court had the opportunity to
state in general terms, admittedly in a different context: ‘It would be a travesty of
law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, should the concept of state
sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human rights.’1804
The holding of the Court is indeed striking, the more so because, it is submitted,
the legal regulation that can be deduced from current international law manages
to protect both sets of requirements in a balanced way. As stated above, as long
as a foreign minister is in office, he enjoys full immunity from foreign jurisdiction
and inviolability, for whatever act he may perform. However, once he leaves
office, he may continue to be shielded from foreign criminal or civil jurisdiction for
the acts he performed in his official capacity (under the rules on functional
immunities), but not (i) for his private acts and transactions; in addition, (ii) he
may no longer take shelter behind personal (or functional) immunities, with
respect to international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, torture, and serious international acts of terrorism. If he is accused of
such crimes, whether they were committed prior to his taking office or after he left
office or while he was in office, he may legitimately be subject to foreign criminal
jurisdiction.
Finally, one ought not to pass over in silence one major negative knock-on effect
of the Court’s judgment. In future cases brought before the International Criminal
Court involving states not parties to the Statute, the asserted lack of a customary
rule lifting the functional immunity of state officials could be relied upon by such
third states. Clearly, the relevant provisions of the Court’s Statute removing any
immunity only apply to contracting states. Thus, for instance, if the accused is the
national of a third state who, acting as a state official, has allegedly perpetrated
1804 ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Tadic´ (Interlocutory Appeal), judgment of 2 October 1995, at 32, para. 58.
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international crimes on the territory of a state party to the Statute, the third state
might argue that under customary international law that state official enjoys
functional immunity, hence also immunity from the Court’s jurisdiction.
14.9 The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction
Despite all the attention it receives from both its supporters and critics, universal
jurisdiction remains one of the more confused doctrines of international law.
Indeed, while commentary has focused largely and  unevenly on policy and
normative arguments either favoring or undercutting the desirability of its
exercise, a straightforward legal analysis breaking down critical aspects of this
extraordinary form of jurisdiction remains conspicuously missing. Yet universal
jurisdiction's increased practice by states calls out for such a clear descriptive
understanding. The following Essay will engage this under-treated area. It will
offer to explicate a basic, but overlooked, feature of the law of universal
jurisdiction: If national courts prosecute on grounds of universal jurisdiction, they
must use the international legal definitions-contained in customary international
law-of the universal crimes they adjudicate; otherwise, their exercise of universal
jurisdiction contradicts the very international law upon which it purports to rely.
The Essay will argue that this legal feature derives from the distinctively
symbiotic nature of universal prescriptive jurisdiction (the power to apply law to
certain persons or things) and universal adjudicative jurisdiction (the power to
subject certain persons or things to judicial process). Unlike other bases of
jurisdiction in international law, the prescriptive substance of universal jurisdiction
authorizes and circumscribes universal adjudicative jurisdiction; in other words, it
defines not only the universal crimes themselves, but also the judicial
competence for all courts wishing to exercise universal jurisdiction.
The Essay will look to chart out some important implications of this  thesis for the
real-world practice of universal jurisdiction: It will evaluate how most easily to
determine the customary definitions of universal crimes, to detect breaches of
international law by courts that manipulate subjectively those definitions, and to
enforce against such illicit manipulation. The Essay will contend that while some
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definitional aspects invariably remain to be ironed out by state practice, the
provisions of widely-ratified and longstanding international treaties provide
generally the best record of the core customary definitions of universal crimes,
and accordingly, supply not only a harmonized point of departure for courts
wishing properly to exercise universal jurisdiction, but also a useful means for
detecting breaches of international law by overzealous courts seeking only to
exploit universal jurisdiction for purely political or sensationalist ends. The
framework presented thus will address concerns that universal jurisdiction
hazards unbridled abuse. As the Essay will argue, the law of universal jurisdiction
does not; rather, it prescribes legal  limits. And the Essay will conclude that in the
end, these limits are enforced not by those states exercising universal
jurisdiction, but instead by other jurisdictionally interested states-that is, most
often by those states whose national citizens are the subject of foreign universal
jurisdiction proceedings.
Unlike other bases of jurisdiction in international law, universal jurisdiction
requires no territorial or national nexus to the alleged act or actors over which a
state legitimately may claim legal authority.1805 Universal jurisdiction instead is
based entirely on the commission of certain “universal crimes.”1806 At the
present stage of development of international law, this category of crime is
generally considered to include piracy, slavery, genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, torture, and “perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”'1807 It is
no secret that the near future may envisage an increased rubric of universal
crime that includes, interalia, human sex trafficking, nuclear arms smuggling, and
perhaps other characteristically transnational offenses. A “universal jurisdiction”
1805 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
404 (1987).
1806 See id. § 404 cmt. a.
1807 See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987)); see also THE
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29 (Stephen Macedo ed., Princeton Univ.
2001) [hereinafter THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES]; Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Universal
Jurisdiction: In Absentia Signaling over Clearly Defined Crimes, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 537, 578-602
(2005).
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attaches to these crimes, so the argument goes,1808 because they are
universally condemned and all states have a shared interest in proscribing such
crimes and prosecuting their perpetrators.1809 Accordingly, every state has what
is called prescriptive jurisdiction, or lawmaking authority,1810 to proscribe
universal crimes wherever they occur and whomever they involve, and
adjudicative jurisdiction to subject the alleged universal criminal to its judicial
process.1811 Thus, if a State A national commits a universal crime against
another State A national in State A, all states have jurisdiction to prosecute.
Universal jurisdiction has been the focus of much policy and normative debate: It
has been hailed as a catalyst in the global struggle to bring to justice elusive
international criminals like tyrants and terrorists, while on the other hand decried
as a dangerously pliable tool for hostile states to damage international relations
by initiating unfounded proceedings against each other's officials and
citizens.1812 Such expansive jurisdiction has in fact provoked sharp backlash
from many circles-including former and current U.S. administrations.8 Yet in the
face of some blows to its use,1813 universal jurisdiction is, for the foreseeable
future, here to stay. A number of states' courts have in the past year alone
1808 This Essay will not address directly the underlying rationale for universal jurisdiction or its extension
to certain crimes, but will accept for present purposes its legal existence as well as the generally
acknowledged list of crimes. The focus of the Essay instead will be on clearly marking out some important
legal parameters that govern how courts must exercise such jurisdiction under international law.
1809 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 cmt. A
(1987).
1810 Id. § 401 (a).
1811 Id. § 401 (b).
1812 For a good primer on the debate, compare Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80
FOREIGN AFF. 86 (2001), with Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF.
150 (2001). For a progressive, normative restatement of how universal jurisdiction ought to be exercised so
as to facilitate its purposes, see THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 3.
8. Due to pressure from other nations-principally the United States-Belgium restricted the application of its
controversially expansive universal jurisdiction law to require, inter alia, more traditional links with
Belgium, immunity for foreign governmental officials, and an increased role for the public prosecutor. See
Steven R. Ratner, Editorial Comment, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
888, 891 (2003).
1813 See Ratner, supra note 9; Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone by Its Global Reach,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2003 at AO1.
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exercised this type of extraordinary jurisdiction,1814 and the recent proliferation
of domestic legislation providing for universal jurisdiction1815 signals that the
trend will only continue.
But despite the heated political controversy that surrounds it, and its increased
use by states, a straightforward legal analysis interrogating some basic features
of universal jurisdiction remains strangely lacking. This Essay will engage this
under-treated area; it will not ask whether and under what circumstances
universal jurisdiction might be a good idea, but rather will seek to discern the
international law governing how courts must exercise universal jurisdiction when
in fact they pursue such exercises, as well as the international legal
consequences of improper exercises of universal jurisdiction. My argument
therefore will be primarily a legal one, albeit with important policy implications
that will contribute to the larger debate since it goes to the very heart of when
and how universal jurisdiction can be exercised under international law. The
argument will proceed as follows:
It is presently contrary to international law for one state to extend unilaterally its
prescriptive jurisdiction into the territory of another state absent some territorial or
national link to the matter over which the first state claims competence-for
example, where the act has an impact within that state's territory, involves its
1814 Spain convicted Argentine naval officer Adolfo Scilingo for “crimes against humanity” based on his
participation in a program of throwing political prisoners from airplanes during Argentina's “dirty war.”
Reuters, Argentine Ex-Officer Convicted in Spain; 'Dirty War' Trial First of Its Kind, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 2005, at A17; Giles Tremlett, 'I Don't Try To Justify Myself, GUARDIAN, Apr. 21, 2005, at 6. Spain
has also issued warrants for three United States soldiers concerning an incident in which a U.S. tank fired
on a Baghdad hotel, killing two journalists. Drew Brown, Spanish Judge Wants 3 Soldiers Arrested in
Journalists' Deaths, EATTLE TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at A16. One of the journalists killed was not a
Spanish national; therefore any charges brought based on his death would rely upon the ground of universal
jurisdiction. In Britain, London's Central Criminal Court recently convicted Afghan warlord Farayadi
Sawar Zardad of torture and hostage taking in Afghanistan between 1991 and 1996. Nikki Tait, UK Court
Convicts Afghan Warlord, FIN. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at 12. Similarly, Dutch courts have brought charges
against two former Afghan generals for war crimes and torture committed during the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan in the 1980s. Marlise Simons, 2 Afghans Face Dutch War-Crimes Charges From 80's Soviet
Era, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A13. Belgium has even resuscitated its “universal jurisdiction law” to
grandfather in a case against former Chadian dictator Hissene Habre. Marlise Simons, Belgium Indicts
Chad's Ex-Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A8.
1815 See infra notes 82-86 (listing legislation implementing the Statute of the International Criminal Court
and providing for universal jurisdiction).
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nationals, or directly threatens its security.1816 Thus State B cannot, without
such a link, project its domestic laws onto State A and vice versa. Yet, as we
have seen, the principle of universal jurisdiction grants all states-including our
hypothetical State B-jurisdiction to prosecute universal crimes irrespective of
where the crimes occur or which state's nationals are involved (either as
perpetrators or victims). This immediately raises the important-but thus far
neglected-legal question: What prescriptive jurisdiction prescribes universal
crimes? In concrete terms, what prescriptive law must national courts apply when
they exercise universal adjudicative jurisdiction?
The answer, this Essay will submit, is international prescriptive jurisdiction, and
thus in substance, international law. In other words, while a state's national law
may not extend unilaterally its prescriptive reach into the territory of another
state, international law can, and does, just that with respect to the proscription on
universal crime-only in cases of  universal jurisdiction, the adjudication of this
international legal prohibition occurs through the operation of national courts.
Because the international prescriptive substance of universal crimes authorizes a
given court's universal jurisdiction, courts must apply that substance-that is, the
international legal definitions of the crimes-when they exercise universal
jurisdiction, or else their jurisdictional claim contradicts the very international law
upon which it purports to rely. The thesis from which I will build my argument
therefore is simply that the exercise of universal adjudicative jurisdiction
fundamentally depends upon the application of the legal substance of universal
prescriptive jurisdiction, and that this prescriptive substance-the definitions of
universal crimes derives from customary international law.
Part II will explain how this thesis brings to light and grounds itself in the
uniqueness of universal jurisdiction among the jurisdictional bases generally
accepted in international law. For unlike other bases, universal jurisdiction's
prescriptive substance at the same time authorizes and circumscribes courts'
adjudicative jurisdiction; it defines not only the universal crimes themselves, but
1816 See infra note 33, and accompanying text, listing bases of jurisdiction.
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also the judicial competence for all courts wishing to exercise universal
jurisdiction. And it is a prescriptive substance common to all states since it can
arise only as a matter of customary law, universally binding on them all. My claim
thus will place legal limits on the exercise of universal jurisdiction. It is not just the
empowerment of states by international law to adjudicate certain matters under
any prescriptive law they see fit. Instead, when national courts prosecute on a
theory of universal jurisdiction they must apply the international legal definitions
of the crimes they adjudicate, or else their jurisdiction conflicts with international
law. Part 1I also will employ this thesis to re-but the claim that because courts
typically need some form of domestic authorization to exercise their jurisdiction,
universal jurisdiction depends not on international law but on national law.
The thesis raises a number of important questions for the practice of universal
jurisdiction that need answering, namely: How are courts to go about determining
the definitional substance of what might be dubbed “fuzzy” customary
international law? Further, how can states evaluate whether a universal
jurisdiction court departs from the customary definition of the crime, thus
rendering its underlying jurisdiction contrary to international law? And finally, how
can interested states-that is, states on whose territories the universal crimes
occurred and/or whose nationals are the subject of universal jurisdiction
proceedings-enforce against illegitimate definitional expansions of universal
crimes by overzealous courts seeking only to exploit universal jurisdiction for
political or sensationalist ends?
In response to these questions, Parts III and IV will offer a basic framework for
evaluating the legality of universal jurisdiction exercises under this Essay's
thesis. In response to the first question-how to determine the customary
definitions of universal crimes-Part III will look to the formation of customary law
generally, and will maintain that as to universal crimes in particular, their core
substantive elements are set  forth quite explicitly in the various treaties and
conventions prohibiting the crimes under positive international law. I will not
argue that treaty law sets forth definitively the customary definitions of universal
crimes, but rather the best evidence of what those definitions are. While the
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contention that treaties may generate customary law is perhaps not entirely free
from debate with respect to, for example, the formation of “instant custom” at the
moment the treaty enters into force absent opportunity for subsequent
international acceptance of or acquiescence in the rules contained therein, or the
establishment of custom through only bilateral treaties, I need not go so far for
my argument. The treaties proscribing the various universal crimes represent a
relatively longstanding consensus not only as to the prohibition on those crimes,
but also- necessarily-as to their substance. On this point, the Appendix to this
Essay will critically survey the positive law relating to each of the universal crimes
listed above and assay some of the more important definitional provisions which
supply a harmonized prescriptive foundation for courts wishing to exercise
universal jurisdiction.1817 My purpose in so doing is not to elaborate
comprehensively all aspects of the definitions of universal crimes under
customary law, but rather to provide courts and international lawyers with a
useful point of departure in line with the analytical framework forwarded by this
Essay. To be sure, although state practice and opinion juris (the two elements
that make up customary law) continue to fill in, refine and modify aspects of
these customary definitions, for present purposes courts have a clear and
workable catalog of core definitions handy, in the form of treaty provisions and
legislation transposing those provisions onto domestic law, with which to
prosecute universal crimes. In fact, national legislation enabling universal
jurisdiction characteristically draws from treaty law to define the relevant
offense1818 and courts consequently use that substantive definition to prosecute
universal crimes,1819 thus reinforcing custom in this respect. Next, because
treaty provisions largely evidence the core definitions of universal crimes, we
might respond to the second question-how to determine when universal
jurisdiction courts deviate from the customary definitions of the crimes-by saying
initially that there are “easy cases” and “hard cases.” Where a court claiming
universal jurisdiction clearly departs from the subject crime's core definition-as
1817 See Appendix, infra. As the Appendix bears out, the treaties themselves tend to avow either an explicit
or implicit purpose to codify or create custom in their respective areas of international lawmaking.
1818 See infra notes 82-86.
1819 See infra text accompanying notes 104-16.
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evidenced by the treaty-absent a showing that customary law has evolved to
justify such a departure, the illegitimacy of its jurisdictional claim is easily
identifiable. Especially subject to easy-case categorization are universal crimes
with rule-based elements. A quick example here, and one that will be discussed
in more detail below,1820 is the Spanish Audiencia Nacional's illegitimate
expansion of the victim classes in the definition of genocide to include political
groups, which purported to justify the court's assertion of universal jurisdiction
over former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.1821 Under this Essay's
framework, had the case gone forward on these grounds,1822 Chile-both the
territorial and national state-would have had a powerful legal claim to reject
Spanish jurisdiction since the definition the court employed was plainly
exorbitant. But although treaties strongly evidence the core elements of universal
crimes, there invariably will be aspects of the definitions that need to be ironed
out further by state practice. Thus, objections to universal jurisdiction that are not
based on a court's clear departure from the universal crime's core substantive
definition-as evidenced by the treaty-might  fall into the “hard case” category.
Especially subject to hard-case classification are crimes that depend on the
application of standards. Examples here might include whether a specific act
constitutes a war crime under standards of target selection and proportionality
contained in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols,1823 or
whether a particular interrogation technique constitutes torture under the Torture
Convention's widely-accepted definition of the crime.1824 The jurisprudence of
1820 See infra text accompanying notes 104-16.
1821 See infra text accompanying notes 104-06.
1822 Torture ended up being the relevant crime of extradition for Great Britain, though Pinochet ultimately
was not extradited but sent back to Chile because he was determined medically unfit to stand trial. See
Regina v. Bow St. Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] No. 3, 2 W.L.R.
827, 833-36 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson), reprinted in part in THE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE
CASE OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND BRITAIN 255, 268 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner,
eds., 2000) (hereinafter THE PINOCHET PAPERS).
1823 1 have argued against the use of universal jurisdiction over war crimes generally for this reason. See
Appendix E, infra; Colangelo, supra note 3, at 587-94 (observing that these standards afford courts too
much latitude to allege war crimes against U.S. forces despite an unprecedented adherence to international
humanitarian law in the NATO bombing in the former Yugoslavia and the 2003 invasion of Iraq).
1824 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Res. 39/46, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter
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international criminal tribunals and of national courts exercising universal
jurisdiction-decisions which are not precedent on their own but nonetheless
evidence state practice,1825 would be particularly helpful guides here. But in
order to illustrate most simply its basic thesis, this Essay admittedly concerns
itself more with the easy cases-though the hard cases undoubtedly supply fertile
ground for further legal evaluation of universal jurisdiction assertions in line with
the framework forwarded here. Indeed, and as Part IV indicates in its
enforcement discussion, where territorial and national states-states that have a
strong legal interest in a given universal jurisdiction assertion-object to the
definition of the crime that purports to justify another state's universal jurisdiction
claim, the resolution of that international legal clash will go far toward determining
further the customary definition of the crime at issue.
Finally, Part IV will deal with the question of enforcement against a court's
illegitimate definitional expansion of a universal crime upon which the court
purports to base its jurisdiction. Part IV will explain that the international legal
limits of universal jurisdiction are indeed enforceable against such courts, and
that the enforcers are those states with concurrent jurisdiction over the alleged
crimes-that is, states with territorial or national jurisdiction. As I will show, where
jurisdictionally interested states reject an illegitimate universal jurisdiction claim
stemming from an improper manipulation of the underlying crime's definition,
international law considers the universal jurisdiction claim an enduring breach. In
short, it is not the state exercising universal jurisdiction, but most often those
states whose nationals are in the dock, that are the enforcers of the legal limits of
universal jurisdiction.
Torture Convention]; see also infra Appendix F (for example, the phrase “severe pain or suffering” is
particularly open to interpretation).
1825 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103 cmt. a,
b (1987).
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14.9.1 Universal Jurisdiction's Prescriptive Adjudicative Symbiosis
Jurisdiction is the central concept in the interface between the nation state and
international law; as such, it describes the power allocation both among
individual states and between states and international law. A state's jurisdiction,
or what some may call “sovereignty,”1826 refers by and large to its authority to
make, apply, and enforce law. More distinctly, a state's prescriptive jurisdiction is
its authority to apply its law to certain persons or things,1827 and its adjudicative
jurisdiction is its authority to subject persons or things to its judicial process.1828
Importantly, “[j]urisdiction to enforce or adjudicate is dependent on jurisdiction to
prescribe.”1829 Thus a state has no inherent authority to subject persons or
things to its judicial process if that state has no lawmaking authority over those
persons or things to begin with.1830
1826 Although notoriously opaque, the label “sovereignty” invokes the familiar definition of state power by
implying the state's autonomous jurisdictional authority to create, implement, and enforce its own laws; in
short, it provides a metric by which changes in a given power dynamic- for purposes of the present
discussion, that between the state and international law-may be measured. See Marcel Brus, Bridging the
Gap between State Sovereignty and International Governance: The Authority of Law, in STATE,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 7-10 (Gerard Kreijen, ed. Oxford 2004).
See generally John H. Jackson, Sovereignty Modern: A New Approach To An Outdated Concept, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 782, 786, 789-90 (2003). For a discussion of the evolution of the concept of sovereignty toward
a human rights-based, popular sovereignty see W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990).
1827 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a)
(1987).
1828 Id. § 40 1(b).
1829 CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 132 (2001);
RESTATEMENT § 431 cmt. a.
1830 States may, however, agree either formally or informally to delegate among themselves jurisdiction
absent territorial or national prescriptive authority-but such an exercise of jurisdiction is only legitimate
insofar as it stems from the delegation of jurisdiction by a state with territorial or national prescriptive
authority. For example, there is a form of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction exercised by some European
states, in particular Germany, called the “vicarious administration of justice” or “representation” principle
which allows for the application of municipal criminal law based only on the custody of a foreign
defendant without other territorial or national links. This type of jurisdiction is, however, preconditioned
upon “a request from another state to take over criminal proceedings, or either the refusal of an extradition
request from another state and its willingness to prosecute or confirmation from another state that it will not
request extradition.” Extra-territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN
COMMITTEE ON CRIME PROBLEMS 14 (1990). Unlike universal jurisdiction, the representation
principle conforms with the classical sovereignty model under which states have full prescriptive authority
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The international law of jurisdiction is a customary law. That is, it is  not based on
treaties or other positive agreements among states, but rather on state practice
and opinion juris, or the state's belief or intent that it is acting with legal
purpose1831 (though by these two components, as I  show in more detail below,
treaties certainly may inform or evidence the  customary law     of
jurisdiction).1832 While all states may contribute to international custom since it
embodies their collective “general practice accepted as law,”1833 custom     is an
external force on each individual state  that makes up part of the international
law-making collective.1834 The legal construct of jurisdiction essentially
comprises the package of “external rules that have defined [the nation] as a
regarding conduct within their territories. First, the principle requires some form of agreement or consent
between the custodial prosecuting state and the territorial state. See id.
([T]he 'representation' principle differs from the principle of universality in that the decision to
prosecute is not taken in isolation by the state claiming jurisdiction, but requires a certain
understanding, if not agreement, by the other state which is more directly concerned, for instance
the state where the offence has been committed.).
Hence, the territorial state permits the custodial state's application of prescriptive jurisdiction, which of
course the territorial state has a sovereign prerogative to delegate. Also in this connection, the principle is
decidedly subordinate to other principles of jurisdiction, which take priority. See Jurgen Meyer, The
Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction, 31 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 108, 116
(1990). Second, the substantive crime must be virtually indistinguishable as between the custodial and
territorial states; the custodial state literally acts as a surrogate for the territorial state. See id. at 111
([T]he principle of the vicarious administration of justice... implies that it is insufficient to find an
applicable norm of the place of conduct which is identical to the [custodial state's] norm; the
particular conduct must also satisfy the elements of that norm. Moreover, the grounds of justification
and excuse under the law of the place of conduct must     be observed....);
see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra at 14. In contrast, universal jurisdiction can be exercised
irrespective of the permission and despite the prescriptive legislation of the territorial state.
1831 See e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987) (describing this component as “a sense of legal obligation”); Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1179 (describing
this component as “accepted as law”).
1832 See discussion infra note 46.
1833 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 28, at art. 38.
1834 In a recent defense of customary law, George Norman and Joel Trachtman explain this phenomenon in
the following manner: while custom is “endogenous to states as a group meaning that it is not a vertical
structure produced outside or above the group of states-it has an independent, exogenous influence on the
behavior of each individual state.” George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International
Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 542 (2005).
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'nation.”'1835 Presently those rules circumscribe the prescriptive reach of states
based principally on their authority over territory and national citizens. Traditional
bases therefore hold that a state has jurisdiction over acts that occur-even in
part-within its territory (subjective territoriality), may not occur but  have an effect
within its territory (objective territoriality), involve its national citizens (active and
passive personality-based on perpetrator and  victim respectively), and are
directed against its security (protective principle).1836 Despite an observable
allowance for concurrent jurisdiction by multiple states, e.g., a matter occurs (or
has an effect) in the territory of one state but involves one or more nationals of
another state, and even conflicts between states with concurrent jurisdiction,1837
the jurisdictional construct provides a relatively practicable and objective
measure of the authority of individual states vis-à-vis one another concerning a
particular matter. Thus State B may apply its prescriptive jurisdiction to persons
and things within its territory, and therefore may apply its jurisdiction to a State A
national within State B borders. State B may even have a jurisdictional claim over
a State B national who happens to be in State A. But absent some justifying
territorial or national nexus (or agreement between the states),1838 State B may
not project unilaterally its domestic laws onto State A. For instance State B may
not project unilaterally, say, its traffic codes, onto State A. That issue is squarely
1835 Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110,
1113 (1982) [hereinafter D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights]; Anthony D'Amato, Is International
Law Really “Law”? 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1293, 1308 (1985)
(As a construct of international law, a nation is nothing more nor less than a bundle of entitlements, of
which the most important ones define and secure its boundaries on a map, while others define its
jurisdictional competency and the rights of its citizens when they travel outside its borders.).
1836 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987);
see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limit: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, in
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 168, 172 (Stephen Macedo, ed., 2004) (noting that like territorial and
national bases of jurisdiction, this protective principle is “defined in terms of [a state's] territorial integrity
or the safety of its citizens.”).
1837 See, e.g., Case of S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 30-31 (Sept. 7) (ruling on
the collision of a French ship with a Turkish ship, and observing that
[n]either the exclusive jurisdiction of either State, nor the limitations of the jurisdiction of each to the
occurrences which took place on the respective ships would appear calculated to satisfy the requirements of
justice and effectively to protect the interests of the two States. It is only natural that each should be able to
exercise jurisdiction and to do so  in respect of the incident as a whole. It is therefore a case of concurrent
jurisdiction.).
1838 See supra note 27.
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within State A's sovereign jurisdiction.1839 It follows that State B's courts cannot
apply State B's traffic code to a State A driver, driving only in State A, and with no
other jurisdictional connection to State B since there exists no prescriptive
jurisdiction upon which State B's adjudicative jurisdiction may rely. It would be as
if some British court applied the British rule that drivers must drive on the left side
of the road to a U.S. citizen, driving only in the United States and with absolutely
no connection to Britain. Such an application plainly would clash with
international law.
Yet universal jurisdiction allows State B's courts adjudicative authority with
respect to an act that occurs entirely within State A 's borders, has no effect on
the territory of State B, and involves only State A national citizens. If, as we have
said, State B cannot extend its prescriptive jurisdiction into the territory of State
A, universal jurisdiction begs the question of what prescriptive jurisdiction
authorizes State B's courts. In cases of universal jurisdiction that prescriptive
jurisdiction is, as a legal matter, international-for as we have seen already,
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction of this sort cannot by law be national, e.g.,
State B may not apply unilaterally its municipal law concerning traffic codes to
State A nationals acting with respect to other State A nationals in State A.
Universal crimes are instead proscribed at the level of international law which,
unlike national prescriptive jurisdiction, does extend into the territory of all states.
Universal jurisdiction is therefore quite unique among the bases of international
jurisdiction in two discrete but related respects. First, its prescriptive and
adjudicative faces are distinctively symbiotic: The prescriptive substance of
universal crimes not only defines the crimes themselves, but also authorizes the
adjudicative competence for all states engendered by the commission of those
crimes. In other words, universal adjudicative jurisdiction depends upon the
definitional substance of the crime as prescribed by universal prescriptive
jurisdiction.
1839 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which, even with a link to the conduct in question, one
state's prescriptive jurisdiction regarding traffic codes could justifiably extend into the territory of another
state.
792
Second, the legal content of this prescriptive jurisdiction is moored in customary
international law. By contrast, a state's jurisdiction over its territory or nationals-
while certainly a matter of international law at the  edges since it describes the
state's authority vis-à-vis other states-is not,  at the level of a state's domestic
law, necessarily substantiated by the  content of international law. International
law merely sets the perimeters inside which states have sovereign lawmaking
authority (to the extent that they do not legislatively act contrary to international
law-by endorsing universal crimes).1840 It follows that states may grant their
courts jurisdiction over any subject matter they please within these territorial and
national prescriptive perimeters. The same cannot be said of universal
jurisdiction-courts' subject matter jurisdiction is circumscribed by the prescriptive
substance of the international law outlawing universal crimes. Hence if certain
State A nationals put into action a program of extermination of other State A
nationals based on the latter group's race or ethnic identity, courts in State B
would have the authority, under international law, to prosecute the former group
for the universal crime of genocide. But crucially, State B's adjudicative
jurisdiction would be contingent upon the customary definitional substance of the
crime prosecuted, i.e., genocide. Put differently, absent territorial or national links
or some other legitimating understanding between the states, State B could not
prosecute the State A actors under its municipal code for a series of homicides;
like our traffic code hypothetical, such an application would conflict with
international law. In sum, a state's universal adjudicative jurisdiction is
empowered not by the state's own domestic prescriptive authority-based on, for
instance, its authority over national territory or citizens-but rather, by international
law. Consequently, when states exercise universal jurisdiction they are legally
constrained to adjudicate the prescriptive substance of the crime under
international law.
1840 A question arises where the state, through government power, commits universal crimes on a grand
scale. Such a state arguably has waived its jurisdiction under international law. For ex ample, it has been
suggested that “[a] State that massively violates the rights of an ethnic minority risks forfeiture of its rights
to control a given part of its territory.” Brus, supra note 23, at 13.
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The objection immediately will be made, however, that national courts typically
have no authority to pull sua sponte from the sky principles of international law
according to which they may then adjudicate a matter; instead they must rely
upon some domestic law granting them jurisdiction. And thus, the very idea of
international prescriptive jurisdiction depends entirely on domestic law. It follows,
the argument goes, that (contrary to my stated position) the state court that
asserts universal jurisdiction gets its authority not from international law but from
that state's domestic legislation. References to what skeptics might sardonically
label “so-called international law” may make for nice and popular dicta in the
court's opinion, but as a matter of law they are utterly irrelevant.
This position misunderstands the international law of jurisdiction. The principle of
universal jurisdiction empowers states in the first instance with the capacity to
adjudicate certain matters where they otherwise would have no authority to do
so. How the sovereign state then authorizes its own judicial bodies to adjudicate
the matter is up to the state's domestic law (and thus courts are not randomly
pulling from the sky international law). For instance, the domestic law of the state
may indeed permit the court to draw directly from international law, or domestic
law may incorporate or reflect international law,1841 in which case the state
would be using its domestic laws and procedures to adjudicate the substance of
international law. But importantly, for cases of universal jurisdiction the substance
1841 These two approaches to international law by national legal systems are called monism and dualism
respectively. Under the monist approach to international law
[t]he state's constitutional system must recognize the supremacy of international law. The national
legislature is bound-constitutionally bound to respect international law in enacting legislation. The
national executive is constitutionally required to take care that international law be faithfully
executed, even in the face of inconsistent domestic law. The national judiciary must give effect to
international law, notwithstanding inconsistent domestic law, even domestic law of a constitutional
character.
Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 64 (Dordrecht 1995). Dualism, on
the other hand, views international law as the law between sovereign states, a law that is separate and apart
from domestic law. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 30
(1990). Thus, for international law to be part of a dualist state's domestic legal system, it must be
implemented through domestic legislation. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 107
(1991). Most states incorporate aspects of both approaches with regard to the domestic application of
international law.
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of the law must accord with the prescriptive jurisdiction that governs it-that is, it
must be international.
14.9.2 The Customary Law of Universal Jurisdiction
If state courts' universal adjudicative jurisdiction depends upon universal
prescriptive jurisdiction as defined by international law, then our next question
asks how to determine the content of this prescriptive jurisdiction, or the
customary definitions of universal crimes. This Part contends that the answer lies
in the provisions of the widely-ratified and relatively longstanding multilateral
treaties proscribing universal crimes  under positive international law. To frame
my argument, I begin with two distinctions. The first elaborates upon the
distinction between the more procedural law of universal adjudicative jurisdiction
and the more substantive law of universal prescriptive jurisdiction. The second, to
be clear about the customary character of universal jurisdiction, observes the
difference between a treaty-based or “conventional” version of universal
jurisdiction, which necessarily confines itself to the states party to the convention
that generates such jurisdiction, and the customary law of universal jurisdiction,
which extends to all states. I then explain how treaty provisions prescribing
universal crimes provide a strong and easily-measurable record of customary
law's universal prescription as to those crimes-in other words, the prescriptive
jurisdiction that governs state courts' exercises of universal adjudicative
jurisdiction.
A. Adjudicative Versus Prescriptive Universal Jurisdiction
Although universal adjudicative jurisdiction depends upon the substance of
universal prescriptive jurisdiction (or conversely, the substance of universal
prescriptive jurisdiction authorizes universal adjudicative jurisdiction), the
customary rules of universal adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction are
nonetheless distinct in their character and development. Universal adjudicative
jurisdiction essentially outlines the procedural connection needed for courts to
assert jurisdiction over the person(s) before it. For universal jurisdiction
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purposes, this procedural element exceptionally requires no territorial or national
nexus to the accused criminal over which a court asserts judicial authority.1842
My focus here, however, is on universal prescriptive jurisdiction,   which relates
more to the subject matter over which the court claims competence-that is, the
substance of universal crime itself. Due perhaps to a need for legal analysis
explaining an increased exercise in the last decade or so of jurisdiction by courts
having no territorial or national links to the defendants they seek to
prosecute,1843 commentary has concentrated unevenly on the unqualified, and
literally global ambit of universal adjudicative jurisdiction,1844 while important
aspects of the prescriptive scope and definition of universal crimes themselves
have been overlooked. To illustrate, piracy is commonly understood as a core
universal crime because throughout international legal history any state's  courts
could prosecute the pirate absent territorial or national links to  him or his piratical
acts, and more recently, such adjudicative procedure  has been strongly
endorsed in conventional aw.1845 But the question of what precisely “piracy” is
as a matter of customary law has garnered little attention1846 -and yet, as we
1842 The conventional or positive law relating to this aspect of jurisdiction is found in treaty provisions
establishing states parties' jurisdiction to prosecute, i.e., the provisions determining whether states may
exercise jurisdiction over acts committed outside their territories, having no effect on their territories and
involving non-nationals. See. e.g., the Torture Convention's prosecute-or-extradite provisions set forth
infra, note 52
1843 See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (2003) (noting that “[m]ore cases of 'universal jurisdiction' have been reported
in the past decade than throughout the whole history of modern international law.”).
1844 Commentary has tended to focus almost exclusively on the availability of universal jurisdiction for
courts-i.e., adjudicative jurisdiction, without discussing the substance of the crime itself-i.e., prescriptive
jurisdiction. See, e.g., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 21- 25 (listing various universal
crimes but not explaining how to define them and dealing largely with procedural issues such as due
process, extradition, evidence-gathering, immunities, statutes of limitations, amnesties, resolution of
competing jurisdictions, double jeopardy, and settlement of disputes between states with concurrent
jurisdictional claims). The author has found one article that discusses universal jurisdiction as a
prescriptive jurisdiction, but only to make the point that while a state's universal prescriptive jurisdiction is
extraterritorial, jurisdiction to enforce is territorial. See Roger O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction - Clarifying
the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735 (2004) (dealing primarily with the ICJ opinion in the
Arrest Warrant case, and not discussing the nature of the prescriptive jurisdiction under the universality
principle, the main focus of this Essay).
1845 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International Law, in
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 47-48 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
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have seen, this customary definition determines the legal availability of a given
court's universal subject matter  jurisdiction. To take a more modem and
contentious example, “terrorism” has been rejected by courts as a crime of
universal jurisdiction. The reason for this rejection stems not from a void of state
practice favoring far-reaching adjudicative jurisdiction over the perpetrators of
this type of crime, but rather from the absence of a coherent customary definition
of “terrorism.”1847 In the words of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in the recent Yousef opinion:
Unlike those offenses supporting universal jurisdiction under
customary international law-that is, piracy, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity-that now have fairly precise definitions and that
have achieved universal condemnation, 'terrorism' is a term as
loosely deployed as it is powerfully charged.... No consensus has
developed on how to properly define 'terrorism' generally....[Such]
strenuous disagreement among States about what actions do or do
not constitute terrorism... [means that] terrorism unlike piracy, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity-does not provide a basis for
universal jurisdiction.1848
Thus the answer to the question of how to determine the customary definitional
content of universal crimes is of increasing legal and practical importance.
On my view, developed below, that the answer lies in the substantive definitions
of treaties, the international crime at issue in Yousef, which involved planting and
exploding a bomb on a civilian aircraft-not abstractly “terrorism”---clearly would
be subject to universal jurisdiction. The relevant international instrument, the
1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
1846 For an historical account of the crime that highlights confusion about what set piracy apart from other
actions on the high seas, see Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183 (2004).
1847 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
1848 Id. at 87-89 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
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Safety of Civil Aviation,  not only evidences a custom of universal adjudicative
jurisdiction by providing for extraterritorial and extra-national jurisdiction over
alleged plane-bombers,1849 it fills the prescriptive customary hole that so worried
the Second Circuit by prescribing a definite international law articulation of the
crime of plane-bombing.1850 Thus while “terrorism” abstractly labeled may not be
1849 Article 5 of the Montreal Convention provides that:
Each Contracting State shall.. .take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the
offences [defined].. .in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not
extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.
Article 7 states:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite
him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its
territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities
shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under
the law of that State.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24
U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 181-82 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. For a discussion of how these
provisions evidence custom, see Colangelo, supra note 3, at 598:
A state's entrance into a treaty with other states and commitment to be bound thereby constitutes the
maximal expression of state sovereignty and “assent” to the particular     rules contained in that treaty; the
state's implementing legislation pursuant to the treaty compounds this assent by demonstrating a
“general usage and practice” designed to enforce those rules; and finally, “the [state's] judicial decisions
recognize and enforce that law” in practice.
The Montreal Convention, which was put into effect in 1971, currently has 173 states parties, which means
that in the last thirty years the vast majority of states in the world have agreed to bind themselves to and
put into practice through domestic legislation and judicial enforcement the provisions of the treaty. [And
while] the Montreal Convention “creates a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction that is moored in a
process of formal law  making and that is binding only on the States that accede to it[,1”... it is precisely
this process of formal lawmaking between sovereign states, their mutual assent to the rule agreed upon, and
their affirmative adoption and implementation of this rule in domestic legislation and judicial decision
making that constitutes evidence of the customary rule. What is important to keep in mind is that the
treaty, the municipal legislation, and the judicial opinion are not themselves customary international law;
rather they make up the absolute best evidence of what a state, the United States, and all other states party
to the Montreal Convention consider to be a legally binding practice-and in this respect sup ply the most
powerful evidence possible of customary international law there is. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
1850 Article 1 of the Montreal Convention defines the offense as:
unlawfully and intentionally.. .plac[ing] or caus[ing] to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which
renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight....
Montreal Convention, supra note 46, at art. 1
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subject to universal jurisdiction because of its definitional uncertainty, certain
clearly-defined acts of terrorism, like plane bombing, are.1851
B.     “Conventional” Versus Customary Universal Jurisdiction
But treaties and custom are of course essentially different types of law. And like
all bases of jurisdiction in international law, “[u]niversal jurisdiction is a
fundamentally customary, not treaty-based, law.”1852 So before we make the
jump from treaty definitions to customary definitions, one more distinction should
be made between what might be called treaty-based or “conventional” universal
jurisdiction on the one hand, and customary universal jurisdiction on the other.
So-called “conventional” universal jurisdiction is somewhat of an oxymoron, or at
the least, a misnomer. Because such jurisdiction is rooted in treaty law, it
provides neither in fact, nor in law, a truly “universal” jurisdiction.1853 It merely
vests a comprehensive jurisdiction for states party to a convention inter se with
respect to the prosecution of a crime that is the subject of the convention; states
party may (and in some cases are obliged to) under the jurisdictional provisions
of the convention--exercise their adjudicative jurisdiction absent territorial or
national links to the offense that the convention prescriptively defines and
outlaws. Though the convention's prescriptive mandate-i.e., the proscription on
the crime ostensibly binds all states party all the time, conventions tend to limit
procedurally the exercise of a state courts' adjudicative jurisdiction, absent
territorial or national links to the crime, to instances where the alleged offender is
afterwards present or “found” in that state party's territory and it does not
extradite him to another state party.1854
1851 Colangelo, supra note 3, at 594-603
1852 Id. at 567; see also Yousef 327 F.3d at 96 n.29
1853 See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 64 (1994) (explaining that treaty-based jurisdiction is never “universal jurisdiction stricto sensu”
because such jurisdiction concerns only the states parties to the treaty).
1854 This provision is commonly referred to as a “prosecute-or-extradite” provision, or autdedere
autjudicare.
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To illustrate, the Torture Convention prescriptively defines and bans the crime of
torture for states party to the Convention.1855 And through its prosecute-or-
extradite provisions,1856 the   Convention     provides for an equivalent of
universal adjudicative jurisdiction over torture as among the states party. As a
matter of positive law, however, both the Convention's prescriptive ban on torture
and its grant of extraterritorial and extra-national adjudicative capacity to courts
to prosecute torturers comprehend only the jurisdictions of those states party to
the Convention.1857 In other words, the Torture Convention does not, on its own,
bind non parties.
By contrast, the customary basis of universal jurisdiction over torture, both in
terms of its prescriptive ban on the crime and in terms of its adjudicative scope
allowing all states' courts to prosecute the crime, extends beyond those states
party to the Torture Convention to contemplate the jurisdiction of all states-
making jurisdiction in fact, and in law, “universal.” So if State A and State B are
parties to the Torture Convention, and State B asserts jurisdiction pursuant to the
Convention over a State A national found in State B for torture committed in
State A against other State A nationals, State B is not exercising universal
1855 Torture Convention, supra note 21, at 197; see also Appendix F, infra.
1856 Torture Convention, supra note 21, at 198. Article 5(2) of the convention provides that “[e]ach State
Party shall...take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases
where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it dos not extradite him....”
And Article 7(1) provides:
The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any offence
referred to in [the relevant provision] is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not
extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
Id. at 198.
Lori Damrosch has noted that “at a minimum all the prosecute-or-extradite crimes [like torture]  are ones as
to which there is an option to exercise jurisdiction without any link to the crime other than custody of the
offender.” Lori F. Damrosch, Connecting the Threads in the Fabric of International Law, in UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION 91, supra note 33, at 94 (emphasis in original).
1857 For instance, Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “[a] Treaty does
not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent,” and Article 35 provides that
treaties are only binding on non-parties where the non-party “State expressly accepts that obligation in
writing.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 34 & 35, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333,
8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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jurisdiction, but is simply discharging its treaty obligations.1858 Similarly, in
Yousef, while the Second Circuit found that it did not have universal jurisdiction
as a matter of customary law, it did find jurisdiction under the Montreal
Convention and its domestic implementing legislation with respect to acts
committed by a Pakistani national, which killed and injured Japanese nationals
on a Philippine flag airliner flying from the Philippines to Japan (there was no
evidence that a U.S. citizen was even aboard the flight).1859 Critically, in the
Torture Convention hypothetical, and in Yousef, both the prosecuting and the
territorial states were parties to the applicable conventions1860 and the
prosecuting states used the prescriptive definitions of the crimes contained in the
conventions.1861
To place the jurisdictional competence of the prosecuting state in the torture
hypothetical outside of that vested by the treaty, we would need to make either
State A (the territorial state), or State B (the prosecuting  state), or both, non-
parties to the Convention. Plainly if either both State A and State B are non-
parties, or just State B is a non-party, State B cannot pretend to assert
jurisdiction based on a treaty to which it is not party, and which accordingly does
not vest it with jurisdiction. But what about the scenario in which State B is a
party to the Convention and State A is not? Can State B still prosecute a State A
national for torture committed in State A against only State A nationals based on
1858 This was essentially the reasoning of Lord Browne-Wilkinson speaking for the English House of Lords
in Pinochet III, where he concluded that Pinochet could be extradited to Spain under the Torture
Convention since
the states with the most obvious jurisdiction.. .do not seek to extradite, the state where the alleged torturer
is found must prosecute or, apparently, extradite to another country,     i.e. there is universal jurisdiction ....
Since Chile, Spain and the United Kingdom are all parties to the Convention, they are bound under
treaty by its provisions whether or not      such provisions would apply in the absence of treaty obligation.
THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 19. The Netherlands also recently convicted a torturer absent
territorial or national links to his crimes which occurred in the former Zaire (now Democratic Republic of
the Congo) based on the Dutch implementation of the Torture Convention's provisions.
See 51 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 439, 444-49 (2004).
1859 Yousef 327 F.3d at 97, 108-10.
1860 Id. at 109 n.43.
1861 Id. at 110 (observing that the domestic implementing legislation “carefully tracks the text of the
Montreal Convention”). As to the definition of the crime in particular, the Montreal Convention and 18
U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) define the crime in substantively identical terms, see infra note 69.
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the positive law of the Torture Convention? The answer would seem to be no,
and  the reason is that the Torture Convention, by itself, does not extend its
prescriptive jurisdiction outlawing torture into the territory of non parties, i.e.,
State A. And therefore, State B, acting pursuant only to the Convention, would
have no positive prescriptive jurisdiction authorizing its adjudicative jurisdiction
under the Convention.
The State B prosecution could, however, rely on the customary law of universal
jurisdiction because its prescriptive jurisdiction does extend into the territory of all
states to proscribe torture, and likewise vests all states with the adjudicative
jurisdiction to prosecute the torturer. But State B's customary adjudicative
jurisdiction would only be valid insofar as it accords with the governing customary
prescriptive jurisdiction. And so we come back to the question of how to
determine the prescriptive substance of universal crimes under customary law.
C.   Treaties and the Prescriptive Substance of Universal Crimes
As we have seen, unlike treaties and other positive law instruments that affect
only those states that have signed onto them through a formal international
lawmaking process, customary law is universal in its application. Moreover, it is
evidenced by and evolves organically in light of state practice conditioned by
opinio juris. Such practice is manifest, for instance, in the state's entrance into a
treaty. The idea that generalizable or “norm-creating” treaty provisions-like, for
example, proscriptions on internationally agreed-upon crimes-generate
customary law is not new1862 and is, in the words of the International Court of
Justice, “indeed one of the recognized methods by which new rules of customary
1862 Professor D'Amato first made the argument over forty years ago in his article Treaties as a Source of
General Rules of International Law, 3 HARV. INT'L L.J. I (1962); see also ANTHONY A. D'AMATO,
THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 105-66 (1971) [hereinafter D'AMATO, THE
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM]; see also D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights, supra  note 32 at 1127-47.
See generally Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1988); Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of
Customary International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71 (1996).
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international law  may be formed.”1863 Although some might feel the need to
temper the formation of custom through treaty by requiring a certain threshold
number of states party to the treaty or the passage of a certain amount of time
before its provisions could constitute custom,1864 this Essay needs not go so far
for its argument. Each of the treaties prohibiting universal crimes enjoys
longstanding and widespread acceptance; indeed, and as the Appendix bears
out, the treaties themselves even tend to avow either an explicit or implicit
purpose to codify or create custom in their respective areas of international
lawmaking.1865 That treaties do so is, again, nothing new for international law.
The Nuremberg Tribunal, for instance, applied to the accused Nazi war criminals
before it, as a matter of customary law, the detailed provisions of the 1907 Hague
Convention and the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Prisoners of War.1866 The
Tribunal, citing no state practice other than that of states agreeing upon the rules
contained in, and entering into, these treaties, observed that the rules were
“declaratory of the laws and customs of war.”1867 As Anthony D'Amato points
out, “[iut strains credulity to suppose that state practice had become so detailed
by 1939-particularly between 1929, the date of the Geneva Convention, and
1939!-that the conventions were merely 'declaratory' of such practice. Rather, the
more reasonable interpretation is that the conventions 'declared' what the
1863 North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(3)
(1987) (“International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of
customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are
in fact widely accepted.”).
1864 See generally Scott & Carr, supra note 59.
1865 See Appendix, infra. The express or implied avowal of generating custom, when buttressed by the
history of actions and reactions of states in respect to these treaties, would seem to take care of Dr. Michael
Akehurst's concerns that opinio juris must accompany a treaty for its provisions to create custom; the ways
in which he sees this criterion satisfied are a declaratory statement in the treaty or its preparatory materials
to this effect, or by subsequent practice and opinion juris supporting the rule. Michael Akehurst, Custom as
a Source of International Law, in THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1974-1975
1, 45, 49 (R.Y Jennings & Ian Brownlie eds., 1977).
1866 International Military Tribunal Judgment, in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION:  OPINION
AND JUDGMENT 83 (1947).
1867 Id.
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practice is by virtue of the fact that the signatories undertook to declare that
practice operative under the conventions themselves.”1868
The argument from treaty law engages therefore not just the prohibition on the
crime but also the articulation of its content. It goes beyond accepting that
genocide is prohibited as a matter of international law because the Genocide
Convention prohibits it-treaties are the source of most if not all international
human rights norms in this regard1869 to contend that the substantive definition
of the crime is reflected in the treaty provisions and, in line with Part II of this
Essay, that it is a definition to which courts must adhere in exercising universal
jurisdiction. Again, I do not argue that the treaty provisions setting forth penal
characteristics constitute themselves definitively the customary definitions of
universal crimes; rather, these provisions make up strong evidence of what the
customary definitions are. It follows too that definitions contained in legislation
implementing domestically a state's treaty obligations or simply transposing onto
domestic law the treaty's definitional provisions are particularly useful to courts
since these domestic-law definitions reproduce, by their very nature, the
substance of the conduct prohibited by the treaty.1870 My model necessarily
allows for some flexibility in the definitions of the crimes insofar as domestic
legislation does not substantively alter the definition of the treaty provision it
transforms into domestic law.1871 Even apart from obvious differences that will
1868 D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 59, at 123.
1869 See D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights, supra note 32, at 1128-48.
1870 Of course, if the implementing legislation does not reproduce faithfully the crime as set  forth in the
treaty, the state would be in violation of its treaty obligations, and consequently, the definitions in the
implementing legislation would not reflect the customary definitions of the crime (as set forth in the treaty).
1871
An example of an improper substantive alteration of a treaty definition is Germany's former Criminal Code
§ 220a, which translated the definition of genocide contained in the 1948 Genocide Convention into
German law. Under the Convention's provisions, the act of genocide is defined as “[d]eliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” The
translation in § 220a criminalizes “inflict[ing] on the group conditions apt to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part.” Kai Ambos &  Steffen Wirth, Genocide and War Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia Before German Criminal  Courts, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION
OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL  LAW 769, 784-786 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2004) (emphasis
in secondary source). Ambos and  Wirth explain that the use of the word “apt” in the literal German
translation “substantially  changes the elements of the inflicting-destructive-conditions-[provision] of
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result from translating the treaty provisions into different languages for purposes
of domestic legislation, slight variations on the language are almost inevitable
given the universal prescriptions of treaties as compared to the more state-
specific prescriptions of domestic legislation.1872 Using positive international law
as the starting point for determining the substance of universal crimes
accommodates the modification of definitions through evolutions in customary
law regarding the crimes while presently providing courts with harmonized and
fairly precise definitions that safeguard, among other things, bedrock criminal law
principles of legality, “namely, no crime without a law, no punishment without a
law”1873 in the context of international criminal law.1874
genocide with respect  to both the ordinary meaning and the travaux preparatoires of the Convention.” Id. at
786
1872 To take one example, the Montreal Convention, supra note 46, provides for the equivalent of universal
jurisdiction over anyone who
unlawfully and intentionally:
places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance
which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to
cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight.
The U.S. implementing legislation, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) (1996), similarly provides for
jurisdiction over [w]hoever willfully --
places or causes to be placed on a civil aircraft registered in a country other than the United States while
such aircraft is in service, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage
to that aircraft which renders that aircraft incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger that aircraft's
safety in flight.
1873 Bassiouni, supra note 42, at 45.
1874 The history and development of international criminal law has relied on less stringent legality
requirements than what might be found under domestic law. See Jordan J. Paust, It's No  Defense: Nullum
Crimen, International Crime and the Gingerbread Man, 60 ALB. L. REV. 657,  664-671 (1997); Alfred P.
Rubin, Is International Criminal Law “Universal”?, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 351, 357-363 (2001). Thus,
so long as states do not expand the definitions of the crimes  beyond their customary meanings, states may
specify further the definitions of the crime as set forth in a treaty to comport with more stringent domestic
legality requirements, as are typical in civil law, code-based systems. For instance, Germany's Code of
Crimes Against International  Law transforms the ICC crimes into domestic legislation. “Each crime was,
however, reformulated into language consistent with German legal terminology, and to ensure that [sic], as
required by the German Constitution, the crimes were clearly defined at the time of the commission of the
act.” Steffen Wirth, Germany's New International Crimes Code: Bringing a Case to Court, I J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 151, 153 (2003). The drafters of the ICC evidently were also concerned with specificity
problems and therefore agreed to promulgate more specific “Elements of Crimes,” which are “non-binding
guidelines for the Court, aids for application and interpretation designed  to help judges and prosecutors as
well as legal counsels appearing in cases before the Court.” Wiebke Riuckert & Georg Witschel, Genocide
and Crimes Against Humanity in the Elements of Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 68, at 61.
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There is, however, a circularity problem. How can state practice change the
customary definitions of universal crimes if states are legally constrained in their
exercise of universal jurisdiction to use, as it were, the customary definitions “as
they exist”? This circularity problem tends to afflict customary international law
generally.1875 The easy solution for our purposes would be for states to get
together and simply change the definition of the crime through an amendment to
the relevant treaty, or to create a new instrument relating to that crime. This
process has taken place to some extent with respect to crimes spelled out in the
statute for the newly-established International. Criminal Court and to a lesser
degree (since they are not treaties, strictly speaking) in the statutes of various
international tribunals created under the auspices of the United Nations. For
example, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal under which the Nazis
were prosecuted defined crimes against humanity as “murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian populations....',1876 Although acts such as torture, imprisonment, and
rape could potentially fall into the “other inhumane acts” receptacle, they are not
set forth explicitly in the Charter and courts using its definitional provisions
therefore would be on more precarious ground prosecuting these crimes as
universal crimes against humanity than in prosecuting a listed offense such as
“extermination” or “enslavement.” Yet by the end of the last century, international
law evolved such that the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the ICC Statute, do affirmatively list torture,
imprisonment and rape as crimes against humanity,1877 thus clarifying or
perhaps adding to the customary definitions of crimes against humanity and, in
any event, providing courts with firmer prosecutorial footing as to certain of these
1875 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§  102 reporters' note 2 (1987).
1876 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art.
6(c), August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
1877 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, at art. 5, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, at art. 3, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter ICC statute].
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crimes. Judicial opinions also may contribute to the development or clarification
of the definitions under customary law. For example, although the Genocide
Convention nowhere explicitly mentions rape in its list of acts that may qualify as
genocide when “committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such,”,1878 international criminal
tribunal judgments make clear that acts constituting genocide encompass acts of
rape committed with the requisite mens rea.1879
But all these examples are of legal developments engineered by quintessentially
international agreements or institutions. More difficult is the question of when and
how national courts advance customary law in domestic proceedings that apply
international law, including, naturally, exercises of universal jurisdiction. We can
say, for instance, that if the consistent and widespread practice of states
prosecuting the international crime of genocide deems intent to destroy a group
based on its political self-identification to satisfy the mens rea component of the
crime, the customary definition of genocide has expanded to include within its
victim class political groups along with the national, ethnic and racial groups
carved out by the Genocide Convention. But the first state to extend the definition
in this way violates customary law by improperly asserting jurisdiction over a
crime that-at that moment-prescriptively does not qualify as universal.1880 Yet
customary law's recursive constitution may immediately reduce the illegality of
that act if interested states say, the alleged universal criminal's state of national
citizenship and/or the state on whose territory the crime occurred-acquiesce in or
approve of the universal jurisdictional assertion.1881 And particularly if other
states then prosecute genocide in a way that recognizes political groups as
1878 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 11, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
1879 See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, ¶ 53 (Dec. 6, 1999); Prosecutor v.
Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95- I-T, Judgment, ¶ 117 (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 507-08 (Sept. 2, 1998).
1880 This especially would be the case in this example because including political groups in this victim
classification was debated and rejected in the drafting of the Genocide Convention. For a history of the
drafting debate on this issue see Beth Van Schaack, Note, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the
Genocide Convention's Blind Spot, 106 YALE L. J. 2259, 2262-2269 (1997).
1881 I discuss this point in more detail, see Part IV, infra.
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victims, the first state's illegal act will have planted a customary “seed,”1882 the
cultivation of which, by state practice, will have modified the customary definition
of genocide. The possibility of custom evolving beyond treaty definitions was
even expressly built into the ICC Statute.1883
Evolutions in custom likewise may alter and even expand the capacity of states
to allow procedurally for universal adjudicative jurisdiction over the perpetrators
of international crimes. For instance, while like the Torture Convention, a number
of positive instruments dealing with universal crimes provide for extraterritorial
and extra-national jurisdiction by state courts over alleged offenders (the
conventional equivalent of universal adjudicative jurisdiction), the Genocide
Convention does not. In fact, extraterritorial jurisdiction was explicitly rejected in
the Convention's drafting.1884 Thus to accept genocide as a universal crime, one
must view custom as having expanded the adjudicative scope of jurisdiction as to
genocide beyond that envisaged by the treaty to encompass the jurisdiction of all
states, irrespective of the place of the crime.
But again, my focus here is on prescriptive jurisdiction, or the substance of the
universal crime under international law. Because, as we have seen, treaties
furnish neither definitive nor exhaustive definitions of universal crimes due to the
organic nature of customary law, courts may not always be obliged to use the
precise definitional language of the treaty when exercising universal jurisdiction,
though it will often be the case that the treaty definition is the best-not to mention
the most readily available-evidence of custom. In fact, the practice of universal
jurisdiction evidences this latter point.
1882 Anthony D'Amato, The Theory Of Customary International Law, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 242,
246 (1988); D'Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?, supra note 32, at 1310- II; D'AMATO, THE
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 59, at 97-98.
1883 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998)
(“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules
of international law for purposes other than this Statute.”). For a detailed analysis of Article 10, see Leila
Nadya Sadat, Custom, Codification and Some Thoughts About the Relationship Between the Two: Article
10 of the ICC Statute, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 909 (2000).
1884 For a detailed and persuasive explanation of this point, see REYDAMS, supra note 41, at  48-53.
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To begin with, states' domestic laws facilitating universal jurisdiction flow
routinely from the criminalization of the conduct in question at the level of
international conventional law. These domestic laws may, for instance, fulfill a
state's obligations under a treaty and thus, either through specific implementing
legislation (typical in common law countries) or general enabling clauses making
the treaty provisions directly applicable (typical in civil law countries),1885
translate into national law the international substance of the crime for courts to
prosecute. Prevalent examples include domestic legislation regarding the Torture
Convention,1886 the Genocide Convention,1887 and the Geneva Conventions
1885 For example, Austria's criminal code provision providing for universal jurisdiction states  that
extraterritorial, extra-national jurisdiction applies to “criminal offences, if Austria is under an obligation to
prosecute them-even if committed abroad-irrespective of the penal law of the State where they were
committed.” Strafgestzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] §64(1)(6) (Austria), translated in REYDAMS, supra note
40, at 94. “The term 'obligation' in §64(1) subparagraph 6  refers to a treaty obligation.” REYDAMS, supra
note 40, at 97. Another example is Belgium's Code de procedure p~nale, titre preliminare, article 12 bis,
which has a general enabling clause that reads: “The Belgian courts are competent to take cognizance of
offences committed outside the territory of the Kingdom that are the object of an international convention
binding on Belgium if the convention obliges in any way to submit the case to the competent authorities for
the purpose  of prosecution.” REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 105. Likewise, Denmark's Straffeloven [Strfl] §
8(1)(5) (Denmark), provides: “Acts committed outside the territory of the Danish State, shall also come
within Danish criminal jurisdiction, irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator where the act is
covered by an international convention in pursuance of which Denmark is under an obligation to start legal
proceedings.” REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 127. An enabling provision appears also in France's criminal
code with respect to self-executing treaties. REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 132-33. Somewhat of a departure
from this model, the German code, StGB, supra, § 6, “Offences Against Internationally Protected Interests
or Rights” lists international crimes over which universal jurisdiction exists-all of which, except for one,
are directly the subject of an international treaty-and provides a catch-all provision that provides
jurisdiction over “acts that are to be prosecuted by the terms of an international treaty binding on the
federal republic of Germany even if they are committed outside the country.” REYDAMS, supra note 40, at
142. Spain's Ley Orghnica del Poder Judicial, article 23.4 follows this model as well, listing offenses
prohibited under conventional international law, and providing also for jurisdiction over “any other offence
which Spain is obliged to prosecute under an international treaty or convention.” REYDAMS, supra note
40, at 183. The Netherlands' 2003 International Crimes Act, which amended the Wartime Offenses Act and
implements in part the ICC Statute, likewise draws from treaty law to define the offenses over which it
provides universal jurisdiction, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, torture and grave breaches (and
even non-grave breaches) of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol I. See International
Crimes Act of 19 June 2003, English version available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/0/fb9070f8fc60c047c I 256da30032f0b0?OpenDocument.
1886 See Australia's Crimes (Torture) Act, 1988, translated in REYDAMS supra note 40, at 89-90;
Uitvoeringswet Folteringsverdrag [The Netherlands' Act Implementing the Torture Convention], id. at 167-
69.
1887 See Israel's Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law 1950, see REYDAMS, supra note 40,
at 160; Switzerland's Code penal Suisse, title l2bis, Offences Against the Interests of the International
Community, id. at 195.
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and their Additional Protocol 11888 -this latter legislation has, in a number of
states, been substituted for by legislation implementing the newly established
ICC.1889 Some legislation expressly declares its purpose in this regard. The
since-tamed Belgian War Crimes Act,1890 under which Belgian courts have
prosecuted a number of Rwandan war criminals for acts committed in Rwanda
against Rwandans,1891 had as its purpose “to define three categories of grave
breaches of humanitarian law and to integrate them   into the Belgian domestic
legal order.”1892 In fact, “[t]o remain consistent with the definitions used in
international law, the Act textually refers to the wording of the relevant provisions
of the international conventions.”1893 And its definitional provisions even
1888 See Australia's Geneva Conventions Act 1957, translated in REYDAMS supra note 40, at  87-88;
Belgium's War Crimes Act, which goes beyond the conventional law to add conduct from Additional
Protocol II (non-grave-breaches), and subsequently was amended to add genocide and crimes against
humanity, id. at 106-107, but implementation of the law has been substantially restricted through
amendment due to international pressure, see supra note 1; Canada's Geneva Conventions Act, REYDAMS
supra note 40, at 120; the Netherlands' Crimes in Wartime Act, id at 167; Switzerland's Code penal
militaire, articles 9(1) and 109(l) and Code penal Suisse, article 6bis, id. at 195-196.
1889 See Australia's International Criminal Court Act 2002, REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 88- 89; Canada's
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act which “incorporates the provisions of the ICC Statute into
Canadian legislation,” id. at 122-124; Germany's Code of Crimes Against International Law, “which makes
the core ICC crimes offences under domestic law,” id. at 144; the United Kingdom's International Criminal
Court Act 2001, which limits universal jurisdiction to foreigners either resident when the offense was
committed, or subsequently become resident and reside in the U.K. at the time proceedings are brought, id.
at 206. See REYDAMS, supra note 40, at Part II: Universal Jurisdiction in Municipal Law (discussing the
exercise of universal jurisdiction by fourteen states). For specific examples, see pg. 87-90 (Australia), 97
(Austria), 105-07 (Belgium), 120-24 (Canada), 127 (Denmark), 132-34 (France), 142-46 (Germany), 159
(Israel), 165-69 (the Netherlands), 183-84 (Spain), 193-96 (Switzerland), 204-06 (United Kingdom).
1890 See Ratner, supra note 9.
1891 See Luc Reydams, Belgium's First Application of Universal Jurisdiction: The Butare Four Case, 1 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 428 (2003). Some of these convictions are problematic under international law. For
example, as Reydams points out:
Some of the war crimes of which one of the defendants, Higaniro, was convicted took      place when there
was no armed conflict at all in Rwanda. The two incendiary reports attributed to him dated from late 1993
and early 1994. Contrary to the prosecutor's assertion, there was no armed conflict in Rwanda between 4
August 1993 (date of the Arusha Peace Accords) and 6 April 1994. While sporadic violent incidents took
place during this period they did not reach the threshold of application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocol II.
Id. at 435.
1892 Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, Introductory Note to Belgium: Act Concerning the Punishment of
Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 38 I.L.M. 918, 919 (1999).
1893 Id.
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explicitly invoke the relevant conventions by name; for example, the Act sets
forth the definition of genocide after stating that the crime is defined “[i]n
accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide of 9 December 1948.”1894
As a result of this legislative translation of international law into national law, the
practice of courts has been to use positive international law (as reflected in
national law) to define the subject universal offense when exercising universal
jurisdiction. To take one of the earliest and most well-known examples of
universal jurisdiction, the definitions of “war crimes” and “crimes against
humanity” contained in the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law under
which the Israeli Supreme Court convicted Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann for
acts which were-leaving no doubt as to the universal basis of the jurisdiction
committed before Israel was even a state, embodied the definitions of the
respective crimes in the Nuremberg Charter.1895 The Israeli Supreme Court
1894 Id. at art. 1, § 1. Although the Act formally adopts the prescriptive definitions of the  crimes from
conventional law, like the Netherlands' International Crimes Act it went beyond conventional law regarding
the adjudicative availability of universal jurisdiction over “grave breaches” by including within this
category acts that were not committed as part of an international conflict. Smis and Van der Borght explain
that
contrary to the Geneva law, the Belgian Act does not make a distinction between international and non-
international conflicts for the purposes of defining grave breaches. In fact, pursuant to [the Conventions],
the term “grave breaches” is only applicable to international armed conflicts. The violations of
humanitarian law in non-international armed conflicts (Additional Protocol II) do not fall within the ambit
of the [legislative] undertaking referred to in [connection with grave breaches]. However, considering the
number of violations of international humanitarian law that are committed in non-international conflicts,
the Belgian legislator found it wise to extend the application of “grave breaches” to violations of the laws
of war committed during internal conflicts.
Id. at 920.
1895 The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law defines the crimes as “crime against  humanity”
means any of the following acts:
murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or deportation and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population, and persecution on national, racial, religious or political grounds;
“war crime” means any of the following acts:
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to forced labour or for any other purpose, of civilian population of or in
occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas; killing of hostages;
plunder of public or private property; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages; and devastation not
justified by military necessity.
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justified its competence to judge Eichmann on the grounds that “international law
[enforces itself] by authorizing the countries of the world to mete out punishment
for the violation of its provisions, which is effected by putting these provisions into
operation either directly or by virtue of municipal legislation which has adopted
and integrated them.”1896 Quoting the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Court observed
that “the Charter, with all the principles embodied in it-including that of individual
responsibility-must be seen as 'the expression of international law existing at the
time of its creation; and to that extent (the Charter) is itself a contribution to
international law.”1897 The Charter had, in the words of the Court, “formed part of
the customary law of nations.”1898 Consequently, through the enactment of the
law, the Israeli legislature “gave effect to international law and its objectives.”1899
The United States endorsed universal jurisdiction over these precise crimes-as
defined under Israeli law-when it subsequently extradited another war criminal,
John Demjanjuk, to Israel for prosecution in connection with crimes he had
allegedly committed as a World War II concentration camp guard.1900 Ruling the
extradition legal under national and international law, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit examined the definitions of the crimes contained in the Israeli law
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting the The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Law). The Nuremberg Charter defines the crimes as:
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be
limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to salve labor or for any other purpose of civilian population
of or in occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity.
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds.... Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, arts. 6(b), 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
1896 Judgment reproduced in English, 2 LEON FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR 1664 (Fred L. Israel &
William Hansen eds., 1972).
1897 Id. at 1666 (quoting I.M.T. (1947), vol. 1, 218).
1898 Id. at 1667.
1899 Id. at 1668.
1900 Demjanjuk was later acquitted by the Israeli Supreme Court on these specific charges due to flaws in
the documents identifying him as “Ivan the terrible,” the guard against which the charges were directed.
Based on evidence that he was nonetheless a concentration camp guard, Demjanjuk's legal battles continue.
For a summary see Nathan Guttman, Demjanjuk To Appeal US Decision To Deport Him, JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 30, 2005, at 5.
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and held that Israel had universal jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against
humanity.1901 More recently, France's Court of Cassation found jurisdiction over
a Rwandan national for crimes committed in Rwanda during that country's civil
war based on France's domestic legislation implementing the Torture
Convention, and despite the fact that Rwanda was not party to the
Convention.1902 The Court held that French courts were competent to “judge
persons who could be guilty, in a foreign country, of tortures,” under the Torture
Convention's definition of the crime,1903 which is incorporated by reference into
the French Penal Code through article 689-2 of the Penal Procedures Code.1904
Furthermore, courts also use the decisions and judgments of international
tribunals to inform their application of international law. For example, in
convicting on universal jurisdiction grounds Adolfo Scilingo, an Argentine naval
captain, for his involvement in “death flights” during Argentina's military rule from
1976-1983, Spain's Audiencia Nacional drew from the case law of the ICTY and
the text of the ICC to specify, among other things, the elements of crimes against
humanity under international law, the character of the civilian population against
which the crimes must be directed, the generalized and systematic nature of the
crimes, and issues of command responsibility.1905
1901 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-583 (6th Cir. 1985).
1902 See United Nations, Status of ratification of the Convention against Torture,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-ratify.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005).
1903 Cour de Cassation [Cass. Crim] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction], Jan. 6, 1998. Nr. X  96-82.491
Pf. Nr. Y 96-82.492, translated in I YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL  HUMANITARIAN LAW 598,
599 (Horst Fischer, et al. eds., 1998).
1904 Article 689-2 reads:
Whoever, outside the territory of the Republic, commits acts qualified as a felony or delict, which
constitute torture within the meaning of the first article of the convention    against torture and other cruel,
inhumane, or degrading penalties or treatment, adopted in    New York on December 10, 1984, may be
prosecuted and tried by French courts if he is    found in France.
C. PR. PEN. art. 689-2 (Fr.), translated in THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: 29
THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 294 (Edward M. Wise, ed., Gerald L. Kock &
Richard S. Frase trans., 1988) (1964).
1905 American Society of International Law, International Law in Brief, Audiencia Nacional of Spain:
Sentence for Crimes Against Humanity in the Case of Adolfo Scilingo (April 19, 2005), available at
http://www.asil.org/ilib/2005/04/ilib050426.htm#j3.
813
Where legislatures or courts depart from the treaties, however, they are obliged
to undertake a rigorous and bonafide inquiry into the status of customary law to
justify the definition they employ. But doesn't this divination of custom just bring
us right back to the initial concern of courts subjectively defining universal crimes,
leading to the legally unjustified harassment of high-profile individuals for purely
political or sensationalist motives? These claims might stick if the real-world
practice of courts exercising universal jurisdiction wantonly flouted the legal
strictures imposed by universal jurisdiction's prescriptive limits. But in fact the
reported cases of universal jurisdiction reveal that courts by and large apply
faithfully and responsibly the international legal definitions of universal crimes as
evidenced in positive international law.1906 Where courts do not-and have no
international legal argument to support their deviation-their violation of
international law is readily apparent, and perhaps most importantly, interested
states have a strong legal basis to reject such claims.
For instance, under this Essay's analysis, Spain's Audiencia Nacional defied
international law when it upheld jurisdiction over former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet for genocide based on crimes allegedly committed against a “national
group” by stretching this victim class designation beyond its customary definition
to include “a national human group, a differentiated human group, characterized
by some trait, and integrated into the larger collectivity.,1907 Finding that the acts
alleged constituted genocide since they were designed “to destroy a
differentiated national group” of political opponents irrespective of their
nationalities, i.e., “those who did not fit in [Pinochet's] project of national
reorganization... [whether] Chileans or foreigners,”1908 the court effectively (and
none-too-subtly) amended the victim     groups within the definition of genocide.
The court's own conclusory reasoning bespeaks the lack of legal support for its
1906 For a comprehensive cataloging with summaries of exercises of universal jurisdiction in municipal
courts, see REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 40, at 81-226.
1907 Quoting the English translation in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 19, at 103.
1908 Id. at 103-04.
814
position;1909 genocide has been defined consistently since the 1948 Genocide
Convention        in the statutes of international courts and treaties to have as
victim groups only a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”1910 In
the words of the ICTR, “a national group is defined as a collection of people who
are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship.”1911 The
Audiencia's sprawling construction eviscerates the “as such” qualifier1912 and
defacto enlarges the class of victims to include potentially any group whatsoever-
including, as in the case before it, political groups, which had been explicitly
rejected as victims in the drafting of the Genocide Convention.1913 In short, the
ruling clashes with one of the more recognizable legal demarcations of the crime
of genocide under international law.
In sum, and as the Audiencia's exaggerated ruling shows, positive law articulates
not just the substance of universal crimes but also a clear  benchmark against
which illicit overreaching may be measured. Where such overreaching occurs,
the rulings conflict with international law and the exercise of universal jurisdiction
is illegitimate. Interested states therefore have a solid legal basis to oppose the
1909 Id. at 100. The court's argument relies principally on the former Spanish legislation in place when the
acts allegedly were committed, under which the intent element of genocide encompassed intent to totally or
partially destroy a “national ethnic, religious or social group,” id. At 27, 100 (emphasis added), and which
was therefore in clear departure from Article 1 of the Genocide Convention which prescribed intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a “national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” See Appendix C, infra.
1910 See ICTY Statute, supra note 74, at art. 4; ICTR Statute, supra note 74, at art. 6; ICC Statute, supra note
74, at art. 6.
1911 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (Sept. 2, 1998). Notably, the
jurisprudence of the ICTR has abandoned the notion expressed in the Tribunal's first finding of genocide in
Akayesu, at ¶ 516, that the victim class could include “any stable and permanent group”--a definition that
would nonetheless still exclude the wholly political group found to be victims in the Audiencia's ruling.
Subsequent rulings have determined that the victims of the Rwandan genocide, the Tutsi, were indeed an
ethnic group within the meaning of the Statute. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A ¶ 934 (Jan.
27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 95, 98 (May 21, 1999). For an
explanation of why the Akayesu ruling extending the victim class to “stable and permanent groups” based
on the travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention was wrong, and why the Tutsi constituted a
protected class under the correct definition in any event, see William A. Schabas, The Crime of Genocide
in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
447, 450-456 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001).
1912 The “as such” language was added to “implicitly include” a specific motive. Schabas, supra note 108, at
458.
1913 See discussion, supra note 77.
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exercise of universal jurisdiction in such circumstances. For instance, had the
charges concerning Pinochet's extradition from Great Britain-which had arrested
the former dictator pursuant to Spain's request-relied on Spanish allegations of
genocide (instead of torture, which ended up being the relevant crime of
extradition),1914 Chile would have been perfectly justified in protesting the
legality of Spain's jurisdiction under international law on the grounds that the
basis for jurisdiction-that is, genocide as defined by the Audiencia's ruling-was
faulty.1915 The idea of states successfully objecting to the legality of universal
jurisdictional assertions is not farfetched: Congo successfully obtained a World
Court ruling invalidating a Belgian claim of universal jurisdiction over Congo's
then-Minister of Foreign Affairs on grounds of sovereign immunity,1916 which
resulted in Belgium's repeal of the arrest warrant.1917 Indeed, Chile actively
considered bringing the Pinochet case to the World Court based on its objections
that Pinochet enjoyed immunity1918 (the case was, for practical purposes,
resolved when British Secretary of State Jack Straw allowed Pinochet to return to
Chile on medical grounds).1919 The legal argument presented here would have
been another arrow in Chile's quiver of legal objections to Spanish jurisdiction,
and quite a sharp one at that. And although it is certainly the most formal avenue,
taking the case to the World Court is by no means the only option among the
panoply of mechanisms by which states may express their legal objections and
1914 See THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 19, at 268.
1915 As it turns out, Chile did protest the legality of the jurisdiction, but on grounds of diplomatic and
sovereign immunity. See Susan Cornwell, Chilean Visitors Find Pinochet Looking Well, WASH. POST,
Nov. 16, 1998, at A19; Laurie Goering, Chile's Response to Pinochet Arrest A Gauge of Progress, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 21, 1998, at 4; World/Nation Briefs, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1998, at A 12.
1916 Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb.
14).
1917 See REYDAMS, supra note 40, at 116.
1918 See Goering, supra note 112; Ray Moseley, Chile Will Ask World Court to Intervene for Pinochet; Ex-
Dictator Fighting Extradition to Spain, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1999, at 6.
1919 Statement of Secretary of State Jack Straw in the House of Commons, March 2, 2000, reproduced in
THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 19, at 481.
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attempt to protect their legal rights or “entitlements” under international law,1920
entitlements such as jurisdictional authority over territory and nationals.
14.9.3 Evolving and Enforcing the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction
So far this Essay has argued that universal jurisdiction is a customary law which,
like all customary law, may evolve by violations that gain acceptance and
eventually come to reflect a new consensus of state practice and opinion juris.
But it has also argued that the treaty-based definitions of universal crimes best
evidence custom, and accordingly constrain the legitimate exercise of universal
jurisdiction by courts. The tension in these arguments raises perhaps one last
question worth addressing: How can we tell whether a violation of international
law resulting from a court's expansion of the treaty definition of a universal
crime (a) signals a possible shift in customary law, or (b) represents an enduring
breach of that law? In other words, how are the legal limits of universal
jurisdiction enforced?
Framed broadly, the question of violations blossoming into custom is endemic to
all customary law,1921 but in this particular circumstance the proper legal
analysis may not be too difficult to discern. The answer lies in the reactions of
other jurisdictionally-interested-i.e., national and territorial-states. The protest and
acquiescence of states to what amounts to an international legal claim by
another state has long been held to be a constitutive element of custom.1922 And
a claim of authority to prescribe and adjudicate foreign conduct by foreign
nationals under a theory of universal jurisdiction is as clear an international legal
claim as any. Particularly important to the customary calculus are the reactions of
states that have a substantial legal interest in the claim at issue, that is, states
1920 D'Amato, Is International Law Really Law?, supra note 32, at 1304-07 (describing legal rights as
“entitlements” and applying the terminology to international law); id. at 1310-1313 (explaining how
countermeasures enforce international law).
1921 See supra text accompanying note 78.
1922 See Akehurst, supra note 62, at 38-42 (and cases cited therein).
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whose legal rights or entitlements are directly implicated by the claim.1923 In
comparison to other areas of international law where it may be hard to identify
and measure the various interests of various states implicated by a given
claim,1924 the universal jurisdiction scenario presents a relatively clear picture of
the interested states and the degree of their interests. The legally interested
states are those states that otherwise would have jurisdiction over the acts and
persons involved; they are those states whose nationals are the subject of the
universal jurisdiction claim and/or whose territories suffered the alleged conduct
giving rise to universal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, where a court asserting universal jurisdiction expands the definition
of the crime upon which it grounds its competence beyond the crime's customary
definition-a definition evidenced largely by treaty law-the reactions of national
and territorial states determine the customary status of the universal jurisdiction
court's definitional expansion.1925 As we have seen, these states may take a
number of measures to repudiate the legality of the universal jurisdiction state's
claim; they may, for instance, officially protest,1926 take the case to the World
1923 Id. at 40
(If an act affects the interests of only one State, protest by that State will carry great weight... [and] [t]he
extent to which a State's interests are affected varies according to    the nature of the act concerned. Failure
to protest against an assertion in abstracto about    the content of customary law is less significant than
failure to protest against concrete    action taken by a State in a specific case which has an immediate
impact on the interests of another State.).
1924 See id.
1925 A non-interested state may try to insulate itself from the definitional expansion of a universal crime by
invoking the persistent objector doctrine of international law, which holds that “a state that indicates its
dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of development is not bound by that rule even
after it matures.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 cmt. d (1987). However, “[h]istorically, such dissent and consequent exemption from a
principle that became general customary law has been rare.” Id; see also Ted Stein, The Approach of the
Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J.
457 (1985) (observing that while historically rarely invoked, the principle may play a more instrumental
role in modern international lawmaking that occurs through institutional organs such as the United
Nations).
1926 The contribution of protest alone unaccompanied by some tangible response as a constitutive element
of custom is the subject of some controversy. See Akehurst, supra note 63, at 40-41 (disagreeing with
D'Amato's view that unaccompanied protests are not enough to block a new rule); R.A. Mullerson, New
Thinking by Soviet Scholars: Sources of International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 506-07 (1989). In
cases of universal jurisdiction, the protest will almost inevitably be accompanied by some form of response,
whether it is a suit against the state asserting universal jurisdiction or simply a refusal to extradite.
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Court and, naturally, if the universal jurisdiction is asserted in absentia,1927
refuse to extradite the accused. To enforce the definitional limits of the crime
under customary law therefore, states objecting to universal jurisdiction on the
grounds set forth above would be well-advised to make explicit their rejection of
the universal jurisdiction court's illegitimate definitional expansion upon which the
court purports to base its competence.
Consequently, the potential for evolving-or not-the definitions of universal crimes
by the process of customary law-violation-turned new custom rests not with the
state asserting universal jurisdiction, but instead most often with the states
whose nationals are in the dock. Where interested states object to the universal
jurisdiction assertion by rejecting an illegitimate definitional expansion of the
crime that purports to justify the universal jurisdiction court's competence, the
court's violation represents an enduring breach of international law. In other
words, the objection to jurisdiction effectively blocks a potential shift in customary
law as to the definition of the crime. However, if interested states approve of or
acquiesce in the court's definitional expansion of the crime, such approval or
acquiescence may signal a possible customary shift regarding the definition of
the crime in line with the definition adjudicated by the court. Hence if the Pinochet
extradition had taken place, and if the Spanish courts had rested their jurisdiction
on the universal crime of genocide using their exorbitant definition of the crime-
which we know is exorbitant because we can measure it objectively against the
treaty definition-Chile would determine, either by approval or rejection of Spanish
jurisdiction based on this definition, the potential for a customary definitional
expansion of genocide as contrived by the Spanish courts. It should be
emphasized that even were Chile to approve of the exorbitant definition and the
1927 The status of universal jurisdiction in absentia is not yet clear under international law. See Colangelo,
supra note 3, at 548-49
(Universal jurisdiction in absentia is presently caught in a customary twilight that will     witness either the
development or the dismissal of the practice depending on the actions     and reactions of states in the next
part of this century. State practice has not yet worn     into the fabric of international law an affirmative
custom of universal jurisdiction in absentia assertions. At the same time, however, an incipient trend
supporting this type of assertion is emerging, and those who take a permissive view of international law
might     legitimately submit that custom does not explicitly prohibit universal jurisdiction in absentia.)
(internal citations omitted).
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resulting universal jurisdiction, Spain's jurisdiction would still conflict with
international law; one territorial or national state's approval of or acquiescence in
a definitional expansion would not be enough to change the customary definition
of the crime,1928 especially against the backdrop of a widely-ratified and
longstanding treaty to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Essay has been to explicate a basic but over looked legal
feature of universal jurisdiction: If national courts prosecute on grounds of
universal jurisdiction, they must use the international legal definitions-as derived
from customary law-of the universal crimes they adjudicate. The Essay further
has attempted to explain the best way of going about determining what those
definitions are, by looking to the provisions of widely-ratified and longstanding
international treaties. An important implication of this conclusion addresses
concerns that universal jurisdiction hazards unbridled abuse for purely political
and sensationalist ends. As I hope to have shown, the international law in this
area does not permit such abuse; rather, it prescribes legal limits of universal
jurisdiction. These limits are enforced not by those states exercising universal
jurisdiction, but principally by those states whose nationals are the subject of
foreign universal jurisdiction proceedings. Indeed, should states come to
recognize this Essay's thesis, the near future may very well see precisely this
type of legal argument being made where universal jurisdiction claims are in
dispute.
1928 A basic definition of the hard-to-pin-down threshold for determining the existence of customary law
appears in the Restatement, which states that “[c]ustomary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) (emphasis
added). Whatever view one takes of how much practice achieves the threshold level of generality and
consistency necessary to form customary law, one improper assertion of universal jurisdiction accepted as
legitimate by an interested state and in the face of a treaty to the contrary would not meet that test.
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